Super Boethium De Trinitate

Thomas Aquinas

Questions 1-4, translated by Rose E. Brennan, S.H.N. (Herder, 1946)
Questions 5-6, translated by Armand Mauer (Toronto, 1953)


St. Thomas' Commentary

QUESTION I: Concerning the knowledge of divine things

  1. Whether the Human Mind in Order to Attain to a Knowledge of Truth Requires a New Illumination of Divine Light
  2. Whether the Human Mind Can Arrive at an Idea of God
  3. Whether God Is the First Object Known by the Mind
  4. Whether the Human Mind Is Capable of Arriving at a Knowledge of the Divine Trinity Through Natural Reason
QUESTION II: Concerning the manifestation of knowledge of divine truth
  1. Whether Divine Truths Ought to Be Treated of by the Method of Inquiry
  2. Whether There Can Be Any Science of Divine Truths Which Are Matters of Faith
  3. Whether in the Science of Faith, Which Is Concerning God, it Is Permissible to Use the Rational Arguments of the Natural Philosophers
  4. Whether Divine Truths Ought to Be Concealed by New and Obscure Words
  1. Boethius' Text
  2. St. Thomas' Commentary
QUESTION III: Concerning Those Things That Pertain to the Knowledge Possessed by Faith
  1. Whether Faith Is Necessary for Mankind
  2. Whether Faith Should Be Distinguished from Religion
  3. Whether the Christian Religion Is Aptly Called Catholic or Universal
  4. Whether it Is a True Article of Faith, That the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit Are One God
QUESTION IV: Concerning Those Things That Pertain to the Cause of Plurality
  1. Whether Otherness Is the Cause of Plurality
  2. Whether Variety of Accidents Produces Diversity According to Number
  3. Whether Two Bodies Can Be, or Can Be Conceived of as Being Simultaneously in the Same Place
  4. Whether Variety of Location Has Any Influence in Effecting Numerical Difference
  1. Boethius' Text
  2. St. Thomas' Commentary
QUESTION FIVE: The division of speculative science
  1. Is Speculative Science Appropriately Divided into these Three Parts: Natural, Mathematical, and Divine?
  2. Does Natural Philosophy Treat of What Exists in Motion and Matter?
  3. Does Mathematics Treat, Without Motion and Matter, of What Exists in Matter?
  4. Does Divine Science Treat of What Exists Without Matter and Motion?
QUESTION SIX: The methods of speculative science
  1. Must we Proceed according to the Mode of Reason in Natural Science, according to the Mode of Learning in Mathematics, and according to the Mode of Intellect in Divine Science?
  2. Should We Entirely Abandon the Imagination in Divine Science?
  3. Can Our Intellect Behold the Divine Form Itself?
  4. Can Our Intellect Behold the Divine Form by Means of Some Speculative Science?

Ab initio nativitatis investigabo et ponam in lucem scientiam illius, Sap. 6. “I will seek her out from the beginning of her birth, and bring the knowledge of her to light” (Wis. 6:24)
Naturalis mentis humanae intuitus pondere corruptibilis corporis aggravatus in primae veritatis luce, ex qua omnia sunt facile cognoscibilia, defigi non potest. Unde oportet ut secundum naturalis cognitionis progressum ratio a posterioribus in priora deveniat et a creaturis in Deum, Rom. 1: invisibilia ipsius a creatura mundi etc.; Sap. 13: a magnitudine speciei creaturae et cetera. Et hoc est quod dicitur Iob 36: omnes homines vident eum, scilicet Deum, unusquisque intuetur procul. The natural intuition of the human mind, burdened by the weight of a corruptible body, cannot fix its gaze in the prime light of First Truth, in which all things are easily knowable; whence it must be that, according to the progress of its natural manner of cognition, the reason advances from the things that are posterior to those that are prior, and from creatures to God. “For the invisible things of Him, from the creation of the world, are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made” (Rom. 1:20) and “For by the greatness of the beauty and of the creature, the Creator of them may be seen, so as to be known thereby” (Wis. 13:5); and this is what is said in Job 36:25: “All men see Him, gazing from afar.”
Creaturae enim, per quas naturaliter cognoscitur Deus, in infinitum ab ipso distant. Sed quia in his, quae procul videntur, facile visus decipitur, idcirco ex creaturis in Deum cognoscendum tendentes in errores multiplices inciderunt. Unde dicitur Sap. 14 quod creaturae Dei sunt muscipulae pedibus insipientium et in Psalmo: defecerunt scrutantes scrutinio. Et ideo Deus humano generi aliam tutam viam cognitionis providit, suam notitiam mentibus hominum per fidem infundens. Unde dicitur 1 Cor. 2: quae sunt Dei, nemo novit nisi spiritus Dei, nobis autem revelavit Deus per spiritum suum. Et hic est spiritus, quo efficimur credentes, 2 Cor. 4: habentes eundem spiritum fidei credimus, propter quod et loquimur. For creatures, through whom God can be known by the natural light of reason, are at an infinite distance from Him. But since, in those who look at a thing from a great distance, vision may readily be deceived, therefore those striving to attain to a knowledge of God from creatures fell into many errors: wherefore it is said: “The creatures of God are... a snare to the feet of the unwise” (Wis. 14: 11), and: “They have failed in their search” (Ps. 63:7); and therefore God has provided for the human race another safe road of cognition, bestowing upon the minds of men, by faith, a knowledge of Himself. Therefore, it is said: “The things also that are of God no man knows, but the Spirit of God: but to us God has revealed them by His Spirit” (1 Cor. 2: 11): and this is the Spirit by whom we are enabled to be believers: “Having the same spirit of faith, as it is written: ‘I believed, for which cause I have spoken’ (Ps. 115: 10); we also believe, for which cause we speak also” (2 Cor. 4:13)
Sicut ergo naturalis cognitionis principium est creaturae notitia a sensu accepta, ita cognitionis desuper datae principium est primae veritatis notitia per fidem infusa. Et hinc est quod diverso ordine hinc inde proceditur. Philosophi enim, qui naturalis cognitionis ordinem sequuntur, praeordinant scientiam de creaturis scientiae divinae, scilicet naturalem metaphysicae. Sed apud theologos proceditur e converso, ut creatoris consideratio considerationem praeveniat creaturae. Therefore, as the principle of our cognition is naturally the knowledge of created things, obtained by means of the senses, so the principle of supernatural cognition is that knowledge of First Truth conferred upon us, infused by faith; and hence it follows that in advancing one proceeds according to a diverse order. For philosophers, who follow along the way of natural cognition, place knowledge about created things before knowledge about divine things: natural science before metaphysics: but among theologians the procedure is in reverse order, so that study of the Creator comes before that of creatures.
Hunc ergo ordinem secutus Boethius ea quae sunt fidei tractare intendens in ipsa summa rerum origine principium suae considerationis instituit, scilicet Trinitate unius simplicis Dei. Unde ei competunt verba praemissa: ab initio nativitatis et cetera. This order, therefore, Boethius followed: intending to treat of those things which are of faith, he took as the starting point of his study that highest origin of things, namely, the Trinity of the one, simple God. Whence it is that the above-quoted words are applicable to him: “I will seek her out from the beginning of her birth, and bring the knowledge of her to light.”
In quibus circa praesens opusculum, quod ad Symmachum patricium urbis composuit, tria possunt notari, scilicet materia, modus et finis. In these words, as regards the present opusculum, which he addressed to Symmachus, a patrician of Rome, three things can be noted: namely, the matter, the mode, and the purpose.
Materia siquidem huius operis est in una divina essentia Trinitas personarum, quae consurgit ex prima nativitate, qua divina sapientia a patre aeternaliter generatur, Prov. 8: nondum erant abyssi, et ego iam concepta eram; in Psalmo: ego hodie genui te. The matter of this work is the Trinity of Persons in the one, divine Essence, that Trinity which has its source in the primal nativity in which divine wisdom is eternally generated by the Father. “The depths were not as yet, and I was already conceived” (Prov. 8:24), and: “This day have I begotten you” (Ps. 2:7)
Quae quidem nativitas initium est cuiuslibet nativitatis alterius, cum ipsa sola sit perfecte naturam capiens generantis; aliae vero omnes imperfectae sunt, secundum quas genitum aut partem substantiae generantis accipit aut substantiae similitudinem. Unde oportet quod a praedicta nativitate omnis alia nativitas per quandam imitationem derivetur, Eph. 3: ex quo omnis paternitas in caelo et in terra nominatur. Et propter hoc filius dicitur primogenitus omnis creaturae, Col. 1, ut nativitatis origo et imitatio designetur, non eadem generationis ratio. Unde convenienter dicit: ab initio nativitatis; Prov. 8: dominus possedit me in initio viarum suarum. Nec solum creaturarum est initium praedicta nativitas, sed etiam spiritus sancti, qui a generante genitoque procedit. This nativity is the beginning of every other nativity, as it is the only one involving perfect participation in the nature of the generator: but all others are imperfect according as the one generated receives either a part of the substance of the generator, or only a similitude: from this it follows that from the aforesaid nativity, every other is derived by a kind of imitation; and thus: “Of whom all paternity in heaven and in earth is named” (Eph. 3: 15); and on this account the Son ,is called the first-born of every creature (Col. 1:15) so that the origin of nativity and its imitation might be designated, but not according to the same meaning of generation; and therefore it is aptly said: “I will seek her out from the beginning of her birth.” “The Lord possessed me in the beginning of his ways” (Prov. 8:22); for not only of creatures is the aforesaid nativity the beginning, but even of the Holy Spirit, who proceeds from the Generator and the Generated.
Per hoc autem quod non dicit: initium nativitatis investigabo, sed ab initio designatur quod in hoc nativitatis initio eius perscrutatio non finitur, sed ab hoc incipiens ad alia procedit. But in saying this, he does not say: “I will seek out the beginning of nativity,” but “from the beginning” signifies that his search is not limited by initiation of this kind of nativity, but that, beginning from this, he proceeds to others.
Eius namque doctrina in tres partes dividitur. Prima namque est de Trinitate personarum, ex quarum processione omnis alia nativitas vel processio derivatur, in hoc quidem libro, qui prae manibus habetur, quantum ad id quod de Trinitate et unitate sciendum est, in alio vero libro, quem ad Iohannem diaconum Ecclesiae Romanae scribit, de modo praedicandi, quo utimur in personarum Trinitate, qui sic incipit: quaero, an pater. For his doctrine is divided into three parts. The first part, concerning the Trinity of Persons, from the procession of whom every other nativity and procession are derived, is contained in that book which we possess at hand, so far as anything can be known about the Trinity and Unity. But in another book which he wrote to John, a deacon of the Roman Church, we find what he says about the mode of predication which we employ in the distinction of Persons and unity of essence; and this book begins: “I inquire whether the Father.”
Secunda vero pars est de processione bonarum creaturarum a Deo bono in libro, qui ad eundem Iohannem conscribitur de hebdomadibus, qui sic incipit: postulas a me. The second part, which is about the procession of good creatures from a good God, is in a book that is written to the same John (De hebdomadibus), and this begins: “You ask of me.
Tertia vero pars est de reparatione creaturarum per Christum. Quae quidem in duo dividitur. Primo namque proponitur fides, quam Christus docuit qua iustificamur, in libro qui intitulatur de fide Christiana, qui sic incipit: Christianam fidem. Secundo explanatur, quid de Christo sentiendum sit, quomodo scilicet duae naturae in una persona conveniant, et hoc in libro de duabus naturis in una persona Christi ad Iohannem praedictum conscripto, qui sic incipit: anxie te quidem. The third part is about the separation of creatures through Christ. This is divided into two parts: For first, there is set forth the faith which Christ taught by which we are justified, in that book entitled De fide Christiana, which begins: “The Christian faith.” In the second part, an explanation is given of what must be held about Christ: namely, how two natures are united in one person. This discussion of the two natures and the one person in Christ is also in a book written to the same John, which begins: “You, indeed, solicitously.”
Modus autem de Trinitate tractandi duplex est, ut dicit Augustinus in I de Trinitate, scilicet per auctoritates et per rationes, quem utrumque modum Augustinus complexus est, ut ipsemet dicit. Now the mode employed in treating of the Trinity is twofold, as St. Augustine says in I De Trinitate, namely, through truths known on the basis of authority, and through those known by reason, both of which modes Augustine combined, as he himself says.
Quidam vero sanctorum patrum, ut Ambrosius et Hilarius, alterum tantum modum prosecuti sunt, scilicet per auctoritates. Boethius vero elegit prosequi per alium modum, scilicet per rationes, praesupponens hoc quod ab aliis per auctoritates fuerat prosecutum. Et ideo modus huius operis designatur in hoc quod dicit: investigabo, in quo rationis inquisitio designatur, Eccli. 39: sapientiam, scilicet Trinitatis notitiam, antiquorum, scilicet quam antiqui sola auctoritate asseruerunt, exquiret sapiens, id est ratione investigabit. Some of the holy Fathers, as Ambrose and Hilary, employed but one mode of explanation: namely, by setting forth those truths founded upon authority. But Boethius chose to proceed according to the other mode; namely, according to reasoned arguments, presupposing what had been concluded by others on the grounds of authority. Hence also the method of his work is indicated in what he says: “I shall investigate”, in which an inquiry of reason is signified. In Sirach 39:1 we read: “Wisdom,” namely, knowledge of the Trinity; “of all the ancients,” that is, which the ancients affirmed solely on the grounds of authority; “the wise man will seek out,” that is, he will investigate by reason.
Unde in prooemio praemittit: investigatam diutissime quaestionem. Wherefore, in the preface he speaks of “An investigation carried on for a very long time.”
Finis vero huius operis est, ut occulta fidei manifestentur, quantum in via possibile est, Eccli. 24: qui elucidant me, vitam aeternam habebunt. Et ideo dicit: ponam in lucem scientiam illius, Iob 28: profunda fluviorum scrutatus est, et abscondita produxit in lucem. The purpose of this work is: that hidden things may be made manifest, so far as that is possible in this life. “They that explain me shall have life everlasting” (Sirach 24:31); and therefore, he says: “I will bring the knowledge of her to light” (Wis. 6:24). “The depths also of rivers he searched, and hidden things he brought forth to light” (Job 2 8: 11).

Investigatam diutissime quaetionem quantum nostrae mentis igniculum illustrare lux divina dignata est, formatam rationibus litterisque mandatam, offerendam vobis communicandamque curavi, tam vestri cupidus iudicii, quam nostri studiosus inventi. The problem which has been for so long a time the subject of my investigation—to the extent that the divine light has deigned to enkindle the feeble spark of my mind—now arranged according to a reasoned plan and consigned to writing, I have taken pains to offer and share with you, prompted as much by desire for your judgment as by zeal for my task.
Qua in re quid mihi sit animi, qoties stylo excogitata commendo, tum ex ipsa difficultate materiae, tum ex eo quod viris, idest vobis tantum colloquor, intelligi postest. In this matter it is possible to understand what my intention is whenever I entrust my thought to pen, both because of the difficulty of the matter and because it is only to you men that I am addressing it.
Neque enim famae iactatione et inanibus vulgi clamoribus excitamur, sed si quis est fructus exterior, hic non potest aliam nisi materiae similem sperare sententiam. Indeed, I am not prompted by any desire for fame or for empty popular applause; but if there is any exterior reward, it can be no other than to hope for a judgment in keeping with the matter.
Quocumque igitur a vobis deieci oculos, partim ignava segnities, partim callidus livor occurit, ut contumeliam videat divinis tractatibus irrogare, qui talibus hominum monstris non agnoscenda hic potius quam conculcanda proiecerim. For, wherever I have directed my gaze, apart from you, I have encountered, on the one side, stolid indifference or, on the other, sly envy, so that I would appear to offer insult to matters pertaining to divine things by putting them before such monsters of men to be trampled under foot by them rather than to be acknowledged.
Idcirco stylum brevitate contraho et ex intimis sumpta philosophiae disciplinis novorum verborum significationibus velo, ut haec mihi tantum vobisque, si quando ad ea converteritis oculos, colloquantur; ceteros vero ita submovimus, ut qui capere intellectu nequiverint, ad ea etiam legenda videantur indigni. On this account I restrain my pen by brevity, and truths gleaned from the deepest teachings of philosophy I veil over by the signification of new words, so that they may speak only to me and to you; if you, indeed, will direct your attention to them. But, as for others, I so disregard them that those who are unable to grasp the meaning of my words shall seem unworthy to read them.
Sane tantum a nobis oportet quaeri, quantum humanae rationis intuitus ad Deitatis valet celsa conscendere. Nam ceteris quoque artibus idem finis est constitutus, quousque potest via rationis accedere. Neque enim medicina aegris semper affert salutem. Sed nulla erit culpa medentis, si nihil eorum quae fieri oportebat, omiserit: idemque in ceteris. Only so much ought one require of me as the intuition of human reason can approximate about the sublime truths of the Godhead. For in the case of other arts, the same limit is also established, namely, that which by the way of reason one can attain. Now, medicine does not always effect the cure of the patient. But no blame will be placed upon the physician if he has omitted none of the things which he ought to have done; and the same is true in other matters.
At quantum haec difficilior quaestio est, tantum facilior debet esse ad veniam. Vobis tamen illus etiam inspiciendum est an ex beati Augustini scriptis semina rationum in nos venientia fructus attulerint. Moreover, in proportion to the difficulty of a problem, the pardoning of error ought to be the more easily granted. You must also determine this: whether the seeds of speculation, gathered from the writings of the blessed Augustine, have in my work borne fruit.
Nunc de proposita quaestione hinc sumamus initium. Now, therefore, let us undertake at this point the discussion of the proposed question.
St. Thomas’ Commentary
Huic ergo operi prooemium praemittit, in quo tria facit. Primo breviter causas operis praelibat, in quo reddit auditorem docilem. Secundo excusationem subiungit, in quo reddit auditorem benevolum, ibi: idcirco stilum et cetera. Tertio ostendit sui operis originem et quasi subiectum esse doctrinam Augustini, ex quo reddit auditorem attentum, ibi: vobis tamen etiam illud inspiciendum et cetera. To this work the author prefixes a preface, in which he does three things: First, he briefly indicates the causes of the work, in doing which he inclines his hearer to accept what he says. Secondly, he adds an excuse or explanation in which he gains the good will of his hearer, where he says: “I restrain my pen.” In the third place, he points out that the source of his work and, in a certain way, its teaching, is the doctrine of St. Augustine, and in doing this he renders his hearer attentive, when he says: “You must also determine this: whether the seeds of speculation, gathered from the writings of blessed Augustine, have in my work borne fruit.”
Proponit autem quattuor causas sui operis in prima parte. He likewise sets forth in the first part the four causes of his work.
Primo materialem, cum dicit: investigatam diutissime quaestionem, scilicet de Trinitate personarum unius Dei, in qua et difficultatem materiae insinuat, quae diutina investigatione indiguit, et studii diligentiam, qua ipse eam diutissime investigavit, ut intelligatur investigatam a nobis, quamvis etiam intelligi possit investigatam a pluribus, quia a principio nascentis Ecclesiae haec quaestio ingenia fidelium maxime fatigavit. 1) First, the material cause, when he says: “the problem which has been for so long a time the subject of my investigation,” that is, about the Trinity of Persons of the one God; and in these words he implies both the difficulty of the matter, because he has carried on the investigation for a very long time, and also the diligence of the study with which he has for so long a period investigated it, as “investigation” is understood by us, although it can also be understood to mean investigation by many; because from the beginning of the existence of the Church, this question has especially continued to challenge the cleverest minds of Christians.
Secundo tangit causam efficientem: et proximam sive secundariam in hoc quod dicit: quantum mentis nostrae igniculum, et primam sive principalem in hoc quod dicit: illustrare lux divina dignata est. 2) Secondly, he indicates the proximate or secondary efficient cause when he says: “the feeble spark of my mind.” Moreover, he speaks also of the first or principal cause when he adds: “that the divine light has deigned to enkindle.”
Proxima siquidem causa huius investigationis fuit intellectus auctoris, qui recte igniculus dicitur. Ignis enim, ut dicit Dionysius 15 c. caelestis hierarchiae, maxime competit ad significandas divinas proprietates, tum ratione subtilitatis, tum ratione luminis, tum ratione virtutis activae per calorem, tum ratione situs et motus. Now the proximate cause of this investigation is, indeed, the intellect of the author, which is rightly termed a spark. “For fire,” as Dionysius says (XV Coel. hier.), “especially serves to signify properties of the divinity: at once by reason of its subtlety, of its light, and also by reason of its place and motion.”
Quae quidem Deo maxime competunt, in quo est summa simplicitas et immaterialitas, perfecta claritas, omnipotens virtus et altissima sublimitas, Angelis autem mediocriter, sed humanis mentibus infimo modo, quarum propter corpus coniunctum et puritas inquinatur et lux obscuratur et virtus debilitatur et motus in suprema retardatur; unde humanae mentis efficacia recte igniculo comparatur. These things, in the highest degree, pertain to God, in whom exist the culmination of simplicity and of immateriality, perfect charity, almighty power, and highest majesty. To the angels, “fire” (as indicative of intellect) may be applied in a middle sense, but to human minds, with only a more restricted meaning; for by union with a body, its purity is lessened, its light is obscured, its power weakened, and its upward motion retarded: wherefore the efficacy of the human mind is rightly compared to a spark.
Unde nec ad huius quaestionis veritatem inquirendam sufficit, nisi divina luce illustrata, et sic divina lux est causa principalis, humana mens causa secundaria. Hence it would not be able to investigate the truth of this question unless light were cast upon it by the divine light; and thus the divine light is the principal cause; but the human mind, a cause in the secondary order.
Tertio tangit causam formalem in hoc quod dicit: formatam rationibus, et tangit modum agendi quantum ad tria. 3) Thirdly, he treats of the formal cause when he says: “arranged according to a reasoned plan,” and he indicates the mode of treatment under three headings.
Primo quantum ad hoc quod argumentando processit; unde dicit: formatam rationibus. Quaestio namque quamdiu probabilibus rationibus sub dubio exagitatur, quasi informis est, nondum ad certitudinem veritatis pertingens, et ideo formata dicitur esse, quando ad eam ratio additur, per quam certitudo de veritate habetur. Et in hoc providit intelligentiae, quia quod credimus, debemus auctoritati, quod intelligimus, rationi, ut Augustinus dicit. a) First, since he proceeds by argumentation, he therefore says, “arranged according to a reasoned plan.” For a question discussed even over a long period according to probable reasons but still with doubt is, as it were, without form, not yet laying claim to the certitude of truth; and hence it is said to possess form when reasonable proof is added, through which certitude regarding the truth may be attained: in this process, intellect gives us vision of the truth, because what we believe, we owe to authority; but what we understand, we owe to reason, as Augustine says.
Secundo in hoc quod non solum verbis disseruit, sed etiam scripto mandavit, unde dicit: litterisque mandatam. In quo providit memoriae. b) In the second place he discusses the mode of treatment, since he treats of this matter not only in words, but has incorporated it in writing, he says: “I entrust my thought to pen.” In so doing, he has made provision against the weaknesses of memory.
Tertio in hoc quod non ad praesentes per modum doctrinae, sed ad absentes per modum epistulae conscripsit. c) Thirdly, since he has written, not after the manner of one imparting doctrine to another present with him, but as to one absent, by means of a letter.
Sic enim etiam Aristoteles diversimode libros suos composuit, quosdam quidem ad praesentes, qui ab ipso audiebant - et hi libri dicuntur auditus, sicut dicitur liber de naturali auditu - quosdam autem ad absentes scribens, sicut liber de anima conscriptus esse significatur in I Ethicorum, ubi nominantur exteriores sermones, ut Commentator Graecus ibidem dicit. Thus Aristotle also composed his books in different ways: some addressed to those who in his presence listened to him, and these books are called Auditus, as one such book is, entitled, De naturali auditu; but certain others he wrote to those absent, as we find in I Ethic. that the books De anima were so written, where the names of discourses addressed to those at a distance are given, as the Greek commentator says.
Unde sequitur: offerendam vobis quasi maiori ad iudicandum communicandamque curavi quasi socio ad profectum. Et in hoc iudicium requirit; unde sequitur: tam vestri cupidus iudicii quam nostri studiosus inventi. Ex hoc enim quod fuit studiosus ad inveniendum, praedictam quaestionem rationibus formavit; ex hoc vero quod fuit cupidus iudicii Symmachi, ei formatam obtulit. Accordingly, he adds: “I have taken pains to offer and share with you, prompted by desire for your judgment,” as if addressing an expert and asking his opinion in this matter. Thus, he continues: “prompted as much by desire for your judgment as by zeal for my task.” Because he had been zealous for ascertaining the truth, he had ordered the aforesaid question according to reasonable arguments; and, because he was desirous of the judgment of Symmachus, he presented to him the work thus arranged in orderly fashion.
Quarto tangit causam finalem, cum dicit: qua in re quid mihi sit animi, id est quem finem intendam ex supra dicta re, quotiens excogitata animo de praedictis vel quibuscumque aliis stilo commendo, intelligi potest ex duobus, tum ex ipsa difficultate materiae, tum ex eo quod colloquor non multitudini, sed raris, scilicet sapientibus, id est vobis tantummodo. 4) In the fourth place, he refers to the final cause when he says: “What my intention is,” that is, what end I am striving for in regard to the above-mentioned problem: “Whenever I entrust my thought to pen” concerning the aforesaid or certain other matters, “it is possible to understand” for two reasons: “because of the difficulty of the matter” and also, “because it is only to you men that I am addressing it.”
Non enim hunc librum scripsit, ut multitudini recitaret, quod quandoque fit propter vulgi favorem, sed tantummodo uni sapienti, unde sequitur: neque enim excitamur, scilicet ad scribendum famae iactatione, id est commendatione, et clamoribus vulgi, sicut poetae recitantes carmina in theatris, inanibus, quia tales clamores frequenter sine ratione sunt. Et sic removit finem inconvenientem et subiungit finem debitum, insinuans quidem finem principalem qui est interior, scilicet perceptio divinae veritatis, et explicans finem secundarium, scilicet iudicium sapientis, unde dicit: sed si quis est fructus exterior, quasi dicat: principaliter quidem me excitat fructus interior, sed si aliquis est exterior, hic non potest aliam sperare sententiam nisi materiae similem, id est convenientem, quasi dicat: non aliud iudicium requiro pro fructu exteriori nisi qui deceat tantam materiam, de qua iudicium concedi non debet ignaviter pigris neque callide invidis, sed solum benevolo sapienti, unde sequitur: quocumque igitur a vobis deieci oculos, scilicet ad quoscumque respexi, non ad vos tantum considerationi meae occurrit, partim, id est in aliquibus, ignava, id est stulta, segnities, id est pigritia, partim livor, id est invidia, callidus, id est astutus ad nocendum, in tantum ut contumeliam videatur irrogare divinis tractatibus, qui haec, scilicet divina, proiecerit, id est inordinate exposuerit, talibus monstris hominum - monstra dicuntur homines qui in corpore humano cor gerunt bestiale, propter peccatum bestiis similes effecti in affectu - non agnoscenda potius quam conculcanda, quia non tam quaerunt cognoscere quam vituperare quaecumque dicuntur, propter invidiam; unde dicitur Matth. 7: nolite sanctum dare et cetera. Alia littera: ne et ego si aliter facerem, videar etc. qui proiecerim et cetera. This book, therefore, he has not written in order to read it to the many, which would be with hope of popular acclaim, but rather, for one wise man alone; wherefore, he continues: “I am not prompted by any desire for fame or for empty popular applause,” as are the poets who recite their verses before the foolish crowds in the theater, because such applause is often altogether without reason. Thus he puts aside any unworthy end and establishes one that is honorable, implying a principal purpose, which is interior, namely, knowledge of divine truth, and, explicitly pointing out a secondary end, that is, the judgment of a wise man, when he says: “If there is any exterior reward,” as if he would say: It is an interior reward that principally urges me on, but if there is any that is exterior, this can be none other than to wait and to hope for a judgment like to the matter, that is, proportionate to it: By way of exterior return I ask for nothing except what is fitting in a matter of such importance, in regard to which I have stated that a judgment of it should be neither stolidly indifferent nor the bitter one of an envious critic, but only that pronounced in good will by a wise man. Accordingly, he adds: “Wherever I have directed my gaze apart from you, that is, to whomsoever I have looked, except to you alone, I have encountered on the one side, stolid indifference”; that is, lack of comprehension, “on the other side, sly envy,” that is, ill will, sly only in condemnation, so that he who treated of these things, would seem to offer insult to divine treatises, that is, by inordinately explaining them “to such monsters of men.” Men are called monsters who, though in human body, bear within them the heart of a beast, since vice has made them like to beasts in their affections; hence these things “would be trampled under foot by them, rather than acknowledged,” because they do not so much seek to know, but—because of their envy—to revile whatever is said; wherefore, “Give not what is holy to dogs, neither cast your pearls before swine, lest they trample them under their feet” (Matt. 7:6). Therefore, that I should not do otherwise than this, “I restrain my pen by brevity.”
Idcirco stilum et cetera. Haec est secunda pars prooemii, in qua subiungit excusationem. Et primo excusat operis difficultatem. Secundo operis imperfectionem, ibi: sed tantum a nobis et cetera. Tangit autem triplicem difficultatem, quam sponte huic operi adhibet. This is the second part of the preface, in which he adds an explanation of his manner of writing. And first, he explains the difficulty of the task. In the second place, he excuses its imperfection. “Only so much ought one require of me as the intuition of human reason can approximate about the sublime truths of the Godhead. He refers also to a threefold difficulty which purposely he attached to it.
Prima est ex brevitate Scripturae, unde dicit: idcirco stilum brevitate contraho, secundum illud Horatii: brevis esse laboro, obscurus fio. The first is by reason of the brevity of his writing; wherefore, he says, “I restrain my pen by brevity,” according to that saying of Horace: “While I labor to be brief, I become obscure.”
Secunda est ex subtilibus rationibus quas inducit, et hoc est quod dicit: ex intimis disciplinis philosophiae sumpta, quae sunt disciplinae a sensibilibus abstrahentes, quarum principiis et conclusionibus utitur, ut metaphysicae et logicae. The second arises from the subtlety of the reasoning which he introduces; thus he says: “truths gleaned from the deepest teachings of philosophy,” which are those doctrines abstracted from the senses, the principles and conclusions which metaphysics and logic make use of.
Tertia est ex novitate verborum, unde dicit: haec, scilicet sumpta, velo significationibus novorum verborum. Quae quidem nova dicuntur vel quantum ad materiam istam, quia alii tractatores huius quaestionis talibus verbis usi non sunt, vel quantum ad eos qui legunt, qui talibus verbis non sunt assueti. The third difficulty arises from the newness of the words used; wherefore he says: “I veil over by the signification of new words.” These words are called “new” either with reference to the matter, because others treating of this same question did not employ the same vocabulary, or with reference to those who read them, because they are unaccustomed to such terms.
Tres autem has difficultates addit quartae, quam supra tetigit, quae est materiae difficultas, ut ea, quae in hoc libro scribuntur, tantum sapientibus colloquatur, qui haec intelligere poterunt, sicut est auctor ipse et ille, ad quem liber conscribitur, alii vero, qui capere intellectu non possunt, a lectione excludantur. Non enim libenter leguntur quae non intelliguntur. Et quia ratio ex praecedentibus connectitur, ideo praemisit: idcirco, quod est nota conclusionis. Littera vero plana est. These three difficulties he adds to the fourth which he had previously mentioned: that is, the difficulty of the subject; consequently, in regard to those things written in this book, the meaning is clear only to the wise, to such men as the author himself and the one to whom he has addressed it. But others who cannot comprehend it are excluded from the reading of it. For things which are not understood are not read with pleasure. And because his reason for so writing is connected with preceding statements, he introduces it ‘with “therefore,” which is a sign of a conclusion. The meaning is clear.
Deinde cum dicit: sed tantum a nobis quaeri oportet etc., excusat operis defectum, quia scilicet non debet requiri ab eo in hoc opere plus certitudinis quam quantum humana ratio valet ad alta divinitatis conscendere. Quod probat per locum a minori in aliis artibus, in quibus iste finis unicuique artifici constituitur ut tantum faciat, quantum humana ratio sinit. Non enim medicus semper curat, sed si nihil omittat de his quae facere debet, sine culpa erit, et similiter est in aliis artibus. Unde et in hoc opere, ubi est difficillima materia sensum humanae rationis excedens, magis debet auctori venia dari, si non ad perfectam certitudinem quaestionem deducat. “Only so much ought one require of me as the intuition of human reason can approximate about the sublime truths of the Godhead.” Here he excuses a defect of the work, because, indeed, one ought not demand from him in this task any more certitude than that which the human reason, in mounting up to the divine, is capable of; a position which he justifies by reference to matters of less importance in other arts, in which only such an end is established for each craftsman as he can accomplish, one such as human reason allows. A physician does not always, indeed, effect a cure, but if he omits nothing which he ought to do, he will be without blame; and the same is true in regard to other arts. Therefore in this work, where the matter is difficult, going beyond the experience of human nature, the greater leniency ought to be granted if he does not solve the question with perfect certitude.
Deinde cum dicit: vobis tamen, ostendit, cuius auctoritatem in scribendo sequatur, scilicet Augustini. Non ut ea tantum dicat quae in libro Augustini inveniuntur, sed quia ea quae Augustinus de Trinitate dixit, scilicet quod in absolutis divinae personae conveniunt et in relativis distinguuntur, accipit quasi semina et principia, quibus utitur ad quaestionis difficultatem enodandam. Et sic ipsa veritatis explicatio per multas rationes sunt fructus ex seminibus Augustini in ipso provenientes. Qui autem sint convenientes et uberes, ei, ad quem scribit, inspiciendum committit ad propositam quaestionem accedens. Then, when he says: “You must also determine this: whether the seeds of speculation, gathered from the writings of the blessed Augustine, have in my work borne fruit,” he adduces whose authority he follows in his work, namely, Augustine. Not that he says only those things that are to be found in the books of Augustine, but because those things which Augustine said regarding the Trinity—namely, that the divine Persons are equal in an absolute sense and are distinguished according to relationships—he accepts as seeds and principles, which he uses in resolving this difficult question; and so this explanation of truth by means of many considerations of reason is the fruit springing forth from those seeds found in the writings of Augustine himself; but whether they are acceptable and productive, he leaves to the judgment of him to whom he writes, thus coming directly to the proposed question.

Concerning the Knowledge of Divine Things
Hic duplex quaestio incidit. Prima est de divinorum cognitione, secunda de eorum manifestatione. Here there occurs a twofold question: concerning the knowledge of divine things, and concerning the manifestation of them.
Circa primum quaeruntur quattuor.
  1. Primo. Utrum mens humana in cognitione veritatis nova illustratione divinae lucis indigeat.
  2. Secundo. Utrum possit ad Dei notitiam pervenire.
  3. Tertio. Utrum Deus sit primum quod a mente cognoscitur.
  4. Quarto. Utrum ad divinae Trinitatis cognitionem pervenire per se sufficiat.
In regard to the first, four things are asked:
  1. Whether the human mind in order to attain to a knowledge of truth requires a new illumination of divine light.
  2. Whether it can attain to an idea of God.
  3. Whether God is the first object known by the mind.
  4. Whether the human mind is capable of arriving at a knowledge of the divine Trinity by natural reason.

Article 1
Whether the Human Mind in Order to Attain to a Knowledge of Truth Requires a New Illumination of Divine Light
Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod mens humana in cognitione cuiuslibet veritatis indigeat nova illustratione divinae lucis. 2 Cor. 3: non sumus sufficientes cogitare et cetera. Sed perceptio veritatis non potest esse sine cogitatione. Ergo humana mens non potest veritatem aliquam cognoscere, nisi de novo illustretur a Deo. 1. It seems that the human mind in attaining to any knowledge whatever requires a new illumination of divine light. “Not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves as of ourselves, but our sufficiency is from God” (2 Cor 3:5); but there can be no perception of truth of any kind whatever without thought; therefore the human mind cannot know any truth unless it is illuminated by a new light from God,
Praeterea, facilius est ab alio veritatem addiscere quam per se ipsum eam inspicere. Unde qui per se ipsos sciunt praeferuntur illis, qui ab aliis addiscere possunt, in I Ethicorum. Sed homo non potest ab aliis addiscere, nisi mens eius interius doceatur a Deo, ut dicit Augustinus in libro de magistro et Gregorius in homilia Pentecostes. Ergo nec per se ipsum potest aliquis veritatem inspicere, nisi de novo mens eius illustretur a Deo. 2. It is easier to learn any truth from another than to discover it for oneself: wherefore, those who know things by their own efforts are preferred to those who are able to learn from other men, according to I Ethic.; but man is not able to learn from another unless his mind is interiorly taught by God, as Augustine says in his book, De magistro, and Gregory in Hom. Pentec.; therefore neither can anyone discover truth of himself unless his mind is illuminated by God with a new light.
Praeterea, sicut se habet oculus corporalis ad corpora intuenda, ita se habet intellectus ad intelligibilem veritatem conspiciendam, ut patet in III de anima. Sed oculus corporalis non potest videre corpora nisi illustratione solis materialis superveniente. Ergo nec intellectus humanus potest veritatem inspicere, nisi lumine solis invisibilis, qui est Deus, illustretur. 3. As the eyes of the body are related to corporeal things which they behold, so is the intellect related to the intelligible truth which it perceives, as is evident in III De anima; but the bodily eye cannot see corporeal things unless it is illuminated by the material sun; therefore neither can the intellect behold the truth unless it is illuminated by the light of the invisible sun, which is God.
Praeterea, illi actus in nobis esse dicuntur, ad quos exercendos principia sufficientia in nobis habemus. Sed in nobis non est cognoscere veritatem, cum quandoque multi laborent ad veritatem cognoscendam, qui eam cognoscere nequeunt. Ergo non habemus sufficientia principia in nobis ad veritatem cognoscendam. Ergo oportet ad hoc, quod eam cognoscamus, ab exteriori nos iuvari, et sic idem quod prius. 4. Those acts are said to be in us (as our own) for the exercise of which we possess within ourselves principles that are sufficient; but in us there is not the power to know truth altogether [or absolutely] for there are many who labor to learn the truth and who, nevertheless, are unable to do so; therefore we have not in us sufficient principles for knowing truth and so it must be that to arrive at knowledge of it we require aid from outside ourselves, and so the conclusion is like the foregoing.
Praeterea, magis dependet operatio mentis humanae a luce divina quam operatio creaturae sensibilis inferioris a luce corporis caelestis. Sed corpora inferiora quamvis habeant formas quae sunt principia naturalium operationum, non tamen possunt operationes suas perficere, nisi lumine solis et stellarum superveniente iuvarentur. Unde dicit Dionysius 4 c. de divinis nominibus quod lumen solis ad generationem visibilium corporum confert et ad vitam ipsa movet et nutrit et auget. Ergo nec menti humanae sufficit ad videndam veritatem naturale lumen, quod est quasi forma ipsius, nisi lumen aliud superveniat, scilicet divinum. 5. The operation of the human mind depends more upon the divine light than does the operation of sensible or inferior beings upon the light of the material heaven; but inferior bodies, although they have forms which are principles of their natural operations, are, nevertheless, incapable of perfecting these operations unless they are aided by the influence of the light of the stars; wherefore Dionysius (De div. nom., chap. 4) says that the light of the sun contributes to the generation of visible bodies and that it moves them to life and nourishes them and causes them to grow; therefore its natural light, which is, as it were, its form, would not, suffice to make truth visible to the human mind unless another light, namely, the divine, supervened to assist it.
Praeterea, in omnibus causis ordinatis per se et non secundum accidens effectus non procedit a causa secunda nisi per operationem causae primae, ut patet in libro de causis. Sed mens humana ordinatur sub luce increata ordine essentiali et non accidentali. Ergo operatio mentis quae est eius effectus proprius, scilicet cognitio veritatis, non potest provenire ex ea nisi operante prima luce increata. Eius autem operatio non videtur alia esse nisi illustratio. Et sic idem quod prius. 6. In all causes that are ordered to one another essentially, and not accidentally, no effect proceeds from a second cause unless through the operation of a first cause, as is established. in the first proposition of De causis; but the human mind is ordained beneath the uncreated light according to an order that is essential and not accidental; therefore the operation of the human mind which is its proper effect, namely, the cognition of truth, cannot proceed from it unless by reason of the operation of the first uncreated light: its operation, however, seems to indicate nothing other than illumination; therefore, etc.
Praeterea, sicut se habet voluntas ad bene volendum, ita se habet intellectus ad recte intelligendum. Sed voluntas non potest bene velle, nisi divina gratia adiuvetur, ut Augustinus dicit. Ergo nec intellectus potest veritatem intelligere, nisi divina luce illustretur. 7. As the will is related to willing well, so the intellect is related to right understanding: but the will cannot will well unless it is aided by divine grace, as Augustine says; therefore neither can the intellect know the truth unless illuminated by divine light.
Praeterea, illud, ad quod vires nostrae sufficiunt, irreprehensibiliter nostris viribus ascribimus, sicut currere vel aedificare. Sed reprehensibile est quod aliquis scientiam veritatis suo ascribit ingenio, quin immo iubemur illam Deo ascribere, secundum illud Eccli. ult.: danti mihi sapientiam dabo gloriam. Ergo ad cognoscendam veritatem vires nostrae non sufficiunt. Et sic idem quod prius. 8. That for which our powers do not suffice is wrongly ascribed to our strength: but it is reprehensible that anyone should ascribe knowledge of the truth to his own ability, since indeed we are even commanded to ascribe it to God, according to this saying of Sirach 51:23: “To Him that gives me wisdom, will I give glory”; therefore our powers do not suffice for knowledge of truth, and so the conclusion is as before.
Sed contra, mens humana illustrata est divinitus lumine naturali, secundum illud Psalmi: signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui, domine. Si ergo hoc lumen, quia creatum est, non sufficit ad veritatem conspiciendam, sed requirit novam illustrationem, pari ratione lumen superadditum non sufficiet, sed indigebit alio lumine, et sic in infinitum, quod numquam compleri potest, et sic impossibile erit cognoscere aliquam veritatem. Ergo oportet stare in primo lumine, ut scilicet mens lumine naturali sine aliquo superaddito possit veritatem videre. Sed contra. The human mind is divinely illuminated by its natural light, according to the saying of Psalm 4:7: “The light of Your countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us.” Thus, therefore, if this created light is not sufficient for the knowing of truth, but there is required a new illumination, according to the same reasoning this superadded light would not suffice either, but would require still another light, and so on to infinity, which cannot be encompassed; and so it would be impossible to know any truth. Therefore one must stand firm in reliance upon the first light, namely, that the mind by its natural light, without the superaddition of any other, can see the truth.
Praeterea, sicut visibile in actu sufficiens est ad hoc quod moveat visum, ita intelligibile actu sufficit ad movendum intellectum, si sit proportionatum. Sed mens nostra habet in se unde possit facere intelligibile actu, scilicet intellectum agentem, et tale intelligibile est ei proportionatum. Ergo non indiget aliqua nova illustratione ad hoc quod mens veritatem cognoscat. Again, as it suffices for what is actually visible that it should he proportionate to the sight in order to move it, so it suffices for what is intelligible that it should be proportionate to the intellect in order to move it: but our mind possesses within itself the power of making things intelligible in act, namely, the active intellect, and what is intelligible is proportionate to it; therefore it does not require another new illumination in order to know truth.
Praeterea, sicut se habet lux corporalis ad visionem corporalem, ita se habet lux intellectualis ad visionem intellectus. Sed quaelibet lux corporalis quantumcumque sit parva facit aliquid videri corporaliter, ad minus se ipsam. Ergo et lux intelligibilis, quae est menti connaturalis, sufficit ad aliquam veritatem cognoscendam. Moreover, as corporeal light is related to bodily vision, so is the intellect related to intelligible vision. But any corporeal light at all, even though it is weak, renders something corporeally visible, at least itself; therefore, the light of the intellect also, which is connatural to the mind, suffices for the understanding of some truth.
Praeterea, omnia opera artificialia ex cognitione alicuius veritatis dependent, cum eorum principium sit scientia. Sed quaedam opera artificialia sunt, in quae potest liberum arbitrium per se ipsum secundum Augustinum, ut aedificare domos et huiusmodi. Ergo et in aliquam veritatem cognoscendam sufficit mens sine nova illustratione divina. Furthermore, all things that are artificially made depend upon the cognition of some truth since the principle of them is knowledge; but it is certain that products of art do exist in which, according to Augustine, the free will is able [to act] by itself, as in building houses and the like; therefore man is sufficiently capable of knowing some truth without a new divine illumination.
Responsio. Dicendum quod haec est differentia inter virtutes activas et passivas quod passivae non possunt exire in actum propriae operationis, nisi moveantur a suis activis, sicut sensus non sentit, nisi moveatur a sensibili, sed virtutes activae possunt operari sine hoc quod ab alio moveantur, sicut patet in viribus animae vegetabilis. Sed in genere intellectus invenitur duplex potentia: activa, scilicet intellectus agens, et passiva, scilicet intellectus possibilis. Response. It must be said that between potencies that are active and those that are passive there is this difference: passive potencies cannot enter on the act of their proper operation unless they are moved to do so by their own active agents, just as the senses experience no sensation unless moved by some sensible object; but active potencies are capable of operation without being moved by another, as is evident in the case of the potencies of the vegetative soul: but as regards the intellect, a twofold potency is found, an active potency, that is, the active intellect, and a passive potency, that is, the possible intellect.
Quidam vero posuerunt quod solus intellectus possibilis erat potentia animae, intellectus vero agens erat quaedam substantia separata. Et haec est opinio Avicennae, secundum quam opinionem sequitur quod anima humana non possit in actum propriae operationis, quae est cognitio veritatis, exire, nisi exteriori lumine illustretur, illius scilicet substantiae separatae, quam dicit intellectum agentem. Now, there are certain philosophers who maintained that the possible intellect alone is a faculty of the soul, while the active intellect is a separate substance; and this is the opinion of Avicenna. According to this opinion, it follows that the human soul would not be capable of entering upon its proper operation, which is knowledge, unless illuminated by an exterior light, namely, by the light of that separate substance which they call the active intellect.
Sed quia verba philosophi in III de anima magis videntur sonare quod intellectus agens sit potentia animae et huic etiam auctoritas sacrae Scripturae consonat, quae lumine intelligibili nos insignitos esse profitetur, cui philosophus comparat intellectum agentem, ideo in anima ponitur respectu intelligibilis operationis, quae est cognitio veritatis, et potentia passiva et potentia activa. Unde sicut aliae potentiae activae naturales suis passivis coniunctae sufficiunt ad naturales operationes, ita etiam anima habens in se potentiam activam et passivam sufficit ad perceptionem veritatis. But because the words of the Philosopher (III De anima) seem to proclaim more convincingly that the active intellect is a potency belonging to the soul—and with this the authority of Scripture agrees, which declares that we are distinguished by that intellectual light to which the Philosopher compares the active intellect—therefore it is held that there is in the soul, fitting it for intelligible operation, that is, for undertaking the cognition of truth, a potency which is active and another which is passive. Wherefore, as some powers which are naturally active, when conjoined with those which are their passive complements, suffice for the carrying on of their natural operations, so also the soul of man, having in itself an active and a passive potency, is sufficient for perception of the truth.
Cum autem quaelibet virtus activa creata finita sit, est eius sufficientia ad determinatos effectus limitata. Unde in alios effectus non potest, nisi nova virtus addatur. Sic ergo sunt quaedam intelligibiles veritates, ad quas se extendit efficacia intellectus agentis, sicut principia quae naturaliter homo cognoscit et ea quae ab his deducuntur; et ad haec cognoscenda non requiritur nova lux intelligibilis, sed sufficit lumen naturaliter inditum. Since, however, the power of any created thing is but finite, its efficacy will be limited to certain determined effects. Consequently it cannot attain to certain other effects unless new power is added to it; but there are some intelligible truths to which the efficacy of the active intellect does extend, as, for example, those first principles which man naturally knows, and those truths which are deduced from them; and for such knowledge no new light of intelligence is required, but the light with which the mind is naturally endowed suffices.
Quaedam vero sunt ad quae praedicta principia non se extendunt, sicut sunt ea quae sunt fidei, facultatem rationis excedentia, et futura contingentia et alia huiusmodi; et haec cognoscere mens humana non potest, nisi divinitus novo lumine illustretur superaddito lumini naturali. But there are other truths to which the aforesaid first principles do not extend; e.g., the truths of faith and things that exceed the faculty of reason, such as knowledge of future contingent events, and the like; and such things the human mind cannot know unless it is divinely illuminated by a new light, superadded to that which it naturally possesses.
Quamvis autem non requiratur novi luminis additio ad cognitionem eorum ad quae ratio naturalis se extendit, requiritur tamen divina operatio. Praeter operationem enim qua Deus rerum instituit naturas, singulis formas et virtutes proprias tribuens, quibus possent suas operationes exercere, operatur etiam in rebus opera providentiae omnium rerum virtutes ad actus proprios dirigendo et movendo. Ita enim universa creatura divinae gubernationi subicitur, sicut instrumenta subduntur gubernationi artificis et qualitates naturales virtutibus animae nutritivae, ut dicitur in II de anima. Unde sicut ex calore naturali sequitur opus digestionis secundum regulam, quam imponit calori vis digestiva, et omnes virtutes inferiorum corporum operantur, secundum quod moventur et diriguntur ex virtutibus corporum caelestium, ita omnes virtutes activae creatae operantur, secundum quod moventur et diriguntur a creatore. For, although it does not require the addition of new light for knowledge of those things to which reason naturally extends, it does require divine operation: for over and above that operation by which God created the natures of things, giving to each its proper form and ability, by which they are able to exercise their proper operation. He also operates in things the works of Providence, directing and moving the capabilities of all things to their proper acts. For in this way the whole universe of creatures is subject to the divine governance, as instruments are subject to the direction of the workman and as natural qualities are subject to the power of the nutritive soul, as is said in II De anima. Therefore, as the work of digestion is accompanied by a natural heat, according to the measure which the digestive function imposes upon heat, and as all the inferior powers of the body operate according as they are directed and moved by virtue of the heavenly bodies, so all the active created powers are governed and moved by the Creator.
Sic ergo in omni cognitione veritatis indiget mens humana divina operatione, sed in naturalibus cognoscendis non indiget nova luce, sed solo motu et directione eius, in aliis autem etiam nova illustratione. Et quia de talibus Boethius hic loquitur, ideo dicit: quantum divina lux et cetera. Thus, therefore, in all cognition of truth, the human mind requires the divine operation. In the realm of naturally known truths, however, it requires no new light, but only the divine motion and direction; for the knowledge of other (supernatural) truths it needs also a new illumination. And because it is of such things that Boethius speaks, he says: “To the extent that the divine light has deigned to enkindle the feeble spark of my mind.”
Answers to objections.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod quamvis nihil simus sufficientes cogitare ex nobis sine Dei operatione, non tamen oportet quod in qualibet nostra cognitione novum lumen nobis infundatur. 1. Although we are in no way sufficient of ourselves, as from ourselves, to know anything without the operation of God, yet it is not necessary that for every operation of ours a new light should be given to us.
Ad secundum dicendum quod secundum hoc Deus nos interius docet in naturalibus cognitis, quod lumen naturale in nobis causat et ipsum dirigit in veritatem, in aliis vero etiam novum lumen infundendo. 2. In matters of natural cognition God teaches us interiorly in this way: that He is the cause of the natural light which is in us, and He directs it to the truth; but in other (supernatural) matters He further teaches us by the infusion of a new light.
Ad tertium dicendum quod oculus corporalis ex illustratione solis materialis non consequitur lumen aliquod sibi connaturale, per quod possit facere visibilia in actu, sicut consequitur mens nostra ex illustratione solis increati. Et ideo oculus semper indiget exteriori lumine, non autem mens. 3. The eye of the body, when illuminated by the light of the material sun, does not respond to a light which is in any way natural (i.e., intrinsic) to itself, by means of which it makes things to be actually visible; even as is the case with the mind when it is illuminated by the uncreated Light; and therefore the eye always requires an exterior light, but not the mind.
Ad quartum dicendum quod lumen intelligibile, ubi est purum sicut in Angelis, sine difficultate omnia cognita naturaliter demonstrat, ita quod in eis est omnia naturalia cognoscere. In nobis autem lumen intelligibile est obumbratum per coniunctionem ad corpus et ad vires corporeas, et ex hoc impeditur, ut non libere possit veritatem etiam naturaliter cognoscibilem inspicere, secundum illud Sap. 10: corpus quod corrumpitur et cetera. Et exinde est quod non est omnino in nobis veritatem cognoscere, scilicet propter impedimenta. Sed unusquisque magis vel minus habet hoc in potestate, secundum quod lumen intelligibile est in ipso purius. 4. Where there is pure light of intellect, as in the angels, it makes evident without difficulty all things known in the natural order, so that in them there is cognition of all objects naturally intelligible to them: in us, however, this light is obscure, being overshadowed as it were by reason of conjunction with the body and with corporeal powers, and on this account it ii hindered so that it cannot freely and naturally behold that truth which is itself knowable, as is said in the Book of Wisdom (9:15): “For the corruptible body is a load upon the soul; and the earthly habitation presses down the mind that muses upon many things.” From this it follows that on account of the impediment (of the body) it is not in our power to know truth altogether in its fullness. But each one possesses more or less the power to know in proportion to the purity of the intellectual light which is in him.
Ad quintum dicendum quod corpora inferiora, quamvis indigeant ad hoc quod operentur ut moveantur a corporibus caelestibus, non tamen indigent ad proprias operationes efficiendas quod novas formas ab eis recipiant. Et similiter non oportet quod mens humana, quae movetur a Deo ad cognoscendum naturaliter cognita, nova luce perfundatur. 5. Although inferior bodies have need of superior bodies for their operation, to the extent that they must be moved by them; nevertheless, for the perfect accomplishment of their proper functions, they do not need to receive from these superior bodies any new forms, And in like manner it is not necessary that the human mind, which is moved by God, should be endowed with any new light in order to understand those things which are within its natural field of knowledge.
Ad sextum dicendum quod, sicut dicit Augustinus VIII super Genesim, sicut aer illuminatur a lumine praesente, quod si fuerit absens continuo tenebratur, ita et mens illuminatur a Deo. Et ideo etiam lumen naturale in anima semper Deus causat, non aliud et aliud, sed idem; non enim est causa fieri eius solum, sed etiam esse illius. In hoc ergo continue Deus operatur in mente, quod in ipsa lumen naturale causat et ipsum dirigit, et sic mens non sine operatione causae primae in operationem suam procedit. 6. As Augustine says (VIII Super Gen. ad litteram), as the air is illuminated by the presence of light, but straightway grows dark if the light should be removed, so the mind is illuminated by God, and so also it is God who continually causes the natural light in the soul, not one kind now and another kind at another time, but the same (natural light); for He is the cause not only of its coming to be, but of its continued existence in us. In this way, therefore, God continually operates in the mind since He causes and governs the natural light in it, and thus the mind does not carry on its own function without the operation of the First Cause.
Ad septimum dicendum quod voluntas numquam potest bene velle sine divino instinctu, potest autem bene velle sine gratiae infusione, sed non meritorie. Et similiter intellectus non potest sine divino motu veritatem quamcumque cognoscere, potest autem sine novi luminis infusione, quamvis non ea quae naturalem cognitionem excedunt. 7. The will never can will the good without divine incitement: nevertheless it can will the good without infusion of grace, though not meritoriously. And likewise the intellect, without divine influence, is incapable of knowing any truth whatever; it can, however, know without infusion of new light, though not those truths which exceed natural cognition.
Ad octavum dicendum quod eo ipso quod Deus in nobis lumen naturale conservando causat et ipsum dirigit ad videndum, manifestum est quod perceptio veritatis praecipue sibi debet ascribi, sicut operatio artis magis attribuitur artifici quam serrae. 8. From the very fact that God causes the natural light in us by conserving it and directing it to seeing, it is manifest that perception of the truth must be ascribed principally to Him, just as the producing of a work of art is ascribed to the artist rather than to the thing produced.

Article 2
Whether the Human Mind Can Arrive at an Idea of God
Articulus 2 Objections
Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus nullo modo possit cognosci a nobis. Illud enim, quod in summo gradu nostrae cognitionis nobis ignotum remanet, nullo modo est a nobis cognoscibile. Sed in perfectissimo gradu nostrae cognitionis Deo non coniungimur nisi quasi ignoto, ut dicit Dionysius 1 c. mysticae theologiae. Ergo Deus nullo modo est a nobis cognoscibilis. 1. It seems that in no way can God be known by us. For that which in the highest degree of our knowledge remains unknown to us, in no manner is knowable: but in the most perfect degree of our cognition we are not united with God, except as with One who is, as it were, unknown, as Dionysius says (Theologia mystica, chap. 1); therefore God is in no way knowable by us.
Praeterea, omne quod cognoscitur per aliquam formam cognoscitur. Sed, sicut dicit Augustinus, Deus omnem formam nostri intellectus subterfugit. Ergo nullo modo est a nobis cognoscibilis. 2. Anything that is known is known through some other form; but, as Augustine says, God escapes (by transcending) every form of our intellect; therefore in no way is He knowable by us.
Praeterea, cognoscentis et cognoscibilis oportet esse aliquam proportionem, sicut et potentiae cuiuslibet ad suum obiectum. Sed inter intellectum nostrum et Deum nulla potest esse proportio, sicut nec inter finitum et infinitum. Ergo intellectus nullo modo potest Deum cognoscere. 3. Between the knower and the thing known must be some kind of proportion, as in the case of any potency and its object; but between our intellect and God there can be no proportion, as there can be none between the infinite and the finite; therefore our intellect can in no way know God.
Praeterea, cum potentia et actus reducantur in idem genus, utpote quae dividunt omnia genera entis, nulla potentia potest in actum, qui est extra genus suum, sicut sensus non potest cognoscere substantiam intelligibilem. Sed Deus est extra omne genus. Ergo non potest aliquo intellectu cognosci qui sit in aliquo genere. Sed noster intellectus est huiusmodi. Ergo et cetera. 4. Since potency and act are reduced to the same genus, inasmuch as they divide all classes of being, no potency can be in act which is outside its own genus: just as the senses are incapable of knowing intelligible substance; but God is outside every genus; therefore He cannot be known by any intellect that is in a genus; but our intellect is of this kind; therefore, etc.
Praeterea, remoto primo necesse est omnia consequentia removeri. Sed primum intelligibile est quiditas rei; unde quod quid est dicitur esse obiectum proprium intellectus in III de anima, et quid est est medium demonstrandi an est et omnes alias rei condiciones. Sed de Deo non possumus scire quid est, ut Damascenus dicit. Ergo nihil de illo possumus cognoscere. 5. If that which stands first is done away with, everything consequent upon it is likewise put aside: but what is first intelligible about a thing is its quiddity; hence that which a thing is, is said to be the proper object of the intellect (III De anima); and what is serves as a medium of demonstrating whether it exists, and all the other conditions of the thing. But concerning God, we are unable to know what He is, as Damascene says. Therefore, we can know nothing of God.
Sed contra
Sed contra est quod dicitur Rom. 1: invisibilia Dei et cetera. But on the contrary is the saying of Rom. 1:20: “For the invisible things of Him, from the creation of the world, are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made: His eternal power also and divinity.”
Praeterea, Ier. 10: in hoc glorietur qui gloriatur scire et nosse me. Sed hoc esset inanis gloria, nisi eum cognoscere possemus. Ergo Deum cognoscere possumus. According to Jer. 9:24: “But let him that glories glory in this, that he understands and knows me”; but this would be empty glory unless we were able to know Him; therefore we can know God.
Praeterea, nihil diligitur nisi cognitum, ut patet per Augustinum in libro de Trinitate. Sed Deum diligere iubemur. Ergo eum cognoscere possumus; non enim nobis praecipitur impossibile. Nothing is loved unless it is known, as is evident from Augustine (II De Trinitate); but we are commanded to love God; therefore we are capable of knowing Him, since the impossible is not enjoined by precept.
Responsio. Dicendum quod dupliciter aliqua res cognoscitur. Uno modo per formam propriam, sicut oculus videt lapidem per speciem lapidis. Alio modo per formam alterius similem sibi, sicut cognoscitur causa per similitudinem effectus et homo per formam suae imaginis. Response. I answer: It must be said that there is a twofold way in which anything is known. One manner is through its proper form, as the eye sees a stone through the species of the stone. Another way is through some other form similar to it, as a cause is known through the similitude of its effect, just as man is known through the form of his image.
Per formam autem suam aliquid dupliciter videtur. Uno modo per formam quae est ipsa res, sicut Deus se cognoscit per essentiam suam et etiam Angelus se ipsum. Alio modo per formam quae est ab ipso, sive sit abstracta ab ipso, quando scilicet forma immaterialior est quam res, sicut forma lapidis abstrahitur a lapide; sive sit impressa intelligenti ab eo, utpote quando res est simplicior quam similitudo per quam cognoscitur, sicut Avicenna dicit quod intelligentias cognoscimus per impressiones earum in nobis. Moreover, through its own form a thing is also known in two ways. One way is the following: when knowledge is through the form which is the thing itself, as with God who eternally knows His own essence, and as an angel knows itself. According to another mode, knowledge is through a form which is other than the thing: either when the form has been abstracted from a thing—in which case the form is more immaterial than the thing itself, as is the form of a stone abstracted from the stone itself— or when the form is impressed on the intellect by a thing, as occurs when the thing is more immaterial than the similitude by which it is known; thus, as Avicenna says, we know intellectual beings through their impression in us.
Quia igitur intellectus noster secundum statum viae habet determinatam habitudinem ad formas, quae a sensu abstrahuntur, cum comparetur ad phantasmata sicut visus ad colores, ut dicitur in III de anima, non potest ipsum Deum cognoscere in hoc statu per formam quae est essentia sua, sed sic cognoscetur in patria a beatis. Therefore, since our intellect has, in our present state of wayfaring, a determined relation to forms abstracted from sensible things (since it is dependent upon phantasms in the same way as sight is upon colors, as is said in III De anima), it cannot know God in this life through that form which is His essence; though it is in this way that He is known by the blessed in heaven.
Similitudo etiam quaecumque impressa ab ipso in intellectum humanum non sufficeret ad hoc quod faceret eius essentiam cognosci, cum in infinitum excedat quamlibet formam creatam, ratione cuius intellectui per formas creatas pervius non potest esse Deus, ut Augustinus dicit. Nec etiam in statu huius viae cognoscitur Deus a nobis per formas pure intelligibiles, quae sint aliqua similitudo ipsius propter connaturalitatem intellectus nostri ad phantasmata, ut dictum est. Unde relinquitur quod solummodo per effectus formam cognoscatur. No similitude, however, of whatever kind impressed by Him upon the human intellect, would suffice to make His essence known, since He infinitely transcends every created form; consequently God cannot be made accessible to the mind through created forms, as Augustine says. Nor, in this present state, can God become known to us even through the species of things which are purely intelligible, which have in a certain way a likeness to Him, because our intellect is connaturally related to phantasms, as has been said. Therefore it remains certain that it is only through the forms of His effects that He is known.
Effectus autem est duplex: quidam, qui adaequatur virtuti suae causae, et per talem effectum cognoscitur plenarie virtus causae, et per consequens quiditas ipsius; alius effectus est, qui deficit a praedicta aequalitate, et per talem effectum non potest comprehendi virtus agentis et per consequens nec essentia eius; sed cognoscitur tantum de causa quod est. Et sic se habet cognitio effectus ut principium ad cognoscendum de causa an est, sicut se habet quiditas ipsius causae, cum per suam formam cognoscitur. Hoc autem modo se habet omnis effectus ad Deum. Et ideo non possumus in statu viae pertingere ad cognoscendum de ipso nisi quia est. There are, moreover, two kinds of effects: those which adequate the power of a cause, and through such an effect the power of a cause is fully known, and consequently the essence of the cause; and another kind of effect which is not completely equal to its cause. Through this latter kind of effect it is not possible to comprehend the power of the agent, and consequently not its essence either; but regarding the cause it can be known only that it exists. Thus the knowledge of an effect stands as a principle whereby the existence of its cause is known, just as does the quiddity of the cause when it is known through its own form. Now, it is according to this second mode that every effect stands in relation to God; and hence we are not able in this life to attain to any knowledge of Him, except that He is.
Et tamen unus cognoscentium quia est alio perfectius cognoscit, quia causa tanto ex effectu perfectius cognoscitur, quanto per effectum magis apprehenditur habitudo causae ad effectum. Nevertheless, of those knowing that He is, one will know Him more perfectly than another, because a cause is more perfectly understood from its effect the more perfectly the relation of the cause to its effect is apprehended.
Quae quidem habitudo in effectu non pertingente ad aequalitatem suae causae attenditur secundum tria, scilicet secundum progressionem effectus a causa et secundum hoc quod effectus consequitur de similitudine suae causae et secundum hoc quod deficit ab eius perfecta consecutione. Et sic tripliciter mens humana proficit in cognitione Dei, quamvis ad cognoscendum quid est non pertingat, sed an est solum. And in this relation of an effect not reaching in equality to its cause, three things are noted: namely, the progression of the effect from its cause; secondly, the consequent similitude of the effect to its cause; and thirdly, the failure on the part of the effect to attain to a perfect likeness of its cause. Thus the human mind grows in the knowledge of God, even though it cannot attain to a knowledge of what He is, but only to a knowledge that He is, in three ways.
Primo, secundum quod perfectius cognoscitur eius efficacia in producendo res. Secundo, prout nobiliorum effectuum causa cognoscitur, qui cum eius similitudinem aliquam gerant, magis eminentiam eius commendant. Tertio in hoc quod magis ac magis cognoscitur elongatus ab omnibus his, quae in effectibus apparent. Thus, in the first place, God is known as His productiveness and efficacy are more perfectly known. Secondly inasmuch as He is known as the Cause of the nobler of His effects, since those creatures which display being of a higher mode in their resemblance to Him manifest His eminence more than others. In the third place, He is better recognized as differentiated from all those things which appear in His effects.
Unde dicit Dionysius in libro de divinis nominibus quod cognoscitur ex omnium causa et excessu et ablatione. Hence, in De divinis nominibus, Dionysius says that God is known inasmuch as He is the cause of all things, by His transcending eminence in comparison to all things, and by denial (of all created imperfection).
In hoc autem profectu cognitionis maxime iuvatur mens humana, cum lumen eius naturale nova illustratione confortatur; sicut est lumen fidei et doni sapientiae et intellectus, per quod mens in contemplatione supra se elevari dicitur, in quantum cognoscit Deum esse supra omne id, quod naturaliter comprehendit. Sed quia ad eius essentiam videndam penetrare non sufficit, dicitur in se ipsam quodammodo ab excellenti lumine reflecti, et hoc est quod dicitur Gen. 32 super illud: vidi dominum facie ad faciem, in Glossa Gregorii: visus animae, cum in Deum intenditur, immensitatis coruscatione reverberatur. Moreover, in the attempt to arrive at some knowledge of God, the human mind is greatly assisted when its natural light is fortified by a new illumination: namely, the light of faith and that of the gifts of wisdom and of understanding, by which the mind is elevated above itself in contemplation, inasmuch as it knows God to be above anything which it naturally apprehends. But because even this new light does not suffice to penetrate to a vision of His essence, it is said to be, in a certain way, turned back upon itself by His excellent light; and this is what is said in Gregory’s gloss regarding the statement in Gen. 32:30 (“I have seen God face to face”): “When the vision of the soul is directed to God, it is reflected back upon itself, overwhelmed by the brilliance of His immensity.”
Answers to objections
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod secundum hoc dicimur in fine nostrae cognitionis Deum tamquam ignotum cognoscere, quia tunc maxime mens in cognitione profecisse invenitur, quando cognoscit eius essentiam esse supra omne quod apprehendere potest in statu viae, et sic quamvis maneat ignotum quid est, scitur tamen quia est. 1. It is answered: God as an unknown is said to be the terminus of our knowledge in the following respect: that the mind is found to be most perfectly in possession of knowledge of God when it is recognized that His essence is above everything that the mind is capable of apprehending in this life; and thus, although what He is remains unknown, yet it is known that He is.
Ad secundum dicendum quod ex hoc quod Deus omnem formam intellectus subterfugit, apparet quod non potest cognosci quid est, sed solum an est, ut dictum est. 2. It may be said: From the fact that the divine essence escapes any form of our intellect, evidently it is not possible to know what He is, but only that He exists.
Ad tertium dicendum quod proportio nihil aliud est quam quaedam habitudo duorum ad invicem convenientium in aliquo, secundum hoc quod conveniunt aut differunt. Possunt autem intelligi esse convenientia dupliciter. 3. It is answered: Proportion is nothing other than the mutual relation of two things associated by something in respect to which they either agree or differ. Now, agreement may be of two kinds.
Uno modo ex hoc quod conveniunt in eodem genere quantitatis aut qualitatis, sicut habitudo superficiei ad superficiem aut numeri ad numerum, in quantum unum excedit aliud aut aequatur ei, vel etiam caloris ad calorem, et sic nullo modo potest esse proportio inter Deum et creaturam, cum non conveniant in aliquo genere. In one way, things may be associated as belonging to the same genus of quantity or quality, as is the relation of one surface to another or of one number to another inasmuch as one excels the other or is equal to it, or even as heat is related to heat; and according to this mode of relation there is no possible proportion between God and creature, since there is no agreement in any genus.
Alio modo possunt intelligi convenientia ita quod conveniant in aliquo ordine, et sic attenditur proportio inter materiam et formam, faciens et factum et alia huiusmodi, et talis proportio requiritur inter potentiam cognoscentem et cognoscibile, cum cognoscibile sit quasi actus potentiae cognoscentis. Et sic etiam est proportio creaturae ad Deum ut causati ad causam et cognoscentis ad cognoscibile, sed propter infinitum excessum creatoris super creaturam non est proportio creaturae ad creatorem, ut recipiat influentiam ipsius secundum totam virtutem eius, neque ut ipsum perfecte cognoscat, sicut ipse se ipsum perfecte cognoscit. In another way beings are said to be related when they are associated in a certain order; and in this way there is proportion between matter and form, between the maker and the thing made. This also is the kind of proportion required between knower and knowable, since what is knowable is, in a certain way, the act of the knowing power. Such, too, is the proportion of a creature to God: that of caused to its cause, and of knower to the knowable; but according as the excellence of the Creator transcends the creature, there is no proportion of the creature to the Creator which makes it possible to receive from Him an influx proportionate to His complete power, or to know Him perfectly, even as He perfectly knows Himself.
Ad quartum dicendum quod intellectus et intelligibile sunt unius generis, sicut potentia et actus. Deus autem, quamvis non sit in genere intelligibilium, quasi sub genere comprehensum, utpote generis naturam participans, pertinet tamen ad hoc genus ut principium. Eius etiam effectus non sunt extra genus intelligibilium, unde et hic per effectus et in patria per essentiam cognosci potest. Praeterea, intelligibile videtur magis dici per remotionem quam per positionem. Ex hoc enim est unumquodque intelligibile quod est a materia immune vel separatum. Negationes autem in divinis verificantur, quamvis affirmationes sint incompactae, ut Dionysius dicit 2 c. caelestis hierarchiae. 4. It may be said: The intellect and the intelligible object are of one genus, as potency and act. God, however, although not in the genus of intelligible things, as if comprehended under a genus participating in its nature, nevertheless is related to this genus as its principle. For His effects are not outside every genus of intelligible beings; wherefore even here, He can be known through His effects, and in heaven, through His essence. Moreover, a thing seems to be called “intelligible” more by negation than by, affirmation; for a thing is said to be intelligible inasmuch as it is either immune from matter or separated from it. Hence, negations may be stated in regard to divine things with truth; though affirmations are inadequate in expressing agreement, as Dionysius says (Coel. hier., chap. 2).
Ad quintum dicendum quod quando aliquid non cognoscitur per formam suam, sed per effectum suum, forma effectus supplet locum formae ipsius rei; nam ex ipso effectu scitur an causa sit. 5. It may be answered: When a thing is known, not through its own form, but through an effect, the form of that effect takes the place of the form of the thing itself, and therefore from the effect it is possible to know whether the cause exists.

Article 3
Whether God Is the First Object Known by the Mind
Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod primum, quod a mente cognoscitur, sit Deus. Illud enim, in quo omnia alia cognoscuntur et per quod de omnibus quae cognoscimus iudicamus, est primo cognitum a nobis, sicut lux est primo nota oculo quam ea, quae per lucem videntur, et principia intellectui prius quam conclusiones. Sed omnia in prima veritate cognoscuntur et per ipsam de omnibus iudicamus, ut Augustinus dicit in libro de Trinitate et de vera religione. Ergo prima veritas, scilicet Deus, est id quod primo a nobis cognoscitur. 1. It seems that the first object known or perceived by the mind must be God Himself. For, that in which all other things are known and through which we form judgments of what we know from all other things, is the first thing known by us, just as light is known by the eye prior to what is seen by the light; and as principles are understood before conclusions: but all things are known in the First Truth, and through that Truth we judge of all things, as Augustine says in De Trinitate and in De vera religione; therefore the First Truth is first known by us.
Praeterea, quando sunt plures causae ordinatae, prima causa prius influit in causatum quam causa secunda et ultimo dimittit ipsum, ut habetur in libro de causis. Sed cum scientia humana sit causata a rebus, scibile vel intelligibile est menti humanae causa intelligendi. Ergo primum intelligibilium primo influet in ipsam. Sed influxus intelligibilis in intellectum, in quantum huiusmodi, est ut intelligatur. Ergo Deus, qui est primum intelligibilium, ab intellectu nostro primo intelligitur. 2. When there are many ordered causes, the influx of the first cause into the thing caused is prior to that of the second cause, and it is the last to leave the effect, as is said in Liber de causis: but since human knowledge is caused by things, the knowable or the intelligible is the cause of the mind’s intellection; therefore the first intelligible is the first to influence it: but the influence of the intelligible on the mind, as such ‘ is that it be understood; therefore God is the first object known by our intellect, since He is the first intelligible.
Praeterea, in omni cognitione, in qua ea quae sunt priora et simpliciora primo cognoscuntur, id, quod est primum et simplicissimum, primo cognoscitur. Sed in cognitione humana ea, quae prius occurrunt, sunt priora et simpliciora, ut videtur, quia ens est illud quod primo cadit in cognitione humana, ut Avicenna dicit; esse autem est primum inter creata. Ergo cognitioni humanae primo occurrit Deus, qui est simpliciter primum et simplicissimum. 3. In all cognition, in which those things that are prior and simpler are first known, what is first and simplest is known first: but in human cognition. those things that are first experienced are things prior to others and simpler, as is evident, since being is that of which first the human mind forms a concept, as Avicenna says; being, moreover, is first among created things; therefore also, God first comes to the knowledge of the human mind, since He is absolutely first and most simple being.
Praeterea, finis, qui est ultimus consecutione, est primus in intentione. Sed Deus est ultimus finis humanae voluntatis, ad quem omnes alii fines ordinantur. Ergo est primus in intentione. Sed hoc non potest esse, nisi sit cognitus. Ergo illud quod primo occurrit cognoscendum est Deus. 4. That end which is the last in attainment is the first in intention: but God is the last end of the human will, to whom all other ends are ordained; and He is, therefore, the first in intention. But this could not be unless He were known; therefore God must be the first object of knowledge.
Praeterea, illud, quod non indiget aliqua praecedenti operatione ad hoc quod circa ipsum sit operatio alicuius operantis, prius cadit sub operatione illius operantis quam hoc quod indiget aliqua operatione alia, sicut lignum iam dolatum prius cadit sub operatione facientis scamnum quam lignum adhuc dolandum. Sed res sensibiles indigent quod abstrahantur a materia per intellectum agentem, antequam intelligantur ab intellectu possibili. Deus autem per se ipsum est maxime a materia separatus. Ergo ipse prius intelligitur ab intellectu possibili quam res sensibiles. 5. That which requires no preliminary preparation in order to be fitted to the need of the workman is the first chosen for his task, rather than that which needs some labor in order to be made ready, just as one making a bench selects wood already cut rather than uncut wood: but sensible things need to be abstracted from matter by the active intellect before they can be understood by the possible intellect. God, on the other hand, is by His very nature altogether separate from matter: therefore He is understood by the possible intellect prior to sensible things.
Praeterea, naturaliter cognita et quae non possunt intelligi non esse sunt illa quae primo nostrae cognitioni occurrunt. Sed cognitio exsistendi Deum naturaliter est omnibus inserta, ut dicit Damascenus. Nec potest Deus cogitari non esse, ut dicit Anselmus. Ergo Deus est primum quod a nobis cognoscitur. 6. Those things that are naturally known, and that cannot be thought of as non-existing, are what first occur to our cognition: but an idea of the existence of God is naturally implanted in all minds, as Damascene says. Neither is it possible to think of God as non-existent, as Anselm states; therefore God is the first being known by us.
Sed contra
Sed contra, secundum philosophum omnis nostra cognitio a sensu ortum habet. Sed Deus est maxime remotus a sensu. Ergo ipse non est a nobis primo, sed ultimo cognitus. On the contrary, according to the Philosopher, everything known by us takes its origin from sense knowledge: but God is absolutely remote from sense experience; therefore He is not first known by us, but is known last.
Praeterea, secundum philosophum ea, quae sunt posteriora secundum naturam, sunt priora quoad nos, et minus nota secundum naturam sunt magis nota quoad nos. Sed creaturae sunt posteriores et minus notae secundum naturam quam ipse Deus. Ergo Deus est posterius notus quoad nos. Again, according to the Philosopher, those things that are posterior, according to nature, are first known as far as we are concerned; and those things which are less knowable in themselves are better known as far as we are concerned. But created things are posterior and less knowable by nature than is God Himself; therefore, by us, He is known after creatures.
Praeterea, illud quod promittitur ut ultimum praemium non est primum quod praecedit omnia merita. Sed cognitio Dei promittitur nobis ut ultimum praemium omnis cognitionis et actionis. Ergo Deus non est primo a nobis cognitus. Again, what is promised as an ultimate reward does not come first, preceding everything done to deserve it: but knowledge of God is promised to us as the ultimate reward of all cognition and action; therefore God is not the first object known by us.
Responsio. Dicendum quod quidam dixerunt quod primum, quod a mente humana cognoscitur etiam in hac vita, est ipse Deus qui est veritas prima, et per hoc omnia alia cognoscuntur. Sed hoc apparet esse falsum, quia cognoscere Deum per essentiam est hominis beatitudo, unde sequeretur omnem hominem beatum esse. Response. I answer that it must be said: There are those who declare that the first object known by the human mind even in this life is God Himself, who is first truth and the one through whom all other things are known. But this is evidently false, since to know God through His essence constitutes the beatitude of man; wherefore it would follow that every man would be blessed.
Et praeterea, cum in divina essentia omnia quae dicuntur de ipsa sint unum, nullus erraret circa ea, quae de Deo dicuntur, quod experimento patet esse falsum. Et iterum ea, quae sunt primo in cognitione intellectus, oportet esse certissima, unde intellectus certus est se ea intelligere, quod patet in proposito non esse. Moreover, since in the divine essence all things said of it are one, no one would err in regard to anything he said concerning God—a thing which from experience is evidently false; furthermore, since things first in the comprehension of the intellect ought to be most certainly known, the intellect would be certain that it knew them; but it is clear that this is not the case in the proposition (as to knowing God).
Repugnat etiam haec positio auctoritati Scripturae quae dicit Exodi 3: non videbit me homo et vivet. This position is also repugnant to the authority of Scripture (Exod. 33:20): “Man shall not see Me and live.”
Unde alii dixerunt quod essentia divina non est primo cognitum a nobis in via, sed influentia lucis ipsius, et secundum hoc Deus est primum quod a nobis cognoscitur. Hence there are others who say that the divine essence is not the first thing known by us in this life, but the influx of its light is, and in this way God is the first object known by us.
Sed hoc etiam stare non potest, quia prima lux divinitus influxa in mente est lux naturalis per quam constituitur vis intellectiva. Haec autem lux non est primo cognita a mente neque cognitione qua sciatur de ea quid est, cum multa inquisitione indigeat ad cognoscendum quid est intellectus; neque cognitione qua cognoscitur an est, quia intellectum nos habere non percipimus, nisi in quantum percipimus nos intelligere, ut patet per philosophum in IX Ethicorum. Nullus autem intelligit se intelligere, nisi in quantum intelligit aliquod intelligibile. Ex quo patet quod cognitio alicuius intelligibilis praecedit cognitionem qua aliquis cognoscit se intelligere et per consequens cognitionem qua aliquis cognoscit se habere intellectum, et sic influentia lucis intelligibilis naturalis non potest esse primum cognitum a nobis, et multo minus quaelibet alia influentia lucis. But this claim cannot be held; for the first influx of divine light in the mind is the natural light by which the power of intellectual life is constituted. This light, however, is not at first known by the mind; neither by cognition by which is known what this light is, since much investigation is required to know the essence of the intellect; nor by cognition by which is known whether such a light exists; for we do not perceive that we possess intellect, except inasmuch as we perceive that we understand, as is clear from the Philosopher’s words in IX Ethic. For no one knows that he understands anything, save inasmuch as he understands something intelligible. From this it is evident that cognition of an intelligible object-precedes cognition by which one knows that he himself understands, and consequently precedes the cognition by which he knows that he possesses an intellect; and so the influx of the natural light of intelligence cannot be the first thing known by us; and much less can any other kind of influx of light be the first thing known.
Et ideo dicendum est quod primo cognitum homini potest accipi dupliciter: aut secundum ordinem diversarum potentiarum aut secundum ordinem obiectorum in una potentia. Therefore it must be said that “the first thing known to man” is a phrase which can be understood in two ways: either according to the order of diverse potencies, or according to the order of objects in some one potency.
Primo quidem modo, cum cognitio intellectus nostri tota derivetur a sensu, illud, quod est cognoscibile a sensu, est prius notum nobis quam illud, quod est cognoscibile ab intellectu, scilicet singulare vel sensibile intelligibili. According to the first way, since all the knowledge of our intellect is derived from sense experience, what is made known to us by our senses is known prior to what is known by the intellect; and this is the singular, or the sensible-intelligible.
Alio modo, scilicet secundum alium modum cuilibet potentiae est cognoscibile primo suum proprium obiectum. Cum autem in intellectu humano sit potentia activa et passiva, obiectum potentiae passivae, scilicet intellectus possibilis, erit illud, quod est actum per potentiam activam, scilicet intellectum agentem, quia potentiae passivae debet respondere proprium activum. According to the other meaning, that is, according to the order of objects in any one potency, the proper object of each potency is what is first knowable by it. Since, however, in the human intellect there is an active potency and a passive one, the object of the passive potency, namely, the possible intellect, will be that which is in act through the active potency, that is, through the active intellect, since to the passive potency there must correspond that which activates it.
Intellectus autem agens non facit intelligibilia formas separatas quae sunt ex se ipsis intelligibiles, sed formas quas abstrahit a phantasmatibus, et ideo huiusmodi sunt, quae primo intellectus noster intelligit. Et inter haec illa sunt priora, quae primo intellectui abstrahenti occurrunt. Haec autem sunt quae plura comprehendunt vel per modum totius universalis vel per modum totius integralis, et ideo magis universalia sunt primo nota intellectui et composita componentibus, ut diffinitum partibus diffinitionis. The active intellect, however, does not render intelligible separate forms, which are of themselves intelligible, but those forms which it abstracts from phantasms; and hence forms of this latter kind are those which our intellect knows. And among these forms, the ones that first come to be abstracted by the intellect hold the place of priority. These, furthermore, are the forms that comprehend more notes—either after the manner of a total universal or after the manner of an integral whole—therefore the more universal things are first known to the intellect; a composite is known before its component parts, and a definition before the parts of the definition.
Et secundum quod quaedam imitatio intellectus est in sensu, qui etiam quodammodo abstracta a materia recipit, etiam apud sensum singularia magis communia sunt primo nota, ut hoc corpus quam hoc animal. In this respect there is a certain imitation of the intellect found in the sense powers, which also receive as their objects things which in a certain way are abstracted from matter. For even in the case of the senses, singular things of a more general nature are the first known, as “this body” is known sooner than “this animal.”
Unde patet quod Deus et aliae substantiae separatae nullo modo possunt esse prima intellecta, sed intelliguntur ex aliis, ut dicitur Rom. 1: invisibilia et cetera. Thus it is evident that God and other separate substances cannot in any way be the first objects of our intellection, but are understood from other things, as is said in Rom. 1:20: “For the invisible things of Him, from the creation of the world, are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made.”
Answers to objections
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ex verbis illis Augustini et similibus non est intelligendum quod ipsa veritas increata sit proximum principium, quo cognoscimus et iudicamus, sed quia per lumen, quod est eius similitudo, nobis inditum cognoscimus et iudicamus. Nec hoc lumen habet aliquam efficaciam nisi ex prima luce; sicut in demonstrationibus secunda principia non certificant nisi ex virtute primorum. Nec tamen oportet quod etiam ipsum lumen inditum sit primo a nobis cognitum. Non enim eo alia cognoscimus sicut cognoscibili quod sit medium cognitionis, sed sicut eo quod facit alia esse cognoscibilia. Unde non oportet quod cognoscatur nisi in ipsis cognoscibilibus, sicut lux non oportet quod primo videatur ab oculo nisi in ipso colore illustrato. 1. It may be said: From the words of Augustine and from other similar sayings, it is not to be understood that the uncreated truth itself is the proximate principle by which we know and judge of things, but that through the light conferred upon us, which is a similitude of that truth, we have cognition and judgment. Nor would this light have any efficacy except from the First Light: just as in methods of demonstration second principles would have no certitude unless founded upon the truth of first principles. Nevertheless it should not be thought that even this (natural) light is the first thing known by us. For we do not know other things by means of it, as if it were a medium for cognition of the knowable, but because (as agent) it makes other things knowable. Wherefore it could not itself be known unless it were contained among knowable things; even as light could not be seen by the eye unless manifested in color itself.
Ad secundum dicendum quod non omnium causarum ordinatarum est influentia unius rationis in ultimum effectum. Unde non oportet quod primum intelligibile hoc modo influat in intellectum nostrum quod intelligatur, sed quod praestet intelligendi virtutem. Vel dicendum quod quamvis Deus sit in ordine intelligibilium primum simpliciter, non tamen est primum in ordine intelligibilium nobis. 2. It may be answered: In the case of a plurality of ordered causes, the influx into the ultimate effect is not always of the same nature. Therefore it need not be that the first intelligible so influence our intellect as to be Himself an object of our knowledge; but it is only necessary that as cause He bestow the power of intellection. Or it may be said that although in the order of intelligible things God is first absolutely, yet He is not first in the order of things that are intelligible to us.
Ad tertium dicendum quod quamvis illa, quae sunt prima in genere eorum quae intellectus abstrahit a phantasmatibus, sint primo cognita a nobis, ut ens et unum, non tamen oportet quod illa quae sunt prima simpliciter, quae non continentur in ratione proprii obiecti, sicut et ista. 3. It may be said: Although those things which are first in the genus of things abstracted by the intellect from phantasms are first known by us, as ens and unum, nevertheless it does not follow that those which are first absolutely (simpliciter), which are not contained in the genus of any proper object, should be classed with the former [i.e., things abstracted from phantasms].
Ad quartum dicendum quod quamvis Deus sit ultimus finis in consecutione et primus in intentione appetitus naturalis, non tamen oportet quod sit primus in cognitione mentis humanae quae ordinatur in finem, sed in cognitione ordinantis, sicut et in aliis quae naturali appetitu tendunt in finem suum. Cognoscitur tamen a principio et intenditur in quadam generalitate, prout mens appetit se bene esse et bene vivere, quod tunc solum est ei, cum Deum habet. 4. Answer is made: Although God is the last end in attainment and first in the intention of the natural appetancy, it is not necessary that He be first in the cognition of the human mind, which is ordained to its end, but first in the mind of the One ordaining it, as is the case in other things which by natural appetancy tend toward their own end. Nevertheless, the end is known from the beginning and intended in a certain general way, inasmuch as the mind desires its own well-being and welfare, which is possible to it only on condition that it (ultimately) possess God.
Ad quintum dicendum quod substantiae separatae quamvis abstractione non indigeant ad hoc quod intelligantur, tamen non sunt intelligibiles per lumen intellectus agentis, unde non primo ab intellectu nostro cognoscuntur. Intelligibile enim per huiusmodi lumen est obiectum intellectus, sicut visibile per lumen corporale est obiectum visus. 5. It may be answered: Although a process of abstraction is not required for the understanding of separate substances, they are not intelligible through the light of the active intellect; wherefore they are not the first objects of knowledge as far as our intellect is concerned.
Ad sextum dicendum quod Deum esse, quantum est in se, est per se notum, quia sua essentia est suum esse - et hoc modo loquitur Anselmus - non autem nobis qui eius essentiam non videmus. 6. It may be said: The existence of God, considered in itself, is a thing knowable in itself, since His essence is His existence; and in this way Anselm stated the matter.
Sed tamen eius cognitio nobis innata esse dicitur, in quantum per principia nobis innata de facili percipere possumus Deum esse. Nevertheless, to us, who do not behold His essence, it is not self-evident that He exists; though cognition of it may be said to be innate inasmuch as it is through principles which are innate in us that we are easily able to perceive that God exists.

Article 4
Whether the Human Mind Is Capable of Arriving at a Knowledge of the Divine Trinity Through Natural Reason
Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod per rationem naturalem mens ad cognitionem divinae Trinitatis sufficiat. Quidquid enim convenit enti in quantum ens, oportet maxime in primo ente inveniri. Sed Trinitas convenit enti in quantum ens, cum in omnibus entibus inveniatur, eo quod omnia habeant modum, speciem et ordinem, ut Augustinus dicit. Ergo naturali ratione sciri potest quod in Deo sit Trinitas. 1. It appears that the human mind is sufficiently capable of attaining to a knowledge of the divine Trinity through natural reason. Whatever belongs to being inasmuch as it is being ought especially to be found in first being: but a trinity does belong to being inasmuch as it is being, since such is found in everything, in this way: that all things have species, mode, and order, as Augustine says; therefore it is possible to know by natural reason that in God there is a Trinity.
Praeterea, nulla perfectio Deo est subtrahenda. Sed ternarius est numerus perfectionis omnis rei, ut dicitur in I caeli et mundi. Ergo Trinitas Deo est attribuenda, et sic idem quod prius. 2. No perfection can be wanting in God: but three is the number of every perfect thing, as is said in I De coelo et mundo: therefore Trinity must be attributed to God, and thus the conclusion is like that of the previous argument.
Praeterea, omnis inaequalitas ad aequalitatem reducitur priorem sicut multitudo ad unitatem. Sed inter Deum et primum ens creatum est inaequalitas. Ergo oportet praecedere aliquam aequalitatem, quae cum non sit nisi plurium, oportet esse aliquam pluralitatem in divinis. 3. All inequality is reducible to prior equality, as multitude is reducible to unity: but between God and first created being there is inequality; there must, therefore, be some preceding equality, but this could be no other than that of a plurality; therefore there must be some plurality in the Divine Being.
Praeterea, omne aequivocum reducitur ad univocum. Sed exitus creaturae a Deo est aequivocus. Ergo oportet ante hunc ponere processionem univocam, qua Deus procedit a Deo, ex qua Trinitas personarum consequitur. 4. Anything that is equivocal is reducible to what is univocal: but the issuing forth of creatures from God is equivocal; it is needful, therefore, to presume as prior to it a univocal procession, by which God proceeds from God, by reason of which a Trinity of persons ensues.
Praeterea, nullius boni sine consortio potest esse iucunda possessio. Sed in Deo est ab aeterno iucundissima boni possessio. Ergo habet aeternum consortium, quod non est nisi divinarum personarum, quia nulla creatura est aeterna. Ergo oportet in deitate personas plures ponere. 5. Without companionship, there can be no joy in the possession of any good: but in God there is from all eternity a most joyful possession of good; therefore, He possesses eternal companionship; but this could be no other than the companionship of divine persons, since no creature is eternal. Therefore, it is necessary to suppose a plurality of persons in the Deity.
Praeterea, quod Deus sit intelligens, ratione naturali haberi potest. Sed ex hoc quod est intelligens sequitur quod verbum concipiat, quia hoc est omni intelligenti commune. Ergo naturali ratione cognosci potest quod sit filii generatio et eadem ratione amoris processio. 6. It is possible to know from natural reason that God is intelligent; but from the fact that He is intelligent it follows that He conceives the Word, since this is common to every intelligence; therefore by natural reason it is possible to know of the generation of the Son and, in the same way, of the procession of love (between Father and Son: the Holy Spirit).
Praeterea, Richardus de sancto Victore dicit in I de Trinitate: credo sine dubio quoniam ad quorumlibet explanationem, quae necesse est esse, non modo probabilia, verum etiam necessaria argumenta non deerunt. Sed Deum esse trinum et unum est necesse, quia est aeternum. Ergo ad hoc sunt etiam rationes necessariae. Et sic idem quod prius. 7. Richard of St. Victor in his De Trinitate says: “I believe without any doubt that in the case of whatever things are necessary there cannot be wanting reasons to explain them, not only probable arguments, but necessary ones”; but that God is three and one is a necessary truth, since He is eternal; therefore in proof of this there are necessary arguments of reason, and so the conclusion is as the previous one.
Praeterea, Platonici non habuerunt notitiam de Deo nisi per rationem. Sed ipsi posuerunt ad minus duas personas, scilicet Deum patrem et mentem ab ipso genitam, quae omnium rerum rationes continet, quod nos de filio dicimus. Ergo ratione naturali potest pluralitas personarum cognosci. 8. The Platonists had no knowledge of God except through reason: but they held that there were at least two persons: namely, the Father and the Mind generated by the Father, and this Mind contained the ideas of all things—a truth which we claim in regard to the Son; therefore by natural reason a plurality of persons can be known.
Praeterea, philosophus dicit in I caeli et mundi: per hunc quidem numerum adhibuimus nos ipsos magnificare Deum creatorem. Et sic idem quod prius. 9. The Philosopher at the beginning of De coelo et mundo says: “Through this same number (three) we ourselves are accustomed to call upon God the Creator”; and so the conclusion is the same.
Praeterea, de Deo nullatenus in statu viae possumus cognoscere quid est, sed solum an est. Cognoscimus autem aliquo modo Deum esse trinum et unum, quia per fidem. Ergo hoc non pertinet ad quid est Dei, sed ad an est. Sed an est de Deo possumus ratione naturali ostendere. Ergo et Deum esse trinum et unum ratione naturali sciri potest. 10. In this life we can in no way know what God is but only that He is: but there is a way in which we know that God is three and one, since we know it by faith; therefore this truth does not pertain to a quidditative knowledge of God, but only to an entitative knowledge. But by natural reason we can know God entitatively; therefore it is possible by natural reason to know that God is three and one.
Sed contra
Sed contra, fides est de non apparentibus rationi, ut patet Hebr. 11. Sed Deum esse trinum et unum est articulus fidei. Ergo ad hoc videndum ratio non sufficit. Faith is of things that are not apparent to reason, as is clear from Heb. 11:1; but that God is three and one is an article of faith; therefore reason does not suffice for knowing this.
Praeterea, omnis ratio naturalis ex primis principiis naturaliter cognitis efficaciam habet. Sed Deum esse trinum et unum non potest deduci ex principiis naturaliter cognitis, quae a sensu accipiuntur, cum in sensibilibus nihil simile inveniatur, ut sint tria supposita unius essentiae. Ergo Deum esse trinum et unum non potest sciri per rationem. Again, natural reason has its efficacy from first principles of natural cognition: but that God is three and one cannot be deduced from principles naturally known, for these are derived from sense experience, and in sensible things there is found nothing like to three supposita of one essence; therefore God cannot be known as three and one from reason.
Praeterea, Ambrosius dicit: mihi impossibile est generationis scire secretum, mens deficit, vox silet non solum mea, sed et Angelorum. Ergo ratio naturalis non sufficit ad cognoscendam generationem divinam, et per consequens nec Trinitatem personarum. Moreover, according to the words of Ambrose: “It is impossible for anyone to know the secret of generation; the mind fails; the voice is silent; not only mine, but even that of the angels”; therefore natural reason does not suffice for knowledge of divine generation, and consequently for knowledge of the Trinity of persons.
Responsio. Dicendum quod Deum esse trinum et unum est solum creditum, et nullo modo potest demonstrative probari, quamvis ad hoc aliquales rationes non necessariae nec multum probabiles nisi credenti haberi possint. Quod patet ex hoc quod Deum non cognoscimus in statu viae nisi ex effectibus, ut ex praedictis patere potest. Et ideo naturali ratione de Deo cognoscere non possumus nisi hoc quod percipitur de ipso ex habitudine effectuum ad ipsum, sicut illa quae designant causalitatem ipsius et eminentiam super causata et quae removent ab ipso imperfectas condiciones effectuum. Trinitas autem personarum non potest percipi ex ipsa causalitate divina, cum causalitas sit communis toti Trinitati. Nec etiam dicitur secundum remotionem. Unde nullo modo demonstrative probari potest Deum esse trinum et unum. Response. I answer that the truth that God is three and one is altogether a matter of faith; and in no way can it be demonstratively proved. For, although certain reasons can be found (by way of demonstration ad hoc), they are not necessary, or even very probable except to one who believes it. This is evident from the fact that in this life we know God only from His effects, as previous statements have proved. Hence, according to natural cognition, we can know nothing of God except what we can derive concerning Him from viewing the relationship of effects to Him. Thus there are things that designate His causality and His eminence over creatures and that deny in Him any of the imperfections found in effects. The existence of a Trinity of persons, however, cannot be perceived from a consideration of divine causality, since causality is common to the whole Trinity. Nor can it be known from His lacking any imperfection. Therefore in no way can it be demonstratively proved that God is three and one.
Answers to objections
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ea, quae in creaturis sunt plura, in Deo sunt unum secundum rem. Et ideo quamvis in quolibet ente creato inveniatur aliqua Trinitas, ex hoc tamen non potest necessario concludi quod in Deo sint aliqua tria nisi secundum rationem, et haec pluralitas non sufficit ad personarum distinctionem. 1. It may be said: Those things which are many among created beings are in fact one in God: and therefore, although in every creature there is found a certain kind of trinity, it cannot be necessarily concluded from this that there is such a trinity in God, except logically, and this kind of plurality is not sufficient to prove a distinction of persons.
Ad secundum dicendum quod perfectio ternarii invenitur in Deo etiam secundum essentiae unitatem, non quod ipsa essentia numeretur, sed quia virtute continet omnis numeri perfectionem, ut dicitur in arithmetica Boethii. 2. It may be answered: The perfection of the number three is found in God according even to the unity of His essence, not because His essence is subject to numeration, but because in it there is contained virtually the perfection of every number, as is said in the Arithmetica of Boethius.
Ad tertium dicendum quod etiam remota distinctione personarum est aequalitas in divinis, secundum quod eius potentia suae sapientiae adaequatur. Vel potest dici quod in aequalitate est duo considerare, scilicet pluralitatem suppositorum, inter quae attenditur relatio, et unitatem quantitatis quae est ratio aequalitatis. Reductio ergo inaequalitatis ad aequalitatem non fit ratione pluralitatis suppositorum, sed ratione causae, quia sicut unitas est causa aequalitatis, ita inaequalitatis causa est pluralitas. Et ideo oportet quod causa aequalitatis sit ante causam inaequalitatis, non quod ante quaelibet inaequalia sint aliqua aequalia. Alias oporteret in ordine numerorum esse aliquid ante unitatem et dualitatem, quae sunt inaequalia, vel in ipsa unitate inveniri pluralitatem. 3. It may be said: Apart from any distinction of persons, there is equality in the Divinity, inasmuch as Its wisdom is equal to Its power. Or it can be said that in regard to equality there are two points of consideration, namely, plurality of supposita, among whom equality exists, and unity of quantity, which is the cause of equality. The reduction of inequality to equality, therefore, does not occur by reason of the plurality of supposita, but by reason of the cause; for just as unity is the cause of equality, so inequality is the cause of plurality. Hence it must be that the cause of equality precedes the cause of inequality, but not that any kind of inequality is preceded by some kind of equality: otherwise it would be necessary in an order of numbers that there should be something before unity and duality, which are unequals; or that in unity itself there should be found plurality.
Ad quartum dicendum quod quamvis omne aequivocum reducatur ad univocum, non tamen oportet quod generatio aequivoca reducatur ad generationem univocam, sed ad generans quod est in se univocum. In rebus enim naturalibus videmus quod generationes aequivocae sunt priores generationibus univocis, eo quod causae aequivocae habent influentiam supra totam speciem, non autem causae univocae, sed solum supra unum individuum, unde sunt quasi instrumenta causarum aequivocarum, sicut corpora inferiora corporum caelestium. 4. It must be said: Although anything equivocal is reducible to what is univocal, it is not necessary that equivocal generation should be reduced to univocal generation, but that it should be reduced to a generator which is univocal in itself. Now, in natural things we see that equivocal generations are prior to univocal because equivocal causes have an influx extending to the total species, whereas univocal causes have not, their influence extending only to one individual; and thus they are quasi-instruments of equivocal causes, just as inferior bodies are of superior.
Ad quintum dicendum quod ex hoc homo non potest habere vitam iucundam sine consortio, quia non habet in se unde sibi quantum ad omnia sufficiat. Et propter hoc animalia, quae habent in se singula, unde sibi sufficiant, consortium vitae non requirunt, sed sunt solitaria. Deus autem maxime est sibi sufficiens, unde remota distinctione personarum adhuc manet in eo summa iucunditas. 5. It is answered: It is not possible for man to have a joyous life without companionship because he has not within himself that which makes him all-sufficient; whereas, for the same reason, animals that are self-sufficient require no association with others for preservation of life, but are solitaries. God, however, is supremely self-sufficient; wherefore, even though there were no distinction of persons, infinite joy would still be His.
Ad sextum dicendum quod in Deo idem est intelligens et intellectum, et ideo non oportet quod ex hoc quod intelligit ponatur in ipso aliquid conceptum realiter distinctum ab ipso, sicut est in nobis. Trinitas autem personarum requirit realem distinctionem. 6. It may be said: In God, intellect and object of intellect are the same; and therefore, from the fact that He is intelligent, it need not be supposed that in Him there is any concept really distinct from Himself, as is the case with us: Trinity of persons, however, requires real distinction.
Ad septimum dicendum quod intellectus illius verbi apparet ex hoc quod sequitur: quamvis contingat nostram industriam latere. Omnia ergo necessaria in se ipsis sunt vel per se ipsa nota vel per alia cognoscibilia, non tamen oportet quod ita sit quoad nos. Unde non possumus ad omnia necessaria probanda secundum nostram industriam rationem necessariam invenire. 7. It may be answered: Understanding of this passage is clarified by that which follows: “Although they (these truths) are of such kind as to escape all our endeavors.” All things that are necessary in themselves, therefore, are either known in themselves or are knowable through other things: yet not in such a way that they are necessarily apparent to us. Therefore we cannot, even as a result of all our industry, discover necessary arguments of reason sufficient to prove all necessary truths.
Ad octavum dicendum quod Platonicorum positio nihil facit ad propositum secundum rei veritatem, quamvis videatur facere secundum verba. Non enim posuerunt Platonici quod illa mens esset eiusdem essentiae cum Deo patre, sed quod esset quaedam alia substantia separata ab ipso procedens, et tertiam ponebant animam mundi, ut patet per Macrobium. Et quia omnes substantias separatas deos nominabant, inde est quod has dicebant tres deos, ut dicit Augustinus X de civitate Dei. Quia tamen non ponebant aliquid spiritui sancto simile, sicut patri et filio - anima enim mundi non est nexus aliorum duorum secundum eos, sicut spiritus sanctus patris et filii - ideo dicuntur in tertio signo defecisse, id est in cognitione tertiae personae. Vel dicendum, sicut communiter dicitur, quod cognoverunt duas personas quantum ad appropriata potentiae et sapientiae, non quantum ad propria. Bonitas autem, quae spiritui sancto appropriatur, maxime respicit effectus quos illi non cognoverunt. 8. It may be said: The position of the Platonists affords no argument as regards the truth of this matter, even though it appears to do so according to words. For they did not hold that this Mind was of the same essence with God the Father, but that it was another substance proceeding from the first, and separate; and they also supposed that there was a third substance, the Soul-of-the-World, as is evidenced by Macrobius. And because all these separate substances they called “gods,” it came about that they called upon or spoke of three gods, as Augustine says in De civitate Dei (chap. 10); because they did not hold that there was anything like to the Holy Ghost, as there was to the Father and the Son. For the Soul-of-the-World is not the nexus of the other two, according to their doctrine, as is the Holy Spirit between the Father and the Son; therefore they are said to have lacked the third sign, that is, knowledge of the Third Person. Or it may be said, as the more common explanation has it, that they knew two persons according to the things appropriated to power and wisdom, but not according to the things proper to them. But goodness, which is appropriated to the Holy Spirit especially, has as its effects things which they did not know.
Ad nonum dicendum quod Aristoteles non intendit dicere quod Deus esset magnificandus ut trinus et unus, sed quia ternario sacrificiorum et orationum ab antiquis honorabatur propter ternarii numeri perfectionem. 9. It may be said: Aristotle did not have any intention of saying that God should be worshiped as three in one, but that He was honored by the ancients by the number three in their sacrifices and prayers because of the perfection of three as a number.
Ad decimum dicendum quod omnia, quae in Deo sunt, sunt una eius simplex essentia, sed ea, quae in ipso sunt unum, in intellectu nostro sunt multa, et propter hoc intellectus noster potest apprehendere unum istorum sine altero. Inde est quod in statu viae de nullo eorum possumus cognoscere quid est, sed solum an est, et contingit quod cognoscatur, an est unum eorum et non alterum; sicut si aliquis cognosceret, an sit sapientia in Deo, non autem an in ipso sit omnipotentia. Et similiter potest ratione naturali sciri an Deus sit, non tamen an sit trinus et unus. 10. It may be answered: All things in God are of one, simple essence; but those things that in Him are one, are many in our intellect, and on this account our intellect can apprehend one of these things without the other. Therefore in this life we are able to understand the quiddity of none of these things, but only their existence; and thus it happens that one of them may be known to exist and not another: just as one might know that there is ‘ wisdom in God, but not know that there is also omnipotence; and likewise it is possible, by natural reason to know that God exists, but not that He is a Trinity, and one God.

Quaestio 2, Prooemium
Deinde quaeritur de manifestatione divinae cognitionis.
Concerning the Manifestation of Knowledge of Divine Truth
Et circa hoc quaeruntur quattuor.
  1. Primo. Utrum divina liceat investigando tractare.
  2. Secundo. Utrum de divinis possit esse aliqua scientia.
  3. Tertio. Utrum in scientia fidei quae est de Deo liceat rationibus philosophicis et auctoritatibus uti.
  4. Quarto. Utrum sint obscuris et novis verbis divina velanda.
Here four questions are proposed:
  1. Whether divine truths ought to be treated of by the method of inquiry.
  2. Whether there can be any science of divine truths which are founded upon faith.
  3. Whether in the science of faith, which is concerning God, it is permissible to employ arguments of the natural philosophers.
  4. Whether divine truths ought to be veiled by new and obscure words.

Article 1
Whether Divine Truths Ought to Be Treated of by the Method of Inquiry

Articulus 1 Objections
Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod divina investigare non liceat argumentando. Eccli. 3: altiora te ne quaesieris, et fortiora te ne scrutatus fueris. Sed divina maxime sunt homine altiora, et praecipue ea quae fidei sunt. Ergo huiusmodi scrutari non licet. 1. It seems that it is not permissible to investigate divine things by the arguments of reason. In Sirach 3:22, it is said: “Seek not the things that are too high for thee”; but divine truths are, in a special way, too high for man, and particularly those truths which are of faith; therefore it is not permissible to inquire into them.
Praeterea, poena non infertur nisi pro culpa. Sed, sicut dicitur Prov. 25, perscrutator maiestatis opprimetur a gloria. Ergo perscrutari ea quae ad divinam maiestatem pertinent est illicitum. 2. Punishment is not inflicted except for some fault; but, as it is said in Prov. 25:27, “He that is a searcher of majesty shall be overwhelmed by glory”; therefore, it is not right to search out those things which pertain to divine majesty.
Praeterea, Ambrosius dicit: tolle argumenta, ubi fides quaeritur. Sed in divinis, et maxime circa Trinitatem, praecipue requiritur fides. Ergo in hac materia non licet per argumenta veritatem investigare. 3. Ambrose says: “Abandon arguments where faith is sought.” But in regard to divine truths, especially those concerned with the Trinity, faith is required; therefore in this matter it is not permissible to inquire into truth by arguments of reason.
Praeterea, Ambrosius dicit de generatione divina loquens: scrutari non licet mysteria superna; licet scire quod natus sit, non licet discutere quomodo natus sit. Ergo eadem ratione nihil eorum quae ad Trinitatem pertinent licet argumentis investigare. 4. Ambrose, in speaking of divine generation, says: “Supernal mysteries are not to be scrutinized: one may know that the Son was begotten; but how He was begotten should not be analyzed.” Accordingly, for the same reason it is not permissible to make rational investigation of those truths which pertain to the Trinity.
Praeterea, sicut dicit Gregorius in homilia octavae Paschae, fides non habet meritum, cui humana ratio praebet experimentum. Sed malum est meritum fidei evacuare. Ergo non licet rationibus de his quae sunt fidei perscrutari. 5. Gregory in his Homily for Easter (chap. 8) says: “Faith has no merit where human reason affords proof” ; but it is wrong to lose the merit of faith; therefore it is not right to investigate matters of faith according to methods of reason.
Praeterea, omnis honorificentia Deo debetur. Sed secreta per silentium honorificantur; unde dicit Dionysius in fine caelestis hierarchiae: super nos secretum silentio honorificantes. Et huic consonat quod dicitur in Psalmo secundum litteram Hieronymi: tibi silet laus, Deus, id est ipsum silentium est laus tua. Ergo debemus a perscrutatione divinorum silere. 6. All honor ought to be given to God: but divine mysteries are honored by silence; wherefore Dionysius says at the close of Coel. hier.: “Honoring by silence the hidden truth which is above us”; and with this there agrees what is said in Psalm 64, according to the text of Jerome: “Praise grows silent before You, O God,” that is, silence itself is Your praise, O God; therefore we ought to refrain ourselves in silence from searching into divine truths.
Praeterea, nullus movetur ad infinitum, ut philosophus dicit in I caeli et mundi, quia omnis motus est propter consecutionem finis, qui non invenitur in infinito. Sed Deus in infinitum distat a nobis. Cum ergo perscrutatio sit quidam rationis motus in id quod perscrutatur, videtur quod divina perscrutari non debeamus. 7. No one is moved to infinity, as the Philosopher says in I De Coelo et mundo, because all motion is on account of the attaining of an end [terminus], which is not to be found in infinity; but God is infinitely distant from us. Since, therefore, investigation is a kind of motion of reason toward that which is being searched out, it appears that divine truths ought not to be investigated.
Sed contra
Sed contra est quod dicitur 1 Petr. 3: parati semper ad satisfactionem omni poscenti vos rationem de ea quae in vobis est fide. Sed hoc non potest esse, nisi ea quae sunt fidei argumentis perscrutentur. Ergo perscrutatio per argumenta de his quae sunt fidei est necessaria. On the other hand, it is said (1 Pet. 3:15): “Being ready always to satisfy everyone that asks you a reason of that (faith and) hope which is in you”; but this could not be done unless we inquired reasonably into those things which are matters of faith; therefore investigation according to methods of reason into the truths of faith is necessary.
Praeterea, ut dicitur Tit. 1, ad episcopum requiritur, ut sit potens exhortari in doctrina sana et contradicentes revincere. Sed contradicentes fidei non possunt repelli nisi argumentis. Ergo in his quae sunt fidei argumentis oportet uti. Again as is said in Titus 1:9, it pertains to a bishop that he be capable of exhorting in sound doctrine and of overcoming those contradicting it: but he cannot do this without use of argumentation; therefore one ought to employ the arguments of reason in matters of faith.
Praeterea, Augustinus dicit in I de Trinitate: adiuvante domino Deo nostro suscipiamus et eam quam flagitant rationem quod Trinitas sit unus Deus. Ergo rationibus de Trinitate potest homo perscrutari. Again Augustine says in I De Trinitate: “With the help of God our Lord, we shall begin to discuss according to reason that for which they [our adversaries] seek explanation: that the Trinity is one God.” Therefore man can inquire about the Trinity according to methods of reason.
Praeterea, Augustinus contra Felicianum: quia non nimis inconvenienter duo ista discernis, cum ratione praemissa etiam testimonia non omittis, fateor secuturum quod ipse probaveris, scilicet quod rationibus et auctoritatibus utar. Et sic idem quod prius. Also Augustine says in his argument against Felician: “Since without too much disagreement you recognize these two things—since you do not disregard the foregoing argument and the word of authority—I present the matter to follow in such a way that you yourself may accept it as proof”; that is, I shall make use of arguments from reason and authority; and thus the conclusion is like the previous one.
Responsio. Dicendum quod cum perfectio hominis consistat in coniunctione ad Deum, oportet quod homo ex omnibus quae in ipso sunt, quantum possibile est, ad divina annitatur, ut intellectus contemplationi et ratio inquisitioni divinorum vacet, secundum illud Psalmi: mihi adhaerere Deo bonum est. Et ideo philosophus in X Ethicorum excludit dictum quorundam qui dicebant quod homo non debeat se intromittere de rebus divinis, sed solum de humanis, sic dicens: oportet autem non secundum suadentes humana sapere hominem entem neque mortalia mortalem, sed in quantum contingit immortale facere et omnia facere ad vivere secundum optimum eorum quae in ipso. Response. I answer that it must be said that, since the perfection of man consists in his union with God, it is right that man, by all the means which are in his power and in so far as he is able, mount up to and strive to attain to divine truths, so that his intellect may take delight in contemplation and his reason in the investigation of things of God, according to the saying of Ps. 72:28, “It is good for me to adhere to my God.” Hence also the Philosopher in X Ethic. opposes the saying of those who maintained that man ought not concern himself about divine things, but only about such as are human, saying: “One ought to be wise in regard to man, however, not according to those treating of human affairs alone, as a mortal knowing only mortal things; but, inasmuch as it is fitting for a mortal man to do so, he ought to do all things according to the best of those powers that are in him.”
Tripliciter tamen contingit in hoc peccare. In a threefold manner, however, it is possible for man to err on this point:
Primo ex praesumptione qua scilicet aliquis sic ea scrutatur quasi ea perfecte comprehensurus, et horum praesumptio arguitur Iob 12: forsitan vestigia Dei comprehendes et omnipotentem usque ad perfectum reperies? Et Hilarius dicit: ne te inseras in illud secretum et arcanum inopinabilis nativitatis; ne te immergas, summam intelligentiae comprehendere praesumens, sed intellige incomprehensibilia esse. First, by presumption, since one might enter upon such investigation as if he could attain a perfect comprehension, and it is this kind of presumption that is denounced in Job 11:7: “Do you think you can comprehend the steps of God, and find out the Almighty perfectly?” And Hilary says: “Do not involve yourself in the hiddenness and mystery of this inconceivable nativity; do not overwhelm yourself, presuming to comprehend the loftiest of intelligible things, but understand that it is incomprehensible.”
Secundo ex hoc quod in his quae sunt fidei ratio praecedit fidem, non fides rationem, dum scilicet aliquis hoc solum vult credere quod ratione potest invenire, cum debeat esse e converso; unde Hilarius: credendo incipe, scilicet inquire, percurre, persiste. In the second place, error arises if, in matters of faith, reason has precedence of faith and not faith of reason, to the point that one would be willing to believe only what he could know by reason, when the converse ought to be the case: wherefore Hilary says: “While believing [in a spirit of faith], inquire, discuss, carry through your speculation.”
Tertio ultra modum suae capacitatis ad divinorum perscrutationem se ingerendo, unde dicitur Rom. 12: non plus sapere, quam oportet sapere, sed sapere ad sobrietatem, unicuique sicut Deus divisit mensuram fidei. Non enim omnes eandem mensuram sunt consecuti, unde aliquid est ultra modum unius quod non est ultra modum alterius. In a third way error results from undertaking an inquiry into divine things which are beyond one’s capacity. Wherefore it is said in Rom. 12:3, “Not to be more wise than it behooves to be wise, but to be wise unto sobriety and according as God hath divided to every one the measure of faith.” All men, indeed, have not been accorded the same measure; wherefore a thing is beyond the capacity of one which is not beyond that of another.
Answers to objections
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illa dicuntur homine altiora quae capacitatem eius excedunt, non quae sunt digniora secundum naturam; quia his quae sunt digniora, quanto homo magis servato suo modo intendit, tanto magis perficitur. Sed si etiam in minimis considerandis aliquis modum suae capacitatis excedat, de facili incidit in errorem; unde Glossa ibidem dicit: haeretici duobus modis fiunt, scilicet cum de creatore vel de creaturis ultra modum intendentes in errores incidunt et a veritate recedunt. 1. It may be said: Those things are said to be too high for man which exceed his capacity, no those things which are of greater dignity according to nature: for the more man fixes his gaze upon things loftier by nature, in accordance with his capacity, the more it is to his advantage; but in the consideration of things which in the least exceed his capacity, he easily falls into error. Therefore the gloss on this same passage says: “Heretics are produced in two ways: namely, when men, beyond their proper capacity entering upon inquiry concerning the Creator or creatures fall into errors and depart from the truth.”
Ad secundum dicendum quod perscrutari est quasi ad finem scrutari. Hoc autem illicitum et praesumptuosum est, ut aliquis sic scrutetur divina quasi ad finem comprehensionis perventurus. 2. Answer may be made: To search out is, as it were, to press one’s investigation to the very end; but this would be unlawful and presumptuous if one should so investigate divine truths as though he could attain to complete comprehension as his goal.
Ad tertium dicendum quod ubi quaeritur fides, argumenta tolluntur quae fidei adversantur et eam praecedere conantur, non illa quae ipsam modo debito sequuntur. 3. It is answered: Where faith is sought for, those arguments which are in opposition to faith and those which seek to have precedence over it are cast aside, but not those which in due manner follow it.
Ad quartum dicendum quod non licet hoc modo scrutari superna mysteria, ut ad eorum comprehensionem intentio habeatur, quod patet ex hoc quod sequitur: licet scire quod natus sit, non licet discutere quomodo natus sit. Ille enim modum nativitatis discutit, qui quaerit scire quid sit illa nativitas, cum de divinis possimus scire quia sunt, non quid sunt. 4. It may be said: It is not lawful in this world to inquire into divine mysteries in such a way that one would have the intention of comprehending them, as is evident from the words that follow: “It is lawful to know that He was begotten,” etc. For he undertakes an unlawful mode of inquiry who seeks to know what the nature of this nativity is, since in regard to divine things we are able to know what they are not, but not what they are.
Ad quintum dicendum quod duplex est humana ratio. Una demonstrativa cogens intellectum ad consensum, et talis ratio non potest haberi de his quae fidei sunt, sed potest haberi ad evacuandum ea quae fidem esse impossibilem asserunt. Quamvis enim ea quae sunt fidei demonstrari non possint, non tamen possunt demonstrative improbari. Si autem talis ratio ad probanda ea quae sunt fidei induceretur, evacuaretur meritum fidei, quia iam assentire his non esset voluntarium, sed necessarium. 5. It may be answered: Human reasoning may be spoken of in two ways: in one way, it may be regarded as demonstrative, forcing the intellect to believe; and this kind of reasoning cannot be possessed in regard to those truths which are of faith; but it is possible to possess this kind of reasoning in refuting those arguments which would destroy faith or assert the impossible. For, although reason cannot demonstrate those things which are of faith, neither can these same truths be demonstratively disproved. Moreover, if this kind of reason could lead to a proving of those things which are of faith, it would deprive man of the merit of faith, because then assent would not be voluntary, but necessary.
Ratio autem persuasoria sumpta ex aliquibus similitudinibus ad ea quae sunt fidei inducta non evacuat fidei rationem; quia non facit ea esse apparentia, cum non fiat resolutio in prima principia quae intellectu videntur. Nec iterum meritum fidei evacuat, quia non cogit intellectum ad consensum, unde assensus remanet voluntarius. Persuasive reasoning, however, derived from certain likenesses to those things which are set forth by faith does not void the meaning of faith, since it does not make these truths to be apparent, for there can be no resolution of them to those first principles discernable by the intellect. Nor does it take away the merit of faith, because it does not force the intellect to comprehend truth, but assent remains voluntary.
Ad sextum dicendum quod Deus honoratur silentio, non quod nihil de ipso dicatur vel inquiratur, sed quia quidquid de ipso dicamus vel inquiramus, intelligimus nos ab eius comprehensione defecisse, unde dicitur Eccli. 43: glorificantes dominum quantumcumque potueritis, supervalebit adhuc. 6. It may be said: God is honored by silence, but not in such a way that we may say nothing of Him or make no inquiries about Him, but, inasmuch as we understand that we lack ability to comprehend Him. Wherefore in Sirach 43: 32-34, “Glorify the Lord as much as ever you can, for He will yet far exceed, and His magnificence is wonderful. Blessing the Lord, exit Him as much as you can: for He is above all praise. When you exalt Him put forth all your strength, and be not weary: for you can never go far enough.”
Ad septimum dicendum quod cum Deus in infinitum a creatura distet, nulla creatura movetur in Deum, ut ipsi adaequetur vel recipiendo ab ipso vel cognoscendo ipsum. Hoc ergo, quod in infinitum a creatura distat, non est terminus motus creaturae. Sed quaelibet creatura movetur ad hoc quod Deo assimiletur plus et plus quantum potest. Et sic etiam humana mens semper debet moveri ad cognoscendum de Deo plus et plus secundum modum suum. Unde dicit Hilarius: qui pie infinita persequitur, etsi non contingat aliquando, tamen semper proficiet prodeundo. 7. Answer may be made: Since God is infinitely distant from creatures, no creature is so moved unto God as to be made His equal, either in receiving from Him or in knowing Him. Therefore, by reason of the fact that God is infinitely distant from creatures, there is no terminus to the motion of creatures; but every creature is moved to this: that he may be more and more like to God, so far as this is possible, and so also the human mind ought always be moved more and more to a knowledge of God, according to the measure that is proper to it. Therefore Hilary says: “He who in pious spirit undertakes the infinite, even though he can in no wise attain it, nevertheless profits by advancing.”

Article 2
Whether There Can Be Any Science of Divine Truths Which Are Matters of Faith
Articulus 2 Objections
Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod de divinis quae fidei subsunt scientia esse non possit. Sapientia enim contra scientiam dividitur. Sed sapientia est divinorum. Non ergo scientia. 1. it appears that there can be no science of those divine truths which are matters of faith. For wisdom is distinguished from science; but wisdom treats of divine truths; therefore science cannot do so.
Praeterea, ut dicitur in I posteriorum, in qualibet scientia oportet de subiecto praesupponere quid est. Sed de Deo nullo modo possumus scire quid est, ut dicit Damascenus. Ergo de Deo non potest esse scientia. 2. As is said in I Poster., in every science one must suppose a quidditative knowledge of the subject; but in regard to God, it is impossible for us to know in any way what He is, as Damascene says; therefore it is not possible to possess any science of God.
Praeterea, cuiuslibet scientiae est partes et passiones sui subiecti considerare. Sed Deus, cum sit forma simplex, nec partes habet in quas dividatur nec passionibus aliquibus subici potest. Ergo de Deo non potest esse scientia. 3. It pertains to every science to consider the parts and passive potencies of its subject; but, since God is simple form [absolute act], He has not any parts that can be distinguished, nor in Him can there be any passive potencies; therefore there can be no science about God.
Praeterea, in qualibet scientia ratio praecedit assensum. Demonstratio enim facit in scientiis scibilibus assentire. Sed in his quae fidei sunt oportet esse e converso, scilicet quod assensus fidei praecedat rationem, ut dictum est. Ergo de divinis praecipue quae fide capiuntur non potest esse scientia. 4. In any science, reason precedes assent, for it is demonstration which in the sciences makes one assent to what is knowable; but in regard to those truths which are of faith, the converse ought to prevail, namely, assent on account of faith ought to precede reason, as has been said; therefore, of divine truths, especially of those which are known by faith, there can be no science.
Praeterea, omnis scientia procedit ex principiis per se notis, quae quisque probat audita, aut ex principiis quae ab his fidem habent. Sed articuli fidei, qui sunt prima principia in fide, non sunt huiusmodi, quia neque sunt per se nota neque ad principia per se nota resolvi possunt demonstrative, ut dictum est. Ergo de divinis quae fide tenentur non potest esse scientia. 5. Every science proceeds from self-evident principles which every man accepts upon first hearing, or from principles in which he has faith because of those first principles; but the articles of faith which are first principles in matters of faith, are not principles of this same kind, since they are not per se nota nor can they be resolved by demonstration to those that are, as has been said; therefore, there can be no science of divine truths held by faith.
Praeterea, fides est de non apparentibus. Sed scientia est de apparentibus, quia per scientiam apparent ea quae in scientia traduntur. Ergo de divinis quae fide tenentur non potest esse scientia. 6. Faith is not of those things that are apparent: but science is of things that are apparent, because through science those things that are treated of come to be clearly seen; therefore, concerning divine truths that are held by faith there can be no science.
Praeterea, cuiuslibet scientiae principium est intellectus, quia ex intellectu principiorum venitur in scientiam conclusionum. Sed in his, quae sunt fidei, intellectus non est principium, sed finis, quia, ut dicitur Is. 7, nisi credideritis, non intelligetis. Ergo de divinis quae fidei sunt non potest esse scientia. 7. Understanding is the principle of every science, because from the intellection of principles one comes to scientific knowledge of conclusions: but in those things that are of faith, intellection is not the beginning, but the end, for, as is said in Is. 7:9, “If you will not believe, you shall not understand”; therefore there can be no science of divine truths held by faith.
Sed contra
Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit XII de Trinitate: huic scientiae tribuo illud tantum quo fides saluberrima, quae ad veram beatitudinem ducit, gignitur, defenditur, roboratur. Ergo de his quae sunt fidei est scientia. But on the contrary is what Augustine says in XII De Trinitate: “To that science only do I attribute any value by which faith is well served, which leads to, produces, defends, and strengthens happiness”; therefore there is a science of the truths of faith.
Praeterea, hoc idem videtur per hoc quod dicitur Sap. 10: dedit illi scientiam sanctorum, quod de alia intelligi non potest nisi de ea qua sancti ab impiis discernuntur, quae est scientia fidei. Also, Wis. 10:10: “She gave him the science of the saints”, that is, of the truths of faith, because no other science can be here meant except that by which saints are distinguished from sinners, which is the science of faith.
Praeterea, apostolus de cognitione fidelium loquens 1 Cor. 8 dicit: sed non omnium est scientia, et sic idem quod prius. Also the Apostle in speaking of the knowledge of the faithful says in 1 Cor. 8:7: “But there is not knowledge in everyone,” and thus we come to the same conclusion as before.
Responsio. Dicendum quod cum ratio scientiae consistat in hoc quod ex aliquibus notis alia necessario concludantur, hoc autem de divinis contingat, constat quod de divinis potest esse scientia. Response. I answer that, since the essence of science consists in this, that from things known a knowledge of things previously unknown is derived, and this may occur in relation to divine truths, evidently there can be a science of divine things.
Sed divinorum notitia dupliciter potest aestimari. Uno modo ex parte nostra, et sic nobis cognoscibilia non sunt nisi per res creatas, quarum cognitionem a sensu accipimus. Alio modo ex natura ipsorum, et sic ipsa sunt ex seipsis maxime cognoscibilia, et quamvis secundum modum suum non cognoscantur a nobis, tamen a Deo cognoscuntur et a beatis secundum modum suum. But knowledge of divine truths can be thought of in two ways. In one way, as on our part, such truths are not knowable except from created things, of which we have a knowledge derived from sense experience. In another way, on the part of the nature of these things themselves, they are, in themselves, most knowable; and although they are not known by us according to their essences, they are known by God and by the blessed according to their proper mode;
Et secundum hoc de divinis duplex scientia habetur. Una secundum modum nostrum, qui sensibilium principia accipit ad notificandum divina, et sic de divinis philosophi scientiam tradiderunt, philosophiam primam scientiam divinam dicentes. Alia secundum modum ipsorum divinorum, ut ipsa divina secundum se ipsa capiantur, quae quidem perfecte in statu viae nobis est impossibilis, sed fit nobis in statu viae quaedam illius cognitionis participatio et assimilatio ad cognitionem divinam, in quantum per fidem nobis infusam inhaeremus ipsi primae veritati propter se ipsam. and so science of divine things must be considered in a twofold manner. One is according to our mode of knowledge, in which knowledge of sensible things serves as the principle for coming to a knowledge of divine; and it was in this way that the philosophers handed down a traditional science of divine things, calling first philosophy a divine science. The other mode is according to that of divine things themselves as they are understood in themselves. This is, indeed, a mode of knowledge which we cannot possess perfectly in this life; but there is for us, even in this life, a certain participation and assimilation to such a cognition of divine truth, inasmuch as through the faith which is infused into our souls we adhere to the very First Truth on account of Itself.
Et sicut Deus ex hoc, quod cognoscit se, cognoscit alia modo suo, id est simplici intuitu, non discurrendo, ita nos ex his, quae per fidem capimus primae veritati adhaerendo, venimus in cognitionem aliorum secundum modum nostrum discurrendo de principiis ad conclusiones, ut sic ipsa, quae fide tenemus, sint nobis quasi principia in hac scientia et alia sint quasi conclusiones. Ex quo patet quod haec scientia est altior illa scientia divina, quam philosophi tradiderunt, cum ex altioribus procedat principiis. And as God, since He knows Himself, knows in a way that is His own, that is, by simple intuition, not by discursive thought, so we, from those truths that we possess in adhering to First Truth, come to a knowledge of other truths, according to our own mode of cognition, namely, by proceeding from principles to conclusions. Wherefore, those truths that we hold in the first place by faith are for us, as it were, first principles in this science, and the other truths to which we attain are quasi-conclusions. From this it is evident that this science is of a higher order than that which the philosophers traditionally termed divine, since it proceeds from higher principles.
Answers to objections
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod sapientia non dividitur contra scientiam, sicut oppositum contra suum oppositum, sed quia se habet ex additione ad scientiam. Est enim sapientia, ut dicit philosophus in VI Ethicorum, caput omnium scientiarum, regulans omnes alias in quantum de altissimis principiis est; propter quod etiam dea scientiarum dicitur in principio metaphysicae et multo magis haec quae non solum de altissimis, sed ex altissimis est. Sapientis autem est ordinare, et ideo ista scientia altissima, quae omnes alias regulat et ordinat, sapientia dicitur, sicut in artibus mechanicis sapientes dicimus illos qui alios regulant, ut architectores; scientiae vero nomen aliis inferioribus relinquitur. Et secundum hoc scientia dividitur contra sapientiam sicut proprium contra diffinitionem. 1. It may be said: Wisdom is not distinguished from science as opposed to it, but as related to science by adding to it. For wisdom is, indeed, as the Philosopher says in VI Ethic., the head of all the sciences, regulating all others inasmuch as it treats of highest principles: on this account it is also called “the goddess of sciences” in I Metaph.; and much more is this true of that wisdom which is not only about highest principles, but from highest principles. Moreover, the function of wisdom is to order, and therefore this highest science, which orders and rules all others, is called wisdom; just as in mechanical arts we call those men wise who direct others, as the architects: but the name of “science” is also left to others that are inferior, and accordingly science is distinguished from wisdom as a property from a definition (i.e., as properties flow necessarily from an essence, so do the other sciences from wisdom).
Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, quando causae cognoscuntur per suos effectus, effectus cognitio supplet locum cognitionis quiditatis causae, quae requiritur in illis scientiis quae sunt de rebus quae per se ipsas cognosci possunt; et sic non oportet ad hoc quod de divinis scientiam habeamus, quod praesciatur de eo quid est. Vel potest dici quod hoc ipsum quod scimus de eo quid non est supplet locum in scientia divina cognitionis quid est; quia sicut per quid est distinguitur res ab aliis, ita per hoc quod scitur quid non est. 2. It may be said: As has been previously declared, since causes are known through their effects, the knowledge of an effect substitutes for the quidditative knowledge of the cause; this is necessarily required in those sciences treating of things that cannot be known through themselves: thus, for us to have a science of divine things, it is not necessary that we first have a quidditative knowledge of God. Or, again, it can be said that what we know God is not, takes the place, in divine science, of a cognition of what He is: for as one thing is distinguished from others by what it is, so God is here known by that which He is not.
Ad tertium dicendum quod partes subiecti in scientia non solum sunt intelligendae partes subiectivae vel integrales, sed partes subiecti dicuntur omnia illa quorum cognitio requiritur ad cognitionem subiecti, cum omnia huiusmodi non tractentur in scientia, nisi in quantum habent ordinem ad subiectum. Passiones etiam dicuntur quaecumque de aliquo probari possunt, sive negationes sive habitudines ad aliquas res. Et talia multa de Deo probari possunt et ex principiis naturaliter notis et ex principiis fidei. 3. It may be answered: In science the parts of a subject are not to be understood only as subjective or integral parts; but the parts of a subject are all those things of which knowledge is required in order to have cognition of the subject, since all things of this sort are not dealt with in a co-science except inasmuch as they are related to the subject. Those also are called passive potencies which can be proved in regard to anything, whether they are negations or relations to other things. And many such things can be proved in regard to God, both from naturally known principles and from principles of faith.
Ad quartum dicendum quod in qualibet scientia sunt aliqua quasi principia et aliqua quasi conclusiones. Ratio ergo quae inducitur in scientiis praecedit assensum conclusionum, sed sequitur assensum principiorum, cum ex eis procedat. Articuli autem fidei in hac scientia non sunt quasi conclusiones, sed quasi principia quae etiam defenduntur ab impugnantibus, sicut philosophus in IV metaphysicae disputat contra negantes principia, et manifestantur per aliquas similitudines, sicut principia naturaliter nota per inductionem, non autem ratione demonstrativa probantur. 4. It may be answered: In any science whatever there are certain things that serve as principles, and others as conclusions. Hence the reasoning process set forth in the sciences precedes the assent given to a conclusion, but follows upon assent to principles, since it proceeds from them. Now, it is true that the articles of faith are in this science rather principles than conclusions, but they must be defended against those opposing them, as the Philosopher (IV Metaph.) proves against those denying first principles: for they may be made clearer of understanding by certain similitudes, by inducing results of opposing naturally known principles, but they cannot be proved by demonstrative reasoning.
Ad quintum dicendum quod etiam in scientiis humanitus traditis sunt quaedam principia in quibusdam earum quae non sunt omnibus nota, sed oportet ea supponere a superioribus scientiis, sicut in scientiis subalternatis supponuntur et creduntur aliqua a scientiis superioribus, et illa non sunt per se nota nisi superioribus scientibus. Et hoc modo se habent articuli fidei, qui sunt principia huius scientiae, ad cognitionem divinam, quia ea quae sunt per se nota in scientia, quam Deus habet de se ipso, supponuntur in scientia nostra et creduntur ei nobis haec indicanti per suos nuntios, sicut medicus credit physico quattuor esse elementa. 5. It must be said: Even in those sciences handed down to us by human tradition, there are certain principles in some of them which are not universally known, but which presuppose truths derived from a higher science, just as in subordinate sciences certain things taken from superior sciences are assumed and believed to be true; and truths of this kind are not per se nota except in the higher sciences. This is the case with the articles of faith; for they are principles of that science leading to knowledge of divine things, since those truths which are per se nota in the knowledge which God has of Himself, are presupposed in our science; and He is believed as the one manifesting these truths to us through His messengers, even as the doctor believes from the word of the physicist that there are four elements.
Ad sextum dicendum quod apparentia scientiae procedit ex apparentia principiorum; quoniam scientia non facit apparere principia, sed ex hoc, quod apparent principia, facit apparere conclusiones. Et per hunc modum scientia, de qua loquimur, non facit apparere ea de quibus est fides, sed ex eis facit apparere alia per modum quo de primis certitudo habetur. 6. Answer is made: The evident truths of a science proceed from the evident truth of principles. Wherefore a science does not make clear the truth of its principles, but makes clear that of its conclusions: and in this same way the science of which we now speak does not make evident the things of which we have faith, but on the basis of them, it makes other things evident with the same certitude as that belonging to their first principles.
Ad septimum dicendum quod cuiuslibet scientiae principium est intellectus semper quidem primum, sed non semper proximum, immo aliquando est fides proximum principium scientiae. Sicut patet in scientiis subalternatis, quia earum conclusiones sicut ex proximo principio procedunt ex fide eorum quae supponuntur a superiori scientia, sed sicut a principio primo ab intellectu superioris scientis, qui de his creditis certitudinem per intellectum habet. Et similiter huius scientiae principium proximum est fides, sed primum est intellectus divinus, cui nos credimus, sed finis fidei est nobis, ut perveniamus ad intelligendum quae credimus, sicut si inferior sciens addiscat superioris scientis scientiam, et tunc fient et intellecta vel scita, quae prius erant tantummodo credita. 7. It may be said: Understanding is always the first principle of any science, but not always the proximate principle; rather, it is often faith which is the proximate principle of a science, as is evident in the case of the subordinate sciences; since their conclusions proceed from faith in truths accepted on the authority of a superior science as from a proximate principle, but from the understanding of scientists in the superior field who have intellectual certitude of these created truths as from their ultimate principle. So likewise the proximate principle of this divine science is faith, but the first principle is the divine intellect to the revelation of which we give the assent of faith; but faith is in us that we may attain to an understanding of those things we believe; in the same way that a scientist in an inferior field, if he should gain knowledge of a higher, would then possess understanding and science of truths which previously were accepted only on faith.

Article 3
Whether in the Science of Faith, Which Is Concerning God, it Is Permissible to Use the Rational Arguments of the Natural Philosophers
Articulus 3 Objections
Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod in his quae sunt fidei non liceat philosophicis rationibus uti. 1 Cor. 1: non misit me Christus baptizare, sed evangelizare, non in sapientia verbi, Glossa: in doctrina philosophorum. Et super illud: ubi inquisitor huius saeculi? Dicit Glossa: inquisitor est qui naturae secreta rimatur, tales non recipit Deus inter praedicatores. Et super illud 2 c.: sermo meus et praedicatio mea fuit non in persuasibilibus humanae sapientiae verbis, dicit Glossa: etsi persuasibilia fuerunt verba mea, non tamen per humanam sapientiam, ut verba pseudoapostolorum. 1. It seems that in regard to those truths that are of faith it is not right to employ the rational arguments of the natural philosophers, for, according to 1 Cor. 1:17, “Christ sent me not to baptize, but to preach the gospel: not wisdom of speech”; that is, “in the doctrine of the philosophers,” as the gloss says. And concerning the line (1 Cor. 1:20), “Where is the disputer of this world?” the gloss says: “The disputer is he who searches into the secrets of nature; such men God does not accept as preachers.” And on the line (1 Cor. 2:4), “And my speech and my preaching was not in the persuasive words of human wisdom,” the gloss says: “Although the words were persuasive, they were not so because of human wisdom, as is the word of pseudo-apostles.”
Ex quibus omnibus videtur quod in his quae sunt fidei non liceat rationibus philosophicis uti. From all these lines it is evident that in matters of faith it is not lawful to employ philosophical reasoning.
Praeterea, Is. 15 super illud: nocte vastata est Ar, dicit Glossa: Ar, id est adversarius, scilicet scientia saecularis, quae adversaria est Deo. Ergo scientia saeculari in his quae Dei sunt uti non debemus. 2. On that line (Is. 15:1), “Because in the night Ar of Moab is laid waste,” the gloss says: “Ar, that is, the adversary, namely, secular science, which is the adversary of God”; therefore, etc.
Praeterea, Ambrosius dicit: sacramentum fidei a philosophicis argumentis est liberum. Ergo ubi de fide agitur, philosophorum rationibus et dictis uti non licet. 3. Ambrose says: “The deepest mysteries of faith are free from the reasonings of the philosophers”; therefore, when a matter of faith is dealt with, the reasonings and words of the philosophers ought not to be used.
Praeterea, Hieronymus refert in epistula ad Eustochium virginem se in visione verberatum divino iudicio fuisse pro eo quod in libris legerat Ciceronis, et qui astabant precabantur ut veniam tribueret adolescentiae, exacturus deinde cruciatum, si gentilium libros aliquando legisset; unde obtestans nomen Dei clamavit: domine, si umquam habuero saeculares codices, si legero, te negavi. Si ergo non licet in eis studere et legere, multo minus licet eis in divinis tractatibus uti. 4. Jerome relates in a letter to Eustochium that in vision he was beaten, according to divine justice, because he had read the books of Cicero, and that those standing by besought that leniency might be granted on account of his youth, and that afterward the extreme penalty should be exacted if he read again the books of the Gentiles; wherefore, calling upon the name of God, he exclaimed: “If ever I shall possess secular books, if ever I read them, I shall have denied You”; therefore it is not lawful to use them in treating of divine things.
Praeterea, saecularis sapientia frequenter in Scriptura per aquam significatur, sapientia vero divina per vinum. Sed Is. 1 vituperabuntur caupones aquam vino miscentes. Ergo vituperandi sunt doctores qui sacrae doctrinae philosophica documenta admiscent. 5. In Scripture, secular wisdom is often represented by water, but divine wisdom by wine. Now, according to Is., chap. 1, the innkeepers are upbraided for mixing water with wine; therefore the doctors are blameworthy for their mingling of philosophical doctrine with sacred Scripture.
Praeterea, sicut dicit Hieronymus in Glossa Osee 2, cum haereticis nec nomina debemus habere communia. Sed haeretici utuntur ad fidei corruptionem philosophicis documentis, ut habetur in Glossa Prov. 7 et Is. 15. Ergo Catholici eis in suis tractatibus uti non debent. 6. Jerome says, in his gloss on Hosea, chap. 2, “With heretics we ought not to have even names in common.” But heretics use the arguments of philosophers to destroy faith, as is maintained in the gloss on Prov., chap, 7 and Is., chap. 15; therefore Catholics ought not to use such in their discussions.
Praeterea, sicut quaelibet scientia habet principia propria, ita et sacra doctrina, scilicet articulos fidei. Sed in aliis scientiis non recte proceditur, si assumantur alterius scientiae principia, sed oportet in unaquaque ex propriis principiis procedere, secundum doctrinam philosophi in I posteriorum. Ergo nec in sacra doctrina recte proceditur, si quis ex documentis philosophorum procedit. 7. Every science has its proper principles, and thus also sacred doctrine has those that belong to it, namely, the articles of faith; but in other sciences the process is not valid if principles are taken from a different science, but each ought to proceed from its own principles, according to the teaching of the Philosopher (I Poster.); therefore the method is not permissible in sacred doctrine.
Praeterea, si alicuius doctrina in aliquo repudiatur, eius auctoritas invalida est ad aliquid confirmandum; unde dicit Augustinus quod si in sacra Scriptura concesserimus aliquid esse falsitatis, peribit eius auctoritas ad fidei confirmationem. Sed sacra doctrina in multis doctrinam philosophorum repudiat, quia in multis errasse inveniuntur. Ergo eorum auctoritas non est efficax ad aliquid confirmandum. 8. If the doctrine of anyone is repudiated in any respect, the authority of his teaching will not be valid in proving anything; wherefore Augustine says that, if in sacred doctrine we discover some falsity, the authority of that teaching is destroyed for confirming anything in regard to faith; but sacred doctrine repudiates the doctrine of the philosophers in many ways, because many errors are found among them; therefore their authority has no efficacy in proving anything (regarding sacred doctrine).
Sed contra
Sed contra est quod apostolus Tit. 1 Epimenidis poetae versiculo usus est dicens: Cretenses semper mendaces, malae bestiae, ventres pigri, et 1 Cor. 15 verbis Menandri: corrumpunt bonos mores colloquia prava, et Athenis usus est verbis Arati: ipsius, scilicet Dei, et genus sumus, ut habetur Act. 17. Ergo et aliis divinae Scripturae doctoribus licet philosophicis argumentis uti. But on the contrary, the Apostle (Titus 1: 12) makes use of a verse from the poet Epimenides, saying, “The Cretans are always liars, evil beasts,” etc.; and (1 Cor. 15:33) he employs the words of Menander: “Evil communications corrupt good manners”; and in Acts 17:28 are the words of Aratus, “For we are also his (i.e., God’s) offspring.” Therefore it is licit for other doctors of divine Scripture also to make use of the arguments of the philosophers.
Praeterea, Hieronymus in epistula ad magnum urbis Romae oratorem enumeratis pluribus sacrae Scripturae doctoribus ut Basilio, Gregorio et quibusdam aliis subiungit: qui omnes in tantum philosophorum doctrinis atque sententiis suos referserunt libros, ut nescias, quid in eis primum mirari debeas, utrum eruditionem saeculi vel scientiam Scripturarum. Quod non fecissent, si non licuisset vel inutile fuisset. Again, Jerome, in a letter to Magnus, a famous orator of Rome, having enumerated many doctors of Scripture, such as Basil and Gregory, adds: “All these have so intermingled in their books the teachings and the sayings of the philosophers that one knows not which to admire first in them, their secular erudition or their knowledge of the Scriptures.” But this they would not have done had such been illicit or useless.
Praeterea, Hieronymus in epistula ad Pammachium de dormitione Paulinae: si adamaveris mulierem captivam, id est sapientiam saecularem, et eius pulchritudine captus fueris, decalva eam, et illecebras crinium atque ornamenta verborum cum tenacibus unguibus seca, lava eam prophetali nitro, et requiescens cum illa dicito: sinistra eius sub capite meo, et dextera illius amplexabitur me, et multos tibi captiva fetus dabit, ac de Moabitide efficietur tibi Israelites. Ergo fructuosum est ut aliquis sapientia saeculari utatur. Also Jerome in a letter to Pammachius about the death of Paula says: you have become enamored of the captive woman, secular wisdom, and captivated by her beauty, cut her hair and her finger nails, cut away the enticement of her tresses and the adornments of her words, bathe her with prophetic niter, and, lying with her, say: ‘His left hand under my head, and his right hand shall embrace me’ (Cant. 8:3), and many children will the captive woman give to you, and from the Moabite, Israelites will be born to you.” Therefore with fruitful results some make use of secular wisdom.
Praeterea, Augustinus dicit in II de Trinitate: non ero segnis ad inquirendam substantiam Dei sive per Scripturam sive per creaturam. Sed cognitio de creaturis in philosophia proponitur. Ergo non est inconveniens quod aliquis in sacra doctrina rationibus philosophicis utatur. Again Augustine (II De Trinitate) says: “I shall not be without zeal in seeking out knowledge of God, whether through Scripture or creatures”; but knowledge of God through creatures is given in philosophy; therefore it is not unfitting that in sacred doctrine one should make use of philosophical reasoning.
Praeterea, Augustinus in II de doctrina Christiana: philosophi autem qui dicuntur si qua forte vera et fidei nostrae accomoda dixerunt, non solum formidanda non sunt, sed ab eis tamquam iniustis possessoribus in usum nostrum vindicanda. Et sic idem quod prius. Again Augustine (Book II, De doctrina Christiana) says: “If the philosophers have by chance uttered truths helpful to our faith, they are not only not to be feared, but rather those truths ought to be taken from them as from unjust possessors and used to our advantage.” Thus the conclusion is as before.
Praeterea, Daniel 1 super illud: proposuit autem Daniel etc., dicit Glossa: si quis imperitus mathematicae artis contra mathematicos scribat aut expers philosophiae contra philosophos agat, quis etiam ridendus vel ridendo non rideat? Sed oportet quandoque doctorem sacrae Scripturae contra philosophos agere. Ergo oportet eum philosophia uti. Also on the saying in Dan. 1:8, “But Daniel purposed in his heart,” the gloss says: “If anyone ignorant of mathematics should write in opposition to the mathematicians, or knowing nothing of philosophy should argue against the philosophers, would he not be derided?” But doctors of sacred Scripture must at times argue with philosophers; therefore it is needful that they make use of philosophy.
Responsio. Dicendum quod dona gratiarum hoc modo naturae adduntur quod eam non tollunt, sed magis perficiunt; unde et lumen fidei, quod nobis gratis infunditur, non destruit lumen naturalis rationis divinitus nobis inditum. Et quamvis lumen naturale mentis humanae sit insufficiens ad manifestationem eorum quae manifestantur per fidem, tamen impossibile est quod ea, quae per fidem traduntur nobis divinitus, sint contraria his quae sunt per naturam nobis indita. Oporteret enim alterum esse falsum; et cum utrumque sit nobis a Deo, Deus nobis esset auctor falsitatis, quod est impossibile. Sed magis cum in imperfectis inveniatur aliqua imitatio perfectorum, in ipsis, quae per naturalem rationem cognoscuntur, sunt quaedam similitudines eorum quae per fidem sunt tradita. Response. I answer that it must be said that gifts of grace are added to those of nature in such a way that they do not destroy the latter, but rather perfect them; wherefore also the light of faith, which is gratuitously infused into our minds, does not destroy the natural light of cognition, which is in us by nature. For although the natural light of the human mind is insufficient to reveal those truths revealed by faith, yet it is impossible that those things which God has manifested to us by faith should be contrary to those which are evident to us by natural knowledge. In this case one would necessarily be false: and since both kinds of truth are from God, God would be the author of error, a thing which is impossible. Rather, since in imperfect things there is found some imitation of the perfect, though the image is deficient, in those things known by natural reason there are certain similitudes of the truths revealed by faith.
Sicut autem sacra doctrina fundatur supra lumen fidei, ita philosophia fundatur supra lumen naturale rationis; unde impossibile est quod ea, quae sunt philosophiae, sint contraria his quae sunt fidei, sed deficiunt ab eis. Continent tamen aliquas eorum similitudines et quaedam ad ea praeambula, sicut natura praeambula est ad gratiam. Now, as sacred doctrine is founded upon the light of faith, so philosophy depends upon the light of natural reason; wherefore it is impossible that philosophical truths are contrary to those that are of faith; but they are deficient as compared to them. Nevertheless they incorporate some similitudes of those higher truths, and some things that are preparatory for them, just as nature is the preamble to grace.
Si quid autem in dictis philosophorum invenitur contrarium fidei, hoc non est philosophia, sed magis philosophiae abusus ex defectu rationis. Et ideo possibile est ex principiis philosophiae huiusmodi errorem refellere vel ostendendo omnino esse impossibile vel ostendendo non esse necessarium. Sicut enim ea quae sunt fidei non possunt demonstrative probari, ita quaedam contraria eis non possunt demonstrative ostendi esse falsa, sed potest ostendi ea non esse necessaria. If, however, anything is found in the teachings of the philosophers contrary to faith, this error does not properly belong to philosophy, but is due to an abuse of philosophy owing to the insufficiency of reason. Therefore also it is possible from the principles of philosophy to refute an error of this kind, either by showing it to be altogether impossible, or not to be necessary. For just as those things which are of faith cannot be demonstratively proved, so certain things contrary to them cannot be demonstratively shown to be false, but they can be shown not to be necessary.
Sic ergo in sacra doctrina philosophia possumus tripliciter uti. Thus, in sacred doctrine we are able to make a threefold use of philosophy:
Primo ad demonstrandum ea quae sunt praeambula fidei, quae necesse est in fide scire, ut ea quae naturalibus rationibus de Deo probantur, ut Deum esse, Deum esse unum et alia huiusmodi vel de Deo vel de creaturis in philosophia probata, quae fides supponit. 1. First, to demonstrate those truths that are preambles of faith and that have a necessary place in the science of faith. Such are the truths about God that can be proved by natural reason—that God exists, that God is one; such truths about God or about His creatures, subject to philosophical proof, faith presupposes.
Secundo ad notificandum per aliquas similitudines ea quae sunt fidei, sicut Augustinus in libro de Trinitate utitur multis similitudinibus ex doctrinis philosophicis sumptis ad manifestandum Trinitatem. 2. Secondly, to give a clearer notion, by certain similitudes, of the truths of faith, as Augustine in his book, De Trinitate, employed any comparisons taken from the teachings of the philosophers to aid understanding of the Trinity.
Tertio ad resistendum his quae contra fidem dicuntur sive ostendendo ea esse falsa sive ostendendo ea non esse necessaria. 3. In the third place, to resist those who speak against the faith, either by showing that their statements are false, or by showing that they are not necessarily true.
Tamen utentes philosophia in sacra doctrina possunt dupliciter errare. Nevertheless, in the use of philosophy in sacred Scripture, there can be a twofold error:
Uno modo in hoc quod utantur his quae sunt contra fidem, quae non sunt philosophiae, sed corruptio vel abusus eius, sicut Origenes fecit. In one way, by using doctrines contrary to faith, which are not truths of philosophy, but rather error, or abuse of philosophy, as Origen did.
Alio modo, ut ea quae sunt fidei includantur sub metis philosophiae, ut scilicet si aliquis credere nolit nisi quod per philosophiam haberi potest, cum e converso philosophia sit ad metas fidei redigenda, secundum illud apostoli 2 Cor. 10: in captivitatem redigentes omnem intellectum in obsequium Christi. In another way, by using them in such manner as to include under the measure of philosophy truths of faith, as if one should be willing to believe nothing except what could be held by philosophic reasoning; when, on the contrary, philosophy should be subject to the measure of faith, according to the saying of the Apostle (2 Cor. 10:5), “Bringing into captivity every understanding unto the obedience of Christ.”
Answers to objections
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ex omnibus verbis illis ostenditur quod doctrina philosophorum non sit utendum quasi principali, ut scilicet propter eam veritas fidei credatur; non tamen removetur, quin ea possint uti sacri doctores quasi secundaria. Unde ibidem super illud: perdam sapientiam sapientum, dicit Glossa: non ideo hoc dicit ut veritatis intelligentia possit a Deo reprobari, sed quia eorum prudentia reprobatur, qui in sua eruditione confidunt. 1. It may be said: From all these words it is shown that philosophical doctrine ought not to be used as if it had first place, as if on account of it one believed by faith; nevertheless the fact is not disproved that doctors of sacred learning may employ philosophy, as it were, secondarily. Wherefore, on the saying (1 Cor. 1:19), “I will destroy the wisdom of the wise,” the gloss adds: “This he does not say because the understanding of truth can be worthy of God’s anger, but because the false prudence of those who trusted in their erudition is worthy of reproof.”
Ut tamen totum quod est fidei non humanae potentiae aut sapientiae tribueretur, sed Deo, voluit Deus ut primitiva apostolorum praedicatio esset in infirmitate et simplicitate, cui tamen postea potentia et saecularis sapientia superveniens ostendit per victoriam fidei mundum esse Deo subiectum et quantum ad potentiam et quantum ad sapientiam. Nevertheless, in order that all that is of faith might be attributed not to human power or wisdom but to God, God willed that the primitive preaching of the apostles should be in infirmity and simplicity; though, on the other hand, with the later advent of power and secular wisdom, He manifested by the victory of the faith that the world is subject to God as much by wisdom as by power.
Ad secundum dicendum quod sapientia saecularis dicitur esse contraria Deo quantum ad eius abusum, sicut ea haeretici abutuntur, non quantum ad eius veritatem. 2. It may be said: Secular wisdom is said to be contrary to God in so far as it is an abuse of wisdom (i.e., erroneous) as when heretics abuse it, but not in so far as it is true.
Ad tertium dicendum quod sacramentum fidei pro tanto dicitur liberum a philosophicis argumentis, quia sub metis philosophiae non coartatur, ut dictum est. 3. It may be answered: The sacred deposit of the truth of faith is said to be free from philosophical doctrine inasmuch as it is not confined by the limits of philosophy.
Ad quartum dicendum quod Hieronymus adeo afficiebatur ad gentilium libros quod sacram Scripturam quodammodo contemnebat; unde ipsemet ibidem dicit: si quando in memet reversus prophetas legere coepissem, sermo horrebat incultus. Et hoc esse reprehensibile nullus ambigit. 4. It may be said: Jerome was so influenced by certain books of the Gentiles that he contemned, in a way, sacred Scripture: wherefore he himself says: “If I began to read it while turning over the words of the Prophets in my own mind, their crude expression filled me with distaste.” And no one will deny that such was reprehensible.
Ad quintum dicendum quod ex tropicis locutionibus non est sumenda argumentatio, ut dicit Magister 11 distinctione III sententiarum, et Dionysius dicit in epistula ad Titum quod symbolica theologia non est argumentativa, et praecipue cum illa expositio non sit alicuius auctoris. Et tamen potest dici quod quando alterum duorum transit in dominium alterius, non reputatur mixtio, sed quando utrumque a sua natura alteratur. Unde illi, qui utuntur philosophicis documentis in sacra doctrina redigendo in obsequium fidei, non miscent aquam vino, sed aquam convertunt in vinum. 5. It may be said: No conclusive argument can be drawn from figurative speech, as the Master (Peter Lombard) says. Dionysius also says in his letter to Titus that symbolic theology has no weight of proof, especially when such interprets no authority. Nevertheless it can be said that When one of two things passes into the nature of another, the product is not considered a mixture except when the nature of both is altered. Wherefore those who use philosophical doctrines in sacred Scripture in such a way as to subject them to the service of faith, do not mix water with wine, but change water into wine.
Ad sextum dicendum quod Hieronymus loquitur de illis nominibus quae ab haereticis sunt inventa accomoda suis erroribus. Philosophicae autem disciplinae non sunt tales, immo earum abusus solum in errorem ducit, et ideo non sunt propter hoc vitandae. 6. It may be said: Jerome is speaking of those arguments that were invented by heretics to give support to their errors; but such doctrines do not belong to philosophy; rather they lead only to error; and consequently on their account the truths of philosophy ought not be shunned.
Ad septimum dicendum quod scientiae quae habent ordinem ad invicem hoc modo se habent quod una potest uti principiis alterius, sicut scientiae posteriores utuntur principiis scientiarum priorum, sive sint superiores sive inferiores; unde metaphysica, quae est omnibus superior, utitur his quae in aliis scientiis sunt probata. Et similiter theologia, cum omnes aliae scientiae sint huic quasi famulantes et praeambulae in via generationis, quamvis sint dignitate posteriores, potest uti principiis omnium aliarum scientiarum. 7. Answer may be made: Sciences which are ordered to one another are so related that one can use the principles of another, just as posterior sciences can use the principles of prior sciences, whether they are superior or inferior: wherefore metaphysics, which is superior in dignity to all, uses truths that have been proved in other sciences. And in like manner theology—Although all other sciences are related to it in the order of generation, as serving it and as preambles to it—can make use of the principles of all the others, even if they are posterior to it in dignity.
Ad octavum dicendum quod in quantum sacra doctrina utitur philosophicis documentis propter se, non recipit ea propter auctoritatem dicentium, sed propter rationem dictorum, unde quaedam bene dicta accipit et alia respuit. Sed quando utitur eis propter alios refellendos, utitur eis, in quantum sunt in auctoritatem illis qui refelluntur, quia testimonium ab adversariis est efficacius. 8. It may be said: Inasmuch as sacred doctrine makes use of the teachings of philosophy for their own sake, it does not accept them on account of the authority of those who taught them, but on account of the reasonableness of the doctrine; wherefore it accepts truth well said and rejects other things: but when it uses these doctrines to refute certain errors, it uses them inasmuch as their authority is esteemed by those whose refutation is desired, because the testimony of an adversary has in that case greater weight.

Article 4
Whether Divine Truths Ought to Be Concealed by New and Obscure Words
Articulus 4 Objections
Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod divina in scientia fidei non sunt obscuritate verborum velanda, quia, ut dicitur Prov. 14, doctrina prudentium facilis. Ergo sine obscuritate verborum proponi debet. 1. It seems that in the science of faith divine truths ought not to be veiled over by obscurity of words, for it is said in Prov. 14:6, “The learning of the wise is easy.” Therefore these truths ought to be presented without obscurity of words.
Praeterea, Eccli. 4: ne abscondas sapientiam in decore eius; et Prov. 11: qui abscondit frumenta, Glossa: praedicationis, maledicetur in populis. Ergo verba sacrae doctrinae non sunt velanda. 2. According to Sirach 4:28, “Hide not thy wisdom in her beauty,” and Prov. 11:26, “He that hides up corn (the gloss says that preaching is here meant) shall be cursed among the people.” Therefore the words of sacred doctrine ought not to be hidden.
Praeterea, Matth. 10: quod dico vobis in tenebris, Glossa: in mysterio, dicite in lumine, Glossa: aperte. Ergo obscura fidei sunt magis reseranda quam occultanda difficultate verborum. 3. The text of Matt. 10:27, “That which I tell you in the dark (gloss, in mystery) speak ye in the light (gloss, openly).” Therefore the obscure truths of faith ought to be made more manifest, rather than hidden by the difficulties of words.
Praeterea, doctores fidei sunt sapientibus et insipientibus debitores, ut patet Rom. 1. Ergo taliter debent loqui, ut a magnis et a parvis intelligantur, id est sine obscuritate verborum. 4. The doctors of truths of faith are debtors to wise and unwise, as is evident from Rom. 1:14: therefore they ought so to speak that they may be understood by great and small, that is, without obscurity of words.
Praeterea, Sap. 7 dicitur: quam sine fictione didici et sine invidia communico. Sed ille qui eam occultat, non eam communicat. Ergo videtur invidiae reus. 5. Wis. 7:13, “Which I have learned without guile, and communicate without envy”; but those who hide do not, communicate; therefore they seem guilty of envy.
Praeterea, Augustinus dicit IV de doctrina Christiana: expositores sacrae Scripturae non ita loqui debent, tamquam se ipsos exponendos proponant, sed in omnibus sermonibus suis primitus ac maxime ut intelligantur elaborent ea perspicuitate dicendi, ut multum tardus sit qui non intelligit. 6. Augustine in IV De doctrina Christiana says: “Those explaining sacred Scripture ought not to speak in such a way that they themselves need explanation as of the same authority; but in all their sermons they ought to strive primarily and especially to be understood, and to declare these truths with as much clarity as possible so that he would be very dull who would not comprehend them.”
Sed contra
Sed contra est quod dicitur Matth. 7: nolite sanctum dare canibus neque mittatis margaritas vestras ante porcos, ubi dicit Glossa: res absconsa avidius quaeritur, celata venerabilius conspicitur, diu quaesita carius tenetur. Cum ergo sacra documenta expediat summa veneratione intueri, videtur quod non debeant publicari, sed obscure tradi. But on the contrary is that which is said in Matt, 7:6, “Give not that which is holy to dogs,” on which the gloss comments: “A hidden thing is more eagerly sought for, a thing concealed appears more worthy of veneration, that which is a long time sought for is held more dear.” Since, therefore, sacred writings ought to be regarded with the greatest veneration, it seems that it is expedient they be discussed with obscurity of speech.
Praeterea, Dionysius dicit 1 c. ecclesiasticae hierarchiae: omnem sanctam laudem non tradas alteri praeter aeque ordinatos tibi deiformes, id est divinas laudes, quibus omnia sacra documenta complectitur, non tradas nisi tibi similibus. Sed si verbis conspicuis scriberentur, omnibus paterent. Ergo secreta fidei sunt verborum obscuritate velanda. Again, Dionysius (I Eccles. hier.) says: “Do not reveal to another every holy thing in praise of God, except those forms of praise generally ordained; that is, those divine rites by which all the sacraments are surrounded should not be revealed except to those like yourself”; but if they were written in conspicuous words, they would be apparent to all; therefore the secrets of faith are to be concealed by obscuring words.
Praeterea, ad hoc est quod dicitur Luc. 8: vobis, id est perfectis, datum est nosse mysterium regni Dei, id est intelligentiam Scripturarum, ut patet per Glossam, ceteris autem in parabolis. Ergo oportet aliqua verborum obscuritate a multitudine occultari. Also it is said in Luke 8:10, “To you it is given to know the mystery of the kingdom of God” (that is, to have understanding of the Scriptures, as is evident from the gloss); “but to the rest in parables.” Therefore one ought by obscurity in speech conceal sacred truths from the multitude.
Responsio. Dicendum quod verba docentis ita debent esse moderata ut proficiant, non noceant audienti. Quaedam autem sunt quae audita nemini nocent, sicut ea quae omnes scire tenentur; et talia non sunt occultanda, sed manifeste omnibus proponenda. Quaedam vero sunt quae proposita manifeste auditoribus nocent; quod quidem contingit dupliciter. Uno modo, si arcana fidei infidelibus fidem abhorrentibus denudentur. Eis enim venirent in derisum; et propter hoc dominus dicit Matth. 7: nolite sanctum dare canibus; et Dionysius dicit c. 2 caelestis hierarchiae: quae sancta sunt circumtegens ex immunda multitudine tamquam uniformia custodi. Response. I answer that the words of a teacher ought to be so moderated that they result to the profit and not to the detriment of the one hearing him. Now, there are certain things which on being heard harm no one, as are the truths which all are held responsible to know: and such ought not to be hidden but openly proposed to all. But there are others which, if openly presented, cause harm in those hearing them; and this can occur for two reasons: in one way, if the secret truths of faith are revealed to infidels who oppose the faith and so come to be derided by them. On this account it is said in Matt. 7:6, “Give not that which is holy to dogs.” And Dionysius (II Coel. hierar.) says, “Listen reverently to these words, to this doctrine given for our instruction by the divinity of divinities, and hide these holy teachings in your minds, shielding them from the unclean multitude so that you may keep them as uniform as possible.”
Secundo, quando aliqua subtilia rudibus proponuntur, ex quibus perfecte non comprehensis materiam sumunt errandi; unde apostolus dicit 1 Cor. 3: ego, fratres, non potui vobis loqui quasi spiritualibus, sed tamquam parvulis in Christo lac potum vobis dedi, non escam. Unde Exodi 22 super illud: si quis aperuerit cisternam etc., dicit Glossa Gregorii: qui in sacro eloquio iam alta intelligit, sublimes sensus coram non capientibus per silentium tegat, ne per scandalum interius aut fidelem parvulum aut infidelem, qui credere potuisset, interimat. Haec ergo ab his, quibus nocent, occultanda sunt. Secondly, if any subtleties are proposed to uncultivated people, these folk may find in the imperfect comprehension of them matter for error; wherefore, in 1 Cor. 3:1 it is said: “And I, brethren, could not speak to you as unto spiritual, but as unto carnal. As unto little ones in Christ, I gave you milk to drink, not meat.” And therefore also, on Exod. 21:33, “If a man open a pit,” the gloss of Gregory says: “He who in sacred eloquence now understands lofty things should cover over these sublime truths by silence when in the presence of those who do not comprehend them, lest through some scandal of mind he cause the loss of some little one among the faithful or of an infidel who otherwise might have come to believe. Those truths, therefore, ought to be hidden from those to whom they might do harm; but a distinction can be made as regards speaking, since these same truths may be privately revealed to the wise, though publicly silence is kept regarding them.” Sed in collocutione potest fieri distinctio, ut eadem seorsum sapientibus manifestentur et in publico taceantur.
Unde dicit Augustinus in IV l. de doctrina Christiana: sunt quaedam quae vi sua non intelliguntur aut vix intelliguntur, quantolibet et quantumlibet quamvis plenissime dicentis versentur eloquio, quae in populi audientiam vel raro, si aliquid urget, vel numquam omnino mittenda sunt. Sed in scribendo non potest talis distinctio adhiberi, quia liber conscriptus ad manus quorumlibet venire potest, et ideo sunt occultanda verborum obscuritatibus, ut per hoc prosint sapientibus qui ea intelligunt et occultentur a simplicibus qui ea capere non possunt. Thus, Augustine (IV De doctrina Christiana) says: “Where certain truths are, by reason of their own character, not comprehensible, or scarcely so, even when explained with every effort on the part of the speaker to make them clear, these one rarely dwells upon with a general audience, or never mentions, at all: but in writing, the same distinction cannot be adhered to, because a book, once published, can fall into the hands of any one at all, and therefore some truths should be shielded by obscuring words so that they may profit those who will understand them and be hidden from the simple who will not comprehend them.”
Et in hoc nullus gravatur, quia qui intelligunt, lectione detinentur, qui vero non intelligunt, non coguntur ad legendum. Unde Augustinus dicit in eodem libro: in libris qui ita scribuntur, ut ipsi sibi quodammodo lectorem teneant, cum intelliguntur, cum autem non intelliguntur, molesti non sunt volentibus legere, non est hoc officium disserendi, ut vera, quamvis ad intelligendum difficillima, ad aliorum intelligentiam perducamus. And by this procedure no harm is done to anyone, because those who understand are held by that which they read, but those who do not understand are not compelled to continue reading. And therefore Augustine says in the same place: “In books which are, so written that they somehow keep a hold on the attention of the reader who understands them, but cause no harm to the one who does not understand them and so is unwilling to read further, there is no failure in duty on the part of the author as long as we bring these truths, even though they are so difficult of comprehension, to the understanding of some.”
Answers to objections
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod auctoritas illa non est ad propositum. Non enim est sensus auctoritatis quod doctrina prudentium sit facilis active, id est quod faciliter doceant, sed passive, quia faciliter docentur, ut patet per Glossam. 1. It is answered: The authority quoted is not relevant to the proposition. For it is not to be understood that the teaching of prudent men be “easy” in the active sense; that is, that they easily teach everything; but in the passive sense: that such men are easily taught, as is evident from the gloss.
Ad secundum dicendum quod auctoritates illae loquuntur de illo qui abscondit ea quae manifestanda sunt, unde Eccli. 4 praemittitur: non retineas verbum in tempore salutis. Per hoc autem non removetur, quin ea, quae sunt occultanda, debeant obscuritate verborum celari. 2. It may be answered: These authorities speak of hiding truths which ought to be made manifest; wherefore it is previously said in Sirach 4:28, “Refrain not to speak in the time of salvation.” By this, however, there is no denial of the fact that gore are mysteries which ought to be concealed by obscuring words.
Ad tertium dicendum quod doctrina Christi est publice et plane praedicanda, ita quod unicuique sit planum illud quod expedit ei scire, non autem ut publicentur ea quae scire non expedit. 3. It may be said: The doctrine of Christ ought to be taught publicly and openly to this extent: that the truths expedient for each one to know be made clear. Things that are not expedient, however, need not be publicly taught.
Ad quartum dicendum quod doctores sacrae Scripturae non sunt ita sapientibus et insipientibus debitores, ut eadem utrisque proponant, sed ita quod utrisque proponant ea quae eis competunt. 4. It may be answered: The doctors of sacred Scripture are not debtors to the wise and to the foolish in such a way that they must propose the same truths to both, but that they propose to each what is to the advantage of each.
Ad quintum dicendum quod non est ex invidia quod subtilia multitudini occultantur, sed magis ex debita discretione, ut dictum est. 5. It may be said: Subtle truths are not concealed from the multitude on account of envy, but rather out of due discretion.
Ad sextum dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur de expositoribus qui ad populum loquuntur, non de his qui scripto aliquid tradunt, ut ex consequentibus patet. 6. It may be answered: Augustine is here speaking of explanations made orally to the people, not of those transmitted in writing, as is evident from what follows.

Pars 2

Prooemium: Boethius’ Text
Christianae religionis reverentiam plures usurpant, There are many who claim as theirs the dignity of the Christian religion;
sed ea fides pollet maxime ac solitarie quae cum propter universalium praecepta regularum, quibus eiusdem religionis intellegatur auctoritas, tum propterea, quod eius cultus per omnes paene mundi terminos emanarit, catholica vel universalis vocatur. but that form of faith has supreme authority, and has it exclusively, which, both on account of the universal character of the rules and doctrines affirming its authority, and because the worship in which they are expressed has spread throughout the world, is called catholic or universal.
Cuius haec de trinitatis unitate sententia est: "Pater," inquiunt, "deus filius deus spiritus sanctus deus". 1.1.2 The belief of this religion concerning the Trinity is as follows: The Father is God, the Son is God, the Holy Spirit is God.
Igitur pater filius spiritus sanctus unus non tres dii. 1.2.1 Therefore, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are one God, not three Gods.
Cuius coniunctionis ratio est indifferentia. The nature of Their Unity is such that there is no difference.
Eos enim differentia comitatur qui vel augent vel minuunt, ut Arriani qui gradibus meritorum trinitatem variantes distrahunt atque in pluralitatem diducunt. Difference cannot be avoided by those who add to or take from the Unity, as for instance the Arians, who by graduating the Trinity according to merit, break it up and convert it to Plurality.
Principium enim pluralitatis alteritas est; For the essence of plurality is otherness;
praeter alteritatem enim nec pluralitas quid sit intellegi potest. apart from otherness plurality is unintelligible.
Trium namque rerum vel quotlibet tum genere tum specie tum numero diversitas constat; In fact, the difference between things is to be found in genus or species or number.
quotiens enim idem dicitur, totiens diversum etiam praedicatur. 2.1 In as many ways as things are the same, in the same number of ways they are said to be diverse.
Idem vero dicitur tribus modis: aut genere ut idem homo quod equus, quia his idem genus ut animal; vel specie ut idem Cato quod Cicero, quia eadem species ut homo; vel numero ut Tullius et Cicero, quia unus est numero. Quare diversum etiam vel genere vel specie vel numero dicitur. 2.2 Sameness is predicated in three ways: by genus; e.g., a man and a horse, because of their common genus, animal. By species; e.g., Cato and Cicero, because of their common species, man. By number; e.g., Tullius and Cicero, because they are numerically one. Similarly difference is expressed by genus, species, and number.
Sed numero differentiam accidentium varietas facit. Nam tres homines neque genere neque specie sed suis accidentibus distant; nam vel si animo cuncta ab his accidentia separemus, tamen locus cunctis diversus est quem unum fingere nullo modo possumus; duo enim corpora unum locum non obtinebunt, qui est accidens. Atque ideo sunt numero plures, quoniam accidentibus plures fiunt. 2.3 But a variety of accidents brings about numerical difference; three men differ neither by genus nor species, but by their accidents, for if we mentally remove from them all other accidents, still each one occupies a different place which cannot possibly be regarded as the same for each, since two bodies cannot occupy the same place, and place is an accident. Wherefore it is because men are plural by their accidents that they are plural in number.
St. Thomas’ Commentary
Post prooemium hic Boethius tractatum suum incipit de Trinitate personarum et unitate divinae essentiae. Et dividitur liber iste in duas partes. In prima prosequitur ea quae pertinent ad unitatem essentiae contra Arianos. In secunda prosequitur ea quae pertinent ad Trinitatem personarum contra Sabellium, ibi: sed hoc interim ad eam. Hereupon, after the Prooemium, Boethius begins his treatise De Trinitate Personarum, et Unitate divinae essentiae: and this book is divided into two parts. First, he discusses those things which pertain to the unity of the divine essence, making opposition the Arians. Secondly, he treats of those things which pertain to the Trinity of persons, in opposition to Sabellius, beginning: “In as many ways as things are the same, in the same number of ways they are said to be diverse.”
Prima pars dividitur in duas. In prima proponit Catholicae fidei sententiam de unitate divinae essentiae. In secunda investigat propositae sententiae veritatem, ibi: age igitur, ingrediamur. Prima dividitur in duas. In prima describit fidei condicionem, cuius sententiam prosequi intendit. In secunda proponit descriptae fidei sententiam de proposito, ibi: cuius haec de Trinitatis. The first part is also divided into two sections. In the first, he proposes the doctrine of the Catholic faith in regard to the unity of the divine essence. Secondly, he investigates the truth of the doctrine proposed when he says: “Therefore...” In the first section he treats of two things. First, he represents the condition of that faith whose doctrine he intends to explain. Secondly, he sets forth the doctrine of the faith he has described concerning this proposition, saying: “The belief of this religion concerning the Trinity.”
Describit autem eam dupliciter, scilicet ex comparatione haeresum, quibus praepollet, et ex proprio nomine, quia Catholica vel universalis vocatur. Dicit ergo: plures, id est diversarum haeresum sectae, usurpant, id est indebite sibi attribuunt, reverentiam Christianae religionis, id est quae Christianae religioni debetur, ut scilicet ei omnes subdantur, secundum illud 1 Ioh. 3: haec est victoria quae vincit mundum, fides nostra. Vel reverentiam quam Christiana religio Deo exhibet credendo his quae divinitus sunt praedicata. He describes this religion in a twofold manner, namely, by comparison with heretical cutis, which it excels, and also in its own name since it is called catholic or universal. He says, therefore, that there are many, that is, many sects of diverse heresies, who make unlawful claims, since they unduly attribute to themselves the honor of the Christian religion, that is, the honor which ought to be paid to it: namely, that all others should be subject to it. 1 John 5:4: “This is the victory that overcomes the world, our faith.” Or, again, they claim the dignity which belongs to the Christian religion in that it manifests the glory of God by believing those truths which have been divinely revealed.
Sed ea fides pollet maxime ac solitarie. Haec duo adiungit, ut discretionem faciat eius quod est secundum veritatem et eius quod est secundum opinionem. Secundum enim rei veritatem haeretici Christiani non sunt, cum a doctrina Christi recedant, et quantum ad hoc Catholica fides solitarie pollet; sed secundum apparentiam et hominum opinionem haeretici Christiani dicuntur, quia saltem vel voce nomen Christi confitentur, et quantum ad hoc fides Catholica non sola, sed maxime pollet. “But that form of faith has supreme authority, and has it exclusively.” Here he adds the two things that make it distinct both according to truth and according to reputation. Now according to the truth of the matter, heretics are not Christians, since they cut themselves off from the teachings of Christ, and in this respect the Catholic faith alone is valid. But according to appearances and in the opinion of men, heretics are called Christians because they do indeed still, at least in word, confess the name of Christ; and according to this aspect, the Catholic faith is not the only one, but holds the place of greater authority.
Ipsa enim communius et diffusius est recepta, unde subdit: quae vocatur Catholica in Graeco vel universalis in Latino, quod idem est; Catholicum enim Graece Latine universale dicitur. Cuius nominis assignat duas rationes, dicens: tum propter praecepta universalium regularum. Praecepta enim, quae fides Catholica proponit, non uni tantum genti observanda, sed omnibus proponit, in quo praecipue differt a lege Moysi, quae uni tantum populo praecepta proponebat. Similiter etiam singulae haereses suis tantum sectatoribus praecepta accomoda tradunt, sed fides Catholica de omnibus curam gerens omnibus praecepta accomoda tribuit, non solum continentibus, ut Manichaei, sed etiam coniugatis; non solum innocentibus, ut Novatiani, sed etiam paenitentibus quibus illi salutem denegant. Unde subdit: quibus, scilicet universalibus regulis, intelligitur auctoritas eiusdem religionis, qua omnes ei subditi esse debent. That this religion is the more common and the more widely diffused is understood when he says, “is called catholic or universal.” Now this is the same thing; for catholic in the Greek, means the same as the Latin universal. For the use of this name, he assigns two reasons, saying: “On account of the precepts of its universal rules,” for the precepts which the Catholic religion sets forth are not to be observed by one race alone, but by all: and in this respect it differs especially from the Law of Moses which gave precepts to one people alone. Likewise even individual heresies propose rules that are accommodated to their own members only; while the Catholic faith, having the care of all, gives its precepts to all: not to the unmarried alone, as do the Manichaeans, but also to the married; not to the innocent alone, as do the Novatians, but to sinners as well, for whom that sect would make salvation impossible. Wherefore he adds: “the authority of this religion is evident because of its universal rules,” on account of which all ought to be subject to it.
Vel dicuntur universales regulae, quia eis nihil falsitatis, nihil iniquitatis admiscetur in quocumque articulo sive in quocumque casu. Deinde subiungit aliam causam dicens: tum propterea quod eius cultus et cetera. Planum est secundum illud Psalmi: in omnem terram exivit et cetera. Or they may be called universal rules since there is in them no falsity or any admixture of evil, neither in any essential article or accidentally. Then he adds another reason, saying: “Because the worship in which they are expressed has spread throughout the world,” a thing which is evidently in accord with that saying of Ps. 18:5: “Their sound has gone forth into all the earth: and their words unto the ends of the world.”
Cuius haec de Trinitatis et cetera. Hic ponitur praenotatae fidei sententia de proposita quaestione. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo ponit Catholicae fidei sententiam de unitate Trinitatis. Secundo eiusdem sententiae rationem, ibi: cuius coniunctionis et cetera. Tertio ostendit praedictae rationis convenientiam, ibi: principium enim pluralitatis. 1.1.2 Hereupon he next sets forth the doctrine of the Catholic faith concerning the question proposed: “The belief of this religion concerning the Trinity.” Concerning this, he does three things: First, he presents the teaching of the Catholic faith on the unity of the Trinity. Secondly, the reason for this opinion: “The principle of this unity.” Thirdly, he shows the fitness of the reason, saying: “Now the essence of plurality.”
Proponit autem fidei Catholicae sententiam per modum argumenti, eo quod fides argumentum non apparentium dicitur Hebr. 11. In quo quidem argumento ex hoc, quod deitas singulis personis uniformiter attribuitur, concluditur quod de omnibus non pluraliter, sed singulariter hoc nomen Deus praedicatur. Moreover, he proposes the opinion of Catholic faith in a certain argumentative form, because faith is called “the evidence of things that appear not” (Heb. 11:1). In the same argument, indeed, from the fact that divinity is attributed equally to each of the Persons, he concludes that of all three the name “God” is ‘predicated not plurally, as taken together, but individually.
Deinde huius sententiae rationem assignat. Et primo ponit rationem, secundo per contrarium exponit, ibi: eos enim et cetera. Next he assigns the reason for this belief. First, he states the reason, and secondly, he explains it by its contrary where he says: “Difference cannot be avoided by those who add to or take from the Unity.”
Dicit ergo: cuius quidem coniunctionis, id est coniunctae argumentationis, ratio est indifferentia, scilicet deitatis in tribus personis, quam fides Catholica confitetur. Ex hoc enim est quod ex praemissis praedicta conclusio sequitur, quia indifferens deitas tribus personis non differenter attribuitur. Quam quidem rationem per contrarium exponit, dicens: eos enim comitatur differentia, deitatis scilicet, qui vel augent vel minuunt, id est qui ponunt unam personam maiorem vel minorem alia, ut Ariani dicentes patrem esse maiorem filio. Unde subdit: qui, scilicet Ariani, variantes Trinitatem gradibus meritorum, id est dignitatum, dum filium patri subiciunt et spiritum sanctum utrique, distrahunt, id est in diversa trahunt deitatem in eis dividendo, atque in pluralitatem deducunt. Ex divisione enim sequitur pluralitas. E contrario vero Catholici aequalitatem personarum confitentes indifferentiam profitentur et per consequens unitatem. Therefore he says: “The nature of Their Unity is such that there is no difference,” namely, the Unity of Deity in the three Persons, as confessed by the Catholic faith. From this the conclusion following upon the foregoing words is that Deity without difference is attributed to each of the three Persons; ( and this reasoning he explains by its contrary saying: “Difference cannot be avoided by those who add to or take from the Unity (of the Deity)”: that is, who hold that one Person is greater or less than the others, as the Arians, who make the Father greater than the Son. Wherefore he continues: “As for instance the Arians, who by graduating the Trinity, break it up”; that is, by graduating the Trinity according to dignity, since they make the Son subject to the Father, and the Holy Spirit to both Father and Son, and so “convert it to Plurality”; that is, produce diversity by dividing the Deity among the Persons. For from division there follows plurality. Conversely, Catholics who confess an equality of the Persons, an equality without difference, make profession of consequent Unity.
Deinde cum dicit: principium enim etc., ostendit rationem praemissam esse convenientem. Et dividitur in duas partes. In prima demonstrat praeassignatae rationis necessitatem. In secunda quiddam, quod in sua demonstratione supposuit, probat, ibi: omnium namque et cetera. Circa primum proponit duo. Primo quod alteritas est principium pluralitatis, alteritatem intelligens differentiam qua aliqua inter se altera constituuntur. Et maluit dicere alteritatem quam alietatem, quia non solum substantiales differentiae pluralitatem constituunt, quarum est facere aliud, sed etiam accidentales, quarum est facere alterum; ad alietatem vero sequitur alteritas, sed non e converso. Ex hoc autem habetur ratio Arianicae deductionis. Si enim alteritas est principium pluralitatis et posita causa ponitur effectus, ergo ponentibus alteritatem per augmentum et diminutionem sequitur pluralitas deitatis. Next, he shows that the foregoing reasoning is valid, saying: “For the essence of plurality is otherness,” and first he points out the necessity possessed by this reasoning. Secondly, what in the demonstration itself had been supposed is made clear: “In fact, the difference between three or more things lies in genus or species or number.” Regarding the first point he does two things. First he shows that otherness is the principle of plurality, understanding by “otherness” any difference by which things can be constituted among themselves as other. And he prefers to say “otherness” rather than “separateness” because not only substantial differences constitute plurality, since they make another thing, but accidental differences also constitute plurality, since they make for otherness: they make a thing other. Now otherness follows upon separateness; but the converse is not true. And the reason for the deduction of the Arians follows from this supposition. For if otherness is the principle of plurality, and positing a cause posits its effect, then supposing in them that otherness is by augmentation and diminution, plurality of divinity would follow.
Secundo proponit alteritatem esse proprium principium pluralitatis, quia praeter eam pluralitas intelligi non potest. Ex quo habetur ratio Catholicae coniunctionis. Remota enim propria causa tollitur effectus. Si ergo in tribus personis non est alteritas aliqua deitatis, non erit pluralitas, sed unitas. Secondly, he proposes that otherness is properly the principle of plurality, because, except for it, understanding of plurality is impossible; and according to this principle is the Catholic explanation of divine unity: for if a proper cause is taken away, so also is the effect. If, therefore, in the three Persons there is no otherness of Deity, there will be no plurality, but unity.
Deinde cum dicit: omnium namque rerum etc., probat quod supposuerat, scilicet alteritatem esse proprium principium pluralitatis. Et est ratio sua talis. Omnium rerum genere vel specie vel numero differentium est aliqua alteritas sive differentia causa diversitatis. Sed omnes res plures, sive sint tres sive quotlibet, sunt diversae vel genere vel specie vel numero. Ergo omnium plurium principium est aliqua alteritas. Next, he proves what was supposed, namely, that otherness is the proper principle of plurality, when he says, “In fact, the difference between three or more things.” And the reason is that in all things that differ in genus or species or number, there is some otherness or difference which is the cause of plurality or, diversity. But all plural things, whether three or more, are diverse either generically, specifically, or numerically; therefore some kind of otherness is the principle of all plurality.
Circa hanc rationem tria facit. Primo ponit minorem, secundo ibi: quotiens enim etc. probationem minoris, quae talis est. Quotiens dicitur idem, totiens dicitur diversum. Sed idem dicitur tribus modis: genere, specie et numero. Ergo et diversum. Primam supponit ex hoc quod dicitur in I topicorum quod quotiens dicitur unum oppositorum, totiens dicitur et reliquum, et ex hoc quod dicitur X metaphysicae quod idem et diversum sunt opposita. 2.1 In explaining this, he does three things. First, he states the minor; secondly its proof, beginning, “In as many ways as things are the same, in the same number of ways they are said to be diverse.” This is [the demonstration of] the proof: In as many ways as things are said to be the same, in the same number of ways they are said to be diverse. But things are said to be the same in three ways, namely, in genus, species, and number. Therefore things are said to be diverse in the same number of ways. The first is supposed from what is stated in I Topic., that as much is said of one of two opposites as is said of the other: and from the saying of X Metaph., that the same and different are opposites.
Secundam manifestat per exempla et supponit eam ex I topicorum. 2.2 The second is made clear by examples and supposes what is said in I Topic.
Tertio vero probat maiorem quantum ad id quod poterat esse dubium, ibi: sed numero differentiam et cetera. Quod enim diversitatis illorum, quae sunt diversa genere vel specie, principium sit aliqua alteritas, manifestum est ex ipso nomine. Ex hoc enim aliqua sunt diversa genere, quod est eis genus alterum, et diversa specie, quod sub altera specie continentur. Sed in his, quae dicuntur diversa esse numero, non est manifestum ex ipso nomine quod aliqua alteritas sit principium diversitatis et pluralitatis, immo magis videtur e converso secundum nomen quod pluralitas quae in numero designatur sit principium diversitatis, cum ita dicantur aliqua esse diversa numero secundum nomen, sicut genere vel specie. Et ideo ad verificandum maiorem sui syllogismi ostendit quod hanc etiam differentiam, qua aliqua dicuntur differre numero, facit aliqua alteritas sive varietas. Quod probat per hoc quod in tribus hominibus, qui conveniunt genere et specie, inveniuntur altera accidentia, sicut in homine et bove altera species et in homine et lapide genus alterum. Unde sicut homo et bos distant specie, ita duo homines distant accidentibus. 2.3 Thirdly, he proves the major in regard to that point which might be held in doubt, saying: “But a variety of accidents brings about numerical difference.” That the diversity of those things which are diverse according to genus or species must have as principle some otherness, is evident from the name itself. For from the fact that things are of different genera it is evident that a different, or other, genus belongs to each; and if they differ in species, it is because they are contained under other species. But in the case of things which are said to be diverse numerically, it is not evident from the name itself that otherness is the principle of plurality. Furthermore, it might rather appear to be the converse according to the name and that plurality, which is designated by number, might be the principle of diversity, since things numerically different are different according to the same name employed when difference is by genus or species: Therefore, to prove the major of his syllogism, he shows that this difference by which things are said to differ numerically is produced by a certain kind of otherness or variety. He proves this by the fact that in three men who agree in genus and species, but who differ numerically, there is found accidental otherness, just as between man and ox there is specific otherness and between man and stone generic otherness. Wherefore, as man and ox differ specifically, so two men differ accidentally.
Et quia posset aliquis dicere quod varietas accidentium non est causa pluralitatis secundum numerum, quia remotis accidentibus vel secundum rem, scilicet separabilibus, vel animo sive cogitatione, sicut inseparabilibus, adhuc remanent subiecta, cum accidens sit quod adest et abest praeter subiecti corruptionem, ideo huic responsioni obviat dicens quod quamvis omnia accidentia possint saltem animo separari, tamen alicuius accidentis diversitas nullo modo potest nec etiam animo a diversis individuis separari, scilicet diversitas loci. Duo enim corpora non patiuntur eundem locum nec secundum rem nec secundum animi fictionem, quia hoc non intelligi nec imaginari potest. Unde concludit quod ex hoc sunt aliqui homines plures numero, quod sunt accidentibus plures, id est diversi, et in hoc terminatur sententia huius partis. And because some one might be able to say that accidental variety is not the cause of numerical plurality since, if accidents are done away with-either removed actually, as when separable, or by the mind and in thought, as when inseparable—substance still remains, since accident is that which can be present or absent without corruption of the substance: therefore he forestalls this objection, saying that, although all accidents might indeed be separated from a substance by the mind, nevertheless the diversity of one accident could in no way, even by the mind, be separated from diverse individuals, namely, diversity of place. For two individuals cannot be in the same place either according to fact or according to any fiction of the mind, since this cannot be understood or imagined. Wherefore he concludes that from the fact that men are plural in number they are plural by reason of accidents; that is, they are for this reason diversified; and with this is terminated the teaching of this part of the treatise.

Concerning Those Things That Pertain to the Knowledge Possessed by Faith
Hic duplex est quaestio. Prima de his quae pertinent ad fidei commendationem. Secunda de his quae pertinent ad causam pluralitatis. This question is twofold. First, there is consideration of those things that pertain to the communion of faith: secondly, of those that pertain to the cause of plurality.
Circa primum quaeruntur quattuor.
  1. Primo. Utrum humano generi sit fides necessaria.
  2. Secundo. Quomodo se habet fides ad religionem.
  3. Tertio. Utrum convenienter vera fides Catholica vel universalis nominetur.
  4. Quarto. Utrum haec sit verae fidei confessio quod pater et filius et spiritus sanctus singulus est Deus, et tres sunt unus Deus absque omni inaequalitatis distantia.
In regard to the first, four questions are asked:
  1. Whether faith is necessary for mankind.
  2. How faith is related to religion.
  3. Whether the true faith is aptly called Catholic or universal.
  4. Whether this is the, confession of the true faith: that Father, Son, and Holy Spirit each is God, and that the Three are one God without any difference owing to inequality.
Article 1
Whether Faith Is Necessary for Mankind
Articulus 1 Objections
Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non fuerit necessarium humano generi fidem habere. Ut enim dicitur Eccl. 7, quid necesse est homini maiora se quaerere? Quasi dicat: nihil. Sed ea quae per fidem traduntur sunt homine maiora, utpote rationem eius excedentia; alias ad ea cognoscenda sufficeret ratio causans scientiam nec requireretur fides. Ergo non fuit necessarium homini, ut ea quae sunt fidei extra doceretur. 1. It seems that faith should not be considered necessary for mankind. As is said in Eccles. 7:1, “Why does a man need to seek things that are above him?” This is to say, there is no need. But those things that are believed by faith are above man, as exceeding his reason; otherwise ~his reason, which is the cause of science, would suffice. Therefore it was not necessary for man that, over and above the truths of reason, he should be taught those of faith.
Praeterea, Deus naturam humanam in sua conditione perfecte instituit, unde dicitur Deut. 32: Dei perfecta sunt opera. Sed ex his, quae menti humanae in sua conditione sunt indita, non potest homo pertingere ad cognoscendum ea quae sunt fidei; alias possent per scientiam haberi, quae causatur ex hoc quod conclusiones resolvuntur in principia naturaliter nota. Cum igitur perfectum dicatur aliquid, cui nihil deest eorum quae debet habere, ut dicitur in V metaphysicae, videtur quod homo fide non indigeat. 2. God established human nature as something perfect when He created it. Deut. 32:4, “The works of God are perfect.” But from the ability bestowed upon the human mind according to its original condition, man cannot attain to those things which must be known by faith; otherwise he would be able to possess scientific knowledge of them, a knowledge which is caused by the fact that conclusions are resolved into naturally known principles. Since, therefore, a thing is called perfect if it lacks nothing that it ought to possess, as is said in V Metaph., it seems that man does not require faith.
Praeterea, unusquisque sapiens ad perveniendum ad finem viam eligit levissimam et ab impedimentis remotissimam. Sed difficillimum videtur credere ea quae supra rationem sunt et valde hominibus periculosum, cum multi a salutis statu decidant propter hoc quod non credunt. Ergo videtur quod Deus qui est sapientissimus non debuerit viam fidei praeparare hominibus ad salutem. 3. Every wise man makes choice of the shorter way to reach a goal: but it would appear exceedingly difficult for a creature to believe truths which are above reason and, in the case of men, extremely dangerous, since many fall away from the state of salvation because they do not believe; therefore, it seems that God, who is all-wise, ought not to have established faith as the way of salvation for men.
Praeterea, ubicumque est acceptio aliquorum cognitorum sine iudicio, est via facilis ad errorem. Sed non habemus aliquid in nobis, per quod possimus iudicare de his quae per fidem accipimus, cum iudicatorium naturale se ad huiusmodi non extendat, utpote supra rationem exsistentia. Ergo patet via facilis ad errorem. Et ita videtur esse homini potius noxium quam utile, ut dirigatur in Deum per fidem. 4. Whenever there is acceptance of knowledge without judgment, the road to error is easy; but we have in ourselves no ability by which we are able to judge of the things which we accept by faith, since our natural judgment does not extend to truths of this kind, as they exceed reason; therefore evidently the road to error is an easy one for us, and so it would appear rather harmful than useful for man that he should be directed to God by the way of faith.
Praeterea, ut dicit Dionysius, malum hominis est praeter rationem esse. Sed homo fidei inhaerens a ratione discedit, et in hoc etiam assuescit rationem contemnere. Ergo videtur quod via ista sit hominibus noxia. 5. As Dionysius says, it is an evil for man to exist apart from reason; but man in adhering to faith departs from reason, and in this he is even accustomed to despise reason; therefore it seems that such a way is evil for men.
Sed contra
Sed contra est quod dicitur Hebr. 11: sine fide impossibile est placere Deo. Sed hoc est homini maxime opportunum, ut Deo placeat, sine quo nihil boni facere aut habere potest. Ergo fides est homini maxime necessaria. But on the contrary, it is said in Heb. 11:6, “Without faith it is impossible to please God”; but it is supremely necessary for man that he be pleasing to God, since otherwise he can neither do nor possess any good; therefore faith is most necessary for man.
Praeterea, homini maxime necessarium est veritatem cognoscere, cum gaudium de veritate cognita sit beatitudo, ut Augustinus dicit. Sed, sicut dicit Dionysius 7 c. de divinis nominibus, fides collocat credentes in veritate et in eis veritatem. Ergo fides est homini maxime necessaria. Again, it is most necessary for man to know the truth, since beatitude is joy in knowing the truth, as Augustine says; but faith establishes believers in truth and establishes truth in them, as Dionysius says (De div. nom., chap. 7); therefore faith is most necessary for man.
Praeterea, illud, sine quo non potest conservari humana societas, est humano generi maxime necessarium, cum homo sit naturaliter animal politicum, ut dicitur in VIII Ethicorum. Sed sine fide humana societas non potest conservari, quia oportet quod unus homo alii credat in promissis et in testimoniis et in aliis huiusmodi quae sunt necessaria hominibus ad commanendum. Ergo fides humano generi est maxime necessaria. Again, that without which human society cannot be conserved is especially necessary for man, since man is a political animal, as is said in VIII Ethic.; but without faith human society cannot be preserved, since it is requisite that one man believe in the promises of another and in his testimony and the like, for this is necessary if they are to live together; therefore faith is most necessary for mankind.
Responsio. Dicendum quod fides habet aliquid commune cum opinione et aliquid cum scientia et intellectu, ratione cuius ponitur media inter scientiam et opinionem ab Hugone de sancto Victore. Cum scientia siquidem et intellectu commune habet certum et fixum assensum, in quo ab opinione differt, quae accipit alterum contrariorum cum formidine alterius, et a dubitatione quae fluctuat inter duo contraria. Sed cum opinione commune habet quod est de rebus quae non sunt intellectui pervia, in quo differt a scientia et intellectu. Response. I answer that it must be said that faith has something in common with opinion, and something in common with knowledge and understanding, by reason of which it holds a position midway between opinion and understanding or science, according to Hugh of St. Victor. In common with understanding and knowledge, it possesses certain and fixed assent; and in this it differs from opinion, which accepts one of two opposites, though with fear that the other may be true, and on account of this doubt it fluctuates between two contraries. But, in common with opinion, faith is concerned with things that are not naturally possible to our understanding, and in this respect it differs from science and intellection.
Quod autem aliquid non sit patens humanae cognitioni, potest ex duobus contingere, ut dicitur in II metaphysicae, scilicet ex defectu ipsarum rerum cognoscibilium et ex defectu intellectus nostri. That a thing should not be apparent to human understanding can arise for two reasons, as is said in II Metaph.: namely, because of lack of knowability in things themselves, and because of lack of intellectual ability on our part.
Ex defectu quidem rerum, sicut in rebus singularibus et contingentibus quae a nostris sensibus sunt remotae, sicut sunt facta hominum et dicta et cogitata, quae quidem talia sunt, ut uni homini possint esse nota et alii incognita. Et quia in convictu hominum oportet quod unus utatur altero sicut se ipso in his, in quibus sibi non sufficit, ideo oportet ut stet illis quae alius scit et sunt sibi ignota, sicut his quae ipse cognoscit. Et exinde est quod in conversatione hominum est fides necessaria, qua unus homo dictis alterius credat, et hoc est iustitiae fundamentum, ut Tullius dicit in libro de officiis. Et inde est quod mendacium nullum sine peccato est, cum per omne mendacium huic fidei tam necessariae derogetur. 1. It may be due to lack on the part of things, as in the case of singular and contingent things which are remote from our senses, like the deeds and words and thoughts of men; for these are of such a nature that they may be known to one man, but unknown to others. And since among men dwelling together one man should deal with another as with himself in what he is not self-sufficient, therefore it is needful that he be able to stand with as much certainty on what another knows, but of which he himself is ignorant, as upon the truths which he himself knows. Hence it is that in human society faith is necessary in order that one man give credence to the words of another, and this is the foundation of justice, as Tullius says in his book, De officiis. Hence also it is that no lie is without sin, since every lie derogates from that faith which is so necessary.
Ex defectu vero nostro sunt non apparentia res divinae et necessariae, quae sunt secundum naturam maxime notae. Unde ad harum inspectionem non sumus statim a principio idonei, cum oporteat nos ex minus notis et posterioribus secundum naturam in magis nota et priora naturaliter pervenire. Sed quia ex vi illorum, quae ultimo cognoscimus, sunt nota illa quae primo cognoscimus, oportet etiam a principio aliquam nos habere notitiam de illis quae sunt per se magis nota; quod fieri non potest nisi credendo. Et etiam hoc patet in ordine scientiarum, quia scientia quae est de causis altissimis, scilicet metaphysica, ultimo occurrit homini ad cognoscendum, et tamen in scientiis praeambulis oportet quod supponantur quaedam quae in illa plenius innotescunt; unde quaelibet scientia habet suppositiones, quibus oportet addiscentem credere. 2. The truth of things may also not be evident because of defect on our part, as in the case of divine and necessary things which, according to their own nature, are most knowable. Wherefore, to understand them, we are not capable of immediate intellection, from the very beginning, since it is in accordance with our nature to attain from things less knowable and posterior in themselves, to knowledge of those that are themselves more knowable and prior. But since from none of those things that we know last do we have any knowledge of those that we know first, it is needful for us even at first to have some notion of those things that are most knowable in themselves; but this cannot be except by believing. And this is evident even in the order of the sciences; since that science which is concerned with highest causes, namely, metaphysics, comes last in human knowledge; yet in sciences that are preambles to it there must be supposed certain truths which only in it are more fully revealed; therefore every science has some suppositions that must be believed in order to carry on the process of learning.
Cum ergo finis humanae vitae sit beatitudo, quae consistit in plena cognitione divinorum, necessarium est ad humanam vitam in beatitudinem dirigendam statim a principio habere fidem divinorum, quae plene cognoscenda exspectantur in ultima perfectione humana. Since, therefore, the end of human life is beatitude, which consists in the full cognition of divine truths, it is necessary that human life be directed to this beatitude by an initial possession of divine truths by faith, truths which man can hope to know fully in the ultimate state of human perfection.
Ad quorum quaedam plene cognoscenda possibile est homini pervenire per viam rationis etiam in statu huius vitae. Et horum quamvis possit haberi scientia et a quibusdam habeatur, tamen necessarium est habere fidem propter quinque rationes, quas Rabbi Moyses ponit. Certain of these truths that must be known can be attained by reason even in this life: however, although knowledge of them is possible and even possessed by certain men, nevertheless faith is necessary for five reasons, which Rabbi Moses enumerates:
Prima scilicet propter profunditatem et subtilitatem materiae, per quam occultantur divina ab hominum intellectu. Unde ne sit homo sine eorum qualicumque cognitione, provisum est ei ut saltem per fidem divina cognoscat, Eccl. 7: alta profunditas, quis cognoscet illam? 1. First, on account of the depth and subtlety of the matter, by which divine truths are hidden from human understanding. Therefore, lest any man be without some knowledge of them, provision is made that through faith, at least, he know divine truths. Therefore, in Eccles. 7:25 it is said: “It is a great depth, who shall find it out?”
Secunda propter imbecillitatem intellectus humani a principio. Non enim provenit ei sua perfectio nisi in fine; et ideo ut nullum tempus sit ei vacuum a divina cognitione, indiget fide, per quam ab ipso principio divina accipiat. 2. Secondly, on account of the weakness of the human intellect from the beginning. For perfection of knowledge does not belong to the human intellect except at the end; therefore, that it should at no time lack a knowledge of God, it requires faith by which it may accept divine truths from the very beginning.
Tertio propter multa praeambula, quae exiguntur ad habendam cognitionem de Deo secundum viam rationis. Requiritur enim ad hoc fere omnium scientiarum cognitio, cum omnium finis sit cognitio divinorum; quae quidem praeambula paucissimi consequuntur. Unde ne multitudo hominum a divina cognitione vacua remaneret, provisa est ei divinitus via fidei. 3. Thirdly, because of the many preambles that are required for a knowledge of God according to reason. For this there is needed knowledge of almost all the sciences, since cognition of divine things is the end of them all. But few indeed would comprehend these preambulatory truths or investigate them completely. Therefore, lest large numbers of men should be left without knowledge of divine things, the way of faith has been provided by God Himself.
Quarto, quia multi hominum ex naturali complexione sunt indispositi ad perfectionem intellectus consequendam per viam rationis; unde ut hi etiam divina cognitione non careant, provisa est fidei via. 4. In the fourth place, many men on account of their natural constitution are unfitted for perfect intellectual investigation according to reason; therefore, that these might not lack knowledge of divine truths, the way of faith has been provided.
Quinto propter occupationes plurimas, quibus oportet homines occupari; unde impossibile est quod omnes consequantur per viam rationis illud quod est de Deo necessarium ad cognoscendum, et propter hoc est via fidei procurata, et hoc quantum ad illa quae sunt ab aliquibus scita et aliis proponuntur ut credenda. 5. In the fifth place, because of numerous occupations with which men are busied, it would be impossible for all of them to discover, by way of reason, necessary truth in regard to God, and on this account the way of faith has been established, both as regards things that might in some way be known and as regards those that required revelation in order that they be believed.
Quaedam vero divinorum sunt, ad quae plene cognoscenda nullatenus ratio humana sufficit, sed eorum plena cognitio exspectatur in futura vita, ubi erit plena beatitudo, sicut unitas et Trinitas unius Dei. Et ad hanc cognitionem homo perducetur non ex debito suae naturae, sed ex sola divina gratia. Unde oportet quod huius etiam perfectae scientiae quaedam suppositiones primo ei credendae proponantur, ex quibus dirigatur in plenam cognitionem eorum quae a principio credit, sicut et in aliis scientiis accidit, ut dictum est; et ideo dicitur Is. 7 secundum aliam litteram: nisi credideritis, non intelligetis. Et huiusmodi suppositiones sunt illa quae sunt credita quantum ad omnes et a nullo in hac vita scita vel intellecta. But in the case of certain divine truths, for a complete understanding of them the human mind in no way suffices, but full knowledge of them is to be awaited in that future life when there will be complete beatitude: such is the truth of the Trinity and the unity of one God; and man is led to knowledge of this, not in accordance with anything due his nature, but by divine grace alone. Therefore it is necessary that, for a perfection of knowledge of this kind, certain suppositions be proposed which must be believed at first, and from these one is directed into full cognition of those truths which at the outset he held on faith, even as in other sciences also, as has been said. Hence in Is. 7:9 it is said, according to one translation: “Unless you believed, you would not understand.” And suppositions of this sort are those that must be believed by all, since in this life they are neither known nor understood by, any one.
Answers to objections
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod licet ea quae sunt fidei sint maiora homine naturae viribus consideratis, non sunt tamen maiora homine divino lumine elevato. Et ideo non est necesse homini, ut huiusmodi propria virtute quaerat, sed est ei necesse, ut divina revelatione ea cognoscat. 1. It may be said: Although matters of faith considered according to man’s natural powers are above him, they are not above man when he is illuminated by divine light; hence it is not necessary for man that he seek out such truths by his own power, but it is necessary for him to know them by divine revelation.
Ad secundum dicendum quod Deus in prima rerum conditione hominem perfectum instituit perfectione naturae, quae quidem in hoc consistit, ut homo habeat omnia quae sunt naturae debita. Sed supra debitum naturae adduntur postmodum humano generi aliquae perfectiones ex sola divina gratia, inter quas est fides quae est Dei donum, ut patet Eph. 2. 2. It may be said: God, in the first creation of things, established man as perfect in accordance with the perfection of his nature, and this consisted in the fact that man had all things due to his nature. But over and above that due to nature there were added afterward to the human race certain other perfections owing their source to divine grace alone, and among these was faith, as is evident from Eph. 2:8, where it is said of faith that it is “the gift of God.”
Ad tertium dicendum quod cuilibet in beatitudinem tendenti necessarium est cognoscere in quibus beatitudinem quaerere debeat, et qualiter. Quod quidem facilius fieri non poterat quam per fidem, cum rationis inquisitio ad talia pervenire non possit nisi multis praecognitis quae non est facile scire. Nec etiam potuit cum minori periculo, cum humana inquisitio propter imbecillitatem intellectus nostri sit facilis ad errorem, et hoc aperte ostenditur ex ipsis philosophis, qui per viam rationis finem humanae vitae quaerentes et modum perveniendi in ipsum in errores multiplices et turpissimos inciderunt, adeo sibi invicem dissentientes, ut vix duorum aut trium esset de his per omnia una concors sententia, cum tamen per fidem videamus in unam sententiam etiam plurimos populos convenire. 3. It may be said: For anyone striving to attain beatitude it is necessary to know in what he ought to seek this beatitude, and in what way. But this, indeed, can be done in no easier way than through faith, since investigation by reason cannot attain to such knowledge except after a previous knowledge of many other things, things not easy to know. Nor can one attain to such knowledge without danger, since human investigation, because of the weakness of our intellect, is prone to error; and this is clearly shown by reference to those philosophers who, in attempting to find out the purpose of human life by way of reason, did not find in themselves the true method, and so fell into many and shameful errors; and so greatly did they differ among themselves that scarcely two or three among them all were in agreement on any one question; yet, on the other hand, we see that by faith many peoples are brought to the acceptance of one common belief.
Ad quartum dicendum quod quandocumque acceptis aliquo modo assentitur, oportet esse aliquid quod inclinet ad assensum, sicut lumen naturaliter inditum in hoc quod assentitur primis principiis per se notis et ipsorum principiorum veritas in hoc quod assentitur conclusionibus scitis et aliquae verisimilitudines in hoc quod assentimus his quae opinamur; quae si fuerint aliquantulum fortiores, inclinant ad credendum, prout fides dicitur opinio iuvata rationibus. Sed illud, quod inclinat ad assentiendum principiis intellectis aut conclusionibus scitis, est sufficiens inductivum et ideo etiam cogit ad assensum et est sufficiens ad iudicandum de illis quibus assentitur. Quod vero inclinat ad opinandum qualitercumque vel etiam fortiter, non est sufficiens inductivum, unde nec cogit, nec per hoc potest perfectum haberi iudicium de his quibus assentitur. Unde et in fide qua in Deum credimus non solum est acceptio rerum quibus assentimus, sed aliquid quod inclinat ad assensum; et hoc est lumen quoddam, quod est habitus fidei, divinitus menti humanae infusum. Quod quidem sufficientius est ad inducendum quam aliqua demonstratio, per quam etsi numquam falsum concludatur, frequenter tamen in hoc homo fallitur, quod putat esse demonstrationem quae non est. Est sufficientius etiam quam ipsum lumen naturale quo assentimus principiis, cum lumen illud frequenter impediatur ex corporis infirmitate, ut patet in mente captis. Lumen autem fidei, quod est quasi quaedam sigillatio primae veritatis in mente, non potest fallere, sicut nec Deus potest decipi vel mentiri, unde hoc lumen sufficit ad iudicandum. 4. It may be said: Whenever there is acceptance of a truth, by whatever mode of assent, there must be something which moves the mind to assent: just as the naturally possessed light of the intellect causes assent to first principles, and the truth of those first principles causes assent to conclusions made from them; while in other ways we assent to things of which we have an opinion, though, if motives were a little stronger, they would incline us to belief, in so far as faith is said to be opinion. But that which inclines the mind to assent to the first principles of understanding or to conclusions known from these principles is a sufficient induction which forces assent, and is sufficient to judge of those things to which the mind gives its assent. On the other hand, whatever inclines one to form an opinion, even though with a good amount of conviction, is not that sufficient form of induction whereby assent is forced, nor by reason of it can there be perfect judgment of the things to which assent is given. Therefore also in faith by which we believe in God, not only is there acceptance of the truths to which we give assent, but also something which inclines us to that assent; and this is the special light which is the habit of faith, divinely infused into the human mind. This, moreover, is more sufficient for inducing belief than any demonstration, for, though from the latter no false conclusions are reached, still man frequently errs in this: that he thinks something is a demonstration which is not. The light of faith is also more sufficient than the natural light of reason by which we assent to first principles, since this natural light is often impeded by bodily infirmity, as is evident in the case of the. insane. But the light of faith, which is, as it were, a kind of impression of the First Truth in our minds, cannot fail, any more than God can deceive us or lie; therefore this light suffices for making judgment.
Hic tamen habitus non movet per viam intellectus, sed magis per viam voluntatis; unde non facit videre illa quae creduntur nec cogit assensum, sed facit voluntarie assentire. Et sic patet quod fides ex duabus partibus est a Deo, scilicet et ex parte interioris luminis quod inducit ad assensum et ex parte rerum quae exterius proponuntur, quae ex divina revelatione initium sumpserunt. Et haec se habent ad cognitionem fidei sicut accepta per sensum ad cognitionem principiorum, quia utrisque fit aliqua cognitionis determinatio. Unde sicut cognitio principiorum accipitur a sensu et tamen lumen quo principia cognoscuntur est innatum, ita fides est ex auditu, et tamen habitus fidei est infusus. This habit of faith, nevertheless, does not move us by way of intellectual understanding, but more by way of the will; therefore it does not make us comprehend those truths which we believe, nor does it force assent, but it causes us to assent to them voluntarily. And thus it is evident that faith comes in two ways: namely, from God by reason of the interior light which induces assent, and also by reason of those truths which are proposed exteriorly and take their source from divine revelation. These latter are related to the knowledge which is of faith as things known by the senses are to knowledge of first principles, because in both cases there is a certain determination given to cognition. Therefore, as cognition of first principles is received by way of sense experience, and yet the light by which those principles are known is innate, so faith comes by way of hearing, and yet the habit of faith is infused.
Ad quintum dicendum quod vivere secundum rationem est bonum hominis in quantum est homo, vivere autem praeter rationem potest uno modo sonare in defectum, sicut est in illis qui vivunt secundum sensum, et hoc est hominis malum. Alio modo potest sonare in excessum, ut cum homo divina gratia adducitur in id quod est supra rationem; et sic praeter rationem vivere non est hominis malum, sed bonum supra hominem. Et talis est cognitio eorum quae sunt fidei, quamvis et ipsa fides non omnibus modis sit praeter rationem; hoc enim naturalis ratio habet, quod assentiendum est his quae a Deo dicuntur. 5. It may be said: To live in accordance with reason is the good of man inasmuch as he is man. Now, to live apart from reason, according to one meaning, can be understood as a defect, as it is in those who live according to sense; and this is an evil in man. But in another way, it may mean to live above reason as when, by divine grace, a man is led to that which exceeds reason: and in this case, to live apart from reason is not an evil in man, but a good above that which is human. And such is the cognition of truths of faith, although faith itself is not in every way outside reason; for, it is the natural reason which holds that assent ought to be given to truths declared by God.

Article 2
Whether Faith Should Be Distinguished from Religion
Articulus 2 Objections
Ad secundum sic proceditur, videtur quod fides a religione distinguenda non sit, quia, ut Augustinus dicit in Enchiridion, fide, spe et caritate colendus est Deus. Sed cultus Dei est actus religionis, ut patet per diffinitionem Tullii qui dicit quod religio est quae cuidam superiori naturae, quam divinam vocant, cultum caerimoniamque affert. Ergo fides ad religionem pertinet. 1. It seems that faith ought not to be distinguished from religion, because, as Augustine says in Ench., “God is to be worshiped by faith, hope, and charity”; but worship of God is an act of religion, as is evident from the definition of Tullius, which says: “Religion is that which offers to a superior nature, which men call divine, worship and ceremony”; therefore faith pertains to religion.
Praeterea, Augustinus dicit in libro de vera religione quod vera religio est qua unus Deus colitur et purgatissima pietate cognoscitur. Sed cognoscere Deum est fidei. Ergo fides sub religione continetur. 2. Augustine says in De vera religione: The true religion is that by which the one God is honored and known with a most unsullied piety or purity.” But to know God is a thing which belongs to faith; therefore, faith is contained under religion.
Praeterea, offerre Deo sacrificium est actus religionis. Sed hoc pertinet ad fidem, quia, ut dicit Augustinus in V de civitate Dei, verum sacrificium est omne opus quod agitur, ut sancta societate inhaereamus Deo. Prima autem inhaesio hominis ad Deum est per fidem. Ergo fides ad religionem praecipue pertinet. 3. To offer sacrifice to God is a function or act of religion, but this pertains to faith, as Augustine says in IV De civ. Dei: “True sacrifice is any work done in order that we may adhere to God in holy association”; but the first adherence of man to God is by faith; therefore faith pertains principally to religion.
Praeterea, ut dicitur Ioh. 4, spiritus est Deus, et eos, qui adorant eum, in spiritu et veritate adorare oportet. Magis ergo proprie adoratur Deus, cum ei prosternitur intellectus, quam cum ei prosternitur corpus. Sed per fidem ei prosternitur intellectus, dum se intellectus totaliter subicit ad assentiendum his quae a Deo dicuntur. Ergo fides ad religionem maxime pertinet. 4. In John 4:24 it is said: “God is a Spirit, and they that adore Him, must adore Him in spirit and in truth.” Now, God is adored more when one submits his intellect to Him than when a bodily prostration is made; but through faith the intellect is submitted to God, since it subjects itself entirely in assenting to the truths revealed by God; therefore faith pertains especially to religion.
Praeterea, omnis virtus, quae habet Deum pro obiecto, est virtus theologica. Sed religio habet Deum pro obiecto; non enim nisi Deo cultum debitum affert. Ergo est virtus theologica. Sed magis videtur pertinere ad fidem quam ad aliquam aliarum, cum non dicantur esse extra religionem Christianam nisi qui sunt extra fidem. Ergo religio videtur idem esse quod fides. 5. Every virtue having God as its object is a theological virtue: but religion has God as its object, since it is nothing else than the offering of due reverence to God; therefore it is a theological virtue. But it appears to belong more to faith than to any of the others, since only those are said to be outside the Christian religion who are outside [i.e., without] faith; therefore religion seems to be the same as faith.
Sed contra
Sed contra est quod Tullius in II veteris rhetoricae ponit religionem partem iustitiae, quae est virtus cardinalis. Ergo cum fides sit virtus theologica, religio erit alterius generis quam fides. On the contrary is what Tullius says in II Veteris Rhetoricae, where he makes religion a part of justice, which is a moral virtue. Therefore, since faith is a theological virtue, religion is of a genus other than that of faith.
Praeterea, religio consistit etiam in actu qui est ad proximum, ut patet Iac. 2: religio munda et immaculata et cetera. Sed fides non habet actum nisi qui est ad Deum. Ergo religio est omnino a fide distincta. Again, religion consists also in activity regarding the neighbor, as is evident in Jas. 1:27: “Religion clean and undefiled before God and the Father is this: to visit the fatherless and widows in their tribulation”; faith has no act except that which is referred to God; therefore religion is altogether distinct from faith.
Praeterea, religiosi dicuntur communiter, qui quibusdam specialibus votis astringuntur. Non solum autem ipsi dicuntur fideles. Ergo non est idem fidelis et religiosus. Ergo nec idem fides et religio. Again, those are commonly called “religious” who are bound by special vows, but they are not the only ones called 1. the faithful.” Since, therefore, one of the faith and a religious are not the same thing, faith and religion are not the same.
Responsio. Dicendum quod, sicut patet per Augustinum X de civitate Dei, theosebia quae cultus Dei dicitur, religio, pietas et latria ad idem pertinere intelliguntur, scilicet ad Deum colendum. Cultus autem cuilibet rei impensus nihil aliud esse videtur quam debita operatio circa illud adhibita. Et ex hoc dicuntur aliqui diversimode colere agros, parentes, patriam et alia huiusmodi, quia diversis diversae operationes coaptantur. Deus autem non hoc modo colitur, quod ei nostra operatio aliquid prosit aut subveniat, sicut est in praedictis, sed solum in quantum nos ei subdimus et subditos demonstramus. Hic ergo cultus divinus absolute nomine theosebiae designatur. Sed religio importat quandam ligationem, secundum quod homo quodammodo se astringit ad cultum istum; unde, ut dicit Augustinus in libro de vera religione, religio a religando dicta creditur, vel etiam a reeligendo, ut dicit in X de civitate Dei. Ex propria enim electione aliquis ligatur ad aliquid faciendum. Oportet autem nos eum reeligere quem amiseramus neglegentes, ut ibidem dicit. Et inde est quod illi, qui vitam suam totam et se ipsos ad divinum obsequium votis quibusdam obligant, religiosi dicuntur. Sed pietas animum colentis respicit, qui non ficte nec mercennario affectu obsequitur. Response. I answer that it must be said that, as is evident from Augustine (X De civ. Dei), theosebia, which the worship of God is called, includes as pertaining to it in the same way, religion, piety and latria, since all have as their purpose the worship of God. Reverence paid to anything, however, seems to be nothing else than a due operation performed with regard to it; and consequently men are said to cherish in various ways their fields, their parents, their country, and other like things because different works are fitting to each. But God is not “cherished” in this same way: that any operation of ours would be of benefit or assistance to Him, as in the case of the above-mentioned instances; but it implies only that we submit ourselves to Him and show ourselves to be His subjects. Therefore this reverence which is absolutely divine is designated by the name of theosebia. But religion implies a certain “binding, back” according to which man obliges himself in some manner to this worship of God; wherefore Augustine says in his book, De vera religione: “The word ‘religion’ is thought to be derived from the religare (‘to bind back’), or from recte eligere (‘to choose rightly’),” as is said in IV De civ. Dei. For it is by proper choice that a person binds himself to do something that must be done. We must also reelect those things which by negligence we have lost, as he also says. Therefore it is that those who consecrate their whole lives and themselves to the service of God by certain vows are called religious; but piety regards the mind of the worshiper, that it be not insincere or moved by desire of gain.
Et quia his, quae supra nos sunt, quasi quaedam divina veneratio debetur, beneficia etiam quae miseris exhibentur sunt quasi quaedam Dei sacrificia, secundum illud Hebr. ultimo: communionis et beneficentiae nolite oblivisci, talibus enim hostiis promeretur Deus, hinc est quod nomen pietatis et religionis ad opera misericordiae transfertur et maxime ad beneficia quae in parentes et patriam exhibentur. Sed latria importat debitum colendi sive rationem cultus, ex hoc scilicet quod eius sumus servi quem colimus, non hoc modo, quo homo servus hominis dicitur propter quodcumque accidentale debitum, sed quia totum, quod sumus, ei debemus tamquam creatori. Unde et latria servitus dicitur non quaelibet, sed illa tantum, qua homo Dei servus est. Sic ergo religio consistit in operatione, qua homo Deum colit se ei subdendo. Quae quidem operatio debet esse conveniens et ei, qui colitur, et colenti. Since also a certain divine veneration, as it were, is due to those above us, even the acts of kindness which are done for the unfortunate are in a way sacrifices to God, according to the last part of the Epistle to the Hebrews (13: 16): “And do not forget to do good and to impart: for by such sacrifices God’s favor is obtained.” Hence it is that the name of piety and of religion are transferred to works of mercy, and especially to benefits done to parents and country. But latria implies a reverence that is of obligation, or worship in its essence; and this is so because we are, indeed, the subjects of Him whom we honor, not after the manner in which one man is said to be the servant of another, because of some accidental debt to him, but because all that we are we owe to Him as our Creator. Therefore latria is not any kind of service, but that by which man acknowledges his subjection to God. Thus, therefore, religion consists in an operation by which man honors God by submitting to Him; and this operation ought to be in harmony with Him who is honored, and with the one offering homage.
Ipse autem qui colitur, cum sit spiritus, non potest corpore, sed sola mente contingi. Et sic cultus ipsius principaliter in mentis actibus consistit, quibus mens ordinatur in Deum. Et hi sunt praecipue actus theologicarum virtutum, et secundum hoc dicit Augustinus quod Deus colitur fide, spe et caritate; et his adiunguntur actus donorum tendentium in Deum, ut sapientiae et timoris. Now since He who is reverenced is a spirit, He cannot be approached by the body, but only by the mind; and so worship of Him consists chiefly in acts of the mind by which the mind itself is ordained to God. These acts are principally those of the theological virtues; and in accordance with this, Augustine says that God is worshiped by faith, hope, and charity, to which are added also the acts of the gifts ordained toward God, such as those of wisdom and of fear.
Sed quia nos, qui Deum colimus, corporei sumus et per corporeos sensus cognitionem accipimus, inde est quod ex parte nostra requiruntur ad cultum praedictum etiam aliquae corporales actiones, tum ut ex toto quod sumus Deo serviamus, tum ut per huiusmodi corporalia nos ipsos et alios excitemus ad actus mentis ordinatos in Deum. Unde dicit Augustinus in libro de cura pro mortuis agenda: orantes de membris sui corporis faciunt quod supplicantibus congruit, cum genua figunt, cum extendunt manus vel prosternuntur solo et si quid aliud visibiliter faciunt, quamvis eorum invisibilis voluntas et cordis intentio Deo nota sit nec ille indigeat his indiciis, ut animus pandatur humanus; sed hinc magis se ipsum excitat homo ad orandum gemendumque humilius atque ferventius. But because we who honor God are also possessed of bodies and receive our knowledge through bodily senses, there is the necessity that certain physical actions accompany the worship of God, not only that we may render service to God with our whole being, but also that by these bodily actions we may arouse in ourselves and in others acts of the mind ordained to God. Wherefore Augustine says in his book, De cura pro mortuis habenda: “Those who pray make the members of their bodies conform to their acts of supplication when they genuflect, extend their hands, or prostrate themselves upon the ground, or perform any other visible action; and although it is their invisible will and the intention of the heart that is known to God, it is not unseemly that the human soul should so express itself, but rather by so doing man stirs himself to pray and to lament his sins the more humbly and fervently.”
Sic ergo omnes actus, quibus homo se Deo subdit, sive sint mentis sive corporis, ad religionem pertinent. Sed quia ea, quae proximis propter Deum impenduntur, ipsi Deo impenduntur, constat quod pertinent ad eandem subiectionem, in qua cultus religionis consistit. Et sic diligenter consideranti apparet omnem actum huiusmodi ad religionem pertinere. Unde Augustinus dicit quod verum sacrificium est omne opus quod agitur, ut sancta societate inhaereamus Deo. Tamen quodam ordine. Primo namque et principaliter ad cultum praedictum pertinent actus mentis ordinati in Deum. Secundo actus corporis qui ad hos excitandos et designandos fiunt, ut prostrationes, sacrificia et huiusmodi. Tertio ad eundem cultum pertinent omnes alii actus in proximum ordinati propter Deum. Hence, all acts by which man subjects himself to God, whether they are acts of mind or of body, pertain to religion. But because those things that are rendered to the neighbor on account of God are rendered to God Himself, it is evident that they also pertain to this same subjection in which religious worship consists; and so to one diligently considering the matter it is apparent that every good act pertains to religion. Hence Augustine says (loc. cit.): “True sacrifice is every work done that we may adhere to God in holy companionship; however, in a certain order.” First and foremost, those acts of the mind ordained to God pertain to the worship which we are speaking of. Secondly, there are acts of the body intended to arouse reverence of mind or to give expression to it, such as prostrations, sacrifices, and the like. Thirdly, there also pertain to divine worship all other acts ordained to the neighbor for the sake of God.
Et tamen sicut magnanimitas est specialis virtus, quamvis omnium virtutum actibus utatur secundum specialem rationem obiecti, utpote coniectans magnum in actibus omnium virtutum, ita et religio est specialis virtus, in actibus omnium virtutum specialem rationem obiecti considerans, scilicet Deo debitum; sic enim est iustitiae pars. Illi tamen actus specialiter religioni assignantur, qui nullius alterius virtutis sunt, sicut prostrationes et huiusmodi, in quibus secundario Dei cultus consistit. Nevertheless, as magnanimity is a certain special virtue, although it uses the acts of all virtues, since it bestows a grandeur in the exercise of them all and so regards its object under a certain special aspect; so also religion is a special virtue in the acts of all the virtues, considering a special aspect of its object, namely, that which is due to God; and thus it forms a part of justice. There are, moreover, special acts assigned to religion, which pertain to no other virtue, such as prostrations and the like, in which the worship of God consists secondarily.
Ex quo patet quod actus fidei pertinet quidem materialiter ad religionem, sicut et actus aliarum virtutum, et magis, in quantum actus fidei est primus motus mentis in Deum. Sed formaliter a religione distinguitur, utpote aliam rationem obiecti considerans. Convenit etiam fides cum religione praeter hoc, in quantum fides est religionis causa et principium. Non enim aliquis eligeret cultum Deo exhibere, nisi fide teneret Deum esse creatorem, gubernatorem et remuneratorem humanorum actuum. From this it is evident that acts of faith pertain, indeed, materially to religion, as do the acts of other virtues, and the more so inasmuch as acts of faith are the first motions of the mind toward God; but formally faith is distinguished from religion, as regarding another aspect of its object. Faith agrees with religion also because faith is the cause and principle, of religion. For no one would elect to manifest reverence to God unless by faith he held that God was the Creator, Ruler, and Rewarder of human actions.
Ipsa tamen religio non est virtus theologica. Habet enim pro materia quasi ipsos actus vel fidei vel alterius virtutis, quos Deo tamquam debitos offert. Sed Deum habet pro fine. Colere enim Deum est huiusmodi actus ut debitos Deo offerre. Nevertheless religion is not a theological virtue: for it has as its matter all acts, as those of faith or ‘of any other virtue inasmuch as these are offered as due to God; but it has God as its end. For to worship God is to offer acts of this kind as due to God.
Et per hoc patet responsio ad omnia obiecta. From what has been said, the response to all the objections is evident.

Article 3
Whether the Christian Religion Is Aptly Called Catholic or Universal
Articulus 3 Objections
Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod fides Christiana Catholica nominari non debeat, quia cognitio debet esse cognoscibili proportionata. Non enim quidlibet modo cognoscitur. Sed fides est cognitio Dei, qui neque est universalis neque particularis, ut Augustinus dicit in libro de Trinitate. Ergo nec fides debet universalis dici. 1. It seems that the Christian religion ought not be called Catholic, because knowledge must be proportionate to the knowability of a thing. Now an indefinite thing is not known in any way at all: but faith is a knowledge of God who is neither universal nor particular, as Augustine says in his book, De Trinitate; therefore this religion cannot be called universal.
Praeterea. De singularibus non potest esse nisi singularis cognitio. Sed fide quaedam singularia facta tenemus, ut passionem Christi, resurrectionem et huiusmodi. Ergo fides non debet dici universalis. 2. One can have only singular knowledge about singular things; but by faith we hold the truth of certain singular facts, as the Passion and Resurrection of Christ, and the like; therefore the Christian faith cannot be called universal.
Praeterea, ab eo quod est commune multis non debet proprium nomen alicui eorum imponi, cum nomen causa innotescendae rei imponatur. Sed quaelibet traditio vel secta proponit ea quae tradit ut universaliter ab omnibus credenda vel observanda et ut universaliter vera. Ergo non debet fides Christiana specialiter Catholica dici. 3. From what is common to many, it is not permissible to impose a name as proper to any one of them, since a name is given in order that a thing may be known as distinct: but every school or sect proposes certain things that must be universally held by all its followers, or certain doctrines that must be universally affirmed as true; therefore the Christian religion has no special right to be called Catholic.
Praeterea, idolatria ad omnes mundi angulos pervenit. Sed Christiana fides nondum invenitur ad omnes mundi fines pervenisse, cum aliqui barbari sint, qui fidem Christi non cognoscant. Ergo idolatriae secta magis debet dici Catholica quam Christiana fides. 4. Idolatry extends to every corner of the earth; but the Christian religion has not yet been brought to all the regions of the world, since there are yet some barbarians who do not know the faith of Christ; therefore these idolatrous sects, rather than the Christian religion, deserve the name of Catholic.
Praeterea, quod non convenit omnibus, non potest dici universale. Sed fides Christiana a multis non recipitur. Ergo inconvenienter Catholica vel universalis dicitur. 5. What does not include all should not be called universal; but the Christian religion is not accepted by many; therefore it is inaptly called universal or Catholic.
Sed contra
Sed contra est quod dicit Augustinus in libro de vera religione: tenenda est nobis Christiana religio et eius Ecclesiae communicatio, quae Catholica est et Catholica nominatur non solum a suis, verum etiam ab omnibus inimicis. On the contrary is that which Augustine says in De vera religione: “The Christian religion must be held by us, and the communication of that Church which is catholic and which is called Catholic, not only by its own members, but even by its enemies.”
Praeterea, universale et commune idem esse videtur. Sed fides Christiana ab apostolo communis fides dicitur, ut patet Tit. 1: Tito dilecto filio secundum communem fidem et cetera. Ergo convenienter potest dici universalis vel Catholica. Again, universal and common appear to be the same; but the Christian faith is called the common faith by the Apostle (Titus 1:4): “To Titus, my beloved son according to the common faith”; therefore it is rightly called Catholic.
Praeterea, illud, quod universaliter omnibus proponitur, maxime debet dici universale. Sed fides Christiana omnibus proponitur, ut patet Matth. ultimo: docete omnes gentes et cetera. Ergo ipsa merito debet dici Catholica vel universalis. Again what is universally proposed to all should in a special way be called universal; but the Christian faith is universally proposed to all, as is evident in the last chapter of Matthew (28:19), “Teach all nations,” etc.; therefore it is deservedly called Catholic or universal.
Responsio. Dicendum quod fides sicut et quaelibet alia cognitio duplicem habet materiam, scilicet in qua, id est ipsos credentes, et de qua, id est res creditas, et ex parte utriusque materiae fides Christiana Catholica dici potest. Response. I answer that it must be said that faith, just as any other cognition, has a twofold matter: namely, that in which it exists (the believers themselves) and that about which it is concerned (the truths believed); and as regards both types of matter, the Christian religion can be called Catholic.
Ex parte quidem credentium, quia illam fidem veram asserit apostolus Rom. 3, quae est testificata a lege et prophetis. Cum autem prophetarum tempore diversae gentes diversorum deorum cultibus insisterent, solus autem populus Israel Deo vero cultum debitum exhiberet, et sic non esset una universalis religio, praedixit per eos spiritus sanctus cultum veri Dei ab omnibus esse assumendum. Unde dicitur Is. 45: mihi curvabitur omne genu et confitebitur omnis lingua; quod quidem per Christianam fidem et religionem impletur. As regards the believers it is Catholic because the Apostle (Rom. 3:2) asserts that that is the true religion which was given testimony to by the law and the prophets. Since, however, in the times of the prophets various tribes offered worship to different gods, only one nation, the people of Israel, gave due honor to the true God, and so there did not exist that one universal religion which was foretold to them by the Holy Spirit, that worship of the true God which would be paid by all. Therefore Isaiah (45:24) says: “For every knee shall be bowed to Me, and every tongue shall swear.” And this prophecy has, indeed, been fulfilled by faith and the Christian religion.
Unde merito Catholica nominatur, utpote a cuiuslibet condicionis hominibus recepta. Et sic illi, qui ab hac fide et religione communiter promissa et recepta in proprias quasdam sententias declinarunt, non Catholici, sed, quasi a communione divisi, haeretici nominantur. Therefore deservedly is that faith called Catholic since it has been accepted by men of every condition. And thus, those who have fallen away from this faith and this religion which has been so universally foretold and received, and who have become divided into various sects, are not called Catholics, but as it were, having been cut off from the communion of the faithful, they are called heretics.
Sed ex parte etiam rerum creditarum in fide Christiana universalitas invenitur. Fuerunt namque antiquitus diversae artes et viae, quibus hominibus quantum ad diversa providebatur vel provideri credebatur. Quidam namque bonum hominis in solis corporalibus ponebant, vel in divitiis vel honoribus aut voluptatibus. Quidam in solis animae bonis, ut in virtutibus moralibus vel intellectualibus. Quidam etiam, ut Augustinus dicit in libro de civitate Dei, aestimabant deos esse colendos propter temporalia bona istius vitae, quidam vero propter bona quae sunt post vitam. Porphyrius etiam ponebat quibusdam gentilibus teletis animae imaginariam partem purgari, non totam animam, dicebatque, ut Augustinus dicit X de civitate Dei, nondum esse receptam unam sectam, quae universalem contineat viam animae liberandae. As regards the truths proposed for belief in the Christian religion, there is also found truth that is catholic. Now, there were various arts and ways in ancient times according as there was vision, or belief in the vision of the human mind among men. For certain men placed the good of man in corporeal things alone, either in riches or in honors or in pleasures. Some others placed this good in the soul alone, as in moral or intellectual virtues. Certain others, as Augustine says in his book, De civ. Dei, thought that gods ought to be honored because of the corporeal blessings of this life; but others, on account of blessings to be realized after death. Porphyry also relates that it was believed among certain peoples of the earth that the imaginative part of the soul would be cleansed, but not the whole soul; and he said, as Augustine tells in X De civ. Dei, that there had not yet been found a single sect that possessed a universal way for liberty of spirit. Now this way, as Augustine says in the same place, is the Christian religion.
Haec autem est religio Christiana, ut Augustinus ibidem dicit. Ipsa enim docet Deum esse colendum non solum propter aeterna, sed etiam propter temporalia beneficia, nec solum in spiritualibus, sed etiam in usu corporalium hominem dirigit et beatitudinem animae et corporis repromittit. Et ideo regulae eius universales dicuntur, utpote totam vitam hominis et omne, quod ad ipsum quolibet modo pertinet, ordinantes. Et has duas rationes universalitatis assignat Boethius, ut in littera patet. This religion teaches that God is to be honored not only on account of eternal, but also because of temporal benefits; that He rules man not only in spiritual ways but also in all that concerns him bodily, and that He promises beatitude for both soul and body. Hence His regulations are called universal, as pertaining to the whole life of man and as extending to all that in any way affects man. For these two reasons, therefore, the name “universal” is given to the Christian religion, as Boethius in the text makes clear.
Answers to objections
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod quamvis Deus in se non sit neque universalis neque particularis, est tamen universalis omnium rerum causa et finis, et sic cognitio, quae de ipso habetur, ad omnia quodammodo universalis est. 1. It may, therefore, be answered: Although God is in Himself neither universal nor particular, yet He is the universal cause and end of all things, and thus knowledge which is held concerning Him is universal since it extends to all things.
Ad secundum dicendum quod illa particularia facta tenet fides ut universalia remedia ad totum genus humanum liberandum. 2. It may be said: Faith holds these particular facts as universal remedies for the healing and the liberation of the whole human race.
Ad tertium dicendum quod aliae sectae hoc sibi vindicare nituntur, quod est proprium fidei Christianae, sed non possunt pertingere, unde eis non proprie universalitatis competit nomen. 3. Answer may be made: Other sects claim for themselves what is proper to the Christian faith, but they cannot vindicate this claim; therefore, the name of universality does not properly belong to them.
Ad quartum dicendum quod idolatria non erat una religio, sed apud diversos diversa, cum diversi diversos sibi deos colendos instituerent. Nec iterum ab omnibus nationibus est acceptata, cum a veri Dei cultoribus fuerit reprobata et etiam a sapientibus gentilium, qui dicebant huiusmodi caerimonias esse observandas tamquam legibus iussas, non tamquam diis placitas, ut de Seneca dicit Augustinus in VI de civitate Dei. 4. It may be said: Idolatry was no one form of religion, but differed among various peoples, since they set up for themselves various gods to be worshiped. Nor again, were those forms of idolatry accepted by all nations, since they were rejected by those who honored the true God, and even by the philosophers of the Gentiles, who said that certain religious ceremonies ought to be observed since they were commanded by law, but not because they could be known to please the gods, as Seneca said, according to Augustine in De civ. Dei.
Ad quintum dicendum quod fides Christiana non dicitur Catholica vel universalis propter singula generum, sed propter genera singulorum, quia ex omni condicione hominum ei aliqui adhaeserunt. 5. It may be answered: The Christian religion is not called Catholic on account of individual nations who adhere to it, but on account of the body of individual men from all conditions of mankind who adhere to it.

Article 4
Whether it Is a True Article of Faith, That the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit Are One God
Articulus 4 Objections
Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit Catholicae fidei confessio quod pater et filius et spiritus sanctus sint unus Deus, quia, ut ipse dicit, ad inaequalitatem horum trium sequitur pluralitas deorum. Sed sacra Scriptura, quae est caput Catholicae religionis, ut dicit Augustinus in libro de vera religione, ponit inaequalitatem patris et filii, ut videtur per hoc quod dicitur Ioh. 14: pater maior me est, ex persona filii. Ergo non est haec sententia Catholicae fidei quam dicit. 1. It seems that it is not the confession of the Catholic faith that Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are one God: because, as Boethius himself says, upon inequality there follows plurality of gods. But the Catholic Scripture, which is the head of the Catholic religion, as Augustine says in De vera religione, states that there is inequality between Father and Son, as is evident from what is said in the person of the Son in John 14:28: “The Father is greater than I.” Therefore what is said is not the confession of the Catholic religion.
Praeterea, 1 Cor. 15: cum subiecta illi fuerint omnia, scilicet filio, tunc et ipse subiectus erit ei, scilicet patri, qui sibi subiecit omnia; et sic idem quod prius. 2. 1 Cor. 15:28 says: “And when all things shall be subdued unto Him, then the Son also Himself shall be subject unto Him that put all things under Him, that God may be all in all.” And so the conclusion is like the former.
Praeterea, orare non est nisi inferioris ad superiorem. Sed filius orat pro nobis, Rom. 8: Christus Iesus qui etiam interpellat pro nobis. Similiter et spiritus sanctus, eodem: spiritus postulat pro nobis gemitibus inenarrabilibus. Ergo filius et spiritus sanctus sunt patre inferiores secundum confessionem Catholicae fidei; et sic idem quod prius. 3. Prayer is not made except by an inferior to a superior: but the Son prays for us. Rom. 8:34, “Christ Jesus... who also makes intercession for us.” Likewise of the Holy Spirit it is said in the same place (8:26), “The Spirit Himself asks for us with unspeakable groanings.” Therefore the Son and the Holy Spirit are inferior to the Father according to the confession of the Catholic faith, and so the conclusion is the same.
Praeterea, Ioh. 17 dicit filius loquens ad patrem: haec est vita aeterna, ut cognoscant te solum verum Deum et quem misisti Iesum Christum. Ergo solus pater est verus Deus, non ergo filius et spiritus. Et sic videntur esse creaturae, et sic idem quod prius. 4. John 17:3 gives the words of the Son addressing Himself to the Father: “That they may know You, the only true God, and Jesus Christ, whom You have sent.” Therefore the Father alone is the true God, and not the Son and the Holy Spirit. Therefore they seem to be creatures, and so the same conclusion is reached.
Praeterea, apostolus de filio loquens 1 Tim. ultimo dicit: quem scilicet Christum suis temporibus ostendit beatus et solus potens rex regum et dominus dominantium, qui solus habet immortalitatem et lucem habitat inaccessibilem. Ergo haec omnia soli patri conveniunt. 5. In 1 Tim. 6:15, the Apostle says: “Which in His times He shall show, who is the Blessed and only Mighty, the King of kings, and Lord of lords. Who only has immortality and inhabits light inaccessible.” Therefore all these titles belong only to the Father, and so the conclusion is as before.
Praeterea, Marc. 13 dicitur: de die autem illa et hora nemo scit neque Angeli in caelo neque filius nisi pater. Ergo maior est scientia patris quam filii. Ergo et maior essentia. Et sic idem quod prius. 6. In Mark 13:32 it is said: “But of that day or hour no man knows, neither the angels in heaven, nor the Son, but the Father.” Therefore the Father’s knowledge is greater than that of the Son. Consequently His essence also is greater, and thus the conclusion is the same.
Praeterea, Matth. 20 dicitur: sedere ad dexteram meam vel sinistram non est meum dare vobis, sed quibus paratum est a patre meo. Ergo filius non est aequalis potestatis cum patre. 7. Matt. 20:23 says: “To sit on My right or left hand, is not Mine to give to you, but to them for whom it is prepared by My Father.” Therefore the power of the Son is not equal to that of the Father.
Praeterea, Col. 1 dicitur de filio quod est primogenitus omnis creaturae. Sed comparatio non est nisi eorum quae sunt unius generis. Ergo filius est creatura. 8. In Col. 1:15, it is said of the Son that He is “the firstborn of every creature.” But this comparison would not be made unless of beings of one genus; therefore the Son is a creature.
Praeterea, Eccli. 24 dicitur ex persona divinae sapientiae: ab initio et ante saecula creata sum, et sic idem quod prius. 9. In Sirach 24:14 it is said in the person of divine Wisdom, “From the beginning, and before the world, was I created.” Thus the conclusion is the same.
Praeterea, ille qui clarificatur minor est eo qui clarificat. Sed filius clarificatur a patre, ut patet Ioh. 12. Ergo filius est minor patre. 10. He who is revealed is less than he who reveals; but the Son is revealed by the Father, as is evident in John, chap. 12; therefore, the Son is less than the Father.
Praeterea, mittens est maior eo qui mittitur. Sed pater mittit filium, ut patet Gal. 4: misit Deus filium suum factum ex muliere et cetera. Mittit etiam spiritum sanctum, Ioh. 14: Paraclitus spiritus sanctus, quem mittet pater et cetera. Ergo pater est maior filio et spiritu sancto. Et sic ista sententia quam dicit non videtur esse fidei Catholicae. 11. The one sending is greater than the one sent. But the Father sends the Son, as is clear from Gal. 4:4, “God sent His Son,” etc. And He also sends the Holy Spirit, according to John 14:26, “The Paraclete, the Holy Spirit, whom the Father will send in My name.” Therefore the Father is greater than the Son and the Holy Spirit. And thus the aforesaid doctrine does not seem to be in accordance with the Catholic faith.
Sed contra
Sed contra est quod dicitur Ioh. 1: in principio erat verbum, et Deus erat verbum, omnia per ipsum facta sunt. Ex quo habetur quod filius sit aeternus, alias non esset in principio; et quod sit patri aequalis, alias Deus non esset; et quod non sit creatura, alias non omnia per ipsum facta essent. But on the contrary it is said in John 1:1, 3: “In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God.... All things were made by Him,” etc. From this it is to be held that the Son is eternal, for otherwise He could not have been in the beginning: and that He is equal to the Father, for otherwise He would not be God: and that He is not a creature, for otherwise all things would riot have been made by Him.
Praeterea, filius, cum sit veritas, de se mentitus non est. Sed filius dicebat se patri aequalem. Unde dicitur Ioh. 5: patrem suum dicebat Deum, aequalem se Deo faciens. Ergo ipse est aequalis patri. Again, since the Son is truth, He could not lie concerning Himself. But the Son said that He was equal to the Father (John 5: 18): “He also said God was His Father, making Himself equal to God.” Therefore He is equal to the Father.
Praeterea, Phil. 2: non rapinam arbitratus est esse se aequalem Deo. Esset autem rapina, si arbitraretur et non esset. Ergo est aequalis Deo. Again, Phil. 2:6 says: “He thought it not robbery to be equal with God.” But it would have been robbery if He thought that was so which was not. Therefore He is equal to God.
Praeterea, Ioh. 10 dicitur: ego et pater unum sumus, praeterea Ioh. 14: ego in patre et pater in me est. Ergo unus alio minor non est. Again, John 10:30, “I and the Father are one.” And John 14:11, “I am in the Father, and the Father in Me.” Therefore one is not greater than the other.
Praeterea, Rom. 9: ex quibus Christus, qui est super omnia Deus benedictus in saecula. Ergo nullus est eo superior, et sic non est minor patre. Again, Rom. 9:5: “And of whom is Christ, according to the flesh, who is over all things, God blessed forever.” Therefore no one is superior to Him; and thus He is not less than the Father.
Praeterea, 1 Ioh. ultimo: dedit nobis sensum ut cognoscamus verum Deum et simus in vero filio eius. Hic est verus Deus et vita aeterna. Ergo non est minor patre. Again, 1 John 5:20, “And we know that the Son of God is come: and He hath given us understanding that we may know the true God, and may be in His true Son. This is the true God and life eternal.” Therefore He is not less than the Father.
Item ostenditur quod spiritus sanctus sit aequalis patri et verus Deus per hoc quod dicitur Phil. 3 secundum Graecam litteram: nos sumus circumcisio, qui spiritui Dei servimus, et intelligitur de latriae servitute, ut in Graeco patet. Sed talis servitus nulli creaturae debetur, Deut. 6 et Matth. 4: dominum Deum tuum adorabis, et illi soli servies. Ergo spiritus sanctus non est creatura. Again, it is shown that the Holy Spirit is the true God and equal to the Father by what is said in Phil. 3:3, according to the Greek text. “We are the circumcision, who serve God the Spirit”, and in regard to this service, that of latria is understood, as is evident in the Greek. And such honor is due to no creature. Deut. 6:13 and Matt. 4:10: “The Lord your God you shall adore, and Him only you shall serve.” Therefore, the Holy Spirit is not a creature.
Praeterea, membra Christi non possunt esse templum alicuius qui sit minor quam Christus. Sed corpora nostra, quae sunt membra Christi secundum apostolum, sunt templum spiritus sancti, ut dicitur 1 Cor. 6. Ergo spiritus sanctus non est minor Christo, et sic nec patre. Et ita verum est id quod auctor dicit esse Catholicae fidei sententiam. Again, the members of Christ cannot be the temple of anyone who is less than Christ: but our bodies, which are members of Christ, according to the Apostle, are temples of the Holy Spirit, as is said in 1 Cor. 6: 19. Therefore the Holy Spirit is not less than Christ, or less than the Father; and thus it is true, as the author says, that this is a doctrine of the Catholic religion.
Responsio. Dicendum quod Arianorum positio inaequalitatem in personis divinis constituens non est Catholicae fidei professio, sed magis gentilis impietas, quod sic patet. Response. I answer that it must be said that the position of the Arians, which establishes inequality among the divine persons, is not a confession of the Catholic religion, but rather an impiety of the Gentiles, as is thus evident.
Apud gentiles enim omnes substantiae immortales dii dicebantur. Inter has autem ponebant Platonici tres primas et principales, ut patet per Augustinum in X de civitate Dei et per Macrobium super somnium Scipionis, scilicet Deum omnium creatorem, quem dicebant Deum patrem propter hoc, quod ab ipso omnia derivarentur, et quandam inferiorem substantiam, quam paternam mentem sive paternum intellectum dicebant, plenam omnium rerum ideis, et hanc factam a Deo patre dicebant, et post hoc ponebant animam mundi quasi spiritum vitae totius mundi. Et has tres substantias tres principales deos nominabant et tria principia, per quae animae purgantur. Among the Gentiles all immortal substances are called gods. Among these, moreover, they hold, or rather the Platonists hold, that there are three principal persons, as is made clear by Augustine in De civitate Dei (Bk. X), and by Macrobius on the Somnium Scipionis, namely, the God, who is the Creator of all things, whom they call also the Father, since all things have their source in Him; and, secondly, a certain inferior substance, whom they call the Paternal Mind or the Paternal Intellect, who contains the ideas of all things, and who is made by God the Father, they say; and thirdly, after Him they suppose a Soul-of-the-World, a spirit who is, as it were, the life of the whole world. And these three substances they name as their chief gods, and as the three principles by which souls are purified.
Origenes autem Platonicis documentis insistens arbitratus est hoc modo in fide nostra ponendum esse tres, qui testimonium dant in caelo, 1 Ioh. ultimo, sicut Platonici tres principales substantias posuerunt, unde posuit esse filium creaturam et minorem patre in libro, quem peri archon, id est de principiis, nominavit, ut patet per Hieronymum in quadam epistula de erroribus Origenis. Et cum ipse Alexandriae docuerit, ex eius scriptis suum errorem Arius hausit. Et propter hoc dicit Epiphanius quod Origenes fuit fons et pater Arii. Origen, moreover, following the teachings of the Platonists, thought that after the same manner the doctrine of the true faith ought to be interpreted, because it is said, “There are three who give testimony in heaven” (1 John 5:7). And so, as the Platonists supposed that there were three principal substances, Origen held that the Son was a creature and less than the Father, in that book which is entitled Peri Archon (“Concerning the Principles”), as is made clear by Jerome in a certain epistle regarding the errors of Origen. And since Origen himself taught at Alexandria, Arius drank in his error from the things he wrote. On this account Epiphanius says that Origen was the father and font of Arius.
Tantum ergo Christianae et Catholicae fidei positio Arii de Trinitate est contraria, quantum error gentilium, qui creaturas deos dicentes eis latriae servitutem exhibebant. Quod arguit apostolus Rom. 1 dicens quod coluerunt et servierunt creaturae potius quam creatori et cetera. Therefore the position of the Christian and Catholic faith regarding the Trinity differs as much from the position of Arius as does the error of the Gentiles, which, in calling creatures gods, rendered to them the service of divine praise. This the Apostle (Rom. 1:25) criticizes when he says, “They worshiped and served the creature rather than the Creator.”
Answers to objections
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut dicit Augustinus in II de Trinitate, de patre et filio tripliciter dicitur aliquid in Scripturis. 1. It may be said: As Augustine states in II De Trinitate, passages found in the Scriptures in regard to the Father and the Son are threefold.
Quaedam namque unitatem substantiae et aequalitatem ipsorum ostendunt, ut: ego et pater unum sumus. a) First, some show a certain unity of substance and equality of persons, as, “I and the Father are one” (John 10:30).
Quaedam vero filium minorem ostendunt propter formam servi, secundum quam factus est etiam se ipso minor, secundum illud Phil. 2: semet ipsum exinanivit formam servi accipiens. b) Other passages show the Son to be less because of His having the form of a servant, according as He made Himself less, as is said in Phil. 2:7, “He emptied Himself, taking the form of a servant.”
Quaedam ita dicuntur, ut neque minor neque aequalis ostendatur, sed tantum quod filius sit de patre, sicut dicitur Ioh. 5: sicut habet pater vitam in semet ipso, sic dedit et filio vitam habere. c) Certain things are also said that show Him to be neither less nor the equal of the Father, but only that the Son is from the Father, as in John 5:26, “As the Father has life in Himself, so He hath given to the Son also to have life in Himself.”
Primae ergo auctoritates sunt Catholicis in adminiculum ad veritatis defensionem. Sed ea, quae secundo et tertio modo dicuntur in Scriptura, assumpserunt haeretici ad sui erroris confirmationem, sed vane. Non enim ea quae de Christo dicuntur secundum humanam naturam sunt referenda ad eius divinitatem; alias sequeretur quod secundum divinitatem esset mortuus, cum hoc de ipso secundum humanitatem dicatur. Similiter nec ostenditur patre minor filius, quamvis filius sit ex patre, quia filius a patre omnia, quae pater habet, accepit, ut habetur Ioh. 16 et Matth. 11. Unde per hoc ordo originis, non inaequalitas deitatis astrui potest. The first authoritative passages are used by Catholics in making a defense of the truth. But those of the second and third kind are employed by heretics in confirmation of their error, though in a vain attempt. For the things that are stated of Christ according to His human nature should not be referred to His divinity; otherwise it would follow that His death, which is recorded of Him according to His humanity, would be according to His divinity. Likewise, neither is it shown that the Son is less than the Father, although the Son is from the Father, because the Son has from the Father all that the Father possesses, as is held in John 16, and Matthew 11. Wherefore no inequality of divinity can be asserted because of the order of origin.
Quod ergo dicitur: pater maior me est, dictum est de filio secundum humanam naturam secundum Augustinum, vel secundum Hilarium secundum divinam ita quod maioritas non importet inaequalitatem, quia filius non est minor patre, cui datum est nomen super omne nomen, sed importat auctoritatem principii, secundum quod hoc nomen, quo filius est aequalis patri, habet filius a patre. When, therefore, it is said, “The Father is greater than I,” this is said of the Son according to His human nature and not according to His divine nature, as Augustine maintains; or, as Hilary says, according to His divine nature in such a way that “greater” does not imply inequality (because the Son is not less than the Father, inasmuch as to Him is given a name above all names); but it implies dignity of a principle inasmuch as it is from the Father that the Son possesses that by which He is the equal of the Father.
Ad secundum dicendum quod filio subiecit omnia non solum pater, sed etiam ipse sibi, secundum illud Phil. 3: secundum virtutem, qua potens est sibi subicere omnia, et hoc secundum deitatem, qua aequalis est patri. Et ideo in hoc quod dicitur quod Christus subiectus erit ei, qui subiecit sibi omnia, non fit comparatio filii secundum divinitatem ad patrem, sed magis secundum humanitatem ad divinitatem patris, quae toti Trinitati est communis. 2. It may be said: All things the Father not only subjected to the Son, but the Son Himself made them subject to Himself, according to the saying of Phil. 3:21: “According to the operation whereby also He is able to subdue all things unto Himself,” i.e., according to the Divinity which is equal in Him to that of the Father. Wherefore, when it is said that Christ will be subject, this does not imply relation of the Son to the Father according to Divinity, but rather the relation of the human nature of the Son to the Divinity of the Father, which Divinity is common to the whole Trinity.
Regnum ergo Christi sunt fideles ipsi; quod regnum tradet Deo et patri, non tamen sibi adimens, cum fideles ad visionem patris adducet, qua visione etiam ipsius deitas videbitur. Et tunc apparebit maxime esse secundum humanam naturam divinae subiectus, quando divina natura perfecte cognoscetur, non tali subiectione, ut quidam haeretici dixerunt, quod ipsa humana natura a Christo assumpta transeat in divinam, sed secundum quod est minor patris divinitate. And when the divine nature shall be perfectly known, then it will be apparent that especially according to His human nature He is subject to the divine nature; but not with such a subjection as that which certain heretics claim who say that the very human nature which was assumed by the divine nature is transmuted into it, but rather that He is less than the Father by reason of His humanity. This is made especially clear by the fact that He will deliver His kingdom, that is, the faithful, to the Father, not claiming them for Himself, but leading them to the vision of the Father, a vision in which His own Divinity also will be seen.
Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit in I de Trinitate, ex hoc filius rogat, quo minor est patre; quo vero aequalis est, exaudit cum patre; id est secundum humanam naturam orat, secundum divinam exaudit. 3. It may be answered: According to Augustine (III De Trinitate), inasmuch as the Son prays He is less than the Father; but inasmuch as He obtains hearing with the Father, He is the equal of the Father.
Sed spiritus sanctus interpellare dicitur, in quantum nos interpellantes facit et nostris orationibus efficaciam praestat. But the Holy Spirit is said to intercede for us inasmuch as He causes us to make intercession and renders our prayers efficacious.
Ad quartum dicendum quod secundum Augustinum in VI de Trinitate solus unus verus Deus non est tantum de patre intelligendum, sed simul de patre et filio et spiritu sancto, qui dicuntur solus unus verus Deus, quia nihil praeter Trinitatem illam est verus Deus. Unde sic intelligendum: ut cognoscant te patrem et quem misisti Iesum Christum esse unum solum verum Deum. De spiritu autem sancto tacet, quia, cum sit nexus amborum, ex utroque intelligitur. 4. It may be said: According to Augustine (VI De Trinitate), the statement that there is one only true God must not be interpreted to refer to the Father alone, but as including Father, Son, and Holy Ghost simultaneously; and they are said to be, the one true God because no being outside the Trinity is true God. Wherefore, it must be in this way that one understands: “That they may know You, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom You have sent” (John 17:3). For there is one only true God, and no mention is here made of the Holy Spirit, because, since He is the nexus of the other two Persons, He is understood by mention of the other two.
Ad quintum dicendum quod, sicut patet per Augustinum in I de Trinitate, verbum illud non est intelligendum solum de persona patris, sed de tota Trinitate. Tota enim est beatus et solus potens etc.; tota etiam Trinitas filium ostendit. Si tamen dixisset: quem ostendit pater beatus et solus potens, non propter hoc filius separaretur, sicut nec pater separatur, cum dicitur Eccli. 24 ex persona filii qui est Dei sapientia: gyrum caeli circuivi sola. Et hoc ideo, quia in his, quae ad essentiam pertinent, pater et filius sunt omnino unum. Et ideo quod de uno dicitur, ab alio per dictionem exclusivam non removetur, sed solum a creaturis, quae habent diversam essentiam. 5. It may be answered: According to Augustine (I De Trinitate), this saying is not to be understood of the Person of the Father alone, but of the entire Trinity. For the whole Trinity is blessed and powerful, and the whole Trinity shows forth the Son. Even if He did say: “He shall show, who is the Blessed and only Mighty,” etc., this would not indicate that the Son is separate from the Father, or that the Father is considered as being separated from the Son, because it is said in Sirach 24:8, in the person of the Son, who is the Wisdom of God, “I alone have compassed the circuit of heaven.” This is said, therefore, because in those things which pertain to the essence of God, Father and Son are altogether one, and hence what is said of one of them by diction which may be exclusive does not imply any mutual separation, but only their separation from creatures.
Ad sextum dicendum quod filius non solum secundum divinam naturam scit diem illam et horam, sed etiam secundum humanam, quia eius anima scit omnia. Dicitur autem illam nescire, ut Augustinus dicit in I de Trinitate, quia non facit nos eam scire. Unde de hoc quaerentibus dixit: non est vestrum nosse tempora etc., Act. 1, per quem modum et apostolus dixit 1 Cor. 1: neque iudicavi me scire aliquid inter vos etc., quia scilicet alia eis dicere noluerat, quia capaces non erant. 6. It may be said: The Son knows “that day and hour,” not only according to His divine nature, but even according to His human nature, since His soul knows all things. Hence He is said not to know that day, as Augustine explains in I De Trinitate, because He does not make it known to us; wherefore He said to those questioning Him: “It is not for you to know the times,” etc. (Acts 1:7). And in the same way the Apostle says in 1 Cor. 2:2, “I judged not myself to know anything among you,” because he was unwilling to disclose lofty things to them since they lacked capacity to understand.
Vel hoc intelligendum est de filio non quantum ad personam ipsius capitis, sed quantum ad corpus eius, quod est Ecclesia, quae hoc nescit, ut Hieronymus dicit. In hoc vero, quod dicitur solus pater scire, ostenditur etiam filius scire secundum regulam praedictam. Or this may be understood as regarding the Son, not in His character as head of the Church, but in the person of His members, since the Church, as Jerome says, is without knowledge of these truths. However, in saying that the Father alone knows them, it is evident that the Son also knows them, according to the aforesaid reason.
Ad septimum dicendum quod, sicut dicit Augustinus in I de Trinitate, sic exponendum est verbum illud: non est meum dare vobis, id est non est humanae potestatis hoc dare, ut per illud intelligatur hoc dare, per quod est Deus et aequalis patri. 7. Answer may be made: As Augustine says in I De Trinitate, the verse: “It is not Mine to give to you,” etc., must be understood to mean that it is not in the power of human nature to give this, so that He may be known to grant it by reason of the fact that He is God and equal to the Father.
Ad octavum dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit in I de Trinitate, hunc apostolicum locum haeretici non intelligentes in contumeliam filii Dei saepe proponunt astruentes quod creatura sit minus considerantes verborum vim. Primogenitus quippe dictus est, non primus creatus, ut et genitus pro natura divina, quam habet, et primus propter perpetuitatem credatur. Quamvis autem filius non sit de genere creaturarum, tamen secundum Basilium habet aliquid cum creaturis commune, scilicet accipere a patre, sed habet prae creaturis quod per naturam habet quae a patre accipit. Et propter hoc potest ordo inter genituram filii et creaturarum productionem notari. 8. It may be said: According to Augustine, I De Trinitate, many heretics, not understanding this point of apostolic doctrine, broke out into insult of the Son of God, saying and declaring that He was a creature, having little regard for the import of words. For He is said, indeed, to be the first begotten, but not the first created, so that He might be believed to have been begotten, according to His divine nature, and to be first on account of His perpetuity. Moreover, although the Son belongs to no genus of creatures, yet, as Basil holds, He has something in common with creatures: namely, the fact that He received from the Father that which He has; but this possession is superior to that of creatures, since through His own nature He possesses what He receives from the Father. On this account there can be noted a certain order between the generation of the Son and the production of creatures.
Ad nonum dicendum quod illud verbum et alia similia, quae de sapientia Dei leguntur, vel sunt referenda ad sapientiam creatam, sicut sunt Angeli, vel ad ipsum Christum secundum humanam naturam. Et sic dicitur ab initio vel initio creatus, quasi ab aeterno praedestinatus creaturam assumere. 9. It may be said: This saying and all sayings similar to it, which are read in regard to the wisdom of God, ought to be referred to the wisdom of creatures, such as the angels, or to Christ Himself according to His human nature. Thus His wisdom is said to be “from the beginning,” or “at the beginning of creation,” as if from eternity it predestined that creation should belong to Him.
Ad decimum dicendum quod, sicut dicit Augustinus in II de Trinitate, ex hoc, quod pater clarificat filium, non ostenditur filius minor patre, alias esset etiam spiritu sancto minor, quia dicit filius de spiritu sancto, Ioh. 16: ille me clarificabit. Illa enim clarificatio non ostendit aliquid in persona filii Dei fieri, sed vel in notitia hominum, secundum quod clarificare est ipsius notitiam claram facere, vel in corpore assumpto, prout refertur ad claritatem resurrectionis. 10. Answer may be made: As Augustine says in II De Trinitate: From the fact that the Father will glorify the Son, it does not follow that the Son is inferior to the Father; otherwise, He would be less than the Holy Spirit, because the Son says of the Holy Spirit in John 16:14: “He shall glorify Me.” Now, this glorification refers not to the Person of the Son, but to the fact that in the knowledge of men He will be glorified, since the Spirit will make Him known; or it may be referred to the body which He had assumed and to the glory of the Resurrection.
Ad undecimum dicendum quod filius et spiritus sanctus dicuntur missi a patre, non quod essent ubi prius non fuerant, sed ut essent aliquo modo quo prius non fuerant, quod est secundum aliquem effectum in creatura. Unde per hoc, quod filius et spiritus sanctus dicuntur a patre missi, non ostenditur Trinitatis inaequalitas, sed ordo originis, quo una persona est ab alia - unde pater non mittitur, qui non est ab alio - et efficientia respectu illius effectus, secundum quem persona divina mittitur. 11. It may be said: The Son and the Holy Spirit are said to be “sent” by the Father, not that they now are where they had previously not been; but that, they are now there in a certain manner in which they had not previously been: that is to say, as regards a certain effect in creatures. Wherefore, when the Son and the Holy Spirit are said to have been sent by the Father, no inequality in the Trinity is revealed, but an order of origin, by which one Person is from another. Therefore the Father is not “sent,” because He is not from another in such a way that He has from another His efficacy in relation to any of His effects; and it is in this way that a divine Person is “sent.”

Quaestio 4, Prooemium QUESTION IV
Concerning Those Things That Pertain to the Cause of Plurality
Deinde quaeritur de his quae ad causam pluralitatis pertinent. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quattuor.
  1. Primo. Utrum alteritas sit causa pluralitatis.
  2. Secundo. Utrum varietas accidentium faciat diversitatem secundum numerum.
  3. Tertio. Utrum duo corpora possint esse vel intelligi esse in eodem loco.
  4. Quarto. Utrum varietas loci aliquid operetur ad differentiam secundum numerum.
Inquiry is made of those things that pertain to the cause of plurality. And this inquiry involves four questions:
  1. Whether otherness is the cause of plurality.
  2. Whether variety of accidents produces diversity according to number.
  3. Whether two bodies can be, or can be thought of as being, simultaneously in the same place.
  4. Whether difference of location exerts some influence as to difference according to number.

Article 1
Whether Otherness Is the Cause of Plurality

Articulus 1 Objections
Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod pluralitatis causa non sit alteritas. Ut enim dicitur in arithmetica Boethii, omnia quaecumque a primaeva rerum natura constructa sunt, numerorum videntur ratione esse formata. Hoc enim fuit principale in animo conditoris exemplar. Et huic consonat quod dicitur Sap. 11: omnia in pondere, numero et mensura disposuisti. Ergo pluralitas sive numerus est primum inter res creatas, et non est eius aliqua causa creata quaerenda. 1. It seems that the cause of plurality cannot be otherness. For as is said in the Arithmetica of Boethius, all things whatever of the sum-total of beings that have been established in nature seem to ‘ have been formed by reason of numbers. For this was the principal exemplar in the mind of the builder of the universe: and this is in agreement with what is said in Wis. 11:21, “You have disposed all things in weight and in number and in measure”. Therefore plurality or number is first among created things, and no cause of it is to be sought for.
Praeterea, ut dicitur in libro de causis, prima rerum creatarum est esse. Sed ens primo dividitur per unum et multa. Ergo multitudine nihil potest esse prius nisi ens et unum. Ergo non videtur esse verum, quod aliquid aliud sit eius causa. 2. As said in the book De causis, the first of created things is being; but being is divided at first by one and many; hence nothing can exist as prior to multitude except being and unity. Therefore it does not seem to be true that anything else should be its cause.
Praeterea, pluralitas vel circuit omnia genera, secundum quod condividitur contra unum, quod est convertibile cum ente, vel est in genere quantitatis, secundum quod condividitur uni quod est principium numeri. Sed alteritas est in genere relationis. Relationes autem non sunt causae quantitatum, sed magis e converso, et multo minus relationes sunt causae eius quod est in omnibus generibus, quia sic essent causae etiam substantiae. Ergo alteritas nullo modo est causa pluralitatis. 3. Plurality either includes all genera according as it is distinguished from unity, which is convertible with being: or it is itself in the genus of quantity, according as it is distinguished from that unity which is the principle of number. But otherness is in the genus of relation, and relations are not causes of quantities, but rather the converse is true. Much less, then, is relation the cause of what is in every genus, because in that case it would be the cause of substance; therefore otherness can in no way be the cause of plurality.
Praeterea, contrariorum contrariae sunt causae. Sed identitas et diversitas sive alteritas sunt opposita. Ergo habent oppositas causas. Sed unitas est causa identitatis, ut patet in V metaphysicae. Ergo pluralitas vel multitudo est causa diversitatis sive alteritatis. Non ergo alteritas est causa pluralitatis. 4. For contrary things there are contrary causes: but identity and otherness or diversity are opposites; therefore they have opposite causes. But unity is the cause of identity, as is evident in V Metaph.; therefore plurality or multitude is the cause of diversity; and consequently otherness is not the cause of plurality.
Praeterea, alteritatis principium est accidentalis differentia; huiusmodi enim differentiae secundum Porphyrium faciunt alterum. Sed non in omnibus, in quibus est pluralitas, invenitur accidentalis differentia nec etiam differentia qualiscumque. Quaedam enim sunt quae accidentibus subici non possunt, sicut formae simplices; quaedam vero sunt quae in nullo conveniunt, unde non possunt differentia dici, sed diversa, ut patet per philosophum in X metaphysicae. Ergo non omnis pluralitatis causa est alteritas. 5. The principle of otherness is accidental difference; for differences of this kind, according to Porphyry, make a thing other. But accidental difference is not found in all things in which there is plurality; in fact, in some cases there is no difference of any kind. Certain things, such as simple forms, cannot be subjects of accidents; and there are other things that agree in no way, so that they cannot be called different, but diverse, as is evident by the words of the Philosopher in X Metaph. Therefore otherness is not the cause of all plurality.
Sed contra
Sed contra est quod Damascenus dicit quod divisio est causa numeri. Sed divisio in diversitate vel alteritate consistit. Ergo diversitas vel alteritas principium pluralitatis est. But on the contrary is what Damascene says, that division is the cause of number; but division consists in diversity or otherness; therefore diversity, or otherness, is the principle of plurality.
Praeterea, Isidorus dicit quod numerus dicitur quasi nutus, id est signum, memeris, id est divisionis. Et sic idem quod prius. Again, Isidore says that number is called, as it were, the master of numeration, that is, of division; and so the conclusion is like the first.
Praeterea, pluralitas non constituitur nisi per recessum ab unitate. Sed ab unitate non recedit aliquid nisi per divisionem, cum ex hoc aliquid dicatur unum, quod est indivisum, ut patet in X metaphysicae. Ergo divisio pluralitatem constituit, et sic idem quod prius. Again, plurality is not constituted except by recession from unity; but there is no loss of unity except by division, since a thing is said to be one in that it is undivided, as is evident from X Metaph.; therefore division constitutes plurality, and thus the conclusion is as before.
Responsio. Dicendum quod, sicut dicit philosophus in X metaphysicae, plurale dicitur aliquid ex hoc quod est divisibile vel divisum. Unde omne illud quod est causa divisionis oportet ponere causam pluralitatis. Response. I answer that it must be said, as the Philosopher states in X Metaph., that a thing is said to be plural (many) from the fact that it is divisible or has been divided. Wherefore anything that is the cause of division ought to be regarded as a cause of plurality.
Causa autem divisionis aliter est accipienda in posterioribus et compositis et in primis et simplicibus. In posterioribus namque et compositis causa divisionis quasi formalis, id est ratione cuius fit divisio, est diversitas simplicium et priorum. Quod patet in divisione quantitatis. Dividitur enim una pars lineae ab alia per hoc quod habet diversum situm, qui est quasi formalis differentia quantitatis continuae positionem habentis. Patet etiam in divisione substantiarum. Dividitur enim homo ab asino per hoc quod habent diversas differentias constitutivas. Sed diversitas, qua dividuntur posteriora composita secundum priora et simplicia, praesupponit pluralitatem priorum simplicium. Ex hoc enim homo et asinus habent diversas differentias, quod rationale et irrationale non sunt una, sed plures differentiae. Nec potest semper dici quod illius pluralitatis sit aliqua diversitas aliquorum priorum et simpliciorum causa, quia sic esset abire in infinitum. Now, the cause of division cannot be considered the same in posterior and composite beings as in those that are first and simple. For in posterior and composite things, the cause of division which is, as it were, the formal cause of division by reason of which division comes about, is diversity found in more simple and primary beings, as is made clear in the case of division according to quantity. For one part of a line is divided from another part by the fact that they have each a different place, which is, as it were, the formal difference of a thing of continuous quantity having position. It is also evident in the division of substances. For man is different from an ass because he has diverse constitutive differences: but the diversity by which posterior, composite beings are divided according as prior and simpler beings are, presupposes plurality of these same primary and more simple beings. For the reason why man and ass have diverse differences is that rationality and irrationality are not one and the same thing, but differ in many ways. Nor can it be said endlessly that the plurality of one thing is owing to another diversity in another prior and simpler cause, because thus we would go on to infinity.
Et ideo pluralitatis vel divisionis primorum et simplicium oportet alio modo causam assignare. Sunt enim huiusmodi secundum se ipsa divisa. Non potest autem hoc esse, quod ens dividatur ab ente in quantum est ens; nihil autem dividitur ab ente nisi non ens. Unde et ab hoc ente non dividitur hoc ens nisi per hoc quod in hoc ente includitur negatio illius entis. Unde in primis terminis propositiones negativae sunt immediatae, quasi negatio unius sit in intellectu alterius. Primum etiam creatum in hoc facit pluralitatem cum sua causa, quod non attingit ad eam. Et secundum hoc quidam posuerunt quodam ordine pluralitatem ab uno primo causari, ut ab uno primo procedat primo unum, quod cum causa pluralitatem constituat, et ex eo iam possunt duo procedere: unum secundum se ipsum, aliud secundum coniunctionem ipsius ad causam. Quod dicere non cogimur, cum unum primum possit aliquid imitari, in quo alterum ab eo deficit, et deficere, in quo alterum imitatur. Et sic possunt inveniri plures primi effectus, in quorum quolibet est negatio et causae et effectus alterius secundum idem vel secundum remotiorem distantiam etiam in uno et eodem. Therefore it is necessary in some other way to assign a cause of plurality and division in prior and more simple beings. Now, there are some beings of this kind divided in themselves. Nevertheless it cannot be that being is divided from being, inasmuch as it is being: for nothing is divided from being except non-being. Likewise also from this-being, this-being is not divided, unless in this-being there is included negation of the same being. Wherefore in primary termini of thought negative propositions are immediately, as it were, negations, one of the other, in the intellect. For the first thing caused constitutes plurality with its cause, which does not reach to it [so as to be identical with it]. And according to this, certain philosophers hold that plurality is caused in a certain order from one and the selfsame thing; so that from one thing proceeds, at first, one being, which with its cause constitutes a plurality, and from this plurality, now two things can proceed, one according to the thing itself, and the other according to its conjunction to a cause. But we are not forced to say this, since one thing might be able to imitate the first in some way in which the second would fail to agree with it; and this defect could be imitated in another; and so there can be found many effects of the first cause in any number of which there is both negation of the cause and negation of the effects in the same way, or according to distance separating one from the other.
Sic ergo patet quod prima pluralitatis vel divisionis ratio sive principium est ex negatione et affirmatione, ut talis ordo originis pluralitatis intelligatur, quod primo sint intelligenda ens et non ens, ex quibus ipsa prima divisa constituuntur, ac per hoc plura. So, therefore, it is evident that the first reason or, principle of plurality or division is from affirmation and negation, as the order of origin of such plurality is understood, because first there must be understanding of being and non-being, by which first divisions are constituted, and by this, there are the many.
Unde sicut post ens, in quantum est indivisum, statim invenitur unum, ita post divisionem entis et non entis statim invenitur pluralitas priorum simplicium. Hanc autem pluralitatem consequitur ratio diversitatis, secundum quod manet in ea suae causae virtus, scilicet oppositionis entis et non entis. Ideo enim unum plurium diversum dicitur alteri comparatum, quia non est illud. Et quia causa secunda non producit effectum nisi per virtutem causae primae, ideo pluralitas primorum non facit divisionem et pluralitatem in secundis compositis, nisi in quantum manet in ea vis oppositionis primae, quae est inter ens et non ens, ex qua habet rationem diversitatis. Et sic diversitas primorum facit pluralitatem secundorum. Hence, just as first being, inasmuch as it is undivided, is immediately recognized as one, so after division of being and non-being there is immediate recognition of the plurality of first simple beings. The nature of diversity, moreover, follows upon plurality according as there remains in it the virtue of its cause, that is, the opposition of being and nonbeing. Therefore one of many diverse things is said to be related to another because it is not that other. And since a second cause does not produce its effect except by virtue of a first cause, therefore the plurality of first causes does not make division and plurality in secondary, composite beings unless there remains in that plurality the virtue of prime opposition, which is between being and non-being, by reason of which it has the nature of diversity; and thus the diversity of first causes produces the diversity of second.
Et secundum hoc verum est quod Boethius dicit quod alteritas est principium pluralitatis. Ex hoc enim alteritas in aliquibus invenitur, quod eis diversa insunt. Quamvis autem divisio praecedat pluralitatem priorum, non tamen diversitas, quia divisio non requirit utrumque condivisorum esse ens, cum sit divisio per affirmationem et negationem; sed diversitas requirit utrumque esse ens, unde praesupponit pluralitatem. Unde nullo modo potest esse quod pluralitatis primorum causa sit diversitas, nisi diversitas pro divisione sumatur. According to this, it is true, as Boethius says, that otherness is the principle of plurality. indeed, otherness is to be found in things because there is diversity among them. However, although division precedes plurality of first causes, diversity does not; because division does not require the being of things divided among themselves, since division is by affirmation and negation, but diversity does require each to be a distinct being; wherefore it presupposes plurality. Hence it is in no way possible that the cause of the plurality of first beings should be diversity, unless diversity is employed as meaning division.
Loquitur ergo Boethius de pluralitate compositorum, quod patet ex hoc, quod inducit probationem de his quae sunt diversa genere vel specie vel numero, quod non est nisi compositorum. Omne enim, quod est in genere, oportet esse compositum ex genere et differentia. Eos autem, qui ponunt patrem et filium inaequales deos, sequitur compositio saltem ratione, in quantum ponunt eos convenire in hoc quod sunt Deus et differre in hoc quod sunt inaequales. Boethius, therefore, is speaking of the plurality of composite beings, as is evident from the fact that he presents a proof involving those things that are diverse according to genus or species or number, and these kinds of diversity exist only in composite beings. For anything which is in a genus must be composed of genus and difference. Those, therefore, who declare the Father and Son to be unequal make declaration of composition, at least according to reason, inasmuch as they say the Father and Son agree in this, that they are God, but differ in the fact that they are unequal.
Answers to objections
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod numerus ex verbis illis ostenditur esse prior rebus aliis creatis, ut elementis et aliis huiusmodi, non autem aliis intentionibus, utpote affirmatione et negatione aut divisione vel aliis huiusmodi. Nec tamen quilibet numerus est prior omnibus rebus creatis, sed numerus qui est exemplar omnis rei, scilicet ipse Deus, qui secundum Augustinum est numerus omni rei speciem praebens. 1. It may be said: In these words, number is shown to be prior to other created things, such as the elements and other such beings; but it is not prior to other notions, such as affirmation and negation or division and the like. Moreover, not every kind of number is prior to all created beings, but only number which is the cause of each thing, namely, God Himself, who, according to Augustine, is Number, giving species to every creature.
Ad secundum dicendum quod pluralitas communiter loquendo immediate sequitur ens, non tamen oportet quod omnis pluralitas. Et ideo non est inconveniens, si pluralitas secundorum causetur ex diversitate priorum. 2. It may be answered: Plurality, commonly speaking, immediately follows upon being; but this is not necessarily true of all plurality, and so it is not unfitting that the plurality of posterior beings should be caused by the diversity of those that are prior.
Ad tertium dicendum quod sicut unum et multa, ita idem et diversum non sunt propria unius generis, sed sunt quasi passiones entis, in quantum est ens. Et ideo non est inconveniens, si aliquorum diversitas aliorum pluralitatem causet. 3. It may be said: As one and many are not properly of one genus, so neither are the same and the diverse, but they are passiones of being inasmuch as it is being, and hence there is no difficulty if the diversity of certain beings causes the plurality of others.
Ad quartum dicendum quod omnem diversitatem praecedit aliqua pluralitas, sed non omnem pluralitatem praecedit diversitas, sed aliquam pluralitatem aliqua diversitas. Unde et utrumque verum est, scilicet quod multitudo diversitatem faciat communiter loquendo, ut philosophus dicit, et quod diversitas in compositis faciat pluralitatem, ut Boethius hic dicit. 4. It may be said: Some kind of plurality precedes all diversity, but diversity does not precede all plurality, yet some kind of diversity precedes certain plurality. Hence two things are equally true: namely, that, commonly speaking, multitude produces diversity, as the Philosopher says; and that diversity in composite things produces plurality, as Boethius here declares.
Ad quintum dicendum quod Boethius accepit alteritatem pro diversitate, quae constituitur ex aliquibus differentiis, sive sint accidentales sive substantiales. Illa vero, quae sunt diversa et non differentia, sunt prima, de quibus hic Boethius non loquitur. 5. It may be answered: Boethius is using “otherness” in place of “diversity,” which is constituted by certain differences, whether they are accidental or substantial. But those beings that are diverse yet not different are first beings, and Boethius is here not speaking of them.

Article 2
Whether Variety of Accidents Produces Diversity According to Number
Articulus 2 Objections
Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod varietas accidentium non possit esse causa pluralitatis secundum numerum. Philosophus enim dicit in V metaphysicae quod numero sunt unum, quorum est materia una. Ergo et numero plura, quorum sunt materiae plures. Ergo diversitatem in numero non facit varietas accidentium, sed magis diversitas materiae. 1. It seems that variety of accidents cannot be the cause of plurality according to number. For the Philosopher says in V Metaph. that those things are numerically one in which the matter is one; therefore they are numerically plural in which the matter is plural; therefore variety of accidents does not produce diversity in number, but rather diversity of matter does so.
Praeterea, philosophus dicit in X metaphysicae quod idem est rebus causa substantiae et unitatis. Sed accidentia non sunt individuis causa substantiae, ergo nec unitatis, et ita per consequens nec pluralitatis secundum numerum. 2. As the Philosopher says in IV Metaph., the cause of the substance and of the unity in things is the same; but accidents are not the cause either of the substance or of the unity in the individual; consequently they cannot be the cause of numerical plurality.
Praeterea, omnia accidentia, cum sint formae, ex se ipsis sunt communicabilia et universalia. Sed nihil tale potest esse alteri principium individuationis. Ergo accidentia non sunt individuationis principium. Sed aliqua sunt secundum numerum diversa, in quantum in sua individuatione dividuntur. Igitur accidentia non possunt esse principium diversitatis secundum numerum. 3. All accidents, since accidents are indeed forms, are themselves communicable or common and universal: but nothing of this kind can be the cause of individuation in another, or a principle of individuation; therefore accidents cannot be principles of individuation. But certain things are diverse according to number inasmuch as they are divided in their own individuation; therefore accidents cannot be causes of diversity according to number.
Praeterea, sicut ea, quae differunt genere vel specie in genere substantiae, differunt secundum substantiam et non solum secundum accidens, ita et ea quae differunt secundum numerum. Sed aliqua dicuntur diversa genere vel specie per id quod est in genere substantiae. Igitur et similiter dicuntur diversa numero per id quod est in genere substantiae et non per accidentia. 4. As those things that are in a genus or a species differ according to their substance, and not only according to an accident, so also those things that differ according to number must do likewise; but certain things are said to be diverse in genus or in species by reason of what is in the genus of substance, and not according to their accidents; therefore, in like manner, things are said to be numerically diverse according to what is in the genus of substance, and not according to accidents.
Praeterea, remota causa removetur effectus. Sed omne accidens contingit a subiecto removeri vel actu vel cogitatione. Si ergo accidens est principium identitatis secundum numerum et diversitatis, contingeret actu vel cogitatione eadem quandoque esse unum secundum numerum, quandoque vero diversa. 5. If a cause is removed, so is its effect. Now it happens that every accident is removed from a subject either actually or by thought. If, therefore, an accident were the principle of plurality according to number and diversity, it would happen that the same things would sometimes be numerically one and sometimes diverse, either actually or by thought.
Praeterea, posterius numquam est causa prioris. Sed inter omnia accidentia primum locum tenet quantitas, ut dicit Boethius in commento praedicamentorum. Inter quantitates autem naturaliter numerus prior est, cum sit simplicior et magis abstractus. Ergo impossibile est quod aliquod aliud accidens sit principium pluralitatis secundum numerum. 6. What is posterior is never the cause of what is prior. But among all accidents, quantity holds first place, as Boethius says in Lib. praedicam. Among quantities, however, number is prior since it is more simple and more abstract. Therefore an accident cannot be the principle of plurality according to number.
Sed contra
Sed contra est quod dicit Porphyrius quod individuum facit collectio accidentium, quae in alio reperiri non possunt. Sed illud, quod est principium individuationis, est principium diversitatis secundum numerum. Ergo accidentia sunt principium pluralitatis secundum numerum. On the contrary is the statement made by Porphyry, that a collection of accidents which are not to be found in another produces the individual. But what is the principle of individuation is the principle of numerical plurality; therefore accidents are the principle of plurality according to number.
Praeterea, in individuo nihil invenitur nisi forma et materia et accidentia. Sed diversitas formae non facit diversitatem secundum numerum, sed secundum speciem, ut patet in X metaphysicae. Diversitatem vero secundum genus facit diversitas materiae. Dicit enim philosophus in X metaphysicae quod genere differunt, quorum non est materia communis nec generatio ad invicem. Ergo diversitatem secundum numerum nihil potest facere nisi diversitas accidentium. Again, in the individual, there is found nothing except matter, form, and accidents. Diversity of form, however, does not produce diversity according to number, but according to species, as is said in X Metaph. Now, diversity of matter produces diversity of genus. For the Philosopher says in X Metaph. that those things differ in genus in which there is not common matter, or generation of one into the other (mutual generation). Therefore diversity according to number cannot be produced except by diversity of accidents.
Praeterea, illud, quod invenitur commune in pluribus specie differentibus, non est causa diversitatis secundum numerum, quia divisio generis in species praecedit divisionem speciei in individua. Sed materia invenitur communis in diversis secundum speciem, quia eadem materia formis contrariis subditur; alias habentia contrarias formas non transmutarentur invicem. Ergo materia non est principium diversitatis secundum numerum, nec forma, ut probatum est. Ergo relinquitur quod accidentia sint huius diversitatis causa. Moreover, what is found as common in many things that are specifically different is not the cause of diversity according to number, because the division of genus into species precedes the division of species into individuals; but matter is found to be common in things that are different in species because the same matter is possessed by contrary forms, otherwise beings having contrary forms would not be transmuted one into the other; therefore matter is not the principle of individuation according to number, and neither is form, as has been noted at the beginning. Hence it remains that accidents are the cause of this kind of diversity.
Praeterea, in genere substantiae nihil invenitur nisi genus et differentia. Sed individua unius speciei non differunt genere nec substantialibus differentiis. Ergo non differunt nisi differentiis accidentalibus. Again, in the genus of substance there is found only genus and difference; but the individuals of one species differ neither in genus, nor by reason of substantial differences; therefore they do not differ except because of accidental differences.
Responsio. Dicendum quod ad evidentiam huius quaestionis et eorum, quae in littera dicuntur, oportet videre, quid sit causa huius triplicis diversitatis, quae in littera assignatur. Response. I answer: For the clarification of this question and of those other questions treated of in the text of Boethius, it is necessary to see what may be the cause of the threefold diversity spoken of in the text.
Cum autem in individuo composito in genere substantiae non sint nisi tria, scilicet materia, forma et compositum, oportet ex aliquo horum cuiuslibet harum diversitatum causas invenire. Sciendum est ergo quod diversitas secundum genus reducitur in diversitatem materiae, diversitas vero secundum speciem in diversitatem formae, sed diversitas secundum numerum partim in diversitatem materiae, partim in diversitatem accidentis. Now, since in the individual composite in the genus of substance there are only three things (matter, form, and the composite), it must be that in each of these things the causes of their diversities are to be found. Accordingly it must be evident that diversity of genus is reduced to diversity of matter; but diversity according to species is reduced to diversity of form; whereas diversity according to number is owing partly to diversity of matter, and partly to accidental diversity.
Cum autem genus sit principium cognoscendi, utpote prima diffinitionis pars, materia autem secundum se sit ignota, non potest secundum se ex ea accipi diversitas generis, sed solum illo modo, quo cognoscibilis est. Est autem cognoscibilis dupliciter. Uno modo per analogiam sive per proportionem, ut dicitur in I physicorum. Hoc est, ut dicamus illud esse materiam quod hoc modo se habet ad res naturales sicut lignum ad lectum. Alio modo cognoscitur per formam, per quam habet esse in actu. Unumquodque enim cognoscitur, secundum quod est in actu, et non secundum quod est in potentia, ut dicitur in IX metaphysicae. Since, moreover, genus is the principle for knowableness of a thing, inasmuch as it is the first part of a definition, though matter in itself is unknowable, it is not possible that from matter in se diversity of genus should be known, but only according to that mode by which it is knowable. Now, a thing is knowable in two ways. (1) In one way, by analogy, or by comparison, as is said in I Physic. Thus we say that this is matter or that matter is related to natural things as wood is to a couch. (2) In another way, a thing is known by the form because of which it has actual being. For everything is known inasmuch as it is in act, not according as it is in potency, as is said in X Metaph.
Et secundum hoc dupliciter sumitur diversitas generis ex materia. Uno modo ex diversa analogia ad materiam, et sic penes materiam distinguuntur prima rerum genera. Id enim, quod est in genere substantiae, comparatur ad materiam sicut ad partem sui; quod vero est in genere quantitatis, non habet materiam partem sui, sed comparatur ad ipsam sicut mensura, et qualitas sicut dispositio. Et his duobus generibus mediantibus omnia alia genera nanciscuntur diversas comparationes ad materiam, quae est pars substantiae, ex qua substantia habet rationem subiecti, secundum quam ad accidentia comparatur. Alio modo penes materiam sumitur diversitas generis, secundum quod materia est perfecta per formam. Cum enim materia sit potentia pura et Deus actus purus, nihil est aliud materiam perfici in actum qui est forma, nisi quatenus participat aliquam similitudinem actus primi, licet imperfecte, ut sic illud, quod est iam compositum ex materia et forma, sit medium inter potentiam puram et actum purum. According to this aspect, diversity of genus derives from matter in two ways. (1) In one way, by analogous diversity in relation to form, and thus the first genera of things are distinguished according to matter. For what is in the genus of substance is referred to matter as to a part of itself; but what is in the genus of quantity has no matter as a part of itself, but is related to it as its measure, and quality is related as its disposition. And by means of these two genera (namely, quantity and quality), all other genera are diversely related to matter, which is a part of substance; hence substance has the nature of a subject and as such has a certain relation to accidents. (2) In another way, diversity of genus has its, origin in matter inasmuch as matter is perfected by form. And since matter is pure potency, just as God is Pure Act, to say that matter is perfected by act (which is form) is to say nothing else than that in some way it shares in a certain similitude to First Act, imperfectly indeed, since what is composed of matter and form is midway between pure potency and pure act.
Non autem materia ex omni parte recipit aequaliter similitudinem primi actus, sed a quibusdam imperfecte, a quibusdam vero perfectius, utpote quaedam participant divinam similitudinem secundum hoc tantum quod subsistunt, quaedam vero secundum quod vivunt, quaedam vero secundum quod cognoscunt, quaedam secundum quod intelligunt. Ipsa igitur similitudo primi actus in quacumque materia exsistens est forma eius. Sed forma talis in quibusdam facit esse tantum, in quibusdam esse et vivere, et sic de aliis una et eadem. Similitudo enim perfectior habet omne illud quod habet similitudo minus perfecta, et adhuc amplius. Aliquid ergo invenitur commune in utraque similitudine, quod in una substernitur imperfectioni et in alia perfectioni, sicut materia substernebatur actui et privationi. Et ideo materia simul accepta cum hoc communi est adhuc materialis respectu perfectionis et imperfectionis praedictae. Moreover, matter does not receive similitude to First Act in an altogether equal way, but in some things it is received imperfectly and in others more perfectly; thus, for example, some beings participate in a divine similitude inasmuch only as they subsist; others, in that they have knowledge; and still others, by possession of intellect. Therefore what is the similitude of First Act in any existing matter is its form. But in some beings this form causes it only to exist, in others to exist and to live, and so, in one and the same being, form may be the cause of other perfections. For what is the more perfect similitude has everything that less perfect similitudes have by way of perfections, and more besides. Something common, therefore, may be found in various similitudes, but possessed more imperfectly in some and more perfectly in others; just as matter may be subjected to both act and privation. And so matter, once taken together with this common element, is still material in regard to the aforementioned perfection and imperfection.
Et ex hoc materiali sumitur genus, differentiae vero ex perfectione et imperfectione praedicta. Sicut ex hoc communi materiali, quod est habere vitam, sumitur hoc genus animatum corpus; ex perfectione vero superaddita haec differentia sensibile; ex imperfectione vero haec differentia insensibile. Et sic diversitas talium materialium inducit diversitatem generis, sicut animal a planta. Et propter hoc dicitur materia esse principium diversitatis secundum genus. Et eadem ratione forma est principium diversitatis secundum speciem, quia a praedictis formalibus, quae habent ad dicta materialia, unde genera sumuntur, comparationem formae ad materiam, sumuntur differentiae quae constituunt species. From this material element it takes its genus, but its difference is from the perfection or imperfection of which we spoke above. For example, from this common material element (namely, having life), there is derived the genus “animated body”; but because of a superadded perfection there derives the difference “sensible,” while, on the other hand, from imperfection there is derived the difference “insensible.” Thus the diversity of such material things brings about diversity of genus, as that between animal and plant. On this account matter is said to be the principle of diversity according to genus, and in the same way, form is the principle of diversity according to species; because it is by reason of formal qualities which material things possess in addition to those which are the cause of their genus as material things, or by relation of form to matter, that the differences constituting species are derived.
Sciendum tamen quod cum illud materiale, unde sumitur genus, habeat in se materiam et formam, logicus considerat genus solum ex parte eius quod formale est, unde et eius diffinitiones dicuntur formales, sed naturalis considerat genus ex parte utriusque. Et ideo contingit quandoque quod aliquid communicat in genere secundum logicum, quod non communicat secundum naturalem. Contingit enim quandoque quod illud de similitudine primi actus quod consequitur res aliqua in materia tali, aliud consequatur sine materia et aliud in alia materia omnino diversa. Sicut patet quod lapis in materia, quae est secundum potentiam ad esse, pertingit ad hoc quod subsistat, ad quod idem pertingit sol secundum materiam ad ubi et non ad esse et Angelus omni materia carens. Unde logicus inveniens in omnibus his illud materiae, ex quo genus sumebat, ponit omnia in uno genere substantiae. Naturalis vero et metaphysicus, qui considerant omnia principia rei, non invenientes convenientiam in materia dicunt genere differre secundum hoc quod dicitur in X metaphysicae quod corruptibile et incorruptibile differunt genere et quod illa conveniunt genere, quorum materia est una et generatio ad invicem. However, it must be borne in mind that this “matter” whence genus is derived has in itself both form and matter. While the logician considers genus only according to its formal aspect, his definitions are said to be formal; but the natural philosopher considers genus from both aspects. Hence it sometimes happens that a thing shares in a logical genus in which it would not be classed according to the natural philosopher. Now, this happens when something by way of similitude to First Act is found in a material thing, and again in one without matter, and again in a being altogether different in matter. Thus it is evident that a stone which is in matter in such a way as to be potential to being, attains to something of similitude to First Act by being subsistent, and the sun also attains to the same similitude, though being in matter which is potential to place, but not any longer to being (having subsistent existence); and an angel likewise, although lacking any kind of matter. Hence the logician, finding in all these beings that from which a genus derives, places them all in the genus of substance; but the natural philosopher and the metaphysician, who considers the principles of things, not finding these all to be in material agreement, says that they differ in genus; as is said in X Metaph.: that corruptible and incorruptible differ generically and that those beings agree in genus whose matter is one and among which there is mutual generation.
Sic ergo patet, quomodo materia facit diversitatem in genere et forma diversitatem in specie. Inter individua vero unius speciei hoc modo consideranda est diversitas. Secundum philosophum enim in VII metaphysicae sicut partes generis et speciei sunt materia et forma, ita partes individui sunt haec materia et haec forma. Unde sicut diversitatem in genere vel specie facit diversitas materiae vel formae absolute, ita diversitatem in numero facit haec forma et haec materia. Nulla autem forma in quantum huiusmodi est haec ex se ipsa. Dico autem in quantum huiusmodi propter animam rationalem, quae quodammodo ex se ipsa est hoc aliquid, sed non in quantum forma. Intellectus enim quamlibet formam, quam possibile est recipi in aliquo sicut in materia vel in subiecto, natus est attribuere pluribus, quod est contra rationem eius quod est hoc aliquid. Unde forma fit haec per hoc quod recipitur in materia. Sed cum materia in se sit indistincta, non potest esse quod formam receptam individuet, nisi secundum quod est distinguibilis. Non enim forma individuatur per hoc quod recipitur in materia, nisi quatenus recipitur in hac materia distincta et determinata ad hic et nunc. Thus therefore it is evident in what way matter produces diversity in genus, and form produces diversity in species. But among individuals of the same species diversity should be considered, according to that laid down by the Philosopher (VII Metaph.); namely, that just as parts of genus and species are matter and form, so the parts of the individual are this matter and this form. Therefore, just as diversity of matter causes diversity in genus, or diversity of form causes diversity in species, absolutely, so this form and this matter produce diversity in number: but no form, as such, is of itself. I say, however, “no form, as such,” because of the rational soul, which in a manner is this something of itself, but not merely inasmuch as it is a form. Intellect, in truth, since it is a form capable of being received into anything—as its matter, or as its subject—can naturally be attributed to many; a thing which is contrary to the nature of that which is this something; hence it is, made a form by the fact that it is received in matter. But since matter, considered in itself, is indistinct, it is not possible that it would individuate a form received into it, except as it is distinguishable. For no form is individuated by the fact that it is received into matter, except in so far as it is received into this matter, or it is this distinct form, determined to this, and at this time.
Materia autem non est divisibilis nisi per quantitatem. Unde philosophus dicit in I physicorum quod subtracta quantitate remanebit substantia indivisibilis. Et ideo materia efficitur haec et signata, secundum quod subest dimensionibus. Dimensiones autem istae possunt dupliciter considerari. Moreover, matter is not divisible except by quantity. Therefore the Philosopher says in I Physic., that if quantity were removed, a substance would remain indivisible: hence matter is made to be this matter and is signate inasmuch as it exists under dimensions. Dimensions, however, can be considered in two ways.
Uno modo secundum earum terminationem; et dico eas terminari secundum determinatam mensuram et figuram, et sic ut entia perfecta collocantur in genere quantitatis. Et sic non possunt esse principium individuationis; quia cum talis terminatio dimensionum varietur frequenter circa individuum, sequeretur quod individuum non remaneret semper idem numero. 1. In one way according to their termination, and I say that they are terminated according to limited measure and figure; and so, as complete beings, dimensions are classed in the genus of quantity, and thus they cannot be the principle of individuation: because such termination of dimensions may frequently vary in regard to the same individual, and in such case it would follow that the individual would not remain numerically the same.
Alio modo possunt considerari sine ista determinatione in natura dimensionis tantum, quamvis numquam sine aliqua determinatione esse possint, sicut nec natura coloris sine determinatione albi et nigri; et sic collocantur in genere quantitatis ut imperfectum. Et ex his dimensionibus indeterminatis materia efficitur haec materia signata, et sic individuat formam, et sic ex materia causatur diversitas secundum numerum in eadem specie. 2. In another way, dimensions may be considered without this certain determination, merely in the nature of dimension, although they never could exist without some kind of determination; just as the nature of color cannot exist without determination to white or black; and according to this aspect dimensions are classed in the genus of quantity as imperfect. And by these indeterminate dimensions matter is made to be this signate matter, and thus gives individuality to a form, and thus also by matter there is caused the numerical diversity of things in the same species.
Unde patet quod materia secundum se accepta nec est principium diversitatis secundum speciem nec secundum numerum, sed sicut est principium diversitatis secundum genus, prout subest formae communi, ita est principium diversitatis secundum numerum, prout subest dimensionibus interminatis. Et ideo cum hae dimensiones sint de genere accidentium, quandoque diversitas secundum numerum reducitur in diversitatem materiae, quandoque in diversitatem accidentis, et hoc ratione dimensionum praedictarum. Alia vero accidentia non sunt principium individuationis, sed sunt principium cognoscendi distinctionem individuorum. Et per hunc modum etiam aliis accidentibus individuatio attribuitur. Therefore it is evident that matter, according as it is considered in itself, is not the principle of diversity, either according to species or according to number; but as it is the principle of generic diversity inasmuch as it is considered the subject of a common form, so it is the principle of numerical diversity inasmuch as it is considered as subject to indeterminate dimensions. Therefore also, since these dimensions are in the genus of accidents, diversity according to number is reduced to diversity of matter, or to accidental diversity, according to the nature of the aforesaid dimensions. Other accidents, however, are not principles of individuation, but they are the principle of knowing the individual to be distinct. In this way individuation is also attributed to other accidents.
Answers to objections
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, cum dicit philosophus quod numero sunt unum, quorum est materia una, intelligendum est de materia signata, quae subest dimensionibus, alias oporteret dicere quod omnia generabilia et corruptibilia sint unum numero, cum eorum sit materia una. 1. It may be said: When the Philosopher says that those things are numerically one in which the matter is one, this must be understood of signate matter which is the subject of dimensions; otherwise it would be necessary to say that all generable and corruptible things are numerically one, since their matter is one.
Ad secundum dicendum quod dimensiones, cum sint accidentia, per se non possunt esse principium unitatis individuae substantiae; sed materia, prout talibus dimensionibus subest, intelligitur esse principium talis unitatis et multitudinis. 2. It may be answered: Since dimensions are accidents, they cannot per se be the principle of the unity of an individual substance; but matter, inasmuch as it underlies such and such dimensions, is understood to be the principle of this unity and of this multitude.
Ad tertium dicendum quod de ratione individui est quod sit in se indivisum et ab aliis ultima divisione divisum. Nullum autem accidens habet ex se propriam rationem divisionis nisi quantitas. Unde dimensiones ex se ipsis habent quandam rationem individuationis secundum determinatum situm, prout situs est differentia quantitatis. Et sic dimensio habet duplicem rationem individuationis: unam ex subiecto, sicut et quodlibet aliud accidens, et aliam ex se ipsa, in quantum habet situm, ratione cuius etiam abstrahendo a materia sensibili imaginamur hanc lineam et hunc circulum. Et ideo recte materiae convenit individuare omnes alias formas ex hoc, quod subditur illi formae, quae ex se ipsa habet individuationis rationem, ita quod etiam ipsae dimensiones terminatae, quae fundantur in subiecto iam completo, individuantur quodammodo ex materia individuata per dimensiones interminatas praeintellectas in materia. 3. It may be said: It is according to the nature of an individual thing that it be undivided in itself, and divided from other things by an ultimate division. No accident, however, has in itself the proper nature of division, unless it is quantity; therefore dimensions of themselves have a certain nature of individuation according to a determined place, inasmuch as place is a difference of quantity. Thus there is a twofold meaning of individuation: the one on the part of a subject, and this is the same for any accident; the other meaning, on the part of individuation itself, inasmuch as it has place, by reason of which, in abstracting from sensible matter, we may imagine this line and this circle. Hence it rightly pertains to matter to individuate all other forms, because it gives to this form, which of itself has the nature of individuation, that it also be terminated by those dimensions that are found in a subject now made complete; accordingly they are individuated by matter which is individuated by indeterminate dimensions conceived of as in matter.
Ad quartum dicendum quod illa, quae differunt numero in genere substantiae, non solum differunt accidentibus, sed etiam forma et materia. Sed si quaeratur, quare differens est eorum forma, non erit alia ratio, nisi quia est in alia materia signata. Nec invenitur alia ratio, quare haec materia sit divisa ab illa, nisi propter quantitatem. Et ideo materia subiecta dimensioni intelligitur esse principium huius diversitatis. 4. It may be said: Things that differ numerically in the genus of substance, differ not only because of accidents, but also by reason of form and matter; but if it is asked how this form differs from that, the only reason can be that it is in other signate matter. Nor can there be found another reason why this matter is divided from that except by reason of its quantity. Hence matter subject to dimension is understood to be the principle of this kind of diversity.
Ad quintum dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de accidentibus completis, quae sequuntur esse formae in materia, non autem de dimensionibus interminatis, quae praeintelliguntur ante ipsam formam in materia. Sine his enim non potest intelligi individuum, sicut nec sine forma. 5. It may be said: This reasoning relates to completed accidents which follow upon the existence of a form in matter; but not to those indeterminate dimensions which may be conceived of before the reception of the form in matter. For without these, a thing cannot be understood to be ‘ individual, any more than it can be conceived of without form.
Ad sextum dicendum quod numerus formaliter loquendo est prius quam quantitas [84594] Super De continua, sed materialiter quantitas continua est prior, cum numerus ex divisione continui relinquatur, ut dicitur in III physicorum. Et secundum hanc viam causat diversitatem secundum numerum divisio materiae secundum dimensiones. 6. It may be answered: Number, formally speaking, is prior to continuous quantity: but materially, continuous quantity is prior, since number is the result of the division of a continuum, as is said in IV Physic. In this way, division of matter, according to dimensions, causes numerical diversity.
Rationes autem quae sunt in contrarium patet ex dictis qualiter sunt concedendae et qualiter falsum concludunt. As to contrary reasons proposed, it is clear what must be conceded and what false conclusions have been deduced.

Article 3
Whether Two Bodies Can Be, or Can Be Conceived of as Being Simultaneously in the Same Place
Articulus 3 Objections
Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod duo corpora possint intelligi esse in eodem loco. Omnis enim propositio videtur esse intelligibilis, in cuius subiecto non includitur oppositum praedicati, quia talis propositio non habet repugnantiam intellectuum. Sed haec propositio duo corpora sunt in eodem loco non est huiusmodi; alias numquam posset miraculose fieri quod duo corpora sint in eodem loco; quod patet esse falsum in corpore dominico quod exivit clauso utero virginis et intravit ad discipulos clausis ianuis. Non enim Deus potest facere quod affirmatio et negatio sint simul vera, ut dicit Augustinus contra Faustum. Ergo potest aliquis saltem intellectu fingere duo corpora esse in eodem loco. 1. It seems that two bodies can be conceived of as being in the same place. For any proposition seems to be intelligible in which there is included no opposition of the predicate to the subject, since such a proposition contains nothing repugnant to understanding. But this proposition, “Two bodies are in the same place,” is not a proposition repugnant to the intellect. Otherwise it could not happen miraculously, a thing evidently false regarding the body of our Lord, which came forth from the closed womb of the Virgin, and which entered into the midst of the disciples, the doors being shut. Now, even God cannot cause affirmation and negation to be simultaneously true, as Augustine says in answer to Faustus; therefore one can understand, or at least conceive of in his mind, that two bodies could be in the same place at the same time.
Praeterea, a corporibus glorificatis non removetur natura corporeitatis, sed solum natura corpulentiae. Sed removetur ab eis ista condicio, quod non possunt esse in eodem loco, per dotem subtilitatis, ut a multis dicitur. Ergo haec condicio non sequitur naturam corporeitatis, sed corpulentiae sive grossitiei cuiusdam. Ergo non est impossibile universaliter duo corpora esse in eodem loco. 2. From glorified bodies there will be removed not the nature of corporeity, but only that of corpulentia (bodily mass). When this is removed, the possibility of being with other bodies in the same place is theirs by reason of the gift of subtlety, as is said by many. Therefore this condition does not follow the nature of corporeity, but that of corpulentia, of a certain mass. Therefore it is not impossible to conceive of two bodies being simultaneously in the same place.
Praeterea, Augustinus dicit super Genesim ad litteram quod lux in corporibus primum tenet locum. Sed lux est simul in eodem loco cum aere. Ergo duo corpora possunt esse simul in eodem loco. 3. Augustine, in commenting upon the Book of Genesis speaks of light as holding first place among corporeal things; but light is simultaneously in the same place with air; therefore two bodies can be in the same place at the same time.
Praeterea, quaelibet species ignis est corpus. Sed lux est quaedam species ignis, ut dicit philosophus in V topicorum. Ergo lux est corpus. Et sic idem quod prius. Any species of fire, as the Philosopher says in V Topic., is a body; and so the conclusion is like the previous one.
Praeterea, in ferro ignito simul est ignis et ferrum. Utrumque autem est corpus. Ergo possibile est simul esse duo corpora in eodem loco. 5. In glowing iron, the fire and the iron are simultaneous; but each is a body; therefore it is possible for two bodies to be in the same place at the same time.
Praeterea, elementa in mixto non sunt corrupta, alias mixtum non sequeretur dominantis motum. Sed omnia quattuor elementa sunt corpora et simul in qualibet parte mixti. Ergo possibile est duo corpora esse in eodem loco. 6. Elements in a compound are not corrupted; otherwise a compound would not follow the motion of a dominant element; but all four elements are bodies and are simultaneously in every part of the compound; therefore it is possible for two bodies to be simultaneously in the same place.
Praeterea, quod duo corpora non sint in eodem loco, hoc non potest convenire corporibus ratione materiae, cum materiae secundum se non debeatur locus, nec ratione formae propter idem nec ratione dimensionis, cum dimensiones non repleant locum, quod patet ex hoc quod quidam locum, ubi erant solae dimensiones, dicebant esse vacuum. Ergo hoc non convenit corpori nisi ratione aliquorum accidentium posteriorum, quae non sunt omnibus corporibus communia et quae possibile est a corporibus separari. Et sic videtur quod duo corpora possint esse in eodem loco. 7. The fact that two bodies are not simultaneously in one place does not occur by reason of the matter of the bodies, since to matter in itself there is no due place; nor does it occur because of the form, for the same reason; nor is it because of dimension, since dimensions do not fill up place, as is evident from the fact that certain philosophers are accustomed to say that the place where there are only dimensions is a vacuum. Therefore this characteristic of a body must arise only from certain posterior accidents, which are not altogether common and which can be separated from the body; and so it seems that two bodies could be simultaneously in the same place.
Praeterea, secundum astrologos, qui sequuntur Ptolemaeum, sex planetarum corpora moventur in epicyclis, qui sunt circuli intersecantes sphaeras excentricas planetarum. Oportet ergo quod planetae corpus quandoque perveniat ad locum sectionis. Sed non potest dici quod ibi sit aliquid vacuum, cum vacuum natura non patiatur, neque quod substantia sphaerarum sit divisibilis, ut intelligatur cedere corpori planetae quando pervenit illuc, sicut cedit aer lapidi aut alii corpori, cum caeli solidissimi quasi aere fundati sint, ut dicitur Iob 37. Ergo oportet quod corpus planetae sit simul cum corpore sphaerae eius in eodem loco. Et sic falsum est quod dicit Boethius hic quod duo corpora numquam unum obtinent locum. 8. According to the astrologers who follow Ptolemy, the six bodies of the planets move in epicycles, which are circles intersecting the spheres extrinsic to the planets. Therefore it must be that a body of a planet at some time would arrive at the place of section. But it cannot be said that at that place there is any vacuum, since nature does not suffer this; nor that the substance of the spheres is divisible, so that it might be thought of as giving way when the planetary body had reached it, as air gives way to a stone, for the heavens are most solid, being formed, as it were, of molten brass, as is said in Job, 37:18. Therefore it must be that the body of the planet is simultaneously in the same place as the body of the sphere; and so Boethius falsely says that two bodies cannot occupy one and the same place.
Sed contra
Sed contra est, quia si duo corpora sunt in eodem loco, eadem ratione et quotlibet. Sed aliquod corpus quantumcumque magnum potest dividi in parva cuiuscumque quantitatis secundum aliquem numerum. Ergo sequetur quod in loco parvissimo continebitur maximum corpus; quod videtur absurdum. On the contrary is the fact that if two bodies are in one and the same place, they are the same in nature and in every respect; but any body, however large, can be divided into small bodies of any quantity, according to any number; therefore, it would follow that in the very smallest place there would be contained the largest body, a thing which appears to be absurd.
Praeterea, impossibile est inter duo puncta signata esse plures lineas rectas. Hoc autem sequetur, si duo corpora sint in eodem loco. Signatis enim duobus punctis ex duabus partibus loci oppositis erunt inter ea duae lineae rectae signatae in duobus corporibus locatis. Non enim potest dici quod inter illa duo puncta nulla sit linea neque quod unius locati linea magis sit inter ea quam alia neque quod sit ibi aliqua una linea praeter corpora locata quae sit inter duo puncta loci, quia sic illa linea esset non in subiecto. Ergo impossibile est duo corpora esse in eodem loco. Again, it is impossible for there to be many straight lines between two given points. But this would follow if two bodies could be in the same place. For then, given two points in two opposite parts of space, there will be between them two straight lines assigned corporeally to two places. Now, it cannot be said that between these two points there will be no lines at all, or that a line of one location would be greater than the other, or that there could be any one line apart from those corporeally located between the two points of given location, for in that case the two lines would not be in a subject. Therefore it is impossible for two bodies to be simultaneously in the same place.
Praeterea, demonstratum est in geometria quod duo circuli non se contingunt nisi in puncto. Sed ponamus duo corpora quae sunt in eodem loco; sequetur quod duo circuli signati in eis se secundum totum contingunt. Ergo impossibile est duo corpora esse in eodem loco. Again, it has been demonstrated in geometry that two circles are tangent only at one point: but if we posit two bodies being simultaneously in the same place, it would follow that two circles could be totally tangent. Therefore it is impossible that two bodies should be in the same place at the same time.
Praeterea, quaecumque uni et eidem sunt eadem, sibi invicem sunt eadem. Sed cum oporteat eandem esse dimensionem loci et locati ex eo quod non est ponere dimensiones sine subiecto, si duo corpora sint in eodem loco, sequetur dimensiones utriusque corporis esse easdem dimensionibus loci. Ergo sequetur eas esse easdem ad invicem, quod est impossibile. Again, whatever things are equal to one and the same thing are equal to each other; but since local dimension must be one with a localized body (since no dimension can be supposed without a subject), if two bodies could be simultaneously in the same place, it would follow that the dimensions of each body would be equal to the dimensions of the place; therefore it would follow that the bodies would be the same, but this is impossible.
Responsio. Dicendum quod in his quae apud nos sunt, quae omnes esse corpora confitentur, ad sensum videmus quod adveniente uno corpore ad locum aliquem aliud corpus a loco illo expellitur. Unde experimento patet talium corporum duo in eodem loco esse non posse. Response. I answer that it must be said that in those things belonging to our world, all of which are judged to be corporeal, we see from sense experience that when one body arrives at any given place, any other body is expelled from that place; therefore it is experimentally evident that two such bodies cannot be in the same place.
Quidam autem dicunt quod non prohibentur duo horum corporum ab hoc, quod sint simul, propter corporeitatem vel propter aliquid quod sit de ratione corporis, in quantum est corpus; sic enim sequeretur omnino duo corpora prohiberi ab hoc quod est esse simul. Sed dicunt quod ab hoc prohibentur propter corpulentiam ipsorum. Sed quidquid sit hoc quod corpulentiam nominant, sive sit densitas sive impuritas vel corruptibilitas aliquorum corporum vel etiam aliqua natura specialis naturae generali corporeitatis superaddita, non potest esse causa huius prohibitionis. There are, however, certain philosophers who declare that two bodies are not thus prohibited from simultaneous occupation of the same place on account of their corporeity, or on account of anything else which belongs to the nature of a body, as a body, for thus it would follow that it would be altogether impossible for two bodies to exist simultaneously [in the same place]. But they say that this prohibition is due only to their corpulentia. But whatever this corpulentia may mean—whether density or impurity or corruptibility which attends certain bodies, or even some special nature superadded to the general nature of corporeity—the prohibition can be on account of none of these things.
Invenitur enim duplex comparatio corporis ad locum. Una, secundum quam ponitur in loco hoc vel illo determinato; et haec comparatio sequitur naturam specialem huius vel illius corporis, sicut quod gravia ex natura gravitatis sunt deorsum, levia vero sursum ex natura levitatis. Now, there is to be found a double relation of a body to place. One is according as it has location in this or that determined place; and this relationship follows upon the specific nature of this or that body, just as heavy things, by the very nature of their gravity, hold a lower place, but light bodies, a higher place.
Alia vero comparatio est, secundum quam dicitur esse in loco simpliciter; et haec comparatio sequitur corpus ex ipsa natura corporeitatis, non propter aliquid additum. Secundum hoc enim corpus est in loco, quod loco se commetitur; hoc autem est, secundum quod est dimensionatum dimensionibus aequalibus et similibus dimensionibus loci. Dimensiones autem insunt cuilibet corpori ex ipsa corporeitatis natura. Esse autem plura corpora in eodem loco vel non esse non respicit locum determinatum, sed locum absolute. Unde oportet quod causa huius impedimenti referatur ad ipsam naturam corporeitatis, ex qua convenit omni corpori quod, in quantum est corpus, natum sit esse in loco. But another relationship prevails according as a body is said, absolutely, to be in place: and this relationship characterizes a bodily thing by the very nature of its corporeity, not because of anything additional. For according as a particular body is in place, it is commensurate with that place; but this is because it has dimensions that are equal and similar to the dimensions of the place; moreover, dimensions belong to every body by reason of its very corporeity. For, that many bodies should or should not be in the same place, has no relation to a determined place, but regards place absolutely; therefore it must be that the cause of this impediment should be referred to the nature of corporeity, by reason of which every body, inasmuch as it is a body, is destined to be in place.
Et si ultima sphaera non sit in loco, hoc non est nisi quia nihil potest esse extra ipsam, non autem propter defectum aptitudinis praedictae. And if the last sphere should not be in place, this is so only because nothing can be outside it, but not because it is lacking in the aforesaid aptitude to occupy place.
Et ideo alii concedunt simpliciter quod nulla duo corpora possunt esse in eodem loco et rationem huius referunt ad principia mathematica, quae oportet salvari in omnibus naturalibus, ut dicitur in III caeli et mundi. Sed hoc non videtur esse conveniens, quia mathematicis non competit esse in loco nisi similitudinarie et non proprie, ut habetur in I de generatione. Et ideo ratio praedicti impedimenti non est sumenda ex principiis mathematicis, sed ex principiis naturalibus, quibus proprie locus debetur. Praeterea, rationes mathematicae non sufficienter concludunt in ista materia. Etsi enim mathematica salventur in naturalibus, tamen naturalia addunt aliquid supra mathematica, scilicet materiam sensibilem, et ex hoc addito potest assignari ratio alicuius in naturalibus, cuius ratio in mathematicis non poterat assignari. In mathematicis enim non potest assignari ratio diversitatis harum duarum linearum nisi propter situm. Unde remota diversitate situs non remanet pluralitas linearum mathematicarum et similiter nec superficierum aut corporum. Et propter hoc non potest esse quod corpora mathematica sint plura et sint simul; et similiter de lineis et superficiebus. Hence there are others who concede that, absolutely, no two bodies can be in the same place at the same time, and they assign the reason for this to mathematical principles, which ought to be observed in all the natural sciences, as is said in III Coel. et mundo. But this reason does not seem fitting, because it does not pertain to the objects of mathematics to be in place, except improperly and by similitude, as is said in II De generatione. Hence, the reason for maintaining this impediment should not be derived from mathematical principles, but from the principles of natural things, to which place is properly due. Furthermore, mathematical reasoning is sufficiently conclusive only in regard to its own matter. For, Although mathematical truths are preserved in natural sciences, beings of the natural order add something over and above what is possessed by, mathematical beings: namely, sensible matter; and because of this addition it is possible to assign as an explanation of something in the natural order what would not be assigned in explanation of an object of mathematics. For in mathematics no reason for diversity of two given lines can be assigned except because of their situation; wherefore, if diversity of situation is removed, there remains no plurality of mathematical lines, and likewise no diversity of surfaces or of bodies. On this account mathematical bodies cannot be both many and simultaneous, and in like manner neither can lines or surfaces.
Sed in corporibus naturalibus posset ab adversario assignari alia ratio diversitatis, scilicet ex materia sensibili, etiam remota diversitate situs. Et ideo illa, quae probabat duo corpora mathematica non esse simul, non est sufficiens ad probandum duo corpora naturalia simul non esse. But in regard to corporeal things in nature, it is possible to assign another and different reason for diversity: namely, that of sensible matter, even though diversity of situation were removed. Hence the reasoning which proves that two mathematical bodies cannot be simultaneously in the same place does not suffice for proving that two bodies in the natural order could not be simultaneous.
Et ideo accipienda est via Avicennae, qua utitur in sua sufficientia in tractatu de loco, per quam assignat causam prohibitionis praedictae ex ipsa natura corporeitatis per principia naturalia. Dicit enim quod non potest esse causa huius prohibitionis nisi illud cui primo et per se competit esse in loco; hoc est enim quod natum est replere locum. Formae autem non competit esse in loco nisi per accidens, quamvis aliquae formae sint principium, quo corpus determinatur ad hunc vel illum locum. Similiter nec materia secundum se considerata, quia sic intelligitur praeter omnia alia genera, ut dicitur in VII metaphysicae. Unde oportet quod materia secundum quod subest ei, per quod habet primam comparationem ad locum, hoc prohibeat. Comparatur autem ad locum, prout subest dimensionibus. And therefore the explanation of Avicenna must be accepted, which he uses in his Sufficientia, in the treatise De loco. In this explanation he assigns as reason of the aforesaid prohibition one which, by natural principles, is owing to the very nature of corporeity itself. For he says there can be no cause of this prohibition except that it pertains, first and per se, to a thing to be in place: but this means that it is destined by its nature to fill a place. Moreover, it does not pertain to a form to be in place, except accidentally; Although certain forms are the principles by which a body is inclined to this or that place. Likewise neither does it pertain to matter, considered per se, to be in place, because, as so considered, it is understood apart from all genera, as is said in VII Metaph. Wherefore it must be that matter, according as it is subject to that by which it has primary relation to place, is the cause of this prohibition; but it is related to place inasmuch as it is subject to dimensions:
Et ideo ex natura materiae subiectae dimensionibus prohibentur corpora esse in eodem loco plura. Oportet enim esse plura corpora, in quibus forma corporeitatis invenitur divisa, quae quidem non dividitur nisi secundum divisionem materiae, cuius divisio cum sit solum per dimensiones, de quarum ratione est situs, impossibile est esse hanc materiam distinctam ab illa, nisi quando est distincta secundum situm, quod non est quando duo corpora ponuntur esse in eodem loco. Unde sequitur illa duo corpora esse unum corpus, quod est impossibile. Cum ergo materia dimensionibus subiecta inveniatur in quibuslibet corporibus, oportet quaelibet duo corpora prohiberi ex ipsa natura corporeitatis, ne sint in eodem loco. Hence it is by nature of matter subject to dimensions that many bodies are prohibited from being in the same place. For, wherever the form of corporeity is found to be divided, there must be a plurality of bodies; but this division does not take place except by division of matter. Since division of matter is only by dimensions, because of which matter has situation, it is impossible that this matter should be distinct from that unless it is distinct according to situation. But this would not be the case if two bodies were posited as being in the same place; for then they would not be two bodies but one body, a thing which is impossible. Since, therefore, matter subject to dimensions is found in all corporeal things, it must be by reason of the very nature of corporeity that any two bodies are prohibited from being in the same place at the same time.
Answers to objections
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod dupliciter aliqua propositio potest dici non intelligibilis. Uno modo ex parte intelligentis qui deficit intellectu, sicut haec propositio: in tribus personis divinis est una essentia. Et huiusmodi propositio non oportet quod implicet contradictionem. 1. It may be said: A proposition may be called not-intelligible in two ways. In one way, it may be on the part of the one understanding, because of the deficiency of his intellect, as is the case in relation to this proposition: “In the three divine Persons there is one essence.” In a proposition of this kind, there can be, indeed, no contradiction.
Alio modo ex parte ipsius propositionis. Et hoc dupliciter. Uno modo implicat contradictionem absolute, sicut rationale est irrationale et similia; et huiusmodi nullo miraculo verificari possunt. Alia vero implicant contradictionem aliquo modo, sicut ista: mortuus redit ad vitam. Implicat enim contradictionem, secundum quod intelligitur redire ad vitam propria virtute, cum ponatur per hoc quod dicitur mortuum omni vitae principio destitutum. Et talia possunt verificari per miraculum superiori virtute operante. Et similiter est in proposito. Non enim in duobus corporibus in eodem loco positis potest aliqua naturalis causa diversitatis inveniri. Sed divina virtus potest ea, quamvis sint unita in situ, in sua distinctione conservare. Et sic miraculose fieri potest quod duo corpora sint in eodem loco. In another way, non-intelligibility may be on the part of the proposition, and this again for two reasons. In one way because it implies a contradiction, absolutely, as for example, “The rational is irrational”; and not even by a miracle can propositions of this sort be made true. In another way, because they imply a contradiction in a certain manner, as this proposition: “The dead man rose to life by his own (proper) power”; for, by the fact that he is said to be “dead,” it is posited that he is destitute of every principle of life. Propositions of this kind can be made true by the miraculous operation of a superior power; and such is the case in regard to this proposition. For just as there can be found no natural cause of diversity for two bodies in the same place, so, by divine power, it is possible that two bodies be in the same place and that, Although united in situation, their, distinction be conserved, as does miraculously happen.
Ad secundum dicendum quod quidquid sit illa corpulentia quae ponitur removeri a corporibus gloriosis, tamen planum est quod corporeitas ab eis numquam removebitur et ideo nec causa naturaliter prohibens aliquod eorum simul esse cum alio corpore in eodem loco. Sed solum miraculose hoc esse poterit quod sint simul cum aliis corporibus in eodem loco. 2. It may be said: Whatever may be this corpulentia, which is said to be removed from glorified bodies, nevertheless it is evident that corporeity will not be removed from them; therefore, neither will the cause which naturally prohibits any one of them from simultaneously occupying the same place with another; but only by a miracle is it possible that a glorified body be in the same place simultaneously with other bodies.
Ad tertium dicendum quod lux non est corpus, sed qualitas quaedam, ut Damascenus dicit et etiam Avicenna. Augustinus autem lucem nominat ipsum ignem, quod patet ex hoc quod condividit lucem contra aerem, aquam et terram. 3. It may be answered: Light is not a body, but a certain quality, as Damascene says, and Avicenna also. But Augustine gives light the same name as fire, as is evident from the fact that he speaks of light as contradistinguished from air, water, and earth.
Ad quartum dicendum quod tres species ignis a philosopho assignatae sic sunt intelligendae, ut per lucem intelligatur ignis in propria materia exsistens, dato etiam, ut quidam dicunt, quod ignis in propria sphaera non lucet. Lucis enim non est lucere, sed quod ex eius participatione alia luceant. Et similiter ignis, etsi in propria materia non luceat, tamen eius participatione alia lucentia fiunt. Per flammam autem intelligitur ignis exsistens in materia aerea, per carbonem in materia terrea. In materia autem aquea non potest ignis convalescere in tantum quod ignis nomen habeat, quia aqua habet omnes qualitates oppositas igni. 4. It may be answered: The three species of fire spoken of by the Philosopher are to be understood in such a way that by “light” is understood fire existing in its proper matter, and granted also, as some say, that fire in its own proper sphere emits no light. For it does not belong to the nature of light to be luminous, but by participation in it other things become so. The same is true of fire: for, Although in its own sphere it emits no light, nevertheless, by participation in it, other things become refulgent. By flame, however, is to be understood fire in the air; and by carbon, fire in terrestrial matter. In aqueous matter, however, fire cannot continue in such a way as to have the nature of fire, because water has qualities which are altogether opposed to fire.
Ad quintum dicendum quod in ferro ignito non sunt duo corpora, sed unum corpus habens quidem speciem ferri, sed aliquas proprietates ignis. 5. It must be said: In iron which has become ignited there are not two bodies, but one body having indeed the species of iron, but certain properties of fire.
Ad sextum dicendum quod etsi ponantur elementa in corpore mixto remanere secundum suas formas substantiales, non tamen ponuntur esse plura corpora in actu, alias nullum corpus mixtum esset vere unum, sed est unum in actu et multa in potentia. 6. It may be answered: Although elements in a compound are supposed to remain according to their substantial forms, nevertheless it is not supposed that there are then many bodies in act, for otherwise no compound would be truly one; but while it is potentially many, it is one in act.
Probabilior tamen videtur esse opinio Commentatoris in III caeli et mundi, qui hanc opinionem Avicennae improbans dicit elementorum formas in mixto non remanere nec totaliter corrumpi, sed fieri ex his unam mediam formam, in quantum suscipiunt magis et minus. Sed cum formae substantiales magis et minus suscipere sit absonum, videtur eius dictum esse intelligendum hoc modo, quod formae elementorum suscipiant magis et minus non secundum se, sed secundum quod manent virtute in qualitatibus elementaribus quasi in propriis instrumentis, ut sic dicatur quod formae secundum se non remanent, sed solum prout sunt virtute in qualitatibus, ex quibus fit una media qualitas. Nevertheless the opinion of the Commentator, III Coel. et mundo, seems the more probable. In rejecting the opinion of Avicenna, he says that the forms of elements neither remain in a compound nor are altogether corrupted, but that from them there comes to be one common or neuter form inasmuch as they comprise it, more or less. But since to give rise to a substantial form “more or less” seems an improbability, it appears that this saying ought to be understood in this way: that the forms of the elements are receptive of more or less (or comprise the form of the compound, more or less), not secundum se, but according as they remain in elementary qualities, as it were in their proper instruments. And thus it is said: Forms remain virtually in the qualities of the elements certain instrumental properties, as it were. Forms secundum se, do not remain, but only according as they remain virtually in their qualities, out of which there is made one, median, or common quality.
Ad septimum dicendum quod quamvis dimensiones per se non possent replere locum, tamen corpus naturale ex hoc quod eius materia intelligitur subiecta dimensionibus habet quod repleat locum. 7. It may be said: Although dimensions of themselves cannot fill out a place, nevertheless a natural body, because of the fact that its matter is understood to be subject to dimensions, has the natural characteristic of filling a place.
Ad octavum dicendum quod opinio Ptolemaei de epicyclis et excentricis non videtur consonare principiis naturalibus quae Aristoteles ponit; et ideo illa opinio sectatoribus Aristotelis non placet. Si tamen sustineatur, nulla necessitas erit quod duo corpora sint in eodem loco, quia secundum tenentes illam opinionem triplex substantia distinguitur in caelestibus corporibus, scilicet substantia stellarum, quae est luminosa, et substantia sphaerarum, quae est diaphana et solida non divisibilis, et substantia alia quae est inter sphaeras, quae est divisibilis et inspissabilis ad modum aeris, quamvis sit incorruptibilis. Et per hanc substantiam defenduntur, ne oporteat eos ponere substantiam sphaerarum dividi aut duo corpora esse in eodem loco. 8. It may be said: The opinion of Ptolemy regarding epicycles and eccentrics does not seem consonant with principles of natural philosophy which Aristotle holds; hence this opinion is not acceptable to the followers of Aristotle. If, however, it should be sustained, no necessity arises for supposing two bodies to be in the same place since, according to those who hold this opinion, the substances of heavenly bodies are distinguished as of three kinds: namely, the substance of the stars, which is luminous; the substance of the spheres, which is diaphanous and solid, but not divisible; and another kind of substance, which is between the spheres, and which is divisible and of resisting density, after the manner of the air, Although this substance is incorruptible. And thus those who hold the theory of this third substance have no need to say that the substance of the spheres is divided or that two bodies occupy the same place simultaneously.

Article 4
Whether Variety of Location Has Any Influence in Effecting Numerical Difference
Articulus 4 Objections
Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod loci varietas nihil faciat ad diversitatem secundum numerum. Causa enim diversitatis secundum numerum est in ipsis quae numero differunt. Sed locus est extra locata. Ergo ex diversitate locorum non potest esse causa diversitatis secundum numerum. 1. It seems that variety of location effects nothing as regards diversity according to number. For the cause of diversity according to number is in those things which differ numerically; but place is outside things that are located; therefore diversity of place cannot be the cause of numerical diversity.
Praeterea, res non est completa in esse nisi secundum quod est ab aliis distincta. Sed locus advenit post esse completum, unde etiam motus ad locum est motus perfecti secundum substantiam, ut dicitur in VIII physicorum. Ergo non potest ex loco sumi aliqua causa distinctionis in corporibus locatis. 2. A thing is not complete in being unless it is distinct from others; but place comes after complete being; therefore motion to a place is the motion of that which is perfect according to substance, as is said in IX Physic. Therefore it is not possible that any cause of the distinction of bodies occupying space should be derived from place.
Praeterea, distinctio secundum numerum est invariabilis circa ipsa distincta. Sed a causa variabili non procedit effectus invariabilis. Ergo cum locus varietur circa locatum, non potest esse quod diversitas secundum locum sit causa diversitatis secundum numerum. 3. Numerical distinction is invariable as regards things that are distinct: but an invariable effect cannot proceed from a variable cause; therefore, since place varies in regard to that having location, it is not possible for diversity according to place to be the cause of numerical diversity.
Praeterea, remota causa removetur effectus. Sed aliquando a duobus corporibus removetur per miraculum distinctio secundum locum, ut prius dictum est, et tamen non removetur distinctio secundum numerum. Ergo distinctio secundum locum non est causa diversitatis secundum numerum. 4. If a cause is removed, so also is its effect: but it sometimes happens by a miracle that distinction of place is removed in respect to two bodies, as has been previously said; yet distinction according to number is not removed; therefore distinction according to place is not the cause of numerical diversity.
Praeterea, diversitas secundum numerum non solum invenitur in corporibus, sed etiam in substantiis incorporeis. Sed in eis diversitas locorum non potest esse causa diversitatis secundum numerum, cum incorporalia in loco non sint, ut dicit ipsemet in libro de hebdomadibus. Ergo diversitas secundum locum non potest poni causa diversitatis secundum numerum universaliter, ut ipse videtur dicere. 5. Diversity according to number is found not only in corporeal things, but even in incorporeal substances; but in these latter, diversity according to place cannot be the cause of numerical diversity, since incorporeal beings are not in a place, as Boethius himself says in his book, De hebdomadibus; therefore diversity according to place cannot be taken as the cause of diversity according to number, that is, as its cause by very reason of its nature, as he himself seems to say.
Sed contra
Sed contra est quod ea, quae differunt secundum numerum, differunt accidentibus. Sed nullius accidentis diversitas ita inseparabiliter se habet ad diversitatem in numero, sicut diversitas loci. Ergo diversitas in loco maxime videtur facere ad diversitatem in numero. On the contrary is the fact that things differing according to number differ by reason of their accidents: but the diversity of no other accident is so inseparably related to diversity in number as is diversity of location; therefore diversity in place seems especially to influence diversity in number.
Praeterea, diversitas locorum secundum speciem concomitatur diversitatem corporum secundum speciem, sicut patet in gravibus et levibus. Ergo et diversitas locorum secundum numerum indivisibiliter concomitatur diversitatem corporum secundum numerum, et sic idem quod prius. Again, diversity of location according to the species of things is concomitant with the diversity of bodies according to their species, as is evident in the case of heavy and light bodies. Therefore also diversity of places according to number is indivisibly concomitant with diversity of bodies according to number, and so the conclusion is the same as before.
Praeterea, sicut tempus est mensura motus, ita locus est mensura corporis. Sed motus dividitur numero secundum tempus, ut dicitur in V physicorum. Ergo et corpus dividitur numero secundum locum. Again, as time is the measure of motion, so place is the measure of a body: but motion is divided numerically according to time, as is said in V Physic.; therefore also what is corporeal is divided numerically according to place.
Responsio. Dicendum quod, sicut ex supra dictis patet, diversitas secundum numerum causatur ex divisione materiae sub dimensionibus exsistentis. Ipsa etiam materia, secundum quod sub dimensionibus exsistit, prohibet duo corpora esse in eodem loco, in quantum oportet duorum corporum distinctas secundum situm esse materias. Et sic patet quod ex eodem causatur diversitas secundum numerum, ex quo causatur necessitas diversitatis locorum in diversis corporibus. Et ideo ipsa diversitas locorum in se considerata est signum diversitatis secundum numerum, sicut et de aliis accidentibus praeter dimensiones primas interminatas supra dictum est. Sed si diversitas loci consideretur secundum suam causam, sic planum est quod diversitas loci est causa diversitatis secundum numerum. Et ideo Boethius quod varietas accidentium facit diversitatem secundum numerum omnibus aliis remotis in locorum diversitate hic inevitabiliter verificari constituit, quia scilicet nullum aliud accidentium, quae exterius apparent completa, est ita propinquum ad causam diversitatis secundum numerum sicut diversitas locorum. Response. I answer: It must be said that, as is evident from previous statements, diversity according to number is caused by division of matter existing under dimensions. Now, matter itself, according as it exists under dimensions, prohibits two bodies from being in the same place, inasmuch as in each of the two bodies there must be matter distinct in its situation. And thus it is evident that diversity according to number is caused by the same thing as diversity of location in diverse bodies. Hence diversity of location, considered in itself, is a sign of the diversity which exists according to number—just as is also true of other accidents, except the first indeterminate dimensions which have been previously discussed. But if diversity of place is considered according to its own cause, then it is clear that diversity of place is the cause of diversity according to number. Therefore Boethius says it is variety of accidents that produces diversity according to number. But if all other accidents are removed, numerical diversity still remains verifiable by reason of the diversity of things in place; since, indeed, no other of those accidents which appear as extrinsic to a complete being is so closely related to the cause of diversity according to number as is diversity of location.
Ad primum ergo dicendum et secundum et tertium quod rationes illae concludunt quod diversitas loci non est causa diversitatis individuorum secundum se. Sed per hoc non removetur, quin causa diversitatis locorum sit causa diversitatis secundum numerum. Answers to objections. 1-3. To the first, second, and third objections it may be said: These reasons show conclusively that diversity of place is not the cause of diversity of individuals, secundum se., but this does not refute the fact that the cause of diversity of locations is the cause of diversity according to number.
Ad quartum dicendum quod omnes effectus causarum secundarum magis dependent a Deo quam etiam ab ipsis causis secundis, et ideo etiam remotis causis secundis ipse miraculose potest producere effectus quos voluerit. 4. It may be answered: All effects of second causes depend more on God than on secondary causes, since either with these second causes, or without them, He is able to produce miraculously whatever effects He wills.
Ad quintum dicendum quod in substantiis incorporeis diversitas secundum numerum sequitur diversitatem secundum speciem excepta anima rationali, quae sequitur divisionem materiae sibi dispositae. Hic autem Boethius loquitur de diversitate secundum numerum, ubi est eadem species. 5. It may be said: In corporeal substances diversity according to species follows diversity according to number, except in the case of the rational soul, which follows division of matter disposed for it. Here, however, Boethius is speaking of diversity according to number where the species is the same.
Further answers
Ad primum vero eorum quae in contrarium obiciuntur dicendum quod varietas aliorum accidentium praeter dimensiones interminatas non facit diversitatem in numero sicut causa, sed dicitur facere sicut signum demonstrans, et sic maxime diversitas loci facit, in quantum est propinquius signum. 1. In contradiction to the first objection, it may be said: Variety of accidents, because of indeterminate dimensions, does not produce diversity in number after the manner of a cause, but this variety is said to produce, a sign indicating numerical diversity; and diversity of place does this in a special way, inasmuch as it is the sign, most closely related to numerical diversity.
Ad secundum dicendum quod diversitas locorum secundum speciem est signum diversitatis corporum secundum speciem, sed non causa. 2. To the second, it may be answered: Diversity of locations according to species is a sign of diversity of bodies according to their species, but not a cause of specific diversity.
Ad tertium dicendum quod, cum divisio temporis causetur ex divisione motus, diversitas etiam temporis non est causa diversitatis motus, sed signum. Et similiter est de loco ad corpora. 3. To the third, it may be said: Although division of time is caused by division of motion, diversity, even diversity of time is not the cause of diversity of motion, but a sign of it; and the same is true of location in its relation to a body.

Pars 3, Prooemium LECTIO 2

Boethius’ Text

Age igitur ingrediamur et unumquodque ut intellegi atque capi potest dispiciamus; nam, sicut optime dictum videtur, eruditi est hominis unumquodque ut ipsum est ita de eo fidem capere temptare. 1.1 Let us now begin a careful consideration of each several point, as far as it can be grasped and understood; for it has been wisely said, in my opinion, that it is a scholar’s duty to formulate his belief about anything according to its real nature.
Nam cum tres sint speculativae partes, naturalis, in motu inabstracta anupexairetos~g 1.2. Speculative science may be divided into three kinds: physics, mathematics, and theology.
(considerat enim corporum formas cum materia, quae a corporibus actu separari non possunt, quae corpora in motu sunt ut cum terra deorsum ignis sursum fertur, habet que motum forma materiae coniuncta), Physics deals with motion and is not abstract or separable; for it is concerned with forms of bodies together with their constituent matter, which forms cannot be separated in reality from their bodies. As bodies are in motion—the earth, for instance, tending downward, and fire tending upward—form takes on the movement of the particular thing to which it is annexed.
mathematica, sine motu inabstracta (haec enim formas corporum speculatur sine materia ac per hoc sine motu, quae formae cum in materia sint, ab his separari non possunt), Mathematics does not deal with motion and is not abstract, for it investigates forms of bodies apart from matter, and therefore apart from movement, which forms being connected with matter cannot really be separated from bodies.
theologica, sine motu abstracta atque separabilis (nam dei substantia et materia et motu caret), Theology does not deal with motion and is abstract and of things inseparable, for the divine substance is without matter or motion.
in naturalibus igitur rationabiliter, in mathematicis disciplinaliter, In physics we are bound to use scientific concepts, in mathematics systematic concepts, in theology intellectual concepts;
in divinis intellectualiter versari oportebit neque diduci ad imaginationes, sed potius ipsam inspicere formam and in theology we will not let ourselves be diverted to play with imaginations, but will consider simply form.
quae vere forma neque imago est et quae esse ipsum est et ex qua esse est... 2. Which form, indeed...
St. Thomas’ Commentary
Proposuit superius Boethius sententiam Catholicae fidei de unitate Trinitatis et rationem sententiae prosecutus est. Nunc intendit procedere ad inquisitionem praedictorum. Et quia secundum sententiam philosophi in II metaphysicae ante scientiam oportet inquirere modum scientiae, ideo pars ista dividitur in duas. In prima Boethius ostendit modum proprium huius inquisitionis, quae est de rebus divinis. In secunda vero parte secundum modum assignatum procedit ad propositum inquirendum, ibi: quae vere forma est et cetera. 1.1 Boethius has previously set forth the doctrine of the Catholic faith regarding the unity of the Trinity, and indicated the reason of this belief. Now he intends to proceed to an investigation of the aforesaid doctrine. Since, according to the opinion of the Philosopher in II Metaph., inquiry into the method of a science ought to precede science itself, he therefore divides this section into two parts. In the first place Boethius points out the method proper for this kind of inquiry, which is concerned with divine things. In the second place he proceeds, according to the method he has indicated, to inquire into the proposition determined upon, where he says, “Which form, indeed.”
Prima pars dividitur in duas. In prima ponit necessitatem ostendendi modum inquisitionis. In secunda modum congruum inquisitioni praesenti ostendit, ibi: nam cum tres sint et cetera. Dicit ergo: igitur, ex quo constat hanc esse sententiam Catholicae fidei de unitate Trinitatis et indifferentiam esse rationem unitatis, The first part is again divided into two sections: first, he indicates the necessity of making clear the method of investigation. Secondly, he shows that the method of the present inquiry is suitable, saying: “Speculative science may be divided into three kinds.” Therefore he says: “Wherefore it is certain that this is the doctrine of the Catholic faith regarding the unity of the Trinity, and the nature of that unity without difference.”
age, adverbium exhortandi, ingrediamur, id est interius inquiramus ipsa intima rerum principia considerantes et veritatem quasi velatam et absconditam perscrutantes, et hoc modo convenienti; unde subdit: et unumquodque dicendorum discutiamus, ut potest intelligi atque capi, id est per modum quo possit intelligi et capi. Thereupon, he says by way of exhortation, “Let us now begin,” that is, let us inquire more deeply, carrying our investigation to an examination of the intimate principle of things and of truth which is, as it were, veiled and hidden away from view. And that method which he deems fitting is indicated by the words: “Let us now begin a careful consideration of each several point, as far as it can be grasped and understood,” that is, according to the mode by which. understanding and apprehension are possible.
Et dicit haec duo, quia modus, quo aliqua discutiuntur, debet congruere et rebus et nobis. Nisi enim rebus congrueret, res intelligi non possent; nisi vero congrueret nobis, nos capere non possemus, utpote res divinae ex natura sua habent quod non cognoscantur nisi intellectu. Unde si aliquis vellet sequi imaginationem in consideratione earum, non posset intelligere, quia ipsae res non sunt sic intelligibiles. Si autem aliquis vellet res divinas per se ipsas videre ea certitudine et comprehendere, sicut comprehenduntur sensibilia et demonstrationes mathematicae, non posset hoc modo capere propter defectum intellectus sui, quantumvis ipsae res sint secundum se hoc modo intelligibiles. Moreover, he uses the two words (“grasped” and “understood”) because the method of any investigation ought to be in harmony both with things and with us. For if it is not suited to the matter, things will not be understood; and if it is not suited to us, we shall not be able to apprehend the matter; for example, divine things are such by their very nature that they cannot be known except by intellect. Wherefore, if anyone wished to follow another way and to use imagination instead, he would not be able to understand anything of them as a result of his consideration, because truths, of this kind are not thus to be known. But if, on the other hand, one wished to know divine things so as to see them in themselves, and to comprehend them with the same certitude with which sensible things or mathematical demonstrations are comprehended, this too would be impossible; even things which are, in themselves, understandable in this way cannot be perfectly grasped because of the weakness of our intellect.
Et quod modus congruus sit in inquisitione qualibet observandus, probat inducendo auctoritatem philosophi in principio Ethicorum, et hoc est quod subiungit: nam sicut optime dictum videtur, scilicet ab Aristotele in principio Ethicorum: eruditi hominis est ut unumquodque ipsum est, id est per modum congruum ipsi rei, ita de eo fidem capere temptare. Non enim de omnibus rebus potest aequalis certitudo et evidentia demonstrationis servari. Et sunt haec verba philosophi in I Ethicorum: disciplinati enim est in tantum certitudinem inquirere secundum unumquodque genus, in quantum natura rei recipit. He also shows that the mode of inquiry used must always correspond to the kind of investigation undertaken, by reference to the authority of the Philosopher in I Ethic. when he says: “For it has been wisely said that it is a scholar’s duty to formulate his belief about anything according to its real nature.” So, in regard to a doctrine of faith, the same principle must be applied: for in all cases, equal certitude and demonstrative evidence cannot be demanded. And these are the very words of the Philosopher in I Ethic.: “It is the duty of the scholar to demand as much certitude in his investigation of each thing as the nature of that thing permits.”
Deinde cum dicit: nam cum tres etc., inquirit modum congruum huic inquisitioni per distinctionem a modis qui observantur in aliis scientiis. Et quia modus debet esse congruus rei de qua est perscrutatio, ideo dividitur haec pars in duas. 1.2 In the second place, when he says: “Speculative science may be divided into three kinds,” he inquires into the method of his own investigation, testing its congruousness by distinguishing it from the methods employed in other sciences; and, since method ought to correspond to the matter under investigation, he therefore divides this part of his consideration into two sections.
In prima enim distinguit scientias secundum res, de quibus determinant. In secunda ostendit modos singulis earum congruos, ibi: in naturalibus igitur et cetera. First, he distinguishes sciences according to the matter with which each is concerned. Secondly, he indicates the methods suitable for each kind of matter, beginning, “Physics deals.”
Circa primum tria facit. Primo ostendit, de quibus consideret naturalis philosophia. Secundo, de quibus mathematica, ibi: mathematica et cetera. Tertio, de quibus considerat divina scientia, ibi: theologia est sine motu et cetera. In regard to the first point, he does three things. First, he shows what the objects of natural philosophy are. Secondly, he indicates the objects of mathematics. Thirdly, he speaks of the truths with which divine science is concerned, when he says: “Theology does not.”
Dicit ergo: bene dictum est quod ut unumquodque est, ita debet de eo fides capi. Nam cum tres sint partes speculativae, scilicet philosophiae - hoc dicit ad differentiam Ethicae, quae est activa sive practica - in omnibus requiritur modus competens materiae. Sunt autem tres partes praedictae: physica sive naturalis, mathematica, divina sive theologia. Cum, inquam, sint tres partes, naturalis, quae est una earum, est in motu, inabstracta, id est versatur eius consideratio circa res mobiles a materia non abstractas, quod probat per exempla, ut patet in littera. Quod autem dicit: habetque motum forma materiae coniuncta, sic intelligendum est: ipsum compositum ex materia et forma, in quantum huiusmodi, habet motum sibi debitum, vel ipsa forma in materia exsistens est principium motus; et ideo eadem est consideratio de rebus secundum quod sunt materiales et secundum quod sunt mobiles. Therefore he says: “It has been wisely said that it is a scholar’s duty to formulate his belief about anything according to its real nature.” For, since there are three divisions of speculative science (or philosophy), and he calls it “speculative” to differentiate it from ethics, which is operative or practical; in each of these the method must be in conformity with the matter. The three divisions of speculative science indicated are physics or natural science, mathematics, and divine science or theology. While, I say, there are three divisions, natural philosophy, which is one of the, three, “deals with motion and is not abstract,” that is, it is concerned with things in motion and not abstracted from matter. This he proves by examples, as is evident in his treatise. When, however, he says: “Form takes on the movement of the particular thing to which it is annexed,” his words should be understood as follows: that what is composite of matter and form, inasmuch as it is due the nature of a thing of this kind, has motion; or, in other words, a form existing in matter is the principle of motion. Therefore the consideration of things that are material and of things that are in motion is the same.
Deinde exponit de quibus sit mathematica: mathematica est sine motu, id est sine motus et mobilium consideratione, in quo differt a naturali, inabstracta, id est considerat formas quae secundum esse suum non sunt a materia abstractae, in quo convenit cum naturali; quod quomodo sit exponit. Haec enim, scilicet mathematica, speculatur formas sine materia ac per hoc sine motu, quia ubicumque est motus, est materia, ut probatur in IX metaphysicae, eo modo quo est ibi motus, et sic ipsa speculatio mathematici est sine materia et motu. Quae formae, scilicet de quibus mathematicus speculatur, cum sint in materia, non possunt ab his separari secundum esse, et sic secundum speculationem sunt separabiles, non secundum esse. He then indicates the subject matter of mathematics, saying: “Mathematics does not deal with motion”; that is, it involves no consideration of motion or of movable things, and on this point it differs from natural philosophy. Mathematics, moreover, is said to be “not abstract”; that is, it considers forms which according to their existence are not abstract from matter, and in this respect it is in agreement with natural philosophy. He then explains. how this is: Mathematics considers forms which are without matter and hence without motion, because wherever there is matter there is motion, as is proved in X Metaph. For according as things have matter there will also be motion, and thus the speculations of a mathematician are without matter and without motion, Although these forms, namely, those about which the mathematician speculates, “being connected with matter, cannot really be separated from bodies,” according to their being [real existence]; but according to speculation, they can be considered as separable.
Deinde ostendit de quibus sit tertia, scilicet divina: theologia, id est tertia pars speculativae, quae dicitur divina vel metaphysica vel philosophia prima, est sine motu, in quo convenit cum mathematica et differt a naturali, abstracta, scilicet a materia, atque inseparabilis, per quae duo differt a mathematica. Res enim divinae sunt secundum esse abstractae a materia et motu, sed mathematicae inabstractae, sunt autem consideratione separabiles; sed res divinae inseparabiles, quia nihil est separabile nisi quod est coniunctum. Unde res divinae non sunt secundum considerationem separabiles a materia, sed secundum esse abstractae; res vero mathematicae e contrario. Et hoc probat per Dei substantiam, de qua scientia divina considerat principaliter, unde et inde nominatur. Then he indicates the objects of divine science, calling it, ‘theology,” that is, the third division of speculative science, which is termed divine, or metaphysics, or first philosophy; and it deals with objects apart from motion, in which it agrees with mathematics and differs from natural philosophy. It also is “abstract,” namely, from matter, and “inseparable”; and because of these two facts it differs from mathematics. For the objects of divine science are of themselves abstract from matter and motion, but those of mathematics are not thus naturally abstract, but separable in thought. The objects of divine science, however, are called “inseparable” because a thing is not separable unless there is some conjunction with matter. Hence the objects of divine science are not separable from matter by thought, but are abstract according to their very being; while the converse is true in the case of the objects of mathematics. This he proves by the fact that the substance with which divine science is principally concerned is that of God, and on this account it is called “divine.”
Deinde cum dicit: in naturalibus igitur etc., ostendit, quis sit modus congruus praedictis partibus. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo concludit modos congruos singulis partium praedictarum, et huius partis expositio relinquitur disputationi. Secundo exponit ultimum modum qui est proprius praesenti inquisitioni. Et hoc dupliciter. Primo removendo id quod est impeditivum dicens: neque oportet in divinis deduci ad imaginationes, ut scilicet de eis iudicando sequamur imaginationis iudicium. In the next place, when he says, “In physics, then, we are bound to use scientific concepts, in mathematics systematic concepts, in theology intellectual concepts.” He points out the methods that correspond to the aforesaid divisions. Here he treats of two things. First, he draws conclusions about the methods appropriate for each of the divisions named, and the disposition of this section is left open for discussion. Secondly, he describes the last mode, which is that proper to the present investigation, and indicates a twofold procedure: first, by the removal of that which is an impediment to speculation saying, ‘In theology we will not let ourselves be diverted to play with imaginations (that is, in such a way that in formulating judgments we follow the judgment of the imagination) but will consider simply form.”
Secundo ostendendo id quod est proprium, ibi: sed potius ipsam inspicere formam sine motu et materia, cuius condiciones consequenter exponit ingrediens ad propositam inquisitionem. Secondly, he indicates the method which is the proper one when he says: “but will consider simply form” (apart from motion and matter), the nature of which he consequently explains in beginning his treatment of the proposed question.

The Division of Speculative Science

Hic est duplex quaestio. Prima de divisione speculativae, quam in littera ponit. Secunda de modis, quos partibus speculativae attribuit. Circa primum quaeruntur quattuor.
  1. Primo. Utrum sit conveniens divisio qua dividitur speculativa in has tres partes: naturalem, mathematicam et divinam.
  2. Secundo. Utrum naturalis philosophia sit de his quae sunt in motu et materia.
  3. Tertio. Utrum mathematica consideratio sit sine motu et materia de his quae sunt in materia.
  4. Quarto. Utrum divina scientia sit de his quae sunt sine materia et motu.
There are two questions here. The first concerns the division of speculative science which the text proposes, the second concerns the methods it attributes to the parts of speculative science. With regard to the first question there are four points of inquiry:
  1. Is speculative science appropriately divided into these three parts: natural, mathematical, and divine?
  2. Does natural philosophy treat of what exists in motion and matter?
  3. Does mathematics treat, without motion and matter, of what exists in matter?
  4. Does divine science treat of what exists without matter and motion?

Is Speculative Science Appropriately Divided into these Three Parts:
Natural, Mathematical, and Divine?
Articulus 1. Ad primum sic proceditur. We proceed as follows to the first article:
Videtur quod speculativa inconvenienter in has partes dividatur. It seems that speculative science is not appropriately divided into these three parts, for:
Partes enim speculativae sunt illi habitus qui partem contemplativam animae perficiunt. Sed philosophus in VI Ethicorum ponit quod scientificum animae, quod est pars eius contemplativa, perficitur tribus habitibus, scilicet sapientia, scientia et intellectu. Ergo ista tria sunt partes speculativae et non illa quae in littera ponuntur. 1. The parts of speculative science are the habits that perfect the contemplative part of the soul. But the Philosopher says in the Ethics that the scientific part of the soul, which is its contemplative part, is perfected by three habits, namely, wisdom, science, and understanding. Therefore these are the three divisions of speculative science, not those proposed in the text.
Praeterea, Augustinus dicit in VIII de civitate Dei quod rationalis philosophia, quae est logica, sub contemplativa philosophia vel speculativa continetur. Cum ergo de ea mentionem non faciat, videtur quod divisio sit insufficiens. 2. Again, Augustine says that rational philosophy, or logic, is included under contemplative or speculative philosophy. Consequently, since no mention is made of it, it seems the division is inadequate.
Praeterea, communiter dividitur philosophia in septem artes liberales, inter quas neque naturalis neque divina continetur, sed sola rationalis et mathematica. Ergo naturalis et divina non debuerunt poni partes speculativae. 3. Again, philosophy is commonly divided into seven liberal arts, which include neither natural nor divine science, but only rational and mathematical science. Hence natural and divine should not be called parts of speculative science.
Praeterea, scientia medicinae maxime videtur esse operativa, et tamen in ea ponitur una pars speculativa et alia practica. Ergo eadem ratione in omnibus aliis operativis scientiis aliqua pars est speculativa, et ita debuit in hac divisione mentio fieri de Ethica sive morali, quamvis sit activa, propter partem eius speculativam. 4. Again, medicine seems to be the most practical science, and yet it is said to contain a speculative part and a practical part. By the same token, therefore, all the other practical sciences have a speculative part. Consequently, even though it is a practical science, ethics or moral science should be mentioned in this division because of its speculative part.
Praeterea, scientia medicinae quaedam pars physicae est, et similiter quaedam aliae artes quae dicuntur mechanicae, ut scientia de agricultura, alchimia et aliae huiusmodi. Cum ergo istae sint operativae, videtur quod non debuerit naturalis absolute sub speculativa poni. 5. Again, the science of medicine is a branch of physics, and similarly certain other arts called “mechanical,” like the science of agriculture, alchemy, and others of the same sort. Therefore, since these sciences are practical, it seems that natural science should not be included without qualification under speculative science.
Praeterea, totum non debet dividi contra partem. Sed divina scientia esse videtur ut totum respectu physicae et mathematicae, cum subiecta illarum sint partes subiecti istius. Divinae enim scientiae, quae est prima philosophia, subiectum est ens, cuius pars est substantia mobilis, quam considerat naturalis, et similiter quantitas quam considerat mathematicus, ut patet in III metaphysicae. Ergo scientia divina non debet dividi contra naturalem et mathematicam. 6. Again, a whole should not be contra-distinguished from its part. But divine science seems to be a whole in relation to physics mathematics, since their subjects are parts of its subject of divine science or first philosophy is being; and changeable substance, which the natural scientist considers, and also quantity, which the mathematician considers, are parts of being. This is clear in the Metaphysics. Therefore, divine science should not be contra-distinguished from natural science and mathematics.
Praeterea, scientiae dividuntur quemadmodum et res, ut dicitur in III de anima. Sed philosophia est de ente; est enim cognitio entis, ut dicit Dionysius in epistula ad Polycarpum. Cum ergo ens primo dividatur per potentiam et actum, per unum et multa, per substantiam et accidens, videtur quod per huiusmodi deberent partes philosophiae distingui. 7. Again, as it is said in the De Anima, sciences are divided in the same manner as things. But philosophy concerns being, for it is knowledge of being, as Dionysius says. Now being is primarily divided into potency and act, one and many, substance and accident. So it seems that the parts of philosophy ought to be distinguished by such divisions of being.
Praeterea, multae aliae divisiones sunt entium, de quibus sunt scientiae, magis essentiales quam istae quae sunt per mobile et immobile, per abstractum et non abstractum, utpote per corporeum et incorporeum, animatum et inanimatum et per alia huiusmodi. Ergo magis deberet divisio partium philosophiae accipi per huiusmodi differentias quam per illas quae hic tanguntur. 8. Again, there are many other divisions of beings studied by sciences more essential than the divisions into mobile and immobile and into abstract and non-abstract; for example, the divisions into corporeal and incorporeal and into living and non-living, and the like. Therefore differences of this sort should be the basis for the division of the parts of philosophy rather than those mentioned here.
Praeterea, illa scientia, a qua aliae supponunt, debet esse prior eis. Sed omnes aliae scientiae supponunt a scientia divina, quia eius est probare principia aliarum scientiarum. Ergo debuit scientiam divinam aliis praeordinare. 9. Again, that science on which others depend must be prior to them. Now all the other sciences depend on divine science because it is its business to prove their principles. Therefore Boethius should have placed divine science before the others.
Praeterea, mathematica prius occurrit addiscenda quam naturalis, eo quod mathematicam facile possunt addiscere pueri, non autem naturalem nisi provecti, ut dicitur in VI Ethicorum. Unde et apud antiquos hic ordo in scientiis addiscendis fuisse dicitur observatus, ut primo logica, deinde mathematica, post quam naturalis et post hanc moralis, et tandem divinae scientiae homines studerent. Ergo mathematicam naturali scientiae praeordinare debuit. Et sic videtur divisio haec insufficiens. 10. Again, mathematics should be studied before natural science, for the young can easily learn mathematics, but only the more advanced natural science, as is said in the Ethics. This is why the ancients are said to have observed the following order in learning the sciences: first logic, then mathematics, then natural science, after that moral science, and finally men studied divine science. Therefore, Boethius should have placed mathematics before natural science. And so it seems that this division is unsuitable.
Sed e contra, quod haec divisio sit conveniens, probatur per philosophum in VI metaphysicae, ubi dicit: quare tres erunt philosophicae et theoricae: mathematica, physica, theologia. On the contrary, the Philosopher proves the appropriateness of this division in the Metaphysics, where he says, “There will be three philosophical and theoretical sciences, mathematics, physics, and theology.
Praeterea, in II physicorum ponuntur tres modi scientiarum, qui ad has etiam tres pertinere videntur. Moreover, in the Physics three methods of the sciences are proposed which indeed seem to belong to these three.
Praeterea, Ptolemaeus etiam in principio Almagesti hac divisione utitur. Moreover, Ptolemy also uses this division in the beginning of his Almagest.
Responsio. Dicendum quod theoricus sive speculativus intellectus in hoc proprie ab operativo sive practico distinguitur quod speculativus habet pro fine veritatem quam considerat, practicus vero veritatem consideratam ordinat in operationem tamquam in finem. Et ideo dicit philosophus in III de anima quod differunt ad invicem fine, et in II metaphysicae dicitur quod finis speculativae est veritas, sed finis operativae scientiae est actio. Cum ergo oporteat materiam fini esse proportionatam, oportet practicarum scientiarum materiam esse res illas quae a nostro opere fieri possunt, ut sic earum cognitio in operationem quasi in finem ordinari possit. Reply: The theoretical or speculative intellect is properly distinguished from the operative or practical intellect by the fact that the speculative intellect has for its end the truth that it contemplates, while the practical intellect directs the truth under consideration to activity as to an end. So the Philosopher says in the De Anima that they differ from each other by their ends; and in the Metaphysics he states that “the end of speculative knowledge is truth, but the end of practical knowledge is action.” Now, since matter must be proportionate to the end, the subject-matter of the practical sciences must be things that can be made or done by us, so that we can direct the knowledge of them to activity as to an end.
Speculativarum vero scientiarum materiam oportet esse res quae a nostro opere non fiunt; unde earum consideratio in operationem ordinari non potest sicut in finem. Et secundum harum rerum distinctionem oportet scientias speculativas distingui. On the other hand, the subject-matter of the speculative sciences must be things that cannot be made or done by us, so that our knowledge of them cannot be directed to activity as to an end. And the speculative sciences must differ according to the distinctions among these things.
Sciendum tamen quod, quando habitus vel potentiae penes obiecta distinguuntur, non distinguuntur penes quaslibet differentias obiectorum, sed penes illas quae sunt per se obiectorum in quantum sunt obiecta. Esse enim animal vel plantam accidit sensibili in quantum est sensibile, et ideo penes hoc non sumitur distinctio sensuum, sed magis penes differentiam coloris et soni. Et ideo oportet scientias speculativas dividi per differentias speculabilium, in quantum speculabilia sunt. Speculabili autem, quod est obiectum speculativae potentiae, aliquid competit ex parte intellectivae potentiae et aliquid ex parte habitus scientiae quo intellectus perficitur. Ex parte siquidem intellectus competit ei quod sit immateriale, quia et ipse intellectus immaterialis est; ex parte vero scientiae competit ei quod sit necessarium, quia scientia de necessariis est, ut probatur in I posteriorum. Omne autem necessarium, in quantum huiusmodi, est immobile; quia omne quod movetur, in quantum huiusmodi, est possibile esse et non esse vel simpliciter vel secundum quid, ut dicitur in IX metaphysicae. Sic ergo speculabili, quod est obiectum scientiae speculativae, per se competit separatio a materia et motu vel applicatio ad ea. Et ideo secundum ordinem remotionis a materia et motu scientiae speculativae distinguuntur. Now we must realize that when habits or powers are differentiated by their objects they do not differ according to just any distinction among these objects, but according to the distinctions that are essential to the objects as objects. For example, it is incidental to a sense object as such whether it be an animal or a plant. Accordingly, the distinction between the senses is not based upon this difference but rather upon the difference between color and sound. So the speculative sciences must be divided according to differences between objects of speculation, considered precisely as such. Now an object of this kind ─ namely, an object of a speculative power ─ derives one characteristic from the side of the power of intellect and another from the side of the habit of science that perfects the intellect. From the side of the intellect it has the fact that it is immaterial, because the intellect itself is immaterial. From the side of habit of science it has the fact that it is necessary, for science treats of necessary matters, as is shown in the Posterior Analytics. Now everything that is necessary is, as such, immobile, because everything changeable is, as such, able to be or not to be, either absolutely or in a certain respect, as is said in the Metaphysics. Consequently, separation from matter and motion, or connection with them, essentially belongs to an object of speculation, which is the object of speculative science. As a result, the speculative sciences are differentiated according to their degree of separation from matter and motion.
Quaedam ergo speculabilium sunt, quae dependent a materia secundum esse, quia non nisi in materia esse possunt. Et haec distinguuntur, quia quaedam dependent a materia secundum esse et intellectum, sicut illa, in quorum diffinitione ponitur materia sensibilis; unde sine materia sensibili intelligi non possunt, ut in diffinitione hominis oportet accipere carnem et ossa. Et de his est physica sive scientia naturalis. Quaedam vero sunt, quae quamvis dependeant a materia secundum esse, non tamen secundum intellectum, quia in eorum diffinitionibus non ponitur materia sensibilis, sicut linea et numerus. Et de his est mathematica. Quaedam vero speculabilia sunt, quae non dependent a materia secundum esse, quia sine materia esse possunt, sive numquam sint in materia, sicut Deus et Angelus, sive in quibusdam sint in materia et in quibusdam non, ut substantia, qualitas, ens, potentia, actus, unum et multa et huiusmodi. De quibus omnibus est theologia, id est scientia divina, quia praecipuum in ea cognitorum est Deus, quae alio nomine dicitur metaphysica, id est trans physicam, quia post physicam discenda occurrit nobis, quibus ex sensibilibus oportet in insensibilia devenire. Dicitur etiam philosophia prima, in quantum aliae omnes scientiae ab ea sua principia accipientes eam consequuntur. Non est autem possibile quod sint aliquae res quae secundum intellectum dependeant a materia et non secundum esse, quia intellectus, quantum est de se, immaterialis est. Et ideo non est quartum genus philosophiae praeter praedicta. (1) Now there are some objects of speculation that depend on matter for their being, for they can exist only in matter. And these are subdivided. (a) Some depend on matter both for their being (+) and for their being understood, as do those things whose definition contains sensible matter and which, as a consequence, cannot be understood without sensible matter. For example, it is necessary to include flesh and bones in the definition of man. It is things of this sort that physics or natural science studies. (b) On the other hand, there are some things that, Although dependent upon matter for their being, do not depend upon it (~) for their being understood, because sensible matter is not included in their definitions. This is the case with lines and numbers ─ the kind of objects with which mathematics deals. (2) There are still other objects of speculative knowledge that do not depend upon matter(~) for their being, because they can exist without matter; (a) either they never exist in matter, as in the case of God and the angels, or (b) they exist in matter in some instances and not in others, as in the case of substance, quality, being, potency, act, one and many, and the like. The science that treats of all these is theology or divine science, which is so called because its principal object is God. By another name it is called metaphysics; that is to say, “beyond physics”, because it ought to be learned by us after physics; for we have to proceed from sensible things to those that are non-sensible. It is also called first philosophy, inasmuch as all the other sciences, receiving their principles from it, come after it. Now there can be nothing that depends upon matter for its being understood but not for its being, because by it; very nature the intellect is immaterial. So there is no fourth kind of philosophy besides the ones mentioned.
Reply to the Opposing Arguments:
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod philosophus in VI Ethicorum determinat de habitibus intellectualibus, in quantum sunt virtutes intellectuales. Dicuntur autem virtutes, in quantum perficiunt in sua operatione. Virtus enim est quae bonum facit habentem et opus eius bonum reddit; et ideo secundum quod diversimode perficitur per huiusmodi habitus speculativos, diversificat huiusmodi virtutes. Est autem alius modus quo pars animae speculativa perficitur per intellectum, qui est habitus principiorum, quo aliqua ex se ipsis nota fiunt et quo cognoscuntur conclusiones ex huiusmodi principiis demonstratae, sive demonstratio procedat ex causis inferioribus, sicut est in scientia, sive ex causis altissimis, ut in sapientia. Cum autem distinguuntur scientiae ut sunt habitus quidam, oportet quod penes obiecta distinguantur, id est penes res, de quibus sunt scientiae. Et sic distinguuntur hic et in VI metaphysicae tres partes philosophiae speculativae. Reply to 1. In the Ethics the Philosopher considers the intellectual habits insofar as they are intellectual virtues. Now they are called virtues because they perfect the intellect in its operation; for “virtue makes its possessor good and renders his work good.” So he distinguishes between virtues of this sort in as much as speculative habits perfect the intellect in different ways. In one way the speculative part of the soul is perfected by understanding, which is the habit of principles, through which some things become known of themselves. In another way it is perfected by a habit through which conclusions demonstrated from these principles are known, whether the demonstration proceeds from inferior causes, as in science, or from the highest causes, as in wisdom. But when sciences are differentiated insofar as they are habits, they must be distinguished according to their objects, that is, according to the things of which the sciences treat. And it is in this way that both here and in the Metaphysics speculative philosophy is distinguished into three parts.
Ad secundum dicendum quod scientiae speculativae, ut patet in principio metaphysicae, sunt de illis quorum cognitio quaeritur propter se ipsa. Res autem, de quibus est logica, non quaeruntur ad cognoscendum propter se ipsas, sed ut adminiculum quoddam ad alias scientias. Et ideo logica non continetur sub speculativa philosophia quasi principalis pars, sed sicut quiddam reductum ad philosophiam speculativam, prout ministrat speculationi sua instrumenta, scilicet syllogismos et diffinitiones et alia huiusmodi, quibus in scientiis speculativis indigemus. Unde secundum Boethium in commento super Porphyrium non tam est scientia quam scientiae instrumentum. Reply to 2. As is evident in the beginning of the Metaphysics, the speculative sciences concern things the knowledge of which is sought for their own sake. However, we do not seek to know the things studied by logic for themselves, but as a help to the other sciences. So logic is not included under speculative philosophy as a principal part but as something brought under speculative philosophy as furnishing speculative thought with its instruments, namely, syllogisms, definitions, and the like, which we need in the speculative sciences. Thus, according to Boethius, logic is not so much a science as the instrument of science.
Ad tertium dicendum quod septem liberales artes non sufficienter dividunt philosophiam theoricam, sed ideo, ut dicit Hugo de sancto Victore in III sui didascalicon, praetermissis quibusdam aliis septem connumerantur, quia his primum erudiebantur, qui philosophiam discere volebant, et ideo distinguuntur in trivium et quadrivium, eo quod his quasi quibusdam viis vivax animus ad secreta philosophiae introeat. Et hoc etiam consonat verbis philosophi qui dicit in II metaphysicae quod modus scientiae debet quaeri ante scientias; et Commentator ibidem dicit quod logicam, quae docet modum omnium scientiarum, debet quis addiscere ante omnes alias scientias, ad quam pertinet trivium. Dicit etiam in VI Ethicorum quod mathematica potest sciri a pueris, non autem physica, quae experimentum requirit. Et sic datur intelligi quod post logicam consequenter debet mathematica addisci, ad quam pertinet quadrivium; et ita his quasi quibusdam viis praeparatur animus ad alias philosophicas disciplinas. Vel ideo hae inter ceteras scientias artes dicuntur, quia non solum habent cognitionem, sed opus aliquod, quod est immediate ipsius rationis, ut constructionem syllogismi vel orationem formare, numerare, mensurare, melodias formare et cursus siderum computare. Aliae vero scientiae vel non habent opus, sed cognitionem tantum, sicut scientia divina et naturalis; unde nomen artis habere non possunt, cum ars dicatur ratio factiva, ut dicitur in VI metaphysicae. Vel habent opus corporale, sicut medicina, alchimia et aliae huiusmodi. Unde non possunt dici artes liberales, quia sunt hominis huiusmodi actus ex parte illa, qua non est liber, scilicet ex parte corporis. Scientia vero moralis, quamvis sit propter operationem, tamen illa operatio non est actus scientiae, sed magis virtutis, ut patet in libro Ethicorum. Unde non potest dici ars, sed magis in illis operationibus se habet virtus loco artis. Et ideo veteres diffinierunt virtutem esse artem bene recteque vivendi, ut Augustinus dicit in IV de civitate Dei. Reply to 3. The seven liberal arts do not adequately divide theoretical philosophy; but, as Hugh of St. Victor says, seven arts are grouped together (leaving out certain other ones), because those who wanted to learn philosophy were first instructed in them. And the reason why they are divided into the trivium and quadrivium is that “they are as it were paths (viae) introducing the quick mind to the secrets of philosophy.” This is also in harmony with the Philosopher’s statement in the Metaphysics that we must investigate the method of scientific thinking before the sciences themselves. And the Commentator says in the same place that before all the other sciences a person should learn logic, which teaches the method of all the sciences; and the trivium concerns logic. The Philosopher also says in the Ethics that the young can know mathematics but not physics, because it requires experience. So we are given to understand that after logic we should learn mathematics, which the quadrivium concerns. These, then, are like paths leading the mind to the other philosophical disciplines. We may add that among the other sciences these are called arts because they involve not only knowledge but also a work that is directly a product of reason itself; for example, producing a composition, syllogism or discourse, numbering, measuring, composing melodies, and reckoning the course of the stars. Other sciences (such as divine and natural science) either do not involve a work produced but only knowledge, and so we cannot call them arts, because, as the Metaphysics says, art is “productive reason”; or they involve some bodily activity, as in the case of medicine, alchemy, and other sciences of this kind. These latter, then, cannot be called liberal arts because such activity belongs to man on the side of his nature in which he is not free, namely, on the side of his body. And Although moral science is directed to action, still that action is not the act of the science but rather of virtue, as is clear in the Ethics. So we cannot call moral science an art; but rather in these actions virtue takes the place of art. Thus, as Augustine says, the ancients defined virtue as the art of noble and well-ordered living.
Ad quartum dicendum quod, sicut dicit Avicenna in principio suae medicinae, aliter distinguitur theoricum et practicum, cum philosophia dividitur in theoricam et practicam, aliter cum artes dividuntur in theoricas et practicas, aliter cum medicina. Cum enim philosophia vel etiam artes per theoricum et practicum distinguuntur, oportet accipere distinctionem eorum ex fine, ut theoricum dicatur illud, quod ordinatur ad solam cognitionem veritatis, practicum vero, quod ordinatur ad operationem. Hoc tamen interest, cum in hoc dividitur philosophia totalis et artes, quod in divisione philosophiae habetur respectus ad finem beatitudinis, ad quem tota humana vita ordinatur. Ut enim dicit Augustinus XX de civitate Dei ex verbis Varronis, nulla est homini alia causa philosophandi nisi ut beatus sit. Unde cum duplex felicitas a philosophis ponatur, una contemplativa et alia activa, ut patet in X Ethicorum, secundum hoc etiam duas partes philosophiae distinxerunt, moralem dicentes practicam, naturalem et rationalem dicentes theoricam. Cum vero dicuntur artium quaedam esse speculativae, quaedam practicae, habetur respectus ad aliquos speciales fines illarum artium, sicut si dicamus agriculturam esse artem practicam, dialecticam vero theoricam. Cum autem medicina dividitur in theoricam et practicam, non attenditur divisio secundum finem. Sic enim tota medicina sub practica continetur, utpote ad operationem ordinata. Sed attenditur praedicta divisio secundum quod ea, quae in medicina tractantur, sunt propinqua vel remota ab operatione. Illa enim pars medicinae dicitur practica, quae docet modum operandi ad sanationem, sicut quod talibus apostematibus sunt talia remedia adhibenda, theorica vero illa pars, quae docet principia, ex quibus homo dirigitur in operatione, sed non proxime, sicut quod virtutes sunt tres et quod genera febrium sunt tot. Unde non oportet, ut si alicuius activae scientiae aliqua pars dicatur theorica, quod propter hoc illa pars sub philosophia speculativa ponatur. Reply to 4. As Avicenna says, the distinction between theoretical and practical is not the same when philosophy is divided into theoretical and practical, when the arts are divided into theoretical and practical, and when medicine is so divided. For when we distinguish philosophy or the arts into theoretical and practical we must do so on the basis of their end, calling that theoretical which is directed solely to knowledge of the truth, and that practical which is directed to operation. However, there is this difference when we distinguish the whole of philosophy and the arts on this basis. We divide philosophy with respect to the final end or happiness, to which the whole of human life is directed. For, as Augustine says, following Varro, “There is no other reason for a man philosophizing except to be happy.” And since the philosophers teach that there is a twofold happiness, one contemplative and the other active, as is clear in the Ethics, they have accordingly a]so distinguished between two parts of philosophy, calling moral philosophy practical and natural and rational philosophy theoretical. But when they call some arts speculative and some practical, this is on the basis of some special ends of those arts; as when we say that agricuIture is a Practical art but dialectic is theoretical. However, when we divide medicine into theoretical and practical, the division is not on the basis of the end. For on that basis the whole of medicine is practical, since it is directed to practice. But the above division is made on the basis of whether what is studied in medicine is proximate to, or remote from practice. Thus we call that part of medicine practical which teaches the method of healing; for instance, that these particular medicines should be given for these abscesses. On the other hand, we call that part theoretical which teaches the principles directing a man in his practice, Although not immediately; for instance, that there are three virtues, and that there are so many kinds of fever. Consequently, if we call some part of a practical science theoretical, we should not on that account place that part under speculative philosophy.
Ad quintum dicendum quod aliqua scientia continetur sub alia dupliciter, uno modo ut pars ipsius, quia scilicet subiectum eius est pars aliqua subiecti illius, sicut planta est quaedam pars corporis naturalis; unde et scientia de plantis continetur sub scientia naturali ut pars. Alio modo continetur una scientia sub alia ut ei subalternata, quando scilicet in superiori scientia assignatur propter quid eorum, de quibus scitur in scientia inferiori solum quia, sicut musica ponitur sub arithmetica. Medicina ergo non ponitur sub physica ut pars. Subiectum enim medicinae non est pars subiecti scientiae naturalis secundum illam rationem, qua est subiectum medicinae. Quamvis enim corpus sanabile sit corpus naturale, non tamen est subiectum medicinae, prout est sanabile a natura, sed prout est sanabile ab arte. Sed quia in sanatione, quae fit etiam per artem, ars est ministra naturae, quia ex aliqua naturali virtute sanitas perficitur auxilio artis, inde est quod propter quid de operatione artis oportet accipere ex proprietatibus rerum naturalium. Et propter hoc medicina subalternatur physicae, et eadem ratione alchimia et scientia de agricultura et omnia huiusmodi. Et sic relinquitur quod physica secundum se et secundum omnes partes suas est speculativa, quamvis aliquae scientiae operativae subalternentur ei. Reply to 5. One science is contained under another in two ways: in one way, as its part, because its subject is part of the subject of that other science, as plant is part of natural body. So the science of plants is also contained under natural science as one of its parts. In another way, one science is contained under another as subalternated to it. This occurs when in a higher science there is given the reason for what a lower science knows only as a fact. This is how music is contained under arithmetic. Medicine, therefore, is not contained under physics as a part, for the subject of medicine is not part of the subject of natural science from the point of view from which it is the subject of medicine. For Although the curable body is a natural body, it is not the subject of medicine insofar as it is curable by nature, but insofar as it is curable by art. But because art is nature’s handmaid in healing (in which art too plays a part, for health is brought about through the power of nature with the assistance of art), it follows that the reason for the practices used in the art must be based on the properties of natural things. So medicine is subalternated to physics, and for the same reason so too are alchemy, the science of agricuIture, and all sciences of this sort. We conclude, then, that physics in itself and in all its parts is speculative, Although some practical sciences are subalternated to it.
Ad sextum dicendum quod quamvis subiecta aliarum scientiarum sint partes entis, quod est subiectum metaphysicae, non tamen oportet quod aliae scientiae sint partes ipsius. Accipit enim unaquaeque scientiarum unam partem entis secundum specialem modum considerandi alium a modo, quo consideratur ens in metaphysica. Unde proprie loquendo subiectum illius non est pars subiecti metaphysicae; non enim est pars entis secundum illam rationem, qua ens est subiectum metaphysicae, sed hac ratione considerata ipsa est specialis scientia aliis condivisa. Sic autem posset dici pars ipsius scientia, quae est de potentia vel quae est de actu aut de uno vel de aliquo huiusmodi, quia ista habent eundem modum considerandi cum ente, de quo tractatur in metaphysica. Reply to 6. Although the subjects of the other sciences are parts of being, which is the subject of metaphysics, the other sciences are not necessarily parts of metaphysics. For each science treats of one part of being in a special way distinct from that in which metaphysics treats of being. So its subject is not properly speaking a part of the subject of metaphysics, for it is not a part of being from the point of view from which being is the subject of metaphysics; from this viewpoint it is a special science distinct from the others. However, the science treating of potency, or that treating of act or unity or anything of this sort, could be called a part of metaphysics because these are considered in the same manner as being, which is the subject of metaphysics.
Ad septimum dicendum quod illae partes entis exigunt eundem modum tractandi cum ente communi, quia etiam ipsa non dependent ad materiam, et ideo scientia de ipsis non distinguitur a scientia quae est de ente communi. Reply to 7. These parts of being require the same manner of consideration as being-in-general (ens commune) because they too are independent of matter. For this reason the science dealing with them is not distinct from the science of being-in-general.
Ad octavum dicendum quod aliae diversitates rerum, quas obiectio tangit, non sunt differentiae per se earum in quantum sunt scibiles; et ideo penes eas scientiae non distinguuntur. Reply to 8. The other diversities of things mentioned in the objection do not differentiate those things essentially as objects of knowledge. So the sciences are not distinguished according to them.
Ad nonum dicendum quod quamvis scientia divina sit prima omnium scientiarum naturaliter, tamen quoad nos aliae scientiae sunt priores. Ut enim dicit Avicenna in principio suae metaphysicae, ordo huius scientiae est, ut addiscatur post scientias naturales, in quibus sunt multa determinata, quibus ista scientia utitur, ut generatio, corruptio, motus et alia huiusmodi. Similiter etiam post mathematicas. Indiget enim haec scientia ad cognitionem substantiarum separatarum cognoscere numerum et ordinem orbium caelestium, quod non est possibile sine astrologia, ad quam tota mathematica praeexigitur. Aliae vero scientiae sunt ad bene esse ipsius, ut musica et morales vel aliae huiusmodi. Nec tamen oportet quod sit circulus, quia ipsa supponit ea, quae in aliis probantur, cum ipsa aliarum principia probet, quia principia, quae accipit alia scientia, scilicet naturalis, a prima philosophia, non probant ea quae item philosophus primus accipit a naturali, sed probantur per alia principia per se nota; et similiter philosophus primus non probat principia, quae tradit naturali, per principia quae ab eo accipit, sed per alia principia per se nota. Et sic non est aliquis circulus in diffinitione. Praeterea, effectus sensibiles, ex quibus procedunt demonstrationes naturales, sunt notiores quoad nos in principio, sed cum per eos pervenerimus ad cognitionem causarum primarum, ex eis apparebit nobis propter quid illorum effectuum, ex quibus probabantur demonstratione quia. Et sic et scientia naturalis aliquid tradit scientiae divinae, et tamen per eam sua principia notificantur. Et inde est quod Boethius ultimo ponit scientiam divinam, quia est ultima quoad nos. Reply to 9. Although divine science is by nature the first of all the sciences, with respect to us the other sciences come before it. For as Avicenna says, the position Or this science is that it be learned after the natural sciences, which explain many things used by metaphysics, such as generation, corruption, motion, and the like. It should also be learned after mathematics, because to know the separate substances metaphysics has to know the number and disposition of the heavenly spheres, and this is impossible without astronomy, which presupposes the whole of mathematics. Other sciences, such as music, ethics, and the like, contribute to its fullness of perfection. Nor is there necessarily a vicious circle because metaphysics presupposes conclusions proved in the other sciences while it itself proves their principles. For the principles that another science (such as natural philosophy) takes from first philosophy do not prove the points which the first philosopher takes from the natural philosopher, but they are proved through other self-evident principles. Similarly the first philosopher does not prove the principles he gives the natural philosopher by principles he receives from him, but by other self-evident principles. So there is no vicious circle in their definitions. Moreover, the sensible effects on which the demonstrations of natural science are based are more evident to us in the beginning. But when we come to know the first causes through them, these causes will reveal to us the reason for the effects, from which they were proved by a demonstration quia. In this way natural science also contributes something to divine science, and nevertheless it is divine science that explains its principles. That is why Boethius places divine science last, because it is the last relative to us.
Ad decimum dicendum quod quamvis naturalis post mathematicam addiscenda occurrat, ex eo quod universalia ipsius documenta indigent experimento et tempore, tamen res naturales, cum sint sensibiles, sunt naturaliter magis notae quam res mathematicae a sensibili materia abstractae. Reply to 10. Although we should learn natural science after mathematics because the general proofs of natural science require experience and time, still, since natural things fall under the senses, they are by nature better known than the mathematical entities abstracted from sensible matter.

Article Two
Does Natural Philosophy Treat of What Exists in Motion and Matter?
Ad secundum sic proceditur. We proceed as follows to the second article:
Videtur quod scientia naturalis non sit de his quae sunt in motu et materia. It seems that natural science does not treat of things that exist in motion and matter, for
Materia enim est individuationis principium. Sed nulla scientia est de individuis, sed de solis universalibus, secundum sententiam Platonis, quae ponitur in Porphyrio. Ergo scientia naturalis non est de his quae sunt in materia. 1. Matter is the principle of individuation, Now, according to Plato’s doctrine, which is followed by Porphyry, no science treats of individual things but only of universals. Therefore, natural science does not treat of what is in matter.
Praeterea, scientia ad intellectum pertinet. Sed intellectus cognoscit abstrahendo a materia et a condicionibus materiae. Ergo de his, quae non sunt a materia abstracta, nulla scientia esse potest. 2. Again, science pertains to the intellect. But the intellect knows by abstracting from matter and from the conditions of matter. Therefore, no science can treat of what is not abstracted from matter.
Praeterea, in scientia naturali agitur de primo motore, ut patet in VIII physicorum. Sed ipse est immunis ab omni materia. Ergo scientia naturalis non est de his solis quae sunt in materia. 3. Again, as is clear in the Physics, the First Mover is considered in natural science. But The First Mover is free from all matter. Therefore, natural science does not treat only of what is in matter.
Praeterea, omnis scientia de necessariis est. Sed omne quod movetur, in quantum huiusmodi, est contingens, ut probatur in IX metaphysicae. Ergo nulla scientia potest esse de rebus mobilibus, et sic nec scientia naturalis. 4. Again, every science has to do with what is necessary. But whatever is moved, as such is contingent, as is proved in the Metaphysics. Therefore, no science can treat of what is subject to motion; and so neither can natural science.
Praeterea, nullum universale movetur; homo enim universalis non sanatur, sed hic homo, ut dicitur in principio metaphysicae. Sed omnis scientia de universalibus est. Ergo naturalis scientia non est de his quae sunt in motu. 5. Again, no universal is subject to motion; for as is said in the beginning of the Metaphysics, it is not man in general who is healed, but this man. But every science concerns that which is universal. Therefore natural science does not treat of what is in motion.
Praeterea, in scientia naturali determinatur de quibusdam quae non moventur, sicut est anima, ut probatur in I de anima, et terra, ut probatur in II caeli et mundi; et etiam omnes formae naturales non fiunt nec corrumpuntur, et eadem ratione non moventur nisi per accidens, ut probatur in VII metaphysicae. Ergo non omnia, de quibus est physica, sunt in motu. 6. Again, some of the things with which natural science deals are not subject to motion; for instance, the soul, as is shown in De Anima, and the earth, as is proved in the De Caelo et Mundo. What is more, all natural forms neither come into being nor perish, and for the same reason they are not subject to motion, except accidentally. This is shown in the Metaphysics. Therefore not everything that physics considers is in motion.
Praeterea, omnis creatura est mutabilis, cum vera immutabilitas soli Deo conveniat, ut Augustinus dicit. Si ergo ad naturalem pertinet consideratio de his, quae in motu sunt, eius erit considerare de omnibus creaturis, quod apparet expresse esse falsum. 7. Again, every creature is mutable for, as Augustine says, true immutability belongs to God alone. So if it is the task of natural science to consider what is in motion, it will be its business to consider all creatures, which clearly appears to be false.
Sed contra, ad scientiam naturalem pertinet de rebus naturalibus determinare. Sed res naturales sunt, in quibus est principium motus. Ubicumque autem est motus, oportet et esse materiam, ut dicitur in IX metaphysicae. Ergo scientia naturalis est de his quae sunt in motu et materia. On the contrary, it is the work of natural science to reach conclusions about natural things. Now, natural things are those in which there is a principle of motion; and, as the Metaphysics says, wherever there is motion there must be matter. So natural science treats of what is in motion and matter.
Praeterea, de his, quae sunt in materia et motu, oportet esse aliquam scientiam speculativam, alias non esset perfecta traditio philosophiae quae est cognitio entis. Sed nulla alia speculativa scientia est de his, quia neque mathematica nec metaphysica. Ergo est de his naturalis. Moreover, these must be some speculative science dealing with what is in matter and motion, for otherwise the teaching of philosophy, which is knowledge of being, would be incomplete. Now no other speculative science treats of these things, for neither mathematics nor metaphysics does so. Therefore, natural science treats of them.
Praeterea, hoc apparet ex hoc quod dicit philosophus in VI metaphysicae et in II physicorum. Moreover, the fact is clear from the statements of the Philosopher in the Metaphysics and the Physics.
Responsio. Dicendum quod propter difficultatem huius quaestionis coactus est Plato ad ponendum ideas. Cum enim, ut dicit philosophus in I metaphysicae, crederet omnia sensibilia semper esse in fluxu, secundum opinionem Cratyli et Heracliti, et ita existimaret de eis non posse esse scientiam, posuit quasdam substantias a sensibilibus separatas, de quibus essent scientiae et darentur diffinitiones. Sed hic defectus accidit ex eo quod non distinxit quod est per se ab eo quod est secundum accidens, nam secundum accidens falluntur plerumque etiam sapientes, ut dicitur in I elenchorum. Ut autem probatur in VII metaphysicae, cum in substantia sensibili inveniatur et ipsum integrum, id est compositum, et ratio, id est forma eius, per se quidem generatur et corrumpitur compositum, non autem ratio sive forma, sed solum per accidens. Non enim fit domum esse, ut ibidem dicitur, sed hanc domum. Reply: It was the difficulty of this problem that drove Plato to posit Ideas. Believing that all sensible things were always in flux, as Cratylus and Heraclitus taught, he thought there can be no science concerning them, as the Philosopher says in the Metaphysics. So he claimed that there were substances separated from the sense world, which might serve as the objects of science and of definitions. He made this mistake because he failed to distinguish what is essential from what is accidental. For it happens that by accident even the wise often fall into error, as is said in the Sophistic Refutations. Now, as is shown in the Metaphysics, we find in a sensible substance both the whole or the composite itself, and also its nature (ratio) or form; and it is the composite that is essentially generated and corrupted and not the nature or form, except accidentally. As the Metaphysics says, “It is not house that is made, but this house.
Unumquodque autem potest considerari sine omnibus his quae ei non per se comparantur. Et ideo formae et rationes rerum quamvis in motu exsistentium, prout in se considerantur, absque motu sunt. Et sic de eis sunt scientiae et diffinitiones, ut ibidem philosophus dicit. Non autem scientiae sensibilium substantiarum fundantur super cognitione aliquarum substantiarum a sensibilibus separatarum, ut ibidem probatur. Now anything can be thought of without all the items that are not essentially related to it. Consequently, forms and natures, though belonging to things existing in motion, are without motion when they are considered in themselves; and so they can be the objects of sciences and of definitions, as the Philosopher says. As he proves, the sciences of sensible reality are not based upon the knowledge of certain substances separated from the sense world.
Huiusmodi autem rationes, quas considerant scientiae quae sunt de rebus, considerantur absque motu. Sic oportet quod considerentur absque illis, secundum quae competit motus rebus mobilibus. Cum autem omnis motus tempore mensuretur et primus motus sit motus localis, quo remoto nullus alius motus inest, oportet quod secundum hoc aliquid sit mobile, quod est hic et nunc. Hoc autem consequitur rem ipsam mobilem, secundum quod est individuata per materiam exsistentem sub dimensionibus signatis. Unde oportet quod huiusmodi rationes, secundum quas de rebus mobilibus possunt esse scientiae, considerantur absque materia signata et absque omnibus his quae consequuntur materiam signatam, non autem absque materia non signata, quia ex eius notione dependet notio formae quae determinat sibi materiam. Et ideo ratio hominis, quam significat diffinitio et secundum quam procedit scientia, consideratur sine his carnibus et sine his ossibus, non autem sine carnibus et ossibus absolute. Et quia singularia includunt in sui ratione materiam signatam, universalia vero materiam communem, ut dicitur in VII metaphysicae, ideo praedicta abstractio non dicitur formae a materia absolute, sed universalis a particulari. Natures of this kind, which are the objects of the sciences of real beings, are thought of without motion; and so they must be thought of without those conditions by reason of which motion belongs to mobile things. Now, because every motion is measured by time, and the primary motion is local motion (for without it there is no other motion), a thing must be subject to motion inasmuch as it exists here and now; and it exists under these conditions insofar as it is individuated by matter having determinate dimensions. Consequently, natures of this kind, which make possible sciences of things subject to motion, must be thought of without determinate matter and everything following upon such matter; but not without indeterminate matter, because on its notion depends the notion of form that determines matter to itself. Thus the nature of man, which his definition signifies and which is the object of science, is considered without this flesh and these bones, but not absolutely without flesh and bones. And because individuals include determinate matter in their nature, whereas universals include common matter, as is said in the Metaphysics, the above-mentioned abstraction is not said to be the abstraction of form from matter absolutely, but the abstraction of the universal from the particular.
Possunt ergo huiusmodi rationes sic abstractae considerari dupliciter. Uno modo secundum se, et sic considerantur sine motu et materia signata, et hoc non invenitur in eis nisi secundum esse quod habent in intellectu. Alio modo secundum quod comparantur ad res, quarum sunt rationes; quae quidem res sunt in materia et motu. Et sic sunt principia cognoscendi illa, quia omnis res cognoscitur per suam formam. Et ita per huiusmodi rationes immobiles et sine materia particulari consideratas habetur cognitio in scientia naturali de rebus mobilibus et materialibus extra animam exsistentibus. Natures of this sort, thus abstracted, can be considered in two ways. First, in themselves; and then they are thought of without motion and determinate matter. This happens to them only by reason of the being they have in the intellect. Second, they can be viewed in relation to the things of which they are the natures; and these things exist with matter and motion. Thus they are principles by which we know these things, for everything is known through its form. Consequently, in natural science we know mutable and material things existing outside the soul through natures of this kind; that is to say, natures that are immobile and considered without particular matter.
Replies to opposing arguments:
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod materia non est individuationis principium nisi secundum quod est sub dimensionibus signatis exsistens. Et sic etiam scientia naturalis a materia abstrahit. Reply to 1. Matter is the principle of individuation only insofar as it exists with determinate dimensions, and in this sense natural science indeed abstracts from matter.
Ad secundum dicendum quod forma intelligibilis est quiditas rei. Obiectum enim intellectus est quid, ut dicitur in III de anima. Quiditas autem compositi universalis, ut hominis aut animalis, includit in se materiam universalem, non autem particularem, ut dicitur in VII metaphysicae. Unde intellectus communiter abstrahit a materia signata et condicionibus eius, non autem a materia communi in scientia naturali, quamvis etiam in scientia naturali non consideretur materia nisi in ordine ad formam. Unde etiam forma per prius est de consideratione naturalis quam materia. Reply to 2. The intelligible form is a thing’s quiddity, for, as the De Anima says, the object of the intellect is the quiddity of a thing. Now, as is said in the Metaphysics, the quiddity of a universal composite, like man or animal, includes within itself common but not particular matter. So the intellect regularly abstracts from determinate matter and its conditions; but in natural science it does not abstract from common matter, Although matter itself is considered in natural science only in relation to form. For this reason the natural scientist is more concerned with form than with matter.
Ad tertium dicendum quod de primo motore non agitur in scientia naturali tamquam de subiecto vel de parte subiecti, sed tamquam de termino ad quem scientia naturalis perducit. Terminus autem non est de natura rei, cuius est terminus, sed habet aliquam habitudinem ad rem illam, sicut terminus lineae non est linea, sed habet ad eam aliquam habitudinem, ita etiam et primus motor est alterius naturae a rebus naturalibus, habet tamen ad eas aliquam habitudinem, in quantum influit eis motum, et sic cadit in consideratione naturalis, scilicet non secundum ipsum, sed in quantum est motor. Reply to 3. Natural science does not treat of the First Mover as its subject or as part of its subject, but as the end to which natural science leads. Now the end does not belong to the nature of the thing of which it is the end, but it has a relation to it; as the end of a line is not the line but is related to it. So also the First Mover is of a different nature from natural things, but it is related to them because it moves them. So it falls under the consideration of natural science, not in itself, but insofar as it is a mover.
Ad quartum dicendum quod scientia est de aliquo dupliciter. Uno modo primo et principaliter, et sic scientia est de rationibus universalibus, supra quas fundatur. Alio modo est de aliquibus secundario et quasi per reflexionem quandam, et sic de illis rebus, quarum sunt illae rationes, in quantum illas rationes applicat ad res etiam particulares, quarum sunt, adminiculo inferiorum virium. Ratione enim universali utitur sciens et ut re scita et ut medio sciendi. Per universalem enim hominis rationem possum iudicare de hoc vel de illo. Rationes autem universales rerum omnes sunt immobiles, et ideo quantum ad hoc omnis scientia de necessariis est. Sed rerum, quarum sunt illae rationes, quaedam sunt necessariae et immobiles, quaedam contingentes et mobiles, et quantum ad hoc de rebus contingentibus et mobilibus dicuntur esse scientiae. Reply to 4. Science treats of something in two ways: in one way, primarily and principally; and in this sense science is concerned universal natures, which are its very foundation. In another way it treats of something secondarily, as by a sort of reflection; and in this sense it is concerned with the things whose natures they are, inasmuch as, using the lower powers, it relates those natures to the particular things possessing them. For a knower uses a universal nature both as a thing known and as a means of knowing. Thus, through the universal nature of man we can judge of this or that particular man. Now, all universal natures of things are immutable; and so, in this respect, all science is concerned with what is necessary. But some of the things possessing these natures are necessary and immutable, whereas others are contingent and subject to movement, and in this respect sciences are said to be concerned with the contingent and mutable.
Ad quintum dicendum quod quamvis universale non moveatur, est tamen ratio rei mobilis. Reply to 5. Although a universal is not mutable, it is nevertheless the nature of a mutable thing.
Ad sextum dicendum quod anima et aliae formae naturales, quamvis non moveantur per se, moventur tamen per accidens, et insuper sunt perfectiones rerum mobilium, et secundum hoc cadunt in consideratione naturalis. Terra vero, quamvis secundum totum non moveatur, quod accidit ei, in quantum est in suo loco naturali, in quo aliquid quiescit per eandem naturam, per quam movetur ad locum, tamen partes eius moventur ad locum, cum sunt extra locum proprium. Et sic terra et ratione quietis totius et ratione motus partium cadit in considerationem naturalis. Reply to 6. Although the soul and other natural forms are not themselves subject to motion, they are moved accidentally, and they are, moreover, the perfections of mutable things; and for this reason they come within the domain of natural science. But even though the earth as a whole is not moved (for it happens to be in its natural place, where a thing is at rest in virtue of the same nature through which it is moved to a place), nevertheless, when its parts are outside their proper place, they are moved to a place. Thus the earth falls within the domain of natural science both by reason of the immobility of the whole earth and by reason of the movement of its parts.
Ad septimum dicendum quod mutabilitas illa, quae competit omni creaturae, non est secundum aliquem motum naturalem, sed secundum dependentiam ad Deum, a quo si sibi deserentur, deficerent ab eo quod sunt. Dependentia autem ista pertinet ad considerationem metaphysici potius quam naturalis. Creaturae etiam spirituales non sunt mutabiles nisi secundum electionem, et talis mutatio non pertinet ad naturalem, sed magis ad divinum. Reply to 7. The mutability characteristic of all creatures is not with respect to any natural motion, but with respect to their dependence on God, separation from whom entails destruction of their very being. And that dependence falls under the consideration of metaphysics rather than under that of natural philosophy. Spiritual creatures, moreover, are mutable only with regard to choice; and this sort of motion is not the concern of the natural philosopher but rather of the metaphysician.

Article THREE
Does Mathematics Treat, Without Motion and Matter, of What Exists in Matter?
Ad tertium sic proceditur. We proceed as follows to the third article:
Videtur quod mathematica consideratio non sit sine materia de his quae habent esse in materia. It seems that mathematical thinking does not treat, without motion and matter, of what exists in matter, for:
Cum enim veritas consistat in adaequatione rei ad intellectum, oportet esse falsitatem, quandocumque res consideratur aliter quam sit. Si ergo res, quae sunt in materia, sine materia considerat mathematica, eius consideratio erit falsa, et sic non erit scientia, cum omnis scientia sit verorum. 1. Since truth consists in the conformity of thing to intellect, there must be falsehood whenever we think of something otherwise than it is. If then in mathematics we consider what is in matter in abstraction from matter, we will consider it falsely; and so mathematics will not be a science, for every science is concerned with what is true.
Praeterea, secundum philosophum in I posteriorum cuiuslibet scientiae est considerare subiectum et partes subiecti. Sed omnium materialium secundum esse materia pars est. Ergo non potest esse quod aliqua scientia consideret de his quae sunt in materia, absque hoc quod materiam consideret. 2. Again, as the Philosopher states, every science has the task of considering a subject and the parts of the subject. Now in actual existence matter is a part of all material things. So it is impossible for a science to treat of what is in matter without treating of matter.
Praeterea, omnes lineae rectae sunt eiusdem speciei. Sed mathematicus considerat lineas rectas numerando eas, alias non consideraret triangulum et quadratum. Ergo considerat lineas, secundum quod differunt numero et conveniunt specie. Sed principium differendi his, quae secundum speciem conveniunt, est materia, ut ex supra dictis patet. Ergo materia consideratur a mathematico. 3. Again, all straight lines are specifically the same. But the mathematician treats of straight lines by numbering them; otherwise he would not treat of the triangle and the square. It follows that he considers lines as specifically the same and numerically different. But it is clear from the above that matter is the principle differentiating things specifically the same. So the mathematician treats of matter.
Praeterea, nulla scientia, quae penitus abstrahit a materia, demonstrat per causam materialem. Sed in mathematica fiunt aliquae demonstrationes, quae non possunt reduci nisi ad causam materialem, sicut cum demonstratur aliquid de toto ex partibus. Partes enim sunt materia totius, ut dicitur in II physicorum. Unde et in II posteriorum reducitur ad causam materialem demonstratio, qua demonstratur quod angulus qui est in semicirculo est rectus ex hoc quod utraque pars eius est semirectus. Ergo mathematica non omnino abstrahit a materia. 4. Again, no science completely abstracting from matter demonstrates through a material cause. But in mathematics some demonstrations are made which can only be reduced to a material cause, as when we demonstrate something about a whole by its parts. For, as the Physics says, parts are the matter of the whole. Thus in the Posterior Analytics the demonstration that the angle in a semi-circle is a right angle from the fact that each of its two parts is half of a right angle, is reduced to a material cause. Therefore, mathematics does not entirely abstract from matter.
Praeterea, motus non potest esse sine materia. Sed mathematicus debet considerare motum, quia cum motus mensuretur secundum spatium, eiusdem rationis et scientiae videtur esse considerare quantitatem spatii, quod pertinet ad mathematicum, et quantitatem motus. Ergo mathematicus non omnino dimittit considerationem materiae. 5. Again, motion cannot exist without matter. But the mathematician ought to consider motion, because, since motion is measured relative to space, to consider the quantity of space, which pertains to the mathematician, and the quantity of motion, has the same nature and belongs to the same science. Therefore, the mathematician does not entirely leave matter out of consideration.
Praeterea, astrologia quaedam pars mathematicae est; et similiter scientia de sphaera mota et scientia de ponderibus et musica, in quibus omnibus fit consideratio de motu et rebus mobilibus. Ergo mathematica non abstrahit totaliter a materia et motu. 6. Again, astronomy is a part of mathematics, and so too is the science of the moved sphere, the science of weights, and music, all of which treat of motion and mobile things So mathematics does not entirely abstract from matter and motion.
Praeterea, naturalis consideratio tota est circa materiam et motum. Sed quaedam conclusiones demonstrantur communiter a mathematico et naturali, ut utrum terra sit rotunda, et utrum sit in medio caeli. Ergo non potest esse quod mathematica omnino abstrahat a materia. Si dicatur quod abstrahit tantum a materia sensibili, contra. Materia sensibilis videtur esse materia particularis, quia sensus particularium est, a qua omnes scientiae abstrahunt. Ergo mathematica consideratio non debet dici magis abstracta quam aliqua aliarum scientiarum. 7. Again, natural science is entirely concerned with matter and motion. But some conclusions are demonstrated alike by the mathematician and the natural scientist, for instance, whether the earth is round and whether it is in the middle of the universe. Therefore, mathematics cannot entirely abstract from matter. If it be said that mathematics abstracts only from sensible matter, the contrary seems true. Sensible matter seems to be particular matter, because what the senses perceive are particular things, and all the sciences abstract from this kind of matter. So mathematical thinking should not be called more abstract than that of the other sciences.
Praeterea, philosophus in II physicorum dicit tria esse negotia. Primum est de mobili et corruptibili, secundum de mobili et incorruptibili, tertium de immobili et incorruptibili. Primum autem est naturale, tertium divinum, secundum mathematicum, ut Ptolemaeus exponit in principio Almagesti. Ergo mathematica est de mobilibus. 8. Again, the Philosopher says that there are three branches of study: the first concerns what is mutable and corruptible, the second what is mutable and incorruptible, and the third what is immutable and incorruptible. As Ptolemy explains, the first is natural science the third divine science, and the second mathematics. Therefore mathematics concerns what is mutable.
Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit in VI metaphysicae. To the contrary is the Philosopher’s statement in the Metaphysics.
Praeterea, quaedam res sunt, quae quamvis sint in materia, tamen non recipiunt in sui diffinitione materiam, ut curvum, et in hoc differt a simo. Sed philosophia debet de omnibus entibus considerare. Ergo oportet de huiusmodi esse aliquam partem philosophiae, et haec est mathematica, cum ad nullam aliam pertineat. Moreover, some things, Although existing in matter, do not contain matter in their definition; for instance, curve, which differs in this respect from snub. Now philosophy should treat of all beings. Hence some part of philosophy must consider beings of this sort; and this is mathematics, for this does not belong to any other part.
Praeterea, ea, quae sunt priora secundum intellectum, possunt sine posterioribus considerari. Sed mathematica sunt priora naturalibus, quae sunt in materia et motu; habent enim se ex additione ad mathematica, ut dicitur in III caeli et mundi. Ergo mathematica consideratio potest esse sine materia et motu. Moreover, what is prior from the point of view of the intellect can be considered without what is posterior. Now mathematicals are prior to natural things existing in matter and motion, for the latter are so related to mathematicals that they add something to them, as is said in the De Caelo et Mundo. Therefore, mathematical investigation can be without matter and motion.
Responsio. Dicendum quod ad evidentiam huius quaestionis oportet videre, qualiter intellectus secundum suam operationem abstrahere possit. Reply: In order to throw light on this question we must understand how the intellect in its operation is able to abstract.
Sciendum est igitur quod secundum philosophum in III de anima duplex est operatio intellectus. Una, quae dicitur intelligentia indivisibilium, qua cognoscit de unoquoque, quid est. Alia vero, qua componit et dividit, scilicet enuntiationem affirmativam vel negativam formando. Et hae quidem duae operationes duobus, quae sunt in rebus, respondent. Prima quidem operatio respicit ipsam naturam rei, secundum quam res intellecta aliquem gradum in entibus obtinet, sive sit res completa, ut totum aliquod, sive res incompleta, ut pars vel accidens. Secunda vero operatio respicit ipsum esse rei, quod quidem resultat ex congregatione principiorum rei in compositis vel ipsam simplicem naturam rei concomitatur, ut in substantiis simplicibus. We must realize that, as the Philosopher says, the intellect has two operations, one called the “understanding of indivisibles,” by which it knows what a thing is, and another by which it joins and divides, that is to say, by forming affirmative and negative statements. Now these two operations correspond to two principles in things. The first operation concerns the nature itself of a thing, in virtue of which the object known holds a certain rank among beings, whether it be a complete thing, like some whole, or an incomplete thing, like a part or an accident. The second operation has to do with a thing’s being (esse), which results from the union of the principles of a thing in composite substances, or, as in the case of simple substances, accompanies the thing’s simple nature.
Et quia veritas intellectus est ex hoc quod conformatur rei, patet quod secundum hanc secundam operationem intellectus non potest vere abstrahere quod secundum rem coniunctum est, quia in abstrahendo significaretur esse separatio secundum ipsum esse rei, sicut si abstraho hominem ab albedine dicendo: homo non est albus, significo esse separationem in re. Unde si secundum rem homo et albedo non sint separata, erit intellectus falsus. Hac ergo operatione intellectus vere abstrahere non potest nisi ea quae sunt secundum rem separata, ut cum dicitur: homo non est asinus. Now, since the truth of the intellect results from its conformity with reality, it is clear that in this second operation the intellect cannot truthfully abstract what is united in reality, because the abstraction would signify a separation with regard to the very being of the thing. For example, if I abstract man from whiteness by saying, “Man is not white,” I signify that there is a separation in reality. So if in reality man and whiteness are not separate, the intellect will be false. Through this operation, then, the intellect can truthfully abstract only those things that are separate in reality, as when we say, “Man is not an ass.”
Sed secundum primam operationem potest abstrahere ea quae secundum rem separata non sunt, non tamen omnia, sed aliqua. Cum enim unaquaeque res sit intelligibilis, secundum quod est in actu, ut dicitur in IX metaphysicae, oportet quod ipsa natura sive quiditas rei intelligatur: vel secundum quod est actus quidam, sicut accidit de ipsis formis et substantiis simplicibus, vel secundum id quod est actus eius, sicut substantiae compositae per suas formas, vel secundum id quod est ei loco actus, sicut materia prima per habitudinem ad formam et vacuum per privationem locati. Et hoc est illud, ex quo unaquaeque natura suam rationem sortitur. Through the first operation, however, we can abstract things that are not separate in reality; not all, it is true, but some. For, since everything is intelligible insofar as it is in act, as the Metaphysics says, we must understand the nature itself or the quiddity of a thing either inasmuch as it is a certain act (as happens in the case of forms themselves and simple substances); or through that which is its act (as we know composite substances through their forms); or through that which takes the place of act in it (as we know prime matter through its relation to form, and a vacuum through the absence of a body in place). And it is from this that each nature is given its definition.
Quando ergo secundum hoc, per quod constituitur ratio naturae et per quod ipsa natura intelligitur, natura ipsa habet ordinem et dependentiam ad aliquid aliud, tunc constat quod natura illa sine illo alio intelligi non potest, sive sint coniuncta coniunctione illa, qua pars coniungitur toti, sicut pes non potest intelligi sine intellectu animalis, quia illud, a quo pes habet rationem pedis, dependet ab eo, a quo animal est animal, sive sint coniuncta per modum quo forma coniungitur materiae, vel ut pars comparti vel accidens subiecto, sicut simum non potest intelligi sine naso, sive etiam sint secundum rem separata, sicut pater non potest intelligi sine intellectu filii, quamvis istae relationes inveniantur in diversis rebus. Si vero unum ab altero non dependeat secundum id quod constituit rationem naturae, tunc unum potest ab altero abstrahi per intellectum ut sine eo intelligatur, non solum si sint separata secundum rem, sicut homo et lapis, sed etiam si secundum rem coniuncta sint, sive ea coniunctione, qua pars et totum coniunguntur, sicut littera potest intelligi sine syllaba, sed non e converso, et animal sine pede, sed non e converso, sive etiam sint coniuncta per modum quo forma coniungitur materiae et accidens subiecto, sicut albedo potest intelligi sine homine, et e converso. Therefore, when the nature itself is related to, and depends on something else, with regard to that which forms the definition (ratio) of the nature, and through which the nature itself is understood, clearly we cannot know the nature without that other thing. This is true whether they are connected as a part is united to a whole (as we cannot know foot without knowing animal, because that whereby foot has the nature of foot depends on that whereby animal is animal); or whether they are connected as form is united to matter, or as one part to another part, or as accident to subject (as we cannot know snub without nose); or even whether they are separated in reality (as we cannot know father without knowing son, although these relationships are found in different things). But if one thing does not depend on another with regard to that which forms the definition of the nature, then the intellect can abstract the one from the other so as to know it without the other. This is true not only if they are separated in reality, like man and stone, but also if they are united in reality, whether they are joined as part and whole (as letter can be understood without syllable, but not vice versa, and animal without foot, but not conversely); or even if they are joined as form is united to matter and accident to subject (as whiteness can be understood without man and vice versa).
Sic ergo intellectus distinguit unum ab altero aliter et aliter secundum diversas operationes; quia secundum operationem, qua componit et dividit, distinguit unum ab alio per hoc quod intelligit unum alii non inesse. In operatione vero qua intelligit, quid est unumquodque, distinguit unum ab alio, dum intelligit, quid est hoc, nihil intelligendo de alio, neque quod sit cum eo, neque quod sit ab eo separatum. Unde ista distinctio non proprie habet nomen separationis, sed prima tantum. Haec autem distinctio recte dicitur abstractio, sed tunc tantum quando ea, quorum unum sine altero intelligitur, sunt simul secundum rem. Non enim dicitur animal a lapide abstrahi, si animal absque intellectu lapidis intelligatur. Accordingly, through its various operations the intellect distinguishes one thing from another in different ways. Through the operation by which it composes and divides, it distinguishes one thing from another by understanding that the one does not exist in the other. Through the operation, however, by which it understands what a thing is, it distinguishes one thing from another by knowing what one is without knowing anything of the other, either that it is united to it or separated from it. So this distinction is not properly called separation, but only the first. It is correctly called abstraction, but only when the objects, one of which is known without the other, are one in reality. For if we consider animal without considering stone, we do not say that we abstract animal from stone.
Unde cum abstractio non possit esse, proprie loquendo, nisi coniunctorum in esse, secundum duos modos coniunctionis praedictos, scilicet qua pars et totum uniuntur vel forma et materia, duplex est abstractio, una, qua forma abstrahitur a materia, alia, qua totum abstrahitur a partibus. It follows that since, properly speaking, we can only abstract objects united in existence, there are two sorts of abstraction corresponding to the two modes of union mentioned above, namely, the union of part and whole, and the union of form and matter. The first is that in which we abstract form from matter, and the second is that in which we abstract a whole from its parts.
Forma autem illa potest a materia aliqua abstrahi, cuius ratio essentiae non dependet a tali materia. Ab illa autem materia non potest forma abstrahi per intellectum, a qua secundum suae essentiae rationem dependet. Unde cum omnia accidentia comparentur ad substantiam subiectam sicut forma ad materiam et cuiuslibet accidentis ratio dependeat ad substantiam, impossibile est aliquam talem formam a substantia separari. Sed accidentia superveniunt substantiae quodam ordine. Nam primo advenit ei quantitas, deinde qualitas, deinde passiones et motus. Unde quantitas potest intelligi in materia subiecta, antequam intelligantur in ea qualitates sensibiles, a quibus dicitur materia sensibilis. Et sic secundum rationem suae substantiae non dependet quantitas a materia sensibili, sed solum a materia intelligibili. Substantia enim remotis accidentibus non manet nisi intellectu comprehensibilis, eo quod sensitivae potentiae non pertingunt usque ad substantiae comprehensionem. Et de huiusmodi abstractis est mathematica, quae considerat quantitates et ea quae quantitates consequuntur, ut figuras et huiusmodi. Now a form can be abstracted from matter if the essential nature of the form does not depend on that particular kind of matter; but the intellect cannot abstract form from the kind of matter upon which the form depends according to its essential nature. Consequently, because all accidents are related to the underlying substance as form to matter, and because it is the nature of every accident to depend upon substance, no form of this kind can be separated from substance. But accidents befall substance in a definite order. Quantity comes to it first, then quality, after that passivities (passiones) and actions. So quantity can be thought of in substance before the sensible qualities (because of which matter is called sensible) are considered in it. Quantity, then, according to its essential nature does not depend upon sensible matter but only upon intelligible matter. For, after accidents have been abstracted, substance is intelligible only to the intellect, because it is beyond the sense powers to comprehend substance. And abstract objects of this kind are the concern of mathematics; it treats of quantities and the properties of quantity, such as figures and the like.
Totum etiam non a quibuslibet partibus abstrahi potest. Sunt enim quaedam partes, ex quibus ratio totius dependet, quando scilicet hoc est esse tali toti quod ex talibus partibus componi, sicut se habet syllaba ad litteras et mixtum ad elementa; et tales partes dicuntur partes speciei et formae, sine quibus totum intelligi non potest, cum ponantur in eius diffinitione. Quaedam vero partes sunt quae accidunt toti, in quantum huiusmodi, sicut semicirculus se habet ad circulum. Accidit enim circulo, quod sumantur per divisionem duae eius partes aequales vel inaequales vel etiam plures; non autem accidit triangulo, quod in eo designentur tres lineae, quia ex hoc triangulus est triangulus. Similiter etiam per se competit homini quod inveniatur in eo anima rationalis et corpus compositum ex quattuor elementis, unde sine his partibus homo intelligi non potest, sed haec oportet poni in diffinitione eius; unde sunt partes speciei et formae. Sed digitus, pes et manus et aliae huiusmodi partes sunt post intellectum hominis, unde ex eis ratio essentialis hominis non dependet; et homo sine his intelligi potest. Sive enim habeat pedes sive non, dummodo ponatur coniunctum ex anima rationali et corpore mixto ex elementis propria mixtione, quam requirit talis forma, erit homo. Et hae partes dicuntur partes materiae, quae non ponuntur in diffinitione totius, sed magis e converso. Et hoc modo se habent ad hominem omnes partes signatae, sicut haec anima et hoc corpus et hic unguis et hoc os et huiusmodi. Hae enim partes sunt quidem partes essentiae sortis et Platonis, non autem hominis, in quantum homo; et ideo potest homo abstrahi per intellectum ab istis partibus, et talis abstractio est universalis a particulari. Moreover, we cannot abstract a whole from just any parts. For there are some parts upon which the nature of the whole depends, namely, when the being of a particular whole consists in the composition of particular parts. It is in this way that a syllable is related to letters and a mixed body to the elements. Parts of this sort, which are necessary for understanding the whole because they enter into its definition, are called parts of the species and of the form. There are some parts, however, that are accidental to the whole as such. The semicircle, for instance, is related to the circle in this way, for it is accidental to a circle that it be divided into two or more equal or unequal parts. But it is not accidental to a triangle that three lines are designated in it, for because of this a triangle is a triangle. Similarly, it is an essential characteristic of man that there be found in him a rational soul and a body composed of the four elements. So man cannot be understood without these parts and they must be included in his definition; so they are parts of his species and form. But finger, foot, and hand, and other parts of this kind are outside the definition of man; and thus the essential nature of man does not depend on them and he can be understood without them. For whether or not he has feet, as long as he is constituted of a rational soul and a body composed of the elements in the proper mixture required by this sort of form, he will be a man. These parts are called parts of matter: they are not included in the definition of the whole, but rather the converse is true. This is how all determinate (signatae) parts are related to man; for instance, this soul, this body, this nail, this bone, etc. These indeed are parts of the essence of Socrates and Plato, but not of man precisely as man; and therefore the intellect can abstract man from these parts. And this is the abstraction of the universal from the particular.
Et ita sunt duae abstractiones intellectus. Una quae respondet unioni formae et materiae vel accidentis et subiecti, et haec est abstractio formae a materia sensibili. Alia quae respondet unioni totius et partis, et huic respondet abstractio universalis a particulari, quae est abstractio totius, in quo consideratur absolute natura aliqua secundum suam rationem essentialem, ab omnibus partibus, quae non sunt partes speciei, sed sunt partes accidentales. Non autem inveniuntur abstractiones eis oppositae, quibus pars abstrahatur a toto vel materia a forma; quia pars vel non potest abstrahi a toto per intellectum, si sit de partibus materiae, in quarum diffinitione ponitur totum, vel potest etiam sine toto esse, si sit de partibus speciei, sicut linea sine triangulo vel littera sine syllaba vel elementum sine mixto. In his autem quae secundum esse possunt esse divisa, magis habet locum separatio quam abstractio. Similiter autem cum dicimus formam abstrahi a materia, non intelligitur de forma substantiali, quia forma substantialis et materia sibi correspondens dependent ad invicem, ut unum sine alio non possit intelligi, eo quod proprius actus in propria materia fit. Sed intelligitur de forma accidentali, quae est quantitas et figura, a qua quidem materia sensibilis per intellectum abstrahi non potest, cum qualitates sensibiles non possint intelligi non praeintellecta quantitate, sicut patet in superficie et colore, nec etiam potest intelligi esse subiectum motus, quod non intelligitur quantum. Substantia autem, quae est materia intelligibilis quantitatis, potest esse sine quantitate; unde considerare substantiam sine quantitate magis pertinet ad genus separationis quam abstractionis. So there are two abstractions of the intellect. One corresponds to the union of form and matter or accident and subject. This is the abstraction of form from sensible matter. The other corresponds to the union of whole and part; and to this corresponds the abstraction of the universal from the particular. This is the abstraction of a whole, in which we consider a nature absolutely, according to its essential character, in independence of all parts that do not belong to the species but are accidental parts. But we do not find abstractions opposed to these, by which a part is abstracted from a whole by the intellect if it is one of the parts of matter in whose definition the whole is included, or it can even exist without the whole if it is one of the parts of the species, for instance, a line without a triangle, a letter without a syllable, or an element without a mixed body. But in the case of things that can exist separately, separation rather than abstraction obtains. Similarly, when we say from is abstracted from matter, we do not mean substantial form, because substantial form and the matter correlative to it are interdependent, so that one is not intelligible without the other, because the appropriate act is in its appropriate matter. Rather, we mean the accidental forms of quantity and figure, from which indeed sensible matter cannot be abstracted by the intellect, because sensible qualities cannot be understood unless quantity is presupposed, as is clear in the case of surface and color. And neither can we understand something to be the subject of motion unless we understand it to possess quantity. Substance, however, which is the intelligible matter of quantity, can exist without quantity. Consequently, the consideration of substance without quantity belongs to the order of separation rather than to that of abstraction.
Sic ergo in operatione intellectus triplex distinctio invenitur. Una secundum operationem intellectus componentis et dividentis, quae separatio dicitur proprie; et haec competit scientiae divinae sive metaphysicae. Alia secundum operationem, qua formantur quiditates rerum, quae est abstractio formae a materia sensibili; et haec competit mathematicae. Tertia secundum eandem operationem quae est abstractio universalis a particulari; et haec competit etiam physicae et est communis omnibus scientiis, quia in scientia praetermittitur quod per accidens est et accipitur quod per se est. Et quia quidam non intellexerunt differentiam duarum ultimarum a prima, inciderunt in errorem, ut ponerent mathematica et universalia a sensibilibus separata, ut Pythagorici et Platonici. We conclude that there are three kinds of distinction in the operation of the intellect. There is one through the operation of the intellect joining and dividing which is properly called separation and this belongs to divine science or metaphysics. There is another through the operation by which the quiddities of things are conceived which is the abstraction of form from sensible matter, and this belongs to mathematics. And there is a third through the same operation which is the abstraction of a universal from a particular, and this belongs to physics and to all the sciences in general, because science disregards accidental features and treats of necessary matters. And because certain men (for example, the Pythagoreans and the Platonists) did not understand the difference between the last two kinds of distinction and the first, they fell into error, asserting that the objects of mathematics and universals exist separate from sensible things.
Replies to Opposing Arguments:
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod mathematicus abstrahens non considerat rem aliter quam sit. Non enim intelligit lineam esse sine materia sensibili, sed considerat lineam et eius passiones sine consideratione materiae sensibilis, et sic non est dissonantia inter intellectum et rem, quia etiam secundum rem id, quod est de natura lineae, non dependet ab eo, quod facit materiam esse sensibilem, sed magis e converso. Et sic patet quod abstrahentium non est mendacium, ut dicitur in II physicorum. Reply to 1. When the mathematician abstracts he does not consider something otherwise than it is. Thus, he does not think that a line exists without sensible matter, but he treats of a line and its properties without considering sensible matter. So there is no disagreement between his intellect and reality, because even in reality what belongs to the nature of a line does not depend upon that which makes matter sensible, but vice versa. Consequently, it is evident that “there is no error in the one who abstracts,” as is said in the Physics.
Ad secundum dicendum quod materiale dicitur non solum id, cuius pars est materia, sed etiam illud, quod in materia esse habet, secundum quem modum linea sensibilis materiale quoddam dici potest. Unde per hoc non prohibetur quin linea sine materia intelligi possit. Non enim materia sensibilis comparatur ad lineam sicut pars, sed magis sicut subiectum, in quo esse habet, et similiter est de superficie et corpore. Non enim mathematicus considerat corpus, quod est in genere substantiae, prout eius pars est materia et forma, sed secundum quod est in genere quantitatis tribus dimensionibus perfectum, et sic comparatur ad corpus quod est in genere substantiae, cuius pars est materia physica, sicut accidens ad subiectum. Reply to 2. By “material” is meant not only that which has matter as a part, but also that which exists in matter; and in this way sensible line can be called something material. So this does not prevent a line from being understood without matter. For sensible matter is not related to a line as a part, but rather as the subject in which it exists, and this is also the case with a surface or body. Obviously, the mathematician does not treat of the kind of body that is in the category of substance, whose parts are matter and form, but rather the body in the category of quantity, constituted by three dimensions. Body, in this sense of the term, is related to body the category of substance (of which physical matter is a part) as accident to its subject.
Ad tertium dicendum quod materia non est principium diversitatis secundum numerum nisi secundum quod in multas partes divisa in singulis partibus formam recipiens eiusdem rationis plura individua eiusdem speciei constituit. Materia autem dividi non potest nisi ex praesupposita quantitate, qua remota omnis substantia indivisibilis remanet, et sic prima ratio diversificandi ea, quae sunt unius speciei, est penes quantitatem. Quod quidem quantitati competit, in quantum in sui ratione situm quasi differentiam constitutivam habet, qui nihil est aliud quam ordo partium. Unde etiam abstracta quantitate a materia sensibili per intellectum adhuc contingit imaginari diversa secundum numerum unius speciei, sicut plures triangulos aequilateros et plures lineas rectas aequales. Reply to 3. Matter is the principle of numerical diversity or inasmuch as, being divided into many parts, and receiving in each part a form of the same nature, it constitutes many individuals of the same species. Now matter can be divided only if we presuppose quantity in it; if that is taken away, even substance remains indivisible. So the primary reason for the diversification of things of one species lies in quantity. And this is due to quantity because position, which is the arrangement of parts in place, is contained in its notion as a kind of formal difference. So even when the intellect has abstracted quantity from sensible matter, it is still possible to imagine numerically different things in the same species, for example, several equilateral triangles and several equal straight lines.
Ad quartum dicendum quod mathematica non abstrahuntur a qualibet materia, sed solum a materia sensibili. Partes autem quantitatis, a quibus demonstratio sumpta quodammodo a causa materiali videtur sumi, non sunt materia sensibilis, sed pertinent ad materiam intelligibilem, quae etiam in mathematicis invenitur, ut patet in VII metaphysicae. Reply to 4. Mathematics does not abstract from every kind of matter but only from sensible matter. Now the parts of quantity that seem to be in a way the basis for a demonstration by means of a material cause are not sensible matter; rather, they pertain to intelligible matter, which indeed is found in mathematics, as is clear in the Metaphysics.
Ad quintum dicendum quod motus secundum naturam suam non pertinet ad genus quantitatis, sed participat aliquid de natura quantitatis aliunde, secundum quod divisio motus sumitur vel ex divisione spatii vel ex divisione mobilis; et ideo considerare motus non pertinet ad mathematicum, sed tamen principia mathematica ad motum applicari possunt. Et ideo secundum hoc, quod principia quantitatis ad motum applicantur, naturalis considerat de divisione et continuitate motus, ut patet in VI physicorum. Et in scientiis mediis inter mathematicam et naturalem tractatur de mensuris motuum, sicut in scientia de sphaera mota et in astrologia. Reply to 5. By its very nature motion is not in the category of quantity, but it partakes somewhat of the nature of quantity from another source, namely, according as the division of motion derives from either the division of space or the division of the thing subject to motion. So it does not belong to the mathematician to treat of motion, Although mathematical principles can be applied to motion. Therefore, inasmuch as the principles of quantity are applied to motion, the natural scientist treats of the division and continuity of motion, as is clear in the Physics. And the measurements of motions are studied in the intermediate sciences between mathematics and natural science: for instance, in the science of the moved sphere and in astronomy.
Ad sextum dicendum quod in compositis simplicia salvantur et proprietates eorum, licet per alium modum, sicut propriae qualitates elementorum et motus ipsorum proprii inveniuntur in mixto; quod autem est compositorum proprium, non invenitur in simplicibus. Et inde est quod quanto aliqua scientia est abstractior et simpliciora considerans, tanto eius principia sunt magis applicabilia aliis scientiis. Unde principia mathematicae sunt applicabilia naturalibus rebus, non autem e converso, propter quod physica est ex suppositione mathematicae, sed non e converso, ut patet in III caeli et mundi. Et inde est quod de rebus naturalibus et mathematicis tres ordines scientiarum inveniuntur. Quaedam enim sunt pure naturales, quae considerant proprietates rerum naturalium, in quantum huiusmodi, sicut physica et agricultura et huiusmodi. Quaedam vero sunt pure mathematicae, quae determinant de quantitatibus absolute, sicut geometria de magnitudine et arithmetica de numero. Quaedam vero sunt mediae, quae principia mathematica ad res naturales applicant, ut musica, astrologia et huiusmodi. Quae tamen magis sunt affines mathematicis, quia in earum consideratione id quod est physicum est quasi materiale, quod autem est mathematicum est quasi formale; sicut musica considerat sonos, non in quantum sunt soni, sed in quantum sunt secundum numeros proportionabiles, et similiter est in aliis. Et propter hoc demonstrant conclusiones suas circa res naturales, sed per media mathematica; et ideo nihil prohibet, si in quantum cum naturali communicant, materiam sensibilem respiciunt. In quantum enim cum mathematica communicant, abstractae sunt. Reply to 6. Simple bodies and their properties remain in composite bodies Although in a different way, as the proper qualities of the elements and their proper movements are found in a mixed body. What is proper to composite bodies, however, is not found in simple bodies. And so it is that the more abstract and simple the objects of a science are, the more applicable its principles are to the other sciences. Thus the principles of mathematics are applicable to natural things, but not visa versa, because physics presupposes mathematics; but the converse is not true, as is clear in the De Caelo et Mundo. So there are three levels of sciences concerning natural and mathematical entities. Some are purely natural and treat of the properties of natural things as such, like physics, agricuIture, and the like. Others are purely mathematical and treat of quantities absolutely, as geometry considers magnitude and arithmetic numbers. Still others are intermediate, and these apply mathematical principles to natural things; for instance, music, astronomy, and the like. These sciences, however, have a closer affinity to mathematics, because in their thinking that which is physical is, as it were, material, whereas that which is mathematical is, as it were, formal. For example, music considers sounds, not inasmuch as they are sounds, but inasmuch as they are proportionable according to numbers; and the same holds in other sciences. Thus they demonstrate their conclusions concerning natural things, but by means of mathematics. Therefore nothing prevents their being concerned with sensible matter insofar as they have something in common with natural science, but insofar as they have something in common with mathematics they are abstract.
Ad septimum dicendum quod, quia scientiae mediae, de quibus dictum est, communicant cum naturali secundum id quod in earum consideratione est materiale, differunt autem secundum id quod in earum consideratione est formale, ideo nihil prohibet has scientias cum naturali habere interdum easdem conclusiones. Non tamen per eadem demonstrant nisi secundum quod scientiae sunt immixtae et una interdum utitur eo quod est alterius, sicut rotunditatem terrae naturalis probat ex motu gravium, astrologus autem per considerationem lunarium eclipsium. Reply to 7. Because the intermediate sciences mentioned above have something in common with natural science as regards what is material in their procedure, but differ from it as regards what is formal in it, nothing prevents these sciences from occasionally having the same conclusions as natural science. Nevertheless, they do not use the same means of demonstration, unless the sciences are mixed and one occasionally uses what belongs to another, as the natural scientist proves that the earth is round from the movement of heavy bodies, while the astronomer proves it by considering eclipses of the moon.
Ad octavum dicendum quod, sicut dicit Commentator ibidem, philosophus non intendit ibi distinguere scientias speculativas, quia de quolibet mobili, sive sit corruptibile sive incorruptibile, determinat naturalis. Mathematicus autem, in quantum huiusmodi, non considerat aliquod mobile. Intendit autem distinguere res, de quibus scientiae speculativae determinant, de quibus seorsum et secundum ordinem agendum est, quamvis illa tria genera rerum tribus scientiis appropriari possint. Entia enim incorruptibilia et immobilia praecise ad metaphysicum pertinent. Entia vero mobilia et incorruptibilia propter sui uniformitatem et regularitatem possunt determinari quantum ad suos motus per principia mathematica, quod de mobilibus corruptibilibus dici non potest; et ideo secundum genus entium attribuitur mathematicae ratione astrologiae. Tertium vero remanet proprium soli naturali. Et sic loquitur Ptolemaeus. Reply to 8. As the Commentator says, the Philosopher there did not intend to distinguish between the speculative sciences, because the natural scientist treats of everything subject to motion, whether it be corruptible or incorruptible, while the mathematician as such does not treat of anything subject to motion. But he intended to distinguish between the things studied by the speculative sciences, which must be treated separately and in order, Although these three sorts of things can be apportioned to the three sciences. For incorruptible and immobile beings pertain precisely to the metaphysician. However, mobile and incorruptible beings, owing to their uniformity and regularity, can be determined in their movements by mathematical principles; this cannot be said of beings that are mobile and corruptible. Therefore, as Ptolemy says, the second kind of beings is ascribed to mathematics through astronomy, while the third kind remains the proper domain of natural science alone.

Article FOUR
Does Divine Science Treat of What Exists Without Matter and Motion?
Ad quartum sic proceditur. We proceed as follows to the fourth article:
Videtur quod scientia divina non sit de rebus a motu et materia separatis. It seems that divine science does not treat of things separate from motion and matter, for:
Scientia enim divina maxime videtur esse de Deo. Sed ad Dei cognitionem pervenire non possumus nisi per effectus visibiles, qui sunt in materia et motu constituti, Rom. 1: invisibilia enim ipsius et cetera. Ergo scientia divina non abstrahit a materia et motu. 1. Divine science seems to he especially concerned with God. Now we can come to know God only by way of his visible effects, which are created in matter and motion, as it is said in the Epistle to the Romans, “The invisible things of him, from the creation of the world, are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made.” Therefore, divine science does not abstract from matter and motion.
Praeterea, illud, cui aliquo modo motus convenit, non est omnino a motu et materia separatum. Sed motus aliquo modo Deo convenit; unde dicitur Sap. 7 de spiritu sapientiae quod est mobilis et mobilior omnibus mobilibus. Et Augustinus dicit VIII super Genesim quod Deus movet se sine tempore et loco, et Plato posuit primum movens movere se ipsum. Ergo scientia divina, quae de Deo determinat, non est omnino a motu separata. 2. Again, that to which motion in some way belongs is not entirely separate from motion and matter. But motion in some way belongs to God. Thus it is said in Wisdom that the Spirit of Wisdom is “mobile” and “more mobile than all mobile things.” And Augustine says that God moves himself without time and place. Plato also asserted that the First Mover moves itself. Therefore divine science, which treats of God, is not entirely separate from motion.
Praeterea, scientia divina non solum habet considerare de Deo, sed etiam de Angelis. Sed Angeli moventur et secundum electionem, quia de bonis facti sunt mali, et secundum locum, ut patet in illis qui mittuntur. Ergo illa, de quibus scientia divina considerat, non sunt omnino a motu separata. 3. Again, divine science must treat not only of God but also of angels. But angels change both with regard to choice, because they became bad after having been good, and also with regard to place, as is evident in the case of those who are sent as messengers. So the objects of divine science are not entirely separated from motion.
Praeterea, ut videtur Commentator dicere in principio physicorum, omne, quod est, vel est materia pura vel forma pura vel compositum ex materia et forma. Sed Angelus non est forma pura, quia sic esset actus purus, quod solius Dei est, nec iterum est materia pura. Ergo est compositus ex materia et forma. Et sic scientia divina non abstrahit a materia. 4. Again, as the Commentator seems to say in the beginning of the Physics, every being is either pure matter, or pure form, or a composite of matter and form. But an angel is not a pure form, because then he would be pure act, which is true of God alone. Neither is he pure matter. So he is a composite of matter and form. Therefore divine science does not abstract from matter.
Praeterea, scientia divina, quae ponitur tertia pars speculativae philosophiae, est idem quod metaphysica, cuius subiectum est ens, et principaliter ens quod est substantia, ut patet in IV metaphysicae. Sed ens et substantia non abstrahit a materia, alias nullum ens inveniretur quod haberet materiam. Ergo scientia divina non est a materia abstrahens. 5. Again, divine science, the third part of speculative philosophy, is the same as metaphysics, whose subject is being, and especially substantial being. This is clear in the Metaphysics. But being and substance do not abstract from matter; otherwise there would be no material being. So divine science does not abstract from matter.
Praeterea, secundum philosophum in I posteriorum ad scientiam pertinet considerare non solum subiectum, sed partes et passiones subiecti. Sed ens est subiectum scientiae divinae, ut dictum est. Ergo ad ipsam pertinet considerare de omnibus entibus. Sed materia et motus sunt quaedam entia. Ergo pertinent ad considerationem metaphysicae, et sic scientia divina ab eis non abstrahit. 6. Again, according to the Philosopher, it is the business of a science to consider not only a subject but also the divisions and attributes of that subject. Now, as we have said, being is the subject of divine science. Therefore it is the business of this science to treat of all beings. But matter and motion are beings. Therefore they come under the consideration of metaphysics, and so divine science does not abstract from them.
Praeterea, sicut dicit Commentator in I physicorum, scientia divina demonstrat per tres causas, scilicet efficientem, formalem et finalem. Sed causa efficiens non potest considerari sine consideratione motus, similiter nec finis, ut dicitur in III metaphysicae. Unde in mathematicis propter hoc quod sunt immobilia nulla demonstratio per huiusmodi causas datur. Ergo scientia divina non abstrahit a motu. 7. Again, divine science demonstrates by means of three causes: efficient, formal, and final, as the Commentator says, But we cannot consider an efficient cause without taking motion into account; and the same thing is true of a final cause, as the Metaphysics says. Thus, because the objects of mathematics are immobile, there are no demonstrations through these causes in that science. Consequently, divine science does not abstract from motion.
Praeterea, in theologia determinatur de creatione caeli et terrae et actibus hominum et multis huiusmodi, quae in se materiam et motum continent. Ergo non videtur theologia a materia et motu abstrahere. 8. Again, in theology we treat of the creation of the heavens and the earth, of acts of men, and many similar things that involve matter and motion. So theology does not seem to abstract from matter and motion.
Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit in VI metaphysicae quod prima philosophia est circa separabilia, scilicet a materia, et immobilia. Prima autem philosophia est scientia divina, ut ibidem dicitur. Ergo scientia divina est abstracta a materia et motu. On the contrary, the Philosopher says in the Metaphysics that “first philosophy deals with things that can exist separately,” that is, from matter, “and with immobile things.” Now first philosophy is divine science, as he says in the same place. Therefore divine science abstracts from matter and motion.
Praeterea, nobilissima scientia est de nobilissimis entibus. Sed scientia divina est nobilissima. Cum ergo entia immaterialia et immobilia sint nobilissima, de eis erit scientia divina. Moreover, the most excellent science deals with the most excellent beings. But the most excellent science is divine science. Therefore, since immaterial and immobile beings are the most excellent, divine science will treat of them.
Praeterea, philosophus dicit in principio metaphysicae quod scientia divina est de primis principiis et causis. Huiusmodi autem sunt immaterialia et immobilia. Ergo de talibus est scientia divina. Moreover, the Philosopher says in the beginning of the Metaphysics that divine science concerns first principles and causes. Now these are immaterial and immobile. Therefore things of this sort are the objects of divine science.
Responsio. Dicendum quod ad evidentiam huius quaestionis scire oportet quae scientia divina scientia dici debeat. Sciendum siquidem est quod quaecumque scientia considerat aliquod genus subiectum, oportet quod consideret principia illius generis, cum scientia non perficiatur nisi per cognitionem principiorum, ut patet per philosophum in principio physicorum. Sed principiorum duo sunt genera. Quaedam enim sunt quae et sunt in se ipsis quaedam naturae completae et sunt nihilominus principia aliorum, sicut corpora caelestia sunt quaedam principia inferiorum corporum et corpora simplicia corporum mixtorum. Et ideo ista non solum considerantur in scientiis ut principia sunt, sed etiam ut sunt in se ipsis res quaedam; et propter hoc de eis non solum tractatur in scientia quae considerat ipsa principiata, sed etiam habent per se scientiam separatam, sicut de corporibus caelestibus est quaedam pars scientiae naturalis praeter illam, in qua determinatur de corporibus inferioribus, et de elementis praeter illam, in qua tractatur de corporibus mixtis. Quaedam autem sunt principia, quae non sunt naturae completae in se ipsis, sed solum sunt principia naturarum, sicut unitas numeri et punctus lineae et forma et materia corporis physici, unde huiusmodi principia non tractantur nisi in scientia, in qua de principiatis agitur. Reply: In order to throw light on this question we must understand what science should be called divine science. We must realize indeed that if a science considers a subject-genus, it must investigate the principles of that genus, since science is perfected only through knowledge of principles, as the Philosopher explains in the beginning of the Physics. Now there are two kinds of principles. (1) Some are complete natures in themselves and nevertheless they are the principles of other things, as the heavenly bodies are principles of lower bodies and simple bodies are principles of mixed bodies. In the sciences, therefore, we study them not only insofar as they are principles, but also insofar as they are certain things in themselves. And for this reason they are considered not only in the science of the beings of which they are the principles, but also in a separate science. Thus there is a branch of natural science treating of heavenly bodies distinct from that treating of lower bodies, and there is one treating of the elements distinct from that treating of mixed bodies. (2) There are some principles, however, that are not complete natures in themselves, but only principles of natures, as unity is the principle of number, point the principle of line, and form and matter principles of natural bodies. Principles of this sort, then, are investigated only in the science dealing with the things of which they are principles.
Sicut autem uniuscuiusque determinati generis sunt quaedam communia principia quae se extendunt ad omnia principia illius generis, ita etiam et omnia entia, secundum quod in ente communicant, habent quaedam principia quae sunt principia omnium entium. Quae quidem principia possunt dici communia dupliciter secundum Avicennam in sua sufficientia: uno modo per praedicationem, sicut hoc quod dico: forma est commune ad omnes formas, quia de qualibet praedicatur; alio modo per causalitatem, sicut dicimus solem unum numero esse principium ad omnia generabilia. Now just as there are certain common principles of any particular genus extending to all the principles of that genus, so too all beings, inasmuch as they share in being, have certain principles that are the principles of all beings. And as Avicenna says,” these principles can be called common in two ways, (1) first, by predication, as when I say that form is common to all forms because it is predicated of all; (2) second, by causality, as we say that the sun, which is numerically one, is the principle of all things subject to generation.
Omnium autem entium sunt principia communia non solum secundum primum modum, quod appellat philosophus in XI metaphysicae omnia entia habere eadem principia secundum analogiam, sed etiam secundum modum secundum, ut sint quaedam res eadem numero exsistentes omnium rerum principia, prout scilicet principia accidentium reducuntur in principia substantiae et principia substantiarum corruptibilium reducuntur in substantias incorruptibiles, et sic quodam gradu et ordine in quaedam principia omnia entia reducuntur. Now there are principles common to all beings not only in the first way (in this sense the Philosopher says that all beings have proportionately the same principles), but also in the second way, so that there are certain beings, each numerically one, which are the principles of all things. Thus the principles of accidents are reducible to the principles of substance, and the principles of perishable substances are reducible to imperishable ones, with the result that all beings are reducible to certain principles in a definite graded order.
Et quia id, quod est principium essendi omnibus, oportet esse maxime ens, ut dicitur in II metaphysicae, ideo huiusmodi principia oportet esse completissima, et propter hoc oportet ea esse maxime actu, ut nihil vel minimum habeant de potentia, quia actus est prior et potior potentia, ut dicitur in IX metaphysicae. Et propter hoc oportet ea esse absque materia, quae est in potentia, et absque motu, qui est actus exsistentis in potentia. Et huiusmodi sunt res divinae; quia si divinum alicubi exsistit, in tali natura, immateriali scilicet et immobili, maxime exsistit, ut dicitur in VI metaphysicae. And since the principle of the being of all things must be being in the highest degree as the Metaphysics says, these principles must be most perfect and therefore supremely in act, so that they have no potentiality whatsoever, or the least possible, because actuality is prior to, and more excellent than potentiality, as the Metaphysics says. For this reason they must be free from matter, which is in potency, and free from motion, which is actuality of that which exists in potency. Divine beings are of this sort, “because if the divine exists anywhere, it exists especially in such a nature” (that is to say, in a nature that is immaterial and immutable), as is sad in the Metaphysics.
Huiusmodi ergo res divinae, quia sunt principia omnium entium et sunt nihilominus in se naturae completae, dupliciter tractari possunt: uno modo, prout sunt principia communia omnium entium; alio modo, prout sunt in se res quaedam. Quia autem huiusmodi prima principia quamvis sint in se maxime nota, tamen intellectus noster se habet ad ea ut oculus noctuae ad lucem solis, ut dicitur in II metaphysicae, per lumen naturalis rationis pervenire non possumus in ea nisi secundum quod per effectus in ea ducimur; et hoc modo philosophi in ea pervenerunt, quod patet Rom. 1: invisibilia Dei per ea quae facta sunt intellecta conspiciuntur. Unde et huiusmodi res divinae non tractantur a philosophis, nisi prout sunt rerum omnium principia. Et ideo pertractantur in illa doctrina, in qua ponuntur ea quae sunt communia omnibus entibus, quae habet subiectum ens in quantum est ens; et haec scientia apud eos scientia divina dicitur. Accordingly, because these divine beings are the principles of all things and nevertheless they are complete natures in themselves, they can be studied in two ways: (1) first, insofar as they are the common principles of all things, and (2) second insofar as they are beings in their own right. But even though these first principles are most evident in themselves, our intellect regards them as the eye of an owl does the light of the sun, as the Metaphysics says. We can reach them by the light of natural reason only to the extent that their effects reveal them to us. It was in this way that the philosophers came to know them as is clear from the Epistle to the Romans: “The invisible things of God... are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made.” Philosophers, then, study these divine beings only insofar as they are the principles of all things. Consequently, they are the objects of the science that investigates what is common to all beings, which has for its subject being as being. The philosophers call this divine science.
Est autem alius modus cognoscendi huiusmodi res, non secundum quod per effectus manifestantur, sed secundum quod ipsae se ipsas manifestant. Et hunc modum ponit apostolus 1 Cor. 2: quae sunt Dei, nemo novit nisi spiritus Dei. Nos autem non spiritum huius mundi accepimus, sed spiritum qui a Deo est, ut sciamus. Et ibidem: nobis autem revelavit Deus per spiritum suum. Et per hunc modum tractantur res divinae, secundum quod in se ipsis subsistunt et non solum prout sunt rerum principia. There is, however, another way of knowing beings of this kind, (a) not as their effects reveal them, but (b) as they reveal themselves. The Apostle mentions this way in his First Epistle to the Corinthians: “So the things also that are of God no man knows, but the Spirit of God. Now we have received not the spirit of this world, but the Spirit that is of God, that we may understand.” And again, “But to us God has revealed them by his Spirit.” In this way we consider divine beings as they subsist in themselves and not only inasmuch as they are the principles of things.
Sic ergo theologia sive scientia divina est duplex. Una, in qua considerantur res divinae non tamquam subiectum scientiae, sed tamquam principia subiecti, et talis est theologia, quam philosophi prosequuntur, quae alio nomine metaphysica dicitur. Alia vero, quae ipsas res divinas considerat propter se ipsas ut subiectum scientiae et haec est theologia, quae in sacra Scriptura traditur. Accordingly, there are two kinds of theology or divine science. (1) There is one that treats of divine things, not as the subject of the science but as the principles of the subject. This is the kind of theology pursued by the philosophers and that is also called metaphysics. (2) There is another theology, however, that investigates divine things for their own sakes as the subject of the science. This is the theology taught in Sacred Scripture.
Utraque autem est de his quae sunt separata a materia et motu secundum esse, sed diversimode, secundum quod dupliciter potest esse aliquid a materia et motu separatum secundum esse. Uno modo sic, quod de ratione ipsius rei, quae separata dicitur, sit quod nullo modo in materia et motu esse possit, sicut Deus et Angeli dicuntur a materia et motu separati. Alio modo sic, quod non sit de ratione eius quod sit in materia et motu, sed possit esse sine materia et motu, quamvis quandoque inveniatur in materia et motu. Et sic ens et substantia et potentia et actus sunt separata a materia et motu, quia secundum esse a materia et motu non dependent, sicut mathematica dependebant, quae numquam nisi in materia esse possunt, quamvis sine materia sensibili possint intelligi. Both treat of beings that exist separate from matter and motion, but with a difference, for something can exist separate from matter and motion in two distinct ways: (1) first, because by its nature the thing that is called separate in no way can exist in matter and motion, as God and the angels are said to be separate from matter and motion. (2) Second, because by its nature it does not exist in matter and motion; but it can exist without them, though we sometimes find it with them. In this way being, substance, potency, and act are separate from matter and motion, because they do not depend on them for their existence, unlike the objects of mathematics, which can only exist in matter, though they can be understood without sensible matter.
Theologia ergo philosophica determinat de separatis secundo modo sicut de subiectis, de separatis autem primo modo sicut de principiis subiecti. Theologia vero sacrae Scripturae tractat de separatis primo modo sicut de subiectis, quamvis in ea tractentur aliqua quae sunt in materia et motu, secundum quod requirit rerum divinarum manifestatio. Thus philosophical theology investigates beings separate in the second sense as its subjects, and beings separate in the first sense as the principles of its subject. But the theology of Sacred Scripture treats of beings separate in the first sense as its subjects, though it concerns some items in matter and motion insofar as this is needed to throw light on divine things.
Replies to Opposing Arguments:
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illa, quae non assumuntur in scientia nisi ad alterius manifestationem, non pertinent per se ad scientiam, sed quasi per accidens. Sic enim in naturalibus quaedam mathematica assumuntur, et per hunc modum nihil prohibet in scientia divina esse quaedam quae sunt in materia et motu. Reply to 1. When something is incorporated into a science only to throw light on something else, it does not belong to the science essentially, but, in a way, incidentally, as some mathematics are incorporated into the natural sciences. In this way nothing prevents some things in matter and motion being in divine science.
Ad secundum dicendum quod moveri non attribuitur Deo proprie, sed quasi metaphorice, et hoc dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum quod improprie operatio intellectus vel voluntatis motus dicitur, et secundum hoc dicitur aliquis movere se ipsum, quando intelligit vel diligit se. Et per hunc modum potest verificari dictum Platonis qui dixit quod primus motor movet se ipsum, quia scilicet intelligit et diligit se, ut Commentator dicit in VIII physicorum. Alio modo, secundum quod ipse effluxus causatorum a suis causis nominari potest processio sive motus quidam causae in causatum, in quantum in ipso effectu relinquitur similitudo causae, et sic causa, quae prius erat in se ipsa, postmodum fit in effectu per suam similitudinem. Et hoc modo Deus, qui similitudinem suam omnibus creaturis impartitus est, quantum ad aliquid dicitur per omnia moveri vel ad omnia procedere, quo modo loquendi utitur frequenter Dionysius. Et secundum hunc etiam modum videtur intelligi quod dicitur Sap. 7 quod omnium mobilium mobilior est sapientia et quod attingit a fine usque ad finem fortiter. Hoc autem non est proprie moveri, et ideo ratio non sequitur. Reply to 2. We do not attribute motion to God properly, but by a kind of metaphor, and this in two ways, first, according as the operation of the intellect or will is improperly called motion; and in this way a person is said to move himself when he knows or loves himself. In this sense, as the Commentator says, the statement of Plato is true, that the First Mover moves himself because he knows and loves himself. Second, according as the flowing forth of effects From their causes can be called a procession or motion of cause to effect insofar as the likeness of the cause is left in the effect itself; and so the cause, which previously existed in itself, afterward comes to be in the effect through its likeness. And in this way God, who has communicated his likeness to all creatures, in a certain respect is said to be moved by all of them or to go forward to all things. Dionysius frequently uses this manner of speaking. This also seems to be the meaning of the statement in Wisdom, that “Wisdom is more mobile than all mobile things,” and that “She reaches from end to end mightily.” However, this is not motion in the proper sense the term, and so the argument does not follow.
Ad tertium dicendum quod scientia divina, quae est per inspirationem divinam accepta, non est de Angelis sicut de subiecto, sed solum sicut de his, quae assumuntur ad manifestationem subiecti. Sic enim in sacra Scriptura agitur de Angelis sicut et de ceteris creaturis. Sed in scientia divina, quam philosophi tradunt, consideratur de Angelis, quos intelligentias vocant, eadem ratione qua et de prima causa, quae Deus est, in quantum ipsi etiam sunt rerum principia secunda, saltem per motum orbium, quibus quidem nullus motus physicus accidere potest. Motus autem, qui est secundum electionem, reducitur ad illum modum, quo actus intellectus vel voluntatis motus dicitur, quod est improprie dictum motu pro operatione sumpto. Motus etiam, quo dicuntur secundum locum moveri, non est secundum circumscriptionem localem, sed secundum operationem, quam exercent in hoc vel in illo loco, aut secundum aliquam aliam habitudinem, quam habent ad locum, omnino aequivocam ab illa habitudine, quam habet corpus locatum ad locum. Et ideo patet quod eis non convenit motus, secundum quod naturalia in motu esse dicuntur. Reply to 3. Divine science received through divine inspiration does not treat of the angels as its subject, but only as something incorporated into the science to throw light on its subject. For Sacred Scripture treats of the angels just as it does other creatures. In the divine science taught by the philosophers, however, the angels, which they call Intelligences, are considered from the same point of view as the First Cause or God, insofar as they are also secondary principles of things, at least through the movement of the spheres, though the angels themselves are subject to no physical motion. Moreover, motion with respect to choice is reducible to the sense in which the act of the intellect or will is called motion, which is an improper sense of the term, motion being understood as operation. Further, when angels are said to move in place, their motion is not with reference to enclosure in place but with reference to the activity they exercise in this or that place, or with reference to some other relation they have to place, Although that relation is absolutely equivocal to that which a localized body has to place. So it is clear that they do not move in the sense in which we say natural things move.
Ad quartum dicendum quod actus et potentia sunt communiora quam materia et forma; et ideo in Angelis, etsi non inveniatur compositio formae et materiae, potest tamen inveniri in eis potentia et actus. Materia enim et forma sunt partes compositi ex materia et forma, et ideo in illis tantum invenitur compositio materiae et formae, quorum una pars se habet ad aliam ut potentia ad actum. Quod autem potest esse, potest et non esse; et ideo possibile est unam partem inveniri cum alia et sine alia, et ideo compositio materiae et formae non invenitur secundum Commentatorem in I caeli et mundi et in VIII metaphysicae nisi in his quae sunt per naturam corruptibilia. Nec obstat quod aliquod accidens in aliquo subiecto perpetuo conservetur, sicut figura in caelo, cum tamen corpus caeleste impossibile sit esse sine tali figura et omnia accidentia consequuntur substantiam sicut causam, et ideo subiectum se habet ad accidentia non solum ut potentia passiva, sed etiam quodammodo ut potentia activa, et ideo aliqua accidentia naturaliter perpetuantur in suis subiectis. Materia autem non est hoc modo causa formae, et ideo omnis materia, quae subest alicui formae, potest etiam non subesse, nisi fortassis a causa extrinseca contineatur; sicut virtute divina ponimus aliqua corpora etiam ex contrariis composita esse incorruptibilia, ut corpora resurgentium. Reply to 4. Act and potency are more common than matter and form. Therefore, even though we do not find the composition of form and matter in the angels we can still find potency and act in them. For matter and form are parts of a thing composed of matter and form; and so we find the composition of matter and form only in things with parts, one of which is related to the other as potency to act. Now what can be, can also not be; and so one part can be found with or without the other; and therefore, as the Commentator says, we find the composition of matter and form only in those things that are by nature corruptible. Nor is the objection valid, that an accident may be eternally conserved in a subject, like shape in the heavens. For a heavenly body cannot exist without such a shape, since shape and all accidents in general follow upon substance as their cause. So a subject is related to its accidents not only as passive potency, but also in a way as an active power; and for this reason some accidents are naturally conserved forever in their subjects. But matter is not the cause of form in this way; and therefore all matter subject to form can cease to be subject to it, unless perhaps an extrinsic cause preserves it; thus we maintain that by the divine power even some bodies composed of contraries, like the bodies of those arisen from the dead, are incorruptible.
Essentia autem Angeli secundum naturam suam incorruptibilis est, et ideo non est in ea compositio formae et materiae. Sed quia non habet esse a se ipso Angelus, ideo se habet in potentia ad esse quod accipit a Deo, et sic esse a Deo acceptum comparatur ad essentiam eius simplicem ut actus ad potentiam. Et hoc est quod dicitur quod sunt compositi ex quod est et quo est, ut ipsum esse intelligatur quo est, ipsa vero natura Angeli intelligatur quod est. Tamen si ex materia et forma Angeli compositi essent, non tamen ex materia sensibili, a qua oportet et mathematica abstracta esse et metaphysica separata. Now, since the essence of an angel is incorruptible by its nature, it is not composed of form and matter. But an angel does not exist of himself, and so he is potential to the being (esse) he receives from God. Consequently, the being (esse) received from God is related to his simple essence as act to potency. This is what is meant by saying that angels are composed of what they are (quod est) and that by which they are (quo est); being (esse) is understood as that by which they are and the angelic nature as what they are. However, even if angels were composed of matter and form, they would not be composed of sensible matter, from which both the objects of mathematics must be abstracted and those of metaphysics must be separated.
Ad quintum dicendum quod ens et substantia dicuntur separata a materia et motu non per hoc quod de ratione ipsorum sit esse sine materia et motu, sicut de ratione asini est sine ratione esse, sed per hoc quod de ratione eorum non est esse in materia et motu, quamvis quandoque sint in materia et motu, sicut animal abstrahit a ratione, quamvis aliquod animal sit rationale. Reply to 5. We say that being and substance are separate from matter and motion not because it is of their nature to be without them, as it is of the nature of ass to be without reason, but because it is not of their nature to be in matter and motion, Although sometimes they are in matter and motion, as animal abstracts from reason, Although some animals are rational.
Ad sextum dicendum quod metaphysicus considerat etiam de singularibus entibus non secundum proprias rationes, per quas sunt tale vel tale ens, sed secundum quod participant communem rationem entis, et sic etiam pertinet ad eius considerationem materia et motus. Reply to 6. The metaphysician deals with individual beings too, not with regard to their special natures, in virtue of which they are special kinds of being, but insofar as they share the common character of being. And in this way matter and motion also fall under his consideration.
Ad septimum dicendum quod agere et pati non convenit entibus secundum quod sunt in consideratione, sed secundum quod sunt in esse. Mathematicus autem considerat res abstractas secundum considerationem tantum, et ideo illae res, prout cadunt in consideratione mathematici, non convenit esse principium et finis motus, et ideo mathematicus non demonstrat per causas efficientem et finalem. Res autem, quas considerat divinus, sunt separatae exsistentes in rerum natura, tales quae possunt esse principium et finis motus; unde nihil prohibet quin per causas efficientem et finalem demonstret. Reply to 7. Action and passion do not belong to things as they exist in thought but as they exist in reality. Now since the mathematician deals with things that are abstract only in thought, insofar as they come under his consideration they cannot be the principle or the end of motion. So the mathematician does not demonstrate by means of efficient and final causes. But the things the metaphysician deals with are separate, existing in reality, and these can be the principle and end of motion. So nothing prevents his demonstrating by means of efficient and final causes.
Ad octavum dicendum quod sicut fides, quae est quasi habitus principiorum theologiae, habet pro obiecto ipsam veritatem primam et tamen quaedam alia ad creaturas pertinentia in articulis fidei continentur, in quantum contingunt aliquo modo veritatem primam, per eundem modum theologia est principaliter de Deo sicut de subiecto, de creaturis autem multa assumit ut effectus eius vel quomodolibet habentia habitudinem ad ipsum. Reply to 8. Just as faith, which is in a way the habit of the principles of theology, has for its object the First Truth itself, and yet the articles of faith contain certain other things relating to creatures insofar as they have some connection with the First Truth, in the same way theology is primarily concerned with God as its subject, but it includes many things about creatures as his effects, or as being in some way related to him.

Quaestio 6.
Deinde quaeritur de modis quos scientiis speculativis attribuit. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quattuor.
  1. Primo. Utrum oporteat versari in naturalibus rationabiliter, in mathematicis disciplinabiliter, in divinis intellectualiter.
  2. Secundo. Utrum in divinis sit omnino imaginatio relinquenda.
  3. Tertio. Utrum intellectus noster possit ipsam formam divinam inspicere.
  4. Quarto. Utrum hoc possit fieri per viam alicuius scientiae speculativae.
The next question concerns the methods ascribed by Boethius to the speculative sciences. There are four points of inquiry in this connection:
  1. Must we proceed according to the mode of reason in natural science, according to the mode of learning in mathematics, and according to the mode of intellect in divine science?
  2. Should we entirely abandon the imagination in divine science?
  3. Can our intellect behold the divine form itself?
  4. Can our intellect behold the divine form by means of some speculative science?
Must we proceed according to the Mode of Reason in Natural Science,
according to the Mode of Learning in Mathematics,
and according to the Mode of Intellect in Divine Science?
Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non oporteat in naturalibus rationabiliter versari. On the first point we proceed as follows: It seems that we must no proceed according to the mode of reason in natural science, for:
Philosophia enim rationalis contra naturalem dividitur. Sed rationabiliter procedere videtur proprie ad rationalem pertinere. Ergo non competenter attribuitur naturali. 1. Rational philosophy is contra-distinguished from natural philosophy. But it seems to belong properly to rational philosophy to proceed according to the mode of reason. So this method is not appropriately ascribed to natural philosophy.
Praeterea, philosophus frequenter in libro physicorum distinguit processus ad aliquas conclusiones rationales et physicas. Ergo non est proprium naturali scientiae rationabiliter procedere. 2. Again, in the Physics the Philosopher frequently distinguishes between the methods of arriving at rational conclusions and physical conclusions. Therefore it is not the special characteristic of natural science to proceed rationally.
Praeterea, illud, quod est commune omnibus scientiis, non debet uni appropriari. Sed quaelibet scientia ratiocinando procedit discurrendo vel ex effectibus in causas vel ex causis in effectus vel ex aliquibus signis. Ergo non debet naturali appropriari. 3. Again, what is common to all the sciences should not be reserved to one. But every science proceeds by reasoning, advancing from effects to causes or from causes to effects or from certain signs So this method should not be reserved to natural science.
Praeterea, ratiocinativum in VI Ethicorum contra scientificum distinguitur a philosopho. Sed philosophia naturalis ad scientificum pertinet. Ergo non convenienter attribuitur ei rationabiliter procedere. 4. Again, in the Ethics the Philosopher distinguishes the reasoning part of the soul from the scientific part. But natural philosophy belongs to the scientific part. Therefore it is not appropriately said to proceed according to the mode of reason.
Sed contra est quod dicitur in libro de spiritu et anima quod ratio circa formas corporum versatur. Sed considerare corpora maxime pertinet ad naturalem. Ergo convenienter attribuitur ei rationabiliter procedere. On the contrary, the De Spiritu et Anima says that reason is concerned with the forms of bodies. Now it belongs most especially to natural philosophy to consider bodies. Therefore the rational method is appropriately attributed to it.
Praeterea, in V de consolatione Boethius dicit: ratio cum quid universale respicit, nec imaginatione nec sensu utens imaginabilia tamen et sensibilia comprehendit. Sed imaginabilia et sensibilia comprehendere ad solum naturalem pertinet. Ergo rationalis processus convenienter naturali attribuitur. Moreover, Boethius says: “When reason contemplates some universal nature, using neither imagination nor sense, it nevertheless comprehends imaginable and sensible things.” Now it belongs to the natural philosopher alone to comprehend what is imaginable and sensible. Therefore the rational method is suitably attributed to natural philosophy.
Ulterius videtur quod inconvenienter dicatur mathematica disciplinabiliter procedere. In the second place, it seems inappropriate to say that mathematics proceeds according to the mode of learning, for:
Disciplina enim nihil aliud esse videtur quam acceptio scientiae. Sed in qualibet parte philosophiae accipitur scientia, quia omnes demonstrative procedunt. Ergo procedere disciplinaliter est commune omnibus partibus philosophiae, et ita non debet appropriari mathematicae. 1. Learning seems to be nothing else than the receiving knowledge. But we receive scientific knowledge in all branches of philosophy, because all proceed by means of demonstration. So it is common to all parts of philosophy to proceed according to the mode of learning; and so this procedure should not be made exclusive to mathematics.
Praeterea, quanto est aliquid certius, tanto facilius esse videtur, ut de eo sit disciplina. Sed naturalia sunt certiora, ut videtur, quam mathematica, quia capiuntur sensu, a quo omnis nostra cognitio ortum habet. Ergo hic modus magis competit naturali quam mathematico. 2. Again, the more certain something is, the easier it seems to learn it. But natural things seem to be more certain than mathematics because they are apprehended by the senses, from which all our knowledge takes its origin. Therefore this method belongs to the natural philosopher rather than to the mathematician.
Praeterea, ut dicitur in V metaphysicae, initium in scientiis est, a quo fit facilior disciplina. Sed initium addiscendi accipitur a logica, quam oportet praeaddiscere mathematicae et omnibus aliis. Ergo disciplinalis modus magis convenit logicae quam aliis. 3. Again, as the Metaphysics says, in the sciences we begin at the point from which we learn more easily. But learning begins with logic, which must be mastered before mathematics and all the other sciences. Therefore it belongs to logic rather than to the other sciences to proceed according to the mode of learning.
Praeterea, modus naturalis scientiae et divinae assumitur a potentiis animae, scilicet a ratione et intellectu. Ergo similiter et modus mathematicae ab aliqua animae potentia sumi deberet, et sic non convenienter ponitur eius modus disciplinabiliter versari. 4. Again, the methods of natural and divine science are taken from powers of the soul, namely from reason and intellect. Therefore in the same way the method of mathematics ought to be taken from some power of the soul. So it is not appropriate to say that its method is to proceed according to the mode of learning.
Sed contra, disciplinaliter procedere est demonstrative procedere et per certitudinem. Sed, sicut Ptolemaeus in principio Almagesti dicit, solum mathematicum genus, si quis huic diligentiam exhibeat inquisitionis, firmam stabilemque fidem intendentibus notitiam dabit, velut demonstratione per indubitabiles vias facta. Ergo disciplinaliter procedere maxime proprium est mathematici. On the contrary, to proceed according to the mode of learning is to proceed by demonstration and with certitude. But as Ptolemy says, “Mathematics alone, if one applies himself diligently to it, will give the inquirer after knowledge firm and unshaken certitude by demonstrations carried out with unquestionable methods.” Therefore it is most characteristic of mathematics to proceed according to the mode of learning.
Praeterea, hoc patet per philosophum, qui in pluribus locis suorum librorum scientias mathematicas disciplinas nominat. Moreover, this is evident from the Philosopher who, in several places in his works, calls the mathematical sciences disciplines.
Ulterius videtur quod non sit conveniens modus divinae scientiae intellectualiter procedere. In the third place, it seems that it is not appropriate to divine science to proceed according to the mode of intellect, for:
Intellectus enim secundum philosophum est principiorum, scientia autem conclusionum. Sed non omnia, quae in scientia divina traduntur, sunt principia, sed quaedam etiam conclusiones. Ergo intellectualiter procedere non est conveniens scientiae divinae. 1. According to the Philosopher,” there is understanding (intellectus) of principles, whereas there is science of conclusions. But principles alone are not considered in divine science; some conclusions are also considered. Therefore to proceed according to the mode of intellect is not appropriate to divine science.
Praeterea, in illis, quae omnem intellectum excedunt, intellectualiter versari non possumus. Sed divina excedunt omnem intellectum, ut Dionysius dicit 1 c. de divinis nominibus et philosophus in libro de causis. Ergo intellectualiter tractari non possunt. 2. Again, we cannot proceed intellectually with regard to those things that transcend every intellect. But divine things transcend every intellect, as Dionysius and the Philosopher say. Therefore they cannot be dealt with intellectually.
Praeterea, Dionysius dicit 7 c. de divinis nominibus quod Angeli habent intellectualem virtutem, in quantum divinam cognitionem non congregant a sensibilibus aut a rebus divisis. Sed hoc est supra animae potestatem, ut ibidem subditur. Cum ergo divina scientia, de qua nunc agitur, sit scientia humanae animae, videtur quod non sit proprius modus eius intellectualiter tractare. 3. Again, Dionysius says that angels have intellectual power inasmuch as they do not gather their divine knowledge from what is sensible and divided; but, as he adds, this is beyond the power of the soul. Therefore, since the divine science that is now under discussion is a science belonging to the human soul, it appears that its proper method is not to proceed intellectually.
Praeterea, theologia praecipue videtur esse de his, quae fidei sunt. Sed in his, quae fidei sunt, intelligere est finis. Unde dicitur Is. 7 secundum aliam litteram: nisi credideritis, non intelligetis. Ergo intellectualiter versari circa divina non debet poni theologiae modus, sed finis. 4. Again, theology seems particularly concerned with the things of faith. But understanding (intelligere) is the goal of the things of faith. Thus it is said in Isaiah, according to another version, “Unless you believe, you will not understand.” So we should not say that proceeding intellectually about divine things is the method of theology but the goal.
Sed contra est quod dicitur in libro de spiritu et anima quod intellectus est spirituum creatorum, intelligentia vero ipsius Dei. De his autem praecipue est scientia divina. Ergo intellectualiter procedere videtur esse ipsius proprium. On the contrary, the De Spiritu et Anima says that intellect (intellectus) has for its object created spirits, while understanding (intelligentia) has for its object God himself. Now divine science is principally concerned with them. Therefore it seems proper to it to proceed intellectually.
Praeterea, modus scientiae debet respondere materiae. Sed res divinae sunt res intelligibiles per se ipsas. Ergo modus conveniens divinae scientiae est intellectualiter procedere. Moreover, the method of a science must correspond to its subject matter. But divine things are intelligible in virtue of themselves. Therefore the method appropriate to divine science is to proceed intellectually.
Responsio. Dicendum ad primam quaestionem quod processus aliquis, quo proceditur in scientiis, dicitur rationabilis tripliciter. Reply: To the first question (a) I reply that a method of proceeding in the sciences is called rational in three ways:
Uno modo ex parte principiorum, ex quibus proceditur, ut cum aliquis procedit ad aliquid probandum ex operibus rationis, cuiusmodi sunt genus et species et oppositum et huiusmodi intentiones, quas logici considerant. Et sic dicetur aliquis processus esse rationabilis, quando aliquis utitur in aliqua scientia propositionibus, quae traduntur in logica, prout scilicet utimur logica, prout est docens, in aliis scientiis. Sed hic modus procedendi non potest proprie competere alicui particulari scientiae, in quibus peccatum accidit, nisi ex propriis procedatur. Contingit autem hoc proprie et convenienter fieri in logica et metaphysica, eo quod utraque scientia communis est et circa idem subiectum quodammodo. In one way, because of the principles from which we begin; for instance, when we proceed to prove something beginning with mental beings, like genus, species, opposite, and concepts of this sort, which the logicians study. In this sense a method will be called rational when in a science we use the propositions taught in logic; namely, when we use logic as having a teaching function in the other sciences. But this method of proceeding cannot belong properly to any particular science: it will fall into error unless it proceeds from its own proper principles. However, logic and metaphysics may properly and suitably use this method, because both are universal sciences and in a sense treat of the same subject.
Alio modo dicitur processus rationalis ex termino in quo sistitur procedendo. Ultimus enim terminus, ad quem rationis inquisitio perducere debet, est intellectus principiorum, in quae resolvendo iudicamus; quod quidem quando fit non dicitur processus vel probatio rationabilis, sed demonstrativa. Quandoque autem inquisitio rationis non potest usque ad praedictum terminum perduci, sed sistitur in ipsa inquisitione, quando scilicet inquirenti adhuc manet via ad utrumlibet; et hoc contingit, quando per probabiles rationes proceditur, quae natae sunt facere opinionem vel fidem, non scientiam. Et sic rationabilis processus dividitur contra demonstrativum. Et hoc modo rationabiliter procedi potest in qualibet scientia, ut ex probabilibus paretur via ad necessarias probationes. Et hic est alius modus, quo logica utimur in scientiis demonstrativis, non quidem ut est docens, sed ut est utens. Et his duobus modis denominatur processus rationalis a scientia rationali; his enim modis usitatur logica, quae rationalis scientia dicitur, in scientiis demonstrativis, ut dicit Commentator in I physicorum. In a second way, a method is called rational because of the end that terminates the thinking process. (1) For the ultimate end that rational inquiry ought to reach is the understanding of principles, in which we resolve our judgments. And when this takes place, it is not called a rational procedure or proof but a demonstration. (2) Sometimes, however, rational inquiry, cannot arrive at the ultimate end, but stops in the course of the investigation itself; that is to say, when several possible solutions still remain open to the investigator. This happens when we proceed by means of probable arguments, which by their nature produce opinion or belief, but not science. In this sense, rational method is opposed to demonstrative method. We can proceed by this rational method in all the sciences, preparing the way for necessary, proofs by probable arguments. This is another use of logic in the demonstrative sciences; not indeed as having a teaching function, but as being an instrument. In these two ways, then, a method is called rational from rational science, for, as the Commentator says, in both of them logic (which is another name for rational science) is used in the demonstrative sciences.
Tertio modo dicitur aliquis processus rationalis a potentia rationali, in quantum scilicet in procedendo sequimur proprium modum animae rationalis in cognoscendo, et sic rationabilis processus est proprius scientiae naturalis. Scientia enim naturalis in suis processibus servat proprium modum rationalis animae quantum ad duo. Primo quantum ad hoc, quod sicut anima rationalis a sensibilibus, quae sunt nota magis quoad nos, accipit cognitionem intelligibilium, quae sunt magis nota secundum naturam, ita scientia naturalis procedit ex his, quae sunt nota magis quoad nos et minus nota secundum naturam, ut patet in I physicorum, et demonstratio, quae est per signum vel effectum, maxime usitatur in scientia naturali. Secundo, quia cum rationis sit de uno in aliud discurrere, hoc maxime in scientia naturali observatur, ubi ex cognitione unius rei in cognitionem alterius devenitur, sicut ex cognitione effectus in cognitionem causae. Et non solum proceditur ab uno in aliud secundum rationem, quod non est aliud secundum rem, sicut si ab animali procedatur ad hominem. In scientiis enim mathematicis proceditur per ea tantum, quae sunt de essentia rei, cum demonstrent solum per causam formalem; et ideo non demonstratur in eis aliquid de una re per aliam rem, sed per propriam diffinitionem illius rei. Etsi enim aliquae demonstrationes dentur de circulo ex triangulo vel e converso, hoc non est nisi in quantum in circulo est potentia triangulus et e converso. Sed in scientia naturali, in qua fit demonstratio per causas extrinsecas, probatur aliquid de una re per aliam rem omnino extrinsecam. Et ita modus rationis maxime in scientia naturali observatur, et propter hoc scientia naturalis inter alias est maxime hominis intellectui conformis. Attribuitur ergo rationabiliter procedere scientiae naturali, non quia ei soli conveniat, sed quia ei praecipue competit. In a third way, a method is called rational from the rational power, that is, inasmuch as in our procedure we follow the manner proper to the rational soul in knowing, and in this sense the rational method is proper to natural science. For in its procedures natural science keeps the characteristic method of the rational soul in two ways. (1) First, in this respect, that just as the rational soul receives from sensible things (which are more knowable relatively to us) knowledge of intelligible things (which are more knowable in their nature), so natural science proceeds from what is better known to us and less knowable in its own nature. This is evident in the Physics. Moreover, demonstration by means of a sign or an effect is used especially in natural science. (2) Secondly, natural science uses a rational method in this respect, that it is characteristic of reason to move from one thing to another; and this method is observed particularly in natural science, where we go from the knowledge of one thing to the knowledge of another; for example, from the knowledge of an effect to the knowledge of its cause. (a) And the procedure in natural science is not only a movement from one thing to another distinct from it in the mind and not in reality, as when we go from the concept animal to the concept man. In the mathematical sciences we proceed only by means of what is of the essence of a thing, since they demonstrate only through a formal cause. In these sciences, therefore, we do not demonstrate something about one thing through another thing, but through the proper definition of that thing. It is true that some demonstrations about the circle are made by means of the triangle or vice versa, but this is only because the triangle is potentially in the circle and vice versa. (b) But in natural science, where demonstration takes place through extrinsic causes, something is proved of one thing through another thing entirely external to it. So the method of reason is particularly observed in natural science; and on this account natural science among all the others is most in conformity with the human intellect. Consequently, we say that natural science proceeds rationally, not because this is true of it alone, but because it is especially characteristic of it.
Replies to Opposing Arguments:
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de processu, qui dicitur rationabilis secundum primum modum. Sic enim processus rationabilis est proprius rationali scientiae et divinae, non autem naturali. Reply to 1. That argument is based on the method that is called rational in the first way. In this sense a rational method is proper to rational and divine science, but not to natural science.
Ad secundum dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de processu, qui dicitur rationabilis secundo modo. Reply to 2. That argument is based on the method that is called rational in the second way.
Ad tertium dicendum quod in omnibus scientiis servatur quantum ad hoc modus rationis, quod proceditur de uno in aliud secundum rationem, non autem quod procedatur de una re in aliam, sed hoc est proprium naturalis scientiae. Et sic ei rationabiliter procedere attribuitur, ut dictum est. Reply to 3. The method of reason is observed in all the sciences insofar as they proceed from one item to another that is mentally distinct from it, but not in the sense that they go from one thing to another thing. As has been said, that is proper to natural science.
Ad quartum dicendum quod philosophus ibi pro eodem ponit ratiocinativum et opinativum, unde patet quod pertinet ad secundum modum assignatum. Ratiocinativo autem vel opinativo attribuit philosophus ibidem agibilia humana, de quibus est scientia moralis, ratione suae contingentiae. Unde potest ex dictis colligi quod primus modus rationabilitatis est maxime proprius scientiae rationali, secundus scientiae morali, tertius scientiae naturali. Reply to 4. In that place the Philosopher considers the reasoning and deliberative parts of the soul to be identical: so it is clear that they are related to the second mode of rational procedure mentioned above. In the same place, moreover, because of their contingency he assigns human actions, which are the objects of moral science, to the reasoning or deliberative part of the soul. From what has been said, then, we can gather that the first mode of rationality is most characteristic of rational science, the second of moral science, and the third of natural science.

Ad secundam quaestionem dicendum quod disciplinaliter procedere attribuitur scientiae mathematicae, non quia ipsa sola disciplinaliter procedat, sed quia hoc ei praecipue competit. Cum enim discere nihil sit aliud quam ab alio scientiam accipere, tunc dicimur disciplinabiliter procedere, quando processus noster ad certam cognitionem perducit, quae scientia dicitur; quod quidem maxime contingit in mathematicis scientiis. Cum enim mathematica sit media inter naturalem et divinam, ipsa est utraque certior. To the second question (b) I reply that mathematical science is said to proceed according to the mode of learning, not because it alone does so, but because this is especially characteristic of it. For, since learning is nothing else than the taking of knowledge from another, we are said to proceed according to the mode of learning when our procedure leads to certain knowledge, which is called science. Now this occurs particularly in the mathematical sciences. Because mathematics is situated between natural and divine science, it is more certain than either.
Naturali quidem propter hoc quod eius consideratio est a motu et materia absoluta, cum naturalis consideratio in materia et motu versetur. Ex hoc autem quod consideratio naturalis est circa materiam, eius cognitio a pluribus dependet, scilicet ex consideratione materiae ipsius et formae et dispositionum materialium et proprietatum quae consequuntur formam in materia. Ubicumque autem ad aliquid cognoscendum oportet plura considerare, est difficilior cognitio; unde in I posteriorum dicitur quod minus certa scientia est quae est ex additione, ut geometria arithmetica. Ex hoc vero quod eius consideratio est circa res mobiles et quae non uniformiter se habent, eius cognitio est minus firma, quia eius demonstrationes frequenter procedunt, ut in maiori parte, ex hoc quod contingit aliquando aliter se habere. Et ideo etiam quanto aliqua scientia magis appropinquat ad singularia, sicut scientiae operativae, ut medicina, alchimia et moralis, minus possunt habere de certitudine propter multitudinem eorum quae consideranda sunt in talibus scientiis, quorum quodlibet si omittatur, sequetur error, et propter eorum variabilitatem. It is more certain than natural science because its investigation is not bound up with motion and matter, while the investigation of natural science centers upon matter and motion. Now from the very fact that natural science deals with matter, its knowledge depends upon many factors, upon the consideration of matter itself, of form, and of the material dispositions and properties accompanying form in matter. And whenever there are many factors to be considered in order to know something, knowledge is more difficult. Thus the Posterior Analytics says that a science is less certain that results from adding on some item, as geometry adds something to arithmetic. If the inquiry in a science is about things that are mobile and lack uniformity, its knowledge is less exact because its demonstrations are often valid only in the majority of cases, owing to the fact that things sometimes happen differently. So, too, the more a science draws close to particulars (as do practical sciences like medicine, alchemy, and ethics), the less certain they can be because of the many factors to be taken into account in these sciences, the omission of any one of which will lead to error, and also because of their variability.
Est etiam processus mathematicae certior quam processus scientiae divinae, quia ea, de quibus est scientia divina, sunt magis a sensibilibus remota, a quibus nostra cognitio initium sumit, et quantum ad substantias separatas, in quarum cognitionem insufficienter inducunt ea, quae a sensibilibus accipimus, et quantum ad ea quae sunt communia omnibus entibus, quae sunt maxime universalia et sic maxime remota a particularibus cadentibus sub sensu. Mathematica autem ipsa in sensu cadunt et imaginationi subiacent, ut figura, linea et numerus et huiusmodi. Et ideo intellectus humanus a phantasmatibus accipiens facilius capit horum cognitionem et certius quam intelligentiae alicuius vel etiam quam quiditatem substantiae et actum et potentiam et alia huiusmodi. The method of mathematics is also more certain than the method of divine science, because the objects of divine science are further removed from sensible things, from which our knowledge takes its origin. This is true both in the case of the separate substances (to which our knowledge of the sense world gives us inadequate access), and also in the case of the principles common to all things (which are most universal and therefore furthest removed from the particular things falling under the senses). But mathematical entities do fall under the senses and they are objects of our imagination; for example, figures, lines, numbers, and the like. So the human intellect, which takes its knowledge from images, knows these things with greater ease and certainty than it does a separate Intelligence, or even the nature of substance, act, potency, and the like.
Et sic patet quod mathematica consideratio est facilior et certior quam naturalis et theologica, et multo plus quam scientiae aliae operativae, et ideo ipsa maxime dicitur disciplinaliter procedere. Et hoc est quod Ptolemaeus dicit in principio Almagesti: alia duo genera theorici potius quis opinionem quam conceptionem scientialem dicat: theologicum quidem propter inapparens ipsius et incomprehensibile, physicum vero propter materiae instabile et immanifestum. Solum autem mathematicum inquisitionis firmam stabilemque fidem intendentibus dabit, velut utique demonstratione per indubitabiles vias facta. It is clear, then, that mathematical inquiry, is easier and more certain than physical and theological, and much more so than that of the other sciences that are practical, and for this reason it is said especially to proceed according to the mode of learning. This is what Ptolemy asserts in the beginning of the Almagest: “Let us call the other two kinds of theoretical knowledge opinion rather than science: theology because of its obscurity and incomprehensibility, physics because of the instability and obscurity of matter. The mathematical type of investigation alone will give the inquirer firm and unshaken certainty through demonstrations carried out by unquestionable methods.”
Replies to Opposing Arguments.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod quamvis in qualibet scientia disciplina accipiatur, tamen in mathematica facilius et certius, ut dictum est. Reply to 1. Although we learn in all the sciences, nevertheless, as we have said, we do so with greater ease and certitude in mathematics.
Ad secundum dicendum quod naturalia quamvis sensui subiaceant, tamen propter sui fluxibilitatem non habent magnam certitudinem, cum extra sensum fiunt, sicut habent mathematica, quae sunt absque motu et tamen sunt in materia sensibili secundum esse, et sic sub sensu et imaginatione cadere possunt. Reply to 2. Natural things come under the senses; but because of their instability when they begin to exist in reality they do not have the great certitude of the objects of mathematics. These latter are not subject to change; and yet they exist in sensible matter, and as such they can come under the senses and imagination.
Ad tertium dicendum quod in addiscendo incipimus ab eo quod est magis facile, nisi necessitas aliud requirat. Quandoque enim necessarium est in addiscendo incipere non ab eo quod est facilius, sed ab eo, a cuius cognitione sequentium cognitio dependet. Et hac ratione oportet in addiscendo a logica incipere, non quia ipsa sit facilior ceteris scientiis, habet enim maximam difficultatem, cum sit de secundo intellectis, sed quia aliae scientiae ab ipsa dependent, in quantum ipsa docet modum procedendi in omnibus scientiis. Oportet autem primo scire modum scientiae quam scientiam ipsam, ut dicitur in II metaphysicae. Reply to 3. In learning we begin with what is easier, unless necessity dictates otherwise. For sometimes in learning it is necessary to start, not with what is easier, but with that on which the knowledge of subsequent matters depends. That is why in acquiring knowledge we must begin with logic, not because it is easier than other sciences (for it involves the greatest difficulty, concerned as it is with second intentions), but because the sciences depend on it inasmuch as it teaches the method of proceeding in all the sciences. And, as the Metaphysics says, we must know the method of science before science itself.
Ad quartum dicendum quod a potentiis animae sumitur modus scientiarum propter modum quem habent potentiae animae in agendo. Unde modi scientiarum non respondent potentiis animae, sed modis quibus potentiae animae procedere possunt, qui non solum diversificantur penes potentias tantum, sed etiam penes obiecta; et sic non oportet quod modus cuiuslibet scientiae denominetur ab aliqua potentia animae. Potest tamen dici quod sicut modus physicae sumitur a ratione, secundum quod a sensu accipit, modus autem divinae scientiae ab intellectu, secundum quod nude aliquid considerat, ita etiam et modus mathematicae potest sumi a ratione, secundum quod accipit ab imaginatione. Reply to 4. The method of the sciences is taken from the powers of the soul because of the way in which these powers operate. So the methods of the sciences do not correspond to the soul’s powers, but rather to the ways in which these powers can operate, and these are diversified not only according to the powers, but also according to their objects. So it is not necessary that the method of every science be named after a power of the soul. However, we can say that just as the method of physics is taken from reason inasmuch as it gets its objects from the senses, and the method of divine science is taken from the intellect inasmuch as it understands something purely and simply (nude), so also the method of mathematics can be taken from reason inasmuch as it obtains its objects from the imagination.

Ad tertiam quaestionem dicendum quod sicut rationabiliter procedere attribuitur naturali philosophiae, eo quod in ipsa maxime observatur modus rationis, ita intellectualiter procedere attribuitur divinae scientiae, eo quod in ipsa maxime observatur modus intellectus. Differt autem ratio ab intellectu, sicut multitudo ab unitate. Unde dicit Boethius in IV de consolatione quod similiter se habent ratio ad intelligentiam et tempus ad aeternitatem et circulus ad centrum. Est enim rationis proprium circa multa diffundi et ex eis unam simplicem cognitionem colligere. Unde Dionysius dicit 7 c. de divinis nominibus quod animae secundum hoc habent rationalitatem quod diffusive circueunt exsistentium veritatem, et in hoc deficiunt ab Angelis; sed in quantum convolvunt multa ad unum, quodam modo Angelis aequantur. Intellectus autem e converso per prius unam et simplicem veritatem considerat et in illa totius multitudinis cognitionem capit, sicut Deus intelligendo suam essentiam omnia cognoscit. Unde Dionysius ibidem dicit quod angelicae mentes habent intellectualitatem, in quantum uniformiter intelligibilia divinorum intelligunt. To the third question (c) I reply that just as we attribute the rational method to natural philosophy because it adheres most closely to the method of reason, so we attribute the intellectual method to divine science because it adheres most closely to the method of intellect. Now reason differs from intellect as multitude does from unity. Thus Boethius says that reasoning is related to understanding as time to eternity and as a circle to its center. For it is distinctive of reason to disperse itself in the consideration of many things, and then to gather one simple truth from them. Thus Dionysius says, “Souls have the power of reasoning in that they approach the truth of things from various angles, and in this respect they are inferior to the angels; but inasmuch as they gather a muItiplicity into unity they are in a way equal to the angels.” Conversely, intellect first contemplates a truth one and undivided and in that truth comprehends a whole multitude, as God, by knowing his essence, knows all things. Thus Dionysius says: “Angelic minds have the power of intellect in that they understand divine truths in a unified way.”
Sic ergo patet quod rationalis consideratio ad intellectualem terminatur secundum viam resolutionis, in quantum ratio ex multis colligit unam et simplicem veritatem. Et rursum intellectualis consideratio est principium rationalis secundum viam compositionis vel inventionis, in quantum intellectus in uno multitudinem comprehendit. Illa ergo consideratio, quae est terminus totius humanae ratiocinationis, maxime est intellectualis consideratio. It is clear, then, that rational thinking ends in intellectual thinking, Following the process of analysis, in which reason gathers one simple truth from many things. And again, intellectual thinking is the beginning of rational thinking, following the process of synthesis, in which the intellect comprehends a multiplicity in unity. So the thinking that is the terminus of all human reasoning is supremely intellectual.
Tota autem consideratio rationis resolventis in omnibus scientiis ad considerationem divinae scientiae terminatur. Ratio enim, ut prius dictum est, procedit quandoque de uno in aliud secundum rem, ut quando est demonstratio per causas vel effectus extrinsecos: componendo quidem, cum proceditur a causis ad effectus; quasi resolvendo, cum proceditur ab effectibus ad causas, eo quod causae sunt effectibus simpliciores et magis immobiliter et uniformiter permanentes. Ultimus ergo terminus resolutionis in hac via est, cum pervenitur ad causas supremas maxime simplices, quae sunt substantiae separatae. Quandoque vero procedit de uno in aliud secundum rationem, ut quando est processus secundum causas intrinsecas: componendo quidem, quando a formis maxime universalibus in magis particulata proceditur; resolvendo autem quando e converso, eo quod universalius est simplicius. Maxime autem universalia sunt, quae sunt communia omnibus entibus. Et ideo terminus resolutionis in hac via ultimus est consideratio entis et eorum quae sunt entis in quantum huiusmodi. Haec autem sunt, de quibus scientia divina considerat, ut supra dictum est, scilicet substantiae separatae et communia omnibus entibus. Unde patet quod sua consideratio est maxime intellectualis. Now all rational thinking in all the sciences, following the way of analysis, terminates in the knowledge of divine science. For, as we have said, reason sometimes advances from one thing to another in the order of reality; for example, when a demonstration is made through external causes or effects, by synthesis when we go from causes to effects, by analysis when we proceed from effects to causes, for causes are more simple, unchangeable, and uniformly constant than their effects. Consequently, the ultimate end of analysis in this process is attainment of the highest and most simple causes, which are the separate substances. At other times, however, reason advances from one item to another distinct in the mental order, as when we proceed according to intrinsic causes, by synthesis when we go from the most universal forms to the more particular ones, by analysis when we proceed conversely, because what is more universal is more simple. Now that which is most universal is common to all beings; and so the ultimate end of analysis in this process is the consideration of being and the properties of being as being. And, as we said above, these are the objects of divine science; namely, the separate substances and that which is common to all beings. It is evident, therefore, that its thinking is supremely intellectual.
Et exinde etiam est quod ipsa largitur principia omnibus aliis scientiis, in quantum intellectualis consideratio est principium rationalis, propter quod dicitur prima philosophia; et nihilominus ipsa addiscitur post physicam et ceteras scientias, in quantum consideratio intellectualis est terminus rationalis, propter quod dicitur metaphysica quasi trans physicam, quia post physicam resolvendo occurrit. It also follows that divine science gives principles to all the other sciences, because intellectual thinking is the starting point of rational thinking; and for this reason it is called first philosophy. Nevertheless it is learned after physics and the other sciences, because intellectual thinking is the terminus of rational thinking. For this reason it is called metaphysics, as if to say beyond physics, for in the process of analysis it comes after physics.
Replies to Opposing Arguments:
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod intellectualiter procedere non attribuitur scientiae divinae, quasi ipsa non ratiocinetur procedendo de principiis ad conclusiones, sed quia eius ratiocinatio est intellectuali considerationi propinquissima et conclusiones eius principiis. Reply to 1. We say that divine science proceeds intellectually not as though it makes no use of reason, moving forward from principles to conclusions, but because its reasoning most closely approaches intellectual consideration and its conclusions are closest to its principles.
Ad secundum dicendum quod Deus est supra omnem intellectum creatum quantum ad comprehensionem, non autem supra intellectum increatum, cum ipse se ipsum intelligendo comprehendat. Est vero supra omnem intellectum viatoris quantum ad cognitionem, qua cognoscitur quid est, non autem quantum ad cognitionem, qua cognoscitur an est. A beatis autem cognoscitur etiam quid est, quia vident eius essentiam. Et tamen scientia divina non est solum de Deo, sed et de aliis quae intellectum humanum etiam secundum statum viae non excedunt quantum ad quid est cognoscendum de eis. Reply to 2. God is beyond the comprehension of every created intellect, but he is not beyond the uncreated intellect, since in knowing himself he comprehends himself. However, he is above the intellect of everyone here on earth as regards knowing what he is, but not as regards knowing that he is, The blessed in heaven, however, also know what he is, because they see his essence. Nevertheless divine science is not only about God. It is concerned with other things as well, which are not beyond the human intellect even in its present state as regards knowing what they are.
Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, humana consideratio quantum ad sui terminum quodammodo pertingit ad angelicam cognitionem, non secundum aequalitatem, sed secundum quandam assimilationem. Unde Dionysius dicit 7 c. de divinis nominibus quod animae multorum convolutione ad unum sunt dignae habitae intellectibus aequalibus Angelis, in quantum animabus est proprium et possibile. Reply to 3. As we said above, human thought at its terminus in a way approaches angelic knowledge; not that it equals it, but bears a resemblance to it. So Dionysius says: “Souls, by reducing multitude to unity, are rightly considered the equal of the angelic intelligences, as far as this is proper and possible to souls.
Ad quartum dicendum quod cognitio etiam fidei maxime pertinet ad intellectum. Non enim ea rationis investigatione accipimus, sed simplici acceptione intellectus tenemus. Dicimur autem ea non intelligere, in quantum intellectus eorum plenariam cognitionem non habet; quod quidem nobis in praemium repromittitur. Reply to 4. The knowledge of faith also belongs in a special way to understanding (intellectus). For we do not possess the things of faith through the investigation of reason, but we hold them by simply receiving understanding. But we are said not to understand them because the intellect does not have a full knowledge of them. That indeed is promised to us as our reward.

Article TWO
Should We Entirely Abandon the Imagination in Divine Science?
Ad secundum sic proceditur. We proceed as follows to the second article:
Videtur quod in divinis oporteat ad imaginationes deduci. It seems that in divine science we must turn to images, for:
Scientia enim divina numquam competentius traditur quam in sacra Scriptura. Sed in sacra Scriptura in divinis deducimur ad imaginationes, dum divina nobis sub figuris sensibilibus describuntur. Ergo oportet in divinis ad imaginationes deduci. 1. Divine science was never more appropriately taught than in Sacred Scripture. But treating of the divine in Sacred Scripture we resort to images when divine things are described for us under sensible figures. Therefore in divine science we must turn to images.
Praeterea, divina non capiuntur nisi intellectu, unde et in eis intellectualiter versari oportet, ut dictum est. Sed non est intelligere sine phantasmate, ut dicit philosophus in I et III de anima. Ergo in divinis oportet ad imaginationes deduci. 2. Again, we grasp divine things only by the intellect; and this is why, as we have said, we must proceed intellectually when treating of them. But, as the Philosopher says, it is impossible to understand without the imagination. Therefore in divine science we must resort to images.
Praeterea, divina nobis innotescunt maxime per illustrationem divini radii. Sed, sicut dicit Dionysius in 1 c. caelestis hierarchiae, impossibile est nobis aliter superlucere divinum radium nisi varietate sacrorum velaminum circumvelatum; et vocat sacra velamina sensibilium imagines. Ergo in divinis oportet ad imaginationes deduci. 3. Again, we know the divine especially through divine illumination. But as Dionysius says, “It is impossible for the divine light to illumine us from above unless it be hidden within the covering of many sacred veils.” And he calls these sacred veils “images of sensible things.” So in divine science we must turn to images.
Praeterea, circa sensibilia oportet imaginabiliter versari. Sed divinorum cognitionem ex sensibilibus effectibus accipimus, secundum illud Rom. 1: invisibilia Dei per ea quae facta sunt intellecta conspiciuntur. Ergo in divinis oportet ad imaginationes deduci. 4. Again. when dealing with what is sensible we must make use of the imagination. But we know divine things from sensible effects, according to the statement of the Epistle to the Romans: “The invisible things of God... are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made.” Therefore in divine science we must resort to images.
Praeterea, in cognoscitivis maxime regulamur per id quod est cognitionis principium, sicut in naturalibus per sensum, a quo nostra cognitio incipit. Sed principium intellectualis cognitionis in nobis est imaginatio, cum phantasmata hoc modo comparentur ad intellectum nostrum sicut colores ad visum, ut dicitur in III de anima. Ergo in divinis oportet ad imaginationem deduci. 5. Again, in cognitive matters we are guided especially by the starting point of knowledge; for instance in the sciences of nature we are guided by the senses, from which our knowledge begins. Now in us intellectual knowledge begins in the imagination, since images are related to our intellect as colors to sight, as the De Anima says. Therefore in divine science we must go to the imagination.
Praeterea, cum intellectus non utatur organo corporali, ex laesione organi corporalis non impeditur actio intellectus, nisi quatenus ad imaginationem convertitur. Sed per laesionem organi corporalis, scilicet cerebri, impeditur intellectus in consideratione divinorum. Ergo intellectus divina considerans ad imaginationem deducitur. 6. Again, since the intellect does not use a bodily organ, an injury to such an organ hinders the action of the intellect only insofar as it turns to the imagination. Now the intellect is hindered in its consideration of divine things through an injury of a bodily organ, namely the brain. Therefore in considering divine things the intellect resorts to the imagination.
Sed contra est quod Dionysius dicit 1 c. mysticae theologiae ad Timotheum loquens: tu, inquit, o amice Timothee, circa mysticas visiones sensus derelinque. Sed imaginatio non est nisi sensibilium, cum sit motus factus a sensu secundum actum, ut dicitur in II de anima. Ergo cum divinorum considerationes sint maxime mysticae, in eis non debemus ad imaginationes deduci. On the contrary, Dionysius says in his Mystical Theology, speaking to Timothy: “O beloved Timothy, in mystic contemplation abandon the senses.” But the imagination has to do only with the sensible, for it is a movement produced by the sense in act, as the De Anima says. Therefore, since the considerations of divine things are eminently mystical, we should not have recourse to images in them.
Praeterea, in cuiuslibet scientiae consideratione vitandum est illud quod in ea errorem facit. Sed, sicut dicit Augustinus in I libro de Trinitate, primus error circa divina est eorum, qui ea, quae de corporalibus rebus noverunt, ad res divinas transferre conantur. Cum ergo imaginatio non sit nisi corporalium rerum, videtur quod in divinis non debeamus ad imaginationes deduci. Moreover, in the procedure of any science we should avoid what leads to error in it. But, as Augustine says, the principal error regarding divine things is the mistake of those who try transfer to them what they know of the corporeal world. Therefore, since the imagination has to do only with the corporeal, it seems that in divine science we should not go to images.
Praeterea, virtus inferior non se extendit in id quod est superioris proprium, ut patet per Boethium in V de consolatione. Sed cognoscere divina et spiritualia pertinet ad intellectum et intelligentiam, ut dicitur in libro de spiritu et anima. Cum ergo, ut ibidem dicitur, imaginatio sit infra intelligentiam et intellectum, videtur quod in divinis et spiritualibus non debeamus ad imaginationem deduci. Moreover, as is clear from Boethius, a lower power does not extend to that which is proper to a higher power. But it belongs to an intellect and to an intelligence to know the divine and the spiritual, as is said in the De Spiritu et Anima. Therefore, since, as is said in the same work, imagination is below intelligence and intellect, it seems that in the domain of the divine and the spiritual we should no go to the imagination.
Responsio. Dicendum quod in qualibet cognitione duo est considerare, scilicet principium et terminum. Principium quidem ad apprehensionem pertinet, terminus autem ad iudicium; ibi enim cognitio perficitur. Reply: In all knowledge two factors must be taken into account: the beginning and the end. Knowledge begins with apprehension but it ends with judgment, for it is there that knowledge is completed.
Principium igitur cuiuslibet nostrae cognitionis est in sensu, quia ex apprehensione sensus oritur apprehensio phantasiae, quae est motus a sensu factus, ut dicit philosophus, a qua iterum oritur apprehensio intellectiva in nobis, cum phantasmata sint intellectivae animae ut obiecta, ut patet in III de anima. Now all our knowledge begins in the senses; from sense perception results the apprehension of the imagination (which is a movement arising from sensory knowledge, as the Philosopher says), and from it in turn springs our intellectual apprehension, for images are like objects to the intellectual soul, as is clear in the De Anima.
Sed terminus cognitionis non semper est uniformiter: quandoque enim est in sensu, quandoque in imaginatione, quandoque autem in solo intellectu. Quandoque enim proprietates et accidentia rei, quae sensu demonstrantur, sufficienter exprimunt naturam rei, et tunc oportet quod iudicium de rei natura quod facit intellectus conformetur his quae sensus de re demonstrat. Et huiusmodi sunt omnes res naturales, quae sunt determinatae ad materiam sensibilem, et ideo in scientia naturali terminari debet cognitio ad sensum, ut scilicet hoc modo iudicemus de rebus naturalibus, secundum quod sensus eas demonstrat, ut patet in III caeli et mundi; et qui sensum neglegit in naturalibus, incidit in errorem. Et haec sunt naturalia quae sunt concreta cum materia sensibili et motu et secundum esse et secundum considerationem. But knowledge does not always terminate in the same way. Sometimes it terminates in the senses, sometimes in the imagination, and sometimes in the intellect alone. In some cases the properties and accidents of a thing disclosed by the senses adequately reveal its nature, and then the intellect’s judgment of that nature must conform to what the senses reveal about it. All natural things, which are bound up with sensible matter, are of this kind. So the terminus of knowledge in natural science must be in the senses, with the result that we judge of natural beings as the senses manifest them, as is evident in the De Caelo et Mundo. Accordingly, the man who neglects the senses when dealing with natural things falls into error. By natural things I mean those that are bound up with sensible matter and motion both in existence and in thought.
Quaedam vero sunt, quorum iudicium non dependet ex his quae sensu percipiuntur, quia quamvis secundum esse sint in materia sensibili, tamen secundum rationem diffinitivam sunt a materia sensibili abstracta. Iudicium autem de unaquaque re potissime fit secundum eius diffinitivam rationem. Sed quia secundum rationem diffinitivam non abstrahunt a qualibet materia, sed solum a sensibili et remotis sensibilibus condicionibus remanet aliquid imaginabile, ideo in talibus oportet quod iudicium sumatur secundum id quod imaginatio demonstrat. Huiusmodi autem sunt mathematica. Et ideo in mathematicis oportet cognitionem secundum iudicium terminari ad imaginationem, non ad sensum, quia iudicium mathematicum superat apprehensionem sensus. Unde non est idem iudicium quandoque de linea mathematica quod est de linea sensibili, sicut in hoc quod recta linea tangit sphaeram solum secundum punctum, quod convenit rectae lineae separatae, non autem rectae lineae in materia, ut dicitur in I de anima. Our judgment about some things, however, does not depend upon what the sense perceives, because even though they exist in sensible matter they abstract from it when their essences are defined, and we judge of anything chiefly according to the definition of its essence. But because they do not abstract from every kind of matter when their essences are defined but only from sensible matter, and because an object for the imagination remains after sensible characteristics have been set aside, we must judge about such things according to what the imagination reveals. Now the objects of mathematics are of this kind. Accordingly, the knowledge we have through judgment in mathematics must terminate in the imagination and not in the senses, because mathematical judgment goes beyond sensory perception. Thus, the judgment about a mathematical line is not always the same as that about a sensible line. For example, that a straight line touches a sphere at only one point is true of an abstract straight line but not of a straight line in matter, as is said in the De Anima.
Quaedam vero sunt quae excedunt et id quod cadit sub sensu et id quod cadit sub imaginatione, sicut illa quae omnino a materia non dependent neque secundum esse neque secundum considerationem, et ideo talium cognitio secundum iudicium neque debet terminari ad imaginationem neque ad sensum. There are other beings, however, that transcend both that which falls under the senses and that which falls under the imagination; namely, those that are entirely independent of matter both with respect to their being and with respect to their being understood. So, when we know things of this kind through judgment, our knowledge must terminate neither in the imagination nor in the senses.
Sed tamen ex his, quae sensu vel imaginatione apprehenduntur, in horum cognitionem devenimus vel per viam causalitatis, sicut ex effectu causa perpenditur, quae non est effectui commensurata, sed excellens, vel per excessum vel per remotionem, quando omnia, quae sensus vel imaginatio apprehendit, a rebus huiusmodi separamus; quos modos cognoscendi divina ex sensibilibus ponit Dionysius in libro de divinis nominibus. Nevertheless we reach some knowledge of them through the objects of the senses and the imagination, either by way of causality (as when from an effect we come to know its cause, which is not proportionate to the effect but transcends it), or by way of transcendence, or by way of negation (as when we separate from such beings whatever the sense or imagination apprehends). These are the means of knowing divine things from the sensible world proposed by Dionysius in his Divine Names.
Uti ergo possumus in divinis et sensu et imaginatione sicut principiis nostrae considerationis, sed non sicut terminis, ut scilicet iudicemus talia esse divina, qualia sunt quae sensus vel imaginatio apprehendit. Deduci autem ad aliquid est ad illud terminari. Et ideo in divinis neque ad imaginationem neque ad sensum debemus deduci, in mathematicis autem ad imaginationem et non ad sensum, in naturalibus autem etiam ad sensum. Et propter hoc peccant qui uniformiter in his tribus speculativae partibus procedere nituntur. It follows that we can use the senses and the imagination (+) as the starting points but not (~) as the termini of our knowledge of divine things, so that we judge them to be the sort of objects the sense or the imagination apprehends. Now to go to something is to terminate at it. Therefore, we should go neither to the imagination nor to the senses in divine science, to the imagination and not to the senses in mathematics, and to the senses in the natural sciences. For this reason they are in error who try to proceed in the same way in these three parts of speculative science.
Replies to Opposing Arguments:
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod sacra Scriptura non proponit nobis divina sub figuris sensibilibus, ut ibi intellectus noster remaneat, sed ut ab his ad immaterialia ascendat. Unde etiam per vilium rerum figuras divina tradit, ut minor praebeatur occasio in talibus remanendi, ut dicit Dionysius in 2 c. caelestis hierarchiae. Reply to 1. Sacred Scripture does not present divine things to us under sensible images so that our intellect may stop with them, but that it may rise from them to the immaterial world. Thus, as Dionysius says, it even teaches the divine through symbols of base objects in order to offer less occasion of stopping with them.
Ad secundum dicendum quod intellectus nostri operatio non est in praesenti statu sine phantasmate quantum ad principium cognitionis; non tamen oportet quod nostra cognitio semper ad phantasmata terminetur, ut scilicet illud, quod intelligimus, iudicemus esse tale quale est illud quod phantasia apprehendit. Reply to 2. The operation of our intellect in its present state is never without an image as regards the beginning of knowledge. But our knowledge need not always terminate at images, so that, in other words, we judge the objects of our understanding to be of the same kind as the objects of the imagination.
Ad tertium dicendum quod auctoritas illa Dionysii loquitur quantum ad principium cognitionis et non quantum ad terminum. Reply to 3. The text of Dionysius refers to the beginning of knowledge and not to its end,
Ad quartum dicendum quod ex effectibus sensibilibus venimus in cognitionem divinorum tribus modis praedictis; non autem ita quod oporteat iudicium formari de divinis secundum modum, quo se habent isti sensibiles effectus. Reply to 4. which is reached when we know divine things from their sensible effects by the three methods described above; but not in such a way that we must form our judgment of the divine according to the manner of being of these sensible effects.
Ad quintum dicendum quod ratio illa procedit, quando principium cognitionis est sufficienter ducens in id, cuius cognitio quaeritur, et sic est principium sensus in naturalibus, non autem in divinis, ut dictum est. Reply to 5. That argument is valid when the starting point of knowledge adequately leads to the object we seek to know. This is the way the senses are the starting point in the natural sciences, but not, as we have said, in divine science.
Ad sextum dicendum quod phantasma est principium nostrae cognitionis, ut ex quo incipit intellectus operatio non sicut transiens, sed sicut permanens ut quoddam fundamentum intellectualis operationis; sicut principia demonstrationis oportet manere in omni processu scientiae, cum phantasmata comparentur ad intellectum ut obiecta, in quibus inspicit omne quod inspicit vel secundum perfectam repraesentationem vel per negationem. Et ideo quando phantasmatum cognitio impeditur, oportet totaliter impediri cognitionem intellectus etiam in divinis. Patet enim quod non possumus intelligere Deum esse causam corporum sive supra omnia corpora sive absque corporeitate, nisi imaginemur corpora, non tamen iudicium divinorum secundum imaginationem formatur. Et ideo quamvis imaginatio in qualibet divinorum consideratione sit necessaria secundum statum viae, numquam tamen ad eam deduci oportet in divinis. Reply to 6. An image is the starting point of our knowledge, for it is that from which the operation of the intellect begins; not that it passes away, but it remains as the foundation of intellectual activity, just as the principles of demonstration must remain throughout the whole process of science. This is because images are related to the intellect as objects in which it sees whatever it sees, either through a perfect representation or through a negation. Consequently, when our knowledge of images is impeded, we must be completely incapable of knowing anything with our intellect even about divine things. Clearly, we cannot know that God causes bodies, or transcends all bodies, or is not a body, if we do not form an image of bodies; but our judgment of what is divine is not made according to the imagination. Consequently, even though in our present state of life the imagination is necessary in all our knowledge of the divine, with regard to such matters we must never terminate in it.

Article THREE
Can Our Intellect Behold the Divine Form Itself?
Ad tertium sic proceditur. We proceed as follows to the third article:
Videtur quod non possimus ipsam formam divinam ad minus in statu viae inspicere. It seems that we are unable to behold the divine form itself, at least in this life, for:
Ut enim dicit Dionysius in prima epistula ad Gaium monachum, si quis videntium Deum intellexit quod vidit, non ipsum vidit, sed aliquid eorum quae sunt eius. Sed forma divina est ipse Deus. Ergo non possumus ipsam formam divinam inspicere. 1. As Dionysius says, “If anyone seeing God understood what he saw, he did not see God himself but one of his creations.” Now the divine form is God himself. Therefore we are not able to behold the divine form itself.
Praeterea, forma divina est ipsa divina essentia. Sed Deum per essentiam nemo in statu viae videre potest, ergo nec ipsam divinam formam inspicere. 2. Again, the divine form is the divine essence itself. Now no one in the present life can see God through his essence. Therefore neither can he behold the divine form.
Praeterea, quicumque inspicit formam alicuius rei, aliquid de ipsa re cognoscit. Sed secundum Dionysium in 1 c. mysticae theologiae intellectus noster secundum quod melius potest Deo unitur, quando omnino nihil eius cognoscit. Ergo non possumus divinam formam inspicere. 3. Again, if we see the form of something, we have some knowledge of that thing. But according to Dionysius, our intellect is most united to God when it knows absolutely nothing of him. Therefore we are unable to behold the divine form.
Praeterea, sicut dictum est, totius nostrae cognitionis principium est a sensu. Sed ea, quae sensu percipimus, non sunt sufficientia ad demonstrandum formam divinam nec etiam aliarum substantiarum separatarum. Ergo non possumus ipsam divinam formam inspicere. 4. Again, as was said above, all our knowledge begins from the senses. But what we perceive by the senses is inadequate to reveal the divine form or even the other separate substances. Therefore we are unable to behold the divine form itself.
Praeterea, secundum philosophum in II metaphysicae intellectus noster se habet ad rerum manifestissima sicut oculus noctuae ad solem. Sed oculus noctuae nullo modo potest videre solem, ergo nec intellectus noster formam ipsam divinam et alias formas separatas quae sunt naturae manifestissima. 5. Again, according to the Philosopher, our intellect is related to what is most evident as the eye of an owl to the sun. But the eye of an owl cannot see the sun at all. Therefore neither can our intellect see the divine form itself or other separate forms, which are nature’s most evident beings.
Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit Rom. 1 quod invisibilia Dei per ea quae facta sunt intellecta conspiciuntur a creatura mundi, id est homine, sempiterna quoque virtus eius et divinitas. Nihil autem aliud est forma divina quam ipsa divinitas. Ergo ipsam formam divinam cognoscere intellectu aliquo modo possumus. On the contrary, the Apostle says in the Epistle to the Romans: “The invisible things of God are clearly seen by a creature of the world” (that is, by man), “...his eternal power also and divinity.” Now the divine form is simply the divinity itself. Therefore in some way we can know the divine form with our intellect.
Praeterea, Gen. 32 super illud: vidi dominum facie etc., dicit Glossa Gregorii: nisi homo illam, scilicet veritatem divinam, utcumque conspiceret, non eam conspicere se non posse sentiret. Sed nos sentimus divinam essentiam non posse perfecte conspicere. Ergo aliquo modo ipsam conspicimus. Moreover, commenting on the text of Genesis, “I have seen God face to face,” the gloss of Gregory says, “Unless a person somehow beheld it” (namely, divine truth), “he would not feel himself incapable of beholding it.” But we feel that we cannot perfectly see the divine essence. Therefore in some way we do behold it.
Praeterea, Dionysius dicit 2 c. caelestis hierarchiae quod humanus animus assuescit extendi per visibilia in supermundanas altitudines, quae nihil aliud sunt quam ipsae formae separatae. Ergo formas separatas possumus aliquo modo cognoscere. Moreover, Dionysius says that “the human mind gradually becomes accustomed to rise from the world of sense to heights beyond this world,” which are nothing else than the separate forms. Therefore we can somehow know the separate forms.
Responsio. Dicendum quod dupliciter aliquid cognoscitur: uno modo, dum scitur de eo an est, alio modo, dum scitur de eo quid est. Ad hoc autem quod de aliqua re sciamus quid est, oportet quod intellectus noster feratur in ipsius rei quiditatem sive essentiam vel immediate vel mediantibus aliquibus quae sufficienter eius quiditatem demonstrent. Immediate quidem intellectus noster ferri non potest secundum statum viae in essentiam Dei et in alias essentias separatas, quia immediate extenditur ad phantasmata, ad quae comparatur sicut visus ad colorem, ut dicitur in III de anima. Et sic immediate potest concipere intellectus quiditatem rei sensibilis, non autem alicuius rei intelligibilis. Unde dicit Dionysius 2 c. caelestis hierarchiae quod nostra analogia non valet immediate extendi in invisibiles contemplationes. Sed quaedam invisibilia sunt, quorum quiditas et natura perfecte exprimitur ex quiditatibus rerum sensibilium notis. Et de his etiam intelligibilibus possumus scire quid est, sed mediate, sicut ex hoc quod scitur quid est homo et quid est animal, sufficienter innotescit habitudo unius ad alterum et ex hoc scitur, quid est genus et quid est species. Reply: We know a thing in two ways: in one way when we know that it is, and in another way when we know what it is. Now in order to know what anything is, our intellect must penetrate its quiddity or essence either directly or by means of other things that adequately reveal its quiddity. But in this life our intellect cannot directly penetrate the essence of God or other separate essences, because it directly extends to images, to which it bears the same relation as sight does to color, as the De Anima says. So the intellect can directly conceive the quiddity of a sensible reality but not of an intelligible reality. Thus Dionysius says, “According to our way of knowing, we cannot immediately attain to the contemplation of the invisible.” There are some invisible things, however, whose quiddity or nature is perfectly revealed by the known quiddities of sensible things; and we can also know what these intelligible objects are, although indirectly. For instance, from the fact that we know what man and animal are, we come to know adequately the relation of one to the other, and from this we know what a genus and a species are.
Sensibiles autem naturae intellectae non sufficienter exprimunt essentiam divinam neque etiam alias essentias separatas, cum non sint unius generis naturaliter loquendo et quiditas et omnia huiusmodi nomina fere aequivoce dicantur de sensibilibus et de illis substantiis. Unde similitudines rerum sensibilium ad substantias immateriales translatas vocat Dionysius 2 c. caelestis hierarchiae dissimiles similitudines alio modo intellectualibus habentibus quae sensibilibus aliter distributa sunt. Et sic per viam similitudinis non sufficienter illae substantiae ex his innotescunt. Neque etiam per viam causalitatis, quia ea, quae ab illis substantiis inveniuntur effecta in his inferioribus, non sunt effectus adaequantes earum virtutes, ut sic perveniri possit ad sciendum quod quid est de causa. But the sensible natures known to us do not adequately reveal the divine essence or even other separate essences, since naturally considered they do not belong to one genus; and quiddity and all such terms predicated almost equivocally of sensible things and of these substances. That is why Dionysius calls the likenesses of sensible things, transferred to immaterial substances, “unlike likenesses, which intellectual beings participate in one way and sensible beings in another.” Consequently, we cannot have adequate knowledge of the former from the latter by way of likeness or even by way of causality, because the effects of those substances found in lower beings do not measure up to their powers so that we can come to know the essence of their cause in this way.
Unde de substantiis illis immaterialibus secundum statum viae nullo modo possumus scire quid est non solum per viam naturalis cognitionis, sed etiam nec per viam revelationis, quia divinae revelationis radius ad nos pervenit secundum modum nostrum, ut Dionysius dicit. Unde quamvis per revelationem elevemur ad aliquid cognoscendum, quod alias esset nobis ignotum, non tamen ad hoc quod alio modo cognoscamus nisi per sensibilia. Unde dicit Dionysius in 1 c. caelestis hierarchiae quod impossibile est nobis superlucere divinum radium nisi circumvelatum varietate sacrorum velaminum. Via autem quae est per sensibilia non sufficit ad ducendum in substantias immateriales secundum cognitionem quid est. Et sic restat quod formae immateriales non sunt nobis notae cognitione quid est, sed solummodo cognitione an est, sive naturali ratione ex effectibus creaturarum sive etiam revelatione quae est per similitudines a sensibilibus sumptas. Accordingly, in the present life it is absolutely impossible to know the essence of immaterial substances, not only (~) by natural knowledge but also (~) by revelation; for, as Dionysius say, the light of divine revelation comes to us adapted to our condition. Thus even though revelation elevates us to know something of which we should otherwise be ignorant, it does not elevate us to know in any other way than through sensible things. Thus Dionysius says: “It is impossible for the divine light to illumine us from above unless it be hidden within the covering of many sacred veils.” Now knowledge by way of the sensible is inadequate to enable us to know the essences of immaterial substances. So we conclude that we do not know what immaterial forms are, but only that they are, whether by natural reason based upon created effects or even by revelation, by means of likenesses taken from sensible things.
Et tamen sciendum quod de nulla re potest sciri an est, nisi quoquo modo sciatur de ea quid est vel cognitione perfecta vel saltem cognitione confusa, prout philosophus dicit in principio physicorum quod diffinita sunt praecognita partibus diffinitionis. Oportet enim scientem hominem esse et quaerentem quid est homo per diffinitionem scire quid hoc nomen homo significat. Nec hoc esset, nisi aliquam rem quoquo modo conciperet quam scit esse, quamvis nesciat eius diffinitionem. Concipit enim hominem secundum cognitionem alicuius generis proximi vel remoti et aliquorum accidentium quae extra apparent de ipso. Oportet enim diffinitionum cognitionem, sicut et demonstrationum, ex aliqua praeexsistenti cognitione initium sumere. It should be noticed, however, that we cannot know that a thing is without knowing in some way what it is, either perfectly or at least confusedly, as the Philosopher says we know things defined before we know the parts of their definition. For if a person knows that man exists and wants to find out what man is by definition, he must know the meaning of the term “man.” And this is possible only if he somehow forms a concept of what he knows to exist, even though he does not know its definition. That is to say, he forms a concept of man by knowing a proximate or remote genus and accidental characteristics which reveal him externally. For our knowledge of definitions, like that of demonstrations, must begin with some previous knowledge.
Sic ergo et de Deo et aliis substantiis immaterialibus non possemus scire an est, nisi sciremus quoquo modo de eis quid est sub quadam confusione. Hoc autem non potest esse per cognitionem alicuius generis proximi vel remoti, eo quod Deus in nullo genere est, cum non habeat quod quid est aliud a suo esse, quod requiritur in omnibus generibus, ut Avicenna dicit. Aliae autem substantiae immateriales creatae sunt quidem in genere, et quamvis logice considerando conveniant cum istis substantiis sensibilibus in genere remoto quod est substantia, naturaliter tamen loquendo non conveniunt in eodem genere, sicut nec etiam corpora caelestia cum istis inferioribus. Corruptibile enim et incorruptibile non sunt unius generis, ut dicitur in X metaphysicae. Logicus enim considerat absolute intentiones, secundum quas nihil prohibet convenire immaterialia materialibus et incorruptibilia corruptibilibus. Sed naturalis et philosophus primus considerant essentias secundum quod habent esse in rebus, et ideo ubi inveniunt diversum modum potentiae et actus et per hoc diversum modum essendi, dicunt esse diversa genera. Similiter etiam Deus non habet aliquod accidens, ut infra probabitur. Aliae vero immateriales substantiae si habent aliqua accidentia, non sunt nobis nota. Similarly, therefore, we cannot know that God and other immaterial substances exist unless we know somehow, in some confused way, what they are. (~) Now we cannot do this by knowing a proximate or remote genus, for God is in no genus, since his essence is not distinct from his being; a condition required in all genera, as Avicenna says. Created immaterial substances, however, are indeed in a genus; but even though from the viewpoint of logic they share the same remote genus of substance with sensible substances, from the viewpoint of physics they do not belong to the same genus, as neither do heavenly and terrestrial bodies. For the corruptible and the incorruptible do not belong to the same genus, as the Metaphysics says. For the logician considers concepts in themselves; and from this point of view nothing prevents the immaterial and the material, or the incorruptible and the corruptible, from having something in common. But the philosopher of nature and the metaphysician treat of essences as existing in reality; and therefore they say that there are different genera wherever they find diverse modes of potency and act, and consequently diverse modes of being. Neither has God any accidental characteristics, as we will prove later. If other immaterial substances have such characteristics, we do not know them. Accordingly, we cannot say that we know immaterial substances obscurely by knowing their genus and observable accidents.
Et ideo non possumus dicere quod confusa cognitione cognoscantur a nobis substantiae immateriales per cognitionem generis et apparentium accidentium. Sed loco cognitionis generis habemus in istis substantiis cognitionem per negationes, ut cum scimus quod huiusmodi substantiae sunt immateriales, incorporeae non habentes figuras et alia huiusmodi. Et quanto plures negationes de eis cognoscimus, tanto et minus confusa est earum cognitio in nobis, eo quod per negationes sequentes prior negatio contrahitur et determinatur, sicut genus remotum per differentias. Unde etiam et corpora caelestia, in quantum sunt alterius generis ab istis inferioribus, a nobis ut plurimum per negationes cognoscuntur, utpote quia neque sunt levia neque gravia neque calida neque frigida. Loco autem accidentium habemus in substantiis praedictis habitudines earum ad substantias sensibiles vel secundum comparationem causae ad effectum vel secundum comparationem excessus. Instead of knowing the genus of these substances, we know them (+) by negations; for example, by understanding that they are immaterial, incorporeal, without shapes, and so on. The more negations we know of them the less vaguely we understand them, for subsequent negations limit and determine a previous negation as differences do a remote genus. Our knowledge of the heavenly bodies is also negative for the most part, because they belong to a different genus from that of inferior bodies. We know, for instance, that they are not light or heavy, or hot or cold. And instead of accidental characteristics in these substances we have their connections with sensible ones, either with regard to (+) the relationship of cause to effect or with regard to (+) the relationship of transcendence.
Ita ergo de formis immaterialibus cognoscimus an est et habemus de eis loco cognitionis quid est cognitionem per negationem, per causalitatem et per excessum, quos etiam modos Dionysius ponit in libro de divinis nominibus. Et hoc modo Boethius intelligit esse inspiciendam ipsam divinam formam per remotionem omnium phantasmatum, non ut sciatur de ea quid est. Et per hoc patet solutio ad obiecta, quia primae rationes procedunt de cognitione quid est perfecta, aliae autem de cognitione imperfecta, qualis dicta est. We conclude, then, that in the case of immaterial forms we know that they exist; and instead of knowing what they are we have knowledge of them by way of negation, by way of causality, and by way of transcendence. These are the same ways Dionysius proposes in his Divine Names; and this is how Boethius understands that we can know the divine form by removing all images, and not that we know that it is. The solution of the opposing arguments is clear from what has been said: for the first arguments are based on perfect knowledge of what a thing is, the others on imperfect knowledge of the sort described.

Article FOUR
Can Our Intellect Behold the Divine Form by Means of Some Speculative Science?
Ad quartum sic proceditur. We proceed as follows to the fourth article:
Videtur quod ad formam divinam inspiciendam per scientias speculativas perveniri possit. It seems that we can come to behold the divine form through the speculative sciences, for:
Theologia enim pars scientiae speculativae est, ut hic Boethius dicit. Sed ad theologiam pertinet ipsam formam inspicere divinam, ut hic dicitur. Ergo ad cognoscendam divinam formam potest perveniri per scientias speculativas. 1. As Boethius says here, theology is a part of speculative science. But, as he says, it belongs to theology to behold the divine form itself. Therefore we can arrive at a knowledge of that form through the speculative sciences.
Praeterea, de substantiis immaterialibus in aliqua scientia speculativa determinatur, quia in scientia divina. Sed quaecumque scientia determinat de aliqua substantia, inspicit formam illius substantiae, quia omnis cognitio est per formam et omnis demonstrationis secundum philosophum principium est quod quid est. Ergo inspicere formas separatas possumus per scientias speculativas. 2. Again, there is a speculative science treating of immaterial substances, namely divine science. Now any science treating of a substance beholds the form of that substance, because all knowledge is by means of form, and according to the Philosopher all demonstration begins with essence. Therefore we can behold separate forms through the speculative sciences.
Praeterea, ultima felicitas hominis secundum philosophos consistit in intelligendo substantias separatas. Cum enim felicitas sit operatio perfectissima, oportet quod sit optimorum sub intellectu cadentium, ut potest accipi ex philosopho in X Ethicorum. Est autem felicitas illa, de qua philosophi loquuntur, operatio a sapientia procedens, cum sapientia sit perfectissima virtus perfectissimae potentiae, scilicet intellectus, et haec operatio sit felicitas, ut dicitur in X Ethicorum. Ergo per sapientiam intelliguntur substantiae separatae. Sed sapientia est scientia quaedam speculativa, ut patet in principio metaphysicae et in VI Ethicorum. Ergo per scientias speculativas possumus intelligere substantias separatas. 3. Again, according to the philosophers, the ultimate happiness of man is to understand the separate substances For, since happiness is the most perfect activity, it must have to do with the most excellent things falling under the intellect, as we can learn from the Philosopher in the Ethics. Now the happiness described by the philosophers is an activity springing from wisdom, since wisdom is the most perfect virtue of the most perfect power ─ the intellect; and, as the Ethics says, this activity is happiness. Through wisdom, therefore, we understand the separate substances. Now wisdom is a speculative science, as is clear in the Metaphysics and Ethics. So we can understand the separate substances through the speculative sciences.
Praeterea, frustra est quod non potest pertingere ad finem propter quem est. Sed omnium scientiarum speculativarum consideratio ordinatur sicut in finem in cognitionem substantiarum separatarum, quia perfectissimum in quolibet genere est finis. Ergo si per scientias speculativas huiusmodi substantiae intelligi non possent, omnes scientiae speculativae essent frustra, quod est inconveniens. 4. Again, if something is unable to reach the end for which it exists it is to no purpose. But the inquiry in all the speculative sciences is directed to a knowledge of the separate substances as to its end, because in any class of things the most perfect is the goal [of all the rest], Therefore if substances of this sort cannot be understood through the speculative sciences, all of them would be to no purpose, which is absurd.
Praeterea, omne, quod ordinatur naturaliter in finem aliquem, habet sibi indita aliqua principia, quibus potest pervenire in finem illum, ex quibus inclinatur etiam in finem illum; naturalium enim motionum principia sunt intra. Sed homo naturaliter est ordinatus ad cognitionem substantiarum immaterialium sicut ad finem, ut a sanctis et a philosophis traditur. Ergo habet in se aliqua principia illius cognitionis naturaliter indita. Sed omne illud, in quod possumus devenire ex principiis naturaliter notis, pertinet ad considerationem alicuius scientiae speculativae. Ergo cognitio substantiarum immaterialium ad aliquas scientias speculativas pertinet. 5. Again, everything directed by nature to an end has been previously endowed with principles by which it is able to arrive at that end and by which it also tends toward that end; for the Principles of natural motions are within a thing. Now the end of man to which he is directed by nature is to know the immaterial substances, as both the saints and the philosophers teach. So man is naturally endowed with principles of that knowledge. But everything we can arrive at from naturally known principles is included in one of the speculative sciences. Therefore the knowledge of immaterial substances pertains to some speculative sciences.
Sed contra est quod Commentator dicit in III de anima quod ad hanc positionem sequitur vel quod scientiae speculativae nondum sint perfectae, cum illae scientiae nondum sint inventae, quibus possimus substantias separatas intelligere, et hoc, si contingat ex ignorantia aliquorum principiorum quod nondum substantias praedictas intelligamus; vel si contingat ex defectu naturae nostrae quod non possimus illas scientias speculativas invenire, quibus praedictae substantiae intelligantur, sequetur quod si aliqui nati sunt huiusmodi scientias invenire, quod nos et ipsi simus aequivoce homines; On the contrary, the Commentator says that there are two possible consequences of this position. (1) Either the speculative sciences are not yet perfect, because we have not discovered the sciences by which we can know the separate substances, and this owing to the fact we do not yet understand these substances because of our ignorance of some principles; or (2) if it happens because of some defect in our nature that we cannot discover the speculative sciences by which these substances may be known, it follows that, if some men can discover these sciences, we and they are men only in an equivocal sense.
quorum primum est improbabile, secundum autem est impossibile. Ergo non potest hoc per aliquas speculativas scientias esse quod substantias praedictas intelligamus. The first of these is improbable; the second is impossible. So we cannot understand these substances through some speculative sciences.
Praeterea, in scientiis speculativis investigantur diffinitiones, quibus rerum essentiae intelliguntur per viam divisionis generis in differentias et per investigationem causarum rei et accidentium ipsius quae magnam partem conferunt ad cognoscendum quod quid est. Sed haec non possumus de substantiis immaterialibus cognoscere, quia, ut iam dictum est, naturaliter loquendo non conveniunt in genere cum istis sensibilibus substantiis nobis notis; causam autem vel non habent, ut Deus, vel est nobis occultissima, sicut causa Angelorum; accidentia etiam eorum sunt nobis ignota. Ergo non potest aliqua scientia speculativa esse, per quam perveniamus ad intelligendas substantias immateriales. Moreover, in the speculative sciences we search after definitions, by which we understand the essences of things through the division of a genus into differences and through the examination of a thing’s causes and accidents, which contribute a great deal to our knowledge of the essence. But we cannot know these in the case of immaterial substances, because, as we have already said, from the viewpoint of physics they have no (~) genus in common with the sensible substances known to us. And either they do not have a (~) cause, as in the case of God, or their cause is deeply hidden from us, as in the case of the angels, Their (~) accidents are also unknown to us. So there can be no speculative science through which we may come to understand immaterial substances.
Praeterea, in scientiis speculativis rerum essentiae per diffinitiones cognoscuntur. Diffinitio autem est sermo quidam compositus ex genere et differentiis. Substantiarum autem illarum essentiae sunt simplices, nec intercidit in earum quiditatibus aliqua compositio, ut videtur per philosophum et Commentatorem in IX metaphysicae. Ergo per scientias speculativas non possumus substantias praedictas intelligere. Moreover, in the speculative sciences we know the essences of things through definitions. Now a definition is a phrase made up of a genus and differences. But the essences of these substances are simple and there is no composition in their quiddities, as is clear from the Philosopher and the Commentator. So we cannot understand these substances through the speculative sciences.
Responsio. Dicendum quod in scientiis speculativis semper ex aliquo prius noto proceditur tam in demonstrationibus propositionum quam etiam in inventionibus diffinitionum. Sicut enim ex propositionibus praecognitis aliquis devenit in cognitionem conclusionis, ita ex conceptione generis et differentiae et causarum rei aliquis devenit in cognitionem speciei. Hic autem non est possibile in infinitum procedere, quia sic omnis scientia periret et quantum ad demonstrationes et quantum ad diffinitiones, cum infinita non sit pertransire. Unde omnis consideratio scientiarum speculativarum reducitur in aliqua prima, quae quidem homo non habet necesse addiscere aut invenire, ne oporteat in infinitum procedere, sed eorum notitiam naturaliter habet. Et huiusmodi sunt principia demonstrationum indemonstrabilia, ut omne totum est maius sua parte et similia, in quae omnes demonstrationes scientiarum reducuntur, et etiam primae conceptiones intellectus, ut entis et unius et huiusmodi, in quae oportet reducere omnes diffinitiones scientiarum praedictarum. Reply: In the speculative sciences we always proceed from something previously known, both in demonstrating propositions and also in finding definitions. For just as one comes to know a conclusion by means of propositions previously known, so also from the concept of a genus and difference and from the causes of a thing he comes to know its species. But it is impossible to go on to infinity in this case, because then all science would cease, both as regards demonstrations and as regards definitions, since the infinite cannot be traversed. So inquiry in all the speculative sciences works back to something first given, which one does not have to learn or discover (otherwise he would have to go on to infinity), but which he knows naturally. Such are the indemonstrable principles of demonstration (for example, Every whole is greater than its part, and the like), to which all demonstrations in the sciences are reducible. Such, too, are the first conceptions of the intellect (for example, being, one, and the like), to which all definitions in the sciences must be reduced.
Ex quo patet quod nihil potest sciri in scientiis speculativis neque per viam demonstrationis neque per viam diffinitionis nisi ea tantummodo, ad quae praedicta naturaliter cognita se extendunt. Huiusmodi autem naturaliter cognita homini manifestantur ex ipso lumine intellectus agentis, quod est homini naturale, quo quidem lumine nihil manifestatur nobis, nisi in quantum per ipsum phantasmata fiunt intelligibilia in actu. Hic enim est actus intellectus agentis, ut dicitur in III de anima. Phantasmata autem a sensu accipiuntur; unde principium cognitionis praedictorum principiorum est ex sensu et memoria, ut patet per philosophum in fine posteriorum, et sic huiusmodi principia non ducunt nos ulterius nisi ad ea quorum cognitionem accipere possumus ex his quae sensu comprehenduntur. From this it is clear that the only things we can know in the speculative sciences, either through demonstration or definition, are those that lie within the range of these naturally known principles. Now these principles are revealed to man by the light of the agent intellect, which is something natural to him; and this light makes things known to us only to the extent that it renders images actually intelligible; for in this consists the operation of the agent intellect, as the De Anima says. Now images are taken from the senses. So our knowledge of the above-mentioned principles begins in the senses and memory, as is evident from the Philosopher. Consequently, these principles do not carry us beyond that which we can know from the objects grasped by the senses.
Quiditas autem substantiarum separatarum non potest cognosci per ea quae a sensibus accipimus, ut ex praedictis patet, quamvis per sensibilia possimus devenire ad cognoscendum praedictas substantias esse et aliquas earum condiciones. Et ideo per nullam scientiam speculativam potest sciri de aliqua substantia separata quid est, quamvis per scientias speculativas possimus scire ipsas esse et aliquas earum condiciones, utpote quod sunt intellectuales, incorruptibiles et huiusmodi. Et haec est etiam sententia Commentatoris in III de anima, quamvis Avempace contrarium dixerit ex hoc quod aestimabat quiditates rerum sensibilium sufficienter exprimere quiditates immateriales, quod patet esse falsum, ut ibidem Commentator dicit, cum quiditas de utrisque dicatur quasi aequivoce. Now we cannot know the essence of the separate substances through that which we take from the senses. This is clear from what was said above. But through sensible things we can arrive at a knowledge of the existence of these substances and of some of their characteristics. So we cannot know the quiddity of any separate substance by means of a speculative science, though the speculative sciences enable us to know the existence of these substances and some of their traits; for instance, that they are intellectual, incorruptible, and the like. This is also the teaching of the Commentator. Avempace (Ibn-Bajja) was of the opposite opinion; he thought that the quiddities of sensible things adequately reveal immaterial quiddities; but, as the Commentator says, this is clearly false, because quiddity is predicated of both almost in an equivocal sense.
Replies to Opposing Arguments:
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Boethius non intendit dicere quod per scientiam theologiae possumus ipsam formam divinam contemplari quid est, sed solum eam esse ultra omnia phantasmata. Reply to 1. Boethius does not intend to say that through the science of theology we can contemplate the essence of the divine form itself, but only that is transcends all images.
Ad secundum dicendum quod quaedam res sunt a nobis per se ipsas cognoscibiles, et in talibus manifestandis scientiae speculativae utuntur earum diffinitionibus ad demonstrandum ipsarum proprietates, sicut accidit in scientiis quae demonstrant propter quid. Quaedam vero res sunt, quae non sunt nobis cognoscibiles ex se ipsis, sed per effectus suos. Et si quidem effectus sit adaequans causam, ipsa quiditas effectus accipitur ut principium ad demonstrandum causam esse et ad investigandum quiditatem eius, ex qua iterum proprietates eius ostenduntur. Si autem sit effectus non adaequans causam, tunc diffinitio effectus accipitur ut principium ad demonstrandum causam esse et aliquas condiciones eius, quamvis quiditas causae sit semper ignota, et ita accidit in substantiis separatis. Reply to 2. Some things are knowable to us through themselves; and in clarifying them the speculative sciences use the definitions of these objects to demonstrate their properties, as in the case of the sciences that demonstrate through causes. Other things are not knowable to us through themselves but through their effects. If the effect is proportionate to its cause, we take the quiddity itself of the effect as our starting point to prove that the cause exists and to investigate its quiddity, from which in turn its properties are demonstrated. But if the effect is not proportionate to its cause, we take the definition of the effect as the starting point to prove only the existence of the cause and some of its properties, while the quiddity of the cause remains unknown. This is what happens in the case of the separate substances.
Ad tertium dicendum quod duplex est felicitas hominis. Una imperfecta quae est in via, de qua loquitur philosophus, et haec consistit in contemplatione substantiarum separatarum per habitum sapientiae, imperfecta tamen et tali, qualis in via est possibilis, non ut sciatur ipsarum quiditas. Alia est perfecta in patria, in qua ipse Deus per essentiam videbitur et aliae substantiae separatae. Sed haec felicitas non erit per aliquam scientiam speculativam, sed per lumen gloriae. Reply to 3. Man’s happiness is twofold. One is the imperfect happiness found in this life, of which the Philosopher speaks, and this consists in contemplating the separate substances through the habit of wisdom. But this contemplation is imperfect and such as is possible in our present life, not such that we can know their quiddity. The other is the perfect happiness of heaven, where we will see God himself through his essence and the other separate substances. But this happiness will not come through a speculative science; it will come through the light of glory.
Ad quartum dicendum quod scientiae speculativae ordinantur in cognitionem substantiarum separatarum imperfectam, ut dictum est. Reply to 4. As we have said, the speculative sciences are directed to an imperfect knowledge of the separate substances.
Ad quintum dicendum quod nobis sunt indita principia, quibus nos possimus praeparare ad illam cognitionem perfectam substantiarum separatarum, non autem quibus ad eam possimus pertingere. Quamvis enim homo naturaliter inclinetur in finem ultimum, non tamen potest naturaliter illum consequi, sed solum per gratiam, et hoc est propter eminentiam illius finis. Reply to 5. We are endowed with principles by which we can prepare for that perfect knowledge of separate substances but not with principles by which to reach it. For even though by his nature man is inclined to his ultimate end, he cannot reach it by nature but only by grace, and this owing to the loftiness of that end.