||Lesson 1: Metaphysics Studies Substance
Lesson 2: Three Classes of Substances
Lesson 3: Characteristics of Forms
Lesson 4: The Principles of Movable Substances
Lesson 5: An Eternal Immovable Substance Must Exist
Lesson 6: Eternal Motion Requires An Eternal Mover
Lesson 7: How the First Mover Causes Motion
Lesson 8: The Perfection of the First Substance
Lesson 9: The Number of Primary Movers
Lesson 10: The Number of Unmoved Movers
Lesson 11: The Dignity of the First Intelligence
Lesson 12: God Is the Final Cause of All Things. The Order of the Universe
|LESSON I: Metaphysics Studies Substance
|ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 1: 1069a 18-1069a 30
|[1069α]  περὶ
τῆς οὐσίας ἡ
θεωρία: τῶν γὰρ
οὐσιῶν αἱ ἀρχαὶ
καὶ τὰ αἴτια
||1023. The study here is concerned with substance; for it is the principles and causes of substances which are being investigated.
γὰρ εἰ ὡς ὅλον
τι τὸ πᾶν,  ἡ
μέρος: καὶ εἰ
τῷ ἐφεξῆς, κἂν
οὕτως πρῶτον ἡ
οὐσία, εἶτα τὸ
ποιόν, εἶτα τὸ
||1024. For if the totality of things is a kind of whole, substance is its first part; and if things constitute a whole by reason of succession, substance is also first, and then quality or quantity.
οὐδ᾽ ὄντα ὡς
κινήσεις, ἢ καὶ
τὸ οὐ λευκὸν καὶ
τὸ οὐκ εὐθύ:
||1025. And in like manner the latter are not to be regarded as beings in an unqualified sense, but as qualities and motions of being. Otherwise the not-straight and not-white would be beings; for we say that they are, for example, “the not-white is.”
||1026. Again, none of the other genera can exist separately.
δὲ καὶ οἱ
τῆς γὰρ οὐσίας
καὶ αἴτια. οἱ
μὲν οὖν νῦν τὰ
γὰρ γένη καθόλου,
ἅ φασιν ἀρχὰς
καὶ οὐσίας εἶναι
μᾶλλον διὰ τὸ
λογικῶς ζητεῖν): οἱ δὲ πάλαι τὰ καθ᾽ ἕκαστα,
οἷον πῦρ καὶ γῆν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τὸ  κοινόν, σῶμα.
||1027. The ancient philosophers testify to this in practice, for it was of substance that they sought the principles, elements and causes. Present-day thinkers [Platonists] however, maintain that universals are substances; for genera are universals, and they say that these are principles and substances to a greater degree because they investigate the matter dialectically. But the ancient philosophers regarded particular things as substances, for example, fire and earth, and not a common body.|
|Postquam philosophus in praecedenti libro recollegerat quae ante dicta erant tam in hoc libro quam in libro physicorum de entibus imperfectis, in hoc libro intendit recolligere quae dicta sunt de ente simpliciter idest, de substantia, tam in septimo et in octavo huius, quam etiam in primo physicorum, et addere id quod deest ad complendam considerationem de substantiis. Et dividitur in partes duas. In prima ostendit quod ad istam scientiam pertinet considerare praecipue de substantia. In secunda de substantia determinat, ibi, substantiae vero tres.
||2416. Having summarized in the preceding book the points that were previously made regarding imperfect being both in this work and in the Physics, in this book the Philosopher aims to summarize the things that have been said about being in its unqualified sense, i.e., substance, both in Books VII and VIII of this work and in Book I of the Physics, and to add anything that is missing in order to make his study of substances complete. This is divided into two parts. First (1023:C 2416), he shows that this science is chiefly concerned with substances. Second (1028:C 2424), he gives his views about the classes of substances (“Now there are three”).
|Circa primum duo facit. Primo proponit quod intendit; dicens quod in hac scientia est theoria, idest consideratio principalis de substantia. Nam cum ista scientia, utpote prima, et quae sapientia dicitur, principia prima entium inquirat, necesse est quod in hac scientia inquirantur principaliter principia et causae substantiarum. Nam ista sunt principia entium prima. Quomodo autem differant principium et causa, in quinto habitum est.
||In regard to the first he does two things. First, he states his thesis. He says that in this science “the study,” i.e., the principal inquiry, has to do with substances. For since this science, being the first and the one called wisdom, investigates the first principles of beings, the principles and causes of substances must constitute its main object of study; for these are the first principles of beings. The way in which principle and cause differ has been pointed out in Book V (403:C 760).
||2417. For if the totality (1024)
|Etenim et si probat propositum quatuor modis. Primo per hoc quod substantia est prior aliis entibus. Unde scientia prima, de primo ente debet principaliter determinare. Quod autem substantia sit prima inter omnia entia, manifestat per simile in rebus sensibilibus, in quibus invenitur ordo inter aliqua dupliciter. Uno modo secundum quod partes alicuius totius habent ordinem adinvicem, sicut in animali pars prima est cor, et in domo fundamentum. Alio modo secundum quod aliqua sunt consequenter se habentia, ex quibus non fit unum vel continuitate vel contactu. Sicut in exercitu dicitur prima acies, et secunda acies. Sicut igitur in aliquo toto est aliqua prima pars, et sicut iterum in his quae consequenter se habent, est aliquod primum, ita substantia est primum inter omnia alia entia. Et hoc est quod dicit, quod si omne, idest universitas entium sit quoddam totum, substantia est prima pars, sicut fundamentum in domo. Et si entia se habent sicut ea quae sunt consequenter, ita etiam substantia erit primum, et deinde quantitas, et qualitas, et alia genera.
||He proves his thesis in four ways. The first proof runs thus. Since substance is prior to the other kinds of beings, the first science should be one that is chiefly concerned with the primary kind of being. He shows that substance is the primary kind of being by using an analogous case in the realm of sensible things, among which order is found in two ways. One kind of order is found among sensible things inasmuch as the parts of any whole have a certain natural arrangement; for example, the first part of an animal is the heart, and the first part of a house the foundation. Another kind of order is found among sensible things inasmuch as some follow others and one thing is not constituted from them either by continuity or by contact. It is in this sense that one speaks of the first and second lines of an army. Hence, just as there is some first part in any whole, and also some first entity among things that follow one another, so too substance is the first of all other beings. This is what he means when he says “For if the totality,” i.e., the universe of beings, is a kind of whole, substance is its first part, just as the foundation is the first part of a house. And if beings are like things that follow one another, substance again will be first, and then quantity, and then the other categories.
|Averrois autem non attendens hoc secundum similitudinem dici, quia consideravit non posse cadere in alicuius mentem, quod omnia alia genera entium essent sicut partes unius totius continui, divertit a plano sensu literae in aliam expositionem, dicens per haec duo Aristotelem intendisse duplicem habitudinem quam contingit opinari in entibus; scilicet vel quod habeant se sicut ea quae sunt unius naturae et unius generis, quod esset si ens esset commune genus eorum vel qualitercumque communitatem habens ad ea. Et hoc intelligit cum dicit, si ut totum quoddam. Vel quod habeant se adinvicem sicut quae in nullo communi conveniunt. Et hoc intellexit cum dixit, et si in eo quod consequenter et cetera. Utrolibet enim modo sequitur quod substantia sit prior aliis entibus.
||2418. But Averroes, failing to consider that this statement is analogical because he considered it impossible for anyone to think that all the other genera of beings should be parts of one continuous whole, departs from the obvious sense of the text and explains it in a different way. He says that by these two orders Aristotle meant the twofold relationship which can be conceived between things. The first is that beings are related as things having one nature and one genus, which would be true if being were their common genus, or in whatever way it might be common to them. He says that this is Aristotle’s meaning when he says “If the totality of things is a kind of whole.” The second is that beings are related as things having nothing in common. He says that this is Aristotle’s meaning when he says “And if things constitute a whole by reason of succession”; for in either case it follows that substance is prior to the other kinds of being.
||2419. But in like manner (1025).
|Deinde cum dicit similiter autem secundo modo probat idem; dicens, quod quantitas et qualitas et huiusmodi non sunt simpliciter entia, ut infra dicetur. Nam ens dicitur quasi esse habens, hoc autem solum est substantia, quae subsistit. Accidentia autem dicuntur entia, non quia sunt, sed quia magis ipsis aliquid est; sicut albedo dicitur esse, quia eius subiectum est album. Ideo dicit, quod non dicuntur simpliciter entia, sed entis entia, sicut qualitas et motus.
||Then he gives a second proof of his thesis. He says that quantity and quality and the like are not beings in an unqualified sense, as will be said below. For being means something having existence, but it is substance alone that subsists. And accidents are called beings, not because they are but rather because by them something is; for example, whiteness is said to be because by it the subject is white. Hence Aristotle says that accidents, as quality and motion, are not called beings in an unqualified sense, but beings of a being.
|Nec est mirum, si accidentia dicuntur entia, cum non sint simpliciter entia, quia etiam privationes et negationes dicuntur quodammodo entia, sicut non album et non rectum. Dicimus enim quod non album est; non quia non album esse habeat, sed quia subiectum aliquod est albedine privatum. Hoc igitur commune est inter accidentia et privationes, quia de utrisque dicitur ens ratione subiecti. Sed in hoc differunt, quia subiectum secundum accidentia habet esse aliquale, secundum vero privationes non habet esse aliquale, sed est deficiens ab esse.
||2420. Nor is it surprising if accidents are called beings even though they are not beings in an unqualified sense, because even privations and negations are called beings in a sense, for example, the not-white and the not-straight. For we say that the not-white is, not because the not-white has being, but because some subject is deprived of whiteness. Accidents and privations have this in common, then, that being is predicated of both by reason of their subject. Yet they differ in this respect that, while a subject has being of some kind by reason of its accidents, it does not have being of any kind by reason of privations, but is deficient in being.
|Sic igitur, cum accidentia non sint simpliciter entia, sed solum substantiae, haec scientia, quae considerat ens inquantum est ens, non considerat principaliter accidentia, sed substantias.
||2421. Therefore, since accidents are not beings in an unqualified sense, but only substances are, this science, which considers being as being, is not chiefly concerned with accidents but with substances.
||2422. Again, none (1026).
|Deinde cum dicit amplius nihil tertio modo probat, quia scilicet alia entia non possunt separari a substantia. Accidentia enim non possunt esse nisi in subiecto. Et ideo in consideratione substantiae includitur consideratio accidentium.
||Then he gives a third proof of his thesis that the other kinds of beings cannot exist apart from substance. For accidents can exist only in a subject, and therefore the study of accidents is included in that of substance.
||2423. The ancient philosophers (1027).
|Deinde cum dicit testantur autem quarto probat idem, dicens, quod etiam philosophi antiqui testantur ipso facto, quod philosophi consideratio est de substantiis; quia quaerentes causas entis, quaerunt causas substantiae solum. Et hoc fecerunt et quidam moderni, sed tamen differenter. Non enim quaerebant principia et elementa et causas eodem modo, sed diversimode. Nam moderni, scilicet Platonici, dicunt universalia magis esse substantias quam particularia. Dicunt enim, genera, quae sunt universalia, magis esse principia et causas substantiarum quam particularia. Et hoc ideo, quia logice inquirebant de rebus. Universalia enim, quae secundum rationem sunt abstracta a sensibilibus, credebant etiam in rerum natura abstracta fore, et principia particularium. Sed antiqui philosophi ut Democritus et Empedocles, posuerunt substantias et principia rerum esse particularia, ut ignem et terram; non autem hoc commune, quod est corpus.
||He gives a fourth proof of his thesis. He says that the ancient philosophers also testify to the fact that the philosopher is concerned with substances, because in seeking the causes of being they looked for the causes only of substance. And some of the moderns also did this, but in a different way; for they did not seek principles, causes and elements in the same way, but differently. For the moderns—the Platonists—claimed that universals are substances to a greater degree than particular things; for they said that genera, which are universals, are principles and causes of substances to a greater degree than particular things. They did this because they investigated things from the viewpoint of dialectics; for they thought that universals, which are separate according to their mode of definition from sensible things, are also separate in reality, and that they are the principles of particular things. But the ancient philosophers, such as Democritus and Empedocles, claimed that the substances and principles of things are particular entities, such as fire and earth, but not this common principle, body.
|Three Classes of Substances
|ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapters 1 & 2: 1069a 30-1069b 32
|οὐσίαι δὲ τρεῖς, μία
μὲν αἰσθητή—ἧς ἡ μὲν
ἀΐδιος ἡ δὲ
φθαρτή, ἣν πάντες
ὁμολογοῦσιν, οἷον τὰ φυτὰ καὶ τὰ ζῷα [ἡ δ᾽ ἀΐδιος]—ἧς ἀνάγκη τὰ στοιχεῖα λαβεῖν, εἴτε
ἓν εἴτε πολλά: ἄλλη δὲ ἀκίνητος, καὶ ταύτην φασί
οἱ μὲν εἰς δύο
 οἱ δὲ εἰς
μίαν φύσιν τιθέντες τὰ εἴδη καὶ τὰ
μαθηματικά, οἱ δὲ τὰ
μαθηματικὰ μόνον τούτων. ἐκεῖναι μὲν δὴ φυσικῆς (μετὰ κινήσεως γάρ), [1069β]
 αὕτη δὲ ἑτέρας,
εἰ μηδεμία αὐτοῖς ἀρχὴ
||1028. Now there are three classes of substances. One is sensible, and of this class one kind is eternal and another perishable. The latter, such as plants and animals, all men recognize. But it is the eternal whose elements we must grasp, whether they are one or many. Another class is the immovable, which certain thinkers claim to have separate existence, some dividing it into two kinds, others maintaining that the separate Forms and the objects of mathematics are of one nature, and still others a holding that only the objects of mathematics belong to this class. The first two classes of substance belong to the philosophy of nature since they involve motion; but the last belongs to a different science if there is no principle common to these three.
|ἡ δ᾽ αἰσθητὴ οὐσία
μεταβλητή. εἰ δ᾽ ἡ
τῶν ἀντικειμένων ἢ τῶν μεταξύ, ἀντικειμένων δὲ μὴ  πάντων (οὐ λευκὸν
φωνή) ἀλλ᾽ ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου, ἀνάγκη ὑπεῖναί τι τὸ
εἰς τὴν ἐναντίωσιν: οὐ γὰρ τὰ ἐναντία μεταβάλλει. ἔτι τὸ
μὲν ὑπομένει, τὸ
δ᾽ ἐναντίον οὐχ
ἄρα τι τρίτον
παρὰ τὰ ἐναντία,
||1029. Sensible substance is capable of being changed. And if change proceeds from opposites or from intermediates, yet not from all opposites (for the spoken word is not white) but only from a contrary, then there must be some underlying subject which can be changed from one contrary to another; for contraries themselves are not changed (730). Further, this subject remains, whereas a contrary does not remain. Therefore there is some third thing besides the contraries, and this is matter.
|εἰ δὴ αἱ
ἢ κατὰ τὸ τί  ἢ
κατὰ τὸ ποῖον ἢ
πόσον ἢ ποῦ, καὶ
γένεσις μὲν ἡ ἁπλῆ
καὶ φθορὰ ἡ κατὰ
<τὸ> τόδε, αὔξησις
δὲ καὶ φθίσις ἡ
κατὰ τὸ ποσόν, ἀλλοίωσις
δὲ ἡ κατὰ τὸ πάθος,
φορὰ δὲ ἡ κατὰ
τόπον, εἰς ἐναντιώσεις
ἂν εἶεν τὰς καθ᾽
τὴν ὕλην δυναμένην
||1030. If, then, there are four kinds of change: either in substance or in quality or in quantity or in place, and if change in substance is generation and destruction without qualification, and change in quantity is increase and decrease, and change in attribute is alteration, and change in place is local motion, then the changes occurring in each case must be changes to contrary states. Therefore it must be the matter which is capable of being changed to both states.
διττὸν τὸ ὄν,
ἐκ τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος
εἰς τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ
ὄν (οἷον ἐκ
εἰς τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ
δὲ καὶ ἐπ᾽ αὐξήσεως
καὶ φθίσεως), ὥστε οὐ μόνον κατὰ
συμβεβηκὸς ἐνδέχεται γίγνεσθαι ἐκ μὴ ὄντος,
ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐξ ὄντος
 μέντοι ὄντος, ἐκ μὴ ὄντος
||1031. And since being is twofold, every change is from potential being to actual being, for example, from potentially white to actually white. The same is true of increase and decrease. Hence not only can a thing come to be accidentally from nonbeing, but all things come to be from being, i.e., from potential being, not from actual being.
|καὶ τοῦτ᾽ ἔστι τὸ Ἀναξαγόρου ἕν:
γὰρ ἢ "ὁμοῦ πάντα"—καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλέους τὸ μῖγμα καὶ Ἀναξιμάνδρου, καὶ ὡς Δημόκριτός
φησιν—"ἦν ὁμοῦ πάντα δυνάμει, ἐνεργείᾳ δ᾽ οὔ": ὥστε τῆς ὕλης ἂν
||1032. And this is the “One” of Anaxagoras; for it is better to maintain this view than to claim that “all things were together.” And this is the “Mixture” of Empedocles and Anaximander, and it recalls the statement of Democritus that all things were together potentially but not at all actually. Hence all these thinkers were touching upon matter.
|πάντα δ᾽ ὕλην ἔχει ὅσα
 ἀλλ᾽ ἑτέραν:
καὶ τῶν ἀϊδίων
γενητὰ κινητὰ δὲ
φορᾷ, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ γενητὴν ἀλλὰ
||1033. Now all things which undergo change have matter, but different things have different matters; and of eternal things, those which are incapable of being generated but can be moved by local motion have matter. Yet they do not have that kind of matter which is subject to generation, but only such as is subject to motion from one place to another (697).
τις ἐκ ποίου μὴ ὄντος
τριχῶς γὰρ τὸ μὴ ὄν. εἰ δή τι ἔστι δυνάμει, ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως
οὐ τοῦ τυχόντος ἀλλ᾽ ἕτερον ἐξ ἑτέρου: οὐδ᾽ ἱκανὸν
ὅτι ὁμοῦ πάντα  χρήματα: διαφέρει γὰρ τῇ ὕλῃ, ἐπεὶ διὰ τί ἄπειρα ἐγένετο
ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ἕν; ὁ γὰρ
νοῦς εἷς, ὥστ᾽ εἰ καὶ ἡ ὕλη
ἐγένετο ἐνεργείᾳ οὗ ἡ ὕλη
||1034. And one might raise the question from what kind of non-being generation could come about; for non-being is spoken of in three senses. If, then, one kind of non-being is potentiality, still it is not from anything at all that a thing comes to be, but different things come from different things. Nor is it enough to say that “all things were together,” since they differ in their matter, for otherwise why would an infinite number of things be generated and not just one thing? For mind is one, so that if matter were also one, only that could come to be actually whose matter was in potentiality.|
|Postquam ostendit quod consideratio philosophi principaliter de substantiis est, hic incipit de substantiis determinare: et dividitur in partes duas. In prima dividit substantiam. In secunda de partibus divisionis determinat, ibi, sensibilis vero substantia.
||2424. Having explained that philosophy is concerned chiefly with substances, here the Philosopher begins to deal with substances. This is divided into two parts. In the first (1028:C 2424) he makes a division of substance; and in the second (1029:C 2428) he treats the parts of this division (“Sensible substance”).
|Dicit ergo primo, quod tres sunt substantiae. Una quidem est sensibilis, quae in duo genera dividitur. Nam substantiarum sensibilium quaedam sunt sempiternae, scilicet corpora caelestia, quaedam vero sunt corruptibiles. Substantia vero sensibilis et corruptibilis nota est omnibus, sicut sunt plantae et animalia.
||He accordingly says, first (1028), that there are three classes of substances. One is sensible, and this is divided into two kinds; for some sensible substances are eternal (the celestial bodies) and others perishable. Sensible and perishable substances, such as animals and plants, are recognized by all.
|Sed alia substantia sensibilis, scilicet sempiterna, est cuius principia quaerere intendimus in hoc libro; scilicet si unum sit eorum principium vel multa. Hoc enim inquiret considerando de substantiis separatis, quae sunt principia moventia et fines corporum caelestium, ut infra patebit. Ponit autem hic large elementa loco principiorum. Nam elementum proprie non est nisi causa intrinseca.
||2425. But it is “the other class of sensible substance,” i.e., the eternal, whose principles we aim to discover in this book, whether their principles are one or many. He will investigate this by considering the separate substances, which arc both the sources of motion and the ends of the celestial bodies, as will be made clear below (1086:C 2590-92). He uses elements in the broad sense here in place of principles; for strictly an element is only an intrinsic cause.
|Tertium vero genus est substantiae immobilis, quae non est sensibilis. Et haec non est omnibus manifesta, sed quidam ponunt eam esse separabilem a sensibilibus. Quorum opinio diversificatur. Quidam enim dividunt substantiam separabilem in duo genera: scilicet in species, quas vocant ideas, et mathematica. Sicut enim invenitur secundum rationem duplex modus separationis: unus quo separantur mathematica a materia sensibili, alius quo separantur universalia a particularibus: ita et secundum rem ponebant et universalia esse separata, quae dicebant species, et etiam mathematica. Sed quidam haec duo, scilicet species et mathematica, in unam naturam reducebant. Utrique igitur hi erant Platonici. Sed alii, scilicet Pythagorici, non ponebant species, sed solum mathematica.
||2426. The third class of substance is the immovable and imperceptible. This class is not evident to all, but some men claim that it is separate from sensible things. The opinions of these men differ; for some divide separate substances into two kinds—the separate Forms, which they call Ideas, and the objects of mathematics. For just as a twofold method of separating is found in reason, one by which the objects of mathematics are separated from sensible matter, and another by which universals are separated from particular things, in a similar way they maintained that both universals, which they called separate Forms, and also the objects of mathematics, are separate in reality. But others reduced these two classes—the separate Forms and the objects of mathematics—to one nature. Both of these groups were Platonists. But another group, the Pythagoreans, did not posit separate Forms, but only the objects of mathematics.
|Inter haec autem tria genera substantiarum hoc differt: quia substantiae sensibiles, sive sint corruptibiles sive perpetuae, pertinent ad considerationem naturalis philosophiae, quae determinat de ente mobili. Huiusmodi enim substantiae sensibiles sunt in motu. Substantia autem separabilis et immobilis pertinet ad considerationem alterius scientiae, et non ad eamdem, si tamen nullum principium sit commune utrisque substantiis: quia si in aliquo conveniant, pertinebit utrarumque substantiarum consideratio ad illam scientiam, quae illud commune considerat. Et ideo naturalis scientia considerat solum de substantiis sensibilibus, inquantum sunt in actu et in motu. Et ideo tam de his etiam quam de substantiis immobilibus considerat haec scientia, inquantum communicant in hoc quod sunt entia et substantiae.
||2427. Among these three classes of substances there is this difference, namely, that sensible substances, whether they are perishable or eternal, belong to the consideration of the philosophy of nature, which establishes the nature of movable being; for sensible substances of this kind are in motion. But separable and immovable substances belong to the study of a different science and not to the, same science if there is no principle common to both kinds of substance; for if there were a common principle, the study of both kinds of substance would belong to the science which considers that common principle. The philosophy of nature, then, considers sensible substances only inasmuch as they are actual and in motion. Hence this science (first philosophy) considers both sensible substances and immovable substances inasmuch as both are beings and substances.
||2428. Sensible substance (1029).
|Deinde cum dicit sensibilis vero determinat de praemissis substantiis. Et primo de substantia sensibili. Secundo de substantiis immobilibus, ibi, sed quoniam tres sunt.
||Then he establishes the truth about the above-mentioned substances. He does this, first (1029:C 2429), with regard to sensible substances; and second (1055:C 2488), with regard to immovable substances (“And since there are three”).
|Prima dividitur in duas. In prima inquirit principia substantiae sensibilis. In secunda inquirit utrum sint eadem principia substantiae et aliorum generum, ibi, causae vero et principia.
||The first is divided into two parts. First, he investigates the principles of sensible substances; and second (1042:C 2455), he inquires whether the principles of substances and those of the other categories are the same (“In one sense”).
|Circa primum duo facit. Primo inquirit de materia. Secundo de forma, ibi, tres vero causae et tria principia.
||In regard to the first he does two things. First, he investigates the nature of matter; and second (1035:C 2440, the nature of form (“The causes or principles”).
|Circa primum duo facit. Primo determinat veritatem de materia. Secundo solvit dubitationem, ibi, dubitabit autem aliquis ex quo.
||In regard to the first he does two things. First, he states his views about matter. Second (1034:C 2437), he meets a difficulty (“And one might raise the question”).
|Circa primum duo facit. Primo enim manifestat materiam esse in sensibilibus, et quale ens sit. Secundo, quomodo diversimode invenitur in diversis substantiis sensibilibus, ibi, omnia vero materiam habent.
||In regard to the first he does two things. First, he shows that there is matter in sensible substances; and he also shows what kind of being matter is. Second (1033:C 2436), he shows how matter differs in different kinds of sensible substances (“Now all things”).
|Circa primum duo facit. Primo quod dictum est. Secundo solvit argumentum ex quo aliqui antiqui negaverunt generationem, ibi, quoniam autem duplex.
||In regard to the first he does two things. First, he proceeds as described. Second (1031:C 2432), he meets an argument by which some of the ancient philosophers denied generation (“And since being is twofold”).
|Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit materiam esse in sensibilibus. Secundo vero ostendit quale ens sit materia, ibi, si itaque transmutationes.
||In regard to the first he does two things. First, he shows that there is matter in sensible substances. Second (1030:C 431), he shows what kind of being matter is (“If, then, there are”).
|Dicit ergo primo, quod substantia sensibilis est mutabilis, ut dictum est. Omnis autem mutatio est ex oppositis, aut ex mediis, ut supra ostensum est. Non autem est mutatio ex quibuscumque oppositis: fit enim album ex non albo, non tamen ex quolibet non albo: nam vox est non album; sed corpus non fit album ex voce, sed ex non albo, quod est nigrum vel medium. Et ideo dicit quod mutatio fit ex opposito, quod est contrarium. Nec est instantia de substantia in qua fit mutatio, cum tamen substantiae nihil sit contrarium; quia in substantia est privatio quae quodammodo computatur inter contraria, ut in decimo ostensum est.
||He accordingly says, first (1029), that sensible substance is changeable, as has been pointed out, and every change is either from opposites or from intermediates, as has been shown above (384:C 723-24). Yet change does not proceed from any opposites whatever; for the white comes from the not-white, but not from just any not-white; for a word is not-white, yet a body does not become white from a word, but from a not-white which is black or some intermediate color. Hence he says that change proceeds from an opposite which is a contrary. And there can be no rejoinder based on change in substance on the ground that there is nothing contrary to substance. For in substance there is privation which is included in a sense among contraries, as has been shown in Book X (853:C 2050-53).
|Quia igitur omnis mutatio est de contrario in contrarium, necesse est subesse aliquod subiectum, quod possit mutari de contrario in contrarium. Et hoc philosophus probat dupliciter. Primo quidem, quia unum contrariorum non transmutatur in alterum; non enim ipsa nigredo fit albedo. Unde, si debeat fieri transmutatio de nigro in album, oportet aliquid esse praeter nigredinem quod fiat album.
||2429. Hence, since every change is from one contrary to another, there must be some underlying subject which can be changed from one contrary to another. The Philosopher proves this in two ways. First, he argues on the ground that one contrary is not changed into another; for blackness itself does not become whiteness, so that, if there is a change from black to white, there must be something besides blackness which becomes white.
|Alio modo probat idem ex hoc, quod in qualibet transmutatione invenitur aliquid manens; sicut in transmutatione, quae est de nigro in album, corpus manet; aliud vero, scilicet contrarium, ut puta nigrum, non manet. Unde manifestum est, quod materia est aliquid tertium praeter contraria.
||2430. He proves the same point in another way, namely, from the fact that throughout every change something is found to remain. For example, in a change from black to white a body remains, whereas the other thing —the contrary black—does not remain. Therefore it is evident that matter is some third entity besides the contraries.
||2431. If, then, there are (1030).
|Deinde cum dicit si itaque ostendit cuiusmodi ens sit materia; et dicit, quod transmutationes sunt quatuor: generatio quidem et corruptio simplex secundum substantiam; et augmentum et diminutio secundum quantitatem; alteratio secundum passionem, quae est tertia species qualitatis; latio, idest loci mutatio, secundum ubi. Et manifestum est, quod omnes istae transmutationes erunt secundum contrarietates, quae sunt secundum unumquodque horum generum: ut puta, alteratio in contrarietatem qualitatis; augmentum in contrarietatem quantitatis, et sic de aliis. Et ita, cum in qualibet transmutatione sit quoddam tertium praeter contrarium, quod dicitur materia, necesse est, quod id quod transmutatur, sive subiectum transmutationis, quantum est de se, sit in potentia ad utrumque contrarium. Aliter enim non esset susceptivum utriusque, nec posset de uno in aliud transmutari. Sicut igitur corpus, quod transmutatur de albedine in nigredinem, inquantum est corpus, est in potentia ad utrumque, ita materia in generatione substantiae, quae est subiectum generationis et corruptionis, quantum est de se, est in potentia ad formam et privationem, nec formam nec privationem, quantum est de se, actu habens.
||He now shows what kind of being matter is. He says that there are four kinds of change: simple generation and destruction, which is change in substance; increase and decrease, which is change in quantity; alteration, which is change in affections (and constitutes the third species of quality); and “local motion,” or change of place, which pertains to the where of a thing. Now it has been shown that all of these changes involve the contrarieties that belong to each of these classes; for example, alteration involves contrariety of quality, increase involves contrariety of quantity, and so on for the others. And since in every change there is besides the contraries some third entity which is called matter, the thing undergoing the change, i.e., the subject of the change, considered just in itself, must be in potentiality to both contraries, otherwise it would not be susceptible of both or admit of change from one to the other. Thus, just as a body which is changed from white to black, qua body, is in potentiality to each of the two contraries, in a similar way in the generation of substance the matter, as the subject of generation and destruction, is of itself in potentiality both to form and to privation, and has actually of itself neither form nor privation.
||2432. And since being (1031).
|Deinde cum dicit quoniam autem hic philosophus secundum veritatem determinat de ipsa materia. Circa quod duo facit. Primo solvit dubitationem. Secundo ostendit quomodo aliqui antiqui dixerunt simile praedictae solutioni, ibi, et hoc est Anaxagorae.
||Here the Philosopher establishes the truth about matter itself, and in regard to this he does two things. First, he meets a difficulty. Second (1032:C 2435), he shows how some of the ancient philosophers offered a solution similar to the one mentioned above (“And this is the ‘One’”).
|Solvit autem hanc dubitationem antiquorum naturalium philosophorum, qui removebant generationem propter hoc, quod non credebant quod posset aliquid fieri ex non ente, quia ex nihilo fit nihil; nec etiam ex ente, quia sic esset antequam fieret.
||He meets the difficulty of the ancient philosophers who did away with generation because they did not think that anything could come from non-being, since nothing comes from nothing, or that anything could come from being, since a thing would then be before it came to be.
|Hanc ergo dubitationem philosophus solvit, ostendendo qualiter aliquid fit ex ente et ex non ente; dicens, quod duplex est ens, scilicet ens actu, et ens potentia. Omne igitur, quod transmutatur, transmutatur ex ente in potentia in actu ens; sicut cum aliquid alteratur ex albo in potentia in actu album. Et similiter est in motu ipsius augmenti et decrementi; quia transmutatur aliquid de potentia magno vel parvo, in actu magnum vel parvum. Unde et in genere substantiae fiunt omnia ex non ente et ente. Ex non ente quidem secundum accidens, inquantum fit aliquid ex materia subiecta privationi, secundum quam dicitur non ens. Sed per se fit aliquid ex ente, non autem in actu, sed in potentia, scilicet ex materia, quae est ens in potentia, ut supra ostensum est.
||2433. The Philosopher meets this difficulty by showing how a thing comes to be both from being and from non-being. He says that being is twofold—actual and potential. Hence everything which is changed is changed from a state of potential being to one of actual being; for example, a thing is changed from being potentially white to being actually white. The same thing holds true of the motion of increase and decrease, since something is changed from being potentially large or small to being actually large or small. In the category of substance, then, all things come to be both from being and from non-being. A thing comes to be accidentally from non-being inasmuch as it comes to be from a matter subject to privation, in reference to which it is called non-being. And a thing comes to be essentially from being—not actual being but potential being—i.e., from matter, which is potential being, as has been shown above (1030:C 2431).
|Sciendum est autem, quod praedictae positioni antiquorum naturalium negantium generationem et dicentium, quod generatio non est aliud quam alteratio, voluerunt obviare quidam posteriores dicentes generationem esse per segregationem ab aliquo mixto et confuso.
||2434. Now it should be borne in mind that certain later thinkers wanted to oppose the above-mentioned principle of the ancient philosophers of nature (who denied generation and destruction and claimed that generation is merely alteration) when they said that generation comes about through detachment from some mixture or confused mass.
|Philosophus ergo tertio cum dicit et hoc est ostendit quod etiam omnes sic dicentes, aliquid simile praedictae positioni dicere voluerunt, sed non attingunt. Dicit ergo quod hoc, scilicet materia quae est ens in potentia ad omnia, esse illud unum quod Anaxagoras posuit. Dicebat enim quod omne quod generatur ex aliquo, est in eo ex quo generatur. Et sic a principio omnia erant mixta in quodam uno, nesciens distinguere inter potentiam et actum. Sed dignius est ponere materiam, in qua omnia sunt in potentia, quam ponere omnia simul in actu, ut videtur ex verbis Anaxagorae. Et hoc est quod Empedocles dixit, quod a principio omnia erant mixta et confusa per amicitiam, et postea lis segregavit. Et similiter Anaximander dixit, quod in uno confuso praeexstiterant omnia contraria. Et Democritus etiam dixit, quod omnia, quae fiunt, prius erant in potentia, sed non in actu. Unde manifestum est, quod omnes isti philosophi tetigerunt quodammodo materiam, sed non perfecte ad eam pervenerunt.
||2435. Hence, when the Philosopher in the third part of his division says “And this is the one (1032),” he shows that all who expressed this view wanted to adopt a position similar to the one mentioned above, but did not succeed in doing so. Therefore he says that this, namely, matter, which is in potentiality to all forms, is the “One” of which Anaxagoras spoke; for Anaxagoras said that everything which is generated from something else is present in that thing from which it comes to be. And so, not knowing how to distinguish between potentiality and actuality, he said that in the beginning all things were mixed together in one whole. But it is more fitting to posit a matter in which all things are present potentially than to posit one in which all things are present actually and simultaneously, as seems to be the case from what Anaxagoras said. This is what Empedocles also claimed, namely, that in the beginning all things were mixed or mingled together by friendship and later were separated out by strife. Anaximander similarly held that all contraries originally existed in one confused mass. And Democritus said that everything which comes to be first exists potentially and then actually. Hence it is evident that all these philosophers touched upon matter to some extent but did not fully comprehend it.
||2436. Now all things (1033).
|Deinde cum dicit omnia vero ostendit, quod non eodem modo materia est in omnibus substantiis sensibilibus; dicens, quod quaecumque transmutantur, oportet quod habeant materiam, sed aliam et aliam. Ea enim quae transmutantur secundum substantiam, idest quae generantur et corrumpuntur, habent materiam, quae est subiectum generationis et corruptionis; quae scilicet de se est in potentia ad formas et ad privationes. Sed corpora caelestia, quae sunt sempiterna et ingenerabilia, sed mobilia secundum locum, habent quidem materiam, sed non quae est subiectum generationis, aut quae sit in potentia ad formam et privationem, sed quae est in potentia ad terminos motus localis qui sunt, unde incipit motus, et quo motus intendit.
||He shows that matter is not present in all sensible substances in the same way. He says that all things which undergo change must have matter, but of a different kind. For things which “are changed substantially,” i.e., generated and destroyed, have a matter which is subject to generation and destruction, i.e., one which is in itself in potentiality both to forms and to privations. But the celestial bodies, which are eternal and not subject to generation, yet admit of change of place, have matter—not one which admits of generation and destruction or one which is in potentiality to form and to privation, but one which is in potentiality to the termini of local motion, i.e., the point from which motion begins and the point to which it tends.
||2437. And one might raise (1034).
|Deinde cum dicit dubitabit autem solvit quamdam dubitationem circa praedeterminata; dicens, quod aliquis potest dubitare, cum generatio sit transmutatio de non ente in ens, ex quo non ente in ens fit generatio. Dicitur enim non ens tripliciter. Uno modo quod nullo modo est; et ex tali non ente non fit generatio, quia ex nihilo nihil fit secundum naturam. Alio modo dicitur non ens ipsa privatio, quae consideratur in aliquo subiecto: et ex tali non ente fit quidem generatio, sed per accidens, inquantum scilicet generatio fit ex subiecto, cui accidit privatio. Tertio modo dicitur non ens ipsa materia, quae, quantum est de se, non est ens actu, sed ens potentia. Et ex tali non ente fit generatio per se. Et hoc est quod dicit, quod si aliquod non ens est ens in potentia, ex tali, scilicet non ente, fit generatio per se.
||Then he meets a difficulty that pertains to the points established above. He says that, since generation is a change from non-being to being, one can ask from what sort of non-being generation proceeds; for non-being is said of three things. First, it is said of what does not exist in any way; and from this kind of non-being nothing is generated, because in reality nothing comes from nothing. Second, it is said of privation, which is considered in a/,subject; and while something is generated from this kind of non-being, the generation is accidental, i.e., inasmuch as something is generated from a subject to which some privation occurs. Third, it is said of matter itself, which, taken in itself, is not an actual being but a potential one. And from this kind of non-being something is generated essentially; or in his words, if one kind of non-being is potentiality, then from such a principle, i.e., non-being, something is generated essentially.
|Quamvis autem generatio fiat ex non ente quod est in potentia, non tamen fit quodlibet ex quocumque; sed diversa fiunt ex diversis materiis. Unumquodque enim generabilium habet materiam determinatam ex qua fit, quia formam oportet esse proportionatam materiae. Licet enim materia prima sit in potentia ad omnes formas, tamen quodam ordine suscipit eas. Per prius enim est in potentia ad formas elementares, et eis mediantibus secundum diversas proportiones commixtionum est in potentia ad diversas formas: unde non potest ex quolibet immediate fieri quodlibet, nisi forte per resolutionem in primam materiam.
||2438. Yet even though something is generated from that kind of non-being which is being in potentiality, still a thing is not generated from every kind of non-being, but different things come from different matters. For everything capable of being generated has a definite matter from which it comes to be, because there must be a proportion between form and matter. For even though first matter is in potentiality to all forms, it nevertheless receives them in a certain order. For first of all it is in potency to the forms of the elements, and through the intermediary of these, insofar as they are mixed in different proportions, it is in potency to different forms. Hence not everything can come to be directly from everything else unless perhaps by being resolved into first matter.
|Et hoc est contra Anaxagoram qui posuit quod quodlibet fit ex quolibet. Nec ad hoc asserendum sufficit quod posuit omnia esse simul a principio. Oportet enim quod res differant in materia secundum quod diversis diversae sunt materiae. Quomodo enim essent facta infinita, et non unum tantum, si una esset materia omnium secundum positionem Anaxagorae? Posuit enim Anaxagoras esse unum agens, scilicet intellectum. Unde et si materia est una, necesse est etiam quod factum sit unum, scilicet id ad quod materia erat in potentia. Ubi enim est unum agens et una materia, necesse est esse unum factum, ut in decimo habitum est.
||2439. This view is opposed to that of Anaxagoras, who claimed that anything at all comes to be from anything else. Nor is his assumption that all things were together in the beginning sufficient to support this view. For things differ by reason of matter inasmuch as there are different matters for different things. For if the matter of all things were one, as it is according to the opinion of Anaxagoras, why would an infinite number of things be generated and not just one thing? For Anaxagoras claimed that there is one agent, mind; and therefore, if matter too were one, only one thing would necessarily come to be, namely, that to which matter is in potentiality. For where there is one agent and one matter there must be one effect, as has been stated in Book X.
|Haec autem ratio procedit contra Anaxagoram inquantum ponebat intellectum indigere materia ad faciendum res. Si autem ponat primum rerum principium intellectum, qui ipsam materiam producat, primum principium diversitatis rerum erit ex ordine apprehenso ab intellectu praedicto, qui secundum quod res diversas producere intendit, instituit materias diversas aptas diversitati rerum.
||2440. This argument holds good against Anaxagoras inasmuch as he claimed that mind needs matter in order to produce some effect. And if he claims that the first principle of things is mind, which produces matter itself, the first principle of the diversity of things will proceed from the order apprehended by the above-mentioned mind, which, inasmuch as it aims to produce different things, establishes different matters having an aptitude for a diversity of things.
|Characteristics of Forms
|ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapters 2 & 3: 1069b 32-1070a 30
|τρία δὴ τὰ αἴτια καὶ τρεῖς αἱ ἀρχαί, δύο μὲν ἡ ἐναντίωσις, ἧς
τὸ μὲν λόγος καὶ εἶδος τὸ δὲ στέρησις, τὸ δὲ τρίτον ἡ ὕλη. 
||1035. The causes or principles of things, then, are three. Two of these are the pair of contraries, of which one is the formal determinant or specifying principle, and the other the privation, and the third, matter.
ταῦτα ὅτι οὐ γίγνεται
οὔτε ἡ ὕλη οὔτε
τὸ εἶδος, λέγω δὲ
τὰ ἔσχατα. πᾶν γὰρ
καὶ ὑπό τινος
καὶ εἴς τι: [1070α]  ὑφ᾽
οὗ μέν, τοῦ πρώτου
κινοῦντος: ὃ δέ,
ἡ ὕλη: εἰς ὃ δέ, τὸ
εἶδος. εἰς ἄπειρον
οὖν εἶσιν, εἰ μὴ
μόνον ὁ χαλκὸς
καὶ τὸ στρογγύλον
ἢ ὁ χαλκός: ἀνάγκη
||1036. It should be noted next that neither matter nor form comes to be, and I mean the last matter and form. For everything which changes something else changes it from something to something. That by which it is changed is the first [i.e., immediate] mover; that which is changed is the matter; and that to which it is changed is the form. Hence there will be an infinite regress if not only the bronze becomes round but also roundness itself or bronze comes to be. Therefore there must be some stopping point.
ταῦτα ὅτι ἑκάστη
 ἐκ συνωνύμου
(τὰ γὰρ φύσει
οὐσίαι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα). ἢ γὰρ τέχνῃ ἢ φύσει γίγνεται
τύχῃ ἢ τῷ αὐτομάτῳ. ἡ μὲν οὖν
τέχνη ἀρχὴ ἐν ἄλλῳ, ἡ δὲ φύσις ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ (ἄνθρωπος
γεννᾷ), αἱ δὲ
||1037. Again, it should be noted that every substance comes to be from something having the same name; for both things which are by nature as well as other things are substances. For things come to be either by art or by nature or by luck or spontaneously. Art is a principle in another, but nature is a principle in the subject itself; for man begets man. The remaining causes are the privations of these.
μὲν ὕλη  τόδε τι οὖσα
ἁφῇ καὶ μὴ
ὕλη καὶ ὑποκείμενον), ἡ δὲ φύσις τόδε
τι καὶ ἕξις
τις εἰς ἥν: ἔτι
τρίτη ἡ ἐκ τούτων
καθ᾽ ἕκαστα, οἷον Σωκράτης ἢ Καλλίας.
||1038. There are three kinds of substance. First, there is matter, which is a particular thing in appearance; for whatever things are one by contact and not by natural union are matter and subject. Second, there is the nature [i.e., the form], which is a determinate thing inasmuch as it is a kind of positive state; and third, there is the singular thing which is composed of these, such as Socrates or Callias.
|ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν
τινῶν τὸ τόδε τι οὐκ ἔστι
οἰκίας τὸ εἶδος, εἰ  μὴ ἡ τέχνη (οὐδ᾽ ἔστι γένεσις καὶ φθορὰ τούτων, ἀλλ᾽ ἄλλον
τρόπον εἰσὶ καὶ οὐκ εἰσὶν οἰκία τε ἡ ἄνευ
ὕλης καὶ ὑγίεια
καὶ πᾶν τὸ
κατὰ τέχνην), ἀλλ᾽ εἴπερ, ἐπὶ τῶν φύσει:
διὸ δὴ οὐ κακῶς Πλάτων
ἔφη ὅτι εἴδη
φύσει, εἴπερ ἔστιν
εἴδη ἄλλα τούτων <οἷον πῦρ σὰρξ κεφαλή:  ἅπαντα γὰρ ὕλη ἐστί, καὶ τῆς μάλιστ᾽ οὐσίας ἡ
||1039. Now in some cases the “this” [i.e., the form] does not exist apart from the composite substance; for example, the form of a house, unless it is the art. Nor is there generation and destruction of these forms, but it is in a different sense that house apart from matter, and health, and everything which comes to be by art, do and do not exist. But if the “this” does exist apart from matter, it is only in the case of those things which are by nature. Hence Plato was not wrong in saying that the Forms are things which exist by nature, i.e., if there are separate Forms different from these other things, such as fire, flesh and head. For all of these are matter, and they are the ultimate matter of substance in the fullest sense.
οὖν κινοῦντα αἴτια ὡς
τὰ δ᾽ ὡς ὁ λόγος
ἅμα. ὅτε γὰρ
ὑγιαίνει ὁ ἄνθρωπος,
τότε καὶ ἡ ὑγίεια ἔστιν,
καὶ τὸ σχῆμα τῆς
σφαίρας ἅμα καὶ ἡ χαλκῆ
σφαῖρα (εἰ δὲ καὶ ὕστερόν τι ὑπομένει, σκεπτέον:  ἐπ᾽ ἐνίων γὰρ
οὐδὲν κωλύει, οἷον
μὴ πᾶσα ἀλλ᾽ ὁ νοῦς: πᾶσαν
||1040. Hence efficient causes are causes as things which are prior to their effects; but those things which are causes in the sense of the formal determinant are simultaneous with their effects. For it is when a man becomes healthy that health also exists; and the shape of the bronze sphere comes to be at the same time as the bronze sphere. But whether any form continues to exist afterwards is a question that requires investigation. For nothing prevents this from being so in certain cases, for example, if the soul is of this sort, not every soul but the intellectual; for perhaps it is impossible that every soul should continue to exist.
|φανερὸν δὴ ὅτι
οὐδὲν δεῖ διά γε
τὰς ἰδέας: ἄνθρωπος γὰρ ἄνθρωπον
γεννᾷ, ὁ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον
τὸν τινά: ὁμοίως
δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν τεχνῶν: ἡ γὰρ
ἰατρικὴ τέχνη ὁ λόγος τῆς ὑγιείας
||1041. It is evident, then, that it is not necessary on these grounds that the Ideas should exist; for man begets man, and the singular man begets a singular man. The same thing also holds true in the case of the arts; for the art of medicine is the formal determinant of health.|
|Postquam philosophus determinavit de materia, hic determinat de forma. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo determinat de ea secundum se. Secundo per comparationem ad substantiam compositam, ibi, substantiae autem tres sunt et cetera.
||2441. Having stated his views about matter, the Philosopher now considers form, and in regard to this he does two things. First (1035:C 2440, he deals with form in itself; and second (1038:C 2446), with form in relation to the composite (“There are three kinds”).
|Circa primum tria facit. Primo proponit formam esse principium; dicens, quod tres sunt causae et tria principia substantiae mutabilis. Duo enim sunt contraria: quorum unum est species, idest forma, et aliud est privatio, quae quodammodo est contrarium; tertium autem est materia. Iam enim ostensum est, quod in omni transmutatione oportet esse subiectum, et duo contraria. Unde necesse est quod in generatione substantiae haec requirantur.
||In regard to the first part he does three things. First, he points out that form is a principle. He says that there are three causes, or three principles, of changeable substances. Two of these are contraries: one being “the specifying principle,” i.e., the form, the other privation, which is in a sense a contrary, and the third, matter. For it has been shown already (1029:C 2428-29) that in every change there must be a subject and two contraries, and therefore these are required in the generation of substance.
||2442. It should be noted (1036).
|Secundo ibi, postea quia ostendit, quod forma non generatur, sicut nec materia; dicens quod materia nec species fit, idest generatur. Sed hoc intelligi oportet de ultima materia et de ultima forma. Nam materia aliqua generatur; scilicet quae est subiectum alterationis; est enim substantia composita.
||Second, he shows that neither matter nor form is generated. He says that neither matter nor “form comes to be,” or is generated.—But this must be understood of the last matter and the last form; for some matter is generated, namely, the subject of alteration, since it is a composite substance.
|Quod autem nec forma ultima nec materia ultima generentur, sic probat. In omni transmutatione oportet esse aliquid subiectum transmutationis, quod est materia, et aliquid a quo transmutatur, quod est principium movens, et aliquid in quod transmutatur, quod est species et forma. Si ergo ipsa forma et materia generentur, puta si non solum generetur hoc totum, quod est aes rotundum, sed etiam ipsa rotunditas, et ipsum aes, sequetur quod tam forma quam materia habeant materiam et formam, et sic ibitur in infinitum in materiis et formis; quod est impossibile. Necesse est itaque stare in generatione, ut scilicet ultima forma et ultima materia non generentur.
||2443. That neither the last matter nor the last form is generated he proves thus. In every change there must he some subject of the change, which is matter; and something by which it is changed, which is the principle imparting motion; and something to which it is changed, which is the specifying principle or form. Hence if both the form and the matter are generated, for example, if not only this whole—bronze sphere—is generated, but also the sphericity and the bronze, it follows that both form and matter have matter and form; and thus there will be an infinite regress in matters and forms. This is impossible. Hence, in the process of generation there must be some stopping point, so that the last matter and last form are not generated.
||2444. Again, it should be (1037).
|Postea quia tertio dicit, quod res acquirunt formam ex agentibus similibus; dicens, quod quaecumque substantia fit ex agente univoco, idest simili secundum formam. Omnes enim substantiae, quae generantur, generantur aut a natura, aut ab arte, aut a fortuna, aut automato, idest casu, idest per se vano. Differt autem ars a natura, quia ars est principium agendi in alio, natura autem est principium actionis et motus in eo in quo est. Manifestum est autem, quod ea quae generantur ab arte, fiunt ex sibi simili. Aedificator enim, per formam domus quam habet in mente, facit domum quae est in materia. Et idem etiam apparet in natura; quia homo generat hominem. In quibusdam autem hoc non videtur. Non enim generantur ex sibi similibus in specie; sicut calidum in corporibus inferioribus generatur a sole non calido. Sed licet non sit similitudo secundum speciem, oportet tamen esse aliquam similitudinem, sed tamen imperfectam; quia materia inferiorum non potest pertingere ad perfectam similitudinem superioris agentis. Et cum ita sit in his quae fiunt ab arte et natura, manifestum est quod unumquodque generatur a suo simili.
||Third, he points out that things acquire their form from agents like themselves. He says that every substance comes to be “from an agent having the same name,” i.e., an agent similar in form. For all substances which are generated come to be either by nature or by art or by luck or “spontaneously,” namely, by chance; i.e., they are not directly an object of design. Art differs from nature, because art is a principle of action in something other than the thing moved, whereas nature is a principle of action and motion in the thing in which it is present. Now things produced by art obviously come to be from something similar to themselves in form; for it is by means of the form of the house in his mind that the builder causes the house which exists in matter. The same thing is also apparent in the case of natural things, for man begets man. However, this does not seem to be true in some cases, for some things are not generated by agents similar to themselves in species; for example, the heat found in lower bodies is generated by the sun, not by heat. Yet while there is no likeness in species, there must still be some kind of likeness, even though it is an imperfect one, because the matter of lower bodies cannot acquire perfect likeness to a higher agent. And since this is true in the case of things which come to be both by art and by nature, it is evident that each thing is generated by its like.
|Nam reliquae causae, scilicet fortuna et casus, sunt quasi defectus et privationes naturae et artis. Nam fortuna est intellectus agens praeter intentionem, et casus natura agens praeter intentionem. Unde ea quae fiunt a fortuna et casu, non assimilantur suis agentibus, cum fortuna et casus non sint causae per se, sed per accidens: et ideo quodammodo animalia, quae generantur ex putrefactione, videntur fieri casu, inquantum non fiunt ex sibi similibus secundum speciem. Neque etiam habent causam determinatam agentem in istis inferioribus, sed solum causam agentem superiorem.
||2445. For “the remaining causes,” luck and chance, are defects and privations as it were of nature and of art; for luck is intellect producing an effect over and above the one at which it aims; and chance is nature producing an effect over and above the one at which it aims. Hence those things which come to be by luck and by chance are not similar to their agents in form, since luck and chance are not causes in the strict sense but only accidentally. Therefore in a sense animals which are generated from decomposed matter seem to come into being by chance inasmuch as they are not generated by agents similar to themselves in species. Nor do they have a definite efficient cause in the realm of lower bodies, but only a higher efficient cause.
||2446. There are three kinds (1038).
|Deinde cum dicit substantiae autem determinat de forma per comparationem ad substantiam compositam; et circa hoc tria facit. Primo dividit substantiam in materiam et formam et compositum, dicens quod substantiae sunt tres. Materia, quantum ad id quod apparet, videtur esse substantia et hoc aliquid. Unde primi naturales solam materiam posuerunt esse substantiam. Et hoc ideo quia viderunt quod in artificialibus quae fiunt per contactum, et non per naturalem unionem, sola materia et subiectum videtur esse substantia: nam formae artificiales sunt accidentia. Item natura rei videtur esse substantia et hoc aliquid; natura autem rei est in quam terminatur naturalis generatio, idest forma, quae est quasi habitus quidam. Item tertia substantia est illa, quae componitur ex materia et forma, sicut sunt singularia, ut Callias et Socrates.
||Then he establishes what is true of form in relation to the composite substance, and in regard to this he does three things. First, he divides substance into matter, form and composite. He says that there are three kinds of substance. First, according to appearances, matter seems to be substance and a determinate thing; and it was for this reason that the first natural philosophers claimed that matter alone is substance. They did this because they saw that in the case of artifacts, which come to be by contact and not by natural union, only the matter or underlying subject seems to be substance; for artificial forms are accidents. Second, the nature of a thing also seems to be substance and a determinate thing—the nature of a thing being that in which the process of natural generation is terminated, i.e., the form, which is as it were a kind of permanent state. The third kind of substance is the composite of matter and form, for example, singular things such as Callias and Socrates.
||2447. Now in some cases (1039).
|Secundo ibi, in quibusdam dicit, quod in aliquibus formis manifestum est, quod non sunt praeter substantiam compositam; sicut forma domus non est praeter materiam. Forma enim domus est accidens, et materia domus est substantia: accidens autem non est nisi in substantia.
||Second, he says that some forms evidently do not exist apart from the composite substance, for example, the form of a house does not exist apart from matter; for the form of a house is an accident, and the matter of a house is a substance, and an accident exists only in a substance.
|Sed hoc dico, nisi accipiatur forma domus, ut ars, idest prout est in mente artificis. Sic enim est praeter materiam. Sed harum formarum artificialium prout sunt in mente artificis, nec est generatio nec corruptio. Domus enim, quae est sine materia in anima, et sanitas, et omnia huiusmodi, alio modo incipiunt esse et desinunt quam per corruptionem et generationem; scilicet per disciplinam, aut per inventionem.
||2448. I say that this is true unless the form of the house should be taken “as the art,” i.e., as existing in the mind of the artisan, for in this way it does exist apart from matter. But there is neither generation nor destruction of these artificial forms as existing in the mind of the artisan; for the house which exists in the mind without matter, and health, and all things of this kind, begin to be and cease to be in a different way from those things which come to be by generation and destruction, i.e., by teaching or by discovery.
|Sed, si aliquae formae sunt praeter substantiam compositam, hoc erit verum in formis naturalibus, quae substantiae sunt. Unde Plato non male dixit, quod species, idest formae separatae, sunt formae quae sunt per naturam. Dico autem quod non simpliciter bene dixit, sed si sunt species aliae aliquae ab istis sensibilibus, quae sunt caro, caput et huiusmodi, quae sunt materia ultima substantiae particularis compositae, quae est maxime substantia.
||2449. But if any forms do exist apart from composite substances, this will be true of those natural forms which are substances. Hence Plato was not wrong in saying “that the Forms,” i.e., the separate Forms, are things which exist by nature. But I say that he was not wrong, not in an unqualified sense, but only if there are other forms which differ from sensible ones, such as flesh, head and the like, which are the last matter of a particular composite substance, which is substance in the fullest sense.
||2450. Hence efficient causes (1040).
|Tertio ibi, moventes quidem ostendit, quod formae universales non sunt praeter substantiam compositam; et circa hoc duo facit. Primo manifestat propositum, assignans differentiam inter causas formales et causas moventes. Et dicit, quod causae moventes praeexistunt rebus factis. Et hoc necessarium est; quia causae moventes sunt principia motus, qui terminatur ad rem factam. Sed causa formalis, quae est causa quasi ratio rei, simul incipit esse cum re cuius est forma. Tunc enim incipit esse sanitas, quando homo sanatur; et tunc incipit esse figura sphaerae aereae, quando fit sphaera aerea. Unde manifestum est, quod formae non sunt separatae a substantiis compositis; quia si essent separatae, oporteret quod essent sempiternae, cum non sint talium per se neque generatio, neque corruptio, ut ostensum est: et sic praeessent substantiis his, quarum sunt formae.
||Third, he shows that there are no universal forms apart from composite substances. In regard to this he does two things. First, he makes his purpose clear by differentiating between formal and efficient causes. He says that efficient causes are prior to their effects; and this must be so because efficient causes are the source of the motion which terminates in the thing made. But the formal cause, which is a cause in the sense of the intelligible structure of a thing, begins to be when the thing of which it is the form begins to be. For health begins to be when a man is healed, and the shape of a bronze sphere begins to be when the bronze sphere comes into being. It is evident, then, that forms are not separate from composite substances; for if they were separate, they would have to be eternal, since of such things there is directly neither generation nor destruction, as has been shown (611:C 1420; 696:C 1687); and thus they would be prior to the substances of which they are the forms.
|Sed quamvis formae non praeexistant substantiis compositis, perscrutandum tamen est, si aliqua forma remaneat posterius, corrupta substantia composita. In quibusdam enim formis nihil prohibet quod remaneant post substantiam compositam. Puta, si dicamus animam esse talem. Non tamen omnis anima, sed solus intellectus. Forsitan enim impossibile est omnem animam esse talem, ut remaneat corrupto corpore; quia aliae partes animae non habent operationem sine organis corporeis, intellectus autem non operatur per organum. Dicit autem, forsan, quia non erat praesentis intentionis hoc demonstrare, sed hoc pertinet ad scientiam de anima. Et sicut aliae partes animae ab intellectu non remanent post substantiam compositam, ita etiam nec aliae formae rerum corruptibilium.
||2451. But even though forms are not prior to composite substances, it is still necessary to investigate whether any form remains after the composite substance has been destroyed. For nothing prevents some forms from continuing to exist after the composite ceases to exist; for example, we might say that the soul is of this sort—not every soul but only the intellective. For perhaps it is impossible that every soul should be such that it continues to exist after the body has been destroyed, because the other parts of the soul do not operate without bodily organs, whereas the intellect does not operate by way of a bodily organ. He says “perhaps” because it is not his present intention to demonstrate this point; but this belongs to the science which treats of the soul. And just as the parts of the soul other than the intellect do not continue to exist after the composite substance has been destroyed, in a similar fashion neither do other forms of perishable things.
|Considerandum autem hanc sententiam esse Aristotelis de anima intellectiva quod non fuerit ante corpus, ut Plato posuit, neque etiam destruitur destructo corpore, ut antiqui naturales posuerunt, non distinguentes inter intellectum et sensum. Non enim excipit animam intellectivam a generalitate aliarum formarum, quantum ad hoc quod formae non praeexistunt substantiis compositis; sed solum quantum ad hoc quod non remanent post substantias compositas.
||2452. Now we should observe that it is Aristotle’s view regarding the intellective soul that it did not exist before the body as Plato claimed, and also that it is not destroyed when the body is, as the ancient philosophers held inasmuch as they failed to distinguish between intellect and sense. For he did not exclude the intellective soul from the generality of other forms as regards their not existing prior to composite substances, but only as regards their not continuing to exist after the composite substances have been destroyed.
|Ex quo etiam patet quod non potest hoc depravari, sicut quidam depravare conantur dicentes intellectum possibilem tantum, vel agentem tantummodo esse incorruptibilem. Tum quia ponunt intellectum, quem dicunt esse incorruptibilem, sive sit intellectus possibilis sive agens, esse quamdam substantiam separatam, et sic non est forma. Tum etiam quia si sit forma, sicut remanet corrupto corpore, ita etiam praeexistit corpori. Et quantum ad hoc non esset differentia inter ponentes intellectum separatum esse formam hominis, et ponentes species separatas esse formas rerum sensibilium. Quod Aristoteles hic excludere intendit.
||2453. From this consideration it is also evident that one cannot degrade the intellective soul as some men attempt to do, saying that the possible intellect alone or the agent intellect alone is imperishable. For these men claim not only that the intellect which they say is imperishable (whether it be the possible or the agent intellect) is a separate substance and thus not a form, but also that, if it is a form of the kind which remains after the body has perished, it must exist prior to the body. And in this respect there would be no difference between those who hold that a separate intellect is the form of man and those who hold that separate Forms are the forms of sensible things. This is the view which Aristotle aims to reject here.
||2454. It is evident (1041).
|Palam itaque secundo excludit rationem propter quam ponebant ideas separatas. Ad hoc enim dicebant Platonici esse necessarium ponere ideas, ut substantiae particulares sensibiles ad earum similitudines formarentur. Sed hoc non est necessarium; quia in istis inferioribus invenitur causa sufficiens formationis omnium eorum quae fiunt. Nam agens naturale agit sibi simile. Homo enim generat hominem; non quidem universalis singularem, sed singularis singularem. Unde non est necessarium ponere hominem universalem esse separatum, a quo hic homo singularis formam speciei accipiat vel participet. Et similiter manifestum est in his quae fiunt secundum artem; quia ars medicinalis est quaedam ratio sanitatis et similitudo in anima, ut etiam supra ostensum est.
||Second, he rejects the argument by which they maintained that there are separate Ideas. For the Platonists said that it was necessary to posit Ideas in order that particular things might be formed in likeness to them. But this is not necessary, because in the realm of lower bodies one finds an adequate cause of the formation of everything that comes to be. For a natural agent produces something like itself. For man begets man; but it is not the universal man who begets a singular man, but the singular man begets a singular man. Hence it is not necessary to hold that there is a separate universal man by reason of which the singular man here receives, or shares in, the form of the species. The same thing is evident of those things which come to be by art, because the medical art is the formal determinant and likeness of health in the mind, as has also been shown above (1040:C 2450).
|The Principles of Movable Substances
|ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapters 4 & 5: 1070a 31-1071b 2
|τὰ δ᾽ αἴτια
καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἄλλα
ἄλλων ἔστιν ὥς, ἔστι
δ᾽ ὡς, ἂν καθόλου
λέγῃ τις καὶ
||1042. In one sense the causes and principles of different things are different; but in another sense they are not, for, if one speaks universally and proportionally, they are the same for all.
γὰρ ἄν τις πότερον
ἕτεραι ἢ αἱ αὐταὶ
στοιχεῖα τῶν οὐσιῶν
καὶ τῶν πρός τι,
καὶ καθ᾽  ἑκάστην
ἀλλ᾽ ἄτοπον εἰ
ταὐτὰ πάντων: ἐκ
τῶν αὐτῶν γὰρ ἔσται
τὰ πρός τι καὶ αἱ
||1043. And one might raise the question whether the principles and elements of substances and of relations are the same or different; and the same question may be asked of each of the other categories.
|[1070β]  τί οὖν
παρὰ γὰρ τὴν οὐσίαν
καὶ τἆλλα τὰ
δὲ τὸ στοιχεῖον
ἢ ὧν στοιχεῖον: ἀλλὰ
μὴν οὐδ᾽ ἡ οὐσία
πρός τι, οὐδὲ τούτων
οὐδὲν τῆς οὐσίας.
||1044. But it would be absurd if the principles and elements of all things were the same; for then substance and relations would be derived from the same principles. How then will this be [common]? For there is nothing common existing apart from substance and the other categories; and an element is prior to the things of which it is the element. But substance is not an element of relations, nor is any of these an element of substance.
|ἔτι πῶς ἐνδέχεται
πάντων  εἶναι
οὐδὲν γὰρ οἷόν
τ᾽ εἶναι τῶν
στοιχείων τῷ ἐκ
αὐτό, οἷον τῷ
ΒΑ τὸ Β ἢ Α (οὐδὲ
δὴ τῶν νοητῶν στοιχεῖόν
ἐστιν, οἷον τὸ ὂν
ἢ τὸ ἕν: ὑπάρχει
γὰρ ταῦτα ἑκάστῳ
καὶ τῶν συνθέτων). οὐδὲν ἄρ᾽ ἔσται
αὐτῶν οὔτ᾽ οὐσία οὔτε πρός τι: ἀλλ᾽ ἀναγκαῖον. οὐκ
ἔστιν ἄρα  πάντων ταὐτὰ στοιχεῖα.
||1045. Further, how is it possible for the elements of all things to be the same? For none of the elements can be the same as a composite of elements; for example, neither b nor a is the same as ba; nor can any of the intelligibles, such as being and unity, be an element; for these belong to each composite thing. Hence none of them can be either a substance or a relation. But it must be one or the other. Therefore the elements of all things are not the same.
λέγομεν, ἔστι μὲν
ὥς, ἔστι δ᾽ ὡς οὔ,
οἷον ἴσως τῶν αἰσθητῶν
σωμάτων ὡς μὲν
εἶδος τὸ θερμὸν
καὶ ἄλλον τρόπον
τὸ ψυχρὸν ἡ στέρησις,
ὕλη δὲ τὸ δυνάμει
καθ᾽ αὑτό, οὐσίαι
δὲ ταῦτά τε καὶ
τὰ ἐκ τούτων, ὧν
ἀρχαὶ ταῦτα, ἢ
εἴ τι ἐκ θερμοῦ
καὶ ψυχροῦ  γίγνεται
ἕν, οἷον σὰρξ ἢ ὀστοῦν:
ἕτερον γὰρ ἀνάγκη
τούτων μὲν οὖν
καὶ ἀρχαί (ἄλλων
δ᾽ ἄλλα), πάντων δὲ οὕτω μὲν εἰπεῖν
οὐκ ἔστιν, τῷ ἀνάλογον δέ, ὥσπερ εἴ τις εἴποι ὅτι
ἀρχαὶ εἰσὶ τρεῖς, τὸ εἶδος
ἡ ὕλη. ἀλλ᾽ ἕκαστον
τούτων ἕτερον περὶ  ἕκαστον γένος ἐστίν, οἷον
ἐν χρώματι λευκὸν μέλαν
ἐπιφάνεια: φῶς σκότος
ἀήρ, ἐκ δὲ τούτων ἡμέρα καὶ νύξ.
||1046. Or, as we say, there is a sense in which they are the same and a sense in which they are not; for example, perhaps the elements of sensible bodies are the hot as form, the cold as privation, and that which primarily and of its own nature is potentially both of these as matter. And not only these are substances, but so also are the things of which they are the principles. And so also is any unity which comes to be from the hot and the cold, as flesh and bone; for the thing produced from these must differ from them. The elements and principles of these things, then, are the same, although the elements of different things are different. However, it cannot be said that the elements of all things are the same in this sense, but only proportionally, just as if one were to say that there are three principles, form, privation and matter. But each of these is different in each class of things; for example, in the case of colors there is white, black and surface; and there is darkness, light and air, from which day and night are derived.
|ἐπεὶ δὲ οὐ μόνον τὰ ἐνυπάρχοντα αἴτια, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς οἷον
δῆλον ὅτι ἕτερον
 αἴτια δ᾽ ἄμφω,
ἡ ἀρχή, τὸ δ᾽  ὡς
κινοῦν ἢ ἱστὰν ἀρχή τις καὶ οὐσία, ὥστε στοιχεῖα μὲν
κατ᾽ ἀναλογίαν τρία, αἰτίαι δὲ καὶ ἀρχαὶ τέτταρες: ἄλλο δ᾽ ἐν ἄλλῳ, καὶ τὸ πρῶτον αἴτιον ὡς
κινοῦν ἄλλο ἄλλῳ. ὑγίεια,
νόσος, σῶμα: τὸ κινοῦν ἰατρική. εἶδος, ἀταξία τοιαδί, πλίνθοι: τὸ κινοῦν οἰκοδομική [καὶ εἰς ταῦτα
 ἡ ἀρχή].
||1047. And since not only the things which are intrinsic to a being are its causes, but also certain external things, as the moving cause, it is evident that principle and element differ, although both are causes. And principle is divided into these two kinds; and whatever causes motion or makes it cease is a kind of principle. Hence analogically there are three elements and four causes or principles; but they differ in different things, and the first cause of motion is different in different things: for example, health, sickness and body, and the moving cause is the art of medicine. form, a certain kind of disorder, and bricks, and the moving cause is the art of building. Principle is also divided into these.
|ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ κινοῦν ἐν μὲν τοῖς
ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἀπὸ
τὸ ἐναντίον, τρόπον
αἴτια ἂν εἴη, ὡδὶ δὲ τέτταρα. ὑγίεια γάρ πως ἡ ἰατρική, καὶ οἰκίας
εἶδος ἡ οἰκοδομική, καὶ ἄνθρωπος ἄνθρωπον
||1048. And since in the case of physical things the moving cause of man is man, while in the case of objects of thought the moving cause is the form or its contrary, in one sense there will be three causes and in another sense four. For in a sense the art of medicine is health, and the art of building is the form of a house, and man begets man.
τὸ ὡς  πρῶτον πάντων
||1049. And besides these there is that which as the first of all things imparts motion to all things.
ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν
χωριστὰ τὰ δ᾽ οὐ
ἐκεῖνα. [1071α]  καὶ
διὰ τοῦτο πάντων
αἴτια ταὐτά, ὅτι
τῶν οὐσιῶν ἄνευ
οὐκ ἔστι τὰ πάθη
καὶ αἱ κινήσεις.
||1050. Since some things are separable and some are not, it is the former which are substances. And for this reason these (substances) are the causes of all things, because without substances there can be no affections and motions.
ταῦτα ψυχὴ ἴσως
καὶ σῶμα, ἢ νοῦς
καὶ ὄρεξις καὶ
||1051. Next, all of these causes are perhaps soul and body, or intellect, appetite and body.
|ἔτι δ᾽ ἄλλον
τρόπον τῷ ἀνάλογον
ἀρχαὶ αἱ αὐταί,
 καὶ δύναμις: ἀλλὰ
καὶ ταῦτα ἄλλα
τε ἄλλοις καὶ ἄλλως.
ἐν ἐνίοις μὲν γὰρ
τὸ αὐτὸ ὁτὲ μὲν
ὁτὲ δὲ δυνάμει,
οἷον οἶνος ἢ σὰρξ
ἢ ἄνθρωπος (πίπτει
δὲ καὶ ταῦτα εἰς
τὰ εἰρημένα αἴτια:
ἐνεργείᾳ μὲν γὰρ
τὸ εἶδος, ἐὰν ᾖ
χωριστόν, καὶ τὸ
ἐξ ἀμφοῖν στέρησις
δέ, οἷον  σκότος
ἢ κάμνον, δυνάμει
δὲ ἡ ὕλη: τοῦτο
γάρ ἐστι τὸ δυνάμενον
γίγνεσθαι ἄμφω): ἄλλως δ᾽ ἐνεργείᾳ καὶ
ὧν μὴ ἔστιν ἡ αὐτὴ
ὕλη, ὧν <ἐνίων> οὐκ ἔστι τὸ αὐτὸ εἶδος
ἀλλ᾽ ἕτερον, ὥσπερ ἀνθρώπου
αἴτιον τά τε
πῦρ καὶ γῆ ὡς ὕλη
καὶ τὸ ἴδιον
εἶδος, καὶ ἔτι τι  ἄλλο ἔξω
ὁ ἥλιος καὶ ὁ λοξὸς κύκλος,
οὔτε ὕλη ὄντα
οὔτε στέρησις οὔτε ὁμοειδὲς ἀλλὰ
||11052. Again, there is another sense in which the principles of things are proportionally the same, i.e., as actuality and potentiality; but these are different for different things and apply to them in different ways. For in some cases the same thing is at one time actual and at another time potential, as wine, flesh or man. Now these principles fall into the classes of causes mentioned; for a form is an actuality if it can exist apart, and so also is the thing composed of matter and form, and so also is a privation, such as darkness and suffering; but matter is in potentiality, for it is what is capable of becoming both. But it is in another way that the distinction of actuality and potentiality applies to those things of which the matter is not the same, and the form is not the same but different. For example, the cause of man is his elements—fire and earth as matter, and his proper form—and if there is anything external, such as his father; and besides these there is the sun and the oblique circle, which are neither matter nor species nor privation nor form, but are moving causes.
|ἔτι δὲ ὁρᾶν
ὅτι τὰ μὲν καθόλου ἔστιν
εἰπεῖν, τὰ δ᾽ οὔ. πάντων
ἀρχαὶ τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ πρῶτον τοδὶ καὶ ἄλλο ὃ δυνάμει. ἐκεῖνα μὲν
 οὖν τὰ
οὐκ ἔστιν: ἀρχὴ γὰρ
τὸ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον τῶν καθ᾽ ἕκαστον: ἄνθρωπος μὲν γὰρ ἀνθρώπου
καθόλου, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἔστιν
Πηλεὺς Ἀχιλλέως σοῦ δὲ ὁ πατήρ, καὶ τοδὶ τὸ Β
τουδὶ τοῦ ΒΑ, ὅλως δὲ τὸ Β τοῦ ἁπλῶς
εἰ δὴ τὰ τῶν οὐσιῶν, ἄλλα
δὲ ἄλλων  αἴτια καὶ στοιχεῖα, ὥσπερ
μὴ ἐν ταὐτῷ γένει, χρωμάτων ψόφων οὐσιῶν ποσότητος, πλὴν τῷ ἀνάλογον: καὶ τῶν ἐν
ταὐτῷ εἴδει ἕτερα,
οὐκ εἴδει ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι τῶν καθ᾽ ἕκαστον ἄλλο, ἥ τε σὴ ὕλη καὶ τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸ κινῆσαν καὶ ἡ ἐμή, τῷ
δὲ λόγῳ ταὐτά.
||1053. Further, we must note that some of these causes can be expressed universally and some. not. The first principles of all things are those first “this, one actually, one potentially. Therefore these principles are not universals, for the principle of a singular thing is a singular thing. For while man taken universally is a principle of man, there is no universal man, but Peleus is the cause of Achilles, and your father is the cause of you; and b and a taken either absolutely or particularly are the causes of the syllable ba. Further, there are different causes and elements of different things, as has been stated (1046), and the causes of things which do not belong to the same genus, as colors, sounds, substances and quantity, are different, except in a proportional way. And the causes of things which belong to the same species are different, not specifically, but in the sense that the causes of singular things are different; that is, your matter and form and moving cause are different from mine, although they are the same in their universal intelligibility.
|τὸ δὲ ζητεῖν  τίνες
ἀρχαὶ ἢ στοιχεῖα τῶν
οὐσιῶν καὶ πρός τι καὶ ποιῶν, πότερον
αἱ αὐταὶ ἢ ἕτεραι,
δῆλον ὅτι πολλαχῶς γε λεγομένων ἔστιν
ἑκάστου, διαιρεθέντων δὲ οὐ ταὐτὰ ἀλλ᾽ ἕτερα,
πλὴν ὡδὶ καὶ πάντων, ὡδὶ μὲν ταὐτὰ ἢ τὸ ἀνάλογον, ὅτι ὕλη,
εἶδος, στέρησις, τὸ
ὡδὶ τὰ τῶν οὐσιῶν  αἴτια
ὡς αἴτια πάντων, ὅτι
ἀναιρεῖται ἀναιρουμένων: ἔτι
ἐντελεχείᾳ: ὡδὶ δὲ ἕτερα
πρῶτα ὅσα τὰ ἐναντία ἃ μήτε
ὡς γένη λέγεται
ἔτι αἱ ὗλαι. [1071β]  τίνες μὲν οὖν αἱ ἀρχαὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν καὶ πόσαι, καὶ πῶς αἱ αὐταὶ καὶ πῶς ἕτεραι,
||1054. And to ask whether the principles and elements of substances and of relations and of qualities are the same or different, is clearly to raise questions about terms that are used in many senses. But the principles of different things are not the same but different, except that in a sense they are the same for all. They are the same for all proportionally because each thing has matter, form, privation and a moving cause. And the causes of substances may be regarded as the causes of all things because when they are destroyed all things are destroyed, And again that which is first in complete reality is the cause of all things. However, in a sense the primary [i.e., proximate] causes of things are different, i.e., all the contraries which are not predicated either as genera or as terms having many meanings. And again the matter of different things is different. We have stated what the principles of sensible things are, then, and how many there are, and how they are the same and how different.|
|Postquam philosophus determinavit de principiis substantiae sensibilis, nunc intendit inquirere utrum sint eadem principia substantiarum et aliorum generum, aut alia et alia. Manifestum enim est, quod si sunt eadem, assignatis principiis substantiae, assignata sunt principia omnium aliorum generum. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo proponit veritatem. Secundo subiungit inquisitionem de veritate proposita, ibi, dubitabit autem quis. Tertio recapitulando recolligit veritatem, ibi, quaerere.
||2455. Having stated his position regarding the principles of sensible substances, the Philosopher’s aim here is to investigate whether the principles of substances and those of the other classes of things are the same or different. For if they are the same, it is evident that, when the principles of substances are given, the principles of all the other classes of things are also given. In regard to this be does three things. First (1042:C 2455), he states what is true. Second (1043:C 2456), he introduces a question relating to the answer proposed (“And one might”). Third (1054:C 2484), he gives a summary of what is true (“And to ask”).
|Dicit ergo primo, quod quodammodo sunt alia aliorum et principia et causae, et quodammodo sunt eadem omnium, secundum universalitatem, et secundum proportionem.
||He says, first, that in one sense the principles and causes of different things are different, and in another sense they are the same for all things, i.e., universally and proportionally.
||2456. And one might (1043).
|Deinde cum dicit dubitabit autem inquirendo discutit veritatem praemissam; et circa hoc tria facit. Primo movet dubitationem. Secundo obiicit ad quaestionem, ibi, sed si eadem, inconveniens. Tertio determinat veritatem, ibi, at ut dicimus.
||Then he examines the true answer given above, by raising a question; and in regard to this he does three things. First (1043:C 2456), he raises the question. Second (1044:C 2458), he argues on one side of the question (“But it would be”). Third (1046:C 2464), he settles the issue (“Or, as we say”).
|Dicit ergo primo, quod dubitatio est, utrum substantiarum, et eorum quae sunt ad aliquid, et similiter aliorum praedicamentorum, sint eadem principia, aut alia et alia.
||He accordingly says, first (1043), that one might raise the question whether the principles of substances and those of relations, and also those of the other categories, are the same or different.
|Et ponit specialiter de ad aliquid, quia ea quae sunt ad aliquid, remotiora videntur esse a substantia quam alia genera, ex eo quod sunt debilioris esse. Unde et substantiae inhaerent mediantibus aliis generibus, sicut aequale et inaequale, duplum et dimidium, mediante quantitate. Movens autem et motum, pater et filius, dominus et servus, mediante actione et passione. Et hoc ideo, quia substantia est per se existens; quantitas autem et qualitas sunt entia in alio; sed relativa non solum sunt in alio, sed ad aliud.
||2457. He makes special reference to relations because they seem to be farther removed from substance than the rest of the categories are inasmuch as they have a more imperfect mode of being. And for this reason they inhere in substance by means of the other categories; for example, equal and unequal, double and half, inhere in substance by way of quantity; and mover and thing moved, father and son, master and slave, inhere in substance by way of action and passion. The reason is that, while substance is something which exists of itself, and quantity and quality are things which exist in something else, relations are things which not only exist in something else but also have being in reference to something else.
||2458. But it would be (1044).
|Deinde cum dicit sed inconveniens obiicit ad propositam quaestionem; et ponit duas rationes ad ostendendum, quod non sunt eadem principia substantiae et aliorum generum. Quarum prima talis est. Si eadem sint principia substantiae et aliorum generum, aut oportet quod illa principia eadem sint praeter substantiam et alia genera, aut oportet quod sint in genere substantiae, vel in aliquo alio genere.
||Then he argues on one side of the question mentioned above. He gives two arguments to show that the principles of substance and those of the other classes of things are not the same. The first argument is as follows. If the principles of substance and those of the other classes of things are the same, the same principles must either exist apart from substance and from the other categories, or they must belong to the category of substance or to some other category.
|Sed non potest dici, quod sint extra substantiam et alia praedicamenta; quia oportet quod essent priora tam substantia quam aliis praedicamentis. Prius enim est principium his quae sunt a principio. Cum ergo id quod est prius, inveniatur esse communius, sicut animal est prius homine, sequitur, si aliquid est prius substantia et aliis generibus, quod aliquid sit commune substantiis et aliis generibus, et praecipue secundum opinionem Platonicorum, qui posuerunt universalia esse principia, et unum et ens quasi communissima esse principia omnium.
||2459. But it cannot be said that they exist apart from substance and from the other categories, because then they would have to be prior both to substance and to the other categories; for a principle is prior to the things which come from it. Therefore, since what is prior is found to be more common, as animal is prior to man, it follows that, if some principle is prior both to substance and to the other categories, there must be some principle which is common both to substance and to the other categories. This applies especially to the opinion of the Platonists, who claimed that universals are principles—particularly being and unity as the most common principles of all things.
|Neque etiam potest dici, quod principia communissima omnium generum sint in genere substantiae, aut in genere ad aliquid, vel in aliquo alio genere. Cum enim principia sint homogenea his quae sunt ab eis, non videtur possibile quod substantia sit principium eorum quae sunt ad aliquid, aut e converso. Non igitur eadem sunt principia substantiae et aliorum generum.
||2460. Neither can it be said that the most common principles of all categories belong either to the category of substance or to that of relation or to any other category. For since principles are of the same kind as the things which come from them, it seems impossible that substance should be a principle of relations, or vice versa. Therefore the principles of substance and those of the other categories are not the same.
||2461. Further, how is it (1045).
|Secundam rationem ponit ibi, amplius quomodo quae talis est. Nullum elementum est idem cum eo quod ex elementis est compositum: quia nihil est causa aut elementum suiipsius; sicut huius syllabae ba, elementum est haec litera b aut a.
||He gives a second argument, which runs thus: no element is the same as a composite of elements, for nothing is the cause or element of itself; for example, an element of this syllable ba is the letter b or the letter a.
|Et quia videbatur hoc habere instantiam in principiis a Platone positis, quae sunt unum et ens, eo quod unumquodque principiatorum est unum et ens; ideo consequenter hoc excludit, dicens, quod neque etiam intellectualium elementorum, quae sunt unum et ens, possibile est aliquod esse idem cum his quae sunt ex elementis. Vocat autem ea intellectualia, quia universalia intellectu percipiuntur, et quia Plato ea ponebat separata a sensibilibus.
||2462. And since there would seem to be a rejoinder to this based on the principles laid down by Plato, namely, being and unity, since each thing composed of principles is one and a being, he therefore next rejects this argument. He says that it is also impossible that any of the intelligible elements—unity and being—should be the same as the things which are derived from them. He calls them intelligible, both because universals are grasped by the intellect, and because Plato claimed that they are separate from sensible things.
|Et quod huiusmodi elementa sint alia ab eis quorum sunt elementa, probat, quia huiusmodi elementa, idest unum et ens, insunt singulis compositorum ex eis, nullum autem compositorum ex eis inest aliis. Unde patet, quod et ista elementa differunt ab his quae sunt composita ex eis. Si igitur verum est quod elementa non sunt idem cum his quae sunt ex elementis, si eadem sunt elementa substantiarum et aliorum generum, consequitur, quod nihil eorum sit in genere substantiae, neque in aliis generibus. Sed hoc est impossibile; quia necesse est omne quod est, esse in aliquo genere: non igitur possibile est, quod sint eadem principia omnium.
||2463. He proves that elements of this kind differ from the things of which they are the elements, because “elements of this kind,” i.e., unity and being, are found in each of the things composed of them, whereas no one of the things composed of them is found in other things. Hence it is evident that these elements also differ from the things composed of them. If it is true, then, that elements are not the same as the things composed of them; and if the elements of substances and those of the other classes of things are the same, it follows that none of them belong either to the category of substance or to any other category. But this is impossible, because everything which exists must belong to some category. Hence it is impossible that all the categories should have the same principles.
||2464. Or, as we say (1046).
|Deinde cum dicit at ut dicimus solvit propositam dubitationem. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ostendit, quod eadem sunt principia omnium proportionaliter. Secundo, quod eadem sunt universaliter, ibi, adhuc autem videre et cetera. Haec enim duo supra posuerat, dicens quod principia sunt eadem omnium universaliter et secundum proportionem.
||Then he solves the question which was raised, and in regard to this he does two things. First (1046:C 2464), shows that the principles of all categories are proportionally the same; and second (1053:C 2482), that they are universally the same (“Further, we must note”). For he laid down these two qualifications above (1042:C 2455) when he said that there are the same first principles for all things universally and proportionally.
|Prima pars dividitur in duas partes, secundum quod duos modos assignat, quibus proportionaliter sunt eadem principia omnium. Secunda incipit, ibi, amplius autem alio modo.
||The first part is divided into two members inasmuch as he gives two ways in which the principles of all things are proportionally the same. He begins to treat the second (1052:C 2477) where he says, “Again, there is.”
|Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit quomodo proportionaliter sunt eadem. Secundo quomodo et simpliciter sint eadem principia omnium prima, ibi, amplius autem praeter haec.
||In regard to the first he does two things. First, he shows how the principles of all things are proportionally the same. Second (1049:C 2474), he shows how they are the same without qualification (“And besides”).
|Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit, quod proportionaliter sunt eadem principia omnium quantum ad causas intrinsecas. Secundo quantum ad causas intrinsecas et extrinsecas simul, ibi, quoniam autem non solum.
||In regard to the first he does two things. First, he shows that the principles of all things are proportionally the same as regards their intrinsic causes; and second (1047:C 2468), as regards both their intrinsic and their extrinsic causes (“And since not only”).
|Dicit ergo primo, quod quodammodo est verum dicere omnium eadem principia, et quodammodo non.
||He accordingly says, first (1046), that in one respect it is true to say that the principles of all things are the same, and in another respect it is not.
|Et hoc ostendit dicens: sicut si ponamus quod sensibilium corporum sit principium, tamquam species et forma calidum, et tamquam privatio frigidum, et materia sensibilium corporum sit id quod est secundum se in potentia ad haec duo. Nam materia secundum se sumpta est principium susceptivum formae et privationis. Dicit autem, forsan, quia calidum non est forma substantialis corporum sensibilium, neque frigidum est privatio, sed ambo sunt qualitates. Utitur tamen eis tamquam forma et privatione in genere substantiae ad maiorem manifestationem. Unde subiungit, quod et huiusmodi principia sunt substantiae, non sicut species in genere, sed sicut principia.
||2465. He explains this by saying that it would be the same as if we were to hold that the principle of sensible bodies in the line of specifying principle or form is the hot and in the line of privation is the cold, and that the matter of sensible bodies is what is of itself in potentiality to these two; for matter taken in itself is a principle that is susceptible both of form and of privation. He says “perhaps” because, while heat is not a substantial form of sensible bodies and cold is not a privation but both are qualities, still he uses them as form and privation in the category of substance in order to make the case more evident. Hence he adds that principles of this kind are substances, not as species in a genus, but as principles.
|Et iterum illa quae sunt ex his, quorum haec sunt principia, scilicet ignis et aqua: ac si intelligamus quod ignis componatur ex calido, sicut forma et propria materia, et aqua ex frigido, sicut ex privatione et materia. Aut etiam si aliquid unum fit ex calido et frigido commixtis, eorum sunt praedicta principia, scilicet calidum et frigidum et materia eorum; quia necesse est id quod fit ex calido et frigido, esse aliquid diversum ab illis, scilicet calido et frigido, et a primis corporibus, quorum imaginamur haec esse formas.
||2466. Again, we say that things which are composed of these, i.e., the things of which these are the principles, namely, fire and water, are substances, granted that we understand fire to be composed of hot as a form and of its own matter, and water of cold as a privation and of matter; or again, granted that some one thing comes to be from the mixture of hot and cold, the above-mentioned contraries, hot and cold, and matter are the principles of these things; because that which comes to be from hot and cold must be something different from hot and cold, i.e., from the first bodies of which we imagine these to be the forms.
|Sic igitur horum, scilicet simplicium corporum, et compositorum ex eis, sunt eadem principia et elementa. Sed aliorum sunt alia proxima principia. Non autem omnium sunt eadem nisi proportionaliter. Sicut si aliquis dicat quod sicut praedicta tria, scilicet calidum et frigidum et subiectum eorum, se habent in generatione corporum simplicium ut forma et privatio et materia, ita in quolibet alio genere illa tria sunt, quae se habent ut forma, privatio et materia; sed ista diversa sunt in diversis generibus. Sicut in genere colorum, album est sicut species, nigrum sicut privatio, et superficies sicut materia et subiectum. Et in genere distinctionis temporum, lumen est sicut species, tenebrae sicut privatio, aer sicut materia et subiectum. Ex quibus tribus principiis constituuntur dies et nox.
||2467. Therefore the principles and elements of these things, i.e., of the simple bodies and the things composed of them, are the same. But other things have different proximate principles. However, the principles and elements of all these things are the same only proportionally. We might, for example, say that, just as the three things mentioned above—hot, cold, and their subject—have the character of form, privation and matter respectively in the generation of simple bodies, so too in every other genus there are three things which are proportioned to each other as form, privation and matter. But these three differ for different classes of things. For example, in the genus of color, white has the character of form, black the character of privation, and surface the character of matter or subject; and in the genus of distinctions of time, light has the character of form, darkness the character of privation, and air the character of matter or subject; and from these three principles day and night come to be.
||2468. And since not only (1047).
|Deinde cum dicit quoniam autem ostendit idem in causis intrinsecis et extrinsecis. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo enim ostendit quod computando tam causas intrinsecas quam extrinsecas, sunt quatuor proportionaliter omnium. Secundo, quomodo reducuntur ad tres, ibi, quoniam vero movens.
||Then he shows that the same thing is true of intrinsic and extrinsic causes, and in regard to this he does two things. First (1047:C 2468), he shows that, when we enumerate the intrinsic and extrinsic causes together, there are four causes proportionally of all things. Second (1048:C 2473), he shows how they are reduced to three (“And since in the case”).
|Dicit ergo primo, quod quia non solum sunt causae ea quae dicta sunt intrinseca rei, sed etiam ea quae sunt extra rem, sicut movens, manifestum est quod principium et elementum differunt. Nam principium proprie dicitur quod est extra sicut movens. Nam ab eo est principium motus. Elementum autem proprie dicitur causa intrinseca ex qua constituitur res.
||He accordingly says, first (1047), that, since not only what is intrinsic is a cause, but also what is extrinsic, i.e., a mover, it is evident that principle and element differ. For principle in the strict sense means an extrinsic cause, as a mover, since it is from this that motion proceeds; whereas element in the strict sense means an intrinsic cause, of which a thing is composed.
|Sed ambo dicuntur causae, scilicet tam principia extrinseca quam intrinseca. Et principium quodammodo dividitur in ea, scilicet intrinsecas causas et extrinsecas. Sunt enim quaedam principia intrinseca, ut in quinto ostensum est. Sicut fundamentum est principium domus secundum materiam, et animal hominis secundum formam. Sed id quod est movens, aut sistens, idest quiescere faciens, est principium quoddam, sed non est elementum; quia elementum est ex eo quo fit aliquid, et est in eo, ut habitum est in quinto.
||2469. Yet both are called causes, i.e., both extrinsic principles and intrinsic ones. And in a sense principle is divided into these, i.e., into intrinsic causes and extrinsic causes. For there are certain intrinsic principles, as has been shown in Book V (403:C 755-56); for example, the foundation of a house is a principle of it in the sense of matter, and a soul is a principle of a man in the sense of form. But that which causes motion or makes it cease, i.e., which brings it to rest, is a principle but not an element; because an element is an intrinsic principle from which a thing comes to be, as has been stated in Book V (411:C 795-98).
|Sic igitur manifestum est quod secundum analogiam, idest proportionem, tria sunt elementa omnium; idest materia, forma et privatio. Dicuntur enim privationes esse elementum non per se, sed per accidens, quia scilicet materia cui accidit, est elementum. Materia enim sub una forma existens, habet in se privationem alterius formae. Sed causae et principia sunt quatuor, ut addamus tribus elementis causam moventem. Non facit autem mentionem de causa finali, quia finis non est principium nisi secundum quod est in intentione moventis.
||2470. It is clear, then, that analogously, or proportionally, the elements of all things are three in number: matter, form and privation. For privations are called elements not essentially but accidentally, i.e., because. the matter to which a privation is accidentally related is an element. For matter existing under one form contains within itself the privation of another form. But the causes and principles of things are four in number inasmuch as we may add the moving cause to the three elements. Aristotle does not mention the final cause, however, because a goal is a principle only inasmuch as it is present in the intention of the moving cause.
|Sic igitur causae et principia omnium secundum analogiam sunt quatuor; scilicet materia, et forma, et privatio, et principium movens. Non tamen haec sunt eadem in omnibus, sed alia in aliis. Sicut enim supra dictum est, quod species et materia et privatio sunt alia in aliis, ita etiam prima causarum, quae est quasi movens, est alia in aliis.
||2471. Therefore the causes and principles of all things analogously are four in number—matter, form, privation, and the source of motion. Yet they are not the same in all cases, but differ in different things. For just as it has been said above (1046:C 2467) that matter form and privation differ in different things, so too the first of the causes, which has the character of a mover, differs in different cases.
|Et hoc manifestat per exemplum. Sicut in sanatis sanitas est sicut forma, infirmitas sicut privatio, corpus sicut materia; sicut movens autem ars medicinalis. In aedificativis autem est species domus sicut forma, inordinatio talis, idest opposita ordini quem requirit domus, est privatio, lateres autem sicut materia, movens autem est ars aedificatoria. Et sic in ista quatuor dividitur principium.
||2472. He clarifies this by giving examples. In the case of things healed, health has the character of form, sickness the character of privation, the body the character of matter, and the art of medicine the character of a mover; and in the case of things built, the shape of a house is the form, “a certain kind of disorder,” i.e., the opposite of the order which the house requires, is the privation, bricks are the matter, and the art of building is the mover. Principles, then, are divided into these four kinds.
||2473. And since in the case (1048).
|Deinde cum dicit quoniam autem reducit praedicta quatuor ad tria, eo quod movens et forma reducuntur in idem specie tam in artificialibus quam in naturalibus. Dicit ergo quod quia movens in naturalibus est homo, inquantum habet formam, et in his quae fiunt a mente sive intellectu movens est species concepta ab intellectu, aut etiam contrarium speciei per cuius remotionem species inducit; manifestum est, quod quodammodo tres erunt causae, inquantum movens et forma sunt idem specie, quodam vero modo erunt quatuor, inquantum scilicet differunt numero. Sanitas enim aliqualiter est ipsa ars medicinalis. Et forma domus quodammodo est ipsa ars aedificatoria, inquantum scilicet ipsa ars est similitudo quaedam et ratio formae quae est in materia. Et similiter in rebus quae generantur, in generante invenitur similitudo formae generati. Homo enim generat hominem.
||He now reduces these four kinds of causes to three on the ground that in the case of artifacts and in that of natural things the mover and the form are specifically the same. He accordingly says that this is clear because (a) in the case of natural things man is a mover inasmuch as he has a form; and (b) in the case of things which are made by mind or intellect the cause of motion is the form conceived by the mind, or even the contrary of the form through whose removal the form is induced. Therefore it is evident that in one sense there are three causes, inasmuch as the mover and the form are specifically the same, and in another sense there are four, inasmuch as these two causes differ numerically. For in a sense the art of medicine is health, and the art of building is the form of the house, i.e., inasmuch as the art itself is a kind of likeness and intelligible representation of the form which is in the matter. And similarly in the case of things which come to be through generation the generator is similar in form to the thing generated; for man begets man.
||2474. And besides these (1049).
|Deinde cum dicit amplius autem ostendit quod, licet prima principia non sint eadem in omnibus secundum rem, sed solum secundum proportionem, prima tamen principia sunt simpliciter eadem omnium. Et hoc ostendit quantum ad tria. Primo quidem quantum ad hoc quod inter causas quatuor assignatas, movens est causa prima, quia movens est quod facit esse formam vel privationem in materia. In genere autem moventium, est devenire ad aliquod unum movens, ut ostensum est in libro octavo physicorum. Id igitur primum movens unum et idem, est primum principium omnium.
||Then he shows that, although first principles are not identically the same beings in all things but only proportionally the same, none the less the first principles of all things are the same in an unqualified sense. He proves this by three arguments. First, he shows that the moving cause is the first of the causes which have been given because it is the one which makes the form or the privation exist in matter. Now in the class of movers it is possible to reach a single cause, as has been proved in Book VIII of the Physics. Therefore this first mover, which is one and the same for all, is the first principle of all things.
||2475. Since some things (1050).
|Secundo ibi, quoniam autem ostendit idem secundum aliud. Entium enim quaedam sunt separabilia, scilicet substantiae; alia sunt inseparabilia, scilicet accidentia, quia passiones et motus et huiusmodi accidentia non possunt esse sine substantiis. Unde manifestum est quod principia prima in genere substantiae sunt etiam causae omnium aliorum generum, non solum quantum ad primam causam moventem, sed etiam quantum ad causas intrinsecas. Nam materia et forma substantiae, sunt causae accidentium.
||Second, he proves the same point in a different way. For some beings (substances) are capable of separate existence, and others (accidents) are not, because modifications and motions and accidents of this kind cannot exist apart from substances. It is evident, then, that the first principles in the category of substance are also the causes of all the other categories. This applies not only to the first moving cause but also to intrinsic causes; for the matter and form of a substance are the causes of its accidents.
||2476. Next, all of these (1051).
|Tertio ibi, deinde erunt ostendit ulterius, quod etiam in genere substantiae est devenire in aliqua prima. Nam prima principia in genere substantiarum sunt substantiae viventes animatae, secundum opinionem Aristotelis ponentis caelestia corpora animata. Et sic prima principia in genere substantiae ut materia et forma, erunt anima et corpus, vel etiam corpus et intellectus vel desiderium, nam anima corporis caelestis, si sit animatum, non habet alias partes animae nisi intellectum et appetitum. Aliae enim partes ordinantur ad conservationem corporum generabilium et corruptibilium. Intellectus etiam et desiderium habet rationem causae moventis.
||Third, he shows that we must also reach certain first principles in the category of substance; for first principles in the category of substance are living animated substances according to the thought of Aristotle, who claimed that the celestial bodies are animated. Hence in the category of substance the first principles which have the character of form and matter will be soul and body, or also body and intellect or appetite; for assuming that a celestial body is animated, its soul has none of the different parts of the soul except intellect and appetite; for the other parts of the soul are directed to the preservation of bodies which are capable of being generated and destroyed. Intellect and appetite also have the character of a mover.
||2477. Again, there is another sense (1052).
|Deinde cum dicit amplius autem ponit alium modum, secundum quem sunt eadem principia omnium proportionaliter: et dicit, quod alio modo sunt eadem principia omnium proportionaliter, ita quod dicamus quod actus et potentia sunt principia omnium.
||Then he gives a second way in which the principles of all things are proportionally the same. He says that the principles of all things are proportionally the same in another sense inasmuch as we say that actuality and potentiality are the principles of all things.
|Sed in hoc est differentia quantum ad duo. Uno quidem modo, quia alia potentia et alius actus sunt principia in diversis rebus. Alio modo, quia aliter invenitur potentia et actus in quibusdam, et aliter in aliis.
||2478. But in this case two differences are to be observed. The first is that a different potentiality and a different actuality are principles in different things. The second is that potentiality and actuality are found in different things in different ways.
|Et hoc secundum primo manifestat; dicens, quod in quibusdam idem quandoque est in actu et quandoque in potentia; ut patet in omnibus generabilibus et corruptibilibus et mobilibus et contingentibus: sicut vinum et caro et homo, quandoque sunt in actu, quandoque etiam in potentia. Quaedam vero semper sunt in actu, sicut substantiae sempiternae.
||2479. Then the second difference is first clarified. He says that in some cases the same thing is at one time actual and at another time potential, as is evident of all things which admit of generation and destruction and are movable and contingent; for example, wine, flesh and man are at one time actual and at another potential. But some things are always actual, as the eternal substances.
|Et quia dixerat hunc modum, quo proportionaliter sunt principia eadem omnium, esse alium modum a praeassignato, consequenter ostendit quomodo reducantur in idem. Et hoc est quod dicit, quod haec, scilicet actus et potentia, cadunt in praedictas causas, quae sunt forma, privatio, et materia, et movens: quia forma est actus, sive sit separabilis a composito, ut Platonici posuerunt, sive etiam sit aliquid compositum ex ambobus, scilicet materia et forma. Et similiter privatio est quodammodo actus, ut tenebrae, aut laborans, idest infirmum: materia vero est in potentia, quia ipsa secundum se potest fieri sub ambobus, scilicet sub forma et privatione. Sic igitur manifestum est, quod actus et potentia in idem redeunt cum materia et forma et privatione; et quod actus et potentia in diversis uno modo differunt: quia non similiter est in omnibus, sed aliter et aliter.
||2480. And since he had said that the way in which the principles of all things are proportionally the same differs from the one previously given, he next shows how these principles (actuality and potentiality) are reduced to the same class. He says that these principles (actuality and potentiality) fall under the classes of causes mentioned above, which are form, privation, matter and mover; because form is an actuality, whether it is separable from the composite, as the Platonists claimed, or whether there is something composed of both, i.e., of form and matter. And similarly privation is in a sense an actuality, for example, darkness or “suffering,” i.e., sickness. But matter is in potentiality, because of itself it is capable of receiving both form and privation. It is evident, then, that actuality and potentiality amount to the same thing as matter, form and privation; and that in a sense actuality and potentiality differ in different things, because they are not present in all things in the same way but in different ways.
|Et quia dixerat quod non solum aliter est potentia et actus in diversis, sed etiam sunt alia in aliis, hoc consequenter exponit, dicens, quod alio modo potentia et actus differunt in diversis, quorum non est eadem materia, quae est potentia, et quorum non est eadem species, quae est actus, sed diversa. Sicut hominis causa ut materia, elementa, scilicet ignis etc., et causa ut forma, species propria, scilicet anima; et causa movens est aliquod extrinsecum; sicut pater est causa movens propinqua, et causa remota sol, et obliquus circulus, idest zodiacus in quo movetur sol, et alii planetae, qui suo motu causant generationem in istis inferioribus. Huiusmodi autem causae extrinsecae neque sunt materiae neque formae neque privatio, neque aliquid conforme eis, aut eiusdem speciei, ut possit dici quod reducuntur ad has causas sicut actus et potentia; sed sunt in alio genere causae, quia sunt moventia, et ipsa etiam reducuntur in actum. Alia vero ab homine habent materiam aliam propriam, et aliam formam propriam, et aliquod agens proprium.
||2481. And since he had said that actuality and potentiality not only apply to different things in different ways but also differ for different things, he next explains this by saying that it is in a different way that the distinction of actuality and potentiality applies to different things of which the matter, which is in potentiality, is not the same, and the form, which is actuality, is not the same but different. For example, the material cause of a man is his elements, namely, fire and the like, and his formal cause is “his proper form,” i.e., his soul, and his moving cause is something extrinsic—his father being a proximate efficient cause, and the sun and “the oblique circle,” or zodiac, through which the sun moves together with the other planets which cause generation in lower bodies by their motion, being remote efficient causes. But extrinsic causes of this sort are neither matter nor form nor privation nor anything conforming to or specifically the same as these so that it could be said that they are reduced to these causes as actuality and potentiality. They are reduced to a different class of cause because they are movers, and these are also reduced to actuality. But things which differ from man have a different proper matter and a different proper form and some proper agent.
||2482. Further, we must note (1053).
|Deinde cum dicit adhuc autem quia iam ostensum est, quod sunt eadem principia omnium proportionaliter, vult ostendere quomodo sunt omnium eadem universaliter. Utrumque enim supra dictum fuit. Dicit ergo, quod oportet videre quomodo principia aliqua dicuntur universaliter, et aliqua non universaliter. Et prima principia maxime universaliter significata sunt actus et potentia; nam haec dividunt ens inquantum huiusmodi. Haec autem dicuntur principia universalia, quia universaliter significantur et intelliguntur; non ita quod ipsa universalia subsistentia principia sint, ut Platonici posuerunt, quia singularium non potest esse aliquod principium nisi singulare; universale enim principium est effectus universaliter accepti, ut homo hominis. Sed, cum non sit aliquis homo universaliter subsistens, non erit aliquod principium universale hominis universalis, sed solum hoc particulare huius particularis, sicut si Peleus Achillis est pater, tui vero, pater tuus. Et haec litera b huius syllabae ba, sed b universaliter acceptum, est principium eius quod est ba, universaliter accepti. Sic igitur principia universaliter significata sunt eadem omnium.
||Since it has been shown already (1046:C 2467) how the principles of all things are proportionally the same, Aristotle now wishes to show how the principles of all things are universally the same; for both of these points were mentioned above (1046:C 2464). He accordingly says that we must see how some principles are predicated universally and how some are not. The first principles which are understood to be most universal are actuality and potentiality, for these divide being as being. They are called universal principles because they are signified and understood in a universal way, but not so that universals themselves are subsisting principles, as the Platonists claimed, because the principle of each singular thing can only be a singular thing; for the principle of an effect taken universally is a universal, as man of man. But since there is no subsisting universal man, there will be no universal principle of universal man, but only this particular man will be the principle of this particular man; for example, Peleus is the father of Achilles, and your father is the father of you. And this particular letter b is a principle of this particular syllable ba, but b taken universally is a principle of ba taken universally. Therefore principles signified universally are the same for all things.
|Deinde inducit alium modum, secundum quem principia substantiarum sunt universaliter omnium, inquantum accidentia ex substantiis causantur. Sicut autem actus et potentia sunt universaliter principia omnium, quia consequuntur ens commune, ita oportet quod secundum quod descendit communitas principiatorum, descendat communitas principiorum. Eorum enim quae non sunt in eodem genere, puta colorum, sonorum, substantiarum et quantitatis, sunt aliae causae et elementa, ut dictum est, praeterquam quod proportionaliter sint eadem omnium. Eorum autem, quae sunt in eadem specie, sed diversa secundum numerum, sunt diversa principia, non specie, sed numero. Sicut aliud est materia tua, et forma et movens, et aliud mea. Sed secundum universalem rationem sunt eadem. Nam anima et corpus sunt materia et forma hominis. Huius autem hominis, haec anima et hoc corpus.
||2483. Then he introduces a third way in which the principles of substances are universally the principles of all things, i.e., inasmuch as accidents are caused by substances. Now just as actuality and potentiality are the universal principles of all things because they flow from being as being, so also, to the extent that the community of things caused is lessened, the community of the principles must also be lessened. For things which do not belong to the same genus, as colors, sounds, substance and quantity, have different causes and elements, as has been pointed out (1046:C 2467), even though these are proportionally the same for all things. And things which belong to the same genus but are numerically different have different principles, not formally, but numerically. For example, your matter and form and moving cause are one thing and mine are another, but in their universal intelligibility they are the same; for soul and body are the form and matter of man, but this soul and this body are the form and the matter of this man.
||2484. And to ask (1054).
|Deinde cum dicit quaerere vero recapitulat ea quae dicta sunt in hoc capitulo. Dicit ergo, quod quaerere utrum sint eadem principia et elementa generum et ad aliquid et qualitatum et aliorum generum, aut diversa, est quaerere de multipliciter dictis; quia diversorum non sunt eadem principia, sed diversa, nisi quodammodo.
||Here he summarizes what has been said in this chapter. He says that to ask whether the principles and elements of substances and of relations and of qualities and of the other categories are the same or different is to raise questions about terms which are used in various senses, because the principles of different things are not the same except in a certain respect but different.
|Omnium enim quodammodo sunt eadem principia, aut secundum proportionem; sicut si dicamus, quod in quolibet genere inveniuntur aliqua quae se habent ut materia et forma et privatio et movens; aut eo quod causae substantiarum sunt causae omnium, quia destructis eis, alia destruuntur. Aut quia principia sunt endelechia, idest actus et potentia. Istis autem tribus modis sunt eadem principia omnium.
||2485. For the principles of all things are the same in a certain respect, either proportionally, as when we say that in each class of things we find certain principles which have the character of matter, form, privation and moving cause; or in the sense that the causes of substances are the causes of all things, because when they are destroyed other things are destroyed; or because the principles are “complete reality,” i.e., actuality, and potentiality. The principles of all things, then, are the same in these three ways.
|Alio autem modo sunt diversa principia; quia contraria, quae sunt principia rerum, et ipsa materia, non univoce dicuntur, quia non sunt genera; nec etiam dicuntur multipliciter quasi aequivoca; et ideo non possumus dicere quod sunt eadem simpliciter, sed secundum analogiam.
||2486. But in another respect the principles are different, because contraries, which are principles of things, and matter itself are not predicated in the same way; for they are not genera, nor are they even predicated of things in many ways as though they were equivocal. Hence we cannot say that they are the same without qualification but only analogously.
|Ultimo autem concludit quod dictum est, quot sunt principia sensibilium, et quomodo sunt eadem aut diversa.
||2487. Last, he concludes by saying that he has shown the number of principles which sensible substances have and how they are the same or different.
|An Eternal Immovable Substance Must Exist
|ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 6: 1071b 3-1071b 22
ἦσαν τρεῖς οὐσίαι,
δύο μὲν αἱ
φυσικαὶ μία δ᾽ ἡ
ὅτι ἀνάγκη εἶναι
ἀΐδιόν  τινα οὐσίαν
ἀκίνητον. αἵ τε
γὰρ οὐσίαι πρῶται
τῶν ὄντων, καὶ εἰ
πάντα φθαρτά: ἀλλ᾽
ἢ γενέσθαι ἢ φθαρῆναι
(ἀεὶ γὰρ ἦν), οὐδὲ χρόνον. οὐ γὰρ οἷόν
τε τὸ πρότερον
εἶναι μὴ ὄντος χρόνου: καὶ ἡ κίνησις ἄρα
συνεχὴς ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ χρόνος:  ἢ γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ ἢ κινήσεώς
τι πάθος. κίνησις
δ᾽ οὐκ ἔστι
συνεχὴς ἀλλ᾽ ἢ ἡ κατὰ τόπον, καὶ ταύτης ἡ κύκλῳ.
||1055. Since there are three classes of substance (1028), two of which are physical and one immovable, concerning the latter it is necessary to affirm that an eternal immovable substance must exist. For substances are the primary kind of beings, and if all of them are perishable, all things are perishable. But it is impossible either that motion should have come to be or that it should perish, for it always existed; and the same is true of time, for there cannot be a before and an after if there is no time. Motion is continuous, then, in the sense that time is; for time is either the same as motion or a property of it. Now the only continuous motion is that which pertains to place, and of this only that which is circular.
|ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ ἔστι
κινητικὸν ἢ ποιητικόν, μὴ ἐνεργοῦν δέ τι, οὐκ ἔσται
γὰρ τὸ δύναμιν ἔχον μὴ ἐνεργεῖν. οὐθὲν ἄρα ὄφελος οὐδ᾽ ἐὰν οὐσίας ποιήσωμεν ἀϊδίους,
 ὥσπερ οἱ τὰ εἴδη, εἰ μή τις
οὐδ᾽ αὕτη ἱκανή, οὐδ᾽ ἄλλη οὐσία παρὰ τὰ εἴδη: εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἐνεργήσει, οὐκ ἔσται
||1056. But even if there is something which is capable of imparting or producing motion, but is not actually doing so, motion will still not exist; for that which has a potentiality may possibly not exercise it. Hence nothing is to be gained if we invent certain eternal substances, as do those who posit the separate Forms, unless there is some principle among them which is capable of causing change (83). This is not sufficient, then, nor is another substance besides the separate Forms sufficient; for if it does not act, there will be no eternal motion.
|ἔτι οὐδ᾽ εἰ ἐνεργήσει, ἡ δ᾽ οὐσία αὐτῆς δύναμις:
οὐ γὰρ ἔσται κίνησις ἀΐδιος: ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τὸ
δυνάμει ὂν μὴ εἶναι. δεῖ  ἄρα εἶναι
ἀρχὴν τοιαύτην ἧς
||1057. And even if it does act this will still not be sufficient, if its essence is a potentiality; for there will be no eternal motion, since what is potential may possibly not be. Hence there must be a principle of the kind whose substance is an actuality.
|ἔτι τοίνυν ταύτας
δεῖ τὰς οὐσίας
εἶναι ἄνευ ὕλης:
ἀϊδίους γὰρ δεῖ, εἴπερ
γε καὶ ἄλλο
||1058. Further, such substances must also be immaterial; for they must be eternal if anything else is. Hence they are actualities.|
|Postquam philosophus ostendit quae sunt principia substantiae sensibilis, hic incipit determinare de substantiis immobilibus a materia separatis. Et dividitur in partes duas. In prima determinat de huiusmodi substantiis secundum propriam opinionem. In secunda secundum opinionem aliorum, sequenti libro, ibi, de sensibili quidem igitur substantia.
||2488. After having shown what the principles of sensible substances are, here the Philosopher begins to establish the truth about the immovable substances, which are separate from matter. This topic is divided into two parts. First (1055:C 2488), he treats substances of this sort by giving his own opinion. Second, he treats them by giving the opinions of other thinkers. He does this in the following book (“Concerning the substance of sensible things”).
|Prima in duas. In prima ostendit esse aliquam substantiam sempiternam, immobilem, a materia separatam. In secunda inquirit conditionem huius substantiae, ibi, movet autem.
||The first part is divided into two members. First, he proves that there is a substance which is eternal, immovable and separate from matter. Second (1067:C 2519) he investigates the attributes of this substance (“Now the first mover”).
|Circa primum tria facit. Primo ostendit esse aliquam substantiam sempiternam. In secunda pertractat quamdam quaestionem ex dictis occasionatam, ibi, quamvis dubitatio. Tertio ex solutione quaestionis motae procedit ad manifestationem veritatis prius inventae, ibi, quare non fuit infinito tempore.
||In regard to the first he does three things. First, he proves that an eternal substance must exist. Second (1059:C 2500), he deals with a question arising from the foregoing discussion (“There is a difficulty, however”); and third (1064:C 2508), from the answer given to the question which was raised he proceeds to clarify a truth previously ,established (“Hence, Chaos or Night”).
|Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit, quod necesse est ponere aliquam substantiam sempiternam. Secundo ostendit qualem oportet esse illam substantiam, ibi, sed si fuerit motivum.
||In regard to the first he does two things. First, he shows that it is necessary to posit an eternal substance. Second (1056:C 2492), he shows what kind of substance it must be (“But even if there is”).
|Dicit ergo primo, quod supra dictum est, quod tres sunt substantiae: quarum duae sunt substantiae naturales, quia sunt cum motu: una sempiterna, ut caelum; alia corruptibilis, ut plantae et animalia; et praeter has, est tertia, quae est immobilis, quae non est naturalis: de hac dicendum est nunc. Ad cuius considerationem oportet prius ostendere, quod necesse est esse aliquam substantiam, sempiternam, immobilem. Quod sic probat.
||He accordingly says, first (1055), that it has been pointed out above (1028:C 2424) that there are three classes of substances. Two of these are natural substances, because they undergo motion—one being eternal, as the heavens, and the other perishable, as plants and animals. And besides these there is a third class, which is immovable and not natural; and of this kind of substance it is now necessary to speak. With a view to investigating this kind of substance it is first necessary to prove that an eternal immovable substance must exist. He proceeds as follows.
|Substantiae sunt primae inter entia, ut supra ostensum est. Destructis autem primis nihil remanet aliorum. Si igitur nulla substantia est sempiterna, sed omnes sunt corruptibiles, sequetur quod nihil sit sempiternum, sed omnia sint corruptibilia, idest non semper existentia. Sed hoc est impossibile, ergo necesse est esse aliquam substantiam sempiternam.
||2489. Substances are the primary kind of beings, as has been shown above (1024:C 2417-23), and when primary things are destroyed none of the others remain. Therefore, if no substance is eternal but all are perishable, it follows that nothing is eternal but that “all things are perishable,” i.e., they do not always exist. But this is impossible. Hence there must be an eternal substance.
|Quod autem impossibile sit nihil esse sempiternum, probat ex hoc, quod impossibile est motum fieri aut corrumpi, idest de novo incepisse, aut quandoque totaliter desiturum esse. Ostensum est enim in octavo physicorum, quod motus est sempiternus simpliciter. Et videtur impossibile quod tempus non sit sempiternum. Quia, si tempus aliquando incepit, aut aliquando desinet, sequetur quod prius fuerit non esse temporis quam tempus; et iterum, quod posterius erit non esse temporis quam tempus. Sed hoc non potest esse, ut videtur; quia non est possibile esse prius et posterius nisi sit tempus, cum nihil aliud sit tempus, nisi numerus prioris et posterioris in motu: et sic sequeretur, quod tempus fuerit antequam inciperet esse, et quod sit postquam esse desierit. Videtur igitur necesse esse quod tempus sit sempiternum.
||2490. That it is impossible for nothing to be eternal he proves from the fact that motion cannot have come to be or “perish,” i.e., it cannot have come to be anew or at some time totally cease to be. For it has been shown in Book VIII of the Physics that motion is eternal without qualification. It also seems impossible that time should not be eternal; for if time began to be at some time or will cease to be at some time it would follow that prior to time there was the non-being of time, and also that there will be time after the non-being of time. But this seems to be impossible, because there could be no before or after if time did not exist, since time is nothing else than the measure of before and after in motion. Thus it would follow that time existed before it began to be, and that it will exist after it ceases to be. Hence it seems that time must be eternal.
|Et si tempus est continuum et sempiternum, necesse est quod motus sit continuus et sempiternus: quia motus et tempus, aut sunt idem, ut quidam posuerunt, aut tempus est aliqua passio motus, ut rei veritas habet. Est enim tempus numerus motus, ut patet in quarto physicorum. Sed tamen non est accipiendum de omni motu, quod possit esse sempiternus et continuus. Non enim hoc potest esse verum nisi de motu locali. Et inter motus locales, solum de motu circulari, ut probatur in octavo physicorum.
||2491. And if time is continuous and eternal, motion must be continuous and eternal, because motion and time are either the same thing, as some claimed, or time is a property of motion, as is really the case. For time is the measure of motion, as is evident in Book IV of the Physics. However, it must not be thought that every motion can be eternal and continuous, since this can be true only of local motion; and among local motions this is true only of circular motion, as is proved in Book VIII of the Physics.
||2492. But even if (1056).
|Deinde cum dicit at vero si ostendit cuiusmodi substantiam necesse est esse sempiternam; et circa hoc tria facit. Primo, quod ad sempiternitatem motus sustinendam, necesse est ponere substantiam sempiternam semper moventem vel agentem; dicens, quod cum necesse sit, si motus est sempiternus, quod sit substantia motiva et effectiva sempiterna, ulterius oportet quod sit movens et agens in actu semper; quia si esset motiva aut effectiva, idest potens movere et efficere motum, et non agens in actu, sequeretur quod non esset motus in actu. Non enim est necessarium, si habeat potentiam movendi, quod moveat in actu: contingit enim id quod habet potentiam agendi non agere; et ita motus non erit sempiternus. Ad hoc igitur, quod motus sit sempiternus, necesse est ponere aliquam substantiam sempiternam moventem et agentem in actu.
||Then he shows what kind of substance this eternal substance must be, and in regard to this he does three things. First, he shows that in order to account for the eternity of motion it is necessary to posit an eternal sub~ stance which is always moving or acting. He says that, since it is necessary, on the assumption that motion is eternal, that there be an eternal substance which is capable of imparting or producing motion, it is also necessary that this be a mover or agent which is always acting, because if it were “capable of imparting or producing motion,” i.e., if it had the power to produce or cause motion, and was not actually doing so, it would follow that there would be no actual motion. For that which has the power of causing motion may possibly not be causing it, since that which has the power of acting may possibly not act; and thus motion would not be eternal. Assuming, then, that motion is eternal, it is necessary to posit an eternal substance which is actually moving or acting.
|Ex quo consequenter concludit, quod nihil prodest opinio Platonis ponentis substantias sempiternas, quae est insufficiens ad sustinendum sempiternitatem motus. Non enim ad hoc sustinendum prodest, si fingamus aliquas substantias separatas sempiternas, nisi in eis sit aliquod principium habens potentiam ad transmutandum, quod non videtur convenire speciebus. Species enim nihil aliud ponebant quam universalia separata: universalia autem, inquantum huiusmodi, non movent. Nam omne principium activum vel motivum est aliquod singulare, ut supra dictum est. Sic igitur nec species sunt sufficientes ad sempiternitatem motus servandam, nec alia substantia separata praeter species, sicut quidam posuerunt mathematica separata: quia nec etiam mathematica, inquantum huiusmodi, sunt principia motus. Et si non sit aliqua substantia sempiterna agens, non est motus sempiternus; quia motus principium est aliqua substantia sempiterna movens et agens.
||2493. Next, he concludes from this that nothing is to be gained by accepting the opinion of Plato, who posited eternal substances, since this is not sufficient to account for the eternity of motion. For the assumption that there are certain separate and eternal substances is not sufficient to account for this unless there is some principle among them which can cause change; but this does not seem to fit the separate Forms. For Plato claimed that the separate Forms are nothing else than universals existing apart from matter. But universals as such do not cause motion; for every active or motive principle is a singular thing, as has been pointed out above (1053:C 2482). Neither the separate Forms, then, nor any other separate substances besides the Forms, such as the separate mathematical entities posited by some, are sufficient to account for the eternity of motion, because even the objects of mathematics as such are not principles of motion. And if there is no eternal active substance, there will be no eternal motion, because the principle of motion is an eternal substance which is a mover or agent.
||2494. And even if (1057).
|Secundo ibi, adhuc neque ostendit ulterius, quod oportet ad sempiternitatem motus, quod non solum sit aliqua substantia sempiterna movens et agens, sed etiam quod eius substantia sit actus. Dicit ergo, quod neque est sufficiens ad sempiternitatem motus, si substantia sempiterna agat, sed tamen secundum suam substantiam sit in potentia; sicut si ponamus prima principia esse ignem aut aquam secundum positionem antiquorum naturalium: non enim poterit esse motus sempiternus. Si enim sit tale movens, in cuius substantia admiscetur potentia, contingit id non esse. Quia quod est in potentia contingit non esse. Et per consequens continget quod motus non sit, et sic motus non erit ex necessitate, et sempiternus. Relinquitur ergo, quod oportet esse aliquod primum principium motus tale cuius substantia non sit in potentia, sed sit actus tantum.
||Second, be shows that, in order for motion to be eternal it is necessary not only that an eternal substance exist, which is a mover or agent, but also that its essence be an actuality. Hence he says that the eternity of motion is not adequately accounted for even if it is supposed that an eternal substance does act yet is potential in essence. For example, it would not be sufficient to hold that the first principles are fire or water, as the ancient natural philosophers did, because then motion could not be eternal. For if a mover is such that its essence contains potentiality, it can possibly not be, because whatever is in potentiality may possibly not be. Hence it would be possible for motion not to be, and so it would not be necessary and eternal. Therefore it follows that there must be a first principle of motion of the sort whose essence is not in potentiality but is only an actuality.
||2495. Further, such substances (1058).
|Tertio ibi, amplius igitur concludit ulterius, quod oportet huiusmodi substantiam esse immaterialem. Dicit ergo, quod amplius ex praedictis sequitur, quod huiusmodi substantias, quae sunt principia motus sempiterni, oportet esse sine materia. Nam materia est in potentia. Oportet igitur eas esse sempiternas, si aliquid aliud est sempiternum, utpote motus et tempus. Et sic sequitur quod sint in actu.
||Third, he further concludes that this kind of substance must be immaterial. He says that it also follows from the foregoing (1055-57:C 2488-94) that substances of this kind, which are the principles of eternal motion, must be free from matter; for matter is in potentiality. Therefore they must be eternal if something else is eternal, as motion and time. Thus it follows that they are actualities.
|Hoc autem ultimo concludit propter dubitationem quam consequenter inducet. Ex hoc igitur processu manifestum est quod Aristoteles hic firmiter opinatus est et credidit necessarium fore, quod motus sit sempiternus et similiter tempus. Aliter enim non fundasset super hoc intentionem suam de inquisitione substantiarum immaterialium.
||2496. He concludes in this way last because of the question which be will next raise. From this reasoning, then, it is evident that here Aristotle firmly thought and believed that motion must be eternal and also time; otherwise he would not have based his plan of investigating immaterial substances on this conviction.
|Sed tamen sciendum quod rationes ab eo inductae in octavo physicorum, ex quarum suppositione hic procedit, non sunt demonstrationes simpliciter, sed probabiles rationes. Nisi forte sint demonstrationes contra positiones antiquorum naturalium de inceptione motus, quas destruere intendit.
||2497. Yet it should be noted that the arguments which he introduces in Book VIII of the Physics, which he assumes as the basis of his procedure here, are not demonstrations in the strict sense but only dialectical arguments; unless perhaps they are arguments against the positions of the ancient natural philosophers regarding the beginning of motion, inasmuch as he aims to destroy these positions.
|Et praetermissis aliis rationibus quas hic non tangit, manifestum est quod ratio quam hic posuit ad probandum sempiternitatem temporis, non est demonstrativa. Non enim, si ponimus tempus quandoque incepisse, oportet ponere prius nisi quid imaginatum. Sicut cum dicimus quod extra caelum non est corpus, quod dicimus extra, non est nisi quid imaginatum. Sicut igitur extra caelum non oportet ponere locum, quamvis extra videatur locum significare, ita non est necessarium quod tempus sit prius quam incipiat vel postquam desinet, licet prius et posterius videantur tempus significare.
||2498. And aside from the other arguments which he does not touch upon here, it is evident that the argument which he does give here to prove that time is eternal is not demonstrative. For if we suppose that at some moment time began to be, it is not necessary to assume a prior moment except in imaginary time; just as when we say that there is no body outside of the heavens what we mean by “outside” is merely an imaginary something. Hence, just as it is not necessary to posit some place outside of the heavens, even though “outside” seems to signify place, so too neither is it necessary that there be a time before time began to be or a time after time will cease to be, even though before and after signify time.
|Sed quamvis rationes probantes sempiternitatem motus et temporis non sint demonstrativae et ex necessitate concludentes, tamen ea quae hic probantur de sempiternitate et immaterialitate primae substantiae, ex necessitate sequuntur. Quia si non fuerit mundus aeternus, necesse est quod fuerit productus in esse ab aliquo praeexistente. Et si hoc non sit aeternum, oportet iterum quod sit productum ab aliquo. Et cum hoc non possit procedere in infinitum, ut supra in secundo probatum est, necesse est ponere aliquam substantiam sempiternam, in cuius substantia non sit potentia, et per consequens immaterialem.
||2499. But even if the arguments which prove that motion and time are eternal are not demonstrative and necessarily conclusive, still the things which are proved about the eternity and immateriality of the first substance necessarily follow; for, even if the world were not eternal, it would still have to be brought into being by something that has prior existence. And if this cause were not eternal, it too would have to be produced by something else. But since there cannot be an infinite series, as has been proved in Book II (153:C 301-4), it is necessary to posit an eternal substance whose essence contains no potentiality and is therefore immaterial.
|Eternal Motion Requires An Eternal Mover
|ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapters 6 & 7: 1071b 22-1072a 26
τὸ μὲν ἐνεργοῦν πᾶν
τὸ δὲ δυνάμενον οὐ πᾶν ἐνεργεῖν, ὥστε
εἶναι τὴν δύναμιν.
||1059. There is a difficulty, however; for it seems that, while everything which is acting is able to act, not everything which is able to act is acting; so potentiality is prior.
| ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ τοῦτο, οὐθὲν ἔσται
τῶν ὄντων: ἐνδέχεται
γὰρ δύνασθαι μὲν εἶναι
μήπω δ᾽ εἶναι. καίτοι
εἰ ὡς λέγουσιν
οἱ ἐκ νυκτὸς γεννῶντες, ἢ ὡς
οἱ φυσικοὶ ὁμοῦ πάντα χρήματά
φασι, τὸ αὐτὸ
ἀδύνατον. πῶς γὰρ
εἰ μὴ ἔσται
αἴτιον; οὐ γὰρ ἥ γε  ὕλη κινήσει
αὐτὴ ἑαυτήν, ἀλλὰ
τεκτονική, οὐδὲ τὰ ἐπιμήνια οὐδ᾽ ἡ γῆ, ἀλλὰ τὰ σπέρματα καὶ ἡ γονή.
||1060. But if this is so, no beings will exist; for everything may be capable of being, but still not be. And if we take what the theologians say, who generate everything from Night, or what the— philosophers of nature say, who affirm that “all things were together,” they express the same impossible view. For how will things be moved, if there is no actual cause? Matter will not move itself, but technical knowledge will move it; nor will menstrual blood or earth move themselves, but semen or seed will move them.
|διὸ ἔνιοι ποιοῦσιν ἀεὶ ἐνέργειαν,
οἷον Λεύκιππος καὶ Πλάτων: ἀεὶ γὰρ εἶναί
φασι κίνησιν. ἀλλὰ διὰ τί καὶ τίνα οὐ λέγουσιν, οὐδ᾽, <εἰ> ὡδὶ <ἢ> ὡδί, τὴν αἰτίαν. οὐδὲν γὰρ ὡς  ἔτυχε κινεῖται, ἀλλὰ δεῖ τι ἀεὶ ὑπάρχειν, ἕσπερ νῦν φύσει
μὲν ὡδί, βίᾳ δὲ ἢ ὑπὸ νοῦ ἢ ἄλλου
ὡδί. (εἶτα ποία πρώτη;
ὅσον). ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ Πλάτωνί γε οἷόν τε λέγειν ἣν
[1072α]  τὸ αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ κινοῦν: ὕστερον
γὰρ καὶ ἅμα τῷ οὐρανῷ ἡ ψυχή, ὡς φησίν.
||1061. This is the reason why some men, such as Leucippus and Plato, posit something which is always actual; for they say that motion always exists. But they do not say why it exists, or what it is, or how this is so, or what its cause is. For nothing is moved by chance, but there must always be something existing which moves it. Now things are moved in one way by nature, and in another by force or by mind or by some other agent. What kind of motion, then, is prior? For this makes the greatest difference. Plato cannot explain what it is that he sometimes thinks is the source of motion, i.e., what moves itself; for according to him the soul is later than motion and simultaneous with the heavens.
|τὸ μὲν δὴ δύναμιν οἴεσθαι ἐνεργείας πρότερον ἔστι
μὲν ὡς καλῶς ἔστι δ᾽ ὡς οὔ (εἴρηται δὲ πῶς):
||1062. Now to think that potentiality is prior to actuality is in one sense right and in another not; and we have explained how this is so (1059).
|ὅτι δ᾽  ἐνέργεια πρότερον,
μαρτυρεῖ Ἀναξαγόρας (ὁ γὰρ νοῦς ἐνέργεια) καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς φιλίαν καὶ τὸ νεῖκος, καὶ οἱ ἀεὶ λέγοντες κίνησιν εἶναι, ὥσπερ
||1063. That actuality is prior is affirmed by Anaxagoras (for mind is an actuality), and by Empedocles in his theory of love and strife (50), and by those who say that motion always existed, as Plato and Leucippus.
|ὥστ᾽ οὐκ ἦν ἄπειρον
χρόνον χάος ἢ νύξ, ἀλλὰ ταὐτὰ ἀεὶ ἢ περιόδῳ ἢ
ἄλλως, εἴπερ πρότερον ἐνέργεια
||1064. Hence Chaos or Night did not exist for an infinite time, but the same things have always existed, either in a cycle or in some other way, granted that actuality is prior to potentiality.
|εἰ δὴ τὸ αὐτὸ  ἀεὶ
περιόδῳ, δεῖ τι ἀεὶ μένειν
ὡσαύτως ἐνεργοῦν. εἰ δὲ μέλλει γένεσις
καὶ φθορὰ εἶναι, ἄλλο
ἀεὶ ἐνεργοῦν ἄλλως
ἄρα ὡδὶ μὲν
καθ᾽ αὑτὸ ἐνεργεῖν ὡδὶ δὲ
κατ᾽ ἄλλο: ἤτοι
ἄρα καθ᾽ ἕτερον
κατὰ τὸ πρῶτον. ἀνάγκη δὴ κατὰ τοῦτο: πάλιν
 αὐτῷ τε
αἴτιον κἀκείνῳ. οὐκοῦν
καὶ γὰρ αἴτιον ἦν ἐκεῖνο τοῦ ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως:
τοῦ δ᾽ ἄλλως ἕτερον, τοῦ δ᾽ ἀεὶ ἄλλως ἄμφω δηλονότι. οὐκοῦν οὕτως
τί οὖν ἄλλας δεῖ
||1065. Therefore, if something is always moved in the same cycle, there must be something which always continues to act in the same way. But if there is to be generation and destruction, there must be something else “ which acts in different ways. Hence this must act in one way of itself, and in another way in virtue of something else, i.e., either in virtue of some third agent or of the first. Now it must be in virtue of the first; for this is the cause both of the second and of the third. The first is preferable, then; for it was the cause of that whose being is always to be the same, and something else was the cause of that whose being is to be different; and obviously both of these account for eternal diversity. Therefore, if motion always exhibits these characteristics, why is it necessary to look for other principles?
οὕτω τ᾽ ἐνδέχεται,
καὶ εἰ μὴ οὕτως,
ἐκ νυκτὸς  ἔσται
καὶ ὁμοῦ πάντων
καὶ ἐκ μὴ ὄντος,
λύοιτ᾽ ἂν ταῦτα,
καὶ ἔστι τι ἀεὶ
δ᾽ ἡ κύκλῳ (καὶ
τοῦτο οὐ λόγῳ μόνον
ἀλλ᾽ ἔργῳ δῆλον), ὥστ᾽ ἀΐδιος ἂν εἴη ὁ πρῶτος οὐρανός.
||And since this is a possible account of the matter, and if this is not so all things will come from Night (1060) or “all things were together” (1060) or something comes from non-being (1034), these difficulties are solved. And there is something which is always being moved with an unceasing motion, and this is circular motion. This is evident not only in theory but in fact; and for this reason the first heaven will be eternal.
|ἔστι τοίνυν τι καὶ ὃ κινεῖ. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ κινούμενον καὶ
τοίνυν  ἔστι τι ὃ οὐ
καὶ οὐσία καὶ ἐνέργεια οὖσα.
||1066. Therefore there is also something which causes it to move. And since that which is moved and causes motion is intermediate, there must be something which causes motion and is unmoved, which is eternal and both a substance and an actuality.|
|Movet quamdam dubitationem circa praedeterminata. Et est dubitatio, utrum actus sit simpliciter prior potentia, ut possit poni primum principium rerum esse tale, cuius substantia sit actus. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo ponit rationem ad ostendendum falsum, scilicet quod potentia sit prior actu. Secundo ponit rationem in contrarium, ibi, at vero si hoc, nihil erit. Tertio solvit dubitationem, ibi, potentiam quidem igitur.
||2500. He raises a question about a point already dealt with. The question is whether actuality is prior absolutely to potentiality so that the first principle of things can be held to be one whose substance is actuality. In regard to this he does three things. First (1059:C 2500), he gives an argument to show what is false, namely, that potentiality is prior absolutely to actuality. Second (1060:C 2501), he argues on the other side of the question (“But if this is so”). Third (1062:C 2506), he answers the question (“Now to think”).
|Dicit ergo primo, quod dictum est, quod substantia sempiterna est actus, quamvis de hoc sit dubitatio. Videtur enim potentia simpliciter esse prior actu: nam prius est a quo non convertitur consequentia essendi. Hoc autem modo videtur potentia se habere ad actum: quia omne agens videtur posse agere, sed non omne quod potest agere agit; quare videtur quod potentia sit prior actu.
||He accordingly says, first (1059), that it has been pointed out that an eternal substance is an actuality, although there is a difficulty regarding this. For potentiality seems to be prior to actuality, since one thing is prior to another when the sequence of their being cannot be reversed (465:C 950)Now potentiality seems to be related to actuality in this way, because everything which is acting seems to be able to act, but not everything which is able to act is acting; and so it seems that potentiality is prior to actuality.
||2501. But if this is so (1060).
|Deinde cum dicit at vero si ponit rationem in contrarium. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ponit rationem ducentem ad impossibile: dicens, quod si potentia sit simpliciter prior actu, sequitur quod aliquando nihil sit: contingens est enim id quod potest fieri, sed nondum fit. Et ita, si prima entia sunt in potentia, sequitur quod non sunt actu: et sic nihil aliorum erit.
||Then he argues on the opposite side of the question, and in regard to this he does two things. First, he gives an argument reducing the counter-position to absurdity. He says that, if potentiality is prior absolutely to actuality, it follows that at some time nothing may exist; for the contingent is what can come to be but has not yet done so. Hence, if the first beings are potential, it follows that they do not exist actually; and so no other being will exist.
|Et hoc quidem contingit dupliciter. Uno modo secundum opinionem quorumdam antiquorum, qui vocabantur poetae theologi, sicut fuit Orpheus, et quidam alii, qui ponebant mundum esse generatum ex nocte, idest simplici privatione praeexistente. Alio modo secundum posteriores naturales, sicut physici naturales, et eos sequentes, qui cum viderent quod secundum naturam nihil fit ex nihilo, posuerunt omnia esse simul in quadam confusione, quam vocabant chaos, sicut posuit Anaxagoras: et sic ponebant omnia esse in potentia, non autem in actu.
||2502. This can be taken in two ways. First, according to the opinion of certain of the ancients, who were called the theological poets, such as Orpheus and certain others, who claimed that the world “is generated from Night,” i.e., from a simple pre-existent privation. Second, according to the later physicists, i.e., philosophers of nature and their followers, who, when they saw that nothing comes from nothing in the natural world, claimed that all things were together in a kind of mixture, which they called Chaos. (Anaxagoras, for example, held this view.) Thus they held that all things exist potentially and not actually.
|Sed, sive hoc modo, sive illo dicatur, sequitur idem impossibile, si potentia simpliciter sit prior actu. Illa enim quae sunt in potentia tantum, sive sint omnino sub privatione, sive sint in quadam confusione, non poterunt moveri, ut reducantur in actum, nisi sit aliqua causa movens in actu existens; quia materia in artificialibus non movet seipsam, sed ipsam movet agens, scilicet tectonica, idest ars. Nec menstrua, quae sunt materia in generatione animalis, movent seipsa, sed movet ea genitura, idest semen animalis. Nec terra, quae est materia in generatione plantarum, movet seipsam, sed movent eam spermata, idest semina plantarum.
||2503. But whether this position is stated in the former or in the latter way the same impossible conclusion follows, provided that potentiality is prior absolutely to actuality. For those things which are in potentiality only, or which come entirely under privation, or belong to some confused mass, cannot be moved so as to be brought to actuality unless there is some moving cause which is existing actually. For in things made by art the matter does not move itself, but an agent moves it, i.e., “technical knowledge,” or art. Neither does the menstrual blood, which is the matter from which an animal is generated, move itself, but “semen,” i.e., the sperm of the animal, moves it. Nor does earth, which is the material from which plants are generated, move itself, but “the seed,” i.e., the seeds of plants, move it.
||2504. This is the reason (1061).
|Secundo ibi, propter quod ostendit quomodo huic rationi quidam physici consenserunt. Dicit ergo, quod propter hanc rationem quidam philosophi posuerunt semper actum existentem, scilicet Leucippus socius Democriti, et Plato. Dixerunt enim motum semper fuisse etiam ante mundum. Secundum quidem Leucippum in atomis per se mobilibus, ex quibus ponebat mundum constitui. Secundum Platonem vero in elementis, quae dicebat ante constitutionem mundi mota fuisse motibus inordinatis, sed postea a Deo fuisse ea reducta ad ordinem.
||Second, he shows how some of the philosophers of nature agreed with this argument. He says that this is the reason why some philosophers—Leucippus, the companion of Democritus, and Plato—claimed that something actual always exists. For they said that motion had always existed even before the world; Leucippus attributed motion to the atoms, which are mobile of themselves, from which he supposed the world to be composed; and Plato attributed it to the elements, which he said were moved by disorderly motions before the formation of the world, and afterwards were brought into order by God.
|Sic igitur quantum ad hoc videntur bene dixisse, quod posuerunt semper fuisse motum. Sed in hoc defecerunt, quia non dixerunt quis motus semper fuerit, nec causam motus assignaverunt, nec simpliciter narrando, nec suae positionis causam assignando, cum tamen nihil moveatur ut contingit, idest sine aliqua causa certa. Sed semper oportet aliquid existere, quod est causa motus. Sicut nunc videmus, quod quaedam moventur hoc modo a natura, aut a violentia, aut ab intellectu, aut aliqua alia causa. Deinde debuerunt etiam assignare, qualis sit prima causa motus, utrum natura, sive violentia, sive intellectus; multum enim differt quodcumque horum ponatur causa motus. Sed nec Plato potest excusari, propter hoc, quod posuit principium motus esse aliquid movens seipsum, quod dicebat esse animam: sed anima secundum ipsum non fuit ante constitutionem mundi, sed fuit post illam inordinationem motus. Fuit enim facta simul cum caelo, quod ponebat animatum. Et sic anima non poterit esse principium illius motus inordinati.
||2505. Now they seem to be right in claiming that motion has always existed. But they were wrong in failing to point out which kind of motion has always existed; nor did they give the cause of motion, either by stating this in an absolute sense or by giving the reason for their own position. Yet “nothing is moved by chance,” i.e., without some fixed cause, but there must always be something existing which is the cause of motion. For example, we now see that some things are moved in this way by nature or by force or by mind or by some other agent. Hence they should also have stated what the first cause of motion is, whether nature or force or mind; for it makes a great deal of difference which of these is held to be the cause of motion.—Plato cannot be excused on the ground that he held the principle of motion to be something that moves itself, which he asserted to be a soul, since the soul did not exist of itself before the formation of the world, but only existed after the disorderly state of motion. For according to him the soul was created at the same time as the heavens, which he claimed to be animated; and thus it could not be the principle of that disorderly motion.
||2506. Now to think (1062).
|Deinde cum dicit potentiam quidem solvit propositam quaestionem. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo remittit ad hoc quod determinatum est in nono de ordine potentiae ad actum; dicens, quod opinari potentiam esse priorem actu, quodam modo bene dicitur, et quodam modo non. Et quomodo hoc sit, dictum est in nono. Ibi enim dictum est, quod actus simpliciter est prior potentia; sed in uno eodem quod movetur de potentia in actum, potentia praecedit actum tempore, quamvis actus sit prior natura et perfectione.
||Then he answers the question which was raised, and concerning this he does two things. First, he returns to the points established in Book IX regarding the relationship of potentiality to actuality. He says that the opinion that potentiality is prior to actuality is in one sense right and in another not. The sense in which it is right has been explained in Book IX (778-80:C 1844-49); for it was stated there that actuality is prior absolutely to potentiality. But in one and the same subject which is being moved from potentiality to actuality, potentiality is prior to actuality in time, although actuality is prior both in nature and in perfection.
||2507. That actuality is prior (1063).
|Secundo ibi, quod autem confirmat solutionem per positiones quorumdam philosophorum; dicens, quod hoc quod actus sit simpliciter prior, testatur Anaxagoras, quia posuit primum principium movens esse intellectum. Intellectus enim actus quidam est. Et etiam Empedocles, qui posuit causas moventes litem et amicitiam. Et Leucippus et Plato, qui posuerunt semper motum fuisse.
||Second, he strengthens his answer by giving the opinions of some of the philosophers. He says that the absolute priority of actuality is asserted by Anaxagoras, because he claimed that the first principle of motion is an intellect; for intellect is a kind of actuality. The same thing is also asserted by Empedocles, who claimed that love and strife are the causes of motion; and also by Leucippus and Plato, who claimed that motion has always existed.
||2508. Hence Chaos or Night (1064).
|Deinde cum dicit quare non ex determinatione quaestionis praemissae manifestat quod prius ostensum est. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo concludit ex praemissis perpetuitatem generationis. Secundo ex perpetuitate generationis concludit perpetuitatem motus caeli, ibi, si itaque quidem semper. Tertio ex perpetuitate motus caeli concludit perpetuitatem primi moventis immobilis, ibi, est igitur aliquid et quod movet.
||Then he uses the answer to the question given above to clarify a point previously established, and in regard to this he does three things. First (1064:C 2508), in the light of the things established above he concludes that generation must be eternal. Second (1065:C 2510), on the ground that generation is eternal he concludes that the motion of the heavens must be eternal (“Therefore, if something”). Third (1066:C 2517), on the ground that the motion of the heavens is eternal he concludes that the first unmoved mover must be eternal (“Therefore there is”).
|Dicit ergo primo, quod si actus simpliciter est prior potentia, sequitur, quod falsa sit opinio antiquorum naturalium, qui existimantes potentiam simpliciter esse actu priorem, posuerunt omnia in infinito tempore prius fuisse in potentia, in quadam confusione, quam appellabant chaos. Falsa etiam erit opinio poetarum theologorum, qui propter eamdem existimationem posuerunt infinito tempore prius fuisse simplicem rerum privationem quam res actu esse inciperent. Quam quidem rerum privationem noctem appellabant, propterea forte, quia inter qualitates et formas sensibiles, lux communior et prior invenitur, cum ipsi nihil praeter sensibilia esse arbitrentur. Privatio autem lucis nox est. Utraque igitur opinio falsa est, si actus est prior potentia.
||He accordingly says, first (1064), that, if actuality is prior absolutely to potentiality, it follows that it is false to hold, with the ancient philosophers of nature, who thought potentiality to be prior absolutely to actuality, that all things pre-existed potentially for an infinite time in a kind of confused mass, which they called Chaos. And false also is the opinion of the theological poets, who claimed for the same reason that the simple privation of things had existed for an infinite time before things began to be actually. Some called this privation of things “Night,” and perhaps the reason for their doing so is that among qualities and simple forms light is found to be more common and prior (since they thought that nothing exists except sensible things), and night is the privation of light. Both opinions are false, then, if actuality is prior to potentiality.
|Sed cum videamus ea quae generantur, de potentia ad actum procedere, necesse erit dicere, quod eadem quae actu esse incipiunt post potentiam, semper fuerunt aliquo modo,- vel secundum circularem generationem, prout ponuntur ea quae generantur, prius fuisse eadem non secundum numerum, sed secundum speciem, quod quidem fuit secundum circularem generationem. Nam ex terra humectata resolvuntur vapores, ex quibus generatur pluvia, per quam iterum humectatur terra. Similiter ab homine procedit sperma, et generatur iterum homo; et sic ea quae fiunt reiterantur eadem specie propter circularem generationem. Aut etiam ea quae post potentiam fiunt in actu, eadem fuerunt semper aliter, sicut posuit Anaxagoras quod praeextiterunt actu in his ex quibus generantur.
||2509. But since we see that things which are generated and destroyed pass from potentiality to actuality, it will be necessary to say that the same things which begin to be actually after being potentially have always existed in some way. Either the very things which begin to be actually after being potentially have always existed according to circular generation, inasmuch as they claimed that things which are generated were formerly the same specifically but not numerically, and this is what occurs 2 in circular generation. For from the moist earth vapors are derived, and these turn into rain, by which the earth is again made moist. Similarly sperm comes from a man, and from sperm a man again comes to be. Thus things which come to be are brought back the same in species by reason of circular generation. Or again those things which come to be actually after being potentially have always been the same things in a different way, as Anaxagoras claimed that they had actual prior existence in the things from which they are generated.
||2510. Therefore, if something (1065).
|Deinde cum dicit si itaque ex perpetuitate generationis concludit perpetuitatem motus caelestis. Supposito igitur, quod non sit aliquis alius motus, quo ea quae procedunt de potentia ad actum, semper eadem fuerint, nisi secundum circuitum generationis, ex his quae in scientia naturali ostensa sunt, et praecipue in secundo de generatione, concludit, quod si aliquid permanet idem per circuitum generationis, oportet et aliquid semper manere idem numero, quod similiter agat ad hoc, quod causet perpetuitatem: non enim potest esse causa perpetuitatis quae invenitur in generatione et corruptione, aliquid unum eorum quae generantur et corrumpuntur, quia nullum eorum semper est, neque etiam omnia, cum non simul sint, ut ostensum est in octavo physicorum. Relinquitur igitur, quod oportet aliquid esse perpetuum agens, quod semper uniformiter agat ad perpetuitatem causandam. Et hoc est primum caelum, quod movetur et resolvit omnia motu diurno.
||Then he concludes that the motion of the celestial bodies must be eternal on the ground that generation is eternal. Therefore, granted that there is no other motion by which things that pass from potentiality to actuality have always been the same except that which proceeds according to the cycle of generation, he concludes from what has been shown in the philosophy of nature (especially in Book II of Generation ) that, if something remains the same throughout the cycle of generation, something must also remain numerically the same, which will act in the same way so as to cause the eternal motion of things. For none of the things which are generated and destroyed can be the cause of the eternality which is found in generation and destruction, because no one of them always exists, nor even all of them, since they do not exist at the same time, as has been shown in Book VIII of the Physics. It follows, then, that there must be some eternal, agent which always acts in a uniform way so as to cause the eternal motion of things. This is the first heaven, which is moved and causes all things to be changed by its daily motion.
|Sed quia illud, quod semper eodem modo operatur, non causat nisi aliquod semper eodem modo se habens; in his autem quae generantur et corrumpuntur, apparet quod non semper se habent eodem modo, quia quandoque generantur, et quandoque corrumpuntur; si ergo debet esse generatio et corruptio in istis inferioribus, necesse est ponere aliquod agens, quod aliter se habeat in agendo: et hoc quidem agens dicit esse corpus quod movetur secundum circulum obliquum, qui dicitur zodiacus. Quia, cum hic circulus declinat ad utramque partem ab aequinoctiali, illud, quod movetur secundum circulum per zodiacum, oportet quod sit quandoque magis propinquum et quandoque magis remotum: et secundum hoc sua propinquitate et remotione causat contraria. Videmus enim quod ea, quae appropinquante sole ad nos, generantur, recedente sole, corrumpuntur. Sicut herbae, quae in vere nascuntur, et in autumno siccantur. Moventur enim in circulo zodiaco et sol et alii planetae. Sed et stellae fixae dicuntur moveri super polos zodiaci, et non super polos aequinoctiales, ut Ptolomaeus probat. Ex harum autem motu causatur generatio et corruptio omnium quae generantur et corrumpuntur, sed magis evidenter ex motu solis.
||2511. But that which always acts in the same way only causes something that is always in the same state; and obviously those things which are generated and destroyed do not remain in the same state, for at one time they are generated and at another destroyed. This being so, if generation and destruction are to occur in the realm of lower bodies, it is necessary to posit some agent which is always in different states when it acts. He says that this agent is the body [the sun] which is moved in the oblique circle called the zodiac. For since this circle falls away on either side of the equinoctial circle, the body which is moved circularly through the zodiac must be at one time nearer and at another farther away; and by reason of its being near or far away it causes contraries. For we see that those things which are generated when the sun comes closer to the earth are destroyed when the sun recedes (for example, plants are born in the spring and wither away in the autumn); for both the sun and the other planets are moved in the circle of the zodiac. But the fixed stars are also said to be moved over the poles of the zodiac and not over the equinoctial poles, as Ptolemy proved. And the coming to be and ceasing to be of everything which is generated and destroyed is caused by the motion of these stars, but more evidently by the motion of the sun.
|Hoc ergo movens quod aliter agit, necesse est quod quodam modo agat secundum se, idest ex propria virtute, inquantum causat diversitatem generationis et corruptionis; quodam vero modo secundum aliud idest ex virtute alterius, inquantum causat perpetuam generationem et corruptionem. Aut ergo oportet quod agat secundum aliquid alterum, idest virtute alicuius alterius, aut secundum primum, idest virtute primi, quod semper similiter agit. Et cum non sit aliquod alterum assignare, ex cuius virtute causet perpetuitatem, necesse est quod secundum hoc quod similiter agit, idest virtute eius, perpetuitatem generationis et corruptionis causet. Id enim, scilicet primum quod semper similiter agit, est causa ipsi, quod aliter et aliter agit: quia id quod aliter et aliter agit, perpetuo agit: id vero quod semper similiter agit, est causa perpetuitatis cuiuslibet motus: sic igitur est causa perpetuitatis eius, quod agit aliter et aliter, ut scilicet perpetuo sic agat; et illi etiam, quod ex eo causatur, scilicet generationi et corruptioni perpetuae. Ex quo patet, quod secundum agens, scilicet quod aliter et aliter agit, agit in virtute primi agentis, idest primi caeli sive primi orbis, quod semper similiter agit.
||2512. Therefore this mover which acts in different ways must be one that “acts in one way of itself,” i.e., by its own power, inasmuch as it causes the diversity found in generation and destruction. And it must act “in another way in virtue of something else,” i.e., by the power of some other agent, inasmuch as it causes eternal generation and destruction. Hence this second agent must act either “in virtue of some third agent,” i.e., by the power of some other agent, “or of the first,” i.e., by the power of the first agent, which always acts in the same way. And since it is not possible to assign some other agent by whose power this first agent brings about the eternal motion of things, it is therefore necessary according to this “that it act in the same way”; that is, that by its power it causes the eternal generation and destruction of things. For it—the first agent—which always acts in the same way, is the cause of that which acts in different ways. For that which acts in different ways acts eternally, and that which acts in the same way is the cause of the eternality of any motion. Hence it is the cause of the eternality of that which acts in different ways inasmuch as the latter acts eternally in this way; and it is also the cause of that which is produced by it, namely, eternal generation and destruction. From this it is also evident that the second agent, which acts in different ways, acts by the power “of the first agent,” i.e., the first heaven or first orb, which always acts in the same way.
|Sic ergo patet, quod primum agens, quod semper similiter agit, est potius et dignius, quia ipsum est causa eius quod est semper esse similiter, idest perpetuitatis. Sed eius, quod est esse aliter et aliter, causa est alterum agens, quod aliter et aliter agit. Eius vero, quod est aliter et aliter se habere, quod est generationem et corruptionem esse perpetuam: manifestum est, quod sunt causa ambo coniunctim, scilicet et primum quod semper similiter agit, et secundum quod aliter et aliter agit.
||2513. Hence it is clear that the first agent, which always acts in the same way, is more powerful and nobler, because it is the cause of that “whose being is always to be the same,” i.e., of eternality. But the cause of that whose being is to be different is another agent, which acts in different ways. And it is evident that both of these combined, i.e., both the first agent, which always acts in the same way, and the second agent, which acts in different ways, are the cause of that which both always is and is in different states, namely, the fact that generation and destruction are eternal.
|Ex hoc autem concludit quod si sic se habent motus caeli, quod ex eis potest causari perpetuitas generationis et corruptionis in istis inferioribus, non oportet quaerere aliqua alia principia, scilicet ideas, sicut Platonici posuerunt, vel amicitiam et litem, sicut posuit Empedocles: quia per hunc modum convenit assignare causam perpetuitatis generationis et corruptionis.
||2514. Again, he concludes from this that, if the motions of the heavens are such that eternal generation and destruction in the realm of lower bodies can be caused by them, it is not necessary to look for any other principles (such as the Ideas, which the Platonists posited, or love and hate, which Empedocles posited), because it is possible to account for the eternal generation and destruction of things in the above way.
|Et si iste modus non ponatur, sequentur inconvenientia, ad quae deducti sunt primi philosophantes, scilicet quod omnia fiant ex nocte, idest ex simplici privatione, aut quod omnia simul fuerint, vel quod aliquid fiat ex non ente.
||2515. And if this way is not accepted, the untenable conclusions to which the first philosophers were led will follow namely, that all things “will come from Night,” i.e., from a simple privation, or “all things were together,” or something comes from non-being.
|Manifestum est ergo, quod praedicta positione servata, scilicet quod sit perpetua generatio et corruptio causata a motu caeli perpetuo, solventur praedicta inconvenientia; et sequetur, quod aliquid semper moveatur motu qui non cessat, qui est motus circularis. Et hoc non solum apparet ratione, sed ex ipso effectu et per sensum: unde necesse est, quod primum caelum, eo quod semper hoc motu movet, sit sempiternum.
||296. Therefore it is evident that, if the above-mentioned position is accepted, i.e., that eternal generation and destruction are caused by the eternal motion of the heavens, the foregoing untenable conclusions are eliminated. And it will follow that something is always being moved in an unceasing motion, which is circular motion. This becomes apparent not only by reasoning but from the effect itself and by perception. Hence, since the first heaven always causes motion by means of this motion, it must be eternal.
||2517. Therefore, there is (1066).
|Deinde cum dicit est igitur concludit ex praedictis perpetuitatem motoris immobilis. Cum enim omne quod movetur, ab alio moveatur, ut in physicis probatum est; si caelum est perpetuum, et motus est perpetuus, necesse est aliquod esse movens perpetuum. Sed quia in ordine mobilium et moventium inveniuntur tria, quorum ultimum est quod movetur tantum, supremum autem est movens quod non movetur, medium autem est quod movetur et movet; necesse est, quod ponatur aliquod sempiternum movens quod non movetur. Probatum est enim in octavo physicorum, quod cum non sit abire in infinitum in moventibus et motis, oportet devenire in aliquod primum movens immobile: quia et si deveniatur in aliquod movens seipsum, iterum ex hoc oportet devenire in aliquid movens immobile, ut ibi probatum est.
||From what has been said above he next infers that there is an eternal unmoved mover. For since everything which is being moved is being moved by something else, as has been proved in the Physics, if both the heavens and their motion are eternal, there must be an eternal mover. But since three classes are found among movers and things moved: the lowest of which is something that is merely moved, the highest something that moves but is unmoved, and the intermediate something that both moves and is moved, we must assume that there is an eternal mover which is unmoved. For it has been proved in Book VIII of the Physics that, since there cannot be an infinite number of movers and things moved, we must come to some first unmoved mover. For even if one might come to something that moves itself, it would again be necessary for the above reason to come to some unmoved mover, as has been proved in that work.
|Si autem primum movens est sempiternum et non motum, oportet quod non sit ens in potentia; quia quod est ens in potentia natum est moveri;- sed quod sit substantia per se existens, et quod eius substantia sit actus. Et hoc est quod supra concluserat. Sed necesse fuit movere dubitationem quae erat apud antiquos, ut ea soluta ostenderetur expressius, quo ordine necesse est pervenire ad primum ens, cuius substantia est actus.
||2518. Again, if the first mover is eternal and unmoved, it must not be a potential being (because any potential being is naturally fitted to be moved) but an independent substance whose essence is actuality.—This is the conclusion which he drew above (1058:C 2499). But it was necessary to raise this question, which was discussed among the ancients, in order that when it has been solved the course to be followed in reaching a first being whose substance is actuality will be made more evident.
|How the First Mover Causes Motion
|ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 7: 1072a 26-1072b 14
|κινεῖ δὲ ὧδε τὸ ὀρεκτὸν καὶ τὸ νοητόν: κινεῖ οὐ κινούμενα. τούτων τὰ πρῶτα τὰ αὐτά. ἐπιθυμητὸν μὲν
τὸ ὂν καλόν: ὀρεγόμεθα δὲ διότι δοκεῖ μᾶλλον ἢ δοκεῖ διότι ὀρεγόμεθα:  ἀρχὴ γὰρ ἡ νόησις.
νοῦς δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ νοητοῦ
||1067. Now the first mover causes motion as something intelligible and something appetible; for these alone cause motion without being moved. And what is first in the class of the appetible and in that of the intelligible is the same; for it is the apparent good which is the object of concupiscible appetite, and the real good which is the primary object of will. For we desire a thing because it seems good rather than consider it good because we desire it; for understanding is the principle of desire. And the intellect is moved by an intelligible object.
|νοητὴ δὲ ἡ ἑτέρα συστοιχία καθ᾽ αὑτήν: καὶ ταύτης ἡ οὐσία πρώτη, καὶ ταύτης ἡ ἁπλῆ καὶ
(ἔστι δὲ τὸ ἓν
καὶ τὸ ἁπλοῦν οὐ τὸ αὐτό: τὸ μὲν
γὰρ ἓν μέτρον
τὸ δὲ ἁπλοῦν πὼς ἔχον αὐτό).
||1068. And one of the two columns of opposites (60) is the intelligible in itself; and in this class primary substance is first, and in substance that which is simple and exists actually. However, one and simple are not the same; for one signifies a measure (432; 825), and simple signifies a state.
καὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ  τὸ δι᾽ αὑτὸ αἱρετὸν
ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ συστοιχίᾳ: καὶ ἔστιν ἄριστον ἀεὶ
[1072β]  ὅτι δ᾽ ἔστι
τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα
ἐν τοῖς ἀκινήτοις, ἡ διαίρεσις δηλοῖ: ἔστι γὰρ τινὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα
ὧν τὸ μὲν ἔστι
τὸ δ᾽ οὐκ ἔστι.
κινεῖ δὴ ὡς ἐρώμενον,
||1069. But that which is good and that which is desirable in itself are in the same column of opposites; and that which is first in each class is always best, or analogous to the best. That the final cause belongs to the class of immovable things is shown by a process of division; for the final cause of a thing is either that which exists or that which does not.
|εἰ μὲν οὖν τι
ἐνδέχεται καὶ  ἄλλως ἔχειν, ὥστ᾽ εἰ [ἡ] φορὰ πρώτη ἡ ἐνέργειά ἐστιν,
ταύτῃ γε ἐνδέχεται
ἄλλως ἔχειν, κατὰ τόπον, καὶ εἰ μὴ κατ᾽ οὐσίαν: ἐπεὶ δὲ ἔστι
αὐτὸ ἀκίνητον ὄν, ἐνεργείᾳ ὄν, τοῦτο
ἄλλως ἔχειν οὐδαμῶς.
φορὰ γὰρ ἡ πρώτη τῶν
δὲ ἡ κύκλῳ: ταύτην  δὲ τοῦτο κινεῖ. ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἄρα ἐστὶν ὄν:
καλῶς, καὶ οὕτως ἀρχή. τὸ γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον
τοσαυταχῶς, τὸ μὲν
ὅτι παρὰ τὴν ὁρμήν, τὸ δὲ οὗ οὐκ ἄνευ τὸ εὖ, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως
ἀλλ᾽ ἁπλῶς. ἐκ
τοιαύτης ἄρα ἀρχῆς
ἤρτηται ὁ οὐρανὸς
καὶ ἡ φύσις.
||1070. And it causes motion as something loved, whereas by that which is [first] moved other things are moved. Therefore, if a thing is moved, it is possible for it to be other than it. is. Hence, local motion, which is the primary kind of motion, is also the actuality of that which is [first] moved; and in this respect the thing first moved can differ in place though not in substance. But since there is something which moves yet is itself immovable and exists actually, this can in no way be other than it is. For the primary kind of change is local motion, and of local motion the first is circular motion; and this is the motion which the first mover causes. Hence the first mover necessarily exists; and insofar as it is necessary it is good, and thus is a principle. For necessary has all of these meanings: that which seems to be done by force; that without which something does not fare well; and that which cannot be other than it is, but is absolutely necessary (416-22). It is on such a principle, then, that the heavens and the natural world depend.|
|Postquam philosophus ostendit aliquam substantiam esse sempiternam, immaterialem et immobilem, cuius substantia est actus, procedit ad inquirendum conditionem ipsius substantiae. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo inquirit de perfectione huius substantiae. Secundo de unitate et pluralitate ipsius, ibi, utrum vero una ponenda. Tertio de operatione eius, ibi, quae vero circa intellectum.
||299. After having shown that there is an eternal, immaterial, immovable substance whose essence is actuality, the Philosopher now proceeds to investigate the attributes of this substance. In treating this he does three things. First (1061:C 2519), he considers the perfection of this substance. Second (1078:C 2553), he asks whether it is one or many (“We must not”). Third (1089:C 2600), he considers its operation (“The things which pertain”).
|Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit perfectionem praedictae substantiae. Secundo ostendit eam esse incorpoream, ibi, ostensum autem est.
||In regard to the first he does two things. First, he shows the perfection of this substance. Second (1076:C 2548), he proves that it is incorporeal (“And it has been shown”).
|Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit perfectionem dictae substantiae. Secundo excludit opinionem contrariam, ibi, quicumque autem putant.
||In regard to the first he does two things. First, he shows its perfection. Second (1075:C 2545), he rejects a contrary opinion (“And all those”).
|Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit secundum quem modum movens immobile moveat. Secundo ex hoc ostendit ea quae ad perfectionem eius pertinent, ibi, intelligibilis autem altera.
||In regard to the first he does two things. First, he explains how the unmoved mover causes motion; and second (1068:C 2523), he infers from this what is comprised in its perfection (“And one of the two”).
|Dicit ergo primo, quod cum ostensum sit, quod sit primum movens non motum, necesse est quod sic moveat sicut desiderabile et intelligibile. Haec enim sola, scilicet desiderabile et intelligibile, inveniuntur movere non mota.
||He accordingly says, first (1067), that, since it has been shown that the first mover is unmoved, it must cause motion in the way in which the desirable and the intelligible do; for only these, the desirable and the intelligible, are found to cause motion without being moved.
|Quod sic patet. Est enim duplex motus: naturalis et voluntarius, sive secundum appetitum. Movens autem motu naturali, de necessitate movetur, cum movens naturaliter sit generans et alterans. Nam etiam gravia et levia secundum locum moventur per se a generante. Generans autem et alterans immediate, oportet quod aliter et aliter se habeant. Unde etiam supra dictum est, quod id quod causat generationem et corruptionem agit aliter et aliter. In motu autem qui est secundum voluntatem et appetitum, voluntas, et appetitus se habent sicut movens motum, ut patet in tertio de anima. Unde relinquitur quod solum id quod movet sicut appetibile, sit movens non motum.
||2520. He proves this as follows. Motion is twofold: natural and voluntary, or according to appetite. Now that which causes motion by means of natural motion necessarily undergoes motion, since a natural mover is one that begets and alters things. For both heavy and light bodies are moved locally directly by their begetter. But that which begets and alters things directly must exist in different states. Hence it has also been pointed out above (1065:C 2510) that the cause of generation and destruction acts in different ways. Now in the case of voluntary and appetitive motion, will and appetite have the character of moved movers, as is evident in Book III of The Soul. Hence it remains that only that which causes motion as something appetible is an unmoved mover.
|Dicitur autem primum movens movere sicut appetibile, quia motus caeli est propter ipsum, sicut propter finem, causatus ab aliquo proximo movente quod movet propter primum movens immobile, ut assimilet se ei in causando, et explicet in actum id quod est virtute in primo movente. Non enim est motus caeli propter generationem et corruptionem inferiorum sicut propter finem, cum finis sit nobilior eo quod est ad finem. Sic igitur primum movens movet sicut appetibile.
||2521. Now it is said that the first mover causes motion as something appetible because the motion of the heavens has this mover as its end or goal, for this motion is caused by some proximate mover which moves on account of the first unmoved mover in order that it may be assimilated in its causality to the first mover and bring to actuality whatever is virtually contained in it. For the motion of the heavens does not have the generation and destruction of lower bodies as its end, since an end or goal is nobler than the things ordained to it. Therefore the first mover causes motion as something appetible.
|Sed apud nos aliud est quod movet sicut desiderabile, et aliud quod movet sicut intelligibile bonum; cum tamen utrumque moveat sicut movens non motum. Et hoc praecipue apparet in eo qui est incontinens. Nam secundum rationem movetur ab intelligibili bono. Secundum autem vim concupiscibilem movetur ab aliquo delectabili secundum sensum, quod videtur bonum, cum non sit bonum simpliciter, sed solum secundum quid. Sed non potest esse huiusmodi diversitas in primo intelligibili et primo desiderabili. Sed oportet quod primum intelligibile et primum desiderabile sint eadem. Et hoc ideo, quia concupiscibile quod non est intelligibile bonum, est apparens bonum. Primum autem bonum oportet quod sit voluntabile, idest appetibile appetitu intellectuali. Nam voluntas in intellectu est, et non in appetitu concupiscentiae tantum. Et hoc ideo, quia quod appetitur secundum concupiscentiam videtur bonum, eo quod desideratur. Nam concupiscentia pervertit iudicium rationis, ut ei videatur bonum quod est delectabile. Sed illud quod appetitur appetitu intellectuali, desideratur, quia videtur bonum secundum se. Huiusmodi enim appetitus principium est intelligentia, idest actus intellectus qui movetur quodammodo ab intelligibili. Sic igitur patet quod concupiscibile non est bonum nisi quod desideratur secundum rationis dictamen. Non ergo potest esse primum bonum; sed solum illud quod, quia bonum est, movet desiderium, quod est appetibile et intelligibile simul.
||2522. But in our own case that which causes motion as a desirable good differs from that which causes motion as an intelligible good, though each causes motion as an unmoved mover. This is particularly evident in the case of an incontinent person; for according to his reason he is moved by an intelligible good, but according to his concupiscible power he is moved by something pleasant to the senses, which, while it seems to be good, is not good absolutely but only with some qualification.—However, this kind of difference cannot be found in the first intelligible and the first desirable good. But the first intelligible and the first desirable good must be the same. The reason is that a concupiscible good, which is not an intelligible good, is merely an apparent good; but the first good “must be an object of will,” i.e., an object desired by intellectual appetite. For will belongs to the intellectual order and not merely to that of concupiscible appetite. And this is so because what is desired by the concupiscible power seems to be good because it is desired; for concupiscence perverts the judgment of reason insofar as something pleasant to sense seems to be good to reason. But what is desired by intellectual appetite is desired because it seems to be good in itself. For “understanding” as such, i.e., the act of intellection, which is moved in a way by an intelligible object, “is the principle of desire.” Therefore it is evident that the object of concupiscible appetite is good only when it is desired through a dictate of reason. Hence it cannot be the first good, but only that which, because it is good, moves desire and is at once both appetible and intelligible.
||2523. And one of the two (1068).
|Deinde cum dicit intelligibilis autem quia ostenderat primum movens esse intelligibile et appetibile, restat modo ostendere ex hoc, quomodo in primo movente perfectio invenitur. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo enim ostendit ex ratione intelligibilis et appetibilis perfectionem ipsius secundum se. Secundo per comparationem ad primum mobile, ibi, movet autem ut amatum. Tertio per comparationem ad id quod appetit et intelligit ipsum, ibi, deductio autem et cetera.
||Since he has proved that the first mover is both intelligible and appetible, it now remains to show from this how perfection is found in the first mover. In regard to this he does three things. First (1068:C 2523), he shows the perfection of the first mover in itself by considering the formal character of the intelligible and the appetible; second (1070:C 2529), in relation to the first sphere (“And it causes motion”); and third (107:C 2536), in relation to the thing that desires and understands it (“And its course of life”).
|Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit perfectionem primi moventis ex eo quod est intelligibile. Secundo ex eo quod est appetibile, ibi, at vero quod bonum et cetera.
||In treating the first part he does two things. First, he proves that the first mover is perfect on the ground that it is intelligible; and second (1068:C 2526), on the ground that it is appetible (“But that which is good”).
|Dicit primo, quod sicut moventia et mota habent suam coordinationem, ita intelligibilia habent suam coordinationem: quam quidem coelementationem intelligibilem vocat, eo quod unum intelligibile est primum principium intelligendi alterum, sicut etiam unum movens, alteri est causa movendi.
||He says, first (1068), that, just as movers and things moved are related to one another, so also are intelligible things. He calls this latter relationship an intelligible column of opposites because one intelligible is the first principle for understanding another, just as one mover is also the cause of the motion of another.
|Sicut igitur ex ordinatione moventis et moti, ostensum est, quod primum movens est substantia simplex et actus, ita etiam invenitur idem ex ordinatione intelligibilium. Manifestum est enim quod inter intelligibilia substantia est prima, eo quod accidentia non intelligimus nisi per substantiam, per quam definiuntur: et inter substantias prius est intelligibile simplex quam compositum: nam simplicia clauduntur in intellectu compositorum. Et inter simplicia, quae sunt in genere substantiae, actus est prius intelligibile quam potentia: nam potentia definitur per actum. Relinquitur igitur, quod primum intelligibile sit substantia simplex, quae est actus.
||2524. Therefore, just as it has been shown (1066:C 298) from the series of movers and things moved that the first mover is a simple substance and an actuality, in a similar fashion the same thing is found to be true from the series of intelligible things. For it is evident that substance is the first of intelligible things, because we understand accidents only by means of substance, through which they are defined; and among substances a simple intelligible substance is prior to a composite one; for simple things are included in the concept of composite things. And of the simple entities contained in the class of substance the actually intelligible are prior to the potentially intelligible; for potentiality is defined by means of actuality. It follows, then, that the first intelligible entity is a simple substance which is an actuality.
|Et ne videatur incidere in opinionem Platonis, qui posuit primum principium rerum ipsum unum intelligibile, ostendit consequenter differentiam inter unum et simplex: et dicit, quod unum et simplex non idem significant, sed unum significat mensuram, ut in decimo ostensum est; simplex autem significat dispositionem, secundum quam aliquid aliqualiter se habet, quia videlicet non est ex pluribus constitutum.
||2525. And lest he should seem to be adopting the opinion of Plato, who claimed that the first principle of things is the intelligible one-in-itself, he therefore explains the difference between being one and being simple. He says that one and simple do not signify the same thing, but one signifies a measure, as has been pointed out in Book X (825:C 1950-52), and simple signifies that state whereby something is such as not to be composed of many things.
||2526. But that which is good (1069).
|Deinde cum dicit at vero ostendit idem ex ratione appetibilis: dicens, quod hoc, quod est bonum per se elegibile, secundum eamdem ordinationem se habet. Nam illud quod est prius in genere intelligibilium, est etiam melius in genere appetibilium, aut aliquid ei proportionaliter respondens. Quod quidem dicit, quia intelligibilia actu sunt secundum quod sunt in intellectu, appetibilia autem secundum quod sunt in rebus. Bonum enim et malum in rebus sunt, ut in sexto dictum est.
||Then he proves the same point from the formal character of the appetible. He says that that which is good and that which is desirable in itself belong to the same class. For that which is prior in the class of intelligible things is also a greater good in the class of appetible things, or is something analogous to it. He says this because intelligible things are actual insofar as they exist in the intellect, whereas appetible things are actual insofar as they exist in reality; for good and evil are in things, as has been pointed out in Book VI (558:C 1240).
|Sic igitur, sicut ratio intelligibilis substantiae est prior quam ratio intelligibilis accidentis, sic se habent bona, quae proportionaliter respondent his rationibus. Sic igitur optimum erit substantia simplex, quae est actus, quod est primum inter intelligibilia. Et sic manifestum est, quod primum movens idem est quod primum intelligibile et primum appetibile, quod est optimum.
||2527. Hence, just as the concept of intelligible substance is prior to that of intelligible accidents, the same relationship holds for the goods which correspond proportionally to these concepts. Therefore the greatest good will be a simple substance, which is an actuality, because it is the first of intelligible things. It is evident, then, that the first mover is identical with the first intelligible and the first appetible good, which is the greatest good.
|Sed quia appetibile et bonum habent rationem finis, finis autem non videtur esse in rebus immobilibus, ut in obiectionibus tertii libri actum est, ideo hanc dubitationem removet; et dicit, quod haec divisio, qua distinguitur quot modis dicitur finis, ostendit, quod cuius causa, idest finis, aliquo modo potest esse in immobilibus. Dupliciter autem potest esse aliquid finis alterius. Uno modo sicut praeexistens; sicut medium dicitur finis praeexistens motus gravium, et huiusmodi finem nihil prohibet esse in immobilibus: potest enim aliquid tendere per suum motum ad participandum aliqualiter aliquo immobili: et sic primum movens immobile potest esse finis. Alio modo dicitur aliquid esse finis alicuius, sicut quod non est in actu, sed solum in intentione agentis, per cuius actionem generatur, sicut sanitas est finis operationis medicinae; et huiusmodi finis non est in rebus immobilibus.
||2528. But since what is appetible and what is good have the character of an end or goal, and there does not seem to be an end in the realm of immovable things, as has been explained in the dialectical discussions in Book III (192:C 374-75), he therefore removes this difficulty. He says that the division in which the various senses of end or goal are distinguished shows that a final cause can be found in a way in the realm of immovable things. Now one thing can be the goal of another in two ways: first, as something having prior existence, as the center of the world is said to be a goal which is prior to the motion of heavy bodies; and nothing prevents a goal of this kind from existing in the realm of immovable things. For a thing can tend by its motion to participate in some degree in something immovable; and the first mover can be a goal in this way. Second, one thing is said to be the goal of another, not as something that exists actually, but only as existing in the intention of the agent by whose activity it is produced, is health is the goal of the activity of the medical art. An end or goal of this kind does not exist in the realm of immovable things.
||2529. And it causes motion (1070).
|Deinde cum dicit movet autem comparat primum movens immobile ad primum mobile; dicens, quod cum primum movens immobile moveat quasi amatum, necesse est, quod aliquid sit primo motum ab ipso, per quod movet alia; et hoc est primum caelum. Quia igitur supponimus, quod motus sit sempiternus, oportet, quod illud, quod primo movetur, sempiterne moveatur, et per ipsum moveantur alia. Dicitur autem melius quasi amatum quam quasi desideratum, cum desiderium sit eius quod nondum habetur, sed amor etiam habiti est.
||He now relates the first unmoved mover to the first sphere. He says that, since the first unmoved mover causes motion as something loved, there must be something which is first moved by it, through which it moves other things. This is the first heaven. Therefore, since we suppose motion to be eternal, the first sphere must be moved eternally, and it in turn must move other things. And it is better to speak of it as something loved rather than as something desired, since there is desire only of something that is not yet possessed, but there is love even of something that is possessed.
|Et si oportet quod sempiterne moveatur, necesse est quod non contingat aliter et aliter ipsum se habere; sed ut sit semper in eadem dispositione secundum substantiam. Unde necesse est, quod primus motus, quo movetur primum mobile, sit latio, idest motus localis; quia quod movetur secundum alios motus, idest generationem et corruptionem, augmentum et diminutionem, et alterationem, necesse est quod aliter et aliter se habeat, secundum aliquid quod in ipso est, scilicet secundum substantiam, quantitatem et qualitatem: sed quod movetur secundum loci mutationem habet quidem se aliter et aliter secundum locum, qui est extrinsecus locato, sed non secundum substantiam, vel secundum aliquam intrinsecam dispositionem substantiae.
||2530. And if it must be moved eternally, it must be incapable of being other than it is but must always remain substantially the same. Hence the primary kind of motion, by which “the first sphere” is moved, necessarily “is local motion,” i.e., motion as regards place; because that which is moved “according to the other kinds of motion,” i.e., generation and destruction, increase and decrease, and alteration, must differ as regards something intrinsic, namely, substance, quantity or quality. But that which is moved with local motion differs as regards place, which is extrinsic to the thing in place, but not as regards substance or any intrinsic disposition of substance.
|Cum igitur primum mobile habeat se aliter et aliter secundum locum, et non secundum substantiam, oportet quod primum movens, quod est immobile et semper actu ens, nullo modo possit aliter et aliter se habere, quia non potest moveri. Moveretur enim maxime secundum primum motum. Primus autem motuum est loci mutatio. In hoc autem genere, primus motus est motus circularis: hoc autem motu non movetur, cum hoc motu moveat. Primum enim movens non movetur illo motu, quo movet, sicut primum alterans non alteratur: non igitur movetur circulariter: et per consequens nullo modo potest moveri: et sic non potest aliter et aliter se habere: unde sequitur, quod primus motus sit existens in mobili ex necessitate: hoc enim est necessarium, quod non potest non esse. Sed ex necessitate est, non sicut ea quae sunt per violentiam, sed necessitas eius est ipsum bene se habere, et eius movens est principium motus, scilicet ut desideratum et finis.
||2531. Therefore, since the first sphere differs as regards place but not as regards substance, the first mover, which is immovable and always actual, can in no way be other than it is, because it cannot be moved. For if it were moved, it would be moved especially with the primary kind of motion, which is local motion, of which the first type is circular. But it is not moved with this motion, since it moves other things with this motion. For the first mover is not moved with that kind of motion by which it imparts motion, just as the first cause of alteration is not itself altered. Hence it is not moved circularly, and so cannot be moved in any way. Therefore it cannot be other than it is; and thus it follows that the primary kind of motion exists in that which is moved of necessity; for that is necessary which cannot not be. But it is not necessary in the sense in which things forced are necessary, but its necessity consists in its good state. And the thing which moves it is a principle of motion as an object of desire, or a goal.
|Et quod talis sit eius necessitas, manifestum est ex divisione necessarii: necessarium enim tribus modis dicitur. Uno modo quod est per violentiam, quia scilicet non potest non accidere propter impetum inferentis violentiam. Alio modo dicitur, sine quo non est aliquid bene: seu quia sine eo nullo modo potest esse finis: sicut cibus necessarius est ad vitam animalis, sive quia sine eo non est aliquid perfecte se habens; sicut equus est necessarius ad iter, quia sine eo non faciliter itur. Tertio modo dicitur necessarium quod non convenit aliter et aliter se habere sed simpliciter et secundum se necessarium est.
||2532. That its necessity is such becomes evident from the different meanings of the term necessary, for it is used in three senses. First it means that which happens by force, i.e., what cannot fail to happen because of the power exerted by the thing applying force. Second, it means that without which a thing does not fare well—either that without which a goal cannot be attained at all (as food is necessary for the life of an animal), or that without which something is not in a perfect state (as a horse is necessary for a journey in the sense that it is not easy to make a journey without one). Third, it means that which cannot be other than it is, but is necessary absolutely and essentially.
|Cum ergo dicitur quod caelum ex necessitate movetur, non potest dici, quod huiusmodi sit necessitas violentiae, quia in rebus incorruptibilibus non est aliquid extra naturam; quae autem sunt violenta sunt extra naturam. Similiter non potest esse necessitas absoluta, quia primum mobile est movens seipsum, ut probatur in octavo physicorum; quod autem seipsum movet in seipso habet moveri et non moveri. Relinquitur ergo, quod necessitas primi motus sit necessitas ex fine, inquantum sine perpetuitate talis motus non convenit esse convenientem ordinem ad finem.
||2533. Therefore, when it is said that an orb is moved of necessity, such necessity cannot be called necessity of force; for in imperishable things there is not found anything that is outside their nature, but in the case of things which are forced what occurs is not natural. Similarly such necessity cannot be absolute necessity, because the first thing which is moved moves itself, as is proved in Book VIII of the Physics, and what moves itself has within itself the power to move or not move. It follows, then, that the necessity of the first motion is necessity from the end, inasmuch as there cannot be a fitting order to the end unless such motion is eternal.
|Ex hoc igitur principio, quod est primum movens sicut finis, dependet caelum, et quantum ad perpetuitatem substantiae suae, et quantum ad perpetuitatem sui motus; et per consequens dependet a tali principio tota natura, eo quod omnia naturalia dependent a caelo, et a tali motu eius.
||2534. Hence it is on this principle, i.e., the first mover viewed as an end, that the heavens depend both for the eternality of their substance and the eternality of their motion. Consequently the whole of nature depends on such a principle, because all natural things depend on the heavens and on such motion as they possess.
|Attendendum est autem, quod cum Aristoteles hic dicat, quod necessitas primi motus non est necessitas absoluta, sed necessitas, quae est ex fine, finis autem principium est, quod postea nominat Deum, inquantum attenditur per motum assimilatio ad ipsum: assimilatio autem ad id quod est volens, et intelligens, cuiusmodi ostendit esse Deum, attenditur secundum voluntatem et intelligentiam, sicut artificiata assimilantur artifici, inquantum in eis voluntas artificis adimpletur: sequitur quod tota necessitas primi motus subiaceat voluntati Dei.
||2535. It should also be noted that Aristotle says here that the necessity of the first motion is not absolute necessity but necessity from the end, and the end is the principle which he later calls God inasmuch as things are assimilated to God through motion. Now assimilation to a being that wills and understands (as he shows God to be) is in the line of will and understanding, just as things made by art are assimilated to the artist inasmuch as his will is fulfilled in them. This being so, it follows that the necessity of the first motion is totally subject to the will of God.
|The Perfection of the First Substance
|ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 7: 1072b 14-1073a 13
|διαγωγὴ δ᾽  ἐστὶν
οἵα ἡ ἀρίστη
μικρὸν χρόνον ἡμῖν
(οὕτω γὰρ ἀεὶ
ἐκεῖνο: ἡμῖν μὲν
||1071. And its course of life is like the best which we enjoy for a short time; for it is always in that state, though this is impossible for us.
|ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡδονὴ ἡ ἐνέργεια τούτου (καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐγρήγορσις αἴσθησις νόησις ἥδιστον, ἐλπίδες
δὲ καὶ μνῆμαι διὰ ταῦτα). ἡ δὲ νόησις ἡ καθ᾽ αὑτὴν τοῦ
καθ᾽ αὑτὸ ἀρίστου, καὶ ἡ μάλιστα τοῦ μάλιστα.
||1072. For its operation is also pleasure. This is why being awake, sensing and understanding are most pleasant, and hopes and memories are pleasant because of them. Now understanding in itself has to do with what is best in itself, and the highest type of understanding has to do with what is best in the highest degree.
|αὑτὸν  δὲ
νοεῖ ὁ νοῦς
τοῦ νοητοῦ: νοητὸς γὰρ
καὶ νοῶν, ὥστε ταὐτὸν
νοητόν. τὸ γὰρ δεκτικὸν τοῦ νοητοῦ καὶ τῆς οὐσίας νοῦς, ἐνεργεῖ δὲ ἔχων, ὥστ᾽ ἐκείνου μᾶλλον τοῦτο ὃ δοκεῖ ὁ νοῦς θεῖον
ἔχειν, καὶ ἡ θεωρία τὸ ἥδιστον
εἰ οὖν οὕτως εὖ ἔχει,
 ὡς ἡμεῖς
ποτέ, ὁ θεὸς ἀεί, θαυμαστόν: εἰ δὲ μᾶλλον, ἔτι
||1073. And an intellect understands itself insofar as it takes on its intelligible object; for it becomes intelligible by attaining and understanding its object, so that an intellect and its intelligible object are the same. For that which is receptive of something intelligible and of substance is an intellect; and it is actual when it possesses this. Hence it is the latter rather than the former state which seems to constitute the divine state of intellect; and its act of understanding is the most pleasant and best. Therefore, if God is in that pleasurable state in which we sometimes are, this is wondrous; and if He is in that state in a higher degree, this is even more wondrous; and He is in that state.
|καὶ ζωὴ δέ γε ὑπάρχει:
γὰρ νοῦ ἐνέργεια
ζωή, ἐκεῖνος δὲ ἡ ἐνέργεια: ἐνέργεια
καθ᾽ αὑτὴν ἐκείνου
ἀρίστη καὶ ἀΐδιος. φαμὲν δὴ τὸν θεὸν
εἶναι ζῷον ἀΐδιον
ἄριστον, ὥστε ζωὴ καὶ αἰὼν συνεχὴς  καὶ ἀΐδιος
ὑπάρχει τῷ θεῷ: τοῦτο γὰρ
||1074. Life, then, also belongs to Him; for intellectual activity is life, and God is that activity; and the essential activity of God is the life which is best and eternal. And we say that God is an animal, eternal and most excellent. Hence life and continuous and eternal duration belong to God; for this is what God is.
|ὅσοι δὲ ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, ὥσπερ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι καὶ
μὴ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἶναι, διὰ τὸ καὶ τῶν φυτῶν καὶ τῶν
ζῴων τὰς ἀρχὰς αἴτια
μὲν εἶναι τὸ δὲ καλὸν καὶ τέλειον ἐν
τοῖς ἐκ τούτων,
 τὸ γὰρ
σπέρμα ἐξ ἑτέρων ἐστὶ
καὶ τὸ πρῶτον οὐ σπέρμα ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ τὸ τέλειον: [1073α]  οἷον πρότερον ἄνθρωπον
ἂν φαίη τις εἶναι τοῦ σπέρματος, οὐ τὸν ἐκ
ἀλλ᾽ ἕτερον ἐξ οὗ τὸ σπέρμα. ὅτι
μὲν οὖν ἔστιν
οὐσία τις ἀΐδιος καὶ ἀκίνητος
καὶ κεχωρισμένη τῶν
αἰσθητῶν,  φανερὸν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων:
||1075. And all those, such as the Pythagoreans and Speusippus, who think (1109:C 2644) that the greatest good and excellence are not found in the [first] principle (because they are of the opinion that, while the principles of plants and animals are causes, it is in the things that come from these that goodness and perfection are found) are in error. For seed comes from other things which are prior and perfect, and it is not seed that is first but the perfect being. For example, one might say that the man is prior to the seed, not the man who comes from the. seed, but another man from whom the seed comes (780). Therefore it is evident from what has been said that there is a substance which is eternal and immovable and separate from sensible things.
|δέδεικται δὲ καὶ ὅτι μέγεθος
ἐνδέχεται ταύτην τὴν οὐσίαν ἀλλ᾽ ἀμερὴς καὶ ἀδιαίρετός
ἐστιν (κινεῖ γὰρ τὸν ἄπειρον χρόνον, οὐδὲν δ᾽ ἔχει
πεπερασμένον: ἐπεὶ δὲ πᾶν μέγεθος
ἢ ἄπειρον ἢ
πεπερασμένον, πεπερασμένον μὲν διὰ τοῦτο οὐκ  ἂν ἔχοι
μέγεθος, ἄπειρον δ᾽ ὅτι ὅλως οὐκ ἔστιν
||1076. And it has been shown that this substance can have no magnitude, but is without parts and indivisible; for it causes motion for an infinite time, and nothing finite has an infinite power. And since every magnitude is either finite or infinite, this substance cannot have finite magnitude; and it cannot have infinite magnitude, because there is no infinite magnitude at all.
ἀναλλοίωτον: πᾶσαι γὰρ αἱ ἄλλαι
τῆς κατὰ τόπον. ταῦτα μὲν
οὖν δῆλα διότι τοῦτον
ἔχει τὸν τρόπον.
||1077. It has also been shown (1066) that it lacks potentiality and is unalterable; for all the other kinds of motion are subsequent to local motion. It is clear, then, that these things are of this sort.|
|Hic philosophus comparat primum quod movet sicut intelligibile et desiderabile, ad id quod intelligit et desiderat ipsum: necesse est enim, si primum movens movet sicut primum intellectum et desideratum, quod primum mobile desideret et intelligat ipsum. Et hoc quidem verum est secundum opinionem Aristotelis, inquantum caelum ponitur animatum anima intelligente et desiderante.
||2536. Here the Philosopher relates the first being, which causes Motion as something intelligible and something desirable, to that which understands and desires it. For if the first mover causes motion inasmuch as it is the first thing understood and desired, the first thing moved by it must understand and desire it. This is true according to the opinion of Aristotle inasmuch as he considered a heaven to be animated by a soul which understands and desires.
|Circa hoc igitur tria facit. Primo ostendit delectationem sequi animam caeli desiderantem et intelligentem ex primo movente desiderato et intellecto; dicens, quod quaedam deductio est, idest delectabilis dispositio ipsius desiderantis et intelligentis primum intelligibile, qualis optima potest esse nobis aliquo parvo tempore. Est enim intelligens et desiderans semper in tali dispositione delectabili, quod nobis est impossibile, scilicet quod semper simus in illa delectabili et optima dispositione.
||In regard to this he does three things. First (1071:C 2536), he shows that pleasure naturally belongs to the soul of a heaven, which desires and understands, as a result of its understanding and desiring the first mover. He says that “its course of life,” i.e., the pleasurable state of the thing understanding and desiring the first intelligible being, is like the best which we can enjoy for a short time. For that which understands and desires this being is always in such a pleasurable state, though this is impossible for us, i.e., that we should always be in that state which is pleasant and best.
||2537. For its operation (1072).
|Hoc autem quod dictum est, consequenter ostendit cum dicit quoniam est. Quia scilicet in actu huius desiderantis et intelligentis primum principium est delectatio. Delectatio enim consequitur operationem connaturalem alicuius intelligentis et desiderantis, ut patet in decimo Ethicorum. Et signum huius est, quia delectatio maxime est in vigilia et sensu actuali, et intelligentia. Habent enim se intellectus et sensus in actu ad sensum et intellectum in potentia, sicut vigilia ad somnum. Et quod ista sint maxime delectabilia, patet ex hoc, quod alia non sunt delectabilia, nisi propter hoc. Species enim in memoria sunt delectabiles, inquantum praeteritas vel futuras operationes delectabiles ingerunt animis ut praesentes.
||Then he proves his statement. Pleasure attends the activity of the thing that understands and desires the first principle, for pleasure follows upon the operation connatural to anything that understands and desires, as is evident in Book X of the Ethics. A sign of this is that pleasure is greatest when a person is awake and actually sensing and understanding. For intellect and sense in actual use are to intellect and sense in potential use as being awake is to being asleep.—That these states are the most pleasant is clear from the fact that other states are pleasant only because of these; for hope and memory are pleasant inasmuch as they bring past or future pleasant activities into consciousness as present.
|Quia igitur in actu sensus et intellectus delectatio consistit, manifestum est, quod intelligentia, idest actus intellectus inquantum huiusmodi, est eius quod est secundum se optimum. Bonum enim intelligibile excedit bonum sensibile, sicut bonum immobile et universale bonum mutabile et particulare. Etiam sequitur quod delectatio, quae est in actu intellectus, sit eminentior delectatione quae est in actu sensus. Et per consequens oportet quod maxima et perfectissima intelligentia sit maxime optimi; et ita sequitur maxima delectatio. Sic igitur manifestum est, quod in illa intelligentia, qua intelligitur primum movens, quod etiam est primum intelligibile, est maxima delectatio.
||2538. Hence, since pleasure consists in the actual use of intellect and sense, it is evident “that understanding,” i.e., the activity of the intellect as such, is concerned with what is best in itself; for an intelligible good surpasses a sensible good just as an unchangeable and universal good surpasses a changeable and particular good. It also follows that the pleasure experienced in intellectual activity is of a higher kind than that experienced in sensory activity. Hence the best and most perfect intellectual activity is concerned with what is best in the highest degree, so that the greatest pleasure follows. Therefore it is evident that the greatest pleasure is experienced in those intellectual activities by which the first mover is understood, who is also the first intelligible object.
||2539. And an intellect (1073).
|Deinde cum dicit seipsum autem ostendit, quod in primo intelligibili est adhuc perfectior intelligentia et delectatio quam in intelligente et desiderante ipsum. Et dicit, quod hoc est de ratione intellectus, quod intelligat seipsum inquantum transumit vel concipit in se aliquid intelligibile; fit enim intellectus intelligibilis per hoc quod attingit aliquod intelligibile. Et ideo, cum ipse intellectus fiat intelligibilis concipiendo aliquod intelligibile, sequetur quod idem sit intellectus et intelligibile.
||Then he shows that the act of understanding and the pleasure found in the first intelligible object are even more perfect than those found in the thing that understands and desires it. He says that it is characteristic of an intellect to understand itself inasmuch as it takes on or conceives within itself some intelligible object; for an intellect becomes intelligible by reason of the fact that it apprehends something intelligible. Hence, since the intellect becomes intelligible by conceiving some intelligible object, it follows that the intellect and its intelligible object are the same.
|Quomodo autem intellectus attingat intelligibile exponit. Intellectus enim comparatur ad intelligibile sicut potentia ad actum, et perfectibile ad perfectionem: et sicut perfectibile est susceptivum perfectionis, ita intellectus est susceptivus sui intelligibilis. Intelligibile autem proprie est substantia; nam obiectum intellectus est quod quid est; et propter hoc dicit, quod intellectus est susceptivus intelligibilis et substantiae. Et quia unumquodque fit actu inquantum recipit intelligibile: hoc autem est esse actu in genere intelligibilium, quod est esse intelligibile. Et, quia unumquodque inquantum est actu, est agens, sequitur quod intellectus inquantum attingit intelligibile, fiat agens et operans, idest intelligens.
||2540. He explains how an intellect attains its intelligible object. For an intellect is related to an intelligible object as potentiality is to actuality, and as something perfectible to its perfection. And just as something perfectible is receptive of a perfection, so too an intellect is receptive of its intelligible object. Now its proper intelligible object is substance, since the object of the intellect is a quiddity. Hence he says that the intellect is receptive of something intelligible and of substance. And since each thing becomes actual inasmuch as it attains its own perfection, it follows that the intellect becomes actual inasmuch as it receives its intelligible object. Now to be intelligible is to be actual in the class of intelligible things. And since each thing is active to the extent that it is actual, it follows that the intellect becomes active or operative, i.e., understanding, to the extent that it attains its intelligible object.
|Sed sciendum est quod substantiae materiales non sunt intelligibiles actu, sed potentia; fiunt autem intelligibiles actu per hoc quod mediantibus virtutibus sensitivis earum similitudines immateriales redduntur per intellectum agentem. Illae autem similitudines non sunt substantiae, sed quaedam species intelligibiles in intellectu possibili receptae. Sed secundum Platonem, species intelligibiles rerum materialium erant per se subsistentes. Unde ponebat, quod intellectus noster fit intelligens actu per hoc quod attingit ad huiusmodi species separatas per se subsistentes. Sed secundum opinionem Aristotelis, intelligibiles species rerum materialium non sunt substantiae per se subsistentes.
||2541. But it should be borne in mind that material substances are not actually intelligible but only potentially; and they become actually intelligible by reason of the fact that the likenesses of them which are gotten by way of the sensory powers are made immaterial by the agent intellect. And these likenesses are not substances but certain intelligible forms received into the possible intellect. But according to Plato the intelligible forms of material things are self-subsistent entities. Hence he claimed that our intellect becomes actually understanding by coming in contact with separate self-subsistent forms of this kind. But in Aristotle’s opinion the intelligible forms of material things are not substances which subsist of themselves.
|Est tamen aliqua substantia intelligibilis per se subsistens, de qua nunc agit. Oportet enim esse primum movens substantiam intelligentem et intelligibilem. Relinquitur igitur, quod talis est comparatio intellectus primi mobilis ad illam primam intelligibilem substantiam moventem, qualis est secundum Platonicos comparatio intellectus nostri ad species intelligibiles separatas, secundum quarum contactum et participationem fit intellectus actu, ut ipse dicit. Unde intellectus primi mobilis fit intelligens in actu per contactum aliqualem primae substantiae intelligibilis.
||2542. Yet there is an intelligible substance which subsists of itself, and it is of this that he is now speaking. For the first mover must be a substance which is both understanding and intelligible. Hence it follows that the relationship between the intellect of the first sphere and the first intelligible substance, which causes motion, is similar to the relationship which the Platonists posited between our intellect and the separate intelligible Forms, inasmuch as our intellect becomes actual by coming in contact with and participating in these forms, as Plato himself says. Hence the intellect of the first sphere becomes actually understanding through some kind of contact with the first intelligible substance.
|Propter quod autem unumquodque tale, et illud magis. Et ideo sequitur quod quicquid divinum et nobile, sicut est intelligere et delectari, invenitur in intellectu attingente, multo magis invenitur in intelligibili primo quod attingitur. Et ideo consideratio eiusdem, et delectabilissima est et optima. Huiusmodi autem primum intelligibile dicitur Deus. Cum igitur delectatio, quam nos habemus intelligendo, sit optima, quamvis eam non possimus habere nisi modico tempore, si Deus semper eam habet, sicut nos quandoque, mirabilis est eius felicitas. Sed adhuc mirabilior, si eam habet potiorem semper, quam nos modico tempore.
||2543. Further, since the cause of some attribute of a thing has that attribute in a higher degree, it follows that anything that is divine and noble, such as understanding and taking pleasure, which is found in the intellect having the contact, is found in a much higher degree in the first intelligible object with which it is in contact. Hence its intellectual activity is most pleasant and best. But the first intelligible object of this kind is God. Therefore, since the pleasure which we experience in understanding is the highest, although we can enjoy it only for a short time, if God is always in that state in which we sometimes are, His happiness is wondrous. But if He is always in that state (which we enjoy for only a short time) in a higher degree, this is even more wondrous.
||2544. Life, then, also belongs (1074).
|Deinde cum dicit et vita autem tertio, quia dixerat quod Deo competit consideratio, ostendit quomodo se habeat ad eam. Et dicit quod Deus est ipsa vita. Quod sic probat: actus intellectus, idest intelligere, vita quaedam est, et est perfectissimum quod est in vita. Nam actus, secundum quod ostensum est, perfectior est potentia. Unde intellectus in actu perfectius vivit quam intellectus in potentia, sicut vigilans quam dormiens. Sed illud primum, scilicet Deus, est ipse actus. Intellectus enim eius est ipsum suum intelligere. Alioquin compararetur ad ipsum ut potentia ad actum. Ostensum autem est supra, quod eius substantia est actus. Unde relinquitur quod ipsa Dei substantia sit vita, et actus eius sit vita ipsius optima et sempiterna, quae est secundum se subsistens. Et inde est quod in fama hominum dicitur quod Deus est animal sempiternum et optimum. Vita enim apud nos in solis animalibus apparet manifeste. Inde est ergo quod dicitur animal, quia vita competit ei. Quare manifestum est ex praemissis, quod vita et duratio continua et sempiterna inest Deo, quia Deus hoc ipsum est quod est sua vita sempiterna; non quod aliud sit ipse, et vita eius.
||Third, since he has said that intellectual activity is proper to God, he shows how this applies to Him. He says that God is life itself, and he proves this as follows. “Intellectual activity,” i.e., understanding, is a kind of life; and it is the most perfect kind of life that there is. For according to what has been shown, actuality is more perfect than potentiality; and therefore an intellect which is actually understanding leads a more perfect life than one which is potentially understanding, just as being awake is more perfect than being asleep. But the first being, God, is actuality itself; for His intellect is His intellectual activity; otherwise He would be related to His intellectual activity as potentiality to actuality. Moreover, it has been shown (1066:C 2517) that His substance is actuality. Thus it follows that the very substance of God is life, and that His actuality is His life, and that it is the life which is best and eternal and subsists of itself. This is why common opinion holds that God is an animal which is eternal and best; for around us life is clearly apparent only in animals, and therefore God is called an animal because life belongs to Him. Hence, from what has been said it is evident that life and continuous and eternal duration belong to God, because God is identical with His own eternal life; for He and His life are not different.
||2545. And all those (1075).
|Deinde cum dicit quicumque autem excludit opinionem attribuentium imperfectionem primo principio; dicens, quod non recte existimant quicumque non ponunt optimum et nobilissimum inveniri in primo principio, ut Pythagorici et Leucippus: qui ex hoc movebantur, quod principia animalium et plantarum sunt quaedam causae boni et perfectionis: sed bonum et perfectum non invenitur in principiis, sed in his quae producuntur ex eis: sicut semina, quae sunt principia animalium et plantarum imperfecta, sunt ex aliquibus aliis prioribus perfectis.
||Then he rejects the opinion of those who attributed imperfection to the first principle. He says that the opinion of all those who claim that goodness and excellence are not found in the first principle are false. He cites as examples the Pythagoreans and Speusippus (1109:C 2644), who acted on the supposition that, while the principles of plants and animals are causes of goodness and perfection, goodness and perfection are not found in these principles but in the things produced from them. Thus seeds, which are imperfect principles of plants and animals, come from other individual things which are prior and perfect.
|Hoc igitur solvit interimendo motivum eorum. Sperma enim non est primum simpliciter, sed aliquid perfectum; ut si quis dicat hominem esse priorem spermate, non quidem eum qui dicitur nasci ex spermate, sed alterum ex quo sperma resolvitur. Probatum est enim supra, quod actus simpliciter est prior potentia, licet in uno et eodem, ordine generationis et temporis, potentia praecedat actum.
||2546. He rejects this opinion by disposing of the view which influenced these thinkers. For it is not seed that is first absolutely, but the perfect being. Hence, if someone says that the man is prior to the seed, it is not the man who is said to be born from the seed in question, but a different man from whom the seed comes. For it has been proved above (1059-60:C 2500-03) that actuality is prior absolutely to potentiality, though in one and the same subject potentiality is prior to actuality in the order of generation and of time.
|His autem habitis, epilogando concludit manifestum esse ex dictis, quod est aliqua substantia sempiterna et immobilis, separata a sensibilibus.
||2547. In view of the points established he terminates his discussion by concluding that it is evident that there is a substance which is eternal and unchangeable and separate from sensible things.
||2548. And it has been shown (1076).
|Deinde cum dicit ostensum est prosequitur quaedam, quae adhuc consideranda restant de praedicta substantia. Et primo ostendit, quod est incorporea; dicens, quod ostensum est in octavo physicorum, quod huiusmodi substantia nullam magnitudinem potest habere, sed est impartibilis et indivisibilis.
||Then he proceeds to examine certain points which still remain to be considered about the above-mentioned substance. First, he shows that it is incorporeal. He says that it has been proved in Book VIII of the Physics that this kind of substance can have no magnitude but is without parts and indivisible.
|Cuius breviter resumit probationem, dicens, quod huiusmodi substantia movet in infinito tempore, cum primus motus sit sempiternus, ut supra dixit. Ex hoc autem sequitur quod eius virtus sit infinita. Videmus enim in moventibus inferioribus, quod quanto aliquid est maioris virtutis, tanto virtus se extendit ad diuturniorem operationem. Nullum autem finitum potest habere potentiam infinitam. Unde sequitur, quod propter hoc praedicta substantia non habebit magnitudinem finitam. Magnitudinem autem infinitam habere non potest, quia nulla magnitudo est infinita, ut supra probatum est. Quia igitur omnis magnitudo vel est finita vel infinita, relinquitur quod praedicta substantia sit omnino absque magnitudine.
||2549. He briefly restates the proof, saying that a substance of this kind moves in infinite time, since the first mover is eternal, as he said above (1075:C 2547). And from this it follows that its power is infinite. For we see that the more powerful any inferior mover is, the more capable it is of acting for a longer time. But nothing finite can have an infinite power. Hence it follows that the above-mentioned substance is not finite in magnitude. Moreover, it cannot be infinite in magnitude because an infinite magnitude is impossible, as has been proved above (1076:C 2548). Therefore, since every magnitude is either finite or infinite, it follows that the above-mentioned substance lacks magnitude in every way.
|Non autem virtus huius substantiae dicitur infinita privative, secundum quod infinitum congruit quantitati; sed dicitur negative, prout scilicet non limitatur ad aliquem determinatum effectum. Non autem potest dici virtus caelestis corporis infinita, etiam si infinito tempore moveat inferiora corpora; quia non movet nisi motum. Et ita influentia est ex primo movente. Sed nec etiam potest dici quod in corpore caelesti sit virtus infinita, etsi infinito tempore esse habeat; quia in eo non est virtus activa sui esse, sed solum susceptiva. Unde infinita eius duratio ostendit virtutem infinitam exterioris principii. Sed ad hoc quod ipsum suscipiat incorruptibile esse ab infinita virtute, requiritur quod in ipso non sit principium corruptionis, neque potentia ad non esse.
||2550. Moreover, the power of this substance is not said to be infinite in a privative sense, in the way that infinity pertains to quantity; but the term is used in a negative sense, i.e., inasmuch as it is not limited to some definite effect. It cannot be said of a heavenly body, however, that its power is infinite even though it may move inferior bodies in an infinite time, because it causes motion only by being moved, and thus its influence is from the first mover. Nor can it be said that the power of a heavenly body is infinite even though it has being in infinite time, because it has no active power of being but only the ability to receive. Hence its infinite duration points to the infinite power of an external principle. But in order to receive indestructible existence from an infinite power a heavenly body must not have any principle of destruction or any potentiality to non-existence.
||2551. It has also been shown (1077).
|At vero secundo, quia supra ostenderat quod primum movens non movetur motu locali, ostendit consequenter quod nec etiam aliis motibus; dicens, quod etiam impossibile est esse alterabile primum movens. Ostensum enim est supra, quod non movetur motu locali. Omnes autem alii motus sunt posteriores isto motu, qui est secundum locum. Remoto igitur primo necesse est removeri posteriora. Unde quicquid invenitur moveri aliis motibus, movetur motu locali.
||Second, since he has shown above (1066:C 2517) that the first mover is not moved with local motion, he next shows that it is not moved with the other kinds of motion. He says that it is also impossible for the first mover to be alterable, for it has been shown above (1066:C 2517) that it is not moved with local motion. But all other motions are subsequent to such motion, which pertains to place. Therefore, when the former is removed, so also must the latter be. Hence whatever is found to be moved with the other kinds of motion is moved with local motion.
|Ultimo autem concludit, quod manifestum est quod praedicta se habeant, sicut determinatum est.
||2552. Last, he concludes that the things discussed above are evidently such as he has established them to be.
|The Number of Primary Movers
|ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 8: 1073a 14-1073b 17
δὲ μίαν θετέον
τὴν τοιαύτην οὐσίαν
ἢ πλείους,  καὶ
πόσας, δεῖ μὴ
τὰς τῶν ἄλλων ἀποφάσεις,
ὅτι περὶ πλήθους
ὅ τι καὶ σαφὲς εἰπεῖν.
ἡ μὲν γὰρ περὶ
τὰς ἰδέας ὑπόληψις
σκέψιν ἰδίαν (ἀριθμοὺς
γὰρ λέγουσι τὰς
ἰδέας οἱ λέγοντες
ἰδέας, περὶ δὲ
τῶν ἀριθμῶν ὁτὲ
μὲν ὡς  περὶ ἀπείρων
λέγουσιν ὁτὲ δὲ
ὡς μέχρι τῆς
δι᾽ ἣν δ᾽ αἰτίαν
τοσοῦτον τὸ πλῆθος
τῶν ἀριθμῶν, οὐδὲν
||1078. We must not neglect the question whether it is necessary to posit one such substance or more than one, and if the latter, how many; and we must also recall the lack of statements on this point by other philosophers, because they have said nothing about the number of these substances which can be clearly stated. The theory of Ideas makes no proper study of this problem; for the proponents of the Ideas say that the Ideas are numbers, and they speak of numbers sometimes as unlimited and sometimes as limited to the number ten. But as to the reason why there should be so many numbers, nothing is said apodictically.
|ἡμῖν δ᾽ ἐκ τῶν ὑποκειμένων καὶ
διωρισμένων λεκτέον. ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχὴ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον τῶν ὄντων ἀκίνητον
καὶ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ καὶ κατὰ 
πρώτην ἀΐδιον καὶ μίαν κίνησιν:
ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ κινούμενον ἀνάγκη
καὶ τὸ πρῶτον κινοῦν ἀκίνητον εἶναι καθ᾽ αὑτό, καὶ τὴν ἀΐδιον
κίνησιν ὑπὸ ἀϊδίου κινεῖσθαι καὶ τὴν μίαν
||1079. However, we must discuss this question by beginning with what has already been laid down and established. For the first principle and primary being is both essentially and accidentally immovable, but it causes the primary motion, which is eternal and unique. And since that which is moved must be moved by something else, the first mover must be essentially immovable, and eternal motion must be caused by an eternal mover, and a single motion by a single thing.
δὲ παρὰ τὴν τοῦ παντὸς τὴν ἁπλῆν
φοράν, ἣν κινεῖν φαμὲν  τὴν
φορὰς οὔσας τὰς τῶν
γὰρ καὶ ἄστατον τὸ κύκλῳ σῶμα: δέδεικται
περὶ τούτων), ἀνάγκη καὶ τούτων ἑκάστην τῶν φορῶν ὑπ᾽ ἀκινήτου τε κινεῖσθαι καθ᾽ αὑτὴν καὶ ἀϊδίου
οὐσίας. ἥ τε γὰρ τῶν ἄστρων φύσις ἀΐδιος  οὐσία τις
οὖσα, καὶ τὸ
κινοῦν ἀΐδιον καὶ πρότερον τοῦ
καὶ τὸ πρότερον οὐσίας οὐσίαν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι.
τοίνυν ὅτι τοσαύτας τε οὐσίας ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι
τήν τε φύσιν ἀϊδίους καὶ ἀκινήτους καθ᾽ αὑτάς, καὶ ἄνευ μεγέθους διὰ τὴν εἰρημένην αἰτίαν πρότερον. [1073β]  —ὅτι μὲν
οὖν εἰσὶν οὐσίαι,
κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν τάξιν ταῖς φοραῖς τῶν ἄστρων,
||1080. Now we see that, besides the simple local motion which we say the first immovable substance causes, there are other local motions—those of the planets—which are eternal (for a body which is moved in a circle is eternal and never stands still, as has been proved in our treatises on nature) . Each of these motions, then, must also be caused by a substance which is essentially immovable and eternal. For the nature of the stars is eternal, being a kind of substance; and that which causes motion is eternal and prior to that which is moved; and that which is prior to a substance must be a substance. Hence it is evident that there must be as many substances as there are motions of the stars, and that these substances are eternal in nature, essentially immovable, and without magnitude, for the reason given above (1076). It is evident, then, that these movers are substances, and that one of these is first and another second according to the same order as the motions of the stars.
|τὸ δὲ πλῆθος ἤδη
τῶν φορῶν ἐκ τῆς οἰκειοτάτης
φιλοσοφίᾳ τῶν μαθηματικῶν  ἐπιστημῶν δεῖ σκοπεῖν, ἐκ τῆς ἀστρολογίας: αὕτη
γὰρ περὶ οὐσίας
αἰσθητῆς μὲν ἀϊδίου
τὴν θεωρίαν, αἱ δ᾽ ἄλλαι περὶ οὐδεμιᾶς οὐσίας, οἷον
τε περὶ τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς καὶ τὴν γεωμετρίαν. ὅτι
μὲν οὖν πλείους τῶν
αἱ φοραί, φανερὸν τοῖς
γὰρ ἕκαστον  φέρεται μιᾶς τῶν
ἄστρων): πόσαι δ᾽ αὗται
οὖσαι, νῦν μὲν ἡμεῖς ἃ λέγουσι τῶν
μαθηματικῶν τινὲς ἐννοίας χάριν
λέγομεν, ὅπως ᾖ τι τῇ
διανοίᾳ πλῆθος ὡρισμένον ὑπολαβεῖν: τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν τὰ μὲν ζητοῦντας
αὐτοὺς δεῖ τὰ δὲ
πυνθανομένους παρὰ τῶν ζητούντων,
 ἄν τι φαίνηται παρὰ τὰ νῦν εἰρημένα τοῖς ταῦτα
πραγματευομένοις, φιλεῖν μὲν ἀμφοτέρους, πείθεσθαι δὲ τοῖς ἀκριβεστέροις.
||1081. But it is now necessary to discover the number of these motions from that branch of the mathematical sciences which is most akin to philosophy, namely, astronomy. For this science studies the kind of substance which is sensible but eternal, whereas the other mathematical sciences, such as the science of numbers and geometry, are not concerned with any kind of substance. That there are many motions belonging to the bodies which are moved is evident even to those who have given little consideration to the matter; for each of the wandering stars has more than one motion. As to the number of these motions, in order that we may have some definite number in mind for the purpose of understanding this point, let us now state what some of the mathematicians say; but for the rest, this we must investigate partly for ourselves and partly accept the opinion of other investigators. And if anyone in treating this subject should be found to form a different opinion from the one stated here, we must respect both views but accept the more certain.|
|Postquam philosophus ostendit perfectionem substantiae immaterialis, hic inquirit de unitate vel multitudine eius. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo ostendit necessitatem pertractandi hanc quaestionem, quia ab aliis nihil de hoc determinate dictum est. Secundo ostendit quod sunt plures, ibi, nobis autem ex suppositis. Tertio ostendit quot sunt, ibi, pluralitatem vero lationum.
||2553. Having shown what it is that constitutes the perfection of an immaterial substance, here the Philosopher asks whether this substance is one or many; and in regard to this he does three things. First (1078:C 2553), he indicates that it is necessary to treat this question because nothing definite has teen said about it by other thinkers. Second (1079:C 2555), he shows that there are many such substances (“However, we must discuss”). Third (1081:C 2563), he shows how many there are (“But it is now necessary”).
|Dicit ergo primo, quod non oportet latere utrum sit ponendum unam solam substantiam talem, scilicet sempiternam, immaterialem, aut plures; et si plures, quot sunt: sed etiam oportet commemorare negationes aliorum, idest quod alii nihil dixerunt, quod sit manifestum et planum, de pluralitate harum substantiarum.
||He accordingly says, first (1078), that we must not neglect the question whether it is necessary to posit only one such substance which is eternal and immaterial or many; and if the latter, how many. But we must also “recall the lack of statements on this point by other philosophers,” i.e., the fact that others have said nothing that is clear and evident about the number of these substances.
|Quod sic patet. Ponentes enim substantias immateriales maxime fuerunt qui posuerunt ideas. Opinio autem de ideis secundum id quod sunt, non habet rationem alicuius certae pluralitatis, quia ideae ponuntur omnium rerum quae communicant in aliquo communi. Sed quia ponentes ideas dixerunt eas esse numeros, ex parte numerorum aliqua ratio haberi poterat pluralitatis. Sed tamen de pluralitate numerorum non semper eodem modo disserebant: sed quandoque dicebant species numerorum esse infinitas. Quod quidem verum est, quantum ad ipsam propriam numerorum rationem, quia semper unitas addita, aliam speciem numeri facit. Unde, cum in infinito additio fieri possit in numeris, in infinitum species numerorum multiplicantur. Quandoque autem dicuntur species numerorum determinari usque ad decem; et hoc quantum ad numerorum nominationem. Namque omnes numeri supra decem, videntur esse secundum nomen alicuius primi numeri aliqualiter iterati. Sed non possunt ostendere per determinatam rationem, quare sit tanta pluralitas numerorum, scilicet usque ad decem, et non plus neque minus. Nec est mirum, cum ista determinatio specierum non sit secundum rem, sed secundum nomen. Assignant autem alii hanc rationem, quia numerus denarius generatur ex progressione numerorum usque ad quaternarium, qui est primus numerus quadratus. Unum enim et duo sunt tria; quibus si tria addantur fiunt sex, quatuor autem additis consurgunt decem.
||2554. This is made clear as follows. Those who made a special claim for immaterial substances were the proponents of the Ideas. Now the opinion about the nature of the Ideas contains no theory about any definite number, because there are assumed to be Ideas of all things which share in a common name. But since those who posited Ideas said that they are numbers, it would seem that we could get some notion about how many numbers there are. However, they did not always say the same thing on this point. Sometimes they said that the species of numbers are unlimited. This is true of numbers by reason of their proper nature, because whenever a unit is added it always produces a different species of number. Hence, since in the case of numbers infinite additions can be made, the species of numbers may increase to infinity. At other times they said that the species of numbers are limited to the number ten. This refers to the naming of numbers, for the names of all numbers after ten seem to repeat in some way the name of a primary number. But they cannot show by any definite argument why there should be just so many numbers, i.e., ten, and not more or fewer. Nor is this to be wondered at, since this limitation of the species of numbers is not a real limitation but a nominal one. Other thinkers offer the argument that the number ten is generated from the progression of numbers up to the number four, which is the first square number. For one plus two equals three; and when three is added to this, the number six results; and when four is added to this, the number ten results.
||2555. However, we must discuss (1079).
|Deinde cum dicit nobis autem ostendit, quod necesse est esse plures huiusmodi substantias. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo resumit quod ostensum est de primo principio dicens, quod, cum alii nihil dixerint demonstrative de pluralitate substantiarum separatarum, nobis dicendum est de hoc per ea quae sunt supposita et determinata prius. Dictum est enim supra, quod primum principium entium est quoddam quod non movetur, neque secundum se, neque secundum accidens, sed movet unum motum, qui est primus et sempiternus. Quia enim omne quod movetur, necesse est ab aliquo moveri, ut probatum est in octavo physicorum, necesse est, quod primum movens sit omnino immobile, et sempiternus motus sit a sempiterno motore, et unum motum ab uno motore.
||He now shows that there must be many substances of this kind; and in regard to this he does two things. First, he returns to the points established about the first principle. He says that, since other thinkers have said nothing demonstrative about the number of separate substances, we must discuss this question by beginning with what has already been laid down and established. For it has been said above that, while the first principle of beings is one which is neither essentially nor accidentally moved, it still causes a single motion, which is the first and eternal motion. For since everything which is moved must be moved by something else, as has been shown in Book VIII of the Physics, the first mover must be altogether immovable, and eternal motion must be caused by an eternal mover, and a single motion by a single mover.
||2556. Now we see (1080).
|Deinde cum dicit videmus autem secundo ostendit, quod post primum principium necesse est ponere plures substantias immateriales sempiternas; dicens, quod praeter simplicem motum localem universi, qui est motus diurnus, quo totum caelum revolvitur, et est uniformis, et est simplicissimus, quem motum causat prima substantia immobilis, videmus aliquos motus locales planetarum, qui etiam sunt sempiterni, quia corpus circulare, scilicet caelum, est sempiternum: unde sempiternitas motus non tollitur per corruptionem mobilis. Et est instabile, idest non potest quiescere: unde motus iste non intercipitur quiete. Et ista probata sunt in scientia naturali, tam in libro physicorum quam in libro de caelo. Unde necesse est quod quilibet horum motuum moveatur a motore per se immobili et a substantia sempiterna.
||Second, he shows that after the first principle it is necessary to posit a number of eternal substances. He says that besides the simple local motion of the universe (one that lasts a day —during which the entire heavens revolve—and is uniform and the most simple), which the first immovable substance causes, we observe the local motions of the planets, which are also eternal; because the circular body, i.e., a heaven, is also eternal. Therefore the eternity of motion is no; destroyed as a result of the destruction of a movable being. And “it never stands still,” i.e., it is incapable of coming to rest. Hence this motion is not broken by rest. These points have been proved in the philosophy of nature, both in the Physics as well as in The Heavens. Each of these motions, then, must be caused by a mover which is essentially unmoved and an eternal substance.
|Quod quidem ideo necesse est, quia astra sempiterna sunt, et substantiae quaedam sunt: unde oportet quod movens ea, etiam sempiternum sit et substantia: movens enim est prius moto; et quod est prius substantia, necesse est esse substantiam. Unde manifestum est quod necesse est, quot sunt lationes astrorum, tot esse substantias, quae sunt naturaliter sempiternae, et secundum se immobiles et sine magnitudine, propter causam supra assignatam, quia scilicet movent tempore infinito, et sic per consequens virtute infinita. Manifestum est igitur, quod sunt aliquae substantiae immateriales secundum numerum motuum astrorum, et quod earum etiam ordo est secundum ordinem eorumdem motuum.
||2557. Now this must be so because the stars are eternal and are substances. Hence their mover must also be eternal and a substance; for a mover is prior to the thing moved, and that which is prior to a substance must be a substance. It is clear, then, that there must be as many substances as there are motions of the stars, and that these substances must be by nature eternal and essentially immovable and without magnitude, for the reason given above (1076:C 2548-50), i.e., because they move in infinite time and therefore have infinite power. Hence it is evident that there are immaterial substances which are as numerous as the motions of the stars, and that they also have the same order as the motions of the stars.
|Considerandum est autem quod post primam lationem Aristoteles non computat nisi lationes planetarum, quia eius tempore nondum erat deprehensus motus stellarum fixarum. Unde existimavit, quod octava sphaera, in qua sunt stellae fixae, esset primum mobile, et motor eius esset primum principium. Sed postea deprehensus est ab astrologis motus stellarum fixarum in contrarium primi motus: unde necesse est quod supra sphaeram stellarum fixarum sit alia circumdans totum, quae revolvit totum caelum motu diurno; et hoc est primum mobile, quod movetur a primo motore secundum Aristotelem.
||2558. Now it must be borne in mind that after the first motion Aristotle computes only the motions of the planets, because at his time the motion of the fixed stars had not been detected. Hence he thought that the eighth sphere, in which the fixed stars are located, was the first one to be moved, and that its mover was the first principle. But later on astronomers perceived that the motion of the fixed stars was in an opposite direction to the first motion, so that above the sphere of the fixed stars it was necessary to posit another sphere, [This “ninth” orb or sphere of which St. Thomas speaks was postulated by the astronomers in order to account for the motion which the celestial pole was discovered to be describing every 36,000 years. Since it encompassed all the other spheres, it was considered to be a ninth or outermost sphere, and therefore the first in order of all the spheres.] which surrounds the entire heavens and turns the whole in its daily motion. This is the first sphere, which is moved by the first mover of which Aristotle spoke.
|Sed Avicenna posuit quod primum mobile movetur immediate non a primo principio, sed ab intelligentia a primo principio causata. Cum enim primum principium sit unum simpliciter, existimavit quod ab eo non potest causari nisi unum, quod est intelligentia prima, in qua quidem incidit aliqua pluralitas potentiae et actus, secundum quod acquirit esse ab eo. Comparatur enim ad id, a quo dependet secundum suum esse, sicut potentia ad actum. Sic igitur prima intelligentia potest immediate causare plura. Nam secundum quod intelligit se prout habet aliquid de potentia, causat substantiam orbis, quem movet. Secundum autem quod se intelligit prout habet in actu esse ab alio, causat animam sui orbis. Secundum autem quod intelligit suum principium, causat intelligentiam sequentem, quae movet inferiorem orbem, et deinceps usque ad sphaeram lunae.
||2559. But Avicenna claimed that the first sphere is moved directly, not by the first principle, but by an intelligence which is caused by the first principle. For since the first mover is absolutely one, Avicenna thought that only one thing could be caused by it; and this is the first intelligence, in which a plurality of potentiality and actuality is found inasmuch as it derives being from the first principle. For it is related to that on which it depends for its existence as something potential to something actual. Hence the first intelligence can immediately cause many things; for inasmuch as it understands itself as having some potentiality, it causes the substance of the orb which it moves, but insofar as it understands itself as possessing actual existence from some other cause, it causes the soul of its orb. Again, inasmuch as it understands its own principle, it causes the next intelligence, which moves a lower orb, and so on down to the sphere of the moon.
|Sed hoc non habet necessitatem. Nam causa agens non est in illis substantiis superioribus sicut in rebus materialibus, ut necesse sit ex uno tantum unum causari, quia causa et causatum in eis sunt secundum esse intelligibile. Unde secundum plura quae possunt intelligi ab uno, possunt ab uno plura causari. Et satis conveniens videtur, ut primus motus rerum corporalium, a quo omnes alii dependent, habeat pro causa principium immaterialium substantiarum, ut sit quaedam connexio et ordo sensibilium et intelligibilium. De hoc autem quod philosophus dicit, quod ordo substantiarum separatarum est secundum ordinem motuum et mobilium, potest esse dubitatio. Nam sol maior est quantitate inter omnes planetas, et eius effectus magis apparet in rebus inferioribus; et etiam motus aliorum planetarum ordinantur per motum solis, et quodammodo consequuntur ipsum. Unde videtur quod substantia quae movet solem, sit nobilior substantiis quae movent alios planetas, cum tamen sol non sit super omnes alios planetas. Sed cum in corporibus id quod est continens sit formalius et per hoc dignius et perfectius, et comparetur ad corpus contentum, sicut ad partem totum, sicut dicitur in quarto physicorum, necessarium est quod, cum sphaera superioris planetae contineat sphaeram inferioris, quod planeta superior, ad quem ordinatur tota sua sphaera, sit altioris et universalioris virtutis quam planeta inferior, et diuturniores operetur effectus, utpote propinquior existens primae sphaerae, quae per suum motum causat sempiternitatem, ut supra dictum est. Et inde est quod, sicut dicit Ptolemaeus in quadripartito, effectus Saturni coaptantur ad universalia loca et tempora, Iovis ad annos, Martis, solis, Veneris et Mercurii ad menses, lunae autem ad dies.
||2560. But this is not necessary. For an efficient cause in the realm of superior substances does not act like an agent cause in the realm of material things, in the sense that a single effect is produced by a single cause, because among higher substances cause and thing caused have intelligible existence. Hence insofar as many things can be understood by a single superior substance, many effects can be produced by a single superior substance. And it seems quite fitting that the first motion of corporeal things, on which all other motions depend, should have as its cause the principle of immaterial substances, so that there should be some connection and order between sensible and intelligible things. A problem can arise, however, regarding the Philosopher’s statement that the order of separate substances corresponds to the order of motions and bodies moved. For of all the planets the sun is the largest in size, and its effect is more evident in lower bodies; and even the motions of the other planets are arranged in accordance with the motion of the sun, and in a sense are subsequent to it. Hence it seems that the substance which moves the sun is nobler than the substances which move the other planets, even though the sun is not located above the other planets. But since among bodies one which contains is more formal, and is thereby nobler and more perfect, and is related to a contained body as a whole to a part, as is said in Book IV of the Physics; and since the sphere of a superior planet contains that of an inferior planet, therefore a superior Planet, to which its whole sphere is subordinated, must have a higher and more universal power than an inferior planet, and must produce more lasting effects because it is nearer to the first sphere, which by its motion causes the eternality of things, as has been pointed out above (1065:C 2510). And this is the reason, as Ptolemy says in the Quadripartitum, why the effects of Saturn correspond to universal places and times, and those of Jupiter to years, and those of Mars, the sun, Venus and Mercury to months, and those of the moon to days.
|Et inde est quod effectus planetarum apparent in istis inferioribus secundum ordinem eorumdem. Nam primi tres superiores videntur ordinari ad ea quae pertinent ad existentiam rei secundum seipsam: nam ipsa stabilitas esse rei attribuitur Saturno, perfectio autem rei et bona habitudo correspondet Iovi. Virtus autem rei, secundum quod se contra nociva tuetur et ea propellit, correspondet Marti. Tres vero planetae alii videntur proprium effectum habere ad motum ipsius rei existentis, ita quod sol sit ut universale principium motus: et propter hoc eius operatio in motionibus inferioribus maxime apparet. Venus autem videtur quasi proprium effectum habere magis determinatum, idest generationem, per quam aliquid consequitur speciem, et ad quam scilicet omnes motus alii ordinantur in istis inferioribus. Mercurius autem videtur proprium effectum habere in multiplicatione, idest distinctione individuorum in una specie; et propter hoc varios habet motus. Et ipse etiam cum naturis omnium planetarum miscetur, ut astrologi dicunt. Lunae autem proprie competit immutatio materiae, et dispositio ipsius ad recipiendum omnes impressiones caelestes: et propter hoc videtur quasi esse deferens impressiones caelestes, et applicans inferiori materiae.
||2561. This is also the reason why the effects of the planets appear in lower bodies in accordance with the order among the planets. For the first three highest planets seem to be directed to effects which pertain to the existence of a thing taken in itself; for the very stability of a thing’s act of being is attributed to Saturn, and its perfection and state of well-being to Jupiter, and the power by which it protects itself from what is harmful and drives it away, to Mars. The other three planets seem to have as their proper effects the motion of a being. The sun is a universal principle of motion, and for this reason its operation is most evident in the case of lower motions. For Venus seems to have as its proper effect a more limited one, namely, the process of generation, by which a thing attains its form, and one to which all the other motions among lower bodies are directed. Mercury seems to have as its proper effect the multiplication of things, i.e., the distinction of individuals in the same species; and for this reason it has various motions. It is also mixed with the natures of all the planets, as the astronomers say. The changing of matter and the disposing of it to receive all celestial impressions belongs properly to the moon; and for this reason it seems that it is the planet which transmits celestial impressions and applies them to inferior matter.
|Sic igitur quanto corpus caeleste est superius, tanto habet universaliorem, diuturniorem et potentiorem effectum. Et cum corpora caelestia sint quasi instrumenta substantiarum separatarum moventium, sequitur quod substantia quae movet superiorem orbem sit universalioris conceptionis et virtutis; et per consequens oportet quod sit nobilior.
||2562. Hence the higher a celestial body, the more universal, lasting, and powerful its effect. And since the celestial bodies are the instruments, so to speak, of the separate substances which cause motion, it follows that a substance which moves a higher orb has a more universal knowledge and power, and must therefore be nobler.
||2563. But it is now necessary (1081).
|Deinde cum dicit pluralitatem vero inquirit quot praedictae substantiae sint; et dividitur in duas partes. In prima inquirit primo numerum motuum caelestium. In secunda ex hoc concludit numerum substantiarum moventium, ibi, quare et substantia et principium.
||Then he investigates the number of these substances; and this is divided into two parts. In the first part (1081:C 2563) he first investigates the number of celestial motions; and in the second (1084:C 2586), he infers from this the number of substances which cause motion (“Hence it is reasonable”).
|Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit unde accipiendus sit numerus motuum caelestium. Secundo ponit circa hoc opiniones diversas, ibi, Eudoxus quidem.
||In regard to the first he does two things. First, he indicates the source from which we must derive the number of celestial motions. Second (1082:C 2567), he gives the different opinions about this (“Now Eudoxus”).
|Dicit ergo primo, quod pluralitatem lationum, sive motuum caelestium, oportet considerare ex astrologia, quae maxime propria est ad hoc inter scientias mathematicas. Ipsa namque sola inter eas speculatur de substantia sensibili et aeterna, scilicet de corpore caelesti. Aliae vero scientiae mathematicae de nulla substantia considerant, sicut de arithmetica patet, quae est circa numeros, et de geometria quae circa magnitudines est: numerus autem et magnitudo, sunt accidentia.
||He says, first (1081), that we must use the science of astronomy in studying the number of revolutions or celestial motions, which is a subject that belongs particularly to this branch of the mathematical sciences. For of these sciences only astronomy speculates about sensible and eternal substances, i.e., celestial bodies. But the other mathematical sciences do not consider any substance, as is clear in the case of arithmetic, which treats of numbers, and in the case of geometry, which treats of continuous quantity. Number and continuous quantity are accidents.
|Quod autem sunt plures motus corporum quae feruntur in caelo, scilicet planetarum, manifestum est his, qui parum attingunt de scientia astrologiae, quia unumquodque astrorum errantium, idest planetarum, movetur pluribus lationibus et non una tantum. Dicuntur autem planetae astra errantia, non quia irregulariter moveantur, sed quia non semper servant eamdem figuram et positionem ad alias stellas, sicut illae adinvicem, quae propter hoc fixae dicuntur.
||2564. That there are many motions belonging to the bodies which move about in the heavens, i.e., the planets, is evident even to those who have little acquaintance with the science of astronomy; for “each of the wandering stars,” i.e., the planets, is moved by several motions and not just by one. Now the planets are called “wandering stars,” not because their motions are irregular, but because they do not always maintain the same pattern and position in relation to the other stars, as these do among themselves and for this reason are called “fixed.”
|Quod autem sint plures motus huiusmodi astrorum, tribus modis deprehenditur. Est enim aliquis motus apprehensus a vulgo visu. Est et alius motus qui non deprehenditur nisi instrumentis et considerationibus. Et horum motuum quidam comprehenduntur longissimis temporibus, et quidam parvis. Est etiam tertius motus, qui declaratur ratione; quia motus stellarum errantium, invenitur quandoque velocior, quandoque tardior; et quandoque videtur esse planeta directus, quandoque retrogradus. Et, quia non potest esse secundum naturam corporis caelestis, cuius motus debet esse omnino regularis, necessarium fuit ponere diversos motus, ex quibus haec irregularitas ad debitum ordinem reducatur.
||2565. That there are many motions of stars of this kind is detected in three ways. There is one motion which is perceived by plain sight. There is another which is perceived only by instruments and calculation; and of these motions, some are grasped after a very long period of time, and others after a short one. There is also a third motion, which is demonstrated by reason; for the motion of the wandering stars is found at one time to be more rapid and at another slower; and sometimes a planet seems to be moving forward, and sometimes backward. And because this cannot be in keeping with the nature of a celestial body, whose motion ought to be regular in all respects, it has been necessary to posit different motions by which this irregularity might be reduced to a fitting order.
|Quot autem sint motus planetarum, nos nunc dicemus ea quae circa haec mathematici dicunt, ut circa haec reddamur attenti, ut aliqua pluralitas determinata mente concipiatur a nobis. Reliquum vero quod non dicetur oportet quod per nos ipsos quaeramus; vel quod in hoc suadeamur ab his qui hoc quaerunt, et si aliquid appareat postmodum per ea quae modo dicuntur ab his qui de huiusmodi tractant. Sed, quia in eligendis opinionibus vel repudiandis, non debet duci homo amore vel odio introducentis opinionem, sed magis ex certitudine veritatis, ideo dicit quod oportet amare utrosque, scilicet eos quorum opinionem sequimur, et eos quorum opinionem repudiamus. Utrique enim studuerunt ad inquirendam veritatem, et nos in hoc adiuverunt. Sed tamen oportet nos persuaderi a certioribus, idest sequi opinionem eorum, qui certius ad veritatem pervenerunt.
||2566. As to the number of planetary motions, let us now state what the mathematicians say about this, so that with this in mind we may conceive some definite number. But as to the other things which have not been stated, we must either investigate these for ourselves or in this matter accept the opinion of those who do investigate the problem. The same thing applies if some view should appear later on in addition to” those which are now stated by men who treat this kind of problem. And since in choosing or rejecting opinions of this kind a person should not be influenced either by a liking or dislike for the one introducing the opinion, but rather by the certainty of truth, he therefore says that we must respect both parties, namely, those whose opinion we follow, and those whose opinion we reject. For both have diligently sought the truth and have aided us in this matter. Yet we must “be persuaded by the more certain,” i.e., we must follow the opinion of those who have attained the truth with greater certitude.
|The Number of Unmoved Movers
|ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 8: 1073b 17-1074b 14
μὲν οὖν ἡλίου
καὶ σελήνης ἑκατέρου
τὴν φορὰν ἐν
ὧν τὴν μὲν πρώτην
τὴν τῶν ἀπλανῶν
ἄστρων εἶναι, τὴν
κατὰ τὸν  διὰ μέσων
τῶν ζῳδίων, τὴν
δὲ τρίτην κατὰ
ἐν τῷ πλάτει τῶν
μείζονι δὲ πλάτει
καθ᾽ ὃν ἡ σελήνη
φέρεται ἢ καθ᾽ ὃν
ὁ ἥλιος), τῶν δὲ πλανωμένων ἄστρων
ἐν τέτταρσιν ἑκάστου
δὲ τὴν μὲν πρώτην
τὴν αὐτὴν εἶναι  ἐκείναις
(τήν τε γὰρ τῶν ἀπλανῶν τὴν ἁπάσας
εἶναι, καὶ τὴν ὑπὸ ταύτῃ τεταγμένην καὶ κατὰ τὸν διὰ μέσων τῶν
εἶναι), τῆς δὲ τρίτης ἁπάντων τοὺς πόλους
ἐν τῷ διὰ μέσων τῶν ζῳδίων εἶναι,
τὴν φορὰν κατὰ τὸν λελοξωμένον  πρὸς τὸν
μέσον ταύτης: εἶναι δὲ τῆς τρίτης
τοὺς πόλους τῶν μὲν ἄλλων ἰδίους,
τοὺς δὲ τῆς Ἀφροδίτης καὶ τοῦ Ἑρμοῦ τοὺς αὐτούς:
||1082. Now Eudoxus claimed that the motion both of the sun and of the moon involves for each three spheres. The first of these is the sphere of the stars whose positions remain unchanged; the second, the one which passes through the middle of the zodiac; and the third, the one which moves obliquely in the latitude of the animals in the zodiac. But the circle in which the moon is moved is inclined at a greater angle than that in which the sun is moved. He also claimed that the motion of the wandering stars involves four spheres for each. The first and second of these are the same as those mentioned above. The sphere of the fixed stars is the one which imparts motion to all of the spheres, and the sphere which is situated below this and moves through the middle of the zodiac is common to all of the planets. The third sphere for each of the planets has its poles in the circle which passes through the middle signs of the zodiac; and the motion of the fourth sphere is in a circle which is inclined at a greater angle to the middle of this sphere; and while the poles of the third sphere are peculiar to each of the other planets, those of Venus and of Mercury are the same.
δὲ τὴν μὲν θέσιν
τὴν αὐτὴν ἐτίθετο
Εὐδόξῳ [τοῦτ᾽ ἔστι τῶν ἀποστημάτων τὴν τάξιν],
τὸ δὲ πλῆθος τῷ μὲν τοῦ Διὸς καὶ  τῷ τοῦ Κρόνου τὸ αὐτὸ
ἐκείνῳ ἀπεδίδου, τῷ δ᾽ ἡλίῳ καὶ τῇ
σελήνῃ δύο ᾤετο
 εἰ μέλλει
τις ἀποδώσειν, τοῖς δὲ λοιποῖς τῶν
ἀναγκαῖον δέ, εἰ μέλλουσι
ἀποδώσειν, [1074α] 
καθ᾽ ἕκαστον τῶν πλανωμένων ἑτέρας σφαίρας μιᾷ ἐλάττονας εἶναι τὰς ἀνελιττούσας καὶ εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ ἀποκαθιστάσας τῇ θέσει τὴν
σφαῖραν ἀεὶ τοῦ ὑποκάτω τεταγμένου ἄστρου:
οὕτω γὰρ μόνως
 ἐνδέχεται τὴν τῶν
φορὰν ἅπαντα ποιεῖσθαι. ἐπεὶ οὖν
ἐν αἷς μὲν
αὐτὰ φέρεται σφαίραις αἱ μὲν ὀκτὼ αἱ δὲ πέντε καὶ εἴκοσίν εἰσιν, τούτων δὲ μόνας οὐ δεῖ ἀνελιχθῆναι ἐν
αἱ μὲν τὰς τῶν
πρώτων δύο ἀνελίττουσαι ἓξ ἔσονται,
αἱ δὲ τὰς
 τῶν ὕστερον
ἑκκαίδεκα: ὁ δὴ ἁπασῶν ἀριθμὸς τῶν
τε φερουσῶν καὶ τῶν ἀνελιττουσῶν ταύτας
εἰ δὲ τῇ σελήνῃ τε καὶ τῷ ἡλίῳ μὴ
προστιθείη τις ἃς
σφαῖραι ἔσονται ἑπτά τε καὶ
τεσσαράκοντα. τὸ μὲν
οὖν πλῆθος τῶν
σφαιρῶν ἔστω 
||1083. And Callippus assumed the position of the spheres to be the same as Eudoxus did, i.e., as regards the arrangement of their distances, and he gave the same number of spheres to Jupiter and to Saturn as Eudoxus did. But he thought that two spheres should be added both to the sun and to the moon if appearances are to be saved. And to each of the other planets he added one sphere. However, if all spheres taken together are to account for appearances, there must be additional spheres for each of the other planets, one less in number than those mentioned above, which revolve the planets and always restore to the same place the first sphere of the star which is next in order below. For only in this way can all the spheres account for the motion of the planets. Therefore, since, as regards the spheres in which the planets themselves are carried along, some are eight in number and others twenty-five in number, and of these only those in which the lowest planet is carried along do not need to be revolved, then the spheres which revolve the first two planets will be six in number, and those which revolve the last four will be sixteen in number. The total number of spheres, then, both those which carry the planets along and those which revolve them, will be fifty-five. And if one has not added to the moon and to the sun the motions which we have mentioned (1083), the total number of spheres will be forty-seven. Let the number of the spheres, then, be so many.
καὶ τὰς οὐσίας
καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς τὰς
γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον ἀφείσθω
||1084. Hence it is reasonable to suppose that there are as many substances and immovable principles and perceptible principles. Therefore the statement of necessity is to be left to more powerful thinkers.
οἷόν τ᾽ εἶναι φορὰν μὴ συντείνουσαν πρὸς ἄστρου
φοράν, ἔτι δὲ πᾶσαν φύσιν
οὐσίαν ἀπαθῆ καὶ
καθ᾽  αὑτὴν
οὐδεμία ἂν εἴη παρὰ ταύτας ἑτέρα φύσις,
ἀλλὰ τοῦτον ἀνάγκη τὸν ἀριθμὸν εἶναι
εἴτε γὰρ εἰσὶν ἕτεραι,
κινοῖεν ἂν ὡς τέλος οὖσαι φορᾶς:
||1085. However, if there can be no celestial motion which is not related to the motion of a star, and further if every nature and substance which is unchangeable and has in itself reached the highest good must be thought to be an end, there will be no other nature besides these; but this must be the number of substances. For if there were others, they would cause motion as being ends of local motion.
|ἀλλὰ εἶναί γε ἄλλας φορὰς ἀδύνατον παρὰ τὰς εἰρημένας. τοῦτο δὲ εὔλογον ἐκ
ὑπολαβεῖν. εἰ γὰρ πᾶν τὸ φέρον τοῦ φερομένου χάριν πέφυκε
καὶ φορὰ πᾶσα φερομένου τινός ἐστιν,
οὐδεμία φορὰ αὑτῆς ἂν ἕνεκα
εἴη οὐδ᾽ ἄλλης φορᾶς, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἄστρων
ἕνεκα. εἰ γὰρ ἔσται
ἕνεκα, καὶ ἐκείνην
χάριν εἶναι: ὥστ᾽ ἐπειδὴ οὐχ οἷόν
τε εἰς ἄπειρον,  τέλος ἔσται
φορᾶς τῶν φερομένων τι θείων σωμάτων κατὰ τὸν οὐρανόν. ὅτι
δὲ εἷς οὐρανός,
||1086. But there cannot be other motions besides those mentioned. And it is reasonable to suppose this from the bodies that are moved. For if everything which moves exists by nature for the sake of that which is moved, and all motion is the motion of something moved, no motion will exist for itself or for the sake of another motion, but all motions will exist for the sake of the stars. For if one motion should exist for the sake of another, the latter must also exist for the sake of another. Hence, since an infinite regress is impossible, the end of every motion must be one of the divine bodies which move about in the heavens.
οὐρανοὶ ὥσπερ ἄνθρωποι, ἔσται εἴδει μία ἡ περὶ ἕκαστον
ἀρχή, ἀριθμῷ δέ γε
πολλαί. ἀλλ᾽ ὅσα ἀριθμῷ
ἔχει (εἷς γὰρ
λόγος καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς
δὲ εἷς): τὸ δὲ τί ἦν εἶναι
οὐκ ἔχει ὕλην
ἐντελέχεια γάρ. ἓν ἄρα καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἀριθμῷ τὸ πρῶτον κινοῦν ἀκίνητον ὄν: καὶ τὸ κινούμενον ἄρα ἀεὶ καὶ
εἷς ἄρα οὐρανὸς μόνος.
||1087. And it is evident that there is only one heaven. For if there were many heavens, as there are many men, the principle of each would be one in species but many in number. But all things which are many in number have matter; for many individuals have one and the same intelligible structure, for example, man, whereas Socrates is one; but the primary quiddity 4 has no matter, for it is complete reality. Therefore the first mover, which is immovable, is one both in its intelligible structure and in number; and therefore what is moved eternally and continuously is only one. Hence there is only one heaven.
|[1074β]  παραδέδοται δὲ παρὰ τῶν ἀρχαίων καὶ
παμπαλαίων ἐν μύθου σχήματι
καταλελειμμένα τοῖς ὕστερον
ὅτι θεοί τέ εἰσιν οὗτοι καὶ περιέχει τὸ θεῖον τὴν
ὅλην φύσιν. τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ
μυθικῶς ἤδη προσῆκται πρὸς τὴν
καὶ  πρὸς
τὴν εἰς τοὺς
καὶ τὸ συμφέρον χρῆσιν: ἀνθρωποειδεῖς τε γὰρ τούτους
καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων ὁμοίους τισὶ λέγουσι, καὶ τούτοις ἕτερα ἀκόλουθα καὶ
αὐτὸ λάβοι μόνον
ὅτι θεοὺς ᾤοντο
τὰς πρώτας οὐσίας εἶναι, θείως ἂν
εἰρῆσθαι  νομίσειεν, καὶ
κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς πολλάκις εὑρημένης
καὶ φιλοσοφίας καὶ πάλιν φθειρομένων καὶ ταύτας τὰς δόξας ἐκείνων
τοῦ νῦν. ἡ μὲν οὖν
δόξα καὶ ἡ παρὰ τῶν πρώτων
ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἡμῖν φανερὰ μόνον. 
||1088. Now traditions have been handed down from our predecessors and the ancient thinkers, and left to posterity in the form of a myth, that these heavenly bodies are gods, and that the divine encompasses the whole of nature. But the rest of the traditions have been added later in the form of a myth for the persuasion of the multitude, the general welfare, and the passing of laws (172). For they say that the gods have human form and are similar to some of the other animals; and they add other statements which follow upon these and are similar to the ones mentioned. Now if anyone will separate these statements and accept only the first, that they thought the first substances to be gods, this will be considered to he a divine statement. And though every art and every philosophy has often been discovered and again lost, the opinions of these early thinkers have been preserved as relics to the present day. Therefore the opinions of our forefathers and those which have come down to us from the first thinkers are evident only to this extent.|
|Ponit opiniones astrologorum sui temporis de numero motuum planetarum. Et primo opinionem Eudoxi. Secundo opinionem Calippi, ibi, Calippus autem.
||2567. Aristotle states the opinions which the Astronomers of his time held about the number of planetary motions. First (1082:C 2567), he gives the opinion of Eudoxus; and second (1083:C 2578), that of Callippus (“And Callippus”).
|Sciendum est igitur circa primum, quod Plato caelestibus motibus attribuens indefectibiliter circularitatem et ordinationem, mathematicas suppositiones fecit, per quas suppositiones possent salvari quae circa erraticas apparent, sustinendo, quod motus planetarum sunt circulares et regulares ordinati. Et Pythagorici quidem ad reducendum in debitum ordinem irregularitatem, quae apparet in motibus planetarum ex statione et retrogradatione, velocitate, et tarditate, et diversa apparentia quantitatis, posuerunt motus planetarum esse in sphaeris eccentricis, et in circulis parvis qui dicuntur epicycli; quam etiam opinionem Ptolemaeus prosequitur.
||Now in regard to the first opinion it must be understood that Plato, in attributing unfailing circularity and order to the celestial motions, made mathematical hypotheses by which the apparent irregular motions of the planets can be explained; for he claimed that the motions of the planets are circular and arranged in an orderly way. And the Pythagoreans, with a view to putting into due order the irregularity which appears in the planetary motions on account of their standing still and moving backwards, and their rapidity and slowness, and their apparent differences in size, claimed that the motions of the planets involve eccentric spheres and small circles which they called epicycles; and Ptolemy 1 also subscribes to this view.
|Videtur autem ex huius suppositione sequi aliquid contrarium his quae demonstrantur in scientia naturali: non enim omnis motus erit vel ad medium vel a medio, vel circa medium mundi. Iterum sequitur, quod sphaera continens sphaeram eccentricam, vel non sit aequalis spissitudinis, vel quod sit aliquid vacuum inter unam sphaeram et aliam, vel quod sit aliquod corpus praeter substantiam sphaerarum intercidens, quod non erit corpus circulare, nec habebit aliquem motum proprium.
||2568. However, something contrary to the points demonstrated in the philosophy of nature seems to follow from this hypothesis; for not every motion will be either towards or away from or around the center of the world. Furthermore it follows that a sphere containing an eccentric sphere either is not of equal density, or there is a vacuum between one sphere and another or there is some body besides the substance of the spheres that lies between them which will not be a circular body and will have no motion of its own.
|Ex positione autem epicyclorum ulterius sequitur, vel quod sphaera, per quam movetur epicyclus, non sit integra et continua, vel quod sit divisibilis et rarefactibilis et condensabilis ad modum quo aer dividitur et inspissatur et rarescit aliquo corpore moto. Sequitur etiam, quod ipsum corpus stellae movetur per seipsum, et non solum ad motum orbis; et quod ex motu corporum caelestium perveniat sonus, quod Pythagorici consenserunt.
||2569. Further, from the hypothesis of epicycles it follows either that the sphere by which the epicycle is moved is not whole and continuous, or that it is divisible, expansible and compressible in the way in which air is divided, expanded and compressed when a body is moved. It also follows that the body itself of a star is moved by itself and not merely by the motion of an orb; and that from the motion of the celestial bodies there will arise the sound about which the Pythagoreans agreed.
|Sed tamen omnia huiusmodi sunt contra ea quae determinata sunt in scientia naturali. Unde ad haec evitanda Eudoxus hoc videns, posuit cuique planetae sphaeras plures concentricas mundo, quarum unaquaque habet motum proprium, et ex omnibus illis motibus causatur id quod apparet de motu planetarum. Posuit igitur Eudoxus motum tam solis quam lunae esse in tribus sphaeris.
||2570. Yet all conclusions of this kind are contrary to the truths established in the philosophy of nature. Therefore Eudoxus, seeing this and seeking to avoid it, claimed that for each planet in the world there are many concentric spheres, each of which has its proper motion and that as a result of all of these motions the observable motion of the planets is accounted for. Hence Eudoxus held that the motion of the sun as well as that of the moon involves three spheres.
|Primus enim tam solis quam lunae, qui est motus diurnus, quo revolvuntur ab oriente ad occidentem, et hunc motum dicit esse astrorum planorum, idest stellarum sine errore, scilicet fixarum; quia sicut supra dictum est, cum nondum esset deprehensus motus stellarum fixarum, qui est ab occidente in orientem, esse contrarium motui primo, putabatur, quod motus diurnus esset proprius octavae sphaerae, quae est sphaera stellarum fixarum. Non autem putabatur, quod sola prima sphaera sufficeret ad deferendas omnes sphaeras planetarum motu diurno, sicut Ptolemaeus ponit: sed ponebat quod quilibet planeta habeat propriam sphaeram, quae revolveret ipsum motu diurno. Ad hunc ergo motum causandum ponebat primam sphaeram solis et lunae.
||2571. For the first motion of the sun as well as that of the moon, which is the daily motion, is that by which they are moved from east to west; and he calls this motion “that of the stars whose positions remain unchanged,” i.e., of the stars which do not wander, namely, the fixed stars; for, as was said above (C 2558), since the motion of the fixed stars, which is from west to east, was not yet discovered to be contrary to the first motion, it was thought that the daily motion was proper to the eighth sphere, which is the sphere of the fixed stars. It was not thought, however, that the first sphere alone might be sufficient to move all the spheres of the planets by a daily motion, as Ptolemy assumed; but he thought that each planet had its own sphere which would move it by a daily motion. Therefore with. a view to explaining this motion he posited a first sphere for both the sun and the moon.
|Secundam autem sphaeram ponebat ad causandum motum solis et lunae, qui est per medium zodiaci, qui vocatur motus longitudinis, secundum quem movetur tam sol quam luna de occidente in orientem contra motum firmamenti.
||2572. He also posited a second sphere to account for the motion of the sun and the moon. This passes through the middle of the zodiac with what is called “longitudinal motion,” according to which both the sun and the moon are moved from west to east in an opposite direction to the motion of the firmament.
|Tertiam autem sphaeram ponebat ad causandum illum motum, qui obliquatur secundum latitudinem animalium, quae figurantur in zodiaco, prout quandoque est Australior, quandoque borealior videtur planeta a media linea zodiaci. Sed hic motus latitudinis magis apparet, et secundum maiorem diversitatem, in luna quam in sole. Et ideo subiungit, quod in maiori latitudine tam obliquatur motus secundum quem fertur luna, quam motus secundum quem fertur sol. Et quidem lunae Ptolemaeus ponit motum latitudinis, non autem solis. Posuit igitur Eudoxus tertium motum, ut Simplicius dicit, quia opinabatur quod etiam sol declinaret a media linea zodiaci versus duos polos; et hoc suspicabatur eo quia non semper in eodem loco sol oritur in tropicis aestivis et hiemalibus. Si autem in uno et eodem tempore fieret restitutio longitudinis et latitudinis sufficeret ad hoc una sphaera per obliquitatem maximi circuli, secundum quam sol movetur. Sed, quia non sic se habet, sed in alio tempore pertransit circulum per longitudinem, in alio vero tempore restitutio fit latitudinis, necesse fuit ad hoc ponere tertiam sphaeram. Hanc autem tertiam sphaeram ponebat in sole revolvi versus eamdem partem cum secunda, sed circa axem alterum, et super alios polos. In luna autem ad eamdem cum prima sphaera. Sed in utroque ponebat motum huius tertiae sphaerae esse tardiorem, quam secundae.
||2573. He posited a third sphere to account for the oblique motion across the latitude of the animals symbolized in the zodiac, inasmuch as a planet sometimes seems to be farther south and sometimes farther north of the middle line of the zodiac. But this motion is more apparent and has a broader spread in the case of the moon than in that of the sun. Hence he adds that the motion by which the moon is carried along is inclined at a greater angle than the sun’s motion. And Ptolemy attributed latitudinal motion to the moon but not to the sun. Hence Eudoxus posited a third motion, as Simplicius says, because he thought that the sun also deviated from the middle line of the zodiac towards the two poles; and he made this assumption because the sun does not always rise in the same place during the summer solstice and during the winter solstice. But if it returned in latitude and in longitude at the same time by means of the declination of the great circle [i.e., the ecliptic] along which the sun travels, one sphere would suffice for this. Since this is not the case, however, but it passes through its course in longitude at one time and returns in latitude at another time, for this reason it was necessary to posit a third sphere. And he claimed that this third sphere of the sun is moved in the same direction as the second sphere, but about a different axis and on different poles. He also claimed that this third sphere of the moon is moved in the same direction as the first sphere. But in each case he claimed that the motion of this third sphere was slower than that of the second.
|Sed aliorum quinque planetarum motum cuiuslibet posuit in quatuor sphaeras; ita quod prima sphaera et secunda est eiusdem rationis cum prima et secunda solis et lunae; quia motus primus, quem ponebat esse stellarum fixarum, et motus secundus, qui est per medium zodiaci secundum longitudinem, apparet communiter in omnibus planetis.
||2574. And he claimed that the motion of each of the other five planets involves four spheres, with the first and second sphere of each planet having the same function as the first and second sphere of the sun and of the moon; because the first motion, which he assumed to be that of the fixed stars, and the second motion, which passes in longitude through the middle line of the zodiac, appear to be common to all the planets.
|Deinde unicuique planetarum ponebat tertiam sphaeram ad causandum motum latitudinis, cuius polos, circa quos revolvitur, ponebat esse in media linea zodiaci. Sed quia ponebat omnes sphaeras esse concentricas, ex quo zodiacus transibat per polos circuli maximi tertiae sphaerae, sequebatur e converso, quod circulus maximus tertiae sphaerae transiret per polos zodiaci. Unde sequebatur quod motus tertiae sphaerae deferret planetam usque ad polos zodiaci, quod nunquam videtur.
||2575. Next, he posited a third sphere for each of the planets in order to account for their latitudinal motion, and he assumed that the poles about which it is revolved were located in the middle line of the zodiac. But since he claimed that all spheres are concentric, it would follow from this that the zodiac would pass through the poles of the great circle of the third sphere, and it would follow in the opposite way that the great circle of the third sphere would pass through the poles of the zodiac. Hence it would follow that the motion of the third sphere would carry a planet right up to the poles of the zodiac, which is never seen to occur.
|Et ideo necesse fuit quod poneret quartam sphaeram, quae ipsum planetam ferret, quae revolvitur in contrarium tertiae, ab oriente scilicet ad occidentem aequali tempore, unde impedit ne plus divertatur secundum latitudinem a zodiaco. Et hoc est quod dicit, quod quartum motum stellae dicebat esse secundum quemdam circulum obliquatum ad medium tertiae sphaerae, hoc est ad maximum circulum eius.
||2576. Therefore he had to posit a fourth sphere, which is the one that would carry the planet, and it would revolve in an opposite direction to the third sphere, namely, from east to west, in equal time, so as to prevent the planet from being diverted farther in latitude from the zodiac. This is what Aristotle means when he says that Eudoxus claimed that the fourth motion of the star is in a circle inclined at an angle to the middle of the third sphere, i.e., to its great circle.
|Si igitur cum quolibet quinque planetarum posuerit quatuor sphaeras, sequitur quod quinque planetarum sunt viginti sphaerae. Quibus si addantur tres solis et tres lunae, erunt omnes viginti sex, ita quod intelligatur corpus cuiuslibet planetae esse defixum in ultima sphaerarum suarum.
||2577. Therefore, if he posited four spheres for each of the five planets, it follows that there would be twenty spheres for these five planets. And if the three spheres of the sun and the three spheres of the moon are added to this number, there will be twenty-six spheres in all, granted that the body of each planet is understood to be fastened to the last of its own spheres.
||2578. And Callippus assumed (1083).
|Calippus autem. Ponit opinionem Calippi de pluralitate sphaerarum. Fuit autem Calippus, ut Simplicius dicit, cum Aristotele Athenis conversatus, cum eo ea quae ab Eudoxo inventa fuerant, corrigens et supplens. Posuit ergo Calippus eamdem rationem sphaerarum sicut Eudoxus, et exposuit positiones sphaerarum per ordinem distantiarum, tum quia ordinabat planetas sicut Eudoxus, tum quia ordinabat motus et sphaeras sicut et ille.
||Then he gives the opinion of Callippus about the number of spheres. Now Callippus, as Simplicius tells us, was associated with Aristotle at Athens when the discoveries of Eudoxus were corrected and supplemented by him. Hence Callippus maintained the same theory of the spheres as Eudoxus did; and he explained the positions of the spheres by the arrangement of their distances, because he gave to the planets and to their motions and spheres the same order as Eudoxus did.
|Conveniebat etiam cum Eudoxo in pluralitate sphaerarum Iovis et Saturni, quia utrisque eorum dabat quatuor sphaeras; sed ipse existimabat esse apponendas sphaeras duas tam soli quam etiam lunae, si quis velit reddere rationem eorum quae apparent de motibus eorum. Videtur autem has duas addidisse ad causandum velocitatem et tarditatem, quae apparet in motibus eorum; ita quod sol habeat quinque sphaeras, et luna similiter quinque. Et reliquis planetis Marti, Veneri et Mercurio, addebat singulis unam sphaeram, ita etiam quod quilibet eorum haberet quinque sphaeras. Forte autem addebant hanc sphaeram ad causandum retrogradationem et stationem, quae apparet in his stellis. Istae igitur sphaerae vocabantur ferentes, quia secundum eas ferebatur corpus planetae.
||2579. And he agreed with Eudoxus as to the number of spheres of Jupiter and Saturn, because he assigned four spheres to each of these; but Callippus thought that two spheres must be added both to the sun and to the moon, if one wants to adopt a theory about them which accords with their motions. He seems to have added these two spheres in order to account for the rapidity and slowness which appears in their motions. The sun would then have five spheres, and the moon likewise would have five. He also added one sphere to each of the remaining planets—Mars, Venus and Mercury—thus giving each of them also five spheres. Perhaps they added this fifth sphere to account for the backward motion and the standing still which appear in these stars. These spheres are called deferent spheres, then, because the body of a planet is carried along by them.
|Sed praeter has ponebant alias, quas vocabant revolventes. Ad ponendum autem eas hac necessitate videbantur induci, quia ultima sphaera superioris planetae, puta Saturni, participabat motum omnium superiorum, ita quod in aliquo deficiebat a motu primae sphaerae. Unde et prima sphaera Iovis, cuius Poli infiguntur aliquo modo in ultima sphaera Saturni, participabat aliquid de motu sphaerarum Saturni, et sic non uniformiter movebantur motu diurno, sicut prima sphaera Saturni. Necessarium igitur videbatur ponere aliam sphaeram revolventem ipsam, ut restitueret id quod auferebatur ei de velocitate ex superioribus sphaeris. Et eadem ratione oportebat ponere aliam sphaeram revolventem secundam sphaeram Iovis, et tertiam sphaeram revolventem tertiam sphaeram Iovis. Non autem oportebat ponere aliquam revolventem quartam sphaeram, quia motus quartae sphaerae, in qua erat astrum infixum, debebat esse compositus ex omnibus superioribus motibus. Sic igitur Iupiter habet quatuor sphaeras deferentes et tres revolventes. Et similiter alii planetae habent tot sphaeras revolventes, quot deferentes, una minus.
||2580. But in addition to these spheres they posited others, which they called revolving spheres. It would appear that they were led to posit these because the last sphere of a higher planet, for example, of Saturn, must share in the motion of all the higher planets, so that its motion gets away somewhat from that of the first sphere. Hence the first sphere of Jupiter, whose poles are fastened in some way to the highest sphere of Saturn, shared to some extent in the motion of the spheres of Saturn, and thus it was not moved uniformly by the daily motion like the first sphere of Saturn. Therefore it seemed necessary to posit another sphere which revolves this first sphere in order to restore the speed which it loses because of the higher planets. And by the same reasoning it was necessary to posit another sphere which revolves the second sphere of Jupiter, and a third sphere which revolves the third sphere of Jupiter. But it was unnecessary to posit another sphere which revolves the fourth sphere, because the motion of the first sphere, to which the star is fixed, must be composed of all the higher motions. Hence Jupiter has four deferent spheres and three revolving spheres. And in a similar way the other planets have as many revolving spheres, minus one, as deferent spheres.
|Hoc est ergo quod dicit, quod necesse est, si omnes sphaerae simul ordinatae debeant reddere et causare illud quod apparet de motu planetarum secundum quemlibet planetarum, ponere praeter supra dictas deferentes alias sphaeras revolventes, et ad idem restituentes primam sphaeram inferius ordinati astri, una pauciores. Et sic solum convenit quod motus planetarum compleant omnia quae apparent de eis.
||2581. Therefore he says that, if all spheres taken together must account for and explain the apparent motion of the planets, it is necessary to posit, in addition to the deferent spheres mentioned above, other spheres, one less in number, which revolve and restore to the same place the first sphere of the star next in order below; for only in this way can the motions of the planets accord with all appearances.
|Quare igitur sphaerae deferentes, quae quidem sunt Saturni et Iovis, sunt octo, cum uterque eorum ponatur habere quatuor sphaeras: quae sunt aliorum quinque planetarum, viginti quinque, quia quilibet eorum habet quinque sphaeras: harum autem sphaerarum illae solae non revolvuntur, quae sunt in fine, in quibus ordinatur astrum, sequitur quod revolventes priorum duorum planetarum, scilicet Saturni et Iovis, sunt sex. Revolventes autem posteriorum quatuor sunt sexdecim. Sed cum post Saturnum et Iovem sint alii quinque, manifestum est quod unum eorum praetermittit, scilicet vel Martem, vel Mercurium: ut quod dicit posteriorum quatuor referatur ad quatuor infimos: vel praetermittit lunam, ut referatur ad quatuor immediate sequentes. Praetermittit autem, vel ex errore, qui interdum accidit in numeris; vel propter aliam rationem, quae nos latet: quia scripta Calippi non inveniuntur, ut Simplicius dicit. Sic igitur numerus omnium sphaerarum deferentium et revolventium sunt quinquaginta quinque.
||2582. Therefore, since the deferent spheres which belong to Saturn and to Jupiter are eight in number, because each is assumed to have four spheres; and since those which belong to the other five planets are twenty-five in number, because each of these has five spheres, and of these only those at the end which carry and regulate the star are not revolved, it follows that the revolving spheres of the first two planets, i.e., of Saturn and Jupiter, are six in number, and that those of the last four planets are sixteen in number. But since after Saturn and Jupiter there are five other planets, he evidently omits one of them, i.e., either Mars or Mercury, so that his statement regarding the last four refers to the four lowest; or he omits the moon, so that he refers to the four planets immediately following. Now he omits this either by error, which sometimes happens in the case of numbers, or for some reason which is unknown to us; because the writings of Callippus are not extant, as Simplicius tells us. Hence the total number of deferent spheres and of revolving spheres together is fifty-five.
|Sed quia de hoc poterat esse dubium, utrum lunae et soli sint addendae duae sphaerae, quas Calippus addit: vel quod utrique sint dandae duae sphaerae solum, ut posuit Eudoxus, ideo dicit quod si aliquis non addit soli vel lunae illos duos motus quos addit Calippus, sequitur quod omnes sphaerae erunt quadraginta septem; subtraherentur enim a praedicto numero quatuor deferentes, duae solis, duae lunae, et totidem revolventes. Remotis autem octo de quinquaginta quinque, remanent quadraginta septem.
||2583. But because the difficulty could arise whether it is necessary to add two spheres to the sun and two to the moon, as Callippus did, or whether only two spheres must be given to each, as Eudoxus claimed, he therefore says that, if one does not add two motions to the sun and two to the moon, as Callippus did, it follows that the total number of spheres will be forty-seven; for four deferent spheres would then be subtracted from the above number two for the sun and two for the moon —and also the same number of revolving spheres; and when eight is subtracted from fifty-five, forty-seven remains.
|Sed attendendum quod si supra, cum dixit revolventes posteriores quatuor, esse sexdecim, praetermisit lunam, remotis duabus deferentibus lunae et duabus solis, non removebuntur quatuor revolventes, sed solum duae, si sphaerae lunae non habent revolventes: et sic a prima pluralitate sphaerarum subtrahuntur sex sphaerae, quatuor deferentes et duae revolventes: unde sequitur quod sphaerae omnes sint quadraginta novem. Et sic non videtur quod Aristoteles voluerit praetermittere lunam sed magis Martem: nisi aliquis dicat Aristotelem oblitum fuisse quod lunae posuerit sphaeras revolventes, idcirco errorem in numero accidisse, quod non videtur probabile.
||2584. But it must be noted that, if above (1083:C 2582), when he said that the revolving spheres of the last four planets are sixteen in number, he omitted the moon, then if two deferent spheres are subtracted from the moon and two from the sun, four revolving spheres are not subtracted but only two, granted that the spheres of the moon do not have revolving spheres; and thus six spheres are subtracted from the first number of spheres, i.e., four deferent and two revolving spheres; and then it follows that the total number of spheres is forty-nine. Hence it seems that Aristotle did not wish to omit the moon but rather Mars, unless one says that Aristotle had forgotten that he had assigned revolving spheres to the moon, and that this is the reason the mistake was made, which does not seem likely.
|Ultimo ergo concludit tantam esse pluralitatem sphaerarum quanta dicta est.
||2585. Last, he draws his conclusion that the number of spheres is that mentioned.
||2586. Hence it is reasonable (1084).
|Deinde cum dicit quare et substantias concludit ex numero motuum caelestium, numerum substantiarum immaterialium; et circa hoc tria facit. Primo concludit propositum. Secundo excludit quaedam, quae possent debilitare illationem praemissam, ibi, si autem nullam possibile. Tertio comparat id quod ostensum est de substantiis separatis, ad opiniones antiquas, et ad opiniones vulgares, quae de his suo tempore habebantur, ibi, tradita autem sunt.
||Then he infers the number of immaterial substances from the number of celestial motions; and in regard to this he does three things. First (1084:C 2586), he draws the conclusion at which he aims. Second (1085:C 2587), he rejects certain suppositions which could weaken the foregoing inference (“However, if there can be”). Third (1088:C 2597), he compares the points demonstrated about separate substance with the opinions of the ancients and with the common opinions held about these things during his own time (“Now traditions have”).
|Dicit ergo primo, quod cum tanta sit pluralitas sphaerarum et motuum caelestium, quanta dicta est, rationabile est opinari tot esse substantias immateriales et principia immobilia, et etiam tot esse principia sensibilia, idest corpora caelestia. Dicit autem rationabile, ut insinuet hoc probabiliter concludi, non autem ex necessitate. Unde subiungit quod ipse relinquit id quod est necessarium circa hoc illis qui sunt fortiores et potentiores ad hoc inveniendum quam ipse esset.
||He says, first (1084), that, since the number of celestial spheres and the number of celestial motions is as has been stated, it is reasonable to suppose that there are the same number of immaterial substances and immobile principles, and even the same number of “perceptible principles,” i.e., celestial bodies. He uses the term reasonable in order to imply that this conclusion is a probable one and not one that is necessary. Hence he adds that he is leaving the necessity of this to those who are stronger and more capable of discovering it than he is.
||2587. However, if there can be (1085).
|Deinde cum dicit si autem hic philosophus excludit ea ex quibus praedicta conclusio debilitari posset; et sunt tria. Quorum primum est. Quia posset aliquis dicere quod sunt quaedam substantiae separatae, quibus non respondent aliqui motus in caelo.
||Here the Philosopher rejects those suppositions by which the conclusion given above could be weakened; and there are three of these. The first is that one could say that there are certain separate substances to which no celestial motion corresponds.
|Ad quod excludendum dicit, quod si non est possibile quod sint aliqui motus in caelo, qui non ordinentur ad motum alicuius astri, et iterum si oportet omnem impassibilem substantiam quae est sortita optimum secundum se, idest quae habet suam perfectionem sine motu, opinari esse finem alicuius motus, non erit aliqua natura impassibilis et immaterialis, praeter eas, quae sunt fines caelestium motuum; sed necesse erit hunc esse numerum substantiarum separatarum, qui est numerus caelestium motuum.
||2588. In order to reject this he says that, if there can be no celestial motions which are not connected with the motion of some star, and again if every immutable substance which has reached “in itself the highest good,” i.e., which has reached its own perfection without motion, must be considered an end of some motion, there wilt be no immutable and immaterial nature besides those substances which are the ends of celestial motions; but the number of separate substances will correspond necessarily to the number of celestial motions.
|Sed tamen primum non est necessarium, scilicet quod omnis substantia immaterialis et impassibilis sit finis alicuius motus caelestis. Potest enim dici quod sunt aliquae substantiae separatae altiores, quam ut sint proportionatae quasi fines caelestibus motibus; quod ponere non est inconveniens. Non enim substantiae immateriales sunt propter corporalia, sed magis e converso.
||2589. Yet the first assumption is not necessary, namely, that every immaterial and immutable substance is the end of some celestial motion. For it can be said that there are separate substances too high to be proportioned to the celestial motions as their ends. And this is not an absurd supposition. For immaterial substances do not exist for the sake of corporeal things, but rather the other way around.
||2590. But there cannot be (1086).
|Deinde cum dicit sed alias removet secundum quod posset debilitare praedictam illationem. Posset enim aliquis dicere, quod sunt multo plures lationes in caelo, quam quae numeratae sunt, quae tamen non possunt deprehendi, eo quod ex eis non accidit aliqua diversitas in motu alicuius corporum caelestium quae visu percipiuntur et dicuntur astra.
||Then he rejects the second supposition which could weaken the inference mentioned above. For one could say that there are many more motions in the heavens than have been counted, but that these cannot be perceived because they produce no diversity in the motion of one of the celestial bodies which are perceived by the sense of sight and are called stars.
|Et ad hoc excludendum similiter etiam dixerat, quod nulla latio potest esse in caelo, quae non ordinetur ad lationem alicuius astri. Hoc est etiam quod nunc dicit, quod impossibile est esse alias lationes in caelo, praeter illas ex quibus accidit diversitas in motu astrorum; sive sint illae quae dictae sunt, sive aliae aut totidem aut plures aut pauciores.
||2591. And in order to reject this he had already equivalently said that there can be no celestial motion which is not connected with the motion of some star. His words here are that there cannot be other motions in the heavens besides those which produce the diversity in the motions of the stars, whether they be the motions mentioned or others, either the same in number or more or fewer.
|Et hoc probabiliter accipi potest ex corporibus quae feruntur: si enim omne ferens est propter id quod defertur, et omnis latio est alicuius quod fertur, non potest esse aliqua latio quae sit propter seipsam, vel propter aliam lationem tantum; sed oportet quod omnes lationes sint causa astrorum. Alioquin si latio propter aliquam lationem est, eadem ratione et illam oportebit esse propter aliam. Et cum non sit procedere in infinitum, sequitur quod finis omnis lationis sit aliquod caelestium corporum, quae deferuntur sicut astra: unde impossibile est esse aliquem motum in caelo, ex quo non possit percipi aliqua diversitas in aliquo astro.
||2592. This can be taken as a probable conclusion from the bodies which are moved; for if every mover exists for the sake of something moved, and every motion belongs to something which is moved, there can be no motion which exists for itself or merely for the sake of another motion, but all motions must exist for the sake of the stars. For otherwise, if one motion exists for the sake of another, then for the same reason this motion also must exist for the sake of another. Now since an infinite regress is impossible, it follows that the end of every motion is one of the celestial bodies which are moved, as the stars. Hence there cannot be any celestial motion as a result of which some diversity in a star cannot be perceived.
||2593. And it is evident (1087).
|Quod autem hic excludit tertium, per quod posset dicta conclusio infirmari. Posset enim aliquis dicere, quod sint plures mundi, et in quolibet sint tot sphaerae et motus, quot in isto, vel plures: et sic necesse est ponere plures substantias immateriales.
||Then he rejects a third supposition by which the above inference could be weakened. For someone might say that there are many worlds, and that in each of these there are as many spheres and motions as there are in this world, or even more, and thus it is necessary to posit many immaterial substances.
|Sed hoc excludit dicens manifestum esse quod sit unum caelum tantum. Quia si essent plures secundum numerum, et in eadem specie, sicut sunt plures homines, oporteret etiam quod simile iudicium esset de primo principio uniuscuiusque caeli, quod est movens immobile, sicut dictum est. Oporteret enim quod plura prima principia essent specie unum et numero multa.
||2594. He rejects this position by saying that there is evidently only one heaven. If there were many numerically and the same specifically, as there are many men, a similar judgment would also have to be made about the first principle of each heaven, which is an immovable mover, as has been stated (1079:C 2555). For there would have to be many first principles which are specifically one and numerically many.
|Sed hoc est impossibile; quia quaecumque sunt unum specie et plura numero, habent materiam. Non enim distinguitur secundum rationem et formam, quia omnium individuorum est communis ratio utpote quae est hominis. Unde relinquitur quod distinguantur per materiam. Et sic Socrates est unus non solum secundum rationem, ut homo, sed etiam secundum numerum.
||2595. But this view is impossible, because all things which are specifically one and numerically many contain matter. For they are not differentiated from the viewpoint of their intelligible structure or form, because all the individuals have a common intelligible structure, for example, man. It follows, then, that they are distinguished by their matter. Thus Socrates is one not only in his intelligible structure, as man, but also in number.
|Sed primum principium cum sit quod quid erat esse, idest sua essentia et ratio, non habet materiam, quia eius substantia est endelechia, idest actus, materia autem est in potentia. Relinquitur igitur quod primum movens immobile sit unum, non solum ratione speciei, sed etiam numero. Oportet igitur quod primus motus sempiternus, qui ab eo causatur, sit unus tantum, et per consequens sequitur quod caelum sit unum tantum.
||2596. However, the first principle, “since it is a quiddity,” i.e., since it is its own essence and intelligible structure, does not contain matter, because its substance is “complete reality,” i.e., actuality, whereas matter is in potentiality. It remains, then, that the first unmoved mover is one not only in its intelligible structure but also in number. Hence the first eternal motion, which is caused by it, must be unique. It therefore follows that there is only one heaven.
||2597. Now traditions (1088).
|Deinde cum dicit tradita sunt comparat ea quae inventa sunt de substantiis immaterialibus ad opiniones antiquas et ad vulgares. Et dicit, quod ab antiquis philosophis quaedam sunt tradita de substantiis separatis, et dimissa posterioribus per modum fabulae, scilicet quod dii sunt, et quod id quod est divinum, continet totam naturam. Et hoc quidem habetur ex superioribus, si omnes substantiae immateriales vocentur dii. Si autem solum primum principium vocetur Deus, est unus tantum Deus, ut ex praedictis patet. Reliqua vero introducta sunt fabulose ad persuasionem multitudinis, quae non potest capere intelligibilia, et secundum quod fuit optimum ad leges ferendas, et ad utilitatem conversationis humanae, ut ex huiusmodi adinventis persuaderetur multitudini, ut intenderent virtuosis actibus et a vitiis declinarent. Et quid sit fabulose introductum exponit subdens, quod dixerunt deos esse conformes hominibus et quibusdam aliorum animalium. Posuerunt enim fabulose homines quosdam deificatos, et quaedam animalia, et quaedam consequentia istis et alia similia dixerunt. Ex quibus si aliquis hoc solum velit accipere quod primo ostensum est in praehabitis, scilicet quod dii sunt quaedam substantiae immateriales, putabitur esse dictum divine et secundum verisimilitudinem. Et hoc ideo est, quia quaelibet ars et etiam philosophia, saepe fuit inventa secundum possibilitatem humanam, et iterum fuit corrupta, vel propter bella impedientia studium, vel propter inundationes, vel alia huiusmodi excidia.
||He shows how the points discovered about an immaterial substance compare with both the ancient and common opinions. He says that certain traditions about the separate substances have been handed down from the ancient philosophers, and these have been bequeathed to posterity in the form of a myth, to the effect that these substances are gods, and that the divine encompasses the whole of nature. This follows from the above points, granted that all immaterial substances are called gods. But if only the first principle is called God, there is only one God, as is clear from what has been said. The rest of the tradition has been introduced in the form of a myth in order to persuade the multitude, who cannot grasp intelligible things, and inasmuch as it was expedient for the passing of laws and for the benefit of society, that by inventions of this kind the multitude might be persuaded to aim at virtuous acts and avoid evil ones. He explains the mythological part of this tradition by adding that they said that the gods have the form of men and of certain other animals. For they concocted the fables that certain men as well as other animals have been turned into gods; and they added certain statements consequent upon these and similar to the ones which have just been mentioned. Now if among these traditions someone wishes to accept only the one which was first noted above, namely, that the gods are immaterial substances, this will be considered a divine statement, and one that is probably true. And it is so because every art and every philosophy has often been discovered by human power and again lost, either because of wars, which prevent study, or because of floods or other catastrophes of this kind.
|Et hoc necessarium fuit ponere Aristoteli ut possit salvare aeternitatem mundi. Manifestum enim erat quod a quodam certo tempore inceperant homines philosophari et artes adinvenire. Inconveniens autem videbatur, quod infinito tempore fuisset absque his humanum genus. Et ideo dicit quod philosophiae et aliae artes fuerunt multoties inventae et corruptae, et quod opiniones illorum antiquorum quasi reliquiae salvantur usque nunc.
||2598. It was also necessary for Aristotle to maintain this view in order to save the eternity of the world. For it was evident that at one time men began to philosophize and to discover the arts; and it would seem absurd that the human race should be without these for an infinite period of time. Hence he says that philosophy and the various arts were often discovered and lost, and that the opinions of those ancient thinkers are preserved as relics up to the present day.
|Et ultimo concludit quod praedicta opinio, idest quae a philosophantibus habita est, post quos destructa fuit philosophia, solum sic manifesta est, scilicet per modum fabulae, ut supra dictum est.
||2599. Last, he concludes that “the opinion of our forefathers,” i.e., the one received from those who philosophized and after whom philosophy was lost, is evident to us only in this way, i.e., in the form of a myth, as has been stated above (1088:C 2597).
|The Dignity of the First Intelligence
|ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 9: 1074b 15-1075a 10
περὶ τὸν νοῦν ἔχει
δοκεῖ μὲν γὰρ εἶναι
δ᾽ ἔχων τοιοῦτος
ἂν εἴη, ἔχει τινὰς
||1089. The things which pertain to intellect (or mind) involve certain difficulties; for of the things apparent to us it seems to be the most divine; but how it is so gives rise to certain difficulties.
γὰρ μηδὲν νοεῖ,
τί ἂν εἴη τὸ
σεμνόν, ἀλλ᾽ ἔχει
ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ὁ
νοεῖ, τούτου δ᾽ ἄλλο
κύριον, οὐ γάρ ἐστι
τοῦτο ὅ ἐστιν αὐτοῦ
ἡ  οὐσία νόησις,
ἀλλὰ δύναμις, οὐκ
ἂν ἡ ἀρίστη οὐσία
εἴη: διὰ γὰρ τοῦ
νοεῖν τὸ τίμιον
||1090. For if it is not actually understanding, but is in a sense like one asleep, what dignity will it have? Or if it is understanding, but its chief good is different from itself, then, since its essence is not an act of understanding but a potentiality, it will not be the best substance; for it is by reason of its act of understanding that dignity belongs to it.
δὲ εἴτε νοῦς ἡ
οὐσία αὐτοῦ εἴτε
νόησίς ἐστι, τί
νοεῖ; ἢ γὰρ αὐτὸς
αὑτὸν ἢ ἕτερόν
τι: καὶ εἰ ἕτερόν
τι, ἢ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀεὶ
||1091. Furthermore, whether its substance is its power to understand or its act of understanding, what does it understand? For it understands either itself or something else; and if something else, either the same thing always or something different.
τι ἢ οὐδὲν τὸ
νοεῖν τὸ καλὸν ἢ
τὸ τυχόν;  ἢ καὶ
||1092. Does it make any difference or not, then, whether it understands what is good or what is contingent? Or is it absurd that it should ponder about certain things?
τοίνυν ὅτι τὸ
νοεῖ, καὶ οὐ
χεῖρον γὰρ ἡ
μεταβολή, καὶ κίνησίς
τις ἤδη τὸ τοιοῦτον.
||1093. Hence it is evident that it understands what is most divine and honorable, and that it does not change; for a change would be for the worse, and this would already be motion.
|πρῶτον μὲν οὖν
εἰ μὴ νόησίς ἐστιν
ἀλλὰ δύναμις, εὔλογον
τὸ συνεχὲς αὐτῷ
||1094. Therefore, if the first mover is not its act of understanding but a potency, it is reasonable to assume, first, that the continuity of its act of understanding is laborious to it (797).
δῆλον  ὅτι ἄλλο
τι ἂν εἴη τὸ
τιμιώτερον ἢ ὁ
νοῦς, τὸ νοούμενον.
καὶ γὰρ τὸ νοεῖν
καὶ ἡ νόησις ὑπάρξει
καὶ τὸ χείριστον
νοοῦντι, ὥστ᾽ εἰ
φευκτὸν τοῦτο (καὶ
γὰρ μὴ ὁρᾶν ἔνια
κρεῖττον ἢ ὁρᾶν), οὐκ ἂν εἴη
τὸ ἄριστον ἡ νόησις. αὑτὸν ἄρα νοεῖ, εἴπερ ἐστὶ τὸ κράτιστον,
||1095, Second, that there is evidently something else more honorable than intellect, namely, what it understands. For both the power to understand and understanding itself belong even to one who understands the basest thing. This must accordingly be avoided; for there are some things which it is better not to see than to see. But this will not be so if the act of understanding is the best of things. Therefore, if there is a most powerful intellect, it must understand itself.
|καὶ ἔστιν ἡ νόησις νοήσεως νόησις.
δ᾽ ἀεὶ ἄλλου ἡ ἐπιστήμη καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις καὶ ἡ δόξα καὶ ἡ διάνοια, αὑτῆς δ᾽ ἐν
||1096. And its act of understanding is an understanding of understanding. But science, perception, opinion and thought always seem to be about something else and only indirectly about themselves.
|ἔτι εἰ ἄλλο
καὶ τὸ νοεῖσθαι, κατὰ πότερον αὐτῷ τὸ εὖ ὑπάρχει; οὐδὲ γὰρ
ταὐτὸ τὸ εἶναι νοήσει καὶ νοουμένῳ.
||1097. Again, if understanding is something different from being understood, from which of these does the intellect derive its goodness? For the essence of understanding and that of being understood are not the same.
|ἢ ἐπ᾽ ἐνίων ἡ ἐπιστήμη τὸ πρᾶγμα, [1075α]  ἐπὶ μὲν
ποιητικῶν ἄνευ ὕλης ἡ οὐσία καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι,
ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν θεωρητικῶν ὁ λόγος
νόησις; οὐχ ἑτέρου οὖν ὄντος
τοῦ νοουμένου καὶ τοῦ νοῦ, ὅσα μὴ ὕλην
ἔχει, τὸ αὐτὸ ἔσται,
τῷ νοουμένῳ μία.
||1098. But in certain cases is not understanding identical with the thing understood? For in the productive sciences the object is the substance or quiddity without matter; and in the theoretical sciences the intelligible structure is both the object and the understanding of it. Therefore, since the object of understanding does not differ from the act of understanding in the case of things which have no matter, they will be the same; and the act of understanding will be identical with the thing understood.
|ἔτι δὴ λείπεται ἀπορία,
γὰρ ἂν ἐν
τοῖς μέρεσι τοῦ ὅλου.
||1099. Yet the difficulty still remains whether the thing that it understands is composite; for if it is, the intellect will be changed in passing from one part of the whole to another.
|ἢ ἀδιαίρετον πᾶν τὸ μὴ ἔχον
ὕλην—ὥσπερ ὁ ἀνθρώπινος νοῦς
||1100. Now whatever does not have matter is indivisible, for example, the human mind.
|ἢ ὅ γε τῶν
ἔχει ἔν τινι χρόνῳ (οὐ γὰρ ἔχει
τὸ εὖ ἐν τῳδὶ ἢ
ἐν τῳδί, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν ὅλῳ τινὶ τὸ ἄριστον,
ὂν ἄλλο τι)—  οὕτως δ᾽ ἔχει αὐτὴ αὑτῆς ἡ νόησις
τὸν ἅπαντα αἰῶνα;
||1101. And the act of understanding composite things involves time. For it does not possess its goodness at this or at that moment but attains the greatest good over a whole period of time, and this is something different from itself. And an intellect which understands itself is in this state through all eternity.|
|Postquam philosophus determinavit de substantia immateriali quantum ad eius perfectionem et quantum ad eius unitatem, nunc determinat quasdam dubitationes pertinentes ad actionem eius. Ostensum est enim supra, quod prima immaterialis substantia movet sicut intelligibile, et sicut bonum desiderabile. Et ideo dividitur haec pars in duas. In prima determinat quaedam dubia circa primam immaterialem substantiam, quantum ad hoc quod est bonum intelligibile et intellectus. In secunda quantum ad hoc quod est bonum appetibile, ibi, perscrutandum est autem qualiter habet et cetera.
||2600. Having settled the issue about the perfection and oneness of this immaterial substance, the Philosopher now meets certain difficulties concerning its activity; for it has been shown above (1067-70:C 2519-35) that the first immaterial substance causes motion as an intelligible object and a desirable good. This is divided into two parts. In the first (1089:C 2600) he settles certain difficulties about the first immaterial substance insofar as it is an intelligible good and an intellect; and in the second (1102:C 2627), insofar as it is a desirable good (“We must also inquire”).
|Circa primum duo facit. Primo assignat rationem dubitationis circa intellectum primae substantiae. Secundo dubitationem movet et determinat, ibi, nam si non intelligat.
||In regard to the first he does two things. First, he gives the reason for the difficulty concerning the intellect of the first substance. Second (1090:C 2901), he raises and meets this difficulty (“For if it is not”).
|Dicit ergo primo, quod ea quae pertinent ad intellectum primae substantiae immaterialis, habent quasdam dubitationes, et videntur oriri ex hoc. Ostenderat enim philosophus quod intellectus intelligens et appetens primum movens, quod movet sicut intelligibile et desiderabile, habet aliquid se dignius, scilicet illud quod intelligitur ab eo, et desideratur. Ostenderat etiam quod ipsum primum intelligibile, est etiam intellectus. Unde posset videri quod pari ratione, haberet aliquid dignius et superius, et quod non esset supremum et optimum: quod est contra ea quae apparent de primo principio. Et ideo dicit hic, quod videtur omnibus apparens, quod principium sit dignissimum. Sed difficultates quaedam emergunt, si quis velit assignare quomodo se habeat ita quod sit dignissimum, idest optimum et perfectissimum.
||He accordingly says, first (1089), that, the things which pertain to the intellect of the first immaterial substance involve certain difficulties, and these seem to arise as follows. The Philosopher has shown that the intellect which understands and desires the first mover, which causes motion as an object of understanding and of desire, has something nobler than itself, namely, what is understood and desired by it. He has also shown that the first intelligible object itself is also an intellect. Hence for a like reason it could appear that the first intellect also has something nobler and higher than itself, and that it therefore is not the highest and best thing. But this is contrary to the truths which are apparent about the first principle; and so he says here that it seems evident to all that this principle is the noblest. Yet certain difficulties emerge if one wishes to explain how it is “noblest,” i.e., best and most perfect.
||2601. For if it is not (1090).
|Deinde cum dicit nam si manifestat huiusmodi difficultates. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo movet dubitationes. Secundo praemittit quaedam, quae sunt praenecessaria ad determinationem omnium quaestionum motarum, ibi, palam ergo quod divinissimum et cetera. Tertio solvit dubitationes, ibi, primum quidem.
||Then he clears up these difficulties; and in regard to this he does three things. First, he raises the difficulties. Second (1093:C 2606), he prefaces his discussion with certain prerequisites for meeting all the questions raised (“Hence it is evident”). Third (1094:C 2608), he solves these difficulties (“Therefore, if the first mover”).
|Circa primum duo facit. Primo movet quaestiones principaliter intentas. Secundo movet quamdam quaestionem incidentem, cuius solutio necessaria est ad praemissas quaestiones, ibi, ergo utrum differt.
||In regard to the first he does two things. First (1090), he raises the questions in which he is chiefly interested. Second (1092:C 2604), he introduces an additional question whose solution is necessary for solving the questions raised (“Does it make”).
|Movet autem primo duas quaestiones. Prima est, quomodo intellectus primi moventis se habeat ad suum intelligere. Secunda, quomodo se habeat ad suum intelligibile, ibi, amplius autem sive intellectus.
||First of all he raises two questions. He asks, first, how the intellect of the first mover is related to its own act of understanding; and second (1091:C 2603), how it is related to its own intelligible object (“Furthermore, whether”).
|Sciendum est ergo, quod intellectus ad suum intelligere potest se habere tripliciter. Uno modo quod non conveniat ei intelligere in actu, sed in potentia tantum, vel in habitu. Alio modo quod conveniat ei in actu. Alio modo quod sit ipsum suum intelligere, sive sua intelligentia, quod idem est.
||Now it should be noted that an intellect can be related to its own act of understanding in three ways: first, actual understanding does not belong to it but only potential or habitual understanding; second, actual understanding does belong to it; and third, it is identical with its own act of understanding or its own knowledge, which are the same thing.
|Dicit ergo, quod si intellectus primi moventis non intelligat in actu, sed solum in potentia, vel in habitu, non erit aliquid nobile: bonum enim et nobilitas intellectus est in hoc quod actu intelligit; intellectus autem intelligens tantum in potentia vel in habitu, se habet sicut dormiens: nam dormiens habet quidem potentias operum vitae, sed opera vitae non operatur: unde somnus dicitur esse dimidium vitae, et secundum somnum non differt felix ab infelice, virtuosus a vitioso. Si autem intellectus primi intellectus intelligat quidem actu, sed principale eius bonum, quod est operatio eius, sit aliquid aliud ab ipso, quia eius intelligentia, idest operatio intellectualis ipsius non est hoc quod sua substantia, comparatur ad ipsum sicut potentia ad actum, et perfectibile ad perfectionem. Et sic sequitur quod primum intelligens non sit optima substantia: honorabilitas enim et nobilitas inest ei per suum intelligere: nihil autem quod est nobile secundum aliud, est nobilissimum. Sic igitur videtur sequi quod substantia primi intelligentis non sit optima, sive intelligat in potentia tantum, sive in actu; nisi ponatur cum hoc quod sua substantia sit suum intelligere, ut post determinabit.
||2602. He accordingly says, first (1090), that, if the intellect of the first mover is not actually understanding but only potentially or habitually understanding, it will have no dignity; for the goodness and nobility of an intellect consists in its actually understanding, and an intellect that is only potentially or habitually understanding is like one asleep. For one asleep has certain powers which enable him to perform vital operations even though he is not using them, and thus he is said to be half alive; and during sleep there is no difference between happiness and unhappiness or between virtue and vice. But if the intellect of the first intelligence is actually understanding, yet its chief good, which is its activity, is something different from itself because its “act of understanding,” i.e., its intellectual activity, is not identical with its own essence, then its essence is related to its act of understanding as potentiality to actuality, and as something perfectible to its perfection. It accordingly follows that the first intellect is not the best substance; for it is by reason of its act of understanding that honor and nobility belong to it, and nothing that is noble in comparison with something else is noblest in itself. It seems to follow, then, that the essence of the first intellect is not the best, whether it understands only potentially or actually, unless one assumes along with this that its very essence is identical with its act of understanding, as he will establish later on (1094:C 2608).
||2603. Furthermore, whether its substance (1091).
|Deinde cum dicit amplius autem antequam solvat positam quaestionem, movet aliam de intelligibili. Unde dicit, quod sive substantia primi moventis sit intellectus, quasi quaedam potentia intellectiva, sive sit intelligentia, idest actus intellectus, idest intelligere, quod prima quaestio quaerebat, quaerendum restat quid intelligit? Aut enim intelligit seipsum, aut aliquid aliud. Si intelligit aliquid aliud, aut intelligit semper idem, aut oportet quod intelligat aliud et aliud; quandoque, scilicet, hoc, quandoque illud.
||Before he answers the questions raised he asks another about the intelligible object of the first mover. He says that, whether the essence of the first mover is its power to understand or its “act of understanding,” i.e., its intellectual activity or thought (this was the first question raised), we must still ask what it understands? For it understands either itself or something else. And if it understands something else, it must understand either the same thing always or something different, i.e., sometimes one thing and sometimes another.
||2604. Does it make any difference (1092).
|Deinde cum dicit ergo utrum antequam solvat praemissas quaestiones, interponit quamdam quaestionem, cuius solutio valet ad determinationem praemissarum. Et est quaestio utrum ad nobilitatem vel perfectionem intellectus aliquid differat, vel nihil, quod intelligatur aliquid bonum et nobile, aut quodcumque contingit.
||So before he answers the foregoing questions, he introduces another question whose solution is useful in giving the answer; that is, whether it makes any difference or none at all to the nobility or perfection of the intellect that it should understand what is good and noble or what is contingent.
|Et quod differat, quodam signo ostendit: quia inconveniens videretur et absurdum, quod aliquis meditetur, et operationem sui intellectus occupet circa quaedam vilia. Quod non esset, si non pertineret ad nobilitatem intellectus nobilitas intelligibilis, sed indifferens esset intelligere nobilia et vilia. Hoc enim omnino est impossibile. Manifestum est enim, quod operationes secundum propria obiecta specificantur. Unde oportet, quod quanto nobilius est obiectum, tanto nobilior sit operatio.
||2605. By using an instance he shows that it does make a difference, because it seems incongruous and unreasonable that anyone should ponder or employ the operation of his intellect on things that are base. That this should not be the case would demand that the nobility of the intellect be independent of the nobility of its object, and that the understanding of base things be no different from the understanding of good things. But this is quite impossible, since activities are evidently specified by their proper objects. Hence the nobler an object, the nobler must be the operation.
||2606. Hence it is evident (1093).
|Deinde cum dicit palam ergo praemittit quaedam necessaria ad solutionem principalium quaestionum. Et primo ponit duo: quorum primum concludit ex solutione interpositae quaestionis. Si enim differt ad nobilitatem intellectus intelligere bonum, aut quodcumque contingens, ut dictum est; manifestum est, quod cum primus intellectus sit nobilissimus, quod intelligit aliquid divinissimum et honoratissimum.
||He prefaces his discussion with certain points necessary for answering the main questions. First, he gives two points. He infers the first of these from the solution of the question which he interjected. For, if it does make a difference to the nobility of the intellect whether it understands what is good or what is contingent, as has been stated (1092:C 2605), then, since the first intellect is the noblest, it obviously knows what is most divine and most honorable.
|Secundum, quod determinata est solutio ultimae partis secundae quaestionis principalis. Quaerebatur enim utrum intellectus primi mutaretur de uno in aliud. Et patet quod non mutatur de uno intellecto in aliud; quia cum intelligat divinissimum, si mutaretur in aliud intelligibile, esset eius mutatio in aliquid indignius, quod non competit alicui, nisi tendenti in defectionem et corruptionem. Iterum hoc ipsum quod est transire de uno intellecto in aliud, est quidam motus: unde non potest competere primo moventi, cum sit omnino immobile.
||2607. The second point is the solution given to the last part of the second main question. The question was whether the intellect of the first mover changes from one intelligible object to another. Now it is evident that it does not change from one object to another. For, since it understands what is most divine, if it were to change from one object to another, it would change to a less noble one; but this is fitting only to something tending to defect and destruction. Moreover, this change from one intelligible object to another would be a kind of motion; and therefore it could not be fitting to the first mover, since he is immovable in every respect.
||2608. Therefore, if the first mover (1094).
|Deinde cum dicit primum quidem solvit prius positas quaestiones. Et primo ponit veritatem primae. Secundo veritatem secundae, ibi, deinde palam et cetera.
||He now answers the questions first raised. First, he gives the correct solution to the first question; and second (1095:C 2611), the solution to the second question (“Second, that”).
|Veritatem autem primae quaestionis manifestat dicens, quod si substantia primi non est intelligentia, idest ipsum suum intelligere, sed est potentia quaedam intellectiva, rationabile est, idest probabiliter videtur sequi, quod continuatio intelligentiae, idest operationis intellectualis, sit ei laboriosa. Quod enim est in potentia ad aliquid, se habet ad hoc et ad eius oppositum; quia quod potest esse, potest non esse; unde si substantia primi comparatur ad intelligere sicut potentia ad actum, quantum est de ratione suae substantiae, poterit intelligere et non intelligere: non ergo inerit ei ex sua substantia quod continue intelligat.
||He answers the first question as follows. If the substance of the first mover “is not its act of understanding,” i.e., its own intellectual activity, but an intellective potency, “it is reasonable,” i.e., it seems to follow as a probable conclusion, that “the continuity of its act of understanding,” i.e., of its intellectual operation, is laborious to it. For whatever is in potentiality to something else is related both to this something else and to its opposite, because what can be can also not be. Hence, if the substance of the first mover is related to its act of understanding as potentiality to actuality, then according to the nature of its own substance it will be able both to understand and not to understand. Therefore continuous understanding will not be proper to it by reason of its own substance.
|Ut autem non se habeat aliquando sicut dormiens, necesse est quod continuationem intelligentiae adipiscatur ex aliquo alio. Quod autem aliquis adipiscitur, et non habet hoc ex sui natura, probabile est quod sit ei cum labore, eo quod sic invenitur in nobis: nam in continue operando laboramus. Non autem est necessarium; quia quod aliquid acquirit ab alio non est laboriosum, nisi vel ipsum, vel aliquid aliud continuans ipsum, sit contra naturam. Unde licet continuitas motus caeli dependeat ab extrinseco, non tamen caelum movetur cum labore.
||2609. In order not to be sometimes like one asleep it must derive the continuity of its intellectual activity from something else. Now whatever a thing acquires from something else and does not have by its own nature is probably laborious to it, because this is true in our case; for when we act continuously we labor. But this conclusion is not necessary, because that which one thing acquires from something else is laborious to it only if the thing acquired or something connected with it is contrary to its nature. Therefore, even though the continuity of the motion of the heavens depends on some external principle, such motion is not laborious.
|Fuit igitur Aristoteles hic contentus inducere ad inconveniens quod probabiliter sequitur; quia inconveniens quod ex necessitate sequitur est manifestum, scilicet quod bonum et perfectio primi moventis dependeat ab aliquo superiori; non enim esset primum et optimum.
||2610. Hence Aristotle was content here to reduce to absurdity the probable conclusion which follows, because the untenable conclusion which necessarily follows is evident, namely, that the goodness and perfection of the first mover will depend on some higher entity; for then it would not be the first and best.
||2611. Second, that there is (1095).
|Deinde cum dicit deinde palam solvit secundam quaestionem. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo determinat veritatem secundae quaestionis. Secundo obiicit in contrarium, ibi, et est intelligentia, et cetera. Tertio solvit, ibi, aut in quibusdam.
||He now answers the second question; and in regard to this he does three things. First, he establishes the correct answer to the second question. Second (1096:C 2617), he argues on the opposite side of the question (“And its act of understanding”). Third (1098:C 2619), he answers the arguments given (“But in certain cases”).
|Dicit ergo primo, quod postquam ostensum est, quod substantia primi non est potentia intellectiva, sed est ipsa intelligentia, ex hoc palam est, quod si primum non intelligit seipsum, sed aliquid aliud, sequitur quod aliquid aliud erit dignius quam primum, idest intellectum ab ipso.
||He accordingly says, first (1095), that, since it has been shown (1094:C 2608) that the substance of the first mover is not an intellective potency but is itself an act of understanding, it is evident from this that, if the first mover does not understand itself but something else, it follows that this other thing, i.e., what is understood by it, is nobler than the first mover.
|Quod sic probat. Ipsum intelligere in actu, quod est intelligentia, convenit alicui etiam intelligenti quodcumque indignissimum. Unde patet quod intelligere aliquod in actu, est fugiendum; quia dignius est quod quaedam non videantur in actu, quam quod videantur. Non autem hoc esset, si intelligentia esset optimum; quia tunc nullum intelligere esset vitandum. Cum ergo aliquod intelligere sit vitandum propter indignitatem intelligibilis, relinquitur quod nobilitas eius, quod est intelligere, dependeat ex nobilitate intelligibilis. Dignius est igitur ipsum intellectum quam ipsum intelligere.
||2612. He proves this as follows. Actual understanding itself, i.e., thinking, also belongs to one who understands the basest thing. Hence it is evident that some actual understanding must be avoided, because there are some things which it is better not to see than to see. But this would not be the case if the act of understanding were the best of things, because then no act of understanding would have to be avoided. Therefore, since some act of understanding must be avoided because of the baseness of the thing understood, it follows that the nobility of the intellect, which is found in its understanding, will depend on the nobility of its object. Hence the intelligible object is nobler than the act of understanding.
|Cum igitur ostensum sit quod primum sit suum intelligere, sequitur, si intelligat aliud a se, quod illud aliud erit eo nobilius. Cum igitur ipsum sit nobilissimum et potentissimum, necesse est quod intelligat seipsum, et quod in eo sit idem intellectus et intellectum.
||2613. Since it has been shown that the first mover is its own act of understanding, it follows that if it understands something different from itself, this other thing will be nobler than it is. Therefore, since the first mover is the noblest and most powerful, it must understand itself; and in its case intellect and thing understood must be the same.
|Considerandum est autem quod philosophus intendit ostendere, quod Deus non intelligit aliud, sed seipsum, inquantum intellectum est perfectio intelligentis, et eius, quod est intelligere. Manifestum est autem quod nihil aliud sic potest intelligi a Deo, quod sit perfectio intellectus eius. Nec tamen sequitur quod omnia alia a se sint ei ignota; nam intelligendo se, intelligit omnia alia.
||2614. Now we must bear in mind that the Philosopher’s aim is to show that God does not understand something else but only himself, inasmuch as the thing understood is the perfection of the one understanding and of his activity, which is understanding. It is also evident that nothing else can be understood by God in such a way that it would be the perfection of His intellect. It does not follow, however, that all things different from Himself are not known by Him; for by understanding Himself He knows all other things.
|Quod sic patet. Cum enim ipse sit ipsum suum intelligere, ipsum autem est dignissimum et potentissimum, necesse est quod suum intelligere sit perfectissimum: perfectissime ergo intelligit seipsum. Quanto autem aliquod principium perfectius intelligitur, tanto magis intelligitur in eo effectus eius: nam principiata continentur in virtute principii. Cum igitur a primo principio, quod est Deus, dependeat caelum et tota natura, ut dictum est, patet, quod Deus cognoscendo seipsum, omnia cognoscit.
||2615. This is made clear as follows. Since God is His own act of understanding and is the noblest and most powerful being, His act of understanding must be most perfect. Therefore He understands Himself most perfectly. Now the more perfectly a principle is known, the more perfectly is its effect known in it; for things derived from principles are contained in the power of their principle. Therefore, since the heavens and the whole of nature depend on the first principle, which is God, God obviously knows all things by understanding Himself.
|Nec vilitas alicuius rei intellectae derogat dignitati. Non enim intelligere actu aliquod indignissimum est fugiendum, nisi inquantum intellectus in eo sistit, et dum illud actu intelligit, retrahitur a dignioribus intelligendis. Si enim intelligendo aliquod dignissimum etiam vilia intelligantur, vilitas intellectorum intelligentiae nobilitatem non tollit.
||2616. And the baseness of any object of knowledge does not lessen His dignity; for the actual understanding of anything more base is to be avoided only insofar as the intellect becomes absorbed in it, and when in actually understanding that thing the intellect is drawn away from the understanding of nobler things. For if in understanding some noblest object base things are also understood, the baseness of the things understood does not lessen the nobility of the act of understanding.
||2617. And its act of understanding (1096).
|Deinde cum dicit et est intelligentia obiicit contra veritatem determinatam dupliciter. Primo quidem sic. Primum intelligit seipsum, ut ostensum est, et iterum supra ostensum est, quod primum est sua intelligentia: ergo intelligentia primi non est aliud quam intelligentia intelligentiae. Sed hoc est contra id quod videtur; quia actus sensus, et scientia, et opinio, et meditatio semper videntur esse alterius. Et si aliquando sint suiipsius, sicut cum aliquis sentit se sentire, vel scit se scire, vel opinatur se opinari, vel meditatur se meditari, hoc est quidem praeter opus vel praeter actum principalem: nam hic videtur principalis actio, ut aliquis intelligat intelligibile. Quod autem aliquis intelligat se intelligere intelligibile, hoc videtur esse praeter principalem actum, quasi accessorium quoddam. Unde si intelligere primi non sit nisi intelligentia intelligentiae, videtur sequi quod suum intelligere non sit principalissimum.
||Then he raises two objections against the correct solution. The first is as follows. The first mover understands himself, as has been shown above (1095:C 2615); and he is his own act of understanding, as has also been shown (1094:C 2608). Hence his act of understanding does not differ from his act of understanding his own thought. But this is contrary to what seems to be true, because perception, science, opinion and thought always seem to be about something else. And if they are sometimes about themselves, as when someone perceives that he perceives, or knows that he knows, or is of the opinion that he has an opinion, or thinks that he is thinking, this seems to be something in addition to the principal act or operation; for the principal act here seems to be that whereby someone understands an intelligible object. But that someone should understand that he is understanding something intelligible seems to be accessory to the principal act. Thus if the first mover’s act of understanding consists solely in his understanding his own thought, it seems to follow that his act of understanding is not the most important thing.
||2618. Again, if understanding (1097).
|Deinde cum dicit amplius si aliud secundo obiicit alio modo. Manifestum est, quod aliud est intelligere et intelligi. Et si contingat quod idem subiecto sit intellectus, et ipsum intellectum, non tamen sunt idem ratione. Si ergo primum est suum intelligere, et est ipsum quod intelligitur, quod est optimum, videbitur dubium remanere secundum quid insit ei hoc quod est bene esse eius; utrum scilicet secundum hoc quod est intelligentia, vel secundum quod est intellectum.
||Then he raises a second objection against the correct solution. He says that the act of understanding and the thing understood are obviously different; and even if it were possible for an intellect and its object to be the same in reality, they would not be the same in their formal structure. Hence, if the first mover is himself both his act of understanding and the object that is being understood, which is the best of things, there still seems to be the problem as to which of these confers goodness on him, namely, his act of understanding or the thing understood.
||2619. But in certain cases (1098).
|Deinde cum dicit an in quibusdam solvit positas obiectiones, dicens, quod in quibusdam res scita idem est quod scientia. Et hoc manifestat dividendo scientiam: nam scientia alia est factiva, et alia speculativa. In factivis autem scientiis, res scita sine materia accepta, est ipsa scientia. Sicut patet, quod domus sine materia, prout est in mente aedificatoris, est ipsa ars aedificativa; et similiter sanitas in mente medici est ars medicativa. Et sic patet, quod ars factiva nihil aliud est quam substantia rei factae, et quod quid erat esse eius. Omnis enim artifex procedit in opus ex eo quod considerat quid est quod operari intendit.
||He now answers the objections raised. He says that in certain cases the thing understood is the same as the knowledge of it. This becomes clear when we draw a distinction between the sciences; for one kind of science is productive and another is speculative. In the case of a productive science the thing understood, taken without matter, is the science of that thing; for example, it is clear that a house without matter, insofar as it exists in the mind of the builder, is the very art of building; and similarly health in the mind of the physician is the medical art itself. Thus a productive art is evidently nothing else than the substance or quiddity of the thing made; for every artist proceeds to his work from a knowledge of the quiddity which he intends to produce.
|In speculativis vero scientiis manifestum est, quod ipsa ratio definitiva rei est res scita, et est ipsa scientia sive intelligentia. Per hoc enim est sciens intellectus, per quod habet rationem rei. Cum igitur intellectus in actu et intellectum non sit alterum, in his quaecumque materiam non habent, manifestum est quod in substantia prima, quae maxime remota est a materia, maxime idem est intelligere et intellectum. Et sic una est intelligentia intellecti tantum, et non est aliud intelligentia intellecti, et aliud intelligentia intelligentiae.
||2620. In the case of the speculative sciences it is evident that the concept, which defines the thing itself, is the thing understood and the science or knowledge of that thing. For an intellect has knowledge by reason of the fact that it possesses the concept of a thing. Therefore, since in the case of all those things which do not have matter the intellect when actually understanding does not differ from the thing understood, then in the case of the first substance, which is separate from matter in the highest degree, the act of understanding and the thing understood are evidently the same in the highest degree. Hence there is just one act of understanding pertaining to the thing understood; that is, the act of understanding the thing understood is not distinct from that of understanding the act of understanding.
||2621. Yet the difficulty (1099).
|Deinde cum dicit adhuc autem movet tertiam dubitationem praeter duas prius determinatas. Cum enim ostensum sit, quod primum intelligit seipsum aliquid autem intelligitur dupliciter: uno modo per modum simplicis intellectus, sicut intelligimus quod quid est; alio modo per modum compositi, sicut intelligimus enunciationem: restat igitur quaerendum, utrum primum intelligat seipsum, per modum intellectus simplicis aut compositi. Et hoc est quod dicit, quod restat dubitatio si quod intelligitur a Deo est compositum.
||Here he raises a third question in addition to the two dealt with above. For since it has been shown (1074:C 2544) that the first mover understands himself, and a thing is understood in two ways: first, by way of a simple understanding, as we understand a quiddity, and second, by way of a composite understanding, as we know a proposition, the question therefore arises whether the first mover understands himself by way of a simple understanding, or by way of a composite one. This is what he refers to when he says that the difficulty still remains whether the object of God’s understanding is composite.
|Ostendit autem quod non sit compositum, cum dicit, transmutabitur enim: et hoc tripliciter. Primo quidem sic. In omni intellecto composito sunt plures partes, quae seorsum intelligi possunt. Licet enim hoc intellectum compositum, quod est,- homo currit,- prout est unum intellectum compositum, simul intelligatur, tamen partes eius seorsum intelligi possunt. Potest enim intelligi hoc quod est - homo - per se, et hoc quod est - currit. Sic igitur quicumque intelligit aliquod intellectum compositum, potest transmutari intelligendo de una parte in aliam. Si igitur intellectum primum sit compositum, sequitur quod potest transmutari intelligendo de parte in partem. Cuius contrarium supra ostensum est.
||2622. Now he shows that it is not composite when he says (1099) “for if it is”; and he gives three arguments in support of this. The first goes as follows. In every composite object of understanding there are several parts, which can be understood separately. For even though this composite object of understanding Man runs, insofar as it is one composite object, is understood all at once, none the less its parts can be understood separately. For the term man can be understood by itself, and so also can the term runs. Hence, whoever understands some composite object can be changed when his act of understanding passes from one part to another. Therefore, if the first intelligible object is composite, it follows that the intellect can change when its act of understanding passes from one part of this object to another. But the contrary of this has been proved above (1098:C 2619).
||2623. Now whatever (1100).
|Deinde cum dicit aut indivisibile secundam rationem ponit, quae talis est. Omne quod non habet materiam, est simplex et indivisibile: sed intellectum primum est immateriale: ergo est simplex et indivisibile.
||Then he gives the second argument. Whatever does not have matter is Simple and indivisible. But the first intellect does not have matter. Therefore it is simple and indivisible.
|Ponit autem exemplum de humano intellectu. Quod quidem exemplum potest dupliciter intelligi. Uno modo secundum similitudinem, ut intelligatur quod humanus intellectus sit secundum suam essentiam indivisibilis, quia est forma omnino immaterialis.
||2624. He gives as an example the human intellect, and this example can be taken in two ways. First, it can be taken as a comparison, meaning that the human intellect is indivisible in its own essence, because it is an immaterial form in every respect.
|Alio modo, et melius, potest intelligi secundum dissimilitudinem, ut sit sensus quod humanus intellectus intelligit compositum, quia accipit sua intelligibilia a rebus materialibus, quod non est de intellectu primi.
||2625. It can also be taken in a second and better way as a contrast, meaning that the human intellect knows composite things because it derives its intelligible objects from material things. And this is not true of the first intellect.
||2626. And the act (1101).
|Deinde cum dicit aut quod tertiam rationem ponit, quae talis est. Intellectus qui est intelligibilium compositorum, habet suam perfectionem non semper, sed in aliquo tempore. Quod sic patet, quia non habet suum bonum in hac parte vel in illa: sed illud quod est optimum eius, est quoddam aliud, quod est in quodam toto. Unde etiam verum (quod est bonum intellectus) non est in incomplexis, sed in complexo. Simplicia autem priora sunt generatione et tempore quam composita: unde illud quod non habet suum bonum in partibus, quae seorsum accipi possunt, sed in toto, quod ex eis constituitur, habet suum bonum per aliquod tempus, et non semper. Sed intelligentia primi, quae est suiipsius, aeternaliter et eodem modo se habet: intellectum ergo primi non est compositum.
||He gives the third argument. An act of understanding which is concerned with composite things does not possess its perfection always but attains it over a period of time. This is clear from the fact that it does not attain its good in knowing one part or another, but its greatest good is something else, which is a kind of whole. Hence the truth (which is the good of the intellect), is not found in simple things but in a composite one. Further, simple things are prior to composite things as regards both generation and time, so that whatever does not possess its own good in knowing parts which can be understood separately but in knowing the whole which is constituted of them, attains its good at some particular moment and does not always possess it.—However, the first mover’s act of understanding, which is of himself, is eternal and always in the same state. Therefore the thing understood by the intellect of the first mover is not composite.
|God Is the Final Cause of All Things. The Order of the Universe
|ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 10: 1075a 11-1076a 4
δὲ καὶ ποτέρως ἔχει
ἡ τοῦ ὅλου φύσις
τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ
τι καὶ αὐτὸ καθ᾽
αὑτό, ἢ τὴν τάξιν.
||1102. We must also inquire how the nature of the whole [universe] contains the good and the highest good, whether as something separate and self-subsisting or as the order of its parts.
|ἢ ἀμφοτέρως ὥσπερ
γὰρ ἐν τῇ τάξει
τὸ εὖ καὶ ὁ
μᾶλλον  οὗτος:
οὐ γὰρ οὗτος διὰ
τὴν τάξιν ἀλλ᾽ ἐκείνη
διὰ τοῦτόν ἐστιν.
||1103. Or is it in both ways, as an army does? For the good of an army consists both in its order and in its commander, but mainly in the latter; for he does not exist for the sake of the order, but the order exists for him.
|πάντα δὲ συντέτακταί
πως, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὁμοίως,
καὶ πλωτὰ καὶ
πτηνὰ καὶ φυτά:
καὶ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει
ὥστε μὴ εἶναι
θατέρῳ πρὸς θάτερον
μηδέν, ἀλλ᾽ ἔστι
τι. πρὸς μὲν γὰρ
ἓν ἅπαντα συντέτακται,
ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ ἐν οἰκίᾳ
 ἥκιστα ἔξεστιν
ὅ τι ἔτυχε ποιεῖν,
ἀλλὰ πάντα ἢ τὰ
τοῖς δὲ ἀνδραπόδοις
καὶ τοῖς θηρίοις
μικρὸν τὸ εἰς τὸ
κοινόν, τὸ δὲ
πολὺ ὅ τι ἔτυχεν:
τοιαύτη γὰρ ἑκάστου
ἀρχὴ αὐτῶν ἡ φύσις
ἐστίν. λέγω δ᾽
οἷον εἴς γε τὸ
καὶ ἄλλα οὕτως ἔστιν
ὧν κοινωνεῖ  ἅπαντα
εἰς τὸ ὅλον.
||1104. And all things, both plants and animals (those that swim and those that fly), are ordered together in some way, but not alike; and things are not such that there is no relation between one thing and another, but there is a connection. For all things are ordered together to one end, but in the same way as in a household, where the children are not permitted to do just as they please, but all or most of the things done are arranged in an orderly way, while the slaves and livestock do little for the common good but act for the most part at random. For the nature of each of these constitutes such a principle. I mean that by it all must be able to be distinguished. And there are other activities which all have in common for the sake of the whole.
|ὅσα δὲ ἀδύνατα
συμβαίνει ἢ ἄτοπα
τοῖς ἄλλως λέγουσι,
καὶ ποῖα οἱ
καὶ ἐπὶ ποίων ἐλάχισται
ἀπορίαι, δεῖ μὴ
||1105. And we must not fail to consider all the impossible and incongruous conclusions that confront those who explain things differently, and what sort of views are expressed by the more popular thinkers, among whom the fewest difficulties appear.
γὰρ ἐξ ἐναντίων
οὔτε δὲ τὸ πάντα
οὔτε τὸ ἐξ ἐναντίων
ὀρθῶς, οὔτ᾽ ἐν ὅσοις
τὰ ἐναντία ὑπάρχει,
πῶς  ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων
ἔσται, οὐ λέγουσιν:
||1106. For all these thinkers derive all things from contraries. But neither “all things” (1055) nor “from contraries” (1029) is correct; nor do they explain how the things in which contraries are present come from contraries.
|ἀπαθῆ γὰρ τὰ ἐναντία
ὑπ᾽ ἀλλήλων. ἡμῖν
δὲ λύεται τοῦτο
εὐλόγως τῷ τρίτον
τι εἶναι. οἱ δὲ
τὸ ἕτερον τῶν ἐναντίων
ὕλην ποιοῦσιν, ὥσπερ
οἱ τὸ ἄνισον τῷ
ἴσῳ ἢ τῷ ἑνὶ τὰ
πολλά. λύεται δὲ
καὶ τοῦτο τὸν αὐτὸν
τρόπον: ἡ γὰρ ὕλη
ἡ μία οὐδενὶ ἐναντίον.
||1107. For contraries cannot be acted upon by one another. But this difficulty is solved by us in a reasonable way on the ground that there is a third element. Some thinkers make one of the contraries matter, as those who make the unequal the matter of the equal, or the many the matter of the one. But this is also met in the same way; for matter, as one, is contrary to nothing.
|ἔτι  ἅπαντα τοῦ
ἔξω τοῦ ἑνός: τὸ
γὰρ κακὸν αὐτὸ
||1108. Further, [according to them] all things except the one will exist by participating in evil; for evil itself is one of the two elements (78).
ἄλλοι οὐδ᾽ ἀρχὰς
τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ
κακόν: καίτοι ἐν
τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀρχή.
||1109. For other thinkers consider neither good nor evil as principles, even though the good is in the fullest sense a principle of things.
| οἱ δὲ τοῦτο μὲν
ὀρθῶς ὅτι ἀρχήν,
ἀλλὰ πῶς τὸ ἀγαθὸν
ἀρχὴ οὐ λέγουσιν,
πότερον ὡς τέλος
ἢ ὡς κινῆσαν ἢ ὡς
||1110. The former are right in holding that the good is a principle, but they do not say how it is a principle: whether as an end or as a mover or as a form.
|[1075β]  ἀτόπως
δὲ καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς:
τὴν γὰρ φιλίαν
ποιεῖ τὸ ἀγαθόν,
αὕτη δ᾽ ἀρχὴ καὶ
ὡς κινοῦσα (συνάγει
γάρ) καὶ ὡς ὕλη: μόριον
γὰρ τοῦ μίγματος. εἰ δὴ καὶ τῷ αὐτῷ συμβέβηκεν  καὶ ὡς ὕλῃ ἀρχῇ εἶναι καὶ ὡς
ἀλλὰ τό γ᾽ εἶναι
οὖν φιλία; ἄτοπον
δὲ καὶ τὸ ἄφθαρτον
εἶναι τὸ νεῖκος: τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶν
αὐτῷ ἡ τοῦ
||1111. And Empedocles’ doctrine (50) is also unreasonable; for he identifies the good with friendship, although the latter is a principle both as a mover (for it combines things), and as matter (for it is a part of the mixture 4). Therefore, even if it happens that the same thing is a principle both as matter and as a mover, still their being is not the same. In what respect, then, is friendship a principle? And it is also unreasonable that strife should be indestructible; for the essence of evil, for him, is precisely this strife.
|Ἀναξαγόρας δὲ ὡς
κινοῦν τὸ ἀγαθὸν
ἀρχήν: ὁ γὰρ
πλὴν ὡς ἡμεῖς λέγομεν:
γὰρ ἰατρική ἐστί
πως ἡ ὑγίεια. ἄτοπον
δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον μὴ ποιῆσαι τῷ ἀγαθῷ καὶ τῷ νῷ. πάντες δ᾽ οἱ τἀναντία λέγοντες
τοῖς ἐναντίοις, ἐὰν
||1112. Again, Anaxagoras makes the good a principle as a mover; for his “Intellect” causes motion. But it causes motion for the sake of some goal, and therefore there must be something other than intellect (84), unless it is as we say; for the art of medicine is in a sense health (606). It is also unreasonable not to provide something that is contrary to the good (78) or to intellect.
|καὶ διὰ τί τὰ μὲν φθαρτὰ τὰ δ᾽ ἄφθαρτα,
πάντα γὰρ τὰ ὄντα
ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀρχῶν. ἔτι
οἱ  μὲν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος
τὰ ὄντα: οἱ δ᾽ ἵνα μὴ τοῦτο ἀναγκασθῶσιν, ἓν
||1113. But all who speak of contraries fail to make use of them as such, except that some make use of imagery. And none of them explain why some things are destructible and others are not; for they derive all things from the same principles (250-263). Again, some derive beings from non-being, while others (63) lest they be driven to this, make all things one.
τί ἀεὶ ἔσται γένεσις
καὶ τί αἴτιον
||1114. Further, no one explains why there is always generation, and what its cause is.
δύο ἀρχὰς ποιοῦσιν
ἄλλην ἀνάγκη ἀρχὴν
καὶ τοῖς τὰ εἴδη
ἔτι ἄλλη ἀρχὴ
τί γὰρ μετέσχεν
ἢ  μετέχει;
||1115. And those who posit two principles of things must assume a first principle which is superior. This also holds for those who posit separate Forms, because there is another principle which is more important; for why has matter participated in the Forms or why does it participate in them?
τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις
ἀνάγκη τῇ σοφίᾳ
καὶ τῇ τιμιωτάτῃ
τι ἐναντίον, ἡμῖν
δ᾽ οὔ. οὐ γάρ ἐστιν
ἐναντίον τῷ πρώτῳ
οὐδέν: πάντα γὰρ
τὰ ἐναντία ὕλην
ἔχει, καὶ δυνάμει
ταῦτα ἔστιν: ἡ δὲ
εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον,
τῷ δὲ πρώτῳ ἐναντίον
||1116. And for other thinkers there must be something contrary to wisdom or the noblest science; but this is not so in our case. For there is nothing contrary to what is primary, since all contraries involve matter, and things having matter are in potentiality; and ignorance is contrary to the particular knowledge which is the contrary into which it can pass. But there is nothing contrary to what is primary.
|εἴ τε μὴ ἔσται
παρὰ τὰ  αἰσθητὰ
ἄλλα, οὐκ ἔσται ἀρχὴ
καὶ τάξις καὶ γένεσις
καὶ τὰ οὐράνια,
ἀλλ᾽ ἀεὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς
ἀρχή, ὥσπερ τοῖς
||1117. Further, if nothing exists except sensible things, there will be no principle, no order, no generation, no heavenly bodies; but every principle will have a principle, as is maintained by all the theologians and natural philosophers.
|εἰ δ᾽ ἔσται
τὰ εἴδη: ἢ <οἱ> ἀριθμοί,
εἰ δὲ μή, οὔτι
||1118. Now if there are separate Forms and numbers, they will not be causes of anything; but if they are, they will certainly not be causes of motion.
πῶς ἔσται ἐξ ἀμεγεθῶν
συνεχές; ὁ γὰρ ἀριθμὸς
οὐ ποιήσει 
συνεχές, οὔτε ὡς
κινοῦν οὔτε ὡς
||1119. Again, how will extension or continuous quantity be composed of parts which are unextended? For number cannot either as a mover or as a form produce a continuum.
οὐδέν γ᾽ ἔσται
τῶν ἐναντίων ὅπερ
καὶ κινητικόν; ἐνδέχοιτο
γὰρ ἂν μὴ εἶναι.
ἀλλὰ μὴν ὕστερόν
γε τὸ ποιεῖν
δυνάμεως. οὐκ ἄρα
ἀΐδια τὰ ὄντα. ἀλλ᾽
ἄρα τούτων τι. τοῦτο δ᾽ εἴρηται
||1120. Further, no one of the contraries will be a productive principle and a mover, because it would be possible for it not to be. And in any case its activity would be subsequent to its potentiality. No beings, then, would be eternal. But some are. Therefore one of these premises must be rejected. How this may be done has been explained (1057).
|ἔτι τίνι οἱ
ἀριθμοὶ ἓν ἢ ἡ 
ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ σῶμα
καὶ ὅλως τὸ εἶδος
καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα, οὐδὲν
λέγει οὐδείς: οὐδ᾽
ἐὰν μὴ ὡς ἡμεῖς
εἴπῃ, ὡς τὸ
||1121. Again, as to the way in which numbers, or soul and body, or forms and things in general are one, no one states anything; nor is it possible to do so unless he says, as we do, that a mover makes them one (733-41).
δὲ λέγοντες τὸν
καὶ οὕτως ἀεὶ ἄλλην
καὶ ἀρχὰς ἑκάστης
ἄλλας, [1076α]  ἐπεισοδιώδη
τὴν τοῦ παντὸς
(οὐδὲν γὰρ ἡ ἑτέρα
τῇ ἑτέρᾳ συμβάλλεται
οὖσα ἢ μὴ οὖσα) καὶ ἀρχὰς πολλάς: τὰ δὲ ὄντα
κακῶς. "οὐκ ἀγαθὸν
||1122. And those who say that mathematical number is the primary reality and that there is always one substance after another and give different principles for each, make the substance of the universe itself a group of substances unrelated to each other (for one substance confers nothing upon another, either by being or not being), and give us many principles. But beings do not want to be badly disposed.—“Many rulers are not good; therefore let there be one ruler.”|
|Postquam philosophus ostendit qualiter primum movens est intelligens et intelligibile, hic intendit inquirere qualiter primum movens sit bonum et appetibile. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ostendit qualiter se habeat bonum in universo secundum opinionem propriam. Secundo secundum opinionem aliorum, ibi, quaecumque vero impossibilia.
||2627. Having shown how the first mover is both an intelligence and an intelligible object, here the Philosopher aims to investigate how the first mover is a good and an object of desire; and in regard to this he does two things. First (1102:C 2628), he shows how the good is present in the universe, according to his opinion; and second (1105:C 2638), according to the opinions of other philosophers (“And we must not fail”).
|Circa primum duo facit. Primo movet quaestionem. Secundo solvit eam, ibi, aut utroque modo et cetera.
||In regard to the first he does two things. First, he raises a question. Second (1103:C 2629), he answers it (“Or is it”).
|Oritur autem ista quaestio ex hoc, quod supra dictum est, quod primum movens movet sicut bonum et appetibile. Bonum enim, secundum quod est finis alicuius, est duplex. Est enim finis extrinsecus ab eo quod est ad finem, sicut si dicimus locum esse finem eius quod movetur ad locum. Est etiam finis intra, sicut forma finis generationis et alterationis, et forma iam adepta, est quoddam bonum intrinsecum eius, cuius est forma. Forma autem alicuius totius, quod est unum per ordinationem quamdam partium, est ordo ipsius: unde relinquitur quod sit bonum eius.
||Now this question arises because of a statement which was made above to the effect that the first mover causes motion as something good and desirable; for good, inasmuch as it is the end or goal of a thing, is twofold. For an end is extrinsic to the thing ordained to it, as when we say that a place is the end of something that is moved locally. Or it is intrinsic, as a form is the end of the process of generation or alteration; and a form already acquired is a kind of intrinsic good of the thing whose form it is. Now the form of any whole which is one through the arrangement of its parts is the order of that whole. Hence it follows that it is a good of that whole.
|Quaerit ergo philosophus utrum natura totius universi habeat bonum et optimum, idest finem proprium, quasi aliquid separatum a se, vel habeat bonum et optimum in ordine suarum partium, per modum, quo bonum alicuius rei naturalis est sua forma.
||2628. Therefore the Philosopher asks whether the nature of the whole universe has its good and highest good, i.e., its proper end, as something separate from itself, or whether this consists in the ordering of its parts in the way in which the good of any natural being in its own form.
||2629. Or is it (1103).
|Deinde cum dicit aut utroque solvit propositam quaestionem. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo enim ostendit, quod universum habet bonum separatum, et bonum ordinis. Secundo ostendit qualiter partes universi se habent ad ordinem, ibi, omnia vero coordinata.
||Then he answers the question raised; and in regard to this he does two things. First, he shows that the universe has both a separate good and a good of order. Second (1104:C 2632), he shows the ways in which the parts of the universe contribute to its order (“And all things”).
|Dicit ergo primo, quod universum habet utroque modo bonum et finem. Est enim aliquod bonum separatum, quod est primum movens, ex quo dependet caelum et tota natura, sicut ex fine et bono appetibili, ut ostensum est. Et, quia omnia, quorum unum est finis, oportet quod in ordine ad finem conveniant, necesse est, quod in partibus universi ordo aliquis inveniatur; et sic universum habet et bonum separatum, et bonum ordinis.
||He accordingly says, first (1103), that the universe has its good and end in both ways. For there is a separate good, which is the first mover, on which the heavens and the whole of nature depend as their end or desirable good, as has been shown (1067:C 2520. And since all things having one end must agree in their ordination to that end, some order must be found in the parts of the universe; and so the universe has both a separate good and a good of order.
|Sicut videmus in exercitu: nam bonum exercitus est et in ipso ordine exercitus, et in duce, qui exercitui praesidet: sed magis est bonum exercitus in duce, quam in ordine: quia finis potior est in bonitate his quae sunt ad finem: ordo autem exercitus est propter bonum ducis adimplendum, scilicet ducis voluntatem in victoriae consecutionem; non autem e converso, bonum ducis est propter bonum ordinis.
||2630. We see this, for example, in the case of an army; for the good of the army is found both in the order itself of the army and in the commander who has charge of the army. But the good of the army is found in a higher degree in its commander than in its order, because the goodness of an end takes precedence over that of the things which exist for the sake of the end. Now the order of an army exists for the purpose of achieving the good of its commander, namely, his will to attain victory. But the opposite of this is not true, i.e., that the good of the commander exists for the sake of the good of order.
|Et, quia ratio eorum quae sunt ad finem, sumitur ex fine, ideo necesse est quod non solum ordo exercitus sit propter ducem, sed etiam quod a duce sit ordo exercitus, cum ordo exercitus sit propter ducem. Ita etiam bonum separatum, quod est primum movens, est melius bonum bono ordinis, quod est in universo. Totus enim ordo universi est propter primum moventem, ut scilicet explicatur in universo ordinato id quod est in intellectu et voluntate primi moventis. Et sic oportet, quod a primo movente sit tota ordinatio universi.
||2631. And since the formal character of things Which exist for the sake of an end is derived from the end, it is therefore necessary not only that the good of the army exist for the sake of the commander, but also that the order of the army depend on the commander, since its order exists for the sake of the commander. In this way too the separate good of the universe, which is the first mover, is a greater good than the good of order which is found in the universe. For the whole order of the universe exists for the sake of the first mover inasmuch as the things contained in the mind and will of the first mover are realized in the ordered universe. Hence the whole order of the universe must depend on the first mover.
||2632. And all things (1104).
|Deinde cum dicit omnia vero ostendit qualiter partes universi se habent ad ordinem; dicens, quod omnia quae sunt in universo, sunt aliquo modo ordinata, sed non similiter omnia habent ordinem, scilicet animalia marina, et volatilia, et plantae. Et tamen licet non sint eodem modo ordinata, non ita se habent, quod unum eorum non pertineat ad alterum; sed est aliqua affinitas et ordo unius ad alterum. Plantae enim sunt propter animalia, et animalia sunt propter homines. Et quod omnia sint ordinata adinvicem, patet ex hoc, quod omnia simul ordinantur ad unum finem.
||Here he shows the ways in which the parts of the universe contribute to its order. He says that all things in the universe are ordered together in some way, but not all are ordered alike, for example, sea animals, birds, and plants. Yet even though they are not ordered in the same way, they are still not disposed in such a way that one of them has no connection with another; but there is some affinity and relationship of one with another. For plants exist for the sake of animals, and animals for the sake of men. That all things are related. to each other is evident from the fact that all are connected together to one end.
|Sed quod omnia non sic sint similiter ordinata, manifestatur per quoddam exemplum. In aliqua enim domo vel familia ordinata inveniuntur diversi gradus, sicut sub patrefamilias est primus gradus filiorum, alius autem gradus est servorum, tertius vero gradus est bestiarum, quae serviunt in domo, ut canes, et huiusmodi animalia. Huiusmodi enim gradus diversimode se habent ad ordinem domus, qui imponitur a patrefamilias gubernatore domus. Filiis enim non competit ut faciant aliquid casualiter et sine ordine; sed omnia, aut plura eorum quae faciunt, ordinata sunt. Non autem ita est de servis aut bestiis, quia parum participant de ordine, qui est ad commune. Sed multum invenitur in eis de eo quod contingit, et casualiter accidit. Et hoc ideo quia parvam affinitatem habent cum rectore domus, qui intendit bonum domus commune.
||2633. That all are not ordered in the same way is made clear by an example; for in an ordered household or family different ranks of members are found. For example, under the head of the family there is a first rank, namely, that of the sons, and a second rank, which is that of the slaves, and a third rank, which is that of the domestic animals, as dogs and the like. For ranks of this kind have a different relation to the order of the household, which is imposed by the head of the family, who governs the household. For it is not proper for the sons to act in a haphazard and disorderly way, but all or most of the things that they do are ordered. This is not the case with the slaves or domestic animals, however, because they share to a very small degree in the order which exists for the common good. But in their case we find many things which are contingent and haphazard; and this is because they have little connection with the ruler of the household, who aims at the common good of the household.
|Sicut autem imponitur in familia ordo per legem et praeceptum patrisfamilias, qui est principium unicuique ordinatorum in domo, exequendi ea quae pertinent ad ordinem domus, ita natura in rebus naturalibus est principium exequendi unicuique id quod competit sibi de ordine universi. Sicuti enim qui est in domo per praeceptum patrisfamilias ad aliquid inclinatur, ita aliqua res naturalis per naturam propriam. Et ipsa natura uniuscuiusque est quaedam inclinatio indita ei a primo movente, ordinans ipsam in debitum finem. Et ex hoc patet, quod res naturales agunt propter finem, licet finem non cognoscant, quia a primo intelligente assequuntur inclinationem in finem.
||2634. And just as the order of the family is imposed by the law and precept of the head of the family, who is the principle of each of the things which are ordered in the household, with a view to carrying out the activities which pertain to the order of the household, in a similar fashion the nature of physical things is the principle by which each of them carries out the activity proper to it in the order of the universe. For just as any member of the household is disposed to act through the precept of the head of the family, in a similar fashion any natural being is disposed by its own nature. Now the nature of each thing is a kind of inclination implanted in it by the first mover, who directs it to its proper end; and from this it is clear that natural beings act for the sake of an end even though they do not know that end, because they acquire their inclination to their end from the first intelligence.
|Sed tamen non similiter omnia ista se habent ad istum finem. Est enim aliquid commune omnibus; quia necesse est quod omnia ad hoc perveniant quod discernantur, idest quod habeant discretas et proprias operationes, et quod etiam secundum substantiam adinvicem discernantur; et quantum ad hoc in nullo deficit ordo. Sed quaedam sunt quae non solum hoc habent, sed ulterius talia sunt, quod omnia, quae sunt in eis communicant ad totum, idest sunt ordinata ad bonum commune totius. Hoc autem invenitur in illis, in quibus nihil est praeter naturam neque casualiter, sed omnia secundum debitum ordinem praecedunt.
||2635. However, not all things are disposed to this end in the same way. For there is something common to all things, since all things must succeed in being distinguished; that is, they must have discrete and proper operations, and must also be differentiated essentially from each other; and in this respect order is lacking in none of them. But there are some things which not only have this but are also such that all their activities “participate in the whole,” i.e., are directed to the common good of the whole. This is found to be true of those things which contain nothing contrary to their nature, nor any element of chance, but everything proceeds according to the right order.
|Manifestum est enim, quod unaquaeque res naturalis, ut dictum est, ordinatur ad bonum commune, secundum suam actionem debitam naturalem. Unde illa quae nunquam deficiunt a sua actione debita et naturali habent omnia sua communicantia ad totum. Illa vero quae aliquando deficiunt ab actione debita et naturali, non habent omnia sua communicantia ad totum, sicut huiusmodi corpora inferiora.
||2636. For it is evident, as has been pointed out (1104:C 2632-34), that each natural being is directed to the common good by reason of its proper natural activity. Hence those things which never fail in their proper natural activity have all their activities contributing to the whole. But those which sometimes fail in their proper natural activity do not have all their activities contributing to the whole; and lower bodies are of this kind.
|Est ergo summa solutionis, quod ordo duo requirit, scilicet ordinatorum distinctionem et communicantiam distinctorum ad totum. Quantum autem ad primum indeficienter est ordo in omnibus; quantum autem ad secundum est quidam ordo indeficienter in aliquibus, quae sunt suprema et proxima primo principio, sicut substantiae separatae et corpora caelestia, in quibus nihil casualiter accidit et praeter naturam: in aliquibus autem deficit, scilicet corporibus, in quibus interdum aliquid accidit casualiter praeter naturam. Et hoc propter remotionem a primo principio semper eodem modo se habente.
||2637. The answer briefly stated, then, is that order requires two things: a distinction between the things ordered, and the contribution of the distinct things to the whole. As regard the first of these, order is found in all things without fail; but as regards the second, order is found in some things, and these are the things which are highest and closest to the first principle, as the separate substances and the heavenly bodies, in which there is no element of chance or anything contrary to their nature. But order is lacking in some things, namely, in [lower] bodies, which are sometimes subject to chance and to things which are contrary to their nature. This is so because of their distance from the first principle, which is always the same.
||2638. And we must not (1105).
|Deinde cum dicit quaecumque vero determinat de bono et ordine universi secundum opinionem aliorum; et circa hoc duo facit. Primo manifestat de quo est intentio; dicens, quod oportet dicere quaecumque impossibilia aut absurda accidunt illis qui aliter dicunt de bono et ordine universi, scilicet quam nos. Et oportet dicere etiam qualia dicunt illi qui melius loquuntur, et in quorum dictis pauciores dubitationes apparent.
||Then he deals with the end and order of the universe according to the opinion of other philosophers. In regard to this he does two things. First, he explains what he aims to do. He says that we must state all the impossible or incongruous conclusions facing those who express views different from our own about the good and order of the universe; and we must also state the kind of views held by those men who give a better explanation of things and in whose statements fewer difficulties appear.
||2639. For all these (1106).
|Deinde cum dicit omnes enim prosequitur suam intentionem; et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ponit opinionem illorum, qui posuerunt principia esse contraria. Secundo eorum qui posuerunt principia esse naturas quasdam separatas, ibi. Amplius si non erunt et cetera.
||He then carries out his plan. In regard to this he does two things. First (1106:C 2639), he gives the opinion of those who held that the principles of things are contraries; and second (1117:C 2656), the opinion of those who held that the principles of things are separate natures (“Further, if nothing”).
|Circa primum duo facit. Primo proponit in quo deficiant illi, qui dicunt principia esse contraria; dicens quod omnes antiqui philosophi posuerunt omnia esse ex principiis contrariis. Et quantum ad tria non recte dixerunt. Neque enim recte dixerunt in hoc, quod posuerunt res esse ex contrariis; neque etiam in hoc quod dixerunt omnia ex contrariis; et tertio defecerunt in hoc quod non dixerunt quomodo ex contrariis res producantur.
||In treating the first point he does two things. First (1106), he explains in what way those men are wrong who say that the principles of things are contraries. He says that all the ancient philosophers held that all things come from contraries as their principles; and they were wrong on three counts. First, they were wrong in holding that things come from contraries; and second, in saying that all things come from contraries; and third, in failing to explain how things are produced from contraries.
||2640. For contraries (1107).
|Secundo ibi, impassibilia namque manifestat quomodo in praedictis tribus defecerunt. Et primo quomodo defecerunt in hoc, quod posuerunt esse res ex contrariis. Secundo in hoc quod posuerunt omnia esse ex contrariis, ibi, amplius autem omnia pravi participatione. Tertio quomodo defecerunt in hoc quod non dixerunt quomodo ex contrariis res sint, ibi, omnes autem contraria dicentes et cetera.
||Second, he indicates how they were wrong in the three ways mentioned above. He explains how they erred, first, in holding that things come from contraries; and second (1108:C 2643), in claiming that all things come from contraries (“Further, [according to them]”); and third (1113:C 2650), in failing to show how things come from contraries (“But all who speak”).
|Dicit ergo primo, quod non recte dicunt res esse ex contrariis, quia contraria secundum se accepta sunt impassibilia adinvicem: non enim albedo patitur a nigredine, neque e converso. Non autem ex eis posset aliquid unum constitui, nisi adinvicem paterentur, ut sic reducantur ad aliquod medium.
||He accordingly says, first (1107), that they were wrong in saying that things comes from contraries, because contraries taken in themselves cannot be acted upon by one another; for whiteness is not acted upon by blackness or vice versa, and one thing could come from them only if they were influenced by one another and so were reduced to an intermediate state.
|Sed haec dubitatio secundum sententiam Aristotelis de facili solvitur. Quia Aristoteles posuit, praeter duo contraria esse tertium principium, quod est materia. Sic ergo unum contrariorum potest pati a reliquo, inquantum materia subiecta uni contrario, ab alio patitur.
||2641. But in Aristotle’s opinion this difficulty is easily solved, because besides the two contraries he also posited a third principle, matter. Hence one of the two contraries can be acted upon by the other in the sense that matter, which is the subject of one contrary, can be acted upon by the other contrary.
|Sed alii posuerunt materiam esse alterum contrariorum, et non aliquid praeter contraria. Sicut patet de illis, qui posuerunt ista contraria esse principia, inaequale et aequale, unum et multa. Attribuebant enim inaequalitatem et multitudinem materiae, aequalitatem et unitatem formae, sicut patet de opinione Platonis, licet philosophi naturales posuerint contrarium. Sed hoc eorum dictum solvitur eodem modo; quia materia, quae una est, quasi commune subiectum contrariorum, nulli est contraria.
||2642. But others claimed that matter is one of the two contraries and not something distinct from them, as is evident in the case of those who held that the contraries, the unequal and the equal, and the one and the many, are principles. For they attribute inequality and plurality to matter, and equality and unity to form, as is found in Plato’s opinion, although the natural philosophers held the opposite. But this statement of theirs is met in the same way, because matter, which is one thing as the common subject of contraries, is contrary to nothing.
||2643. Further, [according to them] (1108).
|Deinde cum dicit amplius autem manifestat philosophus, quomodo defecerunt dicendo omnia esse ex contrariis; et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ostendit inconveniens, quod ex hac positione sequitur. Manifestum est enim quod prima contrariorum genera sunt bonum et malum, quia semper alterum contrariorum est ut privatio, et ita habet rationem mali. Si ergo omnia sunt ex contrariis, sequitur quod omnia participent malo praeter unum, scilicet bonum, quod est principium: nam alterum elementorum ponitur esse bonum, omnia vero alia ponuntur esse ex his duobus principiis. Hoc autem non est verum; quia in corporibus caelestibus et natura substantiarum separatarum non inveniuntur corruptio et malum.
||Then the Philosopher explains how these thinkers were wrong in saying that all things come from contraries; and in regard to this he does two things. First, he shows the unreasonable conclusion which follows from this view. For it is evident that the primary contraries are good and evil, because one of two contraries is always the privation of the other and so has the character of evil. Therefore, if all things come from contraries, it follows that all things participate in evil as well as in unity, i.e., good, which is a principle; for good is posited as one of the two elements, and everything else is supposed to come from these two principles. But this is not true, because destruction and evil are not found in the heavenly bodies or in the nature of the separate substances.
||2644. For other thinkers (1109).
|Secundo ibi, alii autem ostendit quod positio ponentium omnia ex contrariis, non convenit positioni quorumdam philosophorum. Si enim omnia sunt ex contrariis, sequitur, ut dictum est, quod prima principia sint bonum et malum. Sed quidam non posuerunt bonum et malum esse principia; sed id quod est bonum, esse principium omnibus.
||Second, he shows that the position of all those who held that all things come from contraries is not in agreement with the position of certain of the philosophers. For if all things come from contraries, it follows, as has been pointed out, that good and evil are the first principles of things. But some did not claim that good and evil are principles but said that the good is the principle of all things.
||2645. The former (1110).
|Tertio ibi, alii vero ostendit quomodo in ponendo bonum esse principium, defecerunt etiam illi. Et hoc ostendit primo in communi; dicens, quod quidam, licet recte dicerent ponentes bonum esse principium omnium, tamen in hoc defecerunt, quia non determinaverunt quomodo bonum esset principium, utrum scilicet ut finis, aut ut forma, aut ut movens. Haec enim tria habent rationem perfecti et boni; non autem materia, quae non perficitur nisi per formam, unde de ea mentionem non facit.
||Third he indicates the error made even by those who claimed that the good is a principle of things. He makes this clear, first, in a general way. He says that, even though some philosophers are right in holding that the good is a principle of all things, they are still wrong in failing to show how it is a principle, i.e., whether as an end or as a form or as a mover. For these things are characterized by perfection and goodness, whereas matter which is perfected only by form, does not have the character of something good and perfect; and therefore he makes no mention of it.
||2646. And Empedocles’ doctrine (1111).
|Secundo ibi, inconvenienter autem descendit ad speciales opiniones; et primo ad opinionem Empedoclis; dicens, quod inconvenienter Empedocles ponit bonum esse principium. Ponit enim amorem principium, quasi bonum. Sed amorem dicit esse principium dupliciter. Dicit enim quod est ut movens, inquantum habet unire et congregare: et iterum ponit, quod est principium sicut materia. Probat enim amorem esse partem mixtorum. Corpora enim ponebat esse mixta ex quatuor elementis et amicitia et lite. Licet autem contingat esse principium idem sicut materia et sicut movens, non tamen secundum eamdem rationem. Potest enim ignis esse movens secundum formam et materiale principium secundum materiam: non autem secundum idem: quia movens, inquantum huiusmodi, est in actu, materia autem, inquantum huiusmodi, est in potentia. Restat igitur assignandum secundum quid amor sit materia, et secundum quid est movens, quod ipse non assignat.
||Next, he turns to certain particular opinions. First, he considers the opinion of Empedocles. He says that Empedocles made the unreasonable assumption that the good is a principle of things; for he claimed that love is a principle, identifying it with the good. However, he said that love is a principle in two ways. For he claimed that it is a moving principle inasmuch as its function is to unite things and bring them together; and he also claimed that it is a material principle inasmuch as he asserts that love is a part of compounds, since he assumed that bodies are compounds of the four elements and of friendship and strife. And even though the same principle can be both matter and a mover, it is not such under the same formal aspect. For fire can be a mover according to its form, and a material principle according to its matter; but it cannot be both in the same respect, because a mover as such is actual, whereas matter as such is potential. Hence it must still be explained in what respect love has the character of a material principle, and in what respect it has the character of a mover and this he fails to do.
|Aliud autem inconveniens, quod sequitur opinionem Empedoclis, est quod posuit litem esse primum principium incorruptibile. Quae quidem secundum ipsum videtur esse ipsa natura mali: malum autem secundum recte opinantes non ponitur principium esse, sed solum bonum, ut dictum est.
||2647. Another incongruity which follows from Empedocles’ opinion is his positing strife as a first indestructible principle; for strife in itself seems to be essentially evil, and evil, in the opinions of those who are right, is not set down as a principle, but only the good, as has been stated (1109:C 2644).
||2648. Again, Anaxagoras (1112).
|Tertio ibi, Anaxagoras autem descendit ad opinionem Anaxagorae; dicens, quod Anaxagoras posuit bonum esse principium primum quasi movens. Dixit enim quod intellectus movet omnia. Sed manifestum est quod semper intellectus movet gratia alicuius, idest propter finem. Quare oportet quod ponat alterum aliquod principium, propter quod intellectus moveat. Nisi forte dicat sicut nos diximus, scilicet quod idem potest esse intellectus et intellectum, et quod intellectus moveat propter seipsum, quod aliquo modo invenitur in his quae agunt per intellectum secundum nos. Ars enim medicinae agit propter sanitatem, et sanitas est quodam modo ipsa ars medicinae, ut supra dictum est.
||Third, he turns to the opinion of Anaxagoras. He says that Anaxagoras makes the good to be a first principle of things as a mover; for he said that an intellect moves all things. But it is evident that “an intellect always causes motion for the sake of some goal,” i.e., an end. Hence Anaxagoras must posit some other principle by reason of which this intellect causes motion, unless perhaps he should say, as we have, that an intellect and its intelligible object can be the same; and that an intellect moves for its own sake; which is true in a sense of those things which act by intellect, according to our view. For the art of medicine acts for the sake of health, and health is in a sense the art of medicine itself, as has been pointed out above (C 2619; 606:C 1407).
|Aliud autem inconveniens sequi videtur contra opinionem Anaxagorae, si sustineatur communis opinio, scilicet quod contraria sunt principia omnium. Secundum hoc enim videbitur inconveniens, quod non facit aliquod principium contrarium bono et intellectui.
||2649. Another unreasonable consequence which is contrary to the opinion of Anaxagoras also seems to follow if the common view is maintained, namely, that contraries are the principles of all things. For according to this view it would be absurd for him not to make some principle contrary to the good and to intellect.
||2650. But all who speak (1113).
|Deinde cum dicit omnes autem ostendit tertium quod supra posuit, scilicet quod ponentes principia contraria esse, non dicunt quomodo principiata sunt ex contrariis. Et hoc est quod dicit, quod omnes dicentes principia esse contraria non utuntur ad causandum ea quae sunt apparentia in entibus. Nisi aliquis figuret, idest nisi aliquis velit fingere vel figurabiliter dicere.
||He explains the third error which he noted above (1106-07:C 2639-40), namely, that those who held the principles to be contraries did not explain how things come from contraries as their principles. He says that all those who speak of contraries as principles fail to make use of them in accounting for what appears in the world, unless “some make use of imagery,” i.e., unless someone wishes to indulge his fancy or to speak figuratively.
||2651. And none of them (ibid.).
|Et primo cum dicit, et quare haec quidem et cetera. Ostendit quod non possunt causare differentiam corruptibilium vel incorruptibilium. Dicit ergo, quod nullus antiquorum philosophorum assignat causam, quare entia quaedam sunt corruptibilia, et quaedam incorruptibilia. Ponunt enim quidam eorum entia omnia esse ex eisdem principiis, scilicet contrariis. Et haec est opinio antiquorum naturalium. Alii vero, scilicet poetae theologi, posuerunt omnia ex non ente. Unde supra dixit, quod generat mundum ex non ente. Et sic, cum eamdem originem utrique assignent omnibus entibus, non possunt causare distinctionem rerum secundum corruptibile et incorruptibile. Et ideo alii, ut ad hoc non cogantur, quod scilicet ponant omnia esse ex non ente, vel quod assignent causam distinctionis rerum, posuerunt omnia esse unum, totaliter a rebus distinctionem tollentes: et haec est opinio Parmenidis et Melissi.
||First, he shows that they cannot account for the differences between destructible and indestructible things. He accordingly says that none of the ancient philosophers give any reason why some beings are destructible and some are not. Some of them claimed that all things are derived from the same principles, namely, contraries; and this is the opinion of the ancient natural philosophers. Others, the theological poets, held that all things come from non-being. Hence he said above (1065: C 2515) that they generate the world from non-being. And so although both groups assign the origin of all things, they cannot explain why things are distinguished into destructible and indestructible. Hence others, in order not to be driven to this, i.e., to posit that all things come from non-being or to account for the difference between things, held that all things are one, thereby entirely doing away with the distinction between things. This is the view of Parmenides and Melissus.
||2652. Further, no one (1114).
|Secundo ibi, amplius propter ostendit quod etiam in alio deficiunt, quia scilicet non possunt assignare causam, quare generatio sit sempiterna, nec possunt assignare quae sit universalis causa generationis; neutrum enim contrariorum est universalis generationis causa.
||Second, he shows that they were also wrong in another respect, namely, in being unable to explain why generation is eternal or to state what the universal cause of generation is; for neither of the contraries is a universal cause of generation.
||2653. And those who (1115).
|Tertio ibi, et duo principia tertium ponit, in quo deficiunt ponentes principia esse contraria. Necesse est enim eis assignare quod alterum contrariorum sit principalius principium, cum semper alterum sit ut privatio. Vel intendit, quod necesse est ponere aliquod principium principalius utroque contrariorum, ex quo ratio assignari possit quare quaedam attribuuntur uni contrariorum sicut principio, et quaedam alteri, utpote quare quodam tempore moveat lis elementa ad separationem, et quodam tempore amicitia ad congregationem.
||Third, he states how those men were wrong who claimed that the principles of things are contraries; for they must maintain that one of two contraries is a superior principle, since one contrary has the character of a privation. Or he means that it is necessary to posit some principle, which is more important than both contraries, by which it is possible to explain why certain things are attributed to one of the contraries as their principle and why certain others are attributed to the other contrary; for example, why at one time strife will cause the elements to separate and why at another time friendship will cause them to combine.
|Et hoc etiam accidit ponentibus esse species. Necesse enim est eis ponere aliquod principium principalius speciebus. Manifestum est enim, quod ea quae generantur et corrumpuntur, non semper eodem modo participant speciem. Unde oportet ponere aliquod principium, ex quo assignetur ratio, quare hoc individuum prius participavit, aut modo participat speciem.
||2654. This difficulty also faces those who posit separate Forms; for they must assign some principle which is superior to the Forms, since it is evident that things which are generated and destroyed do not always participate in a form in the same way. Hence it is necessary to posit some principle by which it is possible to explain why this individual formerly participated or now participates in a form.
||2655. And for other thinkers (1116).
|Deinde cum dicit et aliis ponit quartum inconveniens, quod eis sequitur; dicens, quod necesse est philosophis ponentibus principia esse contraria, quod sapientiae primae et honoratissimae scientiae, sit aliquid contrarium, quia sapientia est de primo principio, ut in primo ostensum est. Unde si primo principio non est aliquid contrarium, quia omnia contraria habent naturam quae est in potentia ad utrumque contrariorum, primum autem principium, secundum nos, est immateriale, ut ex dictis patet: unde relinquitur quod primo principio non sit contrarium aliquid, et quod primae scientiae non sit contraria aliqua scientia, sed solum ignorantia.
||Here he gives a fourth incongruity which faces these thinkers. He says that the philosophers who claim that the principles of things are contraries must admit that there is something contrary to the primary kind of wisdom or noblest science, because wisdom is concerned with the first principle, as has been shown in Book I (13:C 35). Therefore, if there is nothing contrary to the first principle (for all pairs of contraries have a nature which is in potentiality to each pair), and according to us the first principle is immaterial, as is clear from what has been said (1058:C 2495), then it follows that there is nothing contrary to the first principle, and that there is no science which is contrary to the primary science, but merely ignorance.
||2656. Further, if nothing (1117).
|Deinde cum dicit amplius si descendit ad opinionem ponentium substantias separatas. Et primo ostendit quod inconveniens sequitur non ponentibus eas: et dicit, quod si non sint alia entia praeter sensibilia, non erit primum principium, sicut ostensum est, nec ordo rerum qualis assignatus est, nec generatio perpetua, nec principia qualia supra posuimus; sed semper erit principii principium in infinitum, utpote quod Socrates generetur a Platone et ille ab illo, et sic in infinitum, ut visum est omnibus antiquis philosophis naturalibus. Non enim ponebant aliquod principium universale primum, praeter ista principia particularia et sensibilia.
||Next, he turns to the opinion of those who posited separate substances. First, he points out that an incongruity faces those who fail to posit such substances. He says that, if nothing exists except sensible things, there will be no first principle, as has been noted (1055:C 2489), no order of things such as has been described, no eternal generation, and no principles of the kind which we have posited above (1060:C 2503); but every principle will always have a principle, and so on to infinity. Thus Socrates will be begotten by Plato and the latter by someone else and so on to infinity, as was seen to be the view of all of the ancient philosophers of nature. For they did not posit a first universal principle over and above these particular and sensible principles.
||2657. Now if there (1118).
|Si autem ostendit quod inconveniens sequitur ponentibus naturas quasdam separatas. Et primo quantum ad eos qui ponebant in huiusmodi naturis connexionem quamdam originis. Secundo quantum ad eos qui hoc non ponebant, ibi, dicentes autem numerum.
||Then he shows that an unreasonable consequence faces those who posit certain separate natures. He does this, first, with regard to those who posited a certain connection in origin among natures of this kind; and second (1122:C 2661), with regard to those who did not hold this position (“And those who say”).
|Circa primum ducit ad quatuor inconvenientia: quorum primum est, quod species et numeri, quae ponebant quidam praeter sensibilia, nullius causae videntur esse. Sed si sint alicuius causae, non videbitur aliquid esse causa motus, quia huiusmodi non videntur habere rationem principiorum moventium.
||Concerning the first he draws out four untenable consequences. The first (1118) of these is that the separate Forms and numbers, which some posited over and above sensible things, seem not to be causes of anything. But if they are causes of something, it seems that nothing will be a cause of motion, because things of this kind do not seem to have the character of a moving cause.
||2658. Again, how will (1119).
|Secundo ibi, adhuc quomodo ducit ad aliud inconveniens. Numerus enim non est magnitudo. Magnitudo autem non est nisi ex magnitudinibus, unde impossibile videtur assignare quomodo magnitudo et continuum sunt ex numeris qui non sunt continui. Non enim potest dici quod numerus causet continuum sicut principium motivum et formale.
||Second, he brings forward another incongruity. For number is not continuous quantity, but continuous quantity is constituted only of continuous quantities. Hence it seems impossible to explain how continuous quantity or extension comes from numbers, which are not continuous. For it cannot be said that number is the cause of continuous quantity either as a moving cause or as a formal cause.
||2659. Further, no one (1120).
|Tertium ponit ibi, at vero. Dicens quod si species et numeri sunt prima principia, cum in speciebus et numeris non inveniatur contrarietas, sequitur quod non erunt contraria principia prima, quia non ponuntur factiva et motiva. Et sic continget non esse generationem et motum. Quia, si prima principia non sunt moventia, sed posterius causentur ex primis principiis, sequetur quod sunt in potentia priorum principiorum. Quod autem potest esse, potest et non esse. Unde sequitur quod generatio et motus non sunt sempiterna. Sed sunt sempiterna, ut supra positum est. Interimendum est igitur aliud praemissorum, scilicet quod ponebantur prima principia non esse moventia. Et hoc dictum est, scilicet in primo libro, quomodo prima principia sunt moventia.
||Then he gives the third untenable consequence. He says that, if the separate Forms and numbers are first principles, it follows, since contrariety is not found in forms and numbers, that first principles will not be contraries, because they are not held to be productive principles or movers. Hence it will follow that there is no generation or motion; for if the first principles are not efficient causes of motion but are subsequently caused from first principles, it will follow that they are contained in the potency of prior principles; and what can be can also not be. The conclusion, then, is that generation and motion are not eternal. But they are eternal, as has been proved above (1055:C 2490-91). Therefore one of the premises must be rejected, namely, the one holding that first principles are not movers. The way in which the first principles are movers has been stated in Book I (25-26:C 50-51).
||2660. Again, as to the way (1121).
|Quartum ponit ibi, adhuc quomodo dicens quod nullus istorum dicere potest, quid faciat unum esse numerum, aut animam et corpus, aut universaliter formam et id cuius est forma, nisi dicat, quod movens hoc facit, sicut nos supra diximus in octavo. Species autem et numeri non habent rationem causae moventis.
||He gives the fourth incongruity. He says that none of these philosophers can state what it is that makes number, or soul and body, or in general form and the thing to which form belongs, a unity, unless he says that a mover does this, as we explained above in Book VIII (736:C 1759). Forms and numbers, however, do not have the character of a mover.
||2661. And those who say (1122).
|Deinde cum dicit dicentes autem ostendit quod inconveniens sequatur secundum illos, qui ponunt huiusmodi naturas esse inconnexas; dicens, quod ponentes primum in rebus esse numerum mathematicum, ut Pythagorici posuerunt, et sic consequenter semper aliam naturam habitam, idest consequentem, videlicet quod post numerum, magnitudinem, et post magnitudinem, sensibilia, et dicentes cuiuslibet naturae esse alia et alia principia, sicut quod alia sunt principia numerorum, et alia magnitudinum et alia sensibilium, isti inquam sic dicentes, faciunt substantiam universi esse inconnexam, idest sine ordine, ita quod una pars nihil conferat ad aliam vel ad alteram, sive sit sive non sit. Et similiter faciunt multa principia inconnexa.
||Here he indicates the unreasonable consequence facing those who claim that natures of this kind are unrelated things. He says that those who claim that mathematical number is the primary reality, as the Pythagoreans did, and “that there is always one substance after another” in this way, i.e., consecutively (so that after number comes continuous quantity, and after continuous quantity come sensible things), and who say that there is a different principle for each nature, so that there are certain principles for numbers, others for continuous quantity, and others for sensible things—those who speak in this way, I say, make the substances of the universe a group of substances unrelated to each other, i.e., without order, inasmuch as one part confers nothing on any other part whether it exists or does not. And they likewise make their many principles to be unrelated.
|Et hoc non potest esse, quia entia non volunt male disponi. Dispositio enim entium naturalium est qualis optima potest esse. Et hoc videmus in singulis, quod unumquodque est optimae dispositionis in sua natura. Unde multo magis oportet hoc existimare in toto universo.
||2662. Now this cannot be the case, because beings do not want to be badly disposed; for the disposition of natural things is the best possible. We observe this in the case of particular things, because each is best disposed in its own nature. Hence we must understand this to be the case to a much greater degree in the whole universe.
|Sed pluralitas principatuum non est bonum. Sicut non esset bonum quod essent diversae familiae in una domo, quae invicem non communicarent. Unde relinquitur quod totum universum est sicut unus principatus et unum regnum. Et ita oportet quod ordinetur ab uno gubernatore. Et hoc est quod concludit, quod est unus princeps totius universi, scilicet primum movens, et primum intelligibile, et primum bonum, quod supra dixit Deum, qui est benedictus in saecula saeculorum. Amen.
||2663. But many rulers are not good. For example, it would not be good for different families which shared nothing in common to live in a single home. Hence it follows that the whole universe is like one principality and one kingdom, and must therefore be governed by one ruler. Aristotle’s conclusion is that there is one ruler of the whole universe, the first mover, and one first intelligible object, and one first good, whom above he called God (1074:C 2544), who is blessed for ever and ever. Amen.