St. Thomas Aquinas

The Summa Theologica

(Benziger Bros. edition, 1947)
Translated by
Fathers of the English Dominican Province


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Quoniam autem scientia verorum est, post considerationem scientiae Dei, de veritate inquirendum est. Circa quam quaeruntur octo.    Since knowledge is of things that are true, after the consideration of the knowledge of God, we must inquire concerning truth. About this there are eight points of inquiry:
Primo, utrum veritas sit in re, vel tantum in intellectu.     (1) Whether truth resides in the thing, or only in the intellect?
Secundo, utrum sit tantum in intellectu componente et dividente.     (2) Whether it resides only in the intellect composing and dividing?
Tertio, de comparatione veri ad ens.     (3) On the comparison of the true to being.
Quarto, de comparatione veri ad bonum.     (4) On the comparison of the true to the good.
Quinto, utrum Deus sit veritas.     (5) Whether God is truth?
Sexto, utrum omnia sint vera veritate una, vel pluribus.     (6) Whether all things are true by one truth, or by many?
Septimo, de aeternitate veritatis.     (7) On the eternity of truth.
Octavo, de incommutabilitate ipsius.     (8) On the unchangeableness of truth.


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Question: 16  [<< | >>]
Article: 1  [<< | >>]

Whether truth resides only in the intellect?

Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod veritas non sit tantum in intellectu, sed magis in rebus. Augustinus enim, in libro Soliloq., reprobat hanc notificationem veri, verum est id quod videtur, quia secundum hoc, lapides qui sunt in abditissimo terrae sinu, non essent veri lapides, quia non videntur. Reprobat etiam istam, verum est quod ita se habet ut videtur cognitori, si velit et possit cognoscere, quia secundum hoc sequeretur quod nihil esset verum, si nullus posset cognoscere. Et definit sic verum, verum est id quod est. Et sic videtur quod veritas sit in rebus, et non in intellectu.   Objection 1: It seems that truth does not reside only in the intellect, but rather in things. For Augustine (Soliloq. ii, 5) condemns this definition of truth, "That is true which is seen"; since it would follow that stones hidden in the bosom of the earth would not be true stones, as they are not seen. He also condemns the following, "That is true which is as it appears to the knower, who is willing and able to know," for hence it would follow that nothing would be true, unless someone could know it. Therefore he defines truth thus: "That is true which is." It seems, then, that truth resides in things, and not in the intellect.
Praeterea, quidquid est verum, veritate verum est. Si igitur veritas est in intellectu solo, nihil erit verum nisi secundum quod intelligitur, quod est error antiquorum philosophorum, qui dicebant omne quod videtur, esse verum. Ad quod sequitur contradictoria simul esse vera, cum contradictoria simul a diversis vera esse videantur.   Objection 2: Further, whatever is true, is true by reason of truth. If, then, truth is only in the intellect, nothing will be true except in so far as it is understood. But this is the error of the ancient philosophers, who said that whatever seems to be true is so. Consequently mutual contradictories seem to be true as seen by different persons at the same time.
Praeterea, propter quod unumquodque, et illud magis, ut patet I Poster. Sed ex eo quod res est vel non est, est opinio vel oratio vera vel falsa, secundum philosophum in praedicamentis. Ergo veritas magis est in rebus quam in intellectu.   Objection 3: Further, "that, on account of which a thing is so, is itself more so," as is evident from the Philosopher (Poster. i). But it is from the fact that a thing is or is not, that our thought or word is true or false, as the Philosopher teaches (Praedicam. iii). Therefore truth resides rather in things than in the intellect.
Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, VI Metaphys., quod verum et falsum non sunt in rebus, sed in intellectu.   On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Metaph. vi), " The true and the false reside not in things, but in the intellect."
Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut bonum nominat id in quod tendit appetitus, ita verum nominat id in quod tendit intellectus. Hoc autem distat inter appetitum et intellectum, sive quamcumque cognitionem, quia cognitio est secundum quod cognitum est in cognoscente, appetitus autem est secundum quod appetens inclinatur in ipsam rem appetitam. Et sic terminus appetitus, quod est bonum, est in re appetibili, sed terminus cognitionis, quod est verum, est in ipso intellectu. Sicut autem bonum est in re, inquantum habet ordinem ad appetitum; et propter hoc ratio bonitatis derivatur a re appetibili in appetitum, secundum quod appetitus dicitur bonus, prout est boni, ita, cum verum sit in intellectu secundum quod conformatur rei intellectae, necesse est quod ratio veri ab intellectu ad rem intellectam derivetur, ut res etiam intellecta vera dicatur, secundum quod habet aliquem ordinem ad intellectum. Res autem intellecta ad intellectum aliquem potest habere ordinem vel per se, vel per accidens. Per se quidem habet ordinem ad intellectum a quo dependet secundum suum esse, per accidens autem ad intellectum a quo cognoscibilis est. Sicut si dicamus quod domus comparatur ad intellectum artificis per se, per accidens autem comparatur ad intellectum a quo non dependet.   I answer that, As the good denotes that towards which the appetite tends, so the true denotes that towards which the intellect tends. Now there is this difference between the appetite and the intellect, or any knowledge whatsoever, that knowledge is according as the thing known is in the knower, whilst appetite is according as the desirer tends towards the thing desired. Thus the term of the appetite, namely good, is in the object desirable, and the term of the intellect, namely true, is in the intellect itself. Now as good exists in a thing so far as that thing is related to the appetite—and hence the aspect of goodness passes on from the desirable thing to the appetite, in so far as the appetite is called good if its object is good; so, since the true is in the intellect in so far as it is conformed to the object understood, the aspect of the true must needs pass from the intellect to the object understood, so that also the thing understood is said to be true in so far as it has some relation to the intellect. Now a thing understood may be in relation to an intellect either essentially or accidentally. It is related essentially to an intellect on which it depends as regards its essence; but accidentally to an intellect by which it is knowable; even as we may say that a house is related essentially to the intellect of the architect, but accidentally to the intellect upon which it does not depend.
Iudicium autem de re non sumitur secundum id quod inest ei per accidens, sed secundum id quod inest ei per se. Unde unaquaeque res dicitur vera absolute, secundum ordinem ad intellectum a quo dependet. Et inde est quod res artificiales dicuntur verae per ordinem ad intellectum nostrum, dicitur enim domus vera, quae assequitur similitudinem formae quae est in mente artificis; et dicitur oratio vera, inquantum est signum intellectus veri. Et similiter res naturales dicuntur esse verae, secundum quod assequuntur similitudinem specierum quae sunt in mente divina, dicitur enim verus lapis, qui assequitur propriam lapidis naturam, secundum praeconceptionem intellectus divini. Sic ergo veritas principaliter est in intellectu; secundario vero in rebus, secundum quod comparantur ad intellectum ut ad principium. Et secundum hoc, veritas diversimode notificatur. Nam Augustinus, in libro de vera Relig., dicit quod veritas est, qua ostenditur id quod est. Et Hilarius dicit quod verum est declarativum aut manifestativum esse. Et hoc pertinet ad veritatem secundum quod est in intellectu. Ad veritatem autem rei secundum ordinem ad intellectum, pertinet definitio Augustini in libro de vera Relig., veritas est summa similitudo principii, quae sine ulla dissimilitudine est. Et quaedam definitio Anselmi, veritas est rectitudo sola mente perceptibilis; nam rectum est, quod principio concordat. Et quaedam definitio Avicennae, veritas uniuscuiusque rei est proprietas sui esse quod stabilitum est ei. Quod autem dicitur quod veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus potest ad utrumque pertinere.    Now we do not judge of a thing by what is in it accidentally, but by what is in it essentially. Hence, everything is said to be true absolutely, in so far as it is related to the intellect from which it depends; and thus it is that artificial things are said to be true a being related to our intellect. For a house is said to be true that expresses the likeness of the form in the architect's mind; and words are said to be true so far as they are the signs of truth in the intellect. In the same way natural things are said to be true in so far as they express the likeness of the species that are in the divine mind. For a stone is called true, which possesses the nature proper to a stone, according to the preconception in the divine intellect. Thus, then, truth resides primarily in the intellect, and secondarily in things according as they are related to the intellect as their principle. Consequently there are various definitions of truth. Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxxvi), "Truth is that whereby is made manifest that which is;" and Hilary says (De Trin. v) that "Truth makes being clear and evident" and this pertains to truth according as it is in the intellect. As to the truth of things in so far as they are related to the intellect, we have Augustine's definition (De Vera Relig. xxxvi), "Truth is a supreme likeness without any unlikeness to a principle": also Anselm's definition (De Verit. xii), "Truth is rightness, perceptible by the mind alone"; for that is right which is in accordance with the principle; also Avicenna's definition (Metaph. viii, 6), "The truth of each thing is a property of the essence which is immutably attached to it." The definition that "Truth is the equation of thought and thing" is applicable to it under either aspect.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur de veritate rei; et excludit a ratione huius veritatis, comparationem ad intellectum nostrum. Nam id quod est per accidens, ab unaquaque definitione excluditur.   Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is speaking about the truth of things, and excludes from the notion of this truth, relation to our intellect; for what is accidental is excluded from every definition.
Ad secundum dicendum quod antiqui philosophi species rerum naturalium non dicebant procedere ab aliquo intellectu, sed eas provenire a casu, et quia considerabant quod verum importat comparationem ad intellectum, cogebantur veritatem rerum constituere in ordine ad intellectum nostrum. Ex quo inconvenientia sequebantur quae philosophus prosequitur in IV Metaphys. Quae quidem inconvenientia non accidunt, si ponamus veritatem rerum consistere in comparatione ad intellectum divinum.   Reply to Objection 2: The ancient philosophers held that the species of natural things did not proceed from any intellect, but were produced by chance. But as they saw that truth implies relation to intellect, they were compelled to base the truth of things on their relation to our intellect. From this, conclusions result that are inadmissible, and which the Philosopher refutes (Metaph. iv). Such, however, do not follow, if we say that the truth of things consists in their relation to the divine intellect.
Ad tertium dicendum quod, licet veritas intellectus nostri a re causetur, non tamen oportet quod in re per prius inveniatur ratio veritatis, sicut neque in medicina per prius invenitur ratio sanitatis quam in animali; virtus enim medicinae, non sanitas eius, causat sanitatem, cum non sit agens univocum. Et similiter esse rei, non veritas eius, causat veritatem intellectus. Unde philosophus dicit quod opinio et oratio vera est ex eo quod res est, non ex eo quod res vera est.   Reply to Objection 3: Although the truth of our intellect is caused by the thing, yet it is not necessary that truth should be there primarily, any more than that health should be primarily in medicine, rather than in the animal: for the virtue of medicine, and not its health, is the cause of health, for here the agent is not univocal. In the same way, the being of the thing, not its truth, is the cause of truth in the intellect. Hence the Philosopher says that a thought or a word is true "from the fact that a thing is, not because a thing is true."


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Question: 16  [<< | >>]
Article: 2  [<< | >>]

Whether truth resides only in the intellect composing and dividing?

Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod veritas non sit solum in intellectu componente et dividente. Dicit enim philosophus, in III de anima, quod sicut sensus propriorum sensibilium semper veri sunt, ita et intellectus eius quod quid est. Sed compositio et divisio non est neque in sensu, neque in intellectu cognoscente quod quid est. Ergo veritas non solum est in compositione et divisione intellectus.   Objection 1: It seems that truth does not reside only in the intellect composing and dividing. For the Philosopher says (De Anima iii) that as the senses are always true as regards their proper sensible objects, so is the intellect as regards "what a thing is." Now composition and division are neither in the senses nor in the intellect knowing "what a thing is." Therefore truth does not reside only in the intellect composing and dividing.
Praeterea, Isaac dicit, in libro de definitionibus, quod veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus. Sed sicut intellectus complexorum potest adaequari rebus, ita intellectus incomplexorum, et etiam sensus sentiens rem ut est. Ergo veritas non est solum in compositione et divisione intellectus.   Objection 2: Further, Isaac says in his book On Definitions that truth is the equation of thought and thing. Now just as the intellect with regard to complex things can be equated to things, so also with regard to simple things; and this is true also of sense apprehending a thing as it is. Therefore truth does not reside only in the intellect composing and dividing.
Sed contra est quod dicit philosophus, in VI Metaphys., quod circa simplicia et quod quid est non est veritas, nec in intellectu neque in rebus.   On the contrary, the Philosopher says (Metaph. vi) that with regard to simple things and "what a thing is," truth is "found neither in the intellect nor in things."
Respondeo dicendum quod verum, sicut dictum est, secundum sui primam rationem est in intellectu. Cum autem omnis res sit vera secundum quod habet propriam formam naturae suae, necesse est quod intellectus, inquantum est cognoscens, sit verus inquantum habet similitudinem rei cognitae, quae est forma eius inquantum est cognoscens. Et propter hoc per conformitatem intellectus et rei veritas definitur. Unde conformitatem istam cognoscere, est cognoscere veritatem. Hanc autem nullo modo sensus cognoscit, licet enim visus habeat similitudinem visibilis, non tamen cognoscit comparationem quae est inter rem visam et id quod ipse apprehendit de ea. Intellectus autem conformitatem sui ad rem intelligibilem cognoscere potest, sed tamen non apprehendit eam secundum quod cognoscit de aliquo quod quid est; sed quando iudicat rem ita se habere sicut est forma quam de re apprehendit, tunc primo cognoscit et dicit verum. Et hoc facit componendo et dividendo, nam in omni propositione aliquam formam significatam per praedicatum, vel applicat alicui rei significatae per subiectum, vel removet ab ea. Et ideo bene invenitur quod sensus est verus de aliqua re, vel intellectus cognoscendo quod quid est, sed non quod cognoscat aut dicat verum. Et similiter est de vocibus complexis aut incomplexis. Veritas quidem igitur potest esse in sensu, vel in intellectu cognoscente quod quid est, ut in quadam re vera, non autem ut cognitum in cognoscente, quod importat nomen veri; perfectio enim intellectus est verum ut cognitum. Et ideo, proprie loquendo, veritas est in intellectu componente et dividente, non autem in sensu, neque in intellectu cognoscente quod quid est.   I answer that, As stated before, truth resides, in its primary aspect, in the intellect. Now since everything is true according as it has the form proper to its nature, the intellect, in so far as it is knowing, must be true, so far as it has the likeness of the thing known, this being its form, as knowing. For this reason truth is defined by the conformity of intellect and thing; and hence to know this conformity is to know truth. But in no way can sense know this. For although sight has the likeness of a visible thing, yet it does not know the comparison which exists between the thing seen and that which itself apprehends concerning it. But the intellect can know its own conformity with the intelligible thing; yet it does not apprehend it by knowing of a thing "what a thing is." When, however, it judges that a thing corresponds to the form which it apprehends about that thing, then first it knows and expresses truth. This it does by composing and dividing: for in every proposition it either applies to, or removes from the thing signified by the subject, some form signified by the predicate: and this clearly shows that the sense is true of any thing, as is also the intellect, when it knows "what a thing is"; but it does not thereby know or affirm truth. This is in like manner the case with complex or non-complex words. Truth therefore may be in the senses, or in the intellect knowing "what a thing is," as in anything that is true; yet not as the thing known in the knower, which is implied by the word "truth"; for the perfection of the intellect is truth as known. Therefore, properly speaking, truth resides in the intellect composing and dividing; and not in the senses; nor in the intellect knowing "what a thing is."
Et per hoc patet solutio ad obiecta.    And thus the Objections given are solved.


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Question: 16  [<< | >>]
Article: 3  [<< | >>]

Whether the true and being are convertible terms?

Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod verum et ens non convertantur. Verum enim est proprie in intellectu, ut dictum est. Ens autem proprie est in rebus. Ergo non convertuntur.   Objection 1: It seems that the true and being are not convertible terms. For the true resides properly in the intellect, as stated (Article [1]); but being is properly in things. Therefore they are not convertible.
Praeterea, id quod se extendit ad ens et non ens, non convertitur cum ente. Sed verum se extendit ad ens et non ens, nam verum est quod est esse, et quod non est non esse. Ergo verum et ens non convertuntur.   Objection 2: Further, that which extends to being and not-being is not convertible with being. But the true extends to being and not-being; for it is true that what is, is; and that what is not, is not. Therefore the true and being are not convertible.
Praeterea, quae se habent secundum prius et posterius, non videntur converti. Sed verum videtur prius esse quam ens, nam ens non intelligitur nisi sub ratione veri. Ergo videtur quod non sint convertibilia.   Objection 3: Further, things which stand to each other in order of priority and posteriority seem not to be convertible. But the true appears to be prior to being; for being is not understood except under the aspect of the true. Therefore it seems they are not convertible.
Sed contra est quod dicit philosophus, II Metaphys., quod eadem est dispositio rerum in esse et veritate.   On the contrary, the Philosopher says (Metaph. ii) that there is the same disposition of things in being and in truth.
Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut bonum habet rationem appetibilis, ita verum habet ordinem ad cognitionem. Unumquodque autem inquantum habet de esse, intantum est cognoscibile. Et propter hoc dicitur in III de anima, quod anima est quodammodo omnia secundum sensum et intellectum. Et ideo, sicut bonum convertitur cum ente, ita et verum. Sed tamen, sicut bonum addit rationem appetibilis supra ens, ita et verum comparationem ad intellectum.   I answer that, As good has the nature of what is desirable, so truth is related to knowledge. Now everything, in as far as it has being, so far is it knowable. Wherefore it is said in De Anima iii that "the soul is in some manner all things," through the senses and the intellect. And therefore, as good is convertible with being, so is the true. But as good adds to being the notion of desirable, so the true adds relation to the intellect.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod verum est in rebus et in intellectu, ut dictum est. Verum autem quod est in rebus, convertitur cum ente secundum substantiam. Sed verum quod est in intellectu, convertitur cum ente, ut manifestativum cum manifestato. Hoc enim est de ratione veri, ut dictum est. Quamvis posset dici quod etiam ens est in rebus et in intellectu, sicut et verum; licet verum principaliter in intellectu, ens vero principaliter in rebus. Et hoc accidit propter hoc, quod verum et ens differunt ratione.   Reply to Objection 1: The true resides in things and in the intellect, as said before (Article [1]). But the true that is in things is convertible with being as to substance; while the true that is in the intellect is convertible with being, as the manifestation with the manifested; for this belongs to the nature of truth, as has been said already (Article [1]). It may, however, be said that being also is in the things and in the intellect, as is the true; although truth is primarily in things; and this is so because truth and being differ in idea.
Ad secundum dicendum quod non ens non habet in se unde cognoscatur, sed cognoscitur inquantum intellectus facit illud cognoscibile. Unde verum fundatur in ente, inquantum non ens est quoddam ens rationis, apprehensum scilicet a ratione.   Reply to Objection 2: Not-being has nothing in itself whereby it can be known; yet it is known in so far as the intellect renders it knowable. Hence the true is based on being, inasmuch as not-being is a kind of logical being, apprehended, that is, by reason.
Ad tertium dicendum quod, cum dicitur quod ens non potest apprehendi sine ratione veri, hoc potest dupliciter intelligi. Uno modo, ita quod non apprehendatur ens, nisi ratio veri assequatur apprehensionem entis. Et sic locutio habet veritatem. Alio modo posset sic intelligi, quod ens non posset apprehendi, nisi apprehenderetur ratio veri. Et hoc falsum est. Sed verum non potest apprehendi, nisi apprehendatur ratio entis, quia ens cadit in ratione veri. Et est simile sicut si comparemus intelligibile ad ens. Non enim potest intelligi ens, quin ens sit intelligibile, sed tamen potest intelligi ens, ita quod non intelligatur eius intelligibilitas. Et similiter ens intellectum est verum, non tamen intelligendo ens, intelligitur verum.   Reply to Objection 3: When it is said that being cannot be apprehended except under the notion of the true, this can be understood in two ways. In the one way so as to mean that being is not apprehended, unless the idea of the true follows apprehension of being; and this is true. In the other way, so as to mean that being cannot be apprehended unless the idea of the true be apprehended also; and this is false. But the true cannot be apprehended unless the idea of being be apprehended also; since being is included in the idea of the true. The case is the same if we compare the intelligible object with being. For being cannot be understood, unless being is intelligible. Yet being can be understood while its intelligibility is not understood. Similarly, being when understood is true, yet the true is not understood by understanding being.


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First Part  [<< | >>]
Question: 16  [<< | >>]
Article: 4  [<< | >>]

Whether good is logically prior to the true?

Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod bonum secundum rationem sit prius quam verum. Quod enim est universalius, secundum rationem prius est, ut patet ex I Physic. Sed bonum est universalius quam verum, nam verum est quoddam bonum, scilicet intellectus. Ergo bonum prius est secundum rationem quam verum.   Objection 1: It seems that good is logically prior to the true. For what is more universal is logically prior, as is evident from Phys. i. But the good is more universal than the true, since the true is a kind of good, namely, of the intellect. Therefore the good is logically prior to the true.
Praeterea, bonum est in rebus, verum autem in compositione et divisione intellectus, ut dictum est. Sed ea quae sunt in re, sunt priora his quae sunt in intellectu. Ergo prius est secundum rationem bonum quam verum.   Objection 2: Further, good is in things, but the true in the intellect composing and dividing as said above (Article [2]). But that which is in things is prior to that which is in the intellect. Therefore good is logically prior to the true.
Praeterea, veritas est quaedam species virtutis, ut patet in IV Ethic. Sed virtus continetur sub bono, est enim bona qualitas mentis, ut dicit Augustinus. Ergo bonum est prius quam verum.   Objection 3: Further, truth is a species of virtue, as is clear from Ethic. iv. But virtue is included under good; since, as Augustine says (De Lib. Arbit. ii, 19), it is a good quality of the mind. Therefore the good is prior to the true.
Sed contra, quod est in pluribus, est prius secundum rationem. Sed verum est in quibusdam in quibus non est bonum, scilicet in mathematicis. Ergo verum est prius quam bonum.   On the contrary, What is in more things is prior logically. But the true is in some things wherein good is not, as, for instance, in mathematics. Therefore the true is prior to good.
Respondeo dicendum quod, licet bonum et verum supposito convertantur cum ente, tamen ratione differunt. Et secundum hoc verum, absolute loquendo, prius est quam bonum. Quod ex duobus apparet. Primo quidem ex hoc, quod verum propinquius se habet ad ens, quod est prius, quam bonum. Nam verum respicit ipsum esse simpliciter et immediate, ratio autem boni consequitur esse, secundum quod est aliquo modo perfectum; sic enim appetibile est. Secundo apparet ex hoc, quod cognitio naturaliter praecedit appetitum. Unde, cum verum respiciat cognitionem, bonum autem appetitum, prius erit verum quam bonum secundum rationem.   I answer that, Although the good and the true are convertible with being, as to suppositum, yet they differ logically. And in this manner the true, speaking absolutely, is prior to good, as appears from two reasons. First, because the true is more closely related to being than is good. For the true regards being itself simply and immediately; while the nature of good follows being in so far as being is in some way perfect; for thus it is desirable. Secondly, it is evident from the fact that knowledge naturally precedes appetite. Hence, since the true regards knowledge, but the good regards the appetite, the true must be prior in idea to the good.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod voluntas et intellectus mutuo se includunt, nam intellectus intelligit voluntatem, et voluntas vult intellectum intelligere. Sic ergo inter illa quae ordinantur ad obiectum voluntatis, continentur etiam ea quae sunt intellectus; et e converso. Unde in ordine appetibilium, bonum se habet ut universale, et verum ut particulare, in ordine autem intelligibilium est e converso. Ex hoc ergo quod verum est quoddam bonum, sequitur quod bonum sit prius in ordine appetibilium, non autem quod sit prius simpliciter.   Reply to Objection 1: The will and the intellect mutually include one another: for the intellect understands the will, and the will wills the intellect to understand. So then, among things directed to the object of the will, are comprised also those that belong to the intellect; and conversely. Whence in the order of things desirable, good stands as the universal, and the true as the particular; whereas in the order of intelligible things the converse of the case. From the fact, then, that the true is a kind of good, it follows that the good is prior in the order of things desirable; but not that it is prior absolutely.
Ad secundum dicendum quod secundum hoc est aliquid prius ratione, quod prius cadit in intellectu. Intellectus autem per prius apprehendit ipsum ens; et secundario apprehendit se intelligere ens; et tertio apprehendit se appetere ens. Unde primo est ratio entis, secundo ratio veri, tertio ratio boni, licet bonum sit in rebus.   Reply to Objection 2: A thing is prior logically in so far as it is prior to the intellect. Now the intellect apprehends primarily being itself; secondly, it apprehends that it understands being; and thirdly, it apprehends that it desires being. Hence the idea of being is first, that of truth second, and the idea of good third, though good is in things.
Ad tertium dicendum quod virtus quae dicitur veritas, non est veritas communis, sed quaedam veritas secundum quam homo in dictis et factis ostendit se ut est. Veritas autem vitae dicitur particulariter, secundum quod homo in vita sua implet illud ad quod ordinatur per intellectum divinum, sicut etiam dictum est veritatem esse in ceteris rebus. Veritas autem iustitiae est secundum quod homo servat id quod debet alteri secundum ordinem legum. Unde ex his particularibus veritatibus non est procedendum ad veritatem communem.   Reply to Objection 3: The virtue which is called "truth" is not truth in general, but a certain kind of truth according to which man shows himself in deed and word as he really is. But truth as applied to "life" is used in a particular sense, inasmuch as a man fulfills in his life that to which he is ordained by the divine intellect, as it has been said that truth exists in other things (Article [1]). Whereas the truth of "justice" is found in man as he fulfills his duty to his neighbor, as ordained by law. Hence we cannot argue from these particular truths to truth in general.


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Whether God is truth?

Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit veritas. Veritas enim consistit in compositione et divisione intellectus. Sed in Deo non est compositio et divisio. Ergo non est ibi veritas.   Objection 1: It seems that God is not truth. For truth consists in the intellect composing and dividing. But in God there is not composition and division. Therefore in Him there is not truth.
Praeterea, veritas, secundum Augustinum, in libro de vera Relig., est similitudo principii. Sed Dei non est similitudo ad principium. Ergo in Deo non est veritas.   Objection 2: Further, truth, according to Augustine (De Vera Relig. xxxvi) is a "likeness to the principle." But in God there is no likeness to a principle. Therefore in God there is not truth.
Praeterea, quidquid dicitur de Deo, dicitur de eo ut de prima causa omnium, sicut esse Dei est causa omnis esse, et bonitas eius est causa omnis boni. Si ergo in Deo sit veritas, ergo omne verum erit ab ipso. Sed aliquem peccare est verum. Ergo hoc erit a Deo. Quod patet esse falsum.   Objection 3: Further, whatever is said of God, is said of Him as of the first cause of all things; thus the being of God is the cause of all being; and His goodness the cause of all good. If therefore there is truth in God, all truth will be from Him. But it is true that someone sins. Therefore this will be from God; which is evidently false.
Sed contra est quod dicit dominus, Ioan. XIV, ego sum via, veritas et vita.   On the contrary, Our Lord says, "I am the Way, the Truth, and the Life" (Jn. 14:6).
Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, veritas invenitur in intellectu secundum quod apprehendit rem ut est, et in re secundum quod habet esse conformabile intellectui. Hoc autem maxime invenitur in Deo. Nam esse suum non solum est conforme suo intellectui, sed etiam est ipsum suum intelligere; et suum intelligere est mensura et causa omnis alterius esse, et omnis alterius intellectus; et ipse est suum esse et intelligere. Unde sequitur quod non solum in ipso sit veritas, sed quod ipse sit ipsa summa et prima veritas.   I answer that, As said above (Article [1]), truth is found in the intellect according as it apprehends a thing as it is; and in things according as they have being conformable to an intellect. This is to the greatest degree found in God. For His being is not only conformed to His intellect, but it is the very act of His intellect; and His act of understanding is the measure and cause of every other being and of every other intellect, and He Himself is His own existence and act of understanding. Whence it follows not only that truth is in Him, but that He is truth itself, and the sovereign and first truth.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, licet in intellectu divino non sit compositio et divisio, tamen secundum suam simplicem intelligentiam iudicat de omnibus, et cognoscit omnia complexa. Et sic in intellectu eius est veritas.   Reply to Objection 1: Although in the divine intellect there is neither composition nor division, yet in His simple act of intelligence He judges of all things and knows all things complex; and thus there is truth in His intellect.
Ad secundum dicendum quod verum intellectus nostri est secundum quod conformatur suo principio, scilicet rebus, a quibus cognitionem accipit. Veritas etiam rerum est secundum quod conformantur suo principio, scilicet intellectui divino. Sed hoc, proprie loquendo, non potest dici in veritate divina, nisi forte secundum quod veritas appropriatur filio, qui habet principium. Sed si de veritate essentialiter dicta loquamur, non potest intelligi, nisi resolvatur affirmativa in negativam, sicut cum dicitur, pater est a se, quia non est ab alio. Et similiter dici potest similitudo principii veritas divina, inquantum esse suum non est suo intellectui dissimile.   Reply to Objection 2: The truth of our intellect is according to its conformity with its principle, that is to say, to the things from which it receives knowledge. The truth also of things is according to their conformity with their principle, namely, the divine intellect. Now this cannot be said, properly speaking, of divine truth; unless perhaps in so far as truth is appropriated to the Son, Who has a principle. But if we speak of divine truth in its essence, we cannot understand this unless the affirmative must be resolved into the negative, as when one says: "the Father is of Himself, because He is not from another." Similarly, the divine truth can be called a "likeness to the principle," inasmuch as His existence is not dissimilar to His intellect.
Ad tertium dicendum quod non ens et privationes non habent ex seipsis veritatem, sed solum ex apprehensione intellectus. Omnis autem apprehensio intellectus a Deo est, unde quidquid est veritatis in hoc quod dico, istum fornicari est verum, totum est a Deo. Sed si arguatur, ergo istum fornicari est a Deo, est fallacia accidentis.   Reply to Objection 3: Not-being and privation have no truth of themselves, but only in the apprehension of the intellect. Now all apprehension of the intellect is from God. Hence all the truth that exists in the statement—"that a person commits fornication is true"—is entirely from God. But to argue, "Therefore that this person fornicates is from God", is a fallacy of Accident.


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Whether there is only one truth, according to which all things are true?

Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod una sola sit veritas, secundum quam omnia sunt vera. Quia, secundum Augustinum, nihil est maius mente humana, nisi Deus. Sed veritas est maior mente humana, alioquin mens iudicaret de veritate; nunc autem omnia iudicat secundum veritatem, et non secundum seipsam. Ergo solus Deus est veritas. Ergo non est alia veritas quam Deus.   Objection 1: It seems that there is only one truth, according to which all things are true. For according to Augustine (De Trin. xv, 1), "nothing is greater than the mind of man, except God." Now truth is greater than the mind of man; otherwise the mind would be the judge of truth: whereas in fact it judges all things according to truth, and not according to its own measure. Therefore God alone is truth. Therefore there is no other truth but God.
Praeterea, Anselmus dicit, in libro de veritate, quod sicut tempus se habet ad temporalia, ita veritas ad res veras. Sed unum est tempus omnium temporalium. Ergo una est veritas, qua omnia vera sunt.   Objection 2: Further, Anselm says (De Verit. xiv), that, "as is the relation of time to temporal things, so is that of truth to true things." But there is only one time for all temporal things. Therefore there is only one truth, by which all things are true.
Sed contra est quod in Psalmo XI dicitur, diminutae sunt veritates a filiis hominum.   On the contrary, it is written (Ps. 11:2), "Truths are decayed from among the children of men."
Respondeo dicendum quod quodammodo una est veritas, qua omnia sunt vera, et quodammodo non. Ad cuius evidentiam, sciendum est quod, quando aliquid praedicatur univoce de multis, illud in quolibet eorum secundum propriam rationem invenitur, sicut animal in qualibet specie animalis. Sed quando aliquid dicitur analogice de multis, illud invenitur secundum propriam rationem in uno eorum tantum, a quo alia denominantur. Sicut sanum dicitur de animali et urina et medicina, non quod sanitas sit nisi in animali tantum, sed a sanitate animalis denominatur medicina sana, inquantum est illius sanitatis effectiva, et urina, inquantum est illius sanitatis significativa. Et quamvis sanitas non sit in medicina neque in urina, tamen in utroque est aliquid per quod hoc quidem facit, illud autem significat sanitatem. Dictum est autem quod veritas per prius est in intellectu, et per posterius in rebus, secundum quod ordinantur ad intellectum divinum. Si ergo loquamur de veritate prout existit in intellectu, secundum propriam rationem, sic in multis intellectibus creatis sunt multae veritates; etiam in uno et eodem intellectu, secundum plura cognita. Unde dicit Glossa super illud Psalmi XI, diminutae sunt veritates a filiis hominum etc., quod sicut ab una facie hominis resultant plures similitudines in speculo, sic ab una veritate divina resultant plures veritates. Si vero loquamur de veritate secundum quod est in rebus, sic omnes sunt verae una prima veritate, cui unumquodque assimilatur secundum suam entitatem. Et sic, licet plures sint essentiae vel formae rerum, tamen una est veritas divini intellectus, secundum quam omnes res denominantur verae.   I answer that, In one sense truth, whereby all things are true, is one, and in another sense it is not. In proof of which we must consider that when anything is predicated of many things univocally, it is found in each of them according to its proper nature; as animal is found in each species of animal. But when anything is predicated of many things analogically, it is found in only one of them according to its proper nature, and from this one the rest are denominated. So healthiness is predicated of animal, of urine, and of medicine, not that health is only in the animal; but from the health of the animal, medicine is called healthy, in so far as it is the cause of health, and urine is called healthy, in so far as it indicates health. And although health is neither in medicine nor in urine, yet in either there is something whereby the one causes, and the other indicates health. Now we have said (Article [1]) that truth resides primarily in the intellect; and secondarily in things, according as they are related to the divine intellect. If therefore we speak of truth, as it exists in the intellect, according to its proper nature, then are there many truths in many created intellects; and even in one and the same intellect, according to the number of things known. Whence a gloss on Ps. 11:2, "Truths are decayed from among the children of men," says: "As from one man's face many likenesses are reflected in a mirror, so many truths are reflected from the one divine truth." But if we speak of truth as it is in things, then all things are true by one primary truth; to which each one is assimilated according to its own entity. And thus, although the essences or forms of things are many, yet the truth of the divine intellect is one, in conformity to which all things are said to be true.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod anima non secundum quamcumque veritatem iudicat de rebus omnibus; sed secundum veritatem primam, inquantum resultat in ea sicut in speculo, secundum prima intelligibilia. Unde sequitur quod veritas prima sit maior anima. Et tamen etiam veritas creata, quae est in intellectu nostro, est maior anima, non simpliciter, sed secundum quid, inquantum est perfectio eius; sicut etiam scientia posset dici maior anima. Sed verum est quod nihil subsistens est maius mente rationali, nisi Deus.   Reply to Objection 1: The soul does not judge of things according to any kind of truth, but according to the primary truth, inasmuch as it is reflected in the soul, as in a mirror, by reason of the first principles of the understanding. It follows, therefore, that the primary truth is greater than the soul. And yet, even created truth, which resides in our intellect, is greater than the soul, not simply, but in a certain degree, in so far as it is its perfection; even as science may be said to be greater than the soul. Yet it is true that nothing subsisting is greater than the rational soul, except God.
Ad secundum dicendum quod dictum Anselmi veritatem habet, secundum quod res dicuntur verae per comparationem ad intellectum divinum.   Reply to Objection 2: The saying of Anselm is correct in so far as things are said to be true by their relation to the divine intellect.


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Whether created truth is eternal?

Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod veritas creata sit aeterna. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de libero arbitrio, quod nihil est magis aeternum quam ratio circuli, et duo et tria esse quinque. Sed horum veritas est veritas creata. Ergo veritas creata est aeterna.   Objection 1: It seems that created truth is eternal. For Augustine says (De Lib. Arbit. ii, 8) "Nothing is more eternal than the nature of a circle, and that two added to three make five." But the truth of these is a created truth. Therefore created truth is eternal.
Praeterea, omne quod est semper, est aeternum. Sed universalia sunt ubique et semper. Ergo sunt aeterna. Ergo et verum, quod est maxime universale.   Objection 2: Further, that which is always, is eternal. But universals are always and everywhere; therefore they are eternal. So therefore is truth, which is the most universal.
Praeterea, id quod est verum in praesenti, semper fuit verum esse futurum. Sed sicut veritas propositionis de praesenti est veritas creata, ita veritas propositionis de futuro. Ergo aliqua veritas creata est aeterna.   Objection 3: Further, it was always true that what is true in the present was to be in the future. But as the truth of a proposition regarding the present is a created truth, so is that of a proposition regarding the future. Therefore some created truth is eternal.
Praeterea, omne quod caret principio et fine, est aeternum. Sed veritas enuntiabilium caret principio et fine. Quia, si veritas incoepit cum ante non esset, verum erat veritatem non esse, et utique aliqua veritate verum erat, et sic veritas erat antequam inciperet. Et similiter si ponatur veritatem habere finem, sequitur quod sit postquam desierit, verum enim erit veritatem non esse. Ergo veritas est aeterna.   Objection 4: Further, all that is without beginning and end is eternal. But the truth of enunciables is without beginning and end; for if their truth had a beginning, since it was not before, it was true that truth was not, and true, of course, by reason of truth; so that truth was before it began to be. Similarly, if it be asserted that truth has an end, it follows that it is after it has ceased to be, for it will still be true that truth is not. Therefore truth is eternal.
Sed contra est quod solus Deus est aeternus, ut supra habitum est.   On the contrary, God alone is eternal, as laid down before (Question [10], Article [3]).
Respondeo dicendum quod veritas enuntiabilium non est aliud quam veritas intellectus. Enuntiabile enim et est in intellectu, et est in voce. Secundum autem quod est in intellectu, habet per se veritatem. Sed secundum quod est in voce, dicitur verum enuntiabile, secundum quod significat aliquam veritatem intellectus; non propter aliquam veritatem in enuntiabili existentem sicut in subiecto. Sicut urina dicitur sana, non a sanitate quae in ipsa sit, sed a sanitate animalis, quam significat. Similiter etiam supra dictum est quod res denominantur verae a veritate intellectus. Unde si nullus intellectus esset aeternus, nulla veritas esset aeterna. Sed quia solus intellectus divinus est aeternus, in ipso solo veritas aeternitatem habet. Nec propter hoc sequitur quod aliquid aliud sit aeternum quam Deus, quia veritas intellectus divini est ipse Deus, ut supra ostensum est.   I answer that, The truth of enunciations is no other than the truth of the intellect. For an enunciation resides in the intellect, and in speech. Now according as it is in the intellect it has truth of itself: but according as it is in speech, it is called enunciable truth, according as it signifies some truth of the intellect, not on account of any truth residing in the enunciation, as though in a subject. Thus urine is called healthy, not from any health within it but from the health of an animal which it indicates. In like manner it has been already said that things are called true from the truth of the intellect. Hence, if no intellect were eternal, no truth would be eternal. Now because only the divine intellect is eternal, in it alone truth has eternity. Nor does it follow from this that anything else but God is eternal; since the truth of the divine intellect is God Himself, as shown already (Article [5]).
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio circuli, et duo et tria esse quinque, habent aeternitatem in mente divina.   Reply to Objection 1: The nature of a circle, and the fact that two and three make five, have eternity in the mind of God.
Ad secundum dicendum quod aliquid esse semper et ubique, potest intelligi dupliciter. Uno modo, quia habet in se unde se extendat ad omne tempus et ad omnem locum, sicut Deo competit esse ubique et semper. Alio modo, quia non habet in se quo determinetur ad aliquem locum vel tempus, sicut materia prima dicitur esse una, non quia habet unam formam, sicut homo est unus ab unitate unius formae, sed per remotionem omnium formarum distinguentium. Et per hunc modum, quodlibet universale dicitur esse ubique et semper, inquantum universalia abstrahunt ab hic et nunc. Sed ex hoc non sequitur ea esse aeterna, nisi in intellectu, si quis sit aeternus.   Reply to Objection 2: That something is always and everywhere, can be understood in two ways. In one way, as having in itself the power of extension to all time and to all places, as it belongs to God to be everywhere and always. In the other way as not having in itself determination to any place or time, as primary matter is said to be one, not because it has one form, but by the absence of all distinguishing form. In this manner all universals are said to be everywhere and always, in so far as universals are independent of place and time. It does not, however, follow from this that they are eternal, except in an intellect, if one exists that is eternal.
Ad tertium dicendum quod illud quod nunc est, ex eo futurum fuit antequam esset, quia in causa sua erat ut fieret. Unde, sublata causa, non esset futurum illud fieri. Sola autem causa prima est aeterna. Unde ex hoc non sequitur quod ea quae sunt, semper fuerit verum ea esse futura, nisi quatenus in causa sempiterna fuit ut essent futura. Quae quidem causa solus Deus est.   Reply to Objection 3: That which now is, was future, before it (actually) was; because it was in its cause that it would be. Hence, if the cause were removed, that thing's coming to be was not future. But the first cause is alone eternal. Hence it does not follow that it was always true that what now is would be, except in so far as its future being was in the sempiternal cause; and God alone is such a cause.
Ad quartum dicendum quod, quia intellectus noster non est aeternus, nec veritas enuntiabilium quae a nobis formantur, est aeterna, sed quandoque incoepit. Et antequam huiusmodi veritas esset, non erat verum dicere veritatem talem non esse, nisi ab intellectu divino, in quo solum veritas est aeterna. Sed nunc verum est dicere veritatem tunc non fuisse. Quod quidem non est verum nisi veritate quae nunc est in intellectu nostro, non autem per aliquam veritatem ex parte rei. Quia ista est veritas de non ente; non ens autem non habet ex se ut sit verum, sed solummodo ex intellectu apprehendente ipsum. Unde intantum est verum dicere veritatem non fuisse, inquantum apprehendimus non esse ipsius ut praecedens esse eius.   Reply to Objection 4: Because our intellect is not eternal, neither is the truth of enunciable propositions which are formed by us, eternal, but it had a beginning in time. Now before such truth existed, it was not true to say that such a truth did exist, except by reason of the divine intellect, wherein alone truth is eternal. But it is true now to say that that truth did not then exist: and this is true only by reason of the truth that is now in our intellect; and not by reason of any truth in the things. For this is truth concerning not-being; and not-being has not truth of itself, but only so far as our intellect apprehends it. Hence it is true to say that truth did not exist, in so far as we apprehend its not-being as preceding its being.


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Whether truth is immutable?

Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod veritas sit immutabilis. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro II de libero arbitrio, quod veritas non est aequalis menti, quia esset mutabilis, sicut et mens.   Objection 1: It seems that truth is immutable. For Augustine says (De Lib. Arbit. ii, 12), that "Truth and mind do not rank as equals, otherwise truth would be mutable, as the mind is."
Praeterea, id quod remanet post omnem mutationem, est immutabile, sicut prima materia est ingenita et incorruptibilis, quia remanet post omnem generationem et corruptionem. Sed veritas remanet post omnem mutationem, quia post omnem mutationem verum est dicere esse vel non esse. Ergo veritas est immutabilis.   Objection 2: Further, what remains after every change is immutable; as primary matter is unbegotten and incorruptible, since it remains after all generation and corruption. But truth remains after all change; for after every change it is true to say that a thing is, or is not. Therefore truth is immutable.
Praeterea, si veritas enuntiationis mutatur, maxime mutatur ad mutationem rei. Sed sic non mutatur. Veritas enim, secundum Anselmum, est rectitudo quaedam, inquantum aliquid implet id quod est de ipso in mente divina. Haec autem propositio, Socrates sedet, accipit a mente divina ut significet Socratem sedere, quod significat etiam eo non sedente. Ergo veritas propositionis nullo modo mutatur.   Objection 3: Further, if the truth of an enunciation changes, it changes mostly with the changing of the thing. But it does not thus change. For truth, according to Anselm (De Verit. viii), "is a certain rightness" in so far as a thing answers to that which is in the divine mind concerning it. But this proposition that "Socrates sits", receives from the divine mind the signification that Socrates does sit; and it has the same signification even though he does not sit. Therefore the truth of the proposition in no way changes.
Praeterea, ubi est eadem causa, et idem effectus. Sed eadem res est causa veritatis harum trium propositionum Socrates sedet, sedebit, et sedit. Ergo eadem est harum veritas. Sed oportet quod alterum horum sit verum. Ergo veritas harum propositionum immutabiliter manet. Et eadem ratione cuiuslibet alterius propositionis.   Objection 4: Further, where there is the same cause, there is the same effect. But the same thing is the cause of the truth of the three propositions, "Socrates sits, will sit, sat." Therefore the truth of each is the same. But one or other of these must be the true one. Therefore the truth of these propositions remains immutable; and for the same reason that of any other.
Sed contra est quod dicitur in Psalmo XI, diminutae sunt veritates a filiis hominum.   On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 11:2),"Truths are decayed from among the children of men."
Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, veritas proprie est in solo intellectu, res autem dicuntur verae a veritate quae est in aliquo intellectu. Unde mutabilitas veritatis consideranda est circa intellectum. Cuius quidem veritas in hoc consistit, quod habeat conformitatem ad res intellectas. Quae quidem conformitas variari potest dupliciter, sicut et quaelibet alia similitudo, ex mutatione alterius extremi. Unde uno modo variatur veritas ex parte intellectus, ex eo quod de re eodem modo se habente aliquis aliam opinionem accipit, alio modo si, opinione eadem manente, res mutetur. Et utroque modo fit mutatio de vero in falsum. Si ergo sit aliquis intellectus in quo non possit esse alternatio opinionum, vel cuius acceptionem non potest subterfugere res aliqua, in eo est immutabilis veritas. Talis autem est intellectus divinus, ut ex superioribus patet. Unde veritas divini intellectus est immutabilis. Veritas autem intellectus nostri mutabilis est. Non quod ipsa sit subiectum mutationis, sed inquantum intellectus noster mutatur de veritate in falsitatem; sic enim formae mutabiles dici possunt. Veritas autem intellectus divini est secundum quam res naturales dicuntur verae, quae est omnino immutabilis.   I answer that, Truth, properly speaking, resides only in the intellect, as said before (Article [1]); but things are called true in virtue of the truth residing in an intellect. Hence the mutability of truth must be regarded from the point of view of the intellect, the truth of which consists in its conformity to the thing understood. Now this conformity may vary in two ways, even as any other likeness, through change in one of the two extremes. Hence in one way truth varies on the part of the intellect, from the fact that a change of opinion occurs about a thing which in itself has not changed, and in another way, when the thing is changed, but not the opinion; and in either way there can be a change from true to false. If, then, there is an intellect wherein there can be no alternation of opinions, and the knowledge of which nothing can escape, in this is immutable truth. Now such is the divine intellect, as is clear from what has been said before (Question [14], Article [15]). Hence the truth of the divine intellect is immutable. But the truth of our intellect is mutable; not because it is itself the subject of change, but in so far as our intellect changes from truth to falsity, for thus forms may be called mutable. Whereas the truth of the divine intellect is that according to which natural things are said to be true, and this is altogether immutable.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur de veritate divina.   Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is speaking of divine truth.
Ad secundum dicendum quod verum et ens sunt convertibilia. Unde, sicut ens non generatur neque corrumpitur per se, sed per accidens, inquantum hoc vel illud ens corrumpitur vel generatur, ut dicitur in I Physic.; ita veritas mutatur, non quod nulla veritas remaneat, sed quia non remanet illa veritas quae prius erat.   Reply to Objection 2: The true and being are convertible terms. Hence just as being is not generated nor corrupted of itself, but accidentally, in so far as this being or that is corrupted or generated, as is said in Phys. i, so does truth change, not so as that no truth remains, but because that truth does not remain which was before.
Ad tertium dicendum quod propositio non solum habet veritatem sicut res aliae veritatem habere dicuntur, inquantum implent id quod de eis est ordinatum ab intellectu divino; sed dicitur habere veritatem quodam speciali modo, inquantum significat veritatem intellectus. Quae quidem consistit in conformitate intellectus et rei. Qua quidem subtracta, mutatur veritas opinionis, et per consequens veritas propositionis. Sic igitur haec propositio, Socrates sedet, eo sedente vera est et veritate rei, inquantum est quaedam vox significativa; et veritate significationis, inquantum significat opinionem veram. Socrate vero surgente, remanet prima veritas, sed mutatur secunda.   Reply to Objection 3: A proposition not only has truth, as other things are said to have it, in so far, that is, as they correspond to that which is the design of the divine intellect concerning them; but it said to have truth in a special way, in so far as it indicates the truth of the intellect, which consists in the conformity of the intellect with a thing. When this disappears, the truth of an opinion changes, and consequently the truth of the proposition. So therefore this proposition, "Socrates sits," is true, as long as he is sitting, both with the truth of the thing, in so far as the expression is significative, and with the truth of signification, in so far as it signifies a true opinion. When Socrates rises, the first truth remains, but the second is changed.
Ad quartum dicendum quod sessio Socratis, quae est causa veritatis huius propositionis, Socrates sedet, non eodem modo se habet dum Socrates sedet, et postquam sederit, et antequam sederet. Unde et veritas ab hoc causata, diversimode se habet; et diversimode significatur propositionibus de praesenti, praeterito et futuro. Unde non sequitur quod, licet altera trium propositionum sit vera, quod eadem veritas invariabilis maneat.   Reply to Objection 4: The sitting of Socrates, which is the cause of the truth of the proposition, "Socrates sits," has not the same meaning when Socrates sits, after he sits, and before he sits. Hence the truth which results, varies, and is variously signified by these propositions concerning present, past, or future. Thus it does not follow, though one of the three propositions is true, that the same truth remains invariable.

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