St. Thomas Aquinas

The Summa Theologica

(Benziger Bros. edition, 1947)
Translated by
Fathers of the English Dominican Province


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Consequenter considerandum est de opere ornatus. Et primo, de singulis diebus secundum se; secundo, de omnibus sex diebus in communi.    We must next consider the work of adornment, first as to each day by itself, secondly as to all seven days in general.
Circa primum ergo, considerandum est
  • primo de opere quartae diei,
  • secundo, de opere quintae;
  • tertio, de opere sextae;
  • quarto, de iis quae pertinent ad septimum diem.
   In the first place, then, we consider
  • the work of the fourth day,
  • secondly, that of the fifth day,
  • thirdly, that of the sixth day, and
  • fourthly, such matters as belong to the seventh day.
Circa primum quaeruntur tria.    Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:
Primo, de productione luminarium.     (1) As to the production of the lights;
Secundo, de fine productionis eorum.     (2) As to the end of their production;
Tertio, utrum sint animata.     (3) Whether they are living beings?


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Whether the lights ought to have been produced on the fourth day?

Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod luminaria non debuerint produci quarta die. Luminaria enim sunt corpora incorruptibilia naturaliter. Ergo eorum materia non potest esse absque formis eorum. Sed eorum materia producta est in opere creationis, ante omnem diem. Ergo et eorum formae. Non ergo sunt facta quarta die.   Objection 1: It would seem that the lights ought not to have been produced on the fourth day. For the heavenly luminaries are by nature incorruptible bodies: wherefore their matter cannot exist without their form. But as their matter was produced in the work of creation, before there was any day, so therefore were their forms. It follows, then, that the lights were not produced on the fourth day.
Praeterea, luminaria sunt quasi vasa luminis. Sed lux est facta prima die. Ergo luminaria fieri debuerunt prima die, et non quarta.   Objection 2: Further, the luminaries are, as it were, vessels of light. But light was made on the first day. The luminaries, therefore, should have been made on the first day, not on the fourth.
Praeterea, sicut plantae fixae sunt in terra, ita luminaria fixa sunt in firmamento, unde Scriptura dicit quod posuit ea in firmamento. Sed productio plantarum simul describitur cum formatione terrae, cui inhaerent. Ergo et productio luminarium simul debuit poni, secunda die, cum productione firmamenti.   Objection 3: Further, the lights are fixed in the firmament, as plants are fixed in the earth. For, the Scripture says: "He set them in the firmament." But plants are described as produced when the earth, to which they are attached, received its form. The lights, therefore, should have been produced at the same time as the firmament, that is to say, on the second day.
Praeterea, sol et luna et alia luminaria sunt causae plantarum. Sed naturali ordine causa praecedit effectum. Ergo luminaria non debuerunt fieri quarta die, sed tertia vel ante.   Objection 4: Further, plants are an effect of the sun, moon, and other heavenly bodies. Now, cause precedes effect in the order of nature. The lights, therefore, ought not to have been produced on the fourth day, but on the third day.
Praeterea, multae stellae, secundum astrologos, sunt luna maiores. Non ergo tantum sol et luna debuerunt poni duo magna luminaria.   Objection 5: Further, as astronomers say, there are many stars larger than the moon. Therefore the sun and the moon alone are not correctly described as the "two great lights."
Sed in contrarium sufficit auctoritas Scripturae.   On the contrary, Suffices the authority of Scripture.
Respondeo dicendum quod in recapitulatione divinorum operum, Scriptura sic dicit, igitur perfecti sunt caeli et terra, et omnis ornatus eorum. In quibus verbis triplex opus intelligi potest, scilicet opus creationis, per quod caelum et terra producta leguntur, sed informia. Et opus distinctionis, per quod caelum et terra sunt perfecta, sive per formas substantiales attributas materiae omnino informi, ut Augustinus vult; sive quantum ad convenientem decorem et ordinem, ut alii sancti dicunt. Et his duobus operibus additur ornatus. Et differt ornatus a perfectione. Nam perfectio caeli et terrae ad ea pertinere videtur quae caelo et terrae sunt intrinseca, ornatus vero ad ea quae sunt a caelo et terra distincta. Sicut homo perficitur per proprias partes et formas, ornatur autem per vestimenta, vel aliquid huiusmodi. Distinctio autem aliquorum maxime manifestatur per motum localem, quo ab invicem separantur. Et ideo ad opus ornatus pertinet productio illarum rerum quae habent motum in caelo et in terra. Sicut autem supra dictum est, de tribus fit mentio in creatione, scilicet de caelo et aqua et terra. Et haec tria etiam formantur per opus distinctionis tribus diebus, primo die, caelum; secundo die distinguuntur aquae; tertio die fit distinctio in terra, maris et aridae. Et similiter in opere ornatus, primo die, qui est quartus, producuntur luminaria, quae moventur in caelo, ad ornatum ipsius. Secundo die, qui est quintus, aves et pisces, ad ornatum medii elementi, quia habent motum in aere et aqua, quae pro uno accipiuntur. Tertio die, qui est sextus, producuntur animalia quae habent motum in terra, ad ornatum ipsius. Sed sciendum est quod in productione luminarium non discordat Augustinus ab aliis sanctis. Dicit enim luminaria esse facta in actu, non in virtute tantum, non enim habet firmamentum virtutem productivam luminarium, sicut habet terra virtutem productivam plantarum. Unde Scriptura non dicit, producat firmamentum luminaria; sicut dicit, germinet terra herbam virentem.   I answer that, In recapitulating the Divine works, Scripture says (Gn. 2:1): "So the heavens and the earth were finished and all the furniture of them," thereby indicating that the work was threefold. In the first work, that of "creation," the heaven and the earth were produced, but as yet without form. In the second, or work of "distinction," the heaven and the earth were perfected, either by adding substantial form to formless matter, as Augustine holds (Gen. ad lit. ii, 11), or by giving them the order and beauty due to them, as other holy writers suppose. To these two works is added the work of adornment, which is distinct from perfect. For the perfection of the heaven and the earth regards, seemingly, those things that belong to them intrinsically, but the adornment, those that are extrinsic, just as the perfection of a man lies in his proper parts and forms, and his adornment, in clothing or such like. Now just as distinction of certain things is made most evident by their local movement, as separating one from another; so the work of adornment is set forth by the production of things having movement in the heavens, and upon the earth. But it has been stated above (Question [69], Article [1]), that three things are recorded as created, namely, the heaven, the water, and the earth; and these three received their form from the three days' work of distinction, so that heaven was formed on the first day; on the second day the waters were separated; and on the third day, the earth was divided into sea and dry land. So also is it in the work of adornment; on the first day of this work, which is the fourth of creation, are produced the lights, to adorn the heaven by their movements; on the second day, which is the fifth, birds and fishes are called into being, to make beautiful the intermediate element, for they move in air and water, which are here taken as one; while on the third day, which is the sixth, animals are brought forth, to move upon the earth and adorn it. It must also here be noted that Augustine's opinion (Gen. ad lit. v, 5) on the production of lights is not at variance with that of other holy writers, since he says that they were made actually, and not merely virtually, for the firmament has not the power of producing lights, as the earth has of producing plants. Wherefore Scripture does not say: "Let the firmament produce lights," though it says: "Let the earth bring forth the green herb."
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, secundum Augustinum, nulla difficultas ex hoc oritur. Non enim ponit successionem temporis in istis operibus, et ideo non oportet dicere quod materia luminarium fuerit sub alia forma. Secundum etiam eos qui ponunt caelestia corpora ex natura quatuor elementorum, nulla difficultas accidit, quia potest dici quod sunt formata ex praeiacenti materia, sicut animalia et plantae. Sed secundum eos qui ponunt corpora caelestia esse alterius naturae ab elementis et incorruptibilia per naturam, oportet dicere quod substantia luminarium a principio fuit creata; sed prius erat informis, et nunc formatur; non quidem forma substantiali, sed per collationem determinatae virtutis. Ideo tamen non fit mentio a principio de eis, sed solum quarta die, ut Chrysostomus dicit, ut per hoc removeat populum ab idololatria, ostendens luminaria non esse deos, ex quo nec a principio fuerunt.   Reply to Objection 1: In Augustine's opinion there is no difficulty here; for he does not hold a succession of time in these works, and so there was no need for the matter of the lights to exist under another form. Nor is there any difficulty in the opinion of those who hold the heavenly bodies to be of the nature of the four elements, for it may be said that they were formed out of matter already existing, as animals and plants were formed. For those, however, who hold the heavenly bodies to be of another nature from the elements, and naturally incorruptible, the answer must be that the lights were substantially created at the beginning, but that their substance, at first formless, is formed on this day, by receiving not its substantial form, but a determination of power. As to the fact that the lights are not mentioned as existing from the beginning, but only as made on the fourth day, Chrysostom (Hom. vi in Gen.) explains this by the need of guarding the people from the danger of idolatry: since the lights are proved not to be gods, by the fact that they were not from the beginning.
Ad secundum dicendum quod, secundum Augustinum, nulla sequitur difficultas, quia lux de qua prima die facta est mentio, fuit lux spiritualis; nunc autem fit lux corporalis. Si autem lux primo die facta intelligitur lux corporalis, oportet dicere quod lux primo die fuit producta secundum communem lucis naturam, quarto autem die attributa est luminaribus determinata virtus ad determinatos effectus; secundum quod videmus alios effectus habere radium solis, et alios radium lunae, et sic de aliis. Et propter hanc determinationem virtutis, dicit Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod lumen solis, quod primo erat informe, quarto die formatum est.   Reply to Objection 2: No difficulty exists if we follow Augustine in holding the light made on the first day to be spiritual, and that made on this day to be corporeal. If, however, the light made on the first day is understood to be itself corporeal, then it must be held to have been produced on that day merely as light in general; and that on the fourth day the lights received a definite power to produce determinate effects. Thus we observe that the rays of the sun have one effect, those of the moon another, and so forth. Hence, speaking of such a determination of power, Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) says that the sun's light which previously was without form, was formed on the fourth day.
Ad tertium dicendum quod, secundum Ptolomaeum, luminaria non sunt fixa in sphaeris, sed habent motum seorsum a motu sphaerarum. Unde Chrysostomus dicit quod non ideo dicitur quod posuit ea in firmamento, quia ibi sint fixa; sed quia iusserit ut ibi essent; sicut posuit hominem in Paradiso, ut ibi esset. Sed secundum opinionem Aristotelis, stellae fixae sunt in orbibus, et non moventur nisi motu orbium, secundum rei veritatem. Tamen motus luminarium sensu percipitur, non autem motus sphaerarum. Moyses autem, rudi populo condescendens, secutus est quae sensibiliter apparent, ut dictum est. Si autem sit aliud firmamentum quod factum est secunda die, ab eo in quo posita sunt sidera, secundum distinctionem naturae, licet sensus non discernat, quem Moyses sequitur, ut dictum est; cessat obiectio. Nam firmamentum factum est secunda die, quantum ad inferiorem partem. In firmamento autem posita sunt sidera quarta die, quantum ad superiorem partem; ut totum pro uno accipiatur, secundum quod sensui apparet.   Reply to Objection 3: According to Ptolemy the heavenly luminaries are not fixed in the spheres, but have their own movement distinct from the movement of the spheres. Wherefore Chrysostom says (Hom. vi in Gen.) that He is said to have set them in the firmament, not because He fixed them there immovably, but because He bade them to be there, even as He placed man in Paradise, to be there. In the opinion of Aristotle, however, the stars are fixed in their orbits, and in reality have no other movement but that of the spheres; and yet our senses perceive the movement of the luminaries and not that of the spheres (De Coel. ii, text. 43). But Moses describes what is obvious to sense, out of condescension to popular ignorance, as we have already said (Question [67], Article [4]; Question [68], Article [3]). The objection, however, falls to the ground if we regard the firmament made on the second day as having a natural distinction from that in which the stars are placed, even though the distinction is not apparent to the senses, the testimony of which Moses follows, as stated above (De Coel. ii, text. 43). For although to the senses there appears but one firmament; if we admit a higher and a lower firmament, the lower will be that which was made on the second day, and on the fourth the stars were fixed in the higher firmament.
Ad quartum dicendum quod, sicut dicit Basilius, praemittitur productio plantarum luminaribus, ad excludendam idololatriam. Qui enim credunt luminaria esse deos, dicunt quod primordialem originem habent plantae a luminaribus. Quamvis, ut Chrysostomus dicit, sicut agricola cooperatur ad productionem plantarum, ita etiam et luminaria per suos motus.   Reply to Objection 4: In the words of Basil (Hom. v in Hexaem.), plants were recorded as produced before the sun and moon, to prevent idolatry, since those who believe the heavenly bodies to be gods, hold that plants originate primarily from these bodies. Although as Chrysostom remarks (Hom. vi in Gen.), the sun, moon, and stars cooperate in the work of production by their movements, as the husbandman cooperates by his labor.
Ad quintum dicendum quod, sicut Chrysostomus dicit, dicuntur duo luminaria magna non tam quantitate, quam efficacia et virtute. Quia etsi aliae stellae sint maiores quantitate quam luna, tamen effectus lunae magis sentitur in istis inferioribus. Et etiam secundum sensum maior apparet.   Reply to Objection 5: As Chrysostom says, the two lights are called great, not so much with regard to their dimensions as to their influence and power. For though the stars be of greater bulk than the moon, yet the influence of the moon is more perceptible to the senses in this lower world. Moreover, as far as the senses are concerned, its apparent size is greater.


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Question: 70  [<< | >>]
Article: 2  [<< | >>]

Whether the cause assigned for the production of the lights is reasonable?

Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter causa productionis luminarium describatur. Dicitur enim Ierem. X, a signis caeli nolite metuere, quae gentes timent. Non ergo luminaria in signa facta sunt.   Objection 1: It would seem that the cause assigned for the production of the lights is not reasonable. For it is said (Jer. 10:2): "Be not afraid of the signs of heaven, which the heathens fear." Therefore the heavenly lights were not made to be signs.
Praeterea, signum contra causam dividitur. Sed luminaria sunt causa eorum quae hic aguntur. Ergo non sunt signa.   Objection 2: Further, sign is contradistinguished from cause. But the lights are the cause of what takes place upon the earth. Therefore they are not signs.
Praeterea, distinctio temporum et dierum incoepit a primo die. Non ergo facta sunt luminaria in tempora et dies et annos, idest in horum distinctionem.   Objection 3: Further, the distinction of seasons and days began from the first day. Therefore the lights were not made "for seasons, and days, and years," that is, in order to distinguish them.
Praeterea, nihil fit propter vilius se, quia finis est melior iis quae sunt ad finem. Sed luminaria sunt meliora quam terra. Non ergo facta sunt ut illuminent terram.   Objection 4: Further, nothing is made for the sake of that which is inferior to itself, "since the end is better than the means" (Topic. iii). But the lights are nobler than the earth. Therefore they were not made "to enlighten it."
Praeterea, luna non praeest nocti quando est prima. Probabile autem est quod luna facta fuerit prima, sic enim homines incipiunt computare. Ergo luna non est facta ut praesit nocti.   Objection 5: Further, the new moon cannot be said "to rule the night." But such it probably did when first made; for men begin to count from the new moon. The moon, therefore, was not made "to rule the night."
In contrarium sufficit auctoritas Scripturae.   On the contrary, Suffices the authority of Scripture.
Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est supra, creatura aliqua corporalis potest dici esse facta vel propter actum proprium, vel propter aliam creaturam, vel propter totum universum, vel propter gloriam Dei. Sed Moyses, ut populum ab idololatria revocaret, illam solam causam tetigit, secundum quod sunt facta ad utilitatem hominum. Unde dicitur Deut. IV, ne forte, elevatis oculis ad caelum, videas solem et lunam et omnia astra caeli, et errore deceptus adores ea et colas, quae creavit dominus Deus in ministerium cunctis gentibus. Hoc autem ministerium explicat in principio Genesis per tria. Primo enim provenit utilitas hominibus ex luminaribus quantum ad visum, qui est directivus in operibus, et maxime utilis ad cognoscendas res. Et quantum ad hoc, dicit, ut luceant in firmamento, et illuminent terram. Secundo, quantum ad vicissitudines temporum, quibus et fastidium tollitur et valetudo conservatur, et necessaria victui oriuntur quae non essent, si semper esset aut aestas aut hiems. Et quantum ad hoc, dicit, ut sint in tempora et dies et annos. Tertio, quantum ad opportunitatem negotiorum et operum, inquantum ex luminaribus caeli accipitur significatio pluviosi temporis vel sereni quae sunt apta diversis negotiis. Et quantum ad hoc dicit, ut sint in signa.   I answer that, As we have said above (Question [65], Article [2]), a corporeal creature can be considered as made either for the sake of its proper act, or for other creatures, or for the whole universe, or for the glory of God. Of these reasons only that which points out the usefulness of these things to man, is touched upon by Moses, in order to withdraw his people from idolatry. Hence it is written (Dt. 4:19): "Lest perhaps lifting up thy eyes to heaven, thou see the sun and the moon and all the stars of heaven, and being deceived by error thou adore and serve them, which the Lord thy God created for the service of all nations." Now, he explains this service at the beginning of Genesis as threefold. First, the lights are of service to man, in regard to sight, which directs him in his works, and is most useful for perceiving objects. In reference to this he says: "Let them shine in the firmament and give life to the earth." Secondly, as regards the changes of the seasons, which prevent weariness, preserve health, and provide for the necessities of food; all of which things could not be secured if it were always summer or winter. In reference to this he says: "Let them be for seasons, and for days, and years." Thirdly, as regards the convenience of business and work, in so far as the lights are set in the heavens to indicate fair or foul weather, as favorable to various occupations. And in this respect he says: "Let them be for signs."
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod luminaria sunt in signa corporalium transmutationum, non autem eorum quae dependent ex libero arbitrio.   Reply to Objection 1: The lights in the heaven are set for signs of changes effected in corporeal creatures, but not of those changes which depend upon the free-will.
Ad secundum dicendum quod per causam sensibilem quandoque ducimur in cognitionem effectus occulti, sicut et e converso. Unde nihil prohibet causam sensibilem esse signum. Ideo tamen potius dicit signa quam causas, ut occasionem idololatriae tolleret.   Reply to Objection 2: We are sometimes brought to the knowledge of hidden effects through their sensible causes, and conversely. Hence nothing prevents a sensible cause from being a sign. But he says "signs," rather than "causes," to guard against idolatry.
Ad tertium dicendum quod in prima die facta est communis distinctio temporis per diem et noctem, secundum motum diurnum, qui est communis totius caeli; qui potest intelligi incoepisse primo die. Sed speciales distinctiones dierum et temporum, secundum quod dies est calidior die, et tempus tempore, et annus anno, fiunt secundum speciales motus stellarum; qui possunt intelligi quarto die incoepisse.   Reply to Objection 3: The general division of time into day and night took place on the first day, as regards the diurnal movement, which is common to the whole heaven and may be understood to have begun on that first day. But the particular distinctions of days and seasons and years, according as one day is hotter than another, one season than another, and one year than another, are due to certain particular movements of the stars: which movements may have had their beginning on the fourth day.
Ad quartum dicendum quod in illuminatione terrae intelligitur utilitas hominis, qui secundum animam praefertur corporibus luminarium. Nihil tamen prohibet dici quod dignior creatura facta est propter inferiorem, non secundum quod in se consideratur sed secundum quod ordinatur ad integritatem universi.   Reply to Objection 4: Light was given to the earth for the service of man, who, by reason of his soul, is nobler than the heavenly bodies. Nor is it untrue to say that a higher creature may be made for the sake of a lower, considered not in itself, but as ordained to the good of the universe.
Ad quintum dicendum quod luna, quando est perfecta, oritur vespere et occidit mane, et sic praeest nocti. Et satis probabile est quod luna fuerit facta plena; sicut et herbae factae sunt in sua perfectione, facientes semen, et similiter animalia et homo. Licet enim naturali processu ab imperfecto ad perfectum deveniatur, simpliciter tamen perfectum prius est imperfecto. Augustinus tamen hoc non asserit, quia dicit non esse inconveniens quod Deus imperfecta fecerit, quae postmodum ipse perfecit.   Reply to Objection 5: When the moon is at its perfection it rises in the evening and sets in the morning, and thus it rules the night, and it was probably made in its full perfection as were plants yielding seed, as also were animals and man himself. For although the perfect is developed from the imperfect by natural processes, yet the perfect must exist simply before the imperfect. Augustine, however (Gen. ad lit. ii), does not say this, for he says that it is not unfitting that God made things imperfect, which He afterwards perfected.


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Question: 70  [<< | >>]
Article: 3  [<< | >>]

Whether the lights of heaven are living beings?

Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod luminaria caeli sint animata. Superius enim corpus nobilioribus ornamentis ornari debet. Sed ea quae pertinent ad ornatum inferiorum corporum, sunt animata; scilicet pisces, aves et terrestria animalia. Ergo et luminaria, quae pertinent ad ornatum caeli.   Objection 1: It would seem that the lights of heaven are living beings. For the nobler a body is, the more nobly it should be adorned. But a body less noble than the heaven, is adorned with living beings, with fish, birds, and the beasts of the field. Therefore the lights of heaven, as pertaining to its adornment, should be living beings also.
Praeterea, nobilioris corporis nobilior est forma. Sed sol et luna et alia luminaria sunt nobiliora quam corpora plantarum et animalium. Ergo habent nobiliorem formam. Nobilissima autem forma est anima, quae est principium vitae, quia, ut Augustinus dicit in libro de vera Relig., quaelibet substantia vivens naturae ordine praefertur substantiae non viventi. Ergo luminaria caeli sunt animata.   Objection 2: Further, the nobler a body is, the nobler must be its form. But the sun, moon, and stars are nobler bodies than plants or animals, and must therefore have nobler forms. Now the noblest of all forms is the soul, as being the first principle of life. Hence Augustine (De Vera Relig. xxix) says: "Every living substance stands higher in the order of nature than one that has not life." The lights of heaven, therefore, are living beings.
Praeterea, causa nobilior est effectu. Sed sol et luna et alia luminaria sunt causa vitae, ut patet maxime in animalibus ex putrefactione generatis, quae virtute solis et stellarum vitam consequuntur. Ergo multo magis corpora caelestia vivunt et sunt animata.   Objection 3: Further, a cause is nobler than its effect. But the sun, moon, and stars are a cause of life, as is especially evidenced in the case of animals generated from putrefaction, which receive life from the power of the sun and stars. Much more, therefore, have the heavenly bodies a living soul.
Praeterea, motus caeli et caelestium corporum sunt naturales, ut patet in I de caelo. Motus autem naturalis est a principio intrinseco. Cum igitur principium motus caelestium corporum sit aliqua substantia apprehensiva, quae movetur sicut desiderans a desiderato, ut dicitur in XII Metaphys.; videtur quod principium apprehendens sit principium intrinsecum corporibus caelestibus. Ergo sunt animata.   Objection 4: Further, the movement of the heaven and the heavenly bodies are natural (De Coel. i, text. 7,8): and natural movement is from an intrinsic principle. Now the principle of movement in the heavenly bodies is a substance capable of apprehension, and is moved as the desirer is moved by the object desired (Metaph. xii, text. 36). Therefore, seemingly, the apprehending principle is intrinsic to the heavenly bodies: and consequently they are living beings.
Praeterea, primum mobile est caelum. In genere autem mobilium, primum est movens seipsum, ut probatur in VIII Physic., quia quod est per se, prius est eo quod est per aliud. Sola autem animata movent seipsa, ut in eodem libro ostenditur. Ergo corpora caelestia sunt animata.   Objection 5: Further, the first of movables is the heaven. Now, of all things that are endowed with movement the first moves itself, as is proved in Phys. viii, text. 34, because, what is such of itself precedes that which is by another. But only beings that are living move themselves, as is shown in the same book (text. 27). Therefore the heavenly bodies are living beings.
Sed contra est quod Damascenus dicit in libro II, nullus animatos caelos vel luminaria aestimet; inanimati enim sunt et insensibiles.   On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii), "Let no one esteem the heavens or the heavenly bodies to be living things, for they have neither life nor sense."
Respondeo dicendum quod circa istam quaestionem apud philosophos fuit diversa opinio. Anaxagoras enim, ut Augustinus refert Lib. XVIII de Civ. Dei, factus est reus apud Athenienses, quia dixit solem esse lapidem ardentem, negans utique ipsum esse Deum, vel aliquid animatum. Platonici vero posuerunt corpora caelestia animata. Similiter etiam apud doctores fidei, fuit circa hoc diversa opinio. Origenes enim posuit corpora caelestia animata. Hieronymus etiam idem sentire videtur, exponens illud Eccle. I, lustrans universa, per circuitum pergit spiritus. Basilius vero et Damascenus asserunt corpora caelestia non esse animata. Augustinus vero sub dubio dereliquit, in neutram partem declinans, ut patet in II supra Gen. ad Litt.; et in Enchirid., ubi etiam dicit quod, si sunt animata caelestia corpora, pertinent ad societatem Angelorum eorum animae.   I answer that, Philosophers have differed on this question. Anaxagoras, for instance, as Augustine mentions (De Civ. Dei xviii, 41), "was condemned by the Athenians for teaching that the sun was a fiery mass of stone, and neither a god nor even a living being." On the other hand, the Platonists held that the heavenly bodies have life. Nor was there less diversity of opinion among the Doctors of the Church. It was the belief of Origen (Peri Archon i) and Jerome that these bodies were alive, and the latter seems to explain in that sense the words (Eccles. 1:6), "The spirit goeth forward, surveying all places round about." But Basil (Hom. iii, vi in Hexaem.) and Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii) maintain that the heavenly bodies are inanimate. Augustine leaves the matter in doubt, without committing himself to either theory, though he goes so far as to say that if the heavenly bodies are really living beings, their souls must be akin to the angelic nature (Gen. ad lit. ii, 18; Enchiridion lviii).
In hac autem opinionum diversitate, ut veritas aliquatenus innotescat, considerandum est quod unio animae et corporis non est propter corpus, sed propter animam, non enim forma est propter materiam, sed e converso. Natura autem et virtus animae deprehenditur ex eius operatione, quae etiam quodammodo est finis eius. Invenitur autem corpus necessarium ad aliquam operationem animae, quae mediante corpore exercetur; sicut patet in operibus animae sensitivae et nutritivae. Unde necesse est tales animas unitas esse corporibus propter suas operationes. Est autem aliqua operatio animae, quae non exercetur corpore mediante, sed tamen ex corpore aliquod adminiculum tali operationi exhibetur; sicut per corpus exhibentur animae humanae phantasmata, quibus indiget ad intelligendum. Unde etiam talem animam necesse est corpori uniri propter suam operationem, licet contingat ipsam separari. Manifestum est autem quod anima caelestis corporis non potest habere operationes nutritivae animae, quae sunt nutrire, augere et generare, huiusmodi enim operationes non competunt corpori incorruptibili per naturam. Similiter etiam nec operationes animae sensitivae corpori caelesti conveniunt, quia omnes sensus fundantur super tactum, qui est apprehensivus qualitatum elementarium. Omnia etiam organa potentiarum sensitivarum requirunt determinatam proportionem secundum commixtionem aliquam elementorum, a quorum natura corpora caelestia ponuntur remota. Relinquitur ergo quod de operationibus animae nulla potest competere animae caelesti nisi duae, intelligere et movere, nam appetere consequitur sensum et intellectum, et cum utroque ordinatur. Intellectualis autem operatio, cum non exerceatur per corpus, non indiget corpore nisi inquantum ei per sensus ministrantur phantasmata. Operationes autem sensitivae animae corporibus caelestibus non conveniunt, ut dictum est. Sic igitur propter operationem intellectualem, anima caelesti corpori non uniretur. Relinquitur ergo quod propter solam motionem. Ad hoc autem quod moveat, non oportet quod uniatur ei ut forma; sed per contactum virtutis, sicut motor unitur mobili. Unde Aristoteles, libro VIII Physic., postquam ostendit quod primum movens seipsum componitur ex duabus partibus, quarum una est movens et alia mota; assignans quomodo hae duae partes uniantur, dicit quod per contactum vel duorum ad invicem, si utrumque sit corpus, vel unius ad alterum et non e converso, si unum sit corpus et aliud non corpus. Platonici etiam animas corporibus uniri non ponebant nisi per contactum virtutis, sicut motor mobili. Et sic per hoc quod Plato ponit corpora caelestia animata, nihil aliud datur intelligi, quam quod substantiae spirituales uniuntur corporibus caelestibus ut motores mobilibus. Quod autem corpora caelestia moveantur ab aliqua substantia apprehendente, et non solum a natura, sicut gravia et levia, patet ex hoc, quod natura non movet nisi ad unum, quo habito quiescit, quod in motu corporum caelestium non apparet. Unde relinquitur quod moventur ab aliqua substantia apprehendente Augustinus etiam dicit, III de Trin., corpora omnia administrari a Deo per spiritum vitae.    In examining the truth of this question, where such diversity of opinion exists, we shall do well to bear in mind that the union of soul and body exists for the sake of the soul and not of the body; for the form does not exist for the matter, but the matter for the form. Now the nature and power of the soul are apprehended through its operation, which is to a certain extent its end. Yet for some of these operations, as sensation and nutrition, our body is a necessary instrument. Hence it is clear that the sensitive and nutritive souls must be united to a body in order to exercise their functions. There are, however, operations of the soul, which are not exercised through the medium of the body, though the body ministers, as it were, to their production. The intellect, for example, makes use of the phantasms derived from the bodily senses, and thus far is dependent on the body, although capable of existing apart from it. It is not, however, possible that the functions of nutrition, growth, and generation, through which the nutritive soul operates, can be exercised by the heavenly bodies, for such operations are incompatible with a body naturally incorruptible. Equally impossible is it that the functions of the sensitive soul can appertain to the heavenly body, since all the senses depend on the sense of touch, which perceives elemental qualities, and all the organs of the senses require a certain proportion in the admixture of elements, whereas the nature of the heavenly bodies is not elemental. It follows, then, that of the operations of the soul the only ones left to be attributed to the heavenly bodies are those of understanding and moving; for appetite follows both sensitive and intellectual perception, and is in proportion thereto. But the operations of the intellect, which does not act through the body, do not need a body as their instrument, except to supply phantasms through the senses. Moreover, the operations of the sensitive soul, as we have seen, cannot be attributed to the heavenly bodies. Accordingly, the union of a soul to a heavenly body cannot be for the purpose of the operations of the intellect. It remains, then, only to consider whether the movement of the heavenly bodies demands a soul as the motive power, not that the soul, in order to move the heavenly body, need be united to the latter as its form; but by contact of power, as a mover is united to that which he moves. Wherefore Aristotle (Phys. viii, text. 42,43), after showing that the first mover is made up of two parts, the moving and the moved, goes on to show the nature of the union between these two parts. This, he says, is effected by contact which is mutual if both are bodies; on the part of one only, if one is a body and the other not. The Platonists explain the union of soul and body in the same way, as a contact of a moving power with the object moved, and since Plato holds the heavenly bodies to be living beings, this means nothing else but that substances of spiritual nature are united to them, and act as their moving power. A proof that the heavenly bodies are moved by the direct influence and contact of some spiritual substance, and not, like bodies of specific gravity, by nature, lies in the fact that whereas nature moves to one fixed end which having attained, it rests; this does not appear in the movement of heavenly bodies. Hence it follows that they are moved by some intellectual substances. Augustine appears to be of the same opinion when he expresses his belief that all corporeal things are ruled by God through the spirit of life (De Trin. iii, 4).
Sic igitur patet quod corpora caelestia non sunt animata eo modo quo plantae et animalia, sed aequivoce. Unde inter ponentes ea esse animata, et ponentes ea inanimata, parva vel nulla differentia invenitur in re, sed in voce tantum.    From what has been said, then, it is clear that the heavenly bodies are not living beings in the same sense as plants and animals, and that if they are called so, it can only be equivocally. It will also be seen that the difference of opinion between those who affirm, and those who deny, that these bodies have life, is not a difference of things but of words.
d primum ergo dicendum quod ad ornatum pertinent aliqua secundum proprium motum. Et quantum ad hoc, luminaria caeli conveniunt cum aliis quae ad ornatum pertinent, quia moventur a substantia vivente.   Reply to Objection 1: Certain things belong to the adornment of the universe by reason of their proper movement; and in this way the heavenly luminaries agree with others that conduce to that adornment, for they are moved by a living substance.
Ad secundum dicendum quod nihil prohibet aliquid esse nobilius simpliciter, quod tamen non est nobilius quantum ad aliquid. Forma ergo caelestis corporis, etsi non sit simpliciter nobilior anima animalis, est tamen nobilior quantum ad rationem formae, perficit enim totaliter suam materiam, ut non sit in potentia ad aliam formam; quod anima non facit. Quantum etiam ad motum, moventur corpora caelestia a nobilioribus motoribus.   Reply to Objection 2: One being may be nobler than another absolutely, but not in a particular respect. While, then, it is not conceded that the souls of heavenly bodies are nobler than the souls of animals absolutely it must be conceded that they are superior to them with regard to their respective forms, since their form perfects their matter entirely, which is not in potentiality to other forms; whereas a soul does not do this. Also as regards movement the power that moves the heavenly bodies is of a nobler kind.
Ad tertium dicendum quod corpus caeleste, cum sit movens motum, habet rationem instrumenti, quod agit in virtute principalis agentis. Et ideo ex virtute sui motoris, qui est substantia vivens, potest causare vitam.   Reply to Objection 3: Since the heavenly body is a mover moved, it is of the nature of an instrument, which acts in virtue of the agent: and therefore since this agent is a living substance the heavenly body can impart life in virtue of that agent.
Ad quartum dicendum quod motus corporis caelestis est naturalis, non propter principium activum, sed propter principium passivum, quia scilicet habet in sua natura aptitudinem ut tali motu ab intellectu moveatur.   Reply to Objection 4: The movements of the heavenly bodies are natural, not on account of their active principle, but on account of their passive principle; that is to say, from a certain natural aptitude for being moved by an intelligent power.
Ad quintum dicendum quod caelum dicitur movere seipsum, inquantum componitur ex motore et mobili, non sicut ex forma et materia, sed secundum contactum virtutis, ut dictum est. Et hoc etiam modo potest dici quod eius motor est principium intrinsecum, ut sic etiam motus caeli possit dici naturalis ex parte principii activi; sicut motus voluntarius dicitur esse naturalis animali inquantum est animal, ut dicitur in VIII Physic.   Reply to Objection 5: The heaven is said to move itself in as far as it is compounded of mover and moved; not by the union of the mover, as the form, with the moved, as the matter, but by contact with the motive power, as we have said. So far, then, the principle that moves it may be called intrinsic, and consequently its movement natural with respect to that active principle; just as we say that voluntary movement is natural to the animal as animal (Phys. viii, text. 27).

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