St. Thomas Aquinas

The Summa Theologica

(Benziger Bros. edition, 1947)
Translated by
Fathers of the English Dominican Province

 

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Question: 12  [<< | >>]

OF INTENTION (FIVE ARTICLES)

Deinde considerandum est de intentione. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quinque.    We must now consider Intention: concerning which there are five points of inquiry:
Primo, utrum intentio sit actus intellectus, vel voluntatis.     (1) Whether intention is an act of intellect or of the will?
Secundo, utrum sit tantum finis ultimi.     (2) Whether it is only of the last end?
Tertio, utrum aliquis possit simul duo intendere.     (3) Whether one can intend two things at the same time?
Quarto, utrum intentio finis sit idem actus cum voluntate eius quod est ad finem.     (4) Whether intention of the end is the same act as volition of the means?
Quinto, utrum intentio conveniat brutis animalibus.     (5) Whether intention is within the competency of irrational animals?

 

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First Part of the Second Part  [<< | >>]
Question: 12  [<< | >>]
Article: 1  [<< | >>]

Whether intention is an act of the intellect or of the will?

Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod intentio sit actus intellectus, et non voluntatis. Dicitur enim Matth. VI, si oculus tuus fuerit simplex, totum corpus tuum lucidum erit, ubi per oculum significatur intentio, ut dicit Augustinus in libro de Serm. Dom. in Mont. Sed oculus, cum sit instrumentum visus, significat apprehensivam potentiam. Ergo intentio non est actus appetitivae potentiae, sed apprehensivae.   Objection 1: It would seem that intention is an act of the intellect, and not of the will. For it is written (Mt. 6:22): "If thy eye be single, thy whole body shall be lightsome": where, according to Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 13) the eye signifies intention. But since the eye is the organ of sight, it signifies the apprehensive power. Therefore intention is not an act of the appetitive but of the apprehensive power.
Praeterea, ibidem Augustinus dicit quod intentio lumen vocatur a domino, ubi dicit, si lumen quod in te est, tenebrae sunt, et cetera. Sed lumen ad cognitionem pertinet. Ergo et intentio.   Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 13) that Our Lord spoke of intention as a light, when He said (Mt. 6:23): "If the light that is in thee be darkness," etc. But light pertains to knowledge. Therefore intention does too.
Praeterea, intentio designat ordinationem quandam in finem. Sed ordinare est rationis. Ergo intentio non pertinet ad voluntatem, sed ad rationem.   Objection 3: Further, intention implies a kind of ordaining to an end. But to ordain is an act of reason. Therefore intention belongs not to the will but to the reason.
Praeterea, actus voluntatis non est nisi vel finis, vel eorum quae sunt ad finem. Sed actus voluntatis respectu finis, vocatur voluntas seu fruitio, respectu autem eorum quae sunt ad finem, est electio, a quibus differt intentio. Ergo intentio non est actus voluntatis.   Objection 4: Further, an act of the will is either of the end or of the means. But the act of the will in respect of the end is called volition, or enjoyment; with regard to the means, it is choice, from which intention is distinct. Therefore it is not an act of the will.
Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in XI de Trin., quod voluntatis intentio copulat corpus visum visui, et similiter speciem in memoria existentem ad aciem animi interius cogitantis. Est igitur intentio actus voluntatis.   On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xi, 4,8,9) that "the intention of the will unites the sight to the object seen; and the images retained in the memory, to the penetrating gaze of the soul's inner thought." Therefore intention is an act of the will.
Respondeo dicendum quod intentio, sicut ipsum nomen sonat, significat in aliquid tendere. In aliquid autem tendit et actio moventis, et motus mobilis. Sed hoc quod motus mobilis in aliquid tendit, ab actione moventis procedit. Unde intentio primo et principaliter pertinet ad id quod movet ad finem, unde dicimus architectorem, et omnem praecipientem, movere suo imperio alios ad id quod ipse intendit. Voluntas autem movet omnes alias vires animae ad finem, ut supra habitum est. Unde manifestum est quod intentio proprie est actus voluntatis.   I answer that, Intention, as the very word denotes, signifies, "to tend to something." Now both the action of the mover and the movement of thing moved, tend to something. But that the movement of the thing moved tends to anything, is due to the action of the mover. Consequently intention belongs first and principally to that which moves to the end: hence we say that an architect or anyone who is in authority, by his command moves others to that which he intends. Now the will moves all the other powers of the soul to the end, as shown above (Question [9], Article [1]). Wherefore it is evident that intention, properly speaking, is an act of the will.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod intentio nominatur oculus metaphorice, non quia ad cognitionem pertineat; sed quia cognitionem praesupponit, per quam proponitur voluntati finis ad quem movet; sicut oculo praevidemus quo tendere corporaliter debeamus.   Reply to Objection 1: The eye designates intention figuratively, not because intention has reference to knowledge, but because it presupposes knowledge, which proposes to the will the end to which the latter moves; thus we foresee with the eye whither we should tend with our bodies.
Ad secundum dicendum quod intentio dicitur lumen, quia manifesta est intendenti. Unde et opera dicuntur tenebrae, quia homo scit quid intendit, sed nescit quid ex opere sequatur, sicut Augustinus ibidem exponit.   Reply to Objection 2: Intention is called a light because it is manifest to him who intends. Wherefore works are called darkness because a man knows what he intends, but knows not what the result may be, as Augustine expounds (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 13).
Ad tertium dicendum quod voluntas quidem non ordinat, sed tamen in aliquid tendit secundum ordinem rationis. Unde hoc nomen intentio nominat actum voluntatis, praesupposita ordinatione rationis ordinantis aliquid in finem.   Reply to Objection 3: The will does not ordain, but tends to something according to the order of reason. Consequently this word "intention" indicates an act of the will, presupposing the act whereby the reason orders something to the end.
Ad quartum dicendum quod intentio est actus voluntatis respectu finis. Sed voluntas respicit finem tripliciter. Uno modo, absolute, et sic dicitur voluntas, prout absolute volumus vel sanitatem, vel si quid aliud est huiusmodi. Alio modo consideratur finis secundum quod in eo quiescitur, et hoc modo fruitio respicit finem. Tertio modo consideratur finis secundum quod est terminus alicuius quod in ipsum ordinatur, et sic intentio respicit finem. Non enim solum ex hoc intendere dicimur sanitatem, quia volumus eam, sed quia volumus ad eam per aliquid aliud pervenire.   Reply to Objection 4: Intention is an act of the will in regard to the end. Now the will stands in a threefold relation to the end. First, absolutely; and thus we have "volition," whereby we will absolutely to have health, and so forth. Secondly, it considers the end, as its place of rest; and thus "enjoyment" regards the end. Thirdly, it considers the end as the term towards which something is ordained; and thus "intention" regards the end. For when we speak of intending to have health, we mean not only that we have it, but that we will have it by means of something else.

 

Index  [<< | >>]
First Part of the Second Part  [<< | >>]
Question: 12  [<< | >>]
Article: 2  [<< | >>]

Whether intention is only of the last end?

Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod intentio sit tantum ultimi finis. Dicitur enim in libro sententiarum prosperi, clamor ad Deum est intentio cordis. Sed Deus est ultimus finis humani cordis. Ergo intentio semper respicit ultimum finem.   Objection 1: It would seem that intention is only of the last end. For it is said in the book of Prosper's Sentences (Sent. 100): "The intention of the heart is a cry to God." But God is the last end of the human heart. Therefore intention is always regards the last end.
Praeterea, intentio respicit finem secundum quod est terminus, ut dictum est. Sed terminus habet rationem ultimi. Ergo intentio semper respicit ultimum finem.   Objection 2: Further, intention regards the end as the terminus, as stated above (Article [1], ad 4). But a terminus is something last. Therefore intention always regards the last end.
Praeterea, sicut intentio respicit finem, ita et fruitio. Sed fruitio semper est ultimi finis. Ergo et intentio.   Objection 3: Further, just as intention regards the end, so does enjoyment. But enjoyment is always of the last end. Therefore intention is too.
Sed contra, ultimus finis humanarum voluntatum est unus, scilicet beatitudo, ut supra dictum est. Si igitur intentio esset tantum ultimi finis, non essent diversae hominum intentiones. Quod patet esse falsum.   On the contrary, There is but one last end of human wills, viz. Happiness, as stated above (Question [1], Article [7]). If, therefore, intentions were only of the last end, men would not have different intentions: which is evidently false.
Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, intentio respicit finem secundum quod est terminus motus voluntatis. In motu autem potest accipi terminus dupliciter, uno modo, ipse terminus ultimus, in quo quiescitur, qui est terminus totius motus; alio modo, aliquod medium, quod est principium unius partis motus, et finis vel terminus alterius. Sicut in motu quo itur de a in c per b, c est terminus ultimus, b autem est terminus, sed non ultimus. Et utriusque potest esse intentio. Unde etsi semper sit finis, non tamen oportet quod semper sit ultimi finis.   I answer that, As stated above (Article [1], ad 4), intention regards the end as a terminus of the movement of the will. Now a terminus of movement may be taken in two ways. First, the very last terminus, when the movement comes to a stop; this is the terminus of the whole movement. Secondly, some point midway, which is the beginning of one part of the movement, and the end or terminus of the other. Thus in the movement from A to C through B, C is the last terminus, while B is a terminus, but not the last. And intention can be both. Consequently though intention is always of the end, it need not be always of the last end.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod intentio cordis dicitur clamor ad Deum, non quod Deus sit obiectum intentionis semper, sed quia est intentionis cognitor. Vel quia, cum oramus, intentionem nostram ad Deum dirigimus, quae quidem intentio vim clamoris habet.   Reply to Objection 1: The intention of the heart is called a cry to God, not that God is always the object of intention, but because He sees our intention. Or because, when we pray, we direct our intention to God, which intention has the force of a cry.
Ad secundum dicendum quod terminus habet rationem ultimi; sed non semper ultimi respectu totius, sed quandoque respectu alicuius partis.   Reply to Objection 2: A terminus is something last, not always in respect of the whole, but sometimes in respect of a part.
Ad tertium dicendum quod fruitio importat quietem in fine, quod pertinet solum ad ultimum finem. Sed intentio importat motum in finem, non autem quietem. Unde non est similis ratio.   Reply to Objection 3: Enjoyment implies rest in the end; and this belongs to the last end alone. But intention implies movement towards an end, not rest. Wherefore the comparison proves nothing.

 

Index  [<< | >>]
First Part of the Second Part  [<< | >>]
Question: 12  [<< | >>]
Article: 3  [<< | >>]

Whether one can intend two things at the same time?

Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod non possit aliquis simul plura intendere. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de Serm. Dom. in monte, quod non potest homo simul intendere Deum et commodum corporale. Ergo pari ratione, neque aliqua alia duo.   Objection 1: It would seem that one cannot intend several things at the same time. For Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 14,16,17) that man's intention cannot be directed at the same time to God and to bodily benefits. Therefore, for the same reason, neither to any other two things.
Praeterea, intentio nominat motum voluntatis ad terminum. Sed unius motus non possunt esse plures termini ex una parte. Ergo voluntas non potest simul multa intendere.   Objection 2: Further, intention designates a movement of the will towards a terminus. Now there cannot be several termini in the same direction of one movement. Therefore the will cannot intend several things at the same time.
Praeterea, intentio praesupponit actum rationis sive intellectus. Sed non contingit simul plura intelligere, secundum philosophum. Ergo etiam neque contingit simul plura intendere   Objection 3: Further, intention presupposes an act of reason or of the intellect. But "it is not possible to understand several things at the same time," according to the Philosopher (Topic. ii, 10). Therefore neither is it possible to intend several things at the same time.
Sed contra, ars imitatur naturam. Sed natura ex uno instrumento intendit duas utilitates, sicut lingua ordinatur et ad gustum et ad locutionem, ut dicitur in II de anima. Ergo, pari ratione ars vel ratio potest simul aliquid unum ad duos fines ordinare. Et ita potest aliquis simul plura intendere.   On the contrary, Art imitates nature. Now nature intends two purposes by means of one instrument: thus "the tongue is for the purpose of taste and speech" (De Anima ii, 8). Therefore, for the same reason, art or reason can at the same time direct one thing to two ends: so that one can intend several ends at the same time.
Respondeo dicendum quod aliqua duo possunt accipi dupliciter, vel ordinata ad invicem, vel ad invicem non ordinata. Et si quidem ad invicem fuerint ordinata, manifestum est ex praemissis quod homo potest simul multa intendere. Est enim intentio non solum finis ultimi, ut dictum est, sed etiam finis medii. Simul autem intendit aliquis et finem proximum, et ultimum; sicut confectionem medicinae, et sanitatem.   I answer that, The expression "two things" may be taken in two ways: they may be ordained to one another or not so ordained. And if they be ordained to one another, it is evident, from what has been said, that a man can intend several things at the same time. For intention is not only of the last end, as stated above (Article [2]), but also of an intermediary end. Now a man intends at the same time, both the proximate and the last end; as the mixing of a medicine and the giving of health.
Si autem accipiantur duo ad invicem non ordinata, sic etiam simul homo potest plura intendere. Quod patet ex hoc, quod homo unum alteri praeeligit, quia melius est altero, inter alias autem conditiones quibus aliquid est melius altero, una est quod ad plura valet, unde potest aliquid praeeligi alteri, ex hoc quod ad plura valet. Et sic manifeste homo simul plura intendit.    But if we take two things that are not ordained to one another, thus also a man can intend several things at the same time. This is evident from the fact that a man prefers one thing to another because it is the better of the two. Now one of the reasons for which one thing is better than another is that it is available for more purposes: wherefore one thing can be chosen in preference to another, because of the greater number of purposes for which it is available: so that evidently a man can intend several things at the same time.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Augustinus intelligit hominem non posse simul Deum et commodum temporale intendere, sicut ultimos fines, quia, ut supra ostensum est, non possunt esse plures fines ultimi unius hominis.   Reply to Objection 1: Augustine means to say that man cannot at the same time direct his attention to God and to bodily benefits, as to two last ends: since, as stated above (Question [1], Article [5]), one man cannot have several last ends.
Ad secundum dicendum quod unius motus possunt ex una parte esse plures termini, si unus ad alium ordinetur, sed duo termini ad invicem non ordinati, ex una parte, unius motus esse non possunt. Sed tamen considerandum est quod id quod non est unum secundum rem, potest accipi ut unum secundum rationem. Intentio autem est motus voluntatis in aliquid praeordinatum in ratione, sicut dictum est. Et ideo ea quae sunt plura secundum rem, possunt accipi ut unus terminus intentionis, prout sunt unum secundum rationem, vel quia aliqua duo concurrunt ad integrandum aliquid unum, sicut ad sanitatem concurrunt calor et frigus commensurata; vel quia aliqua duo sub uno communi continentur, quod potest esse intentum. Puta acquisitio vini et vestis continetur sub lucro, sicut sub quodam communi, unde nihil prohibet quin ille qui intendit lucrum, simul haec duo intendat.   Reply to Objection 2: There can be several termini ordained to one another, of the same movement and in the same direction; but not unless they be ordained to one another. At the same time it must be observed that what is not one in reality may be taken as one by the reason. Now intention is a movement of the will to something already ordained by the reason, as stated above (Article [1], ad 3). Wherefore where we have many things in reality, we may take them as one term of intention, in so far as the reason takes them as one: either because two things concur in the integrity of one whole, as a proper measure of heat and cold conduce to health; or because two things are included in one which may be intended. For instance, the acquiring of wine and clothing is included in wealth, as in something common to both; wherefore nothing hinders the man who intends to acquire wealth, from intending both the others.
Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut in primo dictum est, contingit simul plura intelligere, inquantum sunt aliquo modo unum.   Reply to Objection 3: As stated in the FP, Question [12], Article [10]; FP, Question [58], Article [2]; FP, Question [85], Article [4] it is possible to understand several things at the same time, in so far as, in some way, they are one.

 

Index  [<< | >>]
First Part of the Second Part  [<< | >>]
Question: 12  [<< | >>]
Article: 4  [<< | >>]

Whether intention of the end is the same act as the volition of the means?

Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit unus et idem motus intentio finis, et voluntas eius quod est ad finem. Dicit enim Augustinus, in XI de Trin., quod voluntas videndi fenestram, finem habet fenestrae visionem; et altera est voluntas per fenestram videndi transeuntes. Sed hoc pertinet ad intentionem, quod velim videre transeuntes per fenestram, hoc autem ad voluntatem eius quod est ad finem, quod velim videre fenestram. Ergo alius est motus voluntatis intentio finis, et alius voluntas eius quod est ad finem.   Objection 1: It would seem that the intention of the end and the volition of the means are not one and the same movement. For Augustine says (De Trin. xi, 6) that "the will to see the window, has for its end the seeing of the window; and is another act from the will to see, through the window, the passersby." But that I should will to see the passersby, through the window, belongs to intention; whereas that I will to see the window, belongs to the volition of the means. Therefore intention of the end and the willing of the means are distinct movements of the will.
Praeterea, voluntas eius quod est ad finem, dicitur electio. Sed non est idem electio et intentio. Ergo non est idem motus intentio finis, cum voluntate eius quod est ad finem.   Objection 2: Further, acts are distinct according to their objects. But the end and the means are distinct objects. Therefore the intention of the end and the willing of the means are distinct movements of the will.
Praeterea, voluntas eius quod est ad finem, dicitur electio. Sed non est idem electio et intentio. Ergo non est idem motus intentio finis, cum voluntate eius quod est ad finem.   Objection 3: Further, the willing of the means is called choice. But choice and intention are not the same. Therefore intention of the end and the willing of the means are not the same movement of the will.
Praeterea, voluntas eius quod est ad finem, dicitur electio. Sed non est idem electio et intentio. Ergo non est idem motus intentio finis, cum voluntate eius quod est ad finem.   On the contrary, The means in relation to the end, are as the mid-space to the terminus. Now it is all the same movement that passes through the mid-space to the terminus, in natural things. Therefore in things pertaining to the will, the intention of the end is the same movement as the willing of the means.
Respondeo dicendum quod motus voluntatis in finem et in id quod est ad finem, potest considerari dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum quod voluntas in utrumque fertur absolute et secundum se. Et sic sunt simpliciter duo motus voluntatis in utrumque. Alio modo potest considerari secundum quod voluntas fertur in id quod est ad finem, propter finem. Et sic unus et idem subiecto motus voluntatis est tendens ad finem, et in id quod est ad finem. Cum enim dico, volo medicinam propter sanitatem, non designo nisi unum motum voluntatis. Cuius ratio est quia finis ratio est volendi ea quae sunt ad finem. Idem autem actus cadit super obiectum, et super rationem obiecti, sicut eadem visio est coloris et luminis, ut supra dictum est. Et est simile de intellectu, quia si absolute principium et conclusionem consideret, diversa est consideratio utriusque; in hoc autem quod conclusioni propter principia assentit, est unus actus intellectus tantum.   I answer that, The movement of the will to the end and to the means can be considered in two ways. First, according as the will is moved to each of the aforesaid absolutely and in itself. And thus there are really two movements of the will to them. Secondly, it may be considered accordingly as the will is moved to the means for the sake of the end: and thus the movement of the will to the end and its movement to the means are one and the same thing. For when I say: "I wish to take medicine for the sake of health," I signify no more than one movement of my will. And this is because the end is the reason for willing the means. Now the object, and that by reason of which it is an object, come under the same act; thus it is the same act of sight that perceives color and light, as stated above (Question [8], Article [3], ad 2). And the same applies to the intellect; for if it consider principle and conclusion absolutely, it considers each by a distinct act; but when it assents to the conclusion on account of the principles, there is but one act of the intellect.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur de visione fenestrae, et visione transeuntium per fenestram, secundum quod voluntas in utrumque absolute fertur.   Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is speaking of seeing the window and of seeing, through the window, the passersby, according as the will is moved to either absolutely.
Ad secundum dicendum quod finis, inquantum est res quaedam, est aliud voluntatis obiectum quam id quod est ad finem. Sed inquantum est ratio volendi id quod est ad finem, est unum et idem obiectum,   Reply to Objection 2: The end, considered as a thing, and the means to that end, are distinct objects of the will. But in so far as the end is the formal object in willing the means, they are one and the same object.
Ad tertium dicendum quod motus qui est unus subiecto, potest ratione differre secundum principium et finem, ut ascensio et descensio, sicut dicitur in III Physic. Sic igitur inquantum motus voluntatis fertur in id quod est ad finem, prout ordinatur ad finem, est electio. Motus autem voluntatis qui fertur in finem, secundum quod acquiritur per ea quae sunt ad finem, vocatur intentio. Cuius signum est quod intentio finis esse potest, etiam nondum determinatis his quae sunt ad finem, quorum est electio.   Reply to Objection 3: A movement which is one as to the subject, may differ, according to our way of looking at it, as to its beginning and end, as in the case of ascent and descent (Phys. iii, 3). Accordingly, in so far as the movement of the will is to the means, as ordained to the end, it is called "choice": but the movement of the will to the end as acquired by the means, it is called "intention." A sign of this is that we can have intention of the end without having determined the means which are the object of choice.

 

Index  [<< | >>]
First Part of the Second Part  [<< | >>]
Question: 12  [<< | >>]
Article: 5  [<< | >>]

Whether intention is within the competency of irrational animals?

Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod bruta animalia intendant finem. Natura enim in his quae cognitione carent, magis distat a rationali natura, quam natura sensitiva, quae est in animalibus brutis. Sed natura intendit finem etiam in his quae cognitione carent, ut probatur in II Physic. Ergo multo magis bruta animalia intendunt finem.   Objection 1: It would seem that irrational animals intend the end. For in things void of reason nature stands further apart from the rational nature, than does the sensitive nature in irrational animals. But nature intends the end even in things void of reason, as is proved in Phys. ii, 8. Much more, therefore, do irrational animals intend the end.
Praeterea, sicut intentio est finis, ita et fruitio. Sed fruitio convenit brutis animalibus, ut dictum est. Ergo et intentio.   Objection 2: Further, just as intention is of the end, so is enjoyment. But enjoyment is in irrational animals, as stated above (Question [11], Article [2]). Therefore intention is too.
Praeterea, eius est intendere finem, cuius est agere propter finem, cum intendere nihil sit nisi in aliud tendere. Sed bruta animalia agunt propter finem, movetur enim animal vel ad cibum quaerendum, vel ad aliquid huiusmodi. Ergo bruta animalia intendunt finem.   Objection 3: Further, to intend an end belongs to one who acts for an end; since to intend is nothing else than to tend to something. But irrational animals act for an end; for an animal is moved either to seek food, or to do something of the kind. Therefore irrational animals intend an end.
Sed contra, intentio finis importat ordinationem alicuius in finem quod est rationis. Cum igitur bruta animalia non habeant rationem, videtur quod non intendant finem.   On the contrary, Intention of an end implies ordaining something to an end: which belongs to reason. Since therefore irrational animals are void of reason, it seems that they do not intend an end.
Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, intendere est in aliud tendere; quod quidem est et moventis, et moti. Secundum quidem igitur quod dicitur intendere finem id quod movetur ad finem ab alio, sic natura dicitur intendere finem, quasi mota ad suum finem a Deo, sicut sagitta a sagittante. Et hoc modo etiam bruta animalia intendunt finem, inquantum moventur instinctu naturali ad aliquid. Alio modo intendere finem est moventis, prout scilicet ordinat motum alicuius, vel sui vel alterius, in finem. Quod est rationis tantum. Unde per hunc modum bruta non intendunt finem, quod est proprie et principaliter intendere, ut dictum est.   I answer that, As stated above (Article [1]), to intend is to tend to something; and this belongs to the mover and to the moved. According, therefore, as that which is moved to an end by another is said to intend the end, thus nature is said to intend an end, as being moved to its end by God, as the arrow is moved by the archer. And in this way, irrational animals intend an end, inasmuch as they are moved to something by natural instinct. The other way of intending an end belongs to the mover; according as he ordains the movement of something, either his own or another's, to an end. This belongs to reason alone. Wherefore irrational animals do not intend an end in this way, which is to intend properly and principally, as stated above (Article [1]).
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procedit secundum quod intendere est eius quod movetur ad finem.   Reply to Objection 1: This argument takes intention in the sense of being moved to an end.
Ad secundum dicendum quod fruitio non importat ordinationem alicuius in aliquid, sicut intentio; sed absolutam quietem in fine.   Reply to Objection 2: Enjoyment does not imply the ordaining of one thing to another, as intention does, but absolute repose in the end.
Ad tertium dicendum quod bruta animalia moventur ad finem, non quasi considerantia quod per motum suum possunt consequi finem, quod est proprie intendentis, sed concupiscentia finem naturali instinctu, moventur ad finem quasi ab alio mota, sicut et cetera quae moventur naturaliter.   Reply to Objection 3: Irrational animals are moved to an end, not as though they thought that they can gain the end by this movement; this belongs to one that intends; but through desiring the end by natural instinct, they are moved to an end, moved, as it were, by another, like other things that are moved naturally.

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