St. Thomas Aquinas

The Summa Theologica

(Benziger Bros. edition, 1947)
Translated by
Fathers of the English Dominican Province

 

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Question: 108  [<< | >>]

OF THOSE THINGS THAT ARE CONTAINED IN THE NEW LAW (FOUR ARTICLES)

Deinde considerandum est de his quae continentur in lege nova. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor.    We must now consider those things that are contained in the New Law: under which head there are four points of inquiry:
Primo, utrum lex nova debeat aliqua opera exteriora praecipere vel prohibere.     (1) Whether the New Law ought to prescribe or to forbid any outward works?
Secundo, utrum sufficienter se habeat in exterioribus actibus praecipiendis vel prohibendis.     (2) Whether the New Law makes sufficient provision in prescribing and forbidding external acts?
Tertio, utrum convenienter instituat homines quantum ad actus interiores.     (3) Whether in the matter of internal acts it directs man sufficiently?
Quarto, utrum convenienter superaddat consilia praeceptis.     (4) Whether it fittingly adds counsels to precepts?

 

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Question: 108  [<< | >>]
Article: 1  [<< | >>]

Whether the New Law ought to prescribe or prohibit any external acts?

Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex nova nullos exteriores actus debeat praecipere vel prohibere. Lex enim nova est Evangelium regni; secundum illud Matth. XXIV, praedicabitur hoc Evangelium regni in universo orbe. Sed regnum Dei non consistit in exterioribus actibus, sed solum in interioribus; secundum illud Luc. XVII, regnum Dei intra vos est; et Rom. XIV, non est regnum Dei esca et potus, sed iustitia et pax et gaudium in spiritu sancto. Ergo lex nova non debet praecipere vel prohibere aliquos exteriores actus.   Objection 1: It would seem that the New Law should not prescribe or prohibit any external acts. For the New Law is the Gospel of the kingdom, according to Mt. 24:14: "This Gospel of the kingdom shall be preached in the whole world." But the kingdom of God consists not in exterior, but only in interior acts, according to Lk. 17:21: "The kingdom of God is within you"; and Rm. 14:17: "The kingdom of God is not meat and drink; but justice and peace and joy in the Holy Ghost." Therefore the New Law should not prescribe or forbid any external acts.
Praeterea, lex nova est lex spiritus, ut dicitur Rom. VIII. Sed ubi spiritus domini, ibi libertas, ut dicitur II ad Cor. III. Non est autem libertas ubi homo obligatur ad aliqua exteriora opera facienda vel vitanda. Ergo lex nova non continet aliqua praecepta vel prohibitiones exteriorum actuum.   Objection 2: Further, the New Law is "the law of the Spirit" (Rm. 8:2). But "where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty" (2 Cor. 3:17). Now there is no liberty when man is bound to do or avoid certain external acts. Therefore the New Law does not prescribe or forbid any external acts.
Praeterea, omnes exteriores actus pertinere intelliguntur ad manum, sicut interiores actus pertinent ad animum. Sed haec ponitur differentia inter novam legem et veterem, quod vetus lex cohibet manum, sed lex nova cohibet animum. Ergo in lege nova non debent poni prohibitiones et praecepta exteriorum actuum, sed solum interiorum.   Objection 3: Further, all external acts are understood as referable to the hand, just as interior acts belong to the mind. But this is assigned as the difference between the New and Old Laws that the "Old Law restrains the hand, whereas the New Law curbs the will" [*Peter Lombard, Sent. iii, D, 40]. Therefore the New Law should not contain prohibitions and commands about exterior deeds, but only about interior acts.
Sed contra est quod per legem novam efficiuntur homines filii lucis, unde dicitur Ioan. XII, credite in lucem, ut filii lucis sitis. Sed filios lucis decet opera lucis facere, et opera tenebrarum abiicere; secundum illud Ephes. V, eratis aliquando tenebrae, nunc autem lux in domino. Ut filii lucis ambulate. Ergo lex nova quaedam exteriora opera debuit prohibere, et quaedam praecipere.   On the contrary, Through the New Law, men are made "children of light": wherefore it is written (Jn. 12:36): "Believe in the light that you may be the children of light." Now it is becoming that children of the light should do deeds of light and cast aside deeds of darkness, according to Eph. 5:8: "You were heretofore darkness, but now light in the Lord. Walk . . . as children of the light." Therefore the New Law had to forbid certain external acts and prescribe others.
Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, principalitas legis novae est gratia spiritus sancti, quae manifestatur in fide per dilectionem operante. Hanc autem gratiam consequuntur homines per Dei filium hominem factum, cuius humanitatem primo replevit gratia, et exinde est ad nos derivata. Unde dicitur Ioan. I, verbum caro factum est; et postea subditur, plenum gratiae et veritatis; et infra, de plenitudine eius nos omnes accepimus, et gratiam pro gratia. Unde subditur quod gratia et veritas per Iesum Christum facta est. Et ideo convenit ut per aliqua exteriora sensibilia gratia a verbo incarnato profluens in nos deducatur; et ex hac interiori gratia, per quam caro spiritui subditur, exteriora quaedam opera sensibilia producantur.   I answer that, As stated above (Question [106], Articles [1],2), the New Law consists chiefly in the grace of the Holy Ghost, which is shown forth by faith that worketh through love. Now men become receivers of this grace through God's Son made man, Whose humanity grace filled first, and thence flowed forth to us. Hence it is written (Jn. 1:14): "The Word was made flesh," and afterwards: "full of grace and truth"; and further on: "Of His fulness we all have received, and grace for grace." Hence it is added that "grace and truth came by Jesus Christ." Consequently it was becoming that the grace flows from the incarnate Word should be given to us by means of certain external sensible objects; and that from this inward grace, whereby the flesh is subjected to the Spirit, certain external works should ensue.
Sic igitur exteriora opera dupliciter ad gratiam pertinere possunt. Uno modo, sicut inducentia aliqualiter ad gratiam. Et talia sunt opera sacramentorum quae in lege nova sunt instituta, sicut Baptismus, Eucharistia, et alia huiusmodi.    Accordingly external acts may have a twofold connection with grace. In the first place, as leading in some way to grace. Such are the sacramental acts which are instituted in the New Law, e.g. Baptism, the Eucharist, and the like.
Alia vero sunt opera exteriora quae ex instinctu gratiae producuntur. Et in his est quaedam differentia attendenda. Quaedam enim habent necessariam convenientiam vel contrarietatem ad interiorem gratiam, quae in fide per dilectionem operante consistit. Et huiusmodi exteriora opera sunt praecepta vel prohibita in lege nova, sicut praecepta est confessio fidei, et prohibita negatio; dicitur enim Matth. X, qui confitebitur me coram hominibus, confitebor et ego eum coram patre meo. Qui autem negaverit me coram hominibus, negabo et ego eum coram patre meo. Alia vero sunt opera quae non habent necessariam contrarietatem vel convenientiam ad fidem per dilectionem operantem. Et talia opera non sunt in nova lege praecepta vel prohibita ex ipsa prima legis institutione; sed relicta sunt a legislatore, scilicet Christo, unicuique, secundum quod aliquis curam gerere debet. Et sic unicuique liberum est circa talia determinare quid sibi expediat facere vel vitare; et cuicumque praesidenti, circa talia ordinare suis subditis quid sit in talibus faciendum vel vitandum. Unde etiam quantum ad hoc dicitur lex Evangelii lex libertatis, nam lex vetus multa determinabat, et pauca relinquebat hominum libertati determinanda.    In the second place there are those external acts which ensue from the promptings of grace: and herein we must observe a difference. For there are some which are necessarily in keeping with, or in opposition to inward grace consisting in faith that worketh through love. Such external works are prescribed or forbidden in the New Law; thus confession of faith is prescribed, and denial of faith is forbidden; for it is written (Mt. 10:32,33) "(Every one) that shall confess Me before men, I will also confess him before My Father . . . But he that shall deny Me before men, I will also deny him before My Father." On the other hand, there are works which are not necessarily opposed to, or in keeping with faith that worketh through love. Such works are not prescribed or forbidden in the New Law, by virtue of its primitive institution; but have been left by the Lawgiver, i.e. Christ, to the discretion of each individual. And so to each one it is free to decide what he should do or avoid; and to each superior, to direct his subjects in such matters as regards what they must do or avoid. Wherefore also in this respect the Gospel is called the "law of liberty" [*Cf. Reply Objection [2]]: since the Old Law decided many points and left few to man to decide as he chose.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod regnum Dei in interioribus actibus principaliter consistit, sed ex consequenti etiam ad regnum Dei pertinent omnia illa sine quibus interiores actus esse non possunt. Sicut si regnum Dei est interior iustitia et pax et gaudium spirituale, necesse est quod omnes exteriores actus qui repugnant iustitiae aut paci aut gaudio spirituali, repugnent regno Dei, et ideo sunt in Evangelio regni prohibendi. Illa vero quae indifferenter se habent respectu horum, puta comedere hos vel illos cibos, in his non est regnum Dei, unde apostolus praemittit, non est regnum Dei esca et potus.   Reply to Objection 1: The kingdom of God consists chiefly in internal acts: but as a consequence all things that are essential to internal acts belong also to the kingdom of God. Thus if the kingdom of God is internal righteousness, peace, and spiritual joy, all external acts that are incompatible with righteousness, peace, and spiritual joy, are in opposition to the kingdom of God; and consequently should be forbidden in the Gospel of the kingdom. On the other hand, those things that are indifferent as regards the aforesaid, for instance, to eat of this or that food, are not part of the kingdom of God; wherefore the Apostle says before the words quoted: "The kingdom of God is not meat and drink."
Ad secundum dicendum quod, secundum philosophum, in I Metaphys., liber est qui sui causa est. Ille ergo libere aliquid agit qui ex seipso agit. Quod autem homo agit ex habitu suae naturae convenienti, ex seipso agit, quia habitus inclinat in modum naturae. Si vero habitus esset naturae repugnans, homo non ageret secundum quod est ipse, sed secundum aliquam corruptionem sibi supervenientem. Quia igitur gratia spiritus sancti est sicut interior habitus nobis infusus inclinans nos ad recte operandum, facit nos libere operari ea quae conveniunt gratiae, et vitare ea quae gratiae repugnant.   Reply to Objection 2: According to the Philosopher (Metaph. i, 2), what is "free is cause of itself." Therefore he acts freely, who acts of his own accord. Now man does of his own accord that which he does from a habit that is suitable to his nature: since a habit inclines one as a second nature. If, however, a habit be in opposition to nature, man would not act according to his nature, but according to some corruption affecting that nature. Since then the grace of the Holy Ghost is like an interior habit bestowed on us and inclining us to act aright, it makes us do freely those things that are becoming to grace, and shun what is opposed to it.
Sic igitur lex nova dicitur lex libertatis dupliciter. Uno modo, quia non arctat nos ad facienda vel vitanda aliqua, nisi quae de se sunt vel necessaria vel repugnantia saluti, quae cadunt sub praecepto vel prohibitione legis. Secundo, quia huiusmodi etiam praecepta vel prohibitiones facit nos libere implere, inquantum ex interiori instinctu gratiae ea implemus. Et propter haec duo lex nova dicitur lex perfectae libertatis, Iac. I.    Accordingly the New Law is called the law of liberty in two respects. First, because it does not bind us to do or avoid certain things, except such as are of themselves necessary or opposed to salvation, and come under the prescription or prohibition of the law. Secondly, because it also makes us comply freely with these precepts and prohibitions, inasmuch as we do so through the promptings of grace. It is for these two reasons that the New Law is called "the law of perfect liberty" (James 1:25).
Ad tertium dicendum quod lex nova, cohibendo animum ab inordinatis motibus, oportet quod etiam cohibeat manum ab inordinatis actibus, qui sunt effectus interiorum motuum.   Reply to Objection 3: The New Law, by restraining the mind from inordinate movements, must needs also restrain the hand from inordinate acts, which ensue from inward movements.

 

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Question: 108  [<< | >>]
Article: 2  [<< | >>]

Whether the New Law made sufficient ordinations about external acts?

Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex nova insufficienter exteriores actus ordinaverit. Ad legem enim novam praecipue pertinere videtur fides per dilectionem operans; secundum illud ad Gal. V, in Christo Iesu neque circumcisio aliquid valet neque praeputium, sed fides quae per dilectionem operatur. Sed lex nova explicavit quaedam credenda quae non erant in veteri lege explicita, sicut de fide Trinitatis. Ergo etiam debuit superaddere aliqua exteriora opera moralia, quae non erant in veteri lege determinata.   Objection 1: It would seem that the New Law made insufficient ordinations about external acts. Because faith that worketh through charity seems chiefly to belong to the New Law, according to Gal. 5:6: "In Christ Jesus neither circumcision availeth anything, nor uncircumcision: but faith that worketh through charity." But the New Law declared explicitly certain points of faith which were not set forth explicitly in the Old Law; for instance, belief in the Trinity. Therefore it should also have added certain outward moral deeds, which were not fixed in the Old Law.
Praeterea, in veteri lege non solum instituta sunt sacramenta, sed etiam aliqua sacra, ut supra dictum est. Sed in nova lege, etsi sint instituta aliqua sacramenta, nulla tamen sacra instituta a domino videntur, puta quae pertineant vel ad sanctificationem alicuius templi aut vasorum, vel etiam ad aliquam solemnitatem celebrandam. Ergo lex nova insufficienter exteriora ordinavit.   Objection 2: Further, in the Old Law not only were sacraments instituted, but also certain sacred things, as stated above (Question [101], Article [4]; Question [102], Article [4]). But in the New Law, although certain sacraments are instituted by Our Lord; for instance, pertaining either to the sanctification of a temple or of the vessels, or to the celebration of some particular feast. Therefore the New Law made insufficient ordinations about external matters.
Praeterea, in veteri lege, sicut erant quaedam observantiae pertinentes ad Dei ministros, ita etiam erant quaedam observantiae pertinentes ad populum; ut supra dictum est, cum de caeremonialibus veteris legis ageretur. Sed in nova lege videntur aliquae observantiae esse datae ministris Dei, ut patet Matth. X, nolite possidere aurum neque argentum, neque pecuniam in zonis vestris, et cetera quae ibi sequuntur, et quae dicuntur Luc. IX et X. Ergo etiam debuerunt aliquae observantiae institui in nova lege ad populum fidelem pertinentes.   Objection 3: Further, in the Old Law, just as there were certain observances pertaining to God's ministers, so also were there certain observances pertaining to the people: as was stated above when we were treating of the ceremonial of the Old Law (Question [101], Article [4]; Question [102], Article [6]). Now in the New Law certain observances seem to have been prescribed to the ministers of God; as may be gathered from Mt. 10:9: "Do not possess gold, nor silver, nor money in your purses," nor other things which are mentioned here and Lk. 9,10. Therefore certain observances pertaining to the faithful should also have been instituted in the New Law.
Praeterea, in veteri lege, praeter moralia et caeremonialia, fuerunt quaedam iudicialia praecepta. Sed in lege nova non traduntur aliqua iudicialia praecepta. Ergo lex nova insufficienter exteriora opera ordinavit.   Objection 4: Further, in the Old Law, besides moral and ceremonial precepts, there were certain judicial precepts. But in the New Law there are no judicial precepts. Therefore the New Law made insufficient ordinations about external works.
Sed contra est quod dominus dicit, Matth. VII, omnis qui audit verba mea haec et facit ea, assimilabitur viro sapienti qui aedificavit domum suam supra petram. Sed sapiens aedificator nihil omittit eorum quae sunt necessaria ad aedificium. Ergo in verbis Christi sufficienter sunt omnia posita quae pertinent ad salutem humanam.   On the contrary, Our Lord said (Mt. 7:24): "Every one . . . that heareth these My words, and doth them, shall be likened to a wise man that built his house upon a rock." But a wise builder leaves out nothing that is necessary to the building. Therefore Christ's words contain all things necessary for man's salvation.
Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, lex nova in exterioribus illa solum praecipere debuit vel prohibere, per quae in gratiam introducimur, vel quae pertinent ad rectum gratiae usum ex necessitate. Et quia gratiam ex nobis consequi non possumus, sed per Christum solum, ideo sacramenta, per quae gratiam consequimur, ipse dominus instituit per seipsum, scilicet Baptismum, Eucharistiam, ordinem ministrorum novae legis, instituendo apostolos et septuaginta duos discipulos, et poenitentiam, et matrimonium indivisibile. Confirmationem etiam promisit per spiritus sancti missionem. Ex eius etiam institutione apostoli leguntur oleo infirmos ungendo sanasse, ut habetur Marc. VI. Quae sunt novae legis sacramenta.   I answer that, as stated above (Article [1]), the New Law had to make such prescriptions or prohibitions alone as are essential for the reception or right use of grace. And since we cannot of ourselves obtain grace, but through Christ alone, hence Christ of Himself instituted the sacraments whereby we obtain grace: viz. Baptism, Eucharist, Orders of the ministers of the New Law, by the institution of the apostles and seventy-two disciples, Penance, and indissoluble Matrimony. He promised Confirmation through the sending of the Holy Ghost: and we read that by His institution the apostles healed the sick by anointing them with oil (Mk. 6:13). These are the sacraments of the New Law.
Rectus autem gratiae usus est per opera caritatis. Quae quidem secundum quod sunt de necessitate virtutis, pertinent ad praecepta moralia, quae etiam in veteri lege tradebantur. Unde quantum ad hoc, lex nova super veterem addere non debuit circa exteriora agenda. Determinatio autem praedictorum operum in ordine ad cultum Dei, pertinet ad praecepta caeremonialia legis; in ordine vero ad proximum, ad iudicialia; ut supra dictum est. Et ideo, quia istae determinationes non sunt secundum se de necessitate interioris gratiae, in qua lex consistit; idcirco non cadunt sub praecepto novae legis, sed relinquuntur humano arbitrio; quaedam quidem quantum ad subditos, quae scilicet pertinent singillatim ad unumquemque; quaedam vero ad praelatos temporales vel spirituales, quae scilicet pertinent ad utilitatem communem.    The right use of grace is by means of works of charity. These, in so far as they are essential to virtue, pertain to the moral precepts, which also formed part of the Old Law. Hence, in this respect, the New Law had nothing to add as regards external action. The determination of these works in their relation to the divine worship, belongs to the ceremonial precepts of the Law; and, in relation to our neighbor, to the judicial precepts, as stated above (Question [99], Article [4]). And therefore, since these determinations are not in themselves necessarily connected with inward grace wherein the Law consists, they do not come under a precept of the New Law, but are left to the decision of man; some relating to inferiors—as when a precept is given to an individual; others, relating to superiors, temporal or spiritual, referring, namely, to the common good.
Sic igitur lex nova nulla alia exteriora opera determinare debuit praecipiendo vel prohibendo, nisi sacramenta, et moralia praecepta quae de se pertinent ad rationem virtutis, puta non esse occidendum, non esse furandum, et alia huiusmodi.    Accordingly the New Law had no other external works to determine, by prescribing or forbidding, except the sacraments, and those moral precepts which have a necessary connection with virtue, for instance, that one must not kill, or steal, and so forth.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ea quae sunt fidei, sunt supra rationem humanam, unde in ea non possumus pervenire nisi per gratiam. Et ideo, abundantiori gratia superveniente, oportuit plura credenda explicari. Sed ad opera virtutum dirigimur per rationem naturalem, quae est regula quaedam operationis humanae, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo in his non oportuit aliqua praecepta dari ultra moralia legis praecepta, quae sunt de dictamine rationis.   Reply to Objection 1: Matters of faith are above human reason, and so we cannot attain to them except through grace. Consequently, when grace came to be bestowed more abundantly, the result was an increase in the number of explicit points of faith. On the other hand, it is through human reason that we are directed to works of virtue, for it is the rule of human action, as stated above (Question [19], Article [3]; Question [63], Article [2]). Wherefore in such matters as these there was no need for any precepts to be given besides the moral precepts of the Law, which proceed from the dictate of reason.
Ad secundum dicendum quod in sacramentis novae legis datur gratia, quae non est nisi a Christo, et ideo oportuit quod ab ipso institutionem haberent. Sed in sacris non datur aliqua gratia, puta in consecratione templi vel altaris vel aliorum huiusmodi, aut etiam in ipsa celebritate solemnitatum. Et ideo talia, quia secundum seipsa non pertinent ad necessitatem interioris gratiae, dominus fidelibus instituenda reliquit pro suo arbitrio.   Reply to Objection 2: In the sacraments of the New Law grace is bestowed, which cannot be received except through Christ: consequently they had to be instituted by Him. But in the sacred things no grace is given: for instance, in the consecration of a temple, an altar or the like, or, again, in the celebration of feasts. Wherefore Our Lord left the institution of such things to the discretion of the faithful, since they have not of themselves any necessary connection with inward grace.
Ad tertium dicendum quod illa praecepta dominus dedit apostolis non tanquam caeremoniales observantias, sed tanquam moralia instituta. Et possunt intelligi dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum Augustinum, in libro de consensu Evangelist., ut non sint praecepta, sed concessiones. Concessit enim eis ut possent pergere ad praedicationis officium sine pera et baculo et aliis huiusmodi, tanquam habentes potestatem necessaria vitae accipiendi ab illis quibus praedicabant, unde subdit, dignus enim est operarius cibo suo. Non autem peccat, sed supererogat, qui sua portat, ex quibus vivat in praedicationis officio, non accipiens sumptum ab his quibus Evangelium praedicat, sicut Paulus fecit.   Reply to Objection 3: Our Lord gave the apostles those precepts not as ceremonial observances, but as moral statutes: and they can be understood in two ways. First, following Augustine (De Consensu Evang. 30), as being not commands but permissions. For He permitted them to set forth to preach without scrip or stick, and so on, since they were empowered to accept their livelihood from those to whom they preached: wherefore He goes on to say: "For the laborer is worthy of his hire." Nor is it a sin, but a work of supererogation for a preacher to take means of livelihood with him, without accepting supplies from those to whom he preaches; as Paul did (1 Cor. 9:4, seqq.).
Alio modo possunt intelligi, secundum aliorum sanctorum expositionem, ut sint quaedam statuta temporalia apostolis data pro illo tempore quo mittebantur ad praedicandum in Iudaea ante Christi passionem. Indigebant enim discipuli, quasi adhuc parvuli sub Christi cura existentes, accipere aliqua specialia instituta a Christo, sicut et quilibet subditi a suis praelatis, et praecipue quia erant paulatim exercitandi ut temporalium sollicitudinem abdicarent, per quod reddebantur idonei ad hoc quod Evangelium per universum orbem praedicarent. Nec est mirum si, adhuc durante statu veteris legis, et nondum perfectam libertatem spiritus consecutis, quosdam determinatos modos vivendi instituit. Quae quidem statuta, imminente passione, removit, tanquam discipulis iam per ea sufficienter exercitatis. Unde Luc. XXII, dixit, quando misi vos sine sacculo et pera et calceamentis, numquid aliquid defuit vobis? At illi dixerunt, nihil. Dixit ergo eis, sed nunc qui habet sacculum, tollat; similiter et peram. Iam enim imminebat tempus perfectae libertatis, ut totaliter suo dimitterentur arbitrio in his quae secundum se non pertinent ad necessitatem virtutis.    Secondly, according to the explanation of other holy men, they may be considered as temporal commands laid upon the apostles for the time during which they were sent to preach in Judea before Christ's Passion. For the disciples, being yet as little children under Christ's care, needed to receive some special commands from Christ, such as all subjects receive from their superiors: and especially so, since they were to be accustomed little by little to renounce the care of temporalities, so as to become fitted for the preaching of the Gospel throughout the whole world. Nor must we wonder if He established certain fixed modes of life, as long as the state of the Old Law endured and the people had not as yet achieved the perfect liberty of the Spirit. These statutes He abolished shortly before His Passion, as though the disciples had by their means become sufficiently practiced. Hence He said (Lk. 22:35,36) "When I sent you without purse and scrip and shoes, did you want anything? But they said: Nothing. Then said He unto them: But now, he that hath a purse, let him take it, and likewise a scrip." Because the time of perfect liberty was already at hand, when they would be left entirely to their own judgment in matters not necessarily connected with virtue.
Ad quartum dicendum quod iudicialia etiam, secundum se considerata, non sunt de necessitate virtutis quantum ad talem determinationem sed solum quantum ad communem rationem iustitiae. Et ideo iudicialia praecepta reliquit dominus disponenda his qui curam aliorum erant habituri vel spiritualem vel temporalem. Sed circa iudicialia praecepta veteris legis quaedam explanavit, propter malum intellectum Pharisaeorum, ut infra dicetur,   Reply to Objection 4: Judicial precepts also, are not essential to virtue in respect of any particular determination, but only in regard to the common notion of justice. Consequently Our Lord left the judicial precepts to the discretion of those who were to have spiritual or temporal charge of others. But as regards the judicial precepts of the Old Law, some of them He explained, because they were misunderstood by the Pharisees, as we shall state later on (Article [3], ad 2).

 

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Question: 108  [<< | >>]
Article: 3  [<< | >>]

Whether the New Law directed man sufficiently as regards interior actions?

Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod circa interiores actus lex nova insufficienter hominem ordinaverit. Sunt enim decem praecepta Decalogi ordinantia hominem ad Deum et proximum. Sed dominus solum circa tria illorum aliquid adimplevit, scilicet circa prohibitionem homicidii, et circa prohibitionem adulterii, et circa prohibitionem periurii. Ergo videtur quod insufficienter hominem ordinaverit, adimpletionem aliorum praeceptorum praetermittens.   Objection 1: It would seem that the New Law directed man insufficiently as regards interior actions. For there are ten commandments of the decalogue directing man to God and his neighbor. But Our Lord partly fulfilled only three of them: as regards, namely, the prohibition of murder, of adultery, and of perjury. Therefore it seems that, by omitting to fulfil the other precepts, He directed man insufficiently.
Praeterea, dominus nihil ordinavit in Evangelio de iudicialibus praeceptis nisi circa repudium uxoris, et circa poenam talionis, et circa persecutionem inimicorum. Sed multa sunt alia iudicialia praecepta veteris legis, ut supra dictum est. Ergo quantum ad hoc, insufficienter vitam hominum ordinavit.   Objection 2: Further, as regards the judicial precepts, Our Lord ordained nothing in the Gospel, except in the matter of divorcing of wife, of punishment by retaliation, and of persecuting one's enemies. But there are many other judicial precepts of the Old Law, as stated above (Question [104], Article [4]; Question [105]). Therefore, in this respect, He directed human life insufficiently.
Praeterea, in veteri lege, praeter praecepta moralia et iudicialia, erant quaedam caeremonialia. Circa quae dominus nihil ordinavit. Ergo videtur insufficienter ordinasse.   Objection 3: Further, in the Old Law, besides moral and judicial, there were ceremonial precepts about which Our Lord made no ordination. Therefore it seems that He ordained insufficiently.
Praeterea, ad interiorem bonam mentis dispositionem pertinet ut nullum bonum opus homo faciat propter quemcumque temporalem finem. Sed multa sunt alia temporalia bona quam favor humanus, multa etiam alia sunt bona opera quam ieiunium, eleemosyna et oratio. Ergo inconveniens fuit quod dominus docuit solum circa haec tria opera gloriam favoris humani vitari, et nihil aliud terrenorum bonorum.   Objection 4: Further, in order that the mind be inwardly well disposed, man should do no good deed for any temporal whatever. But there are many other temporal goods besides the favor of man: and there are many other good works besides fasting, alms-deeds, and prayer. Therefore Our Lord unbecomingly taught that only in respect of these three works, and of no other earthly goods ought we to shun the glory of human favor.
Praeterea, naturaliter homini inditum est ut sollicitetur circa ea quae sunt sibi necessaria ad vivendum, in qua etiam sollicitudine alia animalia cum homine conveniunt, unde dicitur Prov. VI, vade ad formicam, o piger, et considera vias eius. Parat in aestate cibum sibi, et congregat in messe quod comedat. Sed omne praeceptum quod datur contra inclinationem naturae, est iniquum, utpote contra legem naturalem existens. Ergo inconvenienter videtur dominus prohibuisse sollicitudinem victus et vestitus.   Objection 5: Further, solicitude for the necessary means of livelihood is by nature instilled into man, and this solicitude even other animals share with man: wherefore it is written (Prov. 6:6,8): "Go to the ant, O sluggard, and consider her ways . . . she provideth her meat for herself in the summer, and gathereth her food in the harvest." But every command issued against the inclination of nature is an unjust command, forasmuch as it is contrary to the law of nature. Therefore it seems that Our Lord unbecomingly forbade solicitude about food and raiment.
Praeterea, nullus actus virtutis est prohibendus. Sed iudicium est actus iustitiae; secundum illud Psalmi XCIII, quousque iustitia convertatur in iudicium. Ergo inconvenienter videtur dominus iudicium prohibuisse. Et ita videtur lex nova insufficienter hominem ordinasse circa interiores actus.   Objection 6: Further, no act of virtue should be the subject of a prohibition. Now judgment is an act of justice, according to Ps. 18:15: "Until justice be turned into judgment." Therefore it seems that Our Lord unbecomingly forbade judgment: and consequently that the New Law directed man insufficiently in the matter of interior acts.
Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de Serm. Dom. in monte, considerandum est quia, cum dixit, qui audit verba mea haec, satis significat sermonem istum domini omnibus praeceptis quibus Christiana vita formatur, esse perfectum.   On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 1): We should take note that, when He said: "'He that heareth these My words,' He indicates clearly that this sermon of the Lord is replete with all the precepts whereby a Christian's life is formed."
Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut ex inducta auctoritate Augustini apparet, sermo quem dominus in monte proposuit, totam informationem Christianae vitae continet. In quo perfecte interiores motus hominis ordinantur. Nam post declaratum beatitudinis finem; et commendata apostolica dignitate, per quos erat doctrina evangelica promulganda; ordinat interiores hominis motus, primo quidem quantum ad seipsum; et deinde quantum ad proximum.   I answer that, As is evident from Augustine's words just quoted, the sermon, contains the whole process of forming the life of a Christian. Therein man's interior movements are ordered. Because after declaring that his end is Beatitude; and after commending the authority of the apostles, through whom the teaching of the Gospel was to be promulgated, He orders man's interior movements, first in regard to man himself, secondly in regard to his neighbor.
Quantum autem ad seipsum, dupliciter; secundum duos interiores hominis motus circa agenda, qui sunt voluntas de agendis, et intentio de fine. Unde primo ordinat hominis voluntatem secundum diversa legis praecepta, ut scilicet abstineat aliquis non solum ab exterioribus operibus quae sunt secundum se mala, sed etiam ab interioribus, et ab occasionibus malorum. Deinde ordinat intentionem hominis, docens quod in bonis quae agimus, neque quaeramus humanam gloriam, neque mundanas divitias, quod est thesaurizare in terra.    This he does in regard to man himself, in two ways, corresponding to man's two interior movements in respect of any prospective action, viz. volition of what has to be done, and intention of the end. Wherefore, in the first place, He directs man's will in respect of the various precepts of the Law: by prescribing that man should refrain not merely from those external works that are evil in themselves, but also from internal acts, and from the occasions of evil deeds. In the second place He directs man's intention, by teaching that in our good works, we should seek neither human praise, nor worldly riches, which is to lay up treasures on earth.
Consequenter autem ordinat interiorem hominis motum quoad proximum, ut scilicet eum non temerarie aut iniuste iudicemus, aut praesumptuose; neque tamen sic simus apud proximum remissi, ut eis sacra committamus, si sint indigni.    Afterwards He directs man's interior movement in respect of his neighbor, by forbidding us, on the one hand, to judge him rashly, unjustly, or presumptuously; and, on the other, to entrust him too readily with sacred things if he be unworthy.
Ultimo autem docet modum adimplendi evangelicam doctrinam, scilicet implorando divinum auxilium; et conatum apponendo ad ingrediendum per angustam portam perfectae virtutis; et cautelam adhibendo ne a seductoribus corrumpamur. Et quod observatio mandatorum eius est necessaria ad virtutem, non autem sufficit sola confessio fidei, vel miraculorum operatio, vel solus auditus.    Lastly, He teaches us how to fulfil the teaching of the Gospel; viz. by imploring the help of God; by striving to enter by the narrow door of perfect virtue; and by being wary lest we be led astray by evil influences. Moreover, He declares that we must observe His commandments, and that it is not enough to make profession of faith, or to work miracles, or merely to hear His words.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod dominus circa illa legis praecepta adimpletionem apposuit, in quibus Scribae et Pharisaei non rectum intellectum habebant. Et hoc contingebat praecipue circa tria praecepta Decalogi. Nam circa prohibitionem adulterii et homicidii, aestimabant solum exteriorem actum prohiberi, non autem interiorem appetitum. Quod magis credebant circa homicidium et adulterium quam circa furtum vel falsum testimonium, quia motus irae in homicidium tendens, et concupiscentiae motus tendens in adulterium, videntur aliqualiter nobis a natura inesse; non autem appetitus furandi, vel falsum testimonium dicendi. Circa periurium vero habebant falsum intellectum, credentes periurium quidem esse peccatum; iuramentum autem per se esse appetendum et frequentandum, quia videtur ad Dei reverentiam pertinere. Et ideo dominus ostendit iuramentum non esse appetendum tanquam bonum; sed melius esse absque iuramento loqui, nisi necessitas cogat.   Reply to Objection 1: Our Lord explained the manner of fulfilling those precepts which the Scribes and Pharisees did not rightly understand: and this affected chiefly those precepts of the decalogue. For they thought that the prohibition of adultery and murder covered the external act only, and not the internal desire. And they held this opinion about murder and adultery rather than about theft and false witness, because the movement of anger tending to murder, and the movement of desire tending to adultery, seem to be in us from nature somewhat, but not the desire of stealing or bearing false witness. They held a false opinion about perjury, for they thought that perjury indeed was a sin; but that oaths were of themselves to be desired and to be taken frequently, since they seem to proceed from reverence to God. Hence Our Lord shows that an oath is not desirable as a good thing; and that it is better to speak without oaths, unless necessity forces us to have recourse to them.
Ad secundum dicendum quod circa iudicialia praecepta dupliciter Scribae et Pharisaei errabant. Primo quidem, quia quaedam quae in lege Moysi erant tradita tanquam permissiones, aestimabant esse per se iusta, scilicet repudium uxoris, et usuras accipere ab extraneis. Et ideo dominus prohibuit uxoris repudium, Matth. V; et usurarum acceptionem, Luc. VI, dicens, date mutuum nihil inde sperantes.   Reply to Objection 2: The Scribes and Pharisees erred about the judicial precepts in two ways. First, because they considered certain matters contained in the Law of Moses by way of permission, to be right in themselves: namely, divorce of a wife, and the taking of usury from strangers. Wherefore Our Lord forbade a man to divorce his wife (Mt. 5:32); and to receive usury (Lk. 6:35), when He said: "Lend, hoping for nothing thereby."
Alio modo errabant credentes quaedam quae lex vetus instituerat facienda propter iustitiam, esse exequenda ex appetitu vindictae; vel ex cupiditate temporalium rerum; vel ex odio inimicorum. Et hoc in tribus praeceptis. Appetitum enim vindictae credebant esse licitum, propter praeceptum datum de poena talionis. Quod quidem fuit datum ut iustitia servaretur, non ut homo vindictam quaereret. Et ideo dominus, ad hoc removendum, docet animum hominis sic debere esse praeparatum ut, si necesse sit, etiam paratus sit plura sustinere. Motum autem cupiditatis aestimabant esse licitum, propter praecepta iudicialia in quibus mandabatur restitutio rei ablatae fieri etiam cum aliqua additione, ut supra dictum est. Et hoc quidem lex mandavit propter iustitiam observandam, non ut daret cupiditati locum. Et ideo dominus docet ut ex cupiditate nostra non repetamus, sed simus parati, si necesse fuerit, etiam ampliora dare. Motum vero odii credebant esse licitum, propter praecepta legis data de hostium interfectione. Quod quidem lex statuit propter iustitiam implendam, ut supra dictum est, non propter odia exsaturanda. Et ideo dominus docet ut ad inimicos dilectionem habeamus, et parati simus, si opus fuerit, etiam benefacere. Haec enim praecepta secundum praeparationem animi sunt accipienda, ut Augustinus exponit.    In another way they erred by thinking that certain things which the Old Law commanded to be done for justice's sake, should be done out of desire for revenge, or out of lust for temporal goods, or out of hatred of one's enemies; and this in respect of three precepts. For they thought that desire for revenge was lawful, on account of the precept concerning punishment by retaliation: whereas this precept was given that justice might be safeguarded, not that man might seek revenge. Wherefore, in order to do away with this, Our Lord teaches that man should be prepared in his mind to suffer yet more if necessary. They thought that movements of covetousness were lawful on account of those judicial precepts which prescribed restitution of what had been purloined, together with something added thereto, as stated above (Question [105], Article [2], ad 9); whereas the Law commanded this to be done in order to safeguard justice, not to encourage covetousness. Wherefore Our Lord teaches that we should not demand our goods from motives of cupidity, and that we should be ready to give yet more if necessary. They thought that the movement of hatred was lawful, on account of the commandments of the Law about the slaying of one's enemies: whereas the Law ordered this for the fulfilment of justice, as stated above (Question [105], Article [3], ad 4), not to satisfy hatred. Wherefore Our Lord teaches us that we ought to love our enemies, and to be ready to do good to them if necessary. For these precepts are to be taken as binding "the mind to be prepared to fulfil them," as Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 19).
Ad tertium dicendum quod praecepta moralia omnino in nova lege remanere debebant, quia secundum se pertinent ad rationem virtutis. Praecepta autem iudicialia non remanebant ex necessitate secundum modum quem lex determinavit; sed relinquebatur arbitrio hominum utrum sic vel aliter esset determinandum. Et ideo convenienter dominus circa haec duo genera praeceptorum nos ordinavit. Praeceptorum autem caeremonialium observatio totaliter per rei impletionem tollebatur. Et ideo circa huiusmodi praecepta, in illa communi doctrina, nihil ordinavit. Ostendit tamen alibi quod totus corporalis cultus qui erat determinatus in lege, erat in spiritualem commutandus; ut patet Ioan. IV, ubi dixit, venit hora quando neque in monte hoc neque in Ierosolymis adorabitis patrem; sed veri adoratores adorabunt patrem in spiritu et veritate.   Reply to Objection 3: The moral precepts necessarily retained their force under the New Law, because they are of themselves essential to virtue: whereas the judicial precepts did not necessarily continue to bind in exactly the same way as had been fixed by the Law: this was left to man to decide in one way or another. Hence Our Lord directed us becomingly with regard to these two kinds of precepts. On the other hand, the observance of the ceremonial precepts was totally abolished by the advent of the reality; wherefore in regard to these precepts He commanded nothing on this occasion when He was giving the general points of His doctrine. Elsewhere, however, He makes it clear that the entire bodily worship which was fixed by the Law, was to be changed into spiritual worship: as is evident from Jn. 4:21,23, where He says: "The hour cometh when you shall neither on this mountain, nor in Jerusalem adore the Father . . . but . . . the true adorers shall adore the Father in spirit and in truth."
Ad quartum dicendum quod omnes res mundanae ad tria reducuntur, scilicet ad honores, divitias et delicias; secundum illud I Ioan. II, omne quod est in mundo, concupiscentia carnis est, quod pertinet ad delicias carnis; et concupiscentia oculorum, quod pertinet ad divitias; et superbia vitae, quod pertinet ad ambitum gloriae et honoris. Superfluas autem carnis delicias lex non repromisit, sed magis prohibuit. Repromisit autem celsitudinem honoris, et abundantiam divitiarum, dicitur enim Deut. XXVIII, si audieris vocem domini Dei tui, faciet te excelsiorem cunctis gentibus, quantum ad primum; et post pauca subdit, abundare te faciet omnibus bonis, quantum ad secundum. Quae quidem promissa sic prave intelligebant Iudaei, ut propter ea esset Deo serviendum, sicut propter finem. Et ideo dominus hoc removit, docens primo, quod opera virtutis non sunt facienda propter humanam gloriam. Et ponit tria opera, ad quae omnia alia reducuntur, nam omnia quae aliquis facit ad refrenandum seipsum in suis concupiscentiis, reducuntur ad ieiunium; quaecumque vero fiunt propter dilectionem proximi, reducuntur ad eleemosynam; quaecumque vero propter cultum Dei fiunt, reducuntur ad orationem. Ponit autem haec tria specialiter quasi praecipua, et per quae homines maxime solent gloriam venari. Secundo, docuit quod non debemus finem constituere in divitiis, cum dixit, nolite thesaurizare vobis thesauros in terra.   Reply to Objection 4: All worldly goods may be reduced to three—honors, riches, and pleasures; according to 1 Jn. 2:16: "All that is in the world is the concupiscence of the flesh," which refers to pleasures of the flesh, "and the concupiscence of the eyes," which refers to riches, "and the pride of life," which refers to ambition for renown and honor. Now the Law did not promise an abundance of carnal pleasures; on the contrary, it forbade them. But it did promise exalted honors and abundant riches; for it is written in reference to the former (Dt. 28:1): "If thou wilt hear the voice of the Lord thy God . . . He will make thee higher than all the nations"; and in reference to the latter, we read a little further on (Dt. 28:11): "He will make thee abound with all goods." But the Jews so distorted the true meaning of these promises, as to think that we ought to serve God, with these things as the end in view. Wherefore Our Lord set this aside by teaching, first of all, that works of virtue should not be done for human glory. And He mentions three works, to which all others may be reduced: since whatever a man does in order to curb his desires, comes under the head of fasting; and whatever a man does for the love of his neighbor, comes under the head of alms-deeds; and whatever a man does for the worship of God, comes under the head of prayer. And He mentions these three specifically, as they hold the principal place, and are most often used by men in order to gain glory. In the second place He taught us that we must not place our end in riches, when He said: "Lay not up to yourselves treasures on earth" (Mt. 6:19).
Ad quintum dicendum quod dominus sollicitudinem necessariam non prohibuit, sed sollicitudinem inordinatam. Est autem quadruplex inordinatio sollicitudinis vitanda circa temporalia. Primo quidem, ut in eis finem non constituamus, neque Deo serviamus propter necessaria victus et vestitus. Unde dicit, nolite thesaurizare vobis et cetera. Secundo, ut non sic sollicitemur de temporalibus, cum desperatione divini auxilii. Unde dominus dicit, scit pater vester quia his omnibus indigetis. Tertio, ne sit sollicitudo praesumptuosa, ut scilicet homo confidat se necessaria vitae per suam sollicitudinem posse procurare, absque divino auxilio. Quod dominus removet per hoc quod homo non potest aliquid adiicere ad staturam suam. Quarto, per hoc quod homo sollicitudinis tempus praeoccupat, quia scilicet de hoc sollicitus est nunc, quod non pertinet ad curam praesentis temporis, sed ad curam futuri. Unde dicit, nolite solliciti esse in crastinum.   Reply to Objection 5: Our Lord forbade, not necessary, but inordinate solicitude. Now there is a fourfold solicitude to be avoided in temporal matters. First, we must not place our end in them, nor serve God for the sake of the necessities of food and raiment. Wherefore He says: "Lay not up for yourselves," etc. Secondly, we must not be so anxious about temporal things, as to despair of God's help: wherefore Our Lord says (Mt. 6:32): "Your Father knoweth that you have need of all these things." Thirdly, we must not add presumption to our solicitude; in other words, we must not be confident of getting the necessaries of life by our own efforts without God's help: such solicitude Our Lord sets aside by saying that a man cannot add anything to his stature (Mt. 6:27). We must not anticipate the time for anxiety; namely, by being solicitous now, for the needs, not of the present, but of a future time: wherefore He says (Mt. 6:34): "Be not . . . solicitous for tomorrow."
Ad sextum dicendum quod dominus non prohibet iudicium iustitiae, sine quo non possent sancta subtrahi ab indignis. Sed prohibet iudicium inordinatum, ut dictum est.   Reply to Objection 6: Our Lord did not forbid the judgment of justice, without which holy things could not be withdrawn from the unworthy. But he forbade inordinate judgment, as stated above.

 

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Whether certain definite counsels are fittingly proposed in the New Law?

Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter in lege nova consilia quaedam determinata sint proposita. Consilia enim dantur de rebus expedientibus ad finem; ut supra dictum est, cum de consilio ageretur. Sed non eadem omnibus expediunt. Ergo non sunt aliqua consilia determinata omnibus proponenda.   Objection 1: It would seem that certain definite counsels are not fittingly proposed in the New Law. For counsels are given about that which is expedient for an end, as we stated above, when treating of counsel (Question [14], Article [2]). But the same things are not expedient for all. Therefore certain definite counsels should not be proposed to all.
Praeterea, consilia dantur de meliori bono. Sed non sunt determinati gradus melioris boni. Ergo non debent aliqua determinata consilia dari.   Objection 2: Further, counsels regard a greater good. But there are no definite degrees to the greater good. Therefore definite counsels should not be given.
Praeterea, consilia pertinent ad perfectionem vitae. Sed obedientia pertinet ad perfectionem vitae. Ergo inconvenienter de ea consilium non datur in Evangelio.   Objection 3: Further, counsels pertain to the life of perfection. But obedience pertains to the life of perfection. Therefore it was unfitting that no counsel of obedience should be contained in the Gospel.
Praeterea, multa ad perfectionem vitae pertinentia inter praecepta ponuntur, sicut hoc quod dicitur, diligite inimicos vestros; et praecepta etiam quae dedit dominus apostolis, Matth. X. Ergo inconvenienter traduntur consilia in nova lege, tum quia non omnia ponuntur; tum etiam quia a praeceptis non distinguuntur.   Objection 4: Further, many matters pertaining to the life of perfection are found among the commandments, as, for instance, "Love your enemies" (Mt. 5:44), and those precepts which Our Lord gave His apostles (Mt. 10). Therefore the counsels are unfittingly given in the New Law: both because they are not all mentioned; and because they are not distinguished from the commandments.
Sed contra, consilia sapientis amici magnam utilitatem afferunt; secundum illud Prov. XXVII, unguento et variis odoribus delectatur cor, et bonis amici consiliis anima dulcoratur. Sed Christus maxime est sapiens et amicus. Ergo eius consilia maximam utilitatem continent, et convenientia sunt.   On the contrary, The counsels of a wise friend are of great use, according to Prov. (27:9): "Ointment and perfumes rejoice the heart: and the good counsels of a friend rejoice the soul." But Christ is our wisest and greatest friend. Therefore His counsels are supremely useful and becoming.
Respondeo dicendum quod haec est differentia inter consilium et praeceptum, quod praeceptum importat necessitatem, consilium autem in optione ponitur eius cui datur. Et ideo convenienter in lege nova, quae est lex libertatis, supra praecepta sunt addita consilia, non autem in veteri lege, quae erat lex servitutis. Oportet igitur quod praecepta novae legis intelligantur esse data de his quae sunt necessaria ad consequendum finem aeternae beatitudinis, in quem lex nova immediate introducit. Consilia vero oportet esse de illis per quae melius et expeditius potest homo consequi finem praedictum.   I answer that, The difference between a counsel and a commandment is that a commandment implies obligation, whereas a counsel is left to the option of the one to whom it is given. Consequently in the New Law, which is the law of liberty, counsels are added to the commandments, and not in the Old Law, which is the law of bondage. We must therefore understand the commandments of the New Law to have been given about matters that are necessary to gain the end of eternal bliss, to which end the New Law brings us forthwith: but that the counsels are about matters that render the gaining of this end more assured and expeditious.
Est autem homo constitutus inter res mundi huius et spiritualia bona, in quibus beatitudo aeterna consistit, ita quod quanto plus inhaeret uni eorum, tanto plus recedit ab altero, et e converso. Qui ergo totaliter inhaeret rebus huius mundi, ut in eis finem constituat, habens eas quasi rationes et regulas suorum operum, totaliter excidit a spiritualibus bonis. Et ideo huiusmodi inordinatio tollitur per praecepta. Sed quod homo totaliter ea quae sunt mundi abiiciat, non est necessarium ad perveniendum in finem praedictum, quia potest homo utens rebus huius mundi, dummodo in eis finem non constituat, ad beatitudinem aeternam pervenire. Sed expeditius perveniet totaliter bona huius mundi abdicando. Et ideo de hoc dantur consilia Evangelii.    Now man is placed between the things of this world, and spiritual goods wherein eternal happiness consists: so that the more he cleaves to the one, the more he withdraws from the other, and conversely. Wherefore he that cleaves wholly to the things of this world, so as to make them his end, and to look upon them as the reason and rule of all he does, falls away altogether from spiritual goods. Hence this disorder is removed by the commandments. Nevertheless, for man to gain the end aforesaid, he does not need to renounce the things of the world altogether: since he can, while using the things of this world, attain to eternal happiness, provided he does not place his end in them: but he will attain more speedily thereto by giving up the goods of this world entirely: wherefore the evangelical counsels are given for this purpose.
Bona autem huius mundi, quae pertinent ad usum humanae vitae, in tribus consistunt, scilicet in divitiis exteriorum bonorum, quae pertinent ad concupiscentiam oculorum; in deliciis carnis, quae pertinent ad concupiscentiam carnis; et in honoribus, quae pertinent ad superbiam vitae; sicut patet I Ioan. II. Haec autem tria totaliter derelinquere, secundum quod possibile est, pertinet ad consilia evangelica. In quibus etiam tribus fundatur omnis religio, quae statum perfectionis profitetur, nam divitiae abdicantur per paupertatem; deliciae carnis per perpetuam castitatem; superbia vitae per obedientiae servitutem.    Now the goods of this world which come into use in human life, consist in three things: viz. in external wealth pertaining to the "concupiscence of the eyes"; carnal pleasures pertaining to the "concupiscence of the flesh"; and honors, which pertain to the "pride of life," according to 1 Jn. 2:16: and it is in renouncing these altogether, as far as possible, that the evangelical counsels consist. Moreover, every form of the religious life that professes the state of perfection is based on these three: since riches are renounced by poverty; carnal pleasures by perpetual chastity; and the pride of life by the bondage of obedience.
Haec autem simpliciter observata pertinent ad consilia simpliciter proposita. Sed observatio uniuscuiusque eorum in aliquo speciali casu, pertinet ad consilium secundum quid, scilicet in casu illo. Puta cum homo dat aliquam eleemosynam pauperi quam dare non tenetur, consilium sequitur quantum ad factum illud. Similiter etiam quando aliquo tempore determinato a delectationibus carnis abstinet ut orationibus vacet, consilium sequitur pro tempore illo. Similiter etiam quando aliquis non sequitur voluntatem suam in aliquo facto quod licite posset facere, consilium sequitur in casu illo, puta si benefaciat inimicis quando non tenetur, vel si offensam remittat cuius iuste posset exigere vindictam. Et sic etiam omnia consilia particularia ad illa tria generalia et perfecta reducuntur.    Now if a man observe these absolutely, this is in accordance with the counsels as they stand. But if a man observe any one of them in a particular case, this is taking that counsel in a restricted sense, namely, as applying to that particular case. For instance, when anyone gives an alms to a poor man, not being bound so to do, he follows the counsels in that particular case. In like manner, when a man for some fixed time refrains from carnal pleasures that he may give himself to prayer, he follows the counsel for that particular time. And again, when a man follows not his will as to some deed which he might do lawfully, he follows the counsel in that particular case: for instance, if he do good to his enemies when he is not bound to, or if he forgive an injury of which he might justly seek to be avenged. In this way, too, all particular counsels may be reduced to these three general and perfect counsels.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod praedicta consilia, quantum est de se sunt omnibus expedientia, sed ex indispositione aliquorum contingit quod alicui expedientia non sunt, quia eorum affectus ad haec non inclinatur. Et ideo dominus, consilia evangelica proponens, semper facit mentionem de idoneitate hominum ad observantiam consiliorum. Dans enim consilium perpetuae paupertatis, Matth. XIX, praemittit, si vis perfectus esse; et postea subdit, vade et vende omnia quae habes. Similiter, dans consilium perpetuae castitatis, cum dixit, sunt eunuchi qui castraverunt seipsos propter regnum caelorum, statim subdit, qui potest capere, capiat. Et similiter apostolus, I ad Cor. VII, praemisso consilio virginitatis, dicit, porro hoc ad utilitatem vestram dico, non ut laqueum vobis iniiciam.   Reply to Objection 1: The aforesaid counsels, considered in themselves, are expedient to all; but owing to some people being ill-disposed, it happens that some of them are inexpedient, because their disposition is not inclined to such things. Hence Our Lord, in proposing the evangelical counsels, always makes mention of man's fitness for observing the counsels. For in giving the counsel of perpetual poverty (Mt. 19:21), He begins with the words: "If thou wilt be perfect," and then He adds: "Go, sell all [Vulg.: 'what'] thou hast." In like manner when He gave the counsel of perpetual chastity, saying (Mt. 19:12): "There are eunuchs who have made themselves eunuchs for the kingdom of heaven," He adds straightway: "He that can take, let him take it." And again, the Apostle (1 Cor. 7:35), after giving the counsel of virginity, says: "And this I speak for your profit; not to cast a snare upon you."
Ad secundum dicendum quod meliora bona particulariter in singulis sunt indeterminata. Sed illa quae sunt simpliciter et absolute meliora bona in universali, sunt determinata. Ad quae etiam omnia illa particularia reducuntur, ut dictum est.   Reply to Objection 2: The greater goods are not definitely fixed in the individual; but those which are simply and absolutely the greater good in general are fixed: and to these all the above particular goods may be reduced, as stated above.
Ad tertium dicendum quod etiam consilium obedientiae dominus intelligitur dedisse in hoc quod dixit, et sequatur me; quem sequimur non solum imitando opera, sed etiam obediendo mandatis ipsius; secundum illud Ioan. X. Oves meae vocem meam audiunt, et sequuntur me.   Reply to Objection 3: Even the counsel of obedience is understood to have been given by Our Lord in the words: "And [let him] follow Me." For we follow Him not only by imitating His works, but also by obeying His commandments, according to Jn. 10:27: "My sheep hear My voice . . . and they follow Me."
Ad quartum dicendum quod ea quae de vera dilectione inimicorum, et similibus, dominus dicit Matth. V et Luc. VI, si referantur ad praeparationem animi, sunt de necessitate salutis, ut scilicet homo sit paratus benefacere inimicis, et alia huiusmodi facere, cum necessitas hoc requirat. Et ideo inter praecepta ponuntur. Sed ut aliquis hoc inimicis exhibeat prompte in actu, ubi specialis necessitas non occurrit, pertinet ad consilia particularia, ut dictum est. Illa autem quae ponuntur Matth. X, et Luc. IX, et X, fuerunt quaedam praecepta disciplinae pro tempore illo, vel concessiones quaedam, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo non inducuntur tanquam consilia.   Reply to Objection 4: Those things which Our Lord prescribed about the true love of our enemies, and other similar sayings (Mt. 5; Lk. 6), may be referred to the preparation of the mind, and then they are necessary for salvation; for instance, that man be prepared to do good to his enemies, and other similar actions, when there is need. Hence these things are placed among the precepts. But that anyone should actually and promptly behave thus towards an enemy when there is no special need, is to be referred to the particular counsels, as stated above. As to those matters which are set down in Mt. 10 and Lk. 9 and 10, they were either disciplinary commands for that particular time, or concessions, as stated above (Article [2], ad 3). Hence they are not set down among the counsels.

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