CHAPTER 2
THE SUBJECT OF METAPHYSICS IN GENERAL: BEING

1. BOOK VI: THE METHOD OF INVESTIGATING BEING

Lesson 1

How it differs from other sciences in treating of being

1144. ... [Here the Philosopher] explains the **method** by which this science should establish what is true about being.

The first part is divided into two sections. In the first he explains the method of treating beings, which is proper to this science, by showing how it differs from the other sciences. In the second (1170 he excludes certain senses of being from the investigation of this science, namely, those senses which are not the chief concern of this science ("Being in an unqualified sense").

The first part is again divided into two sections. In the first he shows how this science differs from the others because it considers the **principles of being as being**. In the second (1152) he shows how this science differs from the others in its method of treating principles of this kind ("And since the philosophy of nature"). In regard to the first he does two things.

1145. First, he shows how this science **agrees** with the other sciences in its study of principles. He says that since being is the subject of this kind of science, as has been shown in Book IV (529-30), and every science must investigate the **principles and causes** which belong to its **subject** inasmuch as it is this kind of thing, we must investigate in this science the principles and causes of beings as beings. And this is also what occurs in the other sciences. For there is a cause of health and of its recovery, which the physician seeks. And similarly there are also principles, elements and causes of the objects of mathematics, as figure and number and other things of this kind which the mathematician investigates. And in general every intellectual science, to whatever degree it participates in intellect, must always deal with causes and principles. This is the case whether it deals with purely intelligible things, as divine science does, or with those which are in some way imaginable or sensible in particular but intelligible in general; or even if it deals with sensible things inasmuch as there is science of them, as occurs in the case of mathematics and in that of the philosophy of nature. Or again whether they proceed from universal principles to particular cases in which there is activity, as occurs in the practical sciences, it is always necessary that such sciences deal with principles and causes.

1146. Now these principles are either (1) more certain **to us**, as occurs in the natural sciences, because they are closer to sensible things, or (2) they are simpler and prior **in nature**, as occurs in the mathematical sciences. But cognitions which are only sensory are not the result of principles and causes but of the sensible object itself acting upon the senses. For to proceed from causes to effects or the reverse is not an activity of the senses but only of the intellect. Or "more certain principles" means those which are better known and more deeply probed, and "simple" means those which are studied in a more superficial way, as occurs in the moral sciences, whose principles are derived from those things which occur in the majority of cases.

1147. Second, he shows how the other sciences **differ** from this science in their study of principles and causes. He says that all these particular sciences which have now been mentioned are about one **particular** class of being, for example, number, continuous quantity or something of this kind; and each confines its investigations to "its subject genus,"' i.e., dealing with this class and not with another; for example, the science which deals with number does not deal with continuous quantity. For no one of the other sciences deals "with being in an unqualified sense," i.e., with being in general, or even with any particular being as being; for example, arithmetic does not deal with number as being but as number. For to consider each being as being is proper to metaphysics.

1148. And since it belongs to the same science to consider both being and the whatness or quiddity, because each thing has being by reason of its quiddity, therefore the other particular sciences make "no mention of," i.e., they do (~) not investigate, the whatness or **quiddity** of a thing and the definition signifying it. But (+) they proceed "from this," i.e., from the whatness itself of a thing, to **other things**, using this as an already established principle for the purpose of proving other things.

1149. Now some sciences make the whatness of their subject evident by means of the senses, as the science which treats of animals understands what an animal is by means of what "is apparent to the senses," i.e., by means of sensation and local motion, by which animal is distinguished from non-animal. And other sciences understand the whatness of their subject by assuming it from some other science, as geometry learns what continuous quantity is from first philosophy. Thus, beginning from the whatness itself of a thing, which has been made known either by the senses or by assuming it from some other science, these sciences demonstrate the proper attributes which belong essentially to the subject-genus with which they deal; for a definition is the middle term in a causal demonstration. But the method of demonstration differs; because some sciences demonstrate with greater necessity, as the mathematical sciences, and others "more weakly," i.e., without necessity, as the sciences of nature, whose demonstrations are based on things that do

not pertain to something always but for the most part.

1150. Another translation has "condition" in place of "assumption," but the meaning is the same; for what is assumed is taken, as it were, by stipulation. And since the starting point of demonstration is definition, it is evident that from this kind of inductive method "there is no demonstration of a thing's substance," i.e., of its essence, or of the definition signifying its whatness; but there is some other method by which definitions are made known, namely, the method of elimination and the other methods which are given in the *Posterior Analytics*, Book IV.

1151. And just as no particular science settles the issue about the whatness of things, neither does any one of them discuss the existence or non-existence of the subject-genus with which it deals. This is understandable, because it belongs to the same science to settle the question of a thing's existence and to make known its whatness. For in order to prove that a thing exists, its whatness must be taken as the middle term of the demonstration. Now both of these questions belong to the investigation of the philosopher who considers being as being. Therefore every particular science **assumes** the existence and whatness of its subject, as is stated in Book I of the *Posterior Analytics*. This is indicated by the fact that no particular science establishes the truth about being in an unqualified sense, or about any being as being.

1152. Here he shows how this science differs from the other sciences in its method of considering the **principles** of being as being. And since the philosophy of nature was considered by the ancients to be the first science and the one which would consider being as being, therefore, beginning with it as with what is more evident, he shows, first (534), how the philosophy of nature differs from the practical sciences; and second (535), how it differs from the speculative sciences, showing also the method of study proper to this science.

He says, first (534), that the **philosophy of nature** does not deal with being in an unqualified sense but with some **particular** class of being, i.e., with natural substance, which has within itself a principle of motion and rest; and from this it is evident that it is neither a practical nor a productive science. For action and production differ, because action is an operation that remains in the agent itself, as choosing, understanding and the like (and for this reason the practical sciences are called moral sciences), whereas production is an operation that passes over into some matter in order to change it, as cutting, burning and the like (and for this reason the productive sciences are called mechanical arts).

1153. Now it is evident that the philosophy of nature is not a (~) productive science, because the principle of productive sciences is in the maker and not in the thing made, which is the artifact. But the principle of motion in natural bodies is within these natural bodies. Further, the principle of things made by art, which is in the maker, is, first, the intellect which discovers the art; and second, the art which is an intellectual habit; and third, some executive power, such as the motive power by which the artisan executes the work conceived by his art. Hence it is evident that the philosophy of nature is not a productive science.

1154. And for this reason it is evident that it is not a (~) practical science; for the principle of practical sciences is in the agent, not in the actions or customary operations themselves. This principle is "prohaeresis," i.e., choice; for the object of action and that of choice are the same. Hence it is evident that the philosophy of nature is neither a practical nor a productive science.

1155. If, then, every science is either practical, productive or theoretical, it follows that the philosophy of nature is a (+) theoretical science. Yet "it is theoretical," or speculative, of a **special class** of being, namely, that which is subject to motion; for mobile being is the subject matter of the philosophy of nature. And it deals only with "that kind of substance," i.e., the quiddity or essence of a thing, which is for the most part inseparable from matter in its intelligible structure. He adds this because of the intellect, which comes in a sense within the scope of the philosophy of nature, although its substance is separable from matter. Thus it is clear that the philosophy of nature deals with some special subject, which is mobile being, and that it has a special way of defining things, namely, with matter.

1156. Here he shows how the philosophy of nature differs from the other speculative sciences in its method of defining things; and in regard to this he does two things. First, he explains this difference. Second (1166), he draws a conclusion about the number of theoretical sciences. ("Hence there will be").

In regard to the first he does three things. First, he exposes the **method of defining** things which is proper to the philosophy of nature. He says that, in order to understand how the speculative sciences differ from each other, the quiddity of a thing and the way in which "the conceptual expression," i.e., the definition signifying it, should be expressed in each science, must not remain unknown. For in seeking the aforesaid difference "without this," i.e., without knowing how to define things, our search would be unfruitful. For since a definition is the middle term in a demonstration, and is therefore the starting-point of knowing the difference between the speculative sciences must depend on the different ways of defining things.

1157. Now concerning things which are defined it must be noted that some are defined like snub and others like concave. And these two differ because the definition of snub includes sensible matter (since snub is merely a curved or concave nose), whereas concavity is defined without sensible matter. For some sensible body, such as fire or water or the like, is not included in the definition of concave or curved. For that is said to be concave whose middle curves away from the ends.

1158. Now all natural things are defined in a way similar to snub, as is evident both of those parts of an animal which are unlike, for example, nose, eye and face; and of those which are alike, for example, flesh and bone; and also of the whole animal. And the same is true of the parts of plants, for example, leaf, root and bark; and also of the whole plant. For no one of these can be defined without **motion**; but each includes **sensible matter** in its definition, and therefore motion, because every kind of sensible matter has its own kind of motion. Thus in the definition of flesh and bone it is necessary that the hot and cold be held to be suitably mixed in some way; and the same is true of other things. From this it is evident what the method is which the philosophy of nature uses in investigating and defining the quiddity of natural things; i.e., it involves sensible matter.

1159. And for this reason the philosophy of nature also investigates one kind of **soul**—the kind that is (+) not defined without **sensible matter**. For in Book II of *The Soul* he says that a soul is the first actuality of a natural organic body having life potentially. But if any soul can exist (~) **separately** from a body, then insofar as it is not the actuality of such a body, it does not fall within the scope of the philosophy of nature. Therefore it is evident from the above that the philosophy of nature is a theoretical science, and that it has a special method of defining things.

1160. Second, he exposes the method proper to **mathematics**. He says that mathematics is also a speculative science; for evidently it is neither a practical nor a productive science, since it considers things which are devoid of motion, without which action and production cannot exist. But whether those things which mathematical science considers are immobile and separable from matter in their being is not yet clear. For some men, the Platonists, held that numbers, continuous quantities and other mathematical objects are separate from matter and midway between the Forms and sensible things, as is stated in Book I (157) and in Book III (350). But the answer to this question has not yet been fully established by him, but will be established later on.

1161. However, it is evident that mathematical science studies some things insofar as they are immobile and separate from matter, although they are neither immobile nor separable from matter in being. For their intelligible structure, for example, that of concave or curved, does not contain sensible matter. Hence mathematical science differs from the philosophy of nature in this respect, that while the philosophy of nature considers things whose definitions contain sensible matter (and thus it considers what is not separate insofar as it is not separate), mathematical science considers things whose **definitions do not contain sensible matter**. And thus even though the things which it considers are not separate from matter, it nevertheless considers them insofar as they are separate.

1162. Third, he exposes the **method** proper to this science. He says that, if there is something whose being is immobile, and therefore eternal and separable from matter in being, it is evident that the investigation of it belongs to a **theoretical** science and not to a practical or productive one, whose investigations have to do with certain kinds of motion. However, the study of such being does not belong to the philosophy of nature, for the philosophy of nature deals with certain kinds of beings, namely, mobile ones. Nor likewise does the study of this being belong to mathematics, because mathematics does not consider things which are separable from matter in being but only in their intelligible structure, as has been stated (1161). But the study of this being must belong to another science which is prior to both of these, i.e., prior to the philosophy of nature and to mathematics.

1163. For the *philosophy of nature* deals with things which are inseparable from matter and mobile, and *mathematics* deals with certain immobile things although these are not separate from matter in being but only in their intelligible structure, since in reality they are found in sensible matter. And he says "presumably" because this truth has not yet been established. Further, he says that some mathematical sciences deal with immobile things, as geometry and arithmetic, because some mathematical sciences are applied to motion, as astronomy. But *the first science* deals with things which are **separable from matter in being and are altogether immobile**.

1164. Now **common** causes must be eternal, because the first causes of beings which are generated must not themselves be generated, otherwise the process of generation would proceed to infinity; and this is true especially of those causes which are altogether immobile and immaterial. For those immaterial and immobile causes are the causes of the sensible things evident to us, because they are beings in the highest degree, and therefore are the cause of other things, as was shown in Book II (290). From this it is evident that the science which considers beings of this kind is the first of all the sciences and the one which considers the common causes of all beings. Hence there are **causes of beings as beings**, which are investigated in first philosophy, as he proposed in Book I (36). And from this it is quite evident that the opinion of those who claimed that Aristotle thought that God is not the cause of the substance of the heavens, but only of their motion, is false. [against Ibn-Rushd]

1165. However, we must remember that even though things which are separate from matter and motion in being and in their intelligible structure belong to the study of first philosophy, still the philosopher not only investigates these but **also sensible things inasmuch as they are beings**. Unless perhaps we may say, as Avicenna does, that common things of the kind which this science considers are said to be separate from matter in being, not because they are always without matter, but because they **do not necessarily have being in matter**, as the objects of mathematics do.

1166. He draws a conclusion as to the **number of theoretical sciences**. And in regard to this he does three things. First, he concludes from what has been laid down above that there are **three** parts of theoretical philosophy: mathematics, the philosophy of nature, and theology, which is first philosophy.

1167. Second, he gives two reasons why this science is called **theology**.

The first of these is that "it is obvious that if the **divine** exists anywhere," i.e., if something divine exists in any class of things, it exists in such a nature, namely, in the class of being which is immobile and separate from matter, which this science studies.

1168. He gives the second reason why this science is called theology; and the reason is this: the most **honorable** science deals with the most honorable class of beings, and this is the one in which divine beings are contained. Therefore, since this science is the most honorable of the sciences because it is the most honorable of the theoretical sciences, as was shown before (64)—and these are more honorable than the practical sciences, as was stated in Book I (35)—it is evident that this science deals with divine beings; and therefore it is called theology inasmuch as it is a discourse about divine beings.

1169. [objection] Third, he raises a question about a point already established. First, he states the question, saying that someone can inquire whether first philosophy is universal inasmuch as it considers being in general, or whether it investigates some particular class or a single nature. Now this does not seem to be the case. For this science and the mathematical sciences do not have one and the same method; because geometry and astronomy, which are mathematical sciences, deal with a special nature, whereas first philosophy is universally common to all. Yet the reverse seems to be true, namely, that it deals with a **special** nature, because it is concerned with things which are **separable from matter and immobile**, as has been stated (1163).

1170. Second, he answers this question, saying that if there is no substance other than those which exist in the way that natural substances do, with which the philosophy of nature deals, the philosophy of nature will be the first science. But if there is some **immobile** substance, this will be **prior** to natural substance, and therefore the philosophy of nature, which considers this kind of substance, will be first philosophy. And since it is first, it will be universal; and it will be its function to study being as being, both what being is and what the attributes are which belong to being as being. For the science of the primary kind of being and that of being in general are the same, as has been stated at the beginning of Book IV (533).

Lesson 4

Accidental being and the "being" of propositions are not the subject of this science.

1241. Here he **excludes** being in the sense of the **true** and being in the sense of the **accidental** from the principal consideration of this science. He says that combination and separation, on which truth and falsity depend, are found in the mind and not in things; and that if any combination is also found in things, such combination produces a unity which the intellect understands as one by a simple concept. But that combination or separation by which the intellect combines or separates its concepts is found only in the intellect and not in things. For it consists in a certain comparison of two concepts, whether these two are identical or distinct in reality. For sometimes the intellect uses one concept as two when it forms a combination, as when we say "Man is man"; and it is clear from this that such a combination is found only in the intellect and not in things. Therefore whatever is a being in the sense of the true, and consists in such a combination, differs from those things which are beings in the proper sense and are realities outside of the mind, each of which is "either what a thing is," i.e., substance, or of what sort, or how much, or any of the simple concepts which the mind combines or separates.

1242. Therefore both being in the sense of the **accidental** and being in the sense of the true must be excluded from this science. For the **cause** of the former—being in the sense of the accidental—is the **indeterminate**, and therefore it does not come within the scope of art, as has been shown (1174); and the cause of the latter—being in the sense of the true—is "some positive state of mind," i.e., the operation of the intellect combining and separating, and therefore it belongs to that science which studies the intellect.

1243. Another reason for excluding them is that, while "both of these," namely, being in the sense of the true and accidental being, (+) belong to **some** class of being, (~) they do not belong to being in the **proper** sense, which is found in reality. Nor do they designate another kind of being distinct from beings in the proper sense. For it is evident that accidental being is a result of the coincidental connection of beings which exist outside the mind, each of which is a being of itself. For even though the grammatical musical has being only accidentally, nevertheless both grammatical and musical are beings in the proper sense, because each of these taken by itself has a definite cause. Similarly the intellect combines and separates those things which are contained in the categories.

1244. If, then, the class of being contained in the categories is sufficiently dealt with, the nature of accidental being and being in the sense of the true will be evident. And for this reason we must exclude these types of being and investigate the causes and principles of beings as beings in the proper sense. This is also evident from what has been established in Book V (885), where, in discussing the different senses of such terms, it was stated that being is used in many senses, as follows below at the beginning of Book VII (1240).

2. BOOK III: METAPHYSICAL PROBLEMS

Lesson 1

338. Having indicated in Book II (331) the method of considering the truth, the Philosopher now proceeds with his **study of the truth**. First he proceeds **disputatively**, indicating those points which are open to question so far as the truth of things is concerned.

He says first, then, that with a view to this science which we are seeking about first principles and what is universally true of things, we must attack, first of all, those subjects about which it is necessary to raise questions before the truth is established. Now there are **disputed points** of this kind for two reasons, either because the ancient philosophers entertained a different opinion about these things than is really true, or because they completely neglected to consider them.

339. Here he gives four arguments in support of this thesis:

First, he says that for those who wish to investigate the truth it is "worth the while," i.e., worth the effort, "to ponder these difficulties well," i.e., to examine carefully those matters which are open to question. This is necessary because the subsequent study of truth is nothing else than the solution of earlier difficulties. Now in loosening a physical knot it is evident that one who is unacquainted with this knot cannot loosen it. But a difficulty about some subject is related to the mind as a physical knot is to the body, and manifests the same effect. For insofar as the mind is puzzled about some subject, it experiences something similar to those who are tightly bound. For just as one whose feet are tied cannot move forward on an earthly road, in a similar way one who is puzzled, and whose mind is bound, as it were, cannot move forward on the road of speculative knowledge. Therefore, just as one who wishes to loosen a physical knot must first of all inspect the knot and the way in which it is tied, in a similar way one who wants to solve a problem must first survey all the difficulties and the reasons for them.

340. Here he gives the second argument. He says that those who wish to investigate the truth without first considering the problem are like those who do not know where they are going. This is true for this reason, that, just as the terminus of a journey is the goal intended by one who travels on foot, in a similar way the solution of a problem is the goal intended by one who is seeking the truth. But it is evident that one who does not know where he is going cannot go there directly, except perhaps by chance. Therefore, neither can one seek the truth directly unless he first sees the problem.

341. Here he gives the third argument. He says that, just as one who is ignorant of where he is going does not know whether he should stop or go further when he reaches his appointed goal, in a similar way one who does not know beforehand the problem whose solution marks the terminus of his search cannot know when he finds the truth which he is seeking and when not. For he does not know what the goal of his investigations is, but this is evident to one who knew the problem beforehand.

342. He gives the fourth argument, which is taken from the viewpoint of a judge. For a judge must pass judgment on the things which he hears. But just as one can pass judgment in a lawsuit only if he hears the arguments on both sides, in a similar way one who has to **pass judgment** on a philosophy is necessarily in a better position to do so if he will hear all the arguments, as it were, of the disputants.

343. Now it must be noted that it was for these reasons that Aristotle was accustomed, in nearly all his works, to set forth the problems which emerge before investigating and establishing what is true. But while in other works Aristotle sets down the problems one at a time in order to establish the truth about each one, in this work he sets forth **all the problems at once**, and afterwards in the proper order establishes the things that are true. The reason for this is that other sciences consider the truth in a particular way, and therefore it belongs to them to raise problems of a particular kind about individual truths. But just as it belongs to this science to make a universal study of truth, so also does it belong to it to discuss all the problems which pertain to the truth. Therefore it does not discuss its problems one at a time but all at once.

344. There can also be another reason [why Aristotle proceeds in this way], namely, that those problems on which he touches are chiefly those about which the philosophers have held different opinions. However, he does not proceed to investigate the truth in the same order as the other philosophers did. For he begins with things which are sensible and evident and proceeds to those which are separate from matter, as is evident below in Book VII (1566), whereas the other philosophers wanted to apply intelligible and abstract principles to sensible things. Hence, because he did not intend to establish the truth in the same order as that followed by the other philosophers, and from whose views these problems arise, he therefore decided to give first all the problems in a separate section, and afterwards to solve these problems in their proper order.

345. Averroes gives another reason [for Aristotle's procedure]. He says that Aristotle proceeds in this way because of the relationship of this science to logic, which will be touched on below in Book IV (588); and therefore he made dialectical discussion a principal part of this science.

Lesson 4: Answers

Q 1: Can one science consider many causes?

384. We do not find that Aristotle explicitly solves this question later on, though his solution can be ascertained from the things which he establishes below in different places. For in Book IV (533) he establishes that this science considers being as being, and therefore that it also belongs to it, and not to the philosophy of nature, to consider first substances; for there are other substances besides mobile ones.

But every substance is either a being of itself, granted that it is only a form; or it is a being by its form, granted that it is composed of matter and form. Hence inasmuch as this science considers being, it considers the **formal** cause before all the rest. But the first substances are not known by us in such a way that we know what they are, as can be understood in some way from the things established in Book IX (1904); and thus in our knowledge of them the formal cause has no place.

But even though they are immobile in themselves, they are nevertheless the cause of motion in other things after the manner of an end. Hence inasmuch as this science considers first substances, it belongs to it especially to consider the **final** cause and also in a way the **efficient** cause.

But to consider the **material** cause in itself does not belong to it in any way, because matter is not properly a cause of being but of some definite kind of being, namely, mobile substance. However, such causes belong to the consideration of the particular sciences, unless perhaps they are considered by this science inasmuch as they are contained under being; for it extends its analysis to all things in this way.

385. Now when these things are seen it is easy to answer the arguments which have been raised. For, first, nothing prevents the different causes in this science from belonging to a single existing thing, even though they are not contraries, because they are reducible to one thing—being in general—as has been stated (384).

And in a similar way, even though not every science considers all of the causes, still nothing prevents one science from being able to consider all of the causes or several of them insofar as they are reducible to some one thing. But to be more specific, it must be said that in the case of immobile things nothing prevents the source of motion and the end or good from being investigated. By immobile things I mean here those which are still causes of motion, as the first substances. However, in the case of those things which are neither moved nor cause motion there is no investigation of the source of motion, or of the end in the sense of the end of motion, although an end can be considered as the goal of some operation which does not involve motion. For if there are held to be intellectual substances which do not cause motion, as the Platonists claimed, still insofar as they have an intellect and will it is necessary to hold that they have an end and a good which is the object of their will. However, the objects of mathematics neither are moved nor cause motion nor have a will. Hence in their case the good is not considered under the name of good and end, although in them we do consider what is good, namely, their being and what they are. Hence the statement that the good is not found in the objects of mathematics is false, as he proves below in Book IX (1888) .

386. The reply to the second question is already clear; for a study of the three causes, about which he argued dialectically, belongs to this science.

Lesson 5

Q. 2: Is the science of substance also that of first principles?

392. The Philosopher answers this question in Book IV (590) of this work. He says that the study of the axioms belongs chiefly to the [first] philosopher inasmuch as it pertains to him to consider being in general, to which first principles of this kind essentially belong, as is most evident in the case of the very first principle: it is impossible for the same thing both to be and not to be [at the same time]. Hence all the particular sciences use principles of this kind just as they use being itself, although it is the first philosopher who is chiefly concerned with this. And the first argument is solved in this way.

But the second argument is solved thus: the [first] philosopher does not consider principles of this kind in such a way as to make them known by defining them or by demonstrating them in an absolute sense, but by refutation, i.e., by arguing disputatively against those who deny them, as is stated in Book IV (608).

Lesson 6

Qq. 3 & 6: Does the science of substance consider all substances as well as accidents?

398. This is treated in Book IV (546) of this work, where it is shown that the examination of substance as substance belongs to the first science, whose province it is to consider being as being; and thus it considers all substances according to the common aspect of substance. Therefore it belongs to this science to consider the common accidents of substance. But it belongs to the particular sciences, which deal with particular substances, to consider the particular accidents of substances, just as it belongs to the science of nature to consider the accidents of mobile substance. However, among substances there is also a hierarchy, for the first substances are immaterial ones. Hence the study of them belongs properly to first-philosophy, just as the philosophy of nature would be first philosophy if there were no other substances prior to mobile corporeal substances, as is stated below in Book VI (1170).

399. Here he raises another question regarding the study of substance and accidents. Concerning this he does three things. First, he raises the question whether the investigation of this science is concerned with substance alone or also with the attributes that are accidents of substances. For example, if we say that lines, surfaces and solids are substances of some sort, as some held, the question arises whether it belongs to the same science to consider such things and also their proper accidents, which are demonstrated in the mathematical sciences, or whether it belongs to another science.

402. The Philosopher answers this question in Book IV (570) of this work, saying that it is also the office of that science which is concerned with the study of substance and being to consider the proper accidents of substance and being. Yet it does not follow that it would consider each in the same way, i.e., by demonstrating substance as it demonstrates accidents, but by defining substance and by demonstrating that accidents either belong to or do not belong to it, as is explained more fully at the end of Book IX (1895) of this work.

3. BOOK IV: THE SUBJECT OF METAPHYSICS, DEMONSTRATIVELY

Lesson 1

It is being and its properties

529. In the preceding book the Philosopher proceeded to treat dialectically the things which ought to be considered in this science. Here he begins to proceed **demonstratively** by establishing the true answer to those questions which have been raised and argued dialectically.

In the preceding book he treated dialectically both the things which pertain to the method of this science, namely, those to which the consideration of this science extends, as well as those which fall under the consideration of this science. And because it is first necessary to know the method of a science before proceeding to consider the things with which it deals, as was explained in Book II (335), this. part is therefore divided into two members. First, he speaks of the things which this science considers; and second (749), of those which fall under its consideration. He does this in Book V ("In one sense the term principle").

The first part is divided into two members. First, he establishes what **the subject matter** of this science is. Second (534), he proceeds to answer the questions raised in the preceding book about the things which this science considers ("The term being").

In regard to the first he does three things. First, he submits that there is a science whose subject is being. Second (532), he shows that it is not one of the particular sciences ("But this science"); and third (533), he shows that it is the science with which we are now dealing ("Now since").

Now because a science should investigate not only its subject but also the proper accidents of its subject, he therefore says, first, that there is a science which studies being as being, as its subject, and studies also "the attributes which necessarily belong to being," i.e., its proper accidents.

530. He says "as being" because the other sciences, which deal with particular beings, do indeed consider being (for all the subjects of the sciences are beings), yet they do not consider **being as being**, but as some particular kind of being, for example, number or line or fire or the like.

531. He also says "and the attributes which necessarily belong to being," and not just those which belong to being, in order to show that it is not the business of this science to consider those attributes which belong accidentally to its subject, but only those which belong necessarily to it. For geometry does not consider whether a triangle is of bronze or of wood, but only considers it in an absolute sense according as it has three angles equal to two right angles. Hence a science of this kind, whose subject is being, must not consider all the attributes which belong accidentally to being, because then it would consider the accidents investigated by all sciences; for all accidents belong to some being, but not inasmuch as it is being. For those accidents which are the proper accidents of an inferior thing are related in an accidental way to a superior thing; for example, the proper accidents of man are not the proper accidents of animal.

Now the necessity of this science, which considers **being and its proper accidents**, is evident from this, that such things should not remain unknown since the knowledge of other things depends on them, just as the knowledge of proper objects depends on that of common objects.

532. Then he shows that this science is not one of the particular sciences, and he uses the following argument. No particular science considers universal being as such, but only some part of it separated. from the others; and about this part it studies the proper accidents. For example, the mathematical sciences study one kind of being, quantitative being. But the common science considers universal being as being, and therefore it is not the same as any of the particular sciences.

533. Here he shows that the science with which we are dealing has being as its subject, and he uses the following argument. Every principle is of itself the principle and cause of some nature. But we are seeking the first principles and ultimate causes of things, as was explained in Book I (57), and therefore these are of themselves the causes of some nature. But this nature can only be the nature of being. This is clear from the fact that all philosophers, in seeking the elements of things inasmuch as they are beings, sought principles of this kind, namely, the first and ultimate ones. Therefore in this science we

are seeking the principles of being as being. Hence being is the subject of this science, for any science seeks the proper causes of its subject.

It applies analogically to the different categories.

534. Then he proceeds to answer the questions raised in the preceding book about the things which this science considers, and this is divided into three parts. First, he answers the question whether this science considers **substances and accidents together**, and whether it considers all substances. Second (548), he answers the question whether it belongs to this science to consider all of the following: one and many, same and different, opposites, contraries, and so forth ("Now although"). Third (588), he answers the question whether it belongs to this science to consider the principles of demonstration ("Moreover, it is necessary").

In regard to the first he does three things. First, he shows that it is the office of this science to consider both substances and accidents. Second (546), he shows that this science is chiefly concerned with substances ("But in every respect"). Third (547), he shows that it pertains to this science to consider all substances ("Now of every").

In regard to the first part he uses this kind of argument: Those things which have one term predicated of them in common, not univocally but analogously, belong to the consideration of one science. But the term being is thus predicated of all beings. Therefore all beings, i.e., both substances and accidents, belong to the consideration of one science which considers being as being.

535. Now in this argument he gives, first (535), the **minor premise**; second (544), the major premise ("Therefore, just as"); and third (545), the conclusion ("It is evident, then").

He accordingly says, first, that the term being, or what is, has several meanings. But it must be noted that a term is predicated of different things in various senses. Sometimes it is predicated of them according to a meaning which is entirely the same, and then it is said to be predicated of them **univocally**, as animal is predicated of a horse and of an ox. Sometimes it is predicated of them according to meanings which are entirely different, and then it is said to be predicated of them **equivocally**, as dog is predicated of a star and of an animal. And sometimes it is predicated of them according to meanings which are partly different and partly not (different inasmuch as they imply different relationships, and the same inasmuch as these different relationships are referred to one and the same thing), and then it is said "to be predicated **analogously**," i.e., proportionally, according as each one by its own relationship is referred to that one same thing.

536. It must also be noted that the one thing to which the different relationships are referred in the case of analogical things is numerically one and not just one in meaning, which is the kind of oneness designated by a univocal term. Hence he says that, although the term being has several senses, still it is not predicated equivocally but **in reference to one thing**; not to one thing which is one merely in meaning, but to one which is one as a single definite nature. This is evident in the examples given in the text.

537. First, he gives the example of many things being related to one thing as an end. This is clear in the case of the term healthy or healthful. For the term healthy is not predicated univocally of food, medicine, urine and an animal; because the concept healthy as applied to food means something that preserves health; and as applied to medicine it means something that causes health; and as applied to urine it means something that is a sign of health; and as applied to an animal it means something that is the recipient or subject of health. Hence every use of the term healthy refers to one and the same health; for it is the same health which the animal receives, which urine is a sign of, which medicine causes, and which food preserves.

538. Second, he gives the example of many things being related to one thing as an **efficient** principle. For one thing is called medical because it possesses the art of medicine, as the skilled physician. Another is called medical because it is naturally disposed to have the art of medicine, as men who are so disposed that they may acquire the art of medicine easily (and according to this some men can engage in medical activities as a result of a peculiar natural constitution). And another is called medical or medicinal because it is necessary for healing, as the instruments which physicians use can be called medical. The same thing is also true of the things called medicines, which physicians use in restoring health. Other terms which resemble these in having many senses can be taken in a similar way.

539. And just as the above-mentioned terms have many senses, so also does the term being. Yet every being is called such in relation to one first thing, and this first thing is not an end or an efficient cause, as is the case in the foregoing examples, but a **subject**.

For some things are called beings, or are said to be, because they have being of themselves, as **substances**, which are called beings in the primary and proper sense. Others are called beings because they are affections or properties of substances, as the proper accidents of any substance. Others are called beings because they are processes toward substance, as generation and motion. And others are called beings because they are corruptions of substances; for corruption is the process toward non-being just as generation is the process toward substance. And since corruption terminates in privation just as generation terminates in form, the very privations of substantial forms are fittingly called beings. Again, certain qualities or certain accidents are called beings because

they are productive or generative principles of substances or of those things which are related to substance according to one of the foregoing relationships or any other relationship.

And similarly the negations of those things which are related to substances, or even substance itself, are also called beings. Hence we say that non-being is non-being. But this would not be possible unless a negation possessed being in some way.

540. But it must be noted that the above-mentioned **modes of being** can be reduced to four.

(1) For one of them, which is the most imperfect, i.e., **negation and privation**, exists only in the mind. We say that these exist in the mind because the mind busies itself with them as kinds of being while it affirms or denies something about them. In what respect negation and privation differ will be treated below (564).

541. (2) There is another mode of being inasmuch as **generation and corruption** are called beings, and this mode by reason of its imperfection comes close to the one given above. For generation and corruption have some admixture of privation and negation, because motion is an imperfect kind of actuality, as is stated in the *Physics*, Book III.

542. (3) The third mode of being admits of no admixture of non-being, yet it is still an imperfect kind of being, because it does not exist of itself but **in something else**, for example, qualities and quantities and the properties of substances.

543. (4) The fourth mode of being is the one which is most perfect, namely, what has being in reality without any admixture of privation, and has firm and solid being inasmuch as **it exists of itself**. This is the mode of being which *substances* have. Now all the others are reduced to this as the primary and principal mode of being; for qualities and quantities are said to be inasmuch as they exist in substances; and motions and generations are said to be inasmuch as they are processes tending toward substance or toward some of the foregoing; and negations and privations are said to be inasmuch as they remove some part of the preceding three.

544. Here he gives the **major** premise of the first argument. He says that it is the office of one science to study not only those things which are referred "to one thing," i.e., to one common notion, but also those which are referred to one nature according to different relationships. And the reason for this is that the thing to which they are referred is one; just as it is clear that one science, medicine, considers all health-giving things. The same thing holds true of other things which are spoken of in the same way.

545. Then he draws his intended **conclusion**. This is evident of itself.

546. Then he shows that this science, even though it considers all beings, is **chiefly concerned with substances**. He uses the following argument. Every science which deals with many things that are referred to one primary thing is properly and principally concerned with that primary thing on which other things depend for their being and from which they derive their name; and this is true in every case. But substance is the primary kind of being. Hence the philosopher who considers all beings ought to consider primarily and chiefly the principles and causes of substances. Therefore his consideration extends primarily and chiefly to substances.

547. Then he shows by the following argument that it is the business of the first philosopher to consider **all** substances. There is one sense and one science of all things belonging to one class; for example, sight is concerned with all colors, and grammar with all words. Therefore, if all beings somehow belong to one class, all species of being must belong to the consideration of one science which is a general science, and different species of being must belong to the different species of that science. He says this because it is not necessary for one science to consider all the species of one genus according to the special notes of every single species, but only inasmuch as they agree generically. But according to their specific notes the different species of one genus belong to the special sciences, as happens in the present case. For inasmuch as all substances are beings or substances, they belong to the consideration of this science; but inasmuch as they are a particular kind of substance, as a lion or an ox, they belong to the special sciences.

Lesson 4

General reasons for that (difference between metaphysics and dialectics or sophistry).

570. Here he uses arguments based on common principles to prove what the philosopher ought to consider regarding all of the foregoing attributes. First, he proves his thesis; and second (587), he introduces his intended conclusion ("It is evident").

In regard to the first part he does two things. First, he proves his thesis; and second (586), he draws a corollary from what has been said ("And for this reason").

He gives three arguments to prove his thesis. The second (572) begins where he says, "An indication of this"; and the third (578), at "Further, one corresponding."

The first argument is as follows. All questions that can be raised must be answered by some science. But questions are raised about the common attributes mentioned above, for example, that raised about sameness and otherness: whether Socrates and Socrates sitting are the same; and that raised about contraries: whether one thing has one contrary, and how many meanings the term contrary has. Hence these questions must be answered by some science

which considers sameness and contrariety and the other attributes mentioned above.

571. That this is the job of the philosopher and of no one else he proves thus: that science whose office is to consider being as being is the one which must consider the first properties of being. But all of the above-mentioned attributes are proper accidents of unity and being as such. For number as number has properties, such as excess, equality, commensurability, and so on, some of which belong to a number taken absolutely, as even and odd, and some to one number in relation to another, as equality. And even substance has proper attributes, "as the resistant," or body, and others of this kind. And in a similar way being as being has certain properties, which are the common attributes mentioned above; and therefore the study of them belongs to the philosopher. Hence those dealing with philosophy have not erred in their treatment of these things "by being unphilosophical," i.e., by considering them in a way that does not pertain to the investigations of philosophy, but because in treating them they pay no attention to substance, as though they were completely unmindful of it despite the fact that it is the first thing which the philosopher ought to consider.

572. Then he gives a second argument to prove the same point. This argument employs an example and runs thus: dialecticians and sophists assume the same guise as the philosopher inasmuch as they resemble him in some respect. But the dialectician and sophist dispute about the above-mentioned attributes. Therefore the philosopher should also consider them. In support of his first premise he shows how dialectics and sophistry resemble philosophy and how they differ from it.

573. *Dialectics* resembles philosophy in that it is also the office of the dialectician to consider **all things**. But this could not be the case unless he considered all things insofar as they agree in some one respect; because each science has one subject, and each art has one matter on which it operates. Therefore, since all things agree only in being, evidently the subject matter of dialectics is being and those attributes which belong to being; and this is what the philosopher also investigates. And *sophistry* likewise resembles philosophy; for sophistry has "the semblance of wisdom," or is **apparent wisdom**, without being wisdom. Now anything that takes on the appearance of something else must resemble it in some way. Therefore the philosopher, the dialectician and the sophist must consider the same thing.

574. Yet they **differ** from each other. The philosopher differs from the *dialectician* in power, because the consideration of the philosopher is more efficacious than that of the dialectician. For the philosopher proceeds demonstratively in dealing with the common attributes mentioned above, and thus it is proper to him to have scientific knowledge of these attributes. And he actually knows them with certitude, for certain or scientific knowledge is the effect of demonstration. The dialectician, however, proceeds to treat all of the above-mentioned common attributes from probable premises, and thus he does not acquire scientific knowledge of them but a kind of opinion. The reason for this difference is that there are two kinds of beings: **beings of reason** and real beings. The expression being of reason is applied properly to those notions which reason derives from the objects it considers, for example, the notions of genus, species and the like, which are not found in reality but are a natural result of the consideration of reason. And this kind of being, i.e., being of reason, constitutes the proper subject of *logic*. But intellectual conceptions of this kind are equal in extension to real beings, because all real beings fall under the consideration of reason. Hence the subject of logic extends to all things to which the expression real being is applied. His conclusion is, then, that the subject of logic is equal in extension to the subject of philosophy, which is real being.

Now the **philosopher** proceeds from the principles of this kind of being to prove the things that have to be considered about the common accidents of this kind of being. But the **dialectician** proceeds to consider them from the conceptions of reason, which are extrinsic to reality. Hence it is said that dialectics is in search of knowledge, because in searching it is proper to proceed from extrinsic principles.

575. But the philosopher differs from the *sophist* "in the choice," i.e., in the selection or willing, or in the desire, of a way of life. For the philosopher and sophist direct their life and actions to different things. The philosopher directs his to knowing the **truth**, whereas the sophist directs his so as to **appear** to know what he does not.

576. Now although it is said that philosophy is scientific knowledge, and that dialectics and sophistry are not, this still does not do away with the possibility of dialectics and sophistry being sciences. For *dialectics* can be considered both from the viewpoint of theory and from that of practice. (1) From the viewpoint of **theory** it studies these conceptions and establishes the method by which one proceeds from them to demonstrate with probability the conclusions of the particular sciences; and it does this demonstratively, and to this extent it is a science. (2) But from the viewpoint of **practice** it makes use of the above method so as to reach certain probable conclusions in the particular sciences; and in this respect it falls short of the scientific method.

The same must be said of *sophistry*, because from the viewpoint of **theory** it treats by means of necessary and demonstrative arguments the method of arguing to apparent truth. From the viewpoint of **practice**, however, it falls short of the process of true argumentation.

577. But that part of logic which is said to be *demonstrative* is concerned only with **theory**, and the **practical** application of it belongs to philosophy and to

the other particular sciences, which are concerned with real beings. This is because the practical aspect of the demonstrative part of logic consists in using the principles of things, from which proceeds demonstration (which properly belongs to the sciences that deal with real beings), and not in using the conceptions of logic.

Thus it appears that some parts of logic are at the same time scientific, theoretical, and practical, as exploratory dialectics and sophistry; and one is concerned with theory and not practice, namely, demonstrative logic.

4. ANALOGY

De veritate q.2, a.11

Since an agreement according to proportion can happen in two ways, two kinds of community can be noted in analogy. (1) There is a certain agreement between things having a **proportion** to each other from the fact that they have a **determinate** distance between each other or some other relation to each other, like the proportion which the number two has to unity in as far as it is the double of unity. (2) Again, the agreement is occasionally noted not between two things which have a proportion between them, but rather **between two related proportions**, for example, six has something in common with four because six is two times three, just as four is two times two. The first type of agreement is one of proportion; the second, of proportionality.

(1) We find something predicated analogously of two realities according to the first type of agreement when one of them has a relation to the other, as when being is predicated of substance and accident because of the relation which accident has to substance, or as when healthy is predicated of urine and animal because urine has some relation to the health of an animal. (2) Sometimes, however, a thing is predicated analogously according to the second type of agreement, as when sight is predicated of bodily sight and of the intellect because understanding is in the mind as sight is in the eye.

(1) In those terms predicated according to the first type of analogy, there must be some definite relation between the things having something in common analogously. Consequently, nothing can be predicated analogously of God and creature according to this type of analogy; for no creature has such a relation to God that it could determine the divine perfection. (2) But in the other type of analogy, no definite relation is involved between the things which have something in common analogously, so there is no reason why some name cannot be predicated analogously of God and creature in this manner.

But this can happen in two ways. (a) Sometimes the name implies something belonging to the thing primarily designated which cannot be common to God and creature even in the manner described above. This would be true, for example, of anything predicated of God **metaphorically**, as when God is called lion, which cannot be attributed to God. (b) At other times, however, a term predicated of God and creature implies nothing in its principal meaning which would prevent our finding between a creature and God an agreement of the type described above. To this kind belong all attributes which include no defect nor depend on matter for their act of existence, for example, being, the good, and similar things. [“proper proportionality”]

Commentary on the Sentences I, d.16, q.1, a.3. ad 3

To speak **metaphorically** is not to speak falsely; for by such speech one does not intend to express the natures of things signified by the words one uses, but rather those characteristics that have a certain likeness to those things.

Commentary on the Ethics I, lesson 7, n.96

In this fashion, therefore, he affirms that “good” is predicated of many things not with meanings entirely different, as happens with things completely equivocal, but according to analogy or the same proportion, inasmuch as all goods depend on the first principle of goodness, that is, as they are ordered to one end. Aristotle indeed did not intend that the separated good be the idea and “ratio” of all goods but their principle and end. Likewise, all things are called good by an analogy or the same proportion just as sight is the good of the body and intellect is the good of the soul. He prefers this third way because it is understood according to goodness inherent in things. The first two ways, however, are ascribed to a separated goodness from which a thing is not so properly denominated.

S.T. I, q.12, a.1, ad 4

Proportion is twofold. (1) In one sense it means a **certain relation** of one quantity to another, according to which double, treble, and equal are species of proportion. (2) In another sense, **every relation** of one thing to another is called proportion. And in this sense there can be a proportion of the creature to God, inasmuch as it is related to Him as (a) the effect to its cause, and as (b) potentiality to act; and in this way a created intellect can be proportioned to know God.

Thus, he [Aristotle] says that goodness is predicated of many things, not according to a meaning that is entirely different, as happens in those things that are equivocal by chance, but rather according to **analogy**, that is, (1) they are proportionately the same insofar as all good things depend on one **principle** of goodness, or insofar as they are all ordered to one **end**. Or (2) also all good things are analogously good, that is, according to a **similar proportion**, as vision in the eye is a good of the body and vision of the intellect

is a good of the soul. Therefore he [Aristotle] prefers this kind of analogy, because it is taken to refer to goodness that is really inhering in things.

Summa Theologiae I, q. 13, art. 6

I answer that, in names predicated of many in an *analogical* sense, all are predicated through a relation to **some one thing**; and this one thing must be placed in the definition of them all. And since the essence expressed by the name is the definition, as the Philosopher says, such a name must be applied primarily to that which is put in the definition of the other things, and secondarily to these others according as they approach more or less to the first. Thus, for instance, healthy applied to animals comes into the definition of healthy applied to medicine, which is called healthy as being the cause of health in the animal; and also into the definition of healthy which is applied to urine, which is called healthy insofar as it is the sign of the animal's health.

So it is that all names applied **metaphorically** to God are applied to creatures primarily rather than to God, because when said of God they mean only similitudes to such creatures. For as smiling applied to a field means only that the field in the beauty of its flowering is like to the beauty of the human smile by proportionate likeness, so the name of lion applied to God means only that God manifests strength in His works, as a lion in his. Thus it is clear that applied to God the signification of these names can be defined only from what is said of creatures.

But to other names **not** applied to God in a **metaphorical** sense, the same rule would apply if they were spoken of God as the **cause** only, as some have supposed. For when it is said, God is good, it would then only mean, God is the cause of the creature's goodness; and thus the name good applied to God would include in its meaning the creature's goodness. Hence good would apply primarily to creatures rather than God. But, as was shown above, these names are applied to God not as the cause only, but **also essentially**. For the words, God is good, or wise, signify not only that He is the cause of wisdom or goodness, but that these exist in Him in a more excellent way. Hence (1) as regards what the name signifies, these names are applied primarily to God rather than to creatures, because these perfections flow from God to creatures; but (2) as regards the imposition of the names, they are primarily applied by us to creatures which we know first. Hence they have a mode of signification which belongs to creatures, as was said above.

On the Power of God, q. 7, art. 7

The seventh point of inquiry is whether these terms are attributed to God and creatures univocally or equivocally.

I answer that it is impossible for anything to be predicated **univocally** of God and a creature: this is made plain as follows. (1) Every effect of an univocal agent is adequate to the agent's power: and no creature, being finite, can be adequate to the power of the first agent which is infinite. Wherefore it is impossible for a creature to receive a likeness to God univocally. (2) Again it is clear that although the form in the agent and the form in the effect have a common meaning (*ratio*), the fact that they have different modes of existence precludes their univocal predication: thus though the material house is of the same type as the house in the mind of the builder, since the one is the type of the other; nevertheless house cannot be univocally predicated of both, because the form of the material house has its being in matter, whereas in the builder's mind it has immaterial being. Hence granted the impossibility that goodness in God and in the creature be of the same kind, nevertheless good would not be predicated of God univocally: since that which in God is immaterial and simple, is in the creature material and manifold. (3) Moreover being is not predicated univocally of substance and accident, because substance is a being as subsisting in itself, while accident is that whose being is to be in something else. Wherefore it is evident that a different relation to being precludes an univocal predication of being. Now God's relation to being is different from that of any creature's: for he is his own being, which cannot be said of any creature.

Hence in no way can it be predicated univocally of God and a creature, and consequently neither can any of the other predicables among which is included even the first, being: for if there be diversity in the first, there must be diversity in the others: wherefore nothing is predicated univocally of substance and accident.

Others, however, took a different view, and held that nothing is predicated of God and a creature by analogy but by pure **equivocation**. This is the opinion of Rabbi Moses, as appears from his writings. This opinion, however, is false, because (1) in all purely equivocal terms, which the Philosopher calls equivocal by chance, a term is predicated of a thing without any respect to something else: whereas all things predicated of God and creatures are predicated of God with a certain respect to creatures or vice versa, and this is clearly admitted in all the aforesaid explanations of the divine names. Wherefore they cannot be pure equivocations. (2) Again, since all our knowledge of God is taken from creatures, if the agreement were purely nominal, we should know nothing about God except empty expressions to which nothing corresponds in reality. (3) Moreover, it would follow that all the proofs advanced about God by philosophers are sophisms: for instance, if one were to argue that whatsoever is in potentiality is reduced to actuality by something actual and that therefore God is actual being, since all things are brought into being by him, there will be a fallacy of equivocation; and similarly in all other arguments. (4) And again the effect must in some way be like its cause, wherefore nothing is predicated equivocally of cause and effect; for instance, healthy of medicine and an animal.

We must accordingly take a different view and hold that nothing is predicated univocally of God and the creature: but that those things which are attributed to them in common are predicated not equivocally but **analogically**. Now this kind of predication is twofold. (1) The first is when one thing is predicated of two with respect to a third: thus being is predicated of quantity and quality

with respect to substance. (2) The other is when a thing is predicated of two by reason of a relationship between these two: thus being is predicated of substance and quantity. In the first kind of predication the two things must be preceded by something to which each of them bears some relation: thus substance has a respect to quantity and quality: whereas in the second kind of predication this is not necessary, but one of the two must precede the other. Wherefore since nothing precedes God, but he precedes the creature, the second kind of analogical predication is applicable to him but not the first.

5. BOOK V, Lesson 9: *Kinds of being: Per accidens, Per se—the Categories*

885. Here the Philosopher gives the various senses in which the term being is used, and in regard to this he does three things. First, he divides being into essential being and accidental being. Second (886), he distinguishes between the types of accidental being ("Accidental being"). Third (889), he distinguishes between the types of essential being ("On the other hand").

He says, then, that while things are said to be both essentially and accidentally, it should be noted that this division of being is not the same as that whereby being is divided into substance and accident. This is clear from the fact that he later divides essential being into the ten predicaments, nine of which belong to the class of accident (889). Hence being is divided into substance and accident insofar as it is considered in an absolute sense; for example, whiteness considered in itself is called an accident, and man a substance. But accidental being, in the sense in which it is taken here must be understood by comparing an accident with a substance; and this comparison is signified by the term *is* when, for example, it is said that the man is white. Hence this whole "the man is white" is an accidental being. It is clear, then, that the division of being into essential being and accidental being is based on the fact that one thing is predicated of another either essentially or accidentally. But the division of being into substance and accident is based on the fact that a thing is in its own nature either a substance or an accident.

886. Then he indicates the various senses in which a thing is said to be accidentally. He says that this occurs in three ways: (1) first, when an **accident** is predicated of an **accident**, as when it is said that someone just is musical: (2) second, when an **accident** is predicated of a **subject**, as when it is said that the man is musical; and (3) third, when a **subject** is predicated of an **accident**, as when it is said that the musician is a man. And since he has shown above (787) how an accidental cause differs from an essential cause, he therefore now shows that an accidental being is a result of an accidental cause.

887. He says that in giving an accidental cause we say that the musician builds, because it is accidental to a builder to be a musician, or vice versa; for it is evident that the statement "this is that," i.e., the musician is a builder, simply means that "this is an accident of that." The same is true of the foregoing senses of accidental being when we say that the man is musical by predicating an accident of a subject, or when we say that what is white is musical, or conversely that what is musical is white by predicating an accident of an accident. For in all of these cases *is* signifies merely accidental being: "in the latter case," i.e., when an accident is predicated of an accident, *is* signifies that both accidents are accidental to the same subject; "and in the former," i.e., when an accident is predicated of a subject, *is* signifies "that the attribute is accidental to the being," i.e., to the subject. But when we say that what is musical is a man, we mean "that musical is an accident of this person," i.e., that musical, which holds the position of a subject, is an accident of the predicate. And the reason for making the predication is similar in a sense when a subject is predicated of an accident and when an accident is predicated of an accident. For a subject is predicated of an accident by reason of the fact that the subject is predicated of that to which the accident, which is expressed in the subject, is accidental; and in a similar fashion an accident is predicated of an accident because it is predicated of the subject of an accident. And for this reason the attribute musical is predicated not only of man but also of white, because that of which the attribute musical is an accident, i.e., the subject, is white.

888. It, is evident, then, that those things which are said to be in an accidental sense are said to be such for three reasons: (1) either "because both," namely, the subject and predicate, belong to the same thing (as when an **accident** is predicated of an **accident**); or (2) "because the attribute," namely, the predicate, such as musical, "belongs to the being," i.e., to the subject which is said to be musical (and this occurs when an **accident** is predicated of a **subject**); or (3) "because the thing," i.e., the subject which is expressed in the predicate, to which belongs the accident of which it (the subject) is itself predicated, itself is (and this occurs when a **subject** is predicated of an **accident**, as when we say that what is musical is a man).

Ten ways per se

889. Here he distinguishes between the types of essential being; and in regard to this he does three things. First, he divides the kind of being which lies outside the mind, which is complete being, by the ten predicaments. Second (895), he gives another type of being, inasmuch as being exists only in the mind ("Again, being, signifies"). Third (897), he divides being by potentiality and actuality— and being divided in this way is more common than complete being, for potential being is being only imperfectly and in a qualified sense ("Again, to be").

He says, first (437), that all those things which signify the figures of predication are said to be essentially. For it must be noted that being cannot be narrowed down to some definite thing in the way in which a genus is narrowed

down to a species by means of **(-) differences**. For since a difference does not participate in a genus, it lies outside the essence of a genus. But there could be nothing outside the essence of being which could constitute a particular species of being by adding to being; for what is outside of being is nothing, and this cannot be a difference. Hence in Book III of this work (433) the Philosopher proved that being cannot be a genus.

890. Being must then be narrowed down to diverse genera on the basis of a **(+) different mode of predication**, which flows from a different mode of being; for "being is signified," i.e., something is signified to be, "in just as many ways" (or in as many senses) as we can make predications. And for this reason the classes into which being is first divided are called *predicaments*, because they are distinguished on the basis of different ways of predicating. Therefore, since some predicates signify what (i.e., substance); some, of what kind; some, how much; and so on; there must be a mode of being corresponding to each type of predication. For example, when it is said that a man is an animal, is signifies substance; and when it is said that a man is white, is signifies quality; and so on.

891. For it should be noted that a predicate can be referred to a subject in three ways.

(1) This occurs in one way when the predicate states **what the subject is**, as when I say that Socrates is an animal; for Socrates is the thing which is an animal. And this predicate is said to signify first *substance*, i.e., a particular substance, of which all attributes are predicated.

892. (2) A predicate is referred to a subject in a second way when the predicate is taken as being **in the subject**, and this predicate is in the subject either (a) **essentially** and absolutely and (I) as something flowing from its **matter**, and then it is *quantity*; or (ii) as something flowing from its **form**, and then it is *quality*; or (b) it is not present in the subject absolutely but with **reference to** something else, and then it is *relation*.

(3) A predicate is referred to a subject in a third, way when the predicate is taken from something **extrinsic** to the subject, and this occurs in two ways. (a) In one way, that from which the predicate is taken is **totally extrinsic** to the subject; and (I) if this is **not a measure** of the subject, it is predicated after the manner of *attire*, as when it is said that Socrates is shod or clothed. (ii) But if it is a **measure** of the subject, then, since an extrinsic measure is either time or place, (aa) the predicament is taken either in reference to **time**, and so it will be *when*; or (bb) if it is taken in reference to **place** and the order of parts in place is **not** considered, it will be *where*; but if this order **is considered**, it will be *position.* (b) In another way, that from which the predicate is taken, though outside the subject, is nevertheless **from a certain point of view in** the subject of which it is predicated. (I) And if it is from the viewpoint of the **principle**, then it is predicated as an *action*; for the principle of action is in the subject. (ii) But if it is from the viewpoint of its **terminus**, then it will be predicated as a *passion*; for a passion is terminated in the subject which is being acted upon.

893. But since there are some predications in which the verb *is* is clearly not used (for example, when it is said that a man walks), lest someone think that these predications do not involve the predication of being, for this reason Aristotle subsequently rejects this, saying that in all predications of this kind something is signified to be. For every verb is reduced to the verb is plus a participle. For there is no difference between the statements "the man is recovering" and "the man recovers"; and it is the same in other cases. It is clear, then, that "being" is used in as many ways as we make predications.

894. And there is no truth in Avicenna's statement that predicates which belong to the class of accidents primarily signify substance and secondarily accidents, as the terms white and musical. For the term white, as it is used in the categories, signifies quality alone. Now the term white implies a subject inasmuch as it signifies whiteness after the manner of an accident, so that it must by implication include the subject in its notion, because the being of an accident consists in being in something. For even though *whiteness* signifies an accident, it still does not signify this after the manner of an accident but after that of a substance. Hence it implies a subject in no way. For if it were to signify a subject primarily, then the Philosopher would not put accidental predicates under essential being but under accidental being. For the whole statement "the man is white" is a being in an accidental sense, as has been stated (886).

S.T. I, q.3, a.5, ad 1

The name substance signifies not only what is **being of itself** — for being cannot of itself be a genus — but it also signifies an **essence** to which it belongs in this way, namely, of itself, which being (i.e., existence) however is not its essence.

6. The Categories (see Book V, #891-892 above)

Being, signified by a Predicate:

- which states what the subject is . . . . . 1 Substance
  - spiritual
  - material
    - animate
    - inanimate
- which is in the subject (an accident):
  - essentially and absolutely
    - flowing from its matter . . . . . 2 Quantity
      - number (discrete)
        - natural
        - artificial
      - magnitue (continuous)
    - flowing from its form . . . . . 3 Quality
      - habits/dispositions
      - powers
        - active
          - spiritual (active intellect, power of priest)
          - corporeal
            - vital (nutrition, growth, reproduction, movement)
            - non-vital (resistance, gravity, electrical, thermal, chemical etc.)
        - receptive powers
          - spiritual (passive intellect, will)
          - sensory in body: senses (external, internal) & appetites (irascible, concupiscible)
          - non-sensory in body
      - sensible qualities proper to external senses (e.g. color, sound)
      - shapes, terminating continuous quantity
  - not absolutely, but with reference to something else . . . . . 4 Relation
    - non-causal
      - substantial identity/diversity
      - qualitative similarity/dissimilarity
      - quanitative equality/inequality
    - causal
      - measuring: soul powers to objects; things to exemplar or plan
      - non-measuring: the four causes
- referring to something extrinsic:
  - partly in it:
    - as a principle . . . . . 5 Action
    - as a terminus . . . . . 6 Passion
  - wholly outside it:
    - as a measure:
      - of place:
        - considering order of parts . . . . . 7 Position
        - without regard to order of parts . . . . . 8 Where
      - of time . . . . . 9 When
    - not as a measure . . . . . 10 Attire/Vestition