MEDIEVAL PRECEDENTS FOR ATTITUDES TOWARDS GENOMICS

by Joseph Kenny, O.P.

for EAGER Africa Conference,
Abuja 28-29 November 2011


Genomics: Is it "I have a dream," or "I have a nightmare"?[1] What underlies the opposite perceptions?

Most discussions on the ethics of genomics center on "informed consent" in obtaining samples. This paper looks at another issue, the legitimate autonomy of genomic and other medical research, versus legitimate ethical restraints on this research. Medieval disputes on this issue, both in Christian and Muslim traditions, are instructive, because we see the same different approaches echoing today.

To illustrate these approaches, I look at a philosopher-scientist from each tradition (Ibn-Sīnā and Albert the Great), and a theologian from each tradition (Thomas Aquinas and al-Ghazālī). After showing that they never realized the role of heredity in health, I compare their positions on the origin of human life. This illustrates the extent of scientific autonomy in that period. In the second part, I examine repercussions of these views today, where I see the continuance of three distinct approaches.

Did these men have any idea of heredity as a physical determinant?

Both Ibn-Sīnā and Albert the Great recognize that children resemble both parents, sometimes one more than the other, because of the preponderant activity of the male or female genetic material at conception. In his al-Qanūn fī ṭ-ṭibb, Ibn-Sīnā is very thorough in his description of the types, symptoms, causes and remedies of every sort of disease. Yet hereditary defects are not mentioned in any of the lists of causes. For both authors, "congenital defects" go no further than something gone amiss in the womb or during delivery, not to a defect in one or both parents.

Albert states that he himself observed a man with six fingers in each hand, and six toes in each foot, and that his brother had the same abnormality.[2] That should have set him thinking, but since the parents were normal, and he knew nothing of recessive genes, he speculated no further.

Since medieval science did not query the role of heredity in the health of the offspring, much less did theological thinking.

Since it was never a matter of previous debate, the fact that heredity has some role to play in the offspring, today finds easy acceptance in religious circles. Mendel helped to pave the way.

The two philosopher-scientists

In the area of physical research, two great minds stand out: Ibn-Sīnā (Latinized as Avicenna) and Albert the Great.

Ibn-Sīnā (980-1037) has a vast output, 30% of which has never been published.[3] His principal works on natural science are the eight volumes of ṭabī`iyyāt in his encyclopedic Shifā',[4] and his monumental work on medicine, al-Qanūn fī ṭ- ṭibb.[5]

Albert the Great (1206-1280) has a similarly vast output. His works on natural science fill volumes IV to XII in the critical Cologne edition.[6]

Both men had a similar approach. They were familiar with the works of their predecessors, among whom Aristotle and Galen had greatest authority in physiology. Yet they did much research on their own, supplemented by contemporary informants. All these observations, however, relied on the naked eye or the naked ear. They had no telescopes, no microscopes, or other instruments we take for granted today. Both, however, gave more credence to their own observations than to the "authorities". They frequently disagree with Aristotle and Galen.

Yet they went beyond observation to analysis. For instance, for every disease that Ibn-Sīnā treats, he supplies a description, the symptoms, the causes, and the remedies. These he mostly substantiates by experience. But both he and Albert realized that these phenomena had a chemical foundation, and that disease disturbs the chemical balance of an organism.

For chemistry, the only referential framework they had was that of four elements (fire, air, earth, water) and four qualities (cold, hot, wet, dry). Their juggling of these constants shows ingenuity, but is of no use now.

What remains of value, however, is their use of Aristotle's analysis of all natural things into two principles: matter, the potential principle, and form, the active principle, and his insistence that the two must correspond.

In modern terms, that means you need H2O to have water. We may think that is water, but it is only three atoms. The form gives them unity and definition. Likewise, the form, or soul, of all living things, whether plant, animal or human, requires an organic body, such as we witness in in the adult specimen. The zygote must contain not only the DNA of the species, but also the stem potential to develop into an adult.

Their position on the origin of human life

Medieval Aristotelians, in their reading of De generatione animalium, Book 2, ch. 3-6, generally maintained a delayed reception of the human soul. I do not think Aristotle's Greek text supports that theory—translations often confuse κύημα (female egg) with "embryo". Nevertheless, delayed reception was the prevalent interpretation in the Middle Ages. As we shall see, this was the common position of Muslim and Christian theologians.

This argument was based on the correspondence required between matter and form. The body must have the organic complexity required by the type of soul or life: Nutritive life requires the least; sensitive life requires more; and intellective life still more. Because they could not see this required complexity, most Aristotelians concluded that the human soul was infused later.

Aristotle himself uses the same principle to show why are some people more intelligent than others: "A sign of this is that within the human race, men are gifted or not intellectually in virtue of this sense [of touch], and of no other. For coarse-bodied people are mentally inert, whilst the tenderly-fleshed are quick of understanding."[7]

Both Ibn-Sīnā[8] and Albert spotted a problem in the prevalent Aristotelian reasoning. In discussing Aristotle's text on this point, they never say they disagree with Aristotle. But they do say: How can an individual of one species mutate into another, dramatically different, midstream in its development? Ibn-Sīnā says:

أما النطقية فتكون مباينة وتكون غير مادية، ولكنها لا تكون عاملة بعد، بل تكون كما في السكران والمصروع، وإنما تستكمل في أمر خارج يفيد العقل. وأما سائر القوى فتكمل بالبدن والأمور البدنية. ولو كان الصبي حساساً ثم يصير إنساناً بالنطق لكان ينتقل بالاستكمال من نوع إلى نوع. [9]

The rational [soul/power] is distinct and immaterial, but it is not yet operative. It is like that of someone who is drunk or mad. It can be perfected only by external assistance. But the other powers are perfected by the body and bodily factors. Were a child to be sentient, and then become a man with reason, then, by being perfected, he would have to change from one species to another. (—my translation)

Albert reiterates, almost quoting Ibn-Sīnā:

Si enim puer diceretur primo habere substantiam sensibilem, et postea adipisci animam vel substantiam rationalem, permutaretur de specie ad speciem, et forma substantiali ad formam: quod dicere est absurdum.[10]

If a child were said to have first a sensible substance, and later to acquire a rational soul or substance, he would be change from one species to another, and from one substantial form to another, which is absurd. (—my translation)

Aristotle attributes a "nutritive soul" to the female egg, previous to fertilization. Once it is fertilized, he thought, "what comes into being first is the first principle; this is the heart in the sanguinea and its analogue in the rest " (ch. 5). Ibn-Sīnā adds: "And it must be present from the outset, even though it cannot be perceived" (p. 166). "The source of the sensations is in the heart, therefore this is the part first formed in the whole animal" (ch. 6).

The position of Ibn-Sīnā and Albert, we should note, presupposes the Aristotelian principles of material, formal, efficient and final causes. A species is defined by form and matter. Although Darwin wrote the Origin of species, for many Darwinists today, there are no species, simply individual variants of DNA (material cause), in a continuous spectrum from the simplest life to the super-man. "Humanity" is simply a cluster, with an arbitrary border, at the high end of an evolution still in process. This reductionism arises from rejecting not only final cause, but also formal cause.[11]

A Christian theologian, Thomas Aquinas

On this issue, I first look at Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), who was a student of Albert the Great. Secondly, I look at al-Ghazālī (d. 1111), as representing mainstream Muslim theological opinion.

Thomas Aquinas either never learned his master's position on this question, or he chose to ignore it, and give the opposite opinion. In the Contra gentiles,[12] he says:

[6] Moreover, since plant life requires fewer organs than animal life, from the moment that the organic development of the semen suffices for plant life, the aforesaid seminal power becomes a vegetative soul; and later, the organs having been perfected and multiplied still more, the same power is raised to the level of a sensitive soul; and finally, with the perfecting of the organs form, the same soul becomes rational, not indeed, by the action of that seminal power, but through the influx of an external agent.

[10] Nor is it inconsistent if the generation of an intermediate form takes place and then at once is interrupted, because the intermediate forms lack specific completeness, but are on the way toward that end. Thus, the reason why they are generated is not that they may remain in existence, but that the ultimate term of generation may be attained through them.

[11] Therefore, the more noble a form is and the further removed it is from the elemental form, the more numerous must be the intermediate forms, through which the ultimate form is reached step by step, and, consequently, the intervening generative processes will be multiplied too. That is why, in the generation of an animal and a man, wherein the most perfect type of form exists, there are many intermediate forms and generations-and, hence, corruptions, because the generation of one thing is the corruption of another. Thus, the vegetative soul, which is present first (when the embryo lives the life of a plant), perishes, and is succeeded by a more perfect soul, both nutritive and sensitive in character, and then the embryo lives an animal life; and when this passes away it is succeeded by the rational soul introduced from without, while the preceding souls existed in virtue of the semen.

How long does this development take?

Aristotle: De historia animalium, Book 7, ch. 3 (583b, 2-5): “In the case of male children the first movement usually occurs on the right-hand side of the womb and about the fortieth day, but if the child be a female then on the left-hand side and about the ninetieth day.”

Lecturing on the Sentences of Peter Lombard (III, d. 3, q. 5, a. 2), Thomas Aquinas quotes Augustine's reference to this text, who misinterprets "movement" as "quickening", or the moment the fetus becomes human. Thomas does not question this, except to say that it does not apply to the conception of Christ —a position he repeats in Summa theologiae, III, q. 33, a. 2, arg. 3, were he says that Christ was up and running right from conception.

Reaction to Thomas Aquinas

Since both Christian and Muslim religious authorities opposed abortion, it is surprising that it is the theologians, not the scientists, whose position undermined the security of the unborn. Yet neither Muslim nor Christian religious authorities ever intervened on this question, since none of the parties contested the criminality of abortion at any stage.

In other matters the authorities did intervene. Notable among the targets was the teaching that the universe had no temporal beginning (Aristotle's position), and that the soul has eternal beatitude unencumbered by a resurrected body. These ideas spread from Ibn-Sīnā to Ibn-Rushd (Averroes), to the Parisian Avveroists. Teachers of these doctrines incurred the wrath of both the Church and the Mosque.

Thomas Aquinas was in a vulnerable position. On the one hand, he defended everything that could be defended in Aristotelian and Arabic science/philosophy -This did not please some churchmen inclined to reject human reason and philosophy. This tendency goes back to Tatian (d. 180) and Tertullian (d. c. 220), who both ended by repudiating the Church. Later, William of Ockham (d. c. 1350) and Luther revived this approach.

On the other hand, Thomas filtered out all that he saw as either unreasonable or against the Faith. In particular, he attacked Ibn-Rushd's idea (in his latter days) that there is only one intellect for all humanity. — This did not please the Parisian Avveroists.

After Thomas Aquinas' death, many Parisian theologians ganged up against his followers, and in March 1277 got Archbishop Tempier to issue a condemnation of 219 theses. Albert the Great hastened to Paris to defend Thomas, and the Dominican, John of Vercelli, who was legate of the Pope, squashed the case.[13]

The whole affair dampened academic freedom, but it made a come-back, both in theology and in science. Apart from some squabbles, such as the Galileo affair and Luther's condemnation of philosophy, science has retained its autonomy and prospered in its association with the Church.

A Muslim theologian, al-Ghazālī

The second theologian is the prolific writer, al-Ghazālī (d. 1111). Regarding the beginning of human life, he took inspiration from the following Ḥadīth (which uses terminology of Qur'ān 22:5):

إن خلق أحدكم يُجمع في بطن أمه أربعين يوماً وأربعين ليلة، ثم يكون علقة مثله، ثم يكون مضغة مثله، ثم يُبعث إليه الملك، فيُؤذن بأربع كلمات، فيكتب: رزقه، وأجله، وعمله، وشقي أم سعيد، ثم ينفخ فيه الروح.[14]

Whenever any of you is created, he is assembled in the womb of his mother for 40 days and 40 nights, when he becomes a clot [for a similar period], then he becomes an embryo [for a similar period]. Then an angel is sent to tell him four things: He writes down his his fortune, his life-span, his deeds, and whether he will be wretched or happy. Then he breathes a spirit into him. (—my translation)

So al-Ghazālī says:

وله أيضاً مراتب، وأول مراتب الوجود أن تقع النطفة في الرحم وتختلط بماء المرأة وتستعد لقبول الحياة وإفساد ذلك جناية، فإن صارت مضغة وعلقة كانت الجناية أفحش. وإن نفخ فيه الروح واستوت الخلقة ازدادت الجناية تفاحشاَ. ومنتهى التفاحش في الجناية بعد الانفصال حياً.[15]

It has stages: The first stage of existence is for the sperm to be deposited in the womb and mix with the fluid of the woman, ready to receive life. To destroy this is a crime. If it becomes a clot and an embryo, then the crime is worse. If it has the spirit is breathed into it, and has taken shape, the crime still more serious. The worst crime is to destroy it after it has come out live from the womb. (-my translation)

Al-Ghazālī went on to spearhead opposition to Ibn-Sīnā, particularly with his Tahāfut al-falāsifa (The nonsense of philosophy). As we could expect, he attacked the overtly anti-Islamic positions denying the resurrection and the temporality of the universe. But, belonging to the Ash`arite school, he went on to attack the basis of independent rational thought and science, by denying all natural causality. For him, God acts directly and freely, producing all that we see happen. Human reason is also powerless. Only revelation can determine any question, especially what is right or wrong.

Reaction to al-Ghazālī

Defending philosophy and science, Ibn-Rushd's wrote a rebuttal, the Tahāfut at-Tahāfut, and a trilogy on the harmony of faith and reason,[16] but these could not stem the tide. Many of his works survived only in Latin or Hebrew translation. The originals were consigned to the flames.

That points to a third force, a minority tradition repudiating all scientific and even theological reasoning, and confining itself to the Qur'ān and Ḥadīth alone. This tradition has its roots in the Khārijites of early Islam, but came to the fore with Aḥmad ibn-Ḥanbal (d. 855). Ibn-Taymiyya (d. 1328) was a later proponent. A modern exponent of this trend was the Egyptian, Sayyid Quṭb (d. 1966). His writings inspired al-Qā'ida, the Taliban and such like movements.[17]

Yet Ash`arite thought, which al-Ghazālī defended, has been dominant in Islamic theology up till now. At the same time, science mostly remained in the cooler up till modern times.[18]

Repercussions of medieval views today

Today, people look to genomics for many benefits, particularly:

Enlightenment thinkers saw science as a one-way route to progress. Today, realizing the potential of science to wipe out the human race and the whole planet with it, everyone now agrees that science must have ethical restraints, to assure that it is a blessing rather than a curse. Regarding genomics, there are some fears that all share:

These concerns are further reinforced or specified by traditions harkening back to medieval times or further. We noted in medieval times distinct approaches:

  1. The philosophical or scientific approach, autonomous, yet in dialogue with faith. For the Catholic Church, [19] like Ibn-Rushd, a real discrepancy is not possible. Truth is one.
    If a discrepancy arises, it is because of error on the part of the scientific proponents (scientists can at times be dogmatic) or error on the part of theologians' interpretation of revelation.
    Today, most Christians encourage scientific research, but with certain ethical cautions. Muslims, too, although complaining of educational backwardness, have no religious objections to science and technology-remember when Ayatollah Khomeini told Nikita Nikita Krushchev to study Ibn-Sīnā— but they have their own cautions.[20] In connection with genomics, most Christians and Muslims fear:
    • "therapeutic" cloning or other forms of artificial conception, for the sole purpose of experimentation or harvesting stem-cells,
    • the destruction of embryos on the basis of health or sex selection.
  2. A rejection of science in any case of discrepancy with theology or "interest". As for when human life begins, solid empirical evidence settles the question in favor of Ibn-Sīnā's and Albert's position. Even many abortion supporters agree that the zygote is living and human, but only a "potential person", simply because it is not "conscious", and not "physically independent".[21]
    Yet some Muslim spokespersons today disregard that, in favor of the Ḥadīth quoted above and several Qur'ān commentaries[22] that the rational soul comes only 120 days after conception. Take, for example, the Saudi doctor, Aida I. Al Aqeel. In spite of her impressive academic record,[23] she follows the Ḥadīth and, as a consequence, allows a number of procedures prejudicial to the newly-conceived which the Catholic Church would not accept.[24] Similarly, the practice of some scientists conflicts the ethical implications of science.
  3. Rejection of reason: The third, minority, strand is found in Talaban, Boko Haram, and similar radical Muslim groups. While accepting technology, they reject anything that does not submit to Islamic regulations as they interpret them. Genomics certainly does not do that, and therefore they would ban it as a part of alien Western civilization.

Conclusion

Boko Haram represents a tradition of pious rusticity, religion without learning, especially secular learning.

Some children of the Enlightenment represent the opposite extreme. They pursue science with a disconnect between theoretical knowledge and practical ethics. In the area of genomics, they totally disregard what a fetus is, and not only legalize its destruction, but make it compulsory. For example, the Obama administration not only funds abortions; in spite of a "conscience clause", it also shuts down hospitals that do not offer abortions, and shuts down pharmacies that do not offer abortifacient or birth control products. This approach finds support in some Christian and Muslim thinkers, who regard the fetus, at least at certain stages, as non- or sub-human.

Another strand of the Enlightenment echoes Ibn-Sīnā and Albert the Great. Its representatives pursue science with a sense of the sacredness of the life they handle. They find support from Catholic and many Protestant and Muslim thinkers.

NOTES

[1] For general information, I used Ted Peters Human Genome Project. Encyclopedia of Science and Religion. 2003. Encyclopedia.com. (Accessed October 3, 2011 http://www.encyclopedia.com, and http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/Human_Genome_Project.aspx).

[2] De animalibus, Liber XVI, Tractatus I, Caput V (ed. Bourgnet). Paris: Vivès, 1891; vol. 12:254-255.

[3] For a list of his published works, see my Bibliography of philosophers of the Islamic world, at www.josephkenny.joyers.com/IslPhil/BibPhilAr.htm#10.

[4] بتحقيق الدكتور عبد الحليم منتصر، سعيد زايد، عبد الله إسماعيل. القاهرة: الهيئة المصرية العامة للتأليف والنشر، 1970-1983

[5] I used an edition from مكتبة مشكاة الإسلامية (Accessed November 3, 2011 at http://ddc.aub.edu.lb/projects/saab/avicenna/), in comparison with the Medici 1580 edition, available at the American University of Beirut site. (Accessed November 7, 2011 at http://www.pdfshere.com/up/index.php?action=viewfile&id=4257). A critical edition has recently been published by Jamia Hamdard, New Delhi, India, but I did not have access to that.

[6] See http://www.albertus-magnus-institut.de/. Many of these volumes are not yet published, but can be found in the 1880 Borgnet edition: http://arts.uwaterloo.ca/~albertus/index.html.

[7] De anima, II, ch. 9 421a24. See Thomas Aquinas' commentary, Sentencia libri de anima. Rome, Paris: Commissio Leonina/Vrin, 1984: #483.

[8] I discuss his position in "Ibn-Sīnā and the origin of human life," in Crow Karim Douglas (ed.), Islam, cultural transformation, and the re-emergence of falsafah. Studies honoring Professor George Francis McLean on his eightieth birthday. Tehran: Iranian Institute of Philosophy, 1999: 1-15. Ibn-Sīnā discusses human conception and gestation also in his Qānūn fī ṭ-ṭibb, Book III, treatise 21, article 2, but says nothing new, and only refers to his works on natural science for a fuller discussion.

[9] الشفاء، الطبيعيات، الجزء الثالث: الفن الثاني، الحيوان. بتحقيق إبراهيم مدكور. القاهرة: هيئة الهيئة المصرية العامة للتأليف والنشر، 1970.

[10] De animalibus, Liber XVI, Tractatus I, Caput XVI:170.

[11] See Gilson Étienne, From Aristotle to Darwin and back again, A Journey in Final Causality, Species, and Evolution, translated by John Lyon. South Bend: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984.

[12] Anderson James F. (transl.). New York: Hanover House, 1956: Book II, question 89; see also q. 58, n. 4; Quaestiones disputatae de anima, a. 11, ad 1; Compendium theologiae, c. 92, 218; In Ioannem, c. 1, lectio 9.

[13] See Torrell Jean-Pierre O.P., Saint Thomas Aquinas, Volume 1: The person and his work. Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1997: ch. 15.

[14] البخاري: الصحيح، كتاب التوحيد، باب 28 ولقد سبقت كلمتنا لعبادنا المرسلين. انظر أيضاً #1226، #6222.

[15] إحياء علوم الدين. القاهرة: بدوي طبانة، 1957: الجزء الثاني، باب النكاح

[16] فصل المقال، الضميمة، مناهج الأدلة. See my "Bibliography of philosophers of the Islamic world", at www.josephkenny.joyers.com/IslPhil/BibPhilAr.htm#14.

[17] At the time of Boko Haram's predecessor, the Maitatsine movement, I wrote "The sources of radical movements in Islam," Skepticos n. 1 (Ibadan: 1990), 19-22. See www.josephkenny.joyers.com/Sources.htm.

[18] See my Philosophy of the Muslim World. Washington D.C.: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 2003, chapter 1. Available also at www.josephkenny.joyers.com/phil/default.htm. See too the much expanded Arabic version: فلسفة العالم الإسلامي، الفلاسفة وأهم مواضيع كتبته at www.josephkenny.joyers.com/phil/PhilAr.htm.

[19] The most recent authoritative statement on this is Pope John-Paul's encyclical, Fides et ratio (1998). (Accessed November 7, 2011 http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_15101998_fides-et-ratio_en.html).

[20] For a study of present attitudes of Muslims, see Khuri Richard. Freedom, modernity and modernism, toward a creative synthesis. Syracuse University Press, 1998.

[21] See, for example, McKinley Brian Elroy. Why abortion is moral. (Accessed November 20, 2011 at http://www.elroy.net/ehr/abortionanswers.html).

[22] For example, al-Qurṭubī, commenting on Q 22:5.

[23] See http://www.hgm2011.org/aida_i_al_aqeel.html.

[24] See her article, Ethical Guidelines in Genetics and Genomics: An Islamic Perspective. (Accessed November 25, 2011 at http://ambassadors.net/archives/issue20/selectedstudy11.htm).