CHRISTOLOGY
AND THE CHALLENGE OF INTER-RELIGIOUS DIALOGUECatholic Theological Association of Nigeria:
CATHAN, Ibadan, 22-25 April 2003
This paper is a sequel to "Islam and violence from a Girardian perspective".The following story occurs in the life of Muhammad:
Two liars spoke during the lifetime of the Messenger of God. They were Musaylima ibn-abîb who spoke in al-Yamâma among the anîfa tribe, and al-Aswad ibn-Ka`b who spoke in an`â'. (Ibn-Hishâm, 2:599)
Musaylima had written this letter to the Messenger of God: "From Musaylima, the Messenger of God, to Muammad, the Messenger of God: Peace be with you. I have been made your partner. Half the land is ours and half belongs to the Quraysh, but the Quraysh are a hostile people." Two messengers brought this letter..
When the Messenger of God read it he asked the messengers, "What do you say about it?" They answered, "We agree with it." He said, "By God, if you were not envoys who may not be killed I would cut your heads off."
Then he wrote to Musaylima, "In the name of God the merciful and compassionate. From Muammad the Messenger of God to Musaylima the liar. Peace to anyone who follows guidance. God chooses his own servants to inherit the land, and in the end the pious will succeed."
Muhammad had claimed to be the final and universal prophet, the one who had brought the perfect religion. He was not about to compromise this claim, even though he recognized partial truth in other religions. In this regard, Muslims like to quote the Qur'ân verse: "Today I have brought your religion to perfection for you, and fulfilled my favour to you" (18:33). No true Muslim would accept that other religions have some truths or values that Islam lacks.
This position may sound absolutist, intransigent and hegemonistic, but the same has been said of Catholic Church for its claim to be the divinely appointed messenger to the world of the full revelation of God in his Word made flesh. Paul VI said, "Neither respect and esteem for these religions nor the complexity of the questions raised is an invitation to the Church to withhold from these non-Christians the proclamation of Jesus Christ" (Evangelii nuntiandi, n. 53).
Many writers view these dogmatic positions as an obstacle to dialogue and peace in the world and an invitation to rivalry and confrontation. (1) They therefore call for theological disarmament as a solution. The voices are many. I wish to examine just a sample.
Claude Geffré's "theology of difference" and religious pluralism
In a paper entitled "Pour une théologie de la différence - identité, altérité, dialogue," (2) the French Dominican, Claude Geffré, states that the first condition of dialogue is not the recognition of what we have in common, but respect for what is different about the other. This statement might seem to echo the very fine study of another Dominican, Jan H. Walgrave, "Socio-ethical principles", (3) which he lists as solidarity, subsidiarity and tolerance.
Tolerance maintains solidarity and subsidiarity, even where profound differences in conviction and opinion separate human beings from one another... The "otherness" in question does not arise from natural differences, such as race or temperament, nor from unimportant differences in opinion, but is based on more profound differences of conviction concerning the ultimate questions of existence, concerning that which man ultimately accepts as the fundamental truth and value. From such a difference follows a different interpretation of existence, hence a divergent project of life that expresses itself in personal and social activities and conduct.
For Walgrave, "tolerance does not exclude zeal for one's own conviction, the apostolic, missionary spirit, or a militant defence of one's faith." He also rejects "the prejudice that the believer, the man who is absolutely convinced that what he believes about the ultimate questions of life is true, is incapable of being tolerant," and maintains that the convinced believer is better disposed to be tolerant than one who is not convinced.
Geffré, however, propounds a different basis for respect for the other's beliefs. He states:
La vérité qui fait l'objet pour moi d'une adhésion absolue n'est pas nécessairement exclusive ou même inclusive de toute autre vérité. Elle est relative ne serait-ce qu'à cause de la particularité historique de son origine... Le dialogue conduit plutôt à une redécouverte de ma propre vérité et à la quête d'une vérité plus haute et plus compréhensive que la vérité partielle dont chacun est le témoin.
In other words, the truth that I adhere to is historically conditioned and limited. Therefore, it leaves room for others to have complementary truths which I do not have, and that is what I should respect, since we are both in quest of a higher, more comprehensive truth than the partial truth which each of us have.
Geffré does raise the problem that the coming of God into history through Jesus Christ is a singular event and a definitive revelation that Muslims could not accept. Yet he goes on to make room for religious pluralism. Following Schillebeeckx and Dupuis, he says that diversity of religion is not God's unfinished business of bringing the whole world into the Catholic Church, but it is a permanent situation directly willed by God "to manifest better the fulness of truth which coincides with his unsearchable mystery". While Jesus Christ is the decisive and definitive revelation of God, "Christianity, as a historical religion, does not have a monopoly of the truth about God and man's relationship with God." In other religions there are other kinds of authentic religious experience which are not found in Christianity.
The problem remains: If Jesus is the Son of God and his unique mediator with men, then Christianity must be an imperialist religion. Geffré deals with this problem, arguing that the incarnation itself "invites us not to absolutize the historic particularity of Jesus of Nazareth." A Christianity which is incomplete truth is based on a Jesus who was incomplete truth. But this Christological position is more clearly stated by Geffré's American Dominican colleague, Donald Goergen.
Donald Goergen's "Word that is more than Jesus"
Already in the 1991 third volume of his Christology series, (4) Donald Goergen discussed the relationship between the eternal Word and Jesus. "The Christology of the Fourth Gospel presents clearly a three-stage Christology. To do full justice to Jesus requires a narrative in three parts: the story of the pre-incarnate Word, the incarnate Word or Son, and the risen Lord" (p. 32). Later, he goes into detail:
Johannine theology raised for later generations the question of the precise relationship between God and the Word and Jesus. All are intrinsically connected, so one cannot fully define any apart from reference to the others. Jesus is the Word, the Word incarnate or enfleshed, and yet there is "more" to the Word than Jesus alone, more than the Word's incarnation as Jesus. The Word had a long history prior to its incarnation as Jesus. Also, the Word is God, and yet there is "more" to God than the Word alone. God is both God and Word. Because Jesus truly is the Word, and the Word is God, Jesus truly is God. Yet there is "more" to God than Jesus, though Jesus is God revealed, disclosed, made visible. And there is more to Jesus than his oneness with God. Jesus is also sarx, flesh, human. After Jesus, one cannot talk about God apart from Jesus (God is always the Father of Jesus), nor can one talk about Jesus apart from God (Jesus is God's uniquely begotten Son). With Jesus, one can begin to speak of the relationship between God and the Word as a relationship between Father and Son. "Son" became one of the richest ways of talking about who Jesus is, and "Father" a way of talking about Jesus' God. (pp. 258-9)
He goes on to talk about non-Chalcedonian Christologies, saying that to assess them "from the stance of the seeming superiority of one's own confessional perspective remains a significant theological issue... One cannot separate out a pure essence for Christianity from the history that has shaped it and the diverse historical shapes it has taken. This is not to imply that all historical developments are of equal value or have equivalent claims on the truth."
Then, listing significant themes that are helpful in constructing a contemporary Christology, he mentions:
3. The distinction between "Word" and "Son", in that the Word was not revealed to be a Son and God a Father until the incarnation (cf. Symeon the New Theologian), or that the Word is not properly called Son until the incarnation (cf. Marcellus of Ancyra). (271)
Goergen is more explicit ten years later in his "Dialogue and truth", a paper given at a Bangkok conference. (5) There, like Geffré who gave an innocuous paper at the same conference, Goergen's starting point was the "other magnificent and manifold works of God outside the confines of visible Christianity". He first rightly observes that "the fullness of truth resides in the Catholic tradition, according to Catholic teaching. But this does not mean that it is all already within our grasp... that we have individually or collectively come to a full knowledge of all Truth."
But he goes on implicitly to deny that the fullness of truth resides in the Catholic tradition when he gives another reason why our grasp of truth is limited. That is because Jesus himself (and therefore the Church) only has part of the truth:
Christ does not confine God...There is more to the Logos than Jesus alone. The Logos was already present and active in creation and history before Jesus was ever conceived... Jesus does not exhaust the Word yet fully embodies the Word... So there is more to the Word than its incarnate presence in and self-identification with Jesus, and more to the Spirit than its activity in Jesus and the church. The Word and the Spirit are present and active in all the major religious traditions of the world--the selfsame Word that is Jesus, the one and only Holy Spirit, source of unity and diversity in the world and in the religions of the world.
To illustrate how Jesus does not confine the Word, Goergen refers to Thomas Aquinas' position (Summa Theologiae III:3,7) that the Word could become incarnate in more than one numerically distinct human nature.
Geffré's "Word that is more than Jesus"
Geffré moves in the same direction as Goergen to relativize Jesus and give the Word free scope to operate independently in non-Christian religions:
Et quoiqu'il en soit des explicitations ultérieures de la christologie sur l'identité de substance entre Jésus et Dieu (l'homousios), l'Évangile nous atteste que Jésus a conscience que la plénitude du Royaume eschatologique est advenue en lui. Nous confessons donc que la plénitude de Dieu habite en Jésus de Nazareth. Mais nous devons prendre au sérieux la contingence historique de l'humanité de Jésus. Autrement dit, nous ne pouvons pas identifier l'élément historique et contingent de Jésus et son élément christique et divin. Nous devons maintenir la tension entre l'identification de Dieu en Jésus et l'identification propre à Dieu. Nous sommes toujours renvoyés en effet à un Dieu plus grand qui échappe à toute identification. Le paradoxe même de l'incarnation comme manifestation relative de l'Absolu inconditionnel de Dieu nous aide à comprendre que l'unicité de Jésus-Christ n'est pas exclusive d'autres manifestations de Dieu dans l'histoire. C'est aussi le meilleur moyen de désabsolutiser le christianisme comme religion de l'incarnation et de manifester que loin d'exercer une sorte d'impérialisme à l'égard des autres religions, il se définit plutôt comme une religion essentiellement dialogale.
Geffré then moves to two ambiguous points. The first is that the kenosis of Jesus in his death was a renouncement not only of what was his due because of his divine stature, but also a renouncement of his Jewish particularity. The risen Christ was universal, for all. From this more or less common point of Biblical theology, we would expect him to go on to say that the risen Christ is operative in all the religions of the world. But he does not go in that direction, and prefers to stay with the above position that the Word is doing that work apart from the human Jesus.
The second ambiguous point is: "Je serai tenté de dire qu'un christianisme qui est affronté à des cultures et des religions différentes et qui ne témoignerait pas d'un certain manque ne rencontrera pas l'altérité de ces cultures et de ces religions et sera infidèle à sa vocation universelle." As evidence of this statement, he cites the undeniable "lack" that everyone has with respect to all the cultural riches that are to be found in the world. But he confuses these cultural riches with truth or theological insight which he likewise says that non-Christian people have and Christians lack.
To illustrate this position, Geffré turns to the familiar phrase "seeds of the Word". These, he admits, find their fulfillment in Christ, but "without losing their originality":
De même que l'Église n'intègre pas et ne remplace pas Isral, de même elle n'intègre pas et ne remplace pas la part de vérité religieuse authentique dont une autre tradition religieuse peut être porteuse. En tant que religion historique, le christianisme ne peut avoir l'ambition de totaliser toutes les vérités disséminées tout au long de l'histoire religieuse de l'humanité. Si j'ai cru pouvoir parler d'un pluralisme religieux de principe, cela veut dire qu'il y a plus de vérité d'ordre religieux dans le concert très diversifié des religions que dans le seul christianisme... La venue du Christ coïncide avec la plénitude de la Révélation et comme nous l'avons vu, c'est là l'origine d'une différence insurmontable avec l'islam. Mais il s'agit d'une plénitude qualitative et non quantitative. La Révélation comme événement de la Parole de Dieu en Jésus Christ est définitive et indépassable, mais comme contenu de vérité, elle est nécessairement historique et donc limitée. Il n'est donc pas interdit de considérer d'autres révélations et d'autres Écritures sacrées comme des "rayons de vérité" incomplets mais précieux qui témoignent à leur manière du mystère insondable de Dieu.
He concludes that the "essence of truth is to be in a state of sharing".
Summary of these positions
We have seen how Claude Geffré, in line with Donald Goergen, says that because the humanity of Jesus does not exhaust the eternal Word of God, this Word can be active in the non-Christian world independently of the humanity of Jesus. According to these theologians, there is more to the Word than could be absorbed by the man Jesus, and thus the Word can communicate to prophets of other religions truths and insights that are not merely "seeds of the word", imperfect reflections of the full revelation embodied in Jesus, but are independent "other" truths that cannot be found in Jesus or Christianity. These authors conclude that by acknowledging the "otherness" of other religions we will accord them greater respect, and this will foster inter-religious dialogue.
These authors are not saying that there are Incarnations of the Word in these religions, but they argue that if it is possible for there to be a second incarnate Savior, a fortiori it is possible for the Word to operate in non-Christian religions independently of Jesus' humanity.
Can one divine person assume two human natures? (Summa Theologiae, III:3,7)
It is now time to review the above positions in the light of the hypothesis of Thomas Aquinas that both Goergen and Geffré use to bolster their position. Are there intelligent creatures living on some planet in outer space? Could there be another Incarnation and Catholic Church out there? That is the hypothesis this question raises to the modern mind. Sixteenth century commentators on Thomas talked of far-off India as a site for a possible second Incarnation.
This question follows another hypothetical one: "Can two divine persons assume one and the same human nature?" Cajetan explains that these questions are not raised to discuss what is or is not possible for God to do, but to cast more light on the mystery of the actual Incarnation that we know on this earth.
Thomas answers in the affirmative. One divine person can assume two human natures, for the reason that nothing created can exhaust the infinite power of God, and the assumed nature cannot encompass the divine.
The real point of III:3:7
This and the preceding article in the Summa serve to give a comprehensive view of what is identical and what is distinct in both the Trinity and the Incarnate Word. In the Trinity there are three persons in one nature. In the Incarnation one divine person has added a human nature to his divine nature. To throw more light on this, Thomas examines the consequences of three combinations:
Supposits Natures 3 divine persons 1 divine nature 2 divine persons 1 human nature 1 divine person 2 human natures Thomas maintains that two persons, say the Father and the Son, could have assumed the same human nature, just as they share a single divine nature. They would be one man because they assumed a single human nature, but two persons. (This is similar to the Father and the Son being a single principle of procession of the Holy Spirit.) By communication of idioms, the same man would then be unbegotten because of the person of the Father, and begotten because of the person of the Son.
In the case of one person assuming two human natures, Thomas earlier said in his Commentary on the Sentences (3:q.1, a.5, ad 2):
Peter [the other incarnation] and Jesus are not two supposits, but one. So it is true that "Peter is Jesus". Yet Peter and Jesus are not one man but two, because the singularity or plurality of a substantive term follows the unity or plurality of the nature signified by the term, and not the unity of the supposit. Although the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit are three supposits, yet because of the one divine nature which the name of God signifies, they are called one God. So it is just the opposite in the case of Jesus and Peter. They are one supposit, but because of the plurality of assumed natures, they are said to be two men. But because of the identity of the supposit, the distinction of the natures does not prevent them from being predicated of one another [i.e. "Peter is Jesus], because the identity of the supposit suffices to make the statement true.
In the present article, however, Thomas changes his position to say that if the Word is incarnate as Jesus and the same Word is incarnate as Peter, Jesus and Peter are not two men, but one. That is because we never say anything is two unless there are two supposits. Yet this does not efface the numerical distinction between the two human natures, because the Incarnation does not change the human nature into the divine person, but the divine person only subsists in a human nature. "For the Son of God is his divinity, but he is not his humanity."
In the case of a double incarnation of the Word, communication of idioms would apply. Thus if the man Jesus is crucified, we can say that Jesus and Peter died, even though death affected only the human nature of Jesus, just as we say that when Jesus died, God died, because of the unity of the person.
From the above discussion we can deduce the following rules:
- Plurality requires distinction of supposits. Thus were one divine person to assume two different human natures, the result would be just one man, even though separate in place.
- Moreover, to have two distinct things, two numerically distinct natures are also required. This distinction is lacking in the case of the Trinity.
- Unity, however, is had wherever there is any lack of distinction. Thus there is one God, because of the unity of his nature. Were two persons to assume one human nature, there would be one man.
Soteriological implications
The full humanity of Jesus had its existence through the person of the Word. Because of the adage actiones sunt suppositorum, all that Jesus did was done by the Word, even though the action was rooted in his human nature, such as eating. Similarly, because of communication of idioms, all that the Word does is done by the man Jesus. It is therefore inconceivable that the Word could do anything in isolation from the humanity of Jesus.
This does not apply merely to events after the Incarnation, because the death of Christ, though happening in a moment of time, is the instrument of the eternally present design of God to save people of all time, from Adam to his last descendant to be born. The Incarnation took place by the free choice of God, but this was an eternal unalterable choice. When we say "through him all things were made, even at that beginning of time the future humanity of Jesus was included. That is the implication of the title "Alpha and Omega".
We therefore hold to the universality of Jesus' saving work, both in time and in place.
The only Christology which would allow the Word to operate independently of the humanity of Jesus is a Nestorian Christology. That makes of Christ a human person on whom the Word descended to use him for a salvific mission, without giving him his own divine existence and personhood.
Could God reveal something to non-Christians which Christ did not know?
If we listen to Thomas Aquinas, the answer is an emphatic "no". By his divine knowledge, he knew everything that is or ever could be.
His human knowledge is finite, even that beatific knowledge he had because he is the leader of all to the goal of the beatific vision (cf. Heb 5:9). Yet this knowledge should extend to all that pertains to him. This includes all that ever exists and all that created things are capable of, since all things are subject to him (1 Cor 15:27-28). But his human mind does not know all that God is capable of doing, because that would be to comprehend the divine power and essence. Being united to the Word in person, he is "full of grace and truth" (Jn 1:14) and he sees God more perfectly than any other creature could.
In his earthly life, Jesus also enjoyed the gifts of wisdom, prophecy and all the other gifts of the Holy Spirit more perfectly and fully than anyone could. Thus we read (Heb 1:1-3) that after speaking in fragmentary and various ways through the prophets, God finally spoke to us through his Son. He is the reflection of the Father's glory, the exact representation of the Father's being.
That is why we believe that God could not possibly reveal to us any more than he did in his incarnate Word. And therefore any truth found in non-Christian religions can only be a partial patrimony of what is found fully in Christ.
The only way we could recognize the truth of other religions as "other" is to presuppose a Nestorian Christology, whereby the Christ, as a human person, had not enough bandwidth to download the immensity of divine revelation descending upon him.
Does the Church understand the full revelation of Christ?
Christ said, "All that I have heard from my Father I have made known to you" (Jn 15:15). Yet the Church's understanding was limited and had to progress by divine assistance: "When he comes, the Spirit of truth, he will lead you in the whole truth" (Jn 16:13).
One thing is sure: The virtue of faith enables us to relate directly with the source of all revelation and communicate with God himself. This does not fully enlighten the understanding. That is why in this life the virtue of charity is superior to faith, in that we can love God far more than we understand him. This prepares us for a greater share in the beatific vision in the next life.
Even though the Church grasps the essentials of Christ's revelation, and has the guidance of the Spirit to avoid pitfalls and move on to greater and greater understanding, its grasp of the revelation of Christ is limited.
Therefore it is possible for a non-Christian religion to stress a particular truth that certainly is part of Christian revelation, but which may be neglected by segments of the Church at certain times. For instance, Muslim insistence on regular prayer can be a lesson for Christians who are too prone to activity or too ashamed to excuse themselves and take time out for prayer.
Would the Church gain points by recognizing that other religions have something that it does not have?
The story quoted at the beginning of this paper already tells us "no". The same reaction can be seen in Mahmud Aidin's study of Christian theological attitudes towards Islam since Vatican II. (6) He appreciates gestures such as those made by Vatican II and observes that several theologians subsequently went well beyond Vatican II, some saying that Jesus can well be the savior of Christians, but other prophets can be mediators of salvation for their own people. Yet for Aidin as a Muslim, anything short of a full recognition of Muhammad as the final prophet is unsatisfactory. Secondly, he sees the implication that the doctrinal concessions made by these theologians would seem to demand reciprocity on the part of Muslims. And he is in no way prepared to surrender the finality of Islamic revelation.
The same conclusion comes from my concrete dealings with Muslims. In our interaction, it is presupposed that we have conflicting truth claims which are not negotiable. Rather than dwelling on these differences, we explore the unending depths of what we share in common.
Therefore we can conclude that the theological disarmament implied by calling for a recognition of "other" truth in non-Christian religions is counter-productive. The first rule in dialogue is that neither side should be expected to surrender its own beliefs.
APPENDIX: Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith:
NOTIFICATION (24 January 2001) on the book Toward a Christian Theology of Religious Pluralism (Orbis Books: Maryknoll, New York 1997) by Jacques Dupuis, S.J.
I. On the sole and universal salvific mediation of Jesus Christ 1. It must be firmly believed that Jesus Christ, the Son of God made man, crucified and risen, is the sole and universal mediator of salvation for all humanity.[2]
2. It must also be firmly believed that Jesus of Nazareth, Son of Mary and only Saviour of the world, is the Son and Word of the Father.[3] For the unity of the divine plan of salvation centred in Jesus Christ, it must also be held that the salvific action of the Word is accomplished in and through Jesus Christ, the Incarnate Son of the Father, as mediator of salvation for all humanity.[4] It is therefore contrary to the Catholic faith not only to posit a separation between the Word and Jesus, or between the Word's salvific activity and that of Jesus, but also to maintain that there is a salvific activity of the Word as such in his divinity, independent of the humanity of the Incarnate Word.[5]
II. On the unicity and completeness of revelation of Jesus Christ 3. It must be firmly believed that Jesus Christ is the mediator, the fulfilment and the completeness of revelation.[6] It is therefore contrary to the Catholic faith to maintain that revelation in Jesus Christ (or the revelation of Jesus Christ) is limited, incomplete or imperfect. Moreover, although full knowledge of divine revelation will be had only on the day of the Lord's coming in glory, the historical revelation of Jesus Christ offers everything necessary for man's salvation and has no need of completion by other religions.[7]
4. It is consistent with Catholic doctrine to hold that the seeds of truth and goodness that exist in other religions are a certain participation in truths contained in the revelation of or in Jesus Christ.[8] However, it is erroneous to hold that such elements of truth and goodness, or some of them, do not derive ultimately from the source-mediation of Jesus Christ.[9]
III. On the universal salvific action of the Holy Spirit 5. The Church's faith teaches that the Holy Spirit, working after the resurrection of Jesus Christ, is always the Spirit of Christ sent by the Father, who works in a salvific way in Christians as well as non-Christians.[10] It is therefore contrary to the Catholic faith to hold that the salvific action of the Holy Spirit extends beyond the one universal salvific economy of the Incarnate Word.[11]
IV. On the orientation of all human beings to the Church 6. It must be firmly believed that the Church is sign and instrument of salvation for all people.[12] It is contrary to the Catholic faith to consider the different religions of the world as ways of salvation complementary to the Church.[13]
7. According to Catholic doctrine, the followers of other religions are oriented to the Church and are all called to become part of her.[14]
V. On the value and salvific function of the religious traditions 8. In accordance with Catholic doctrine, it must be held that "whatever the Spirit brings about in human hearts and in the history of peoples, in cultures and religions, serves as a preparation for the Gospel (cf. Dogmatic Constitution Lumen gentium, 16)".[15] It is therefore legitimate to maintain that the Holy Spirit accomplishes salvation in non-Christians also through those elements of truth and goodness present in the various religions; however, to hold that these religions, considered as such, are ways of salvation, has no foundation in Catholic theology, also because they contain omissions, insufficiencies and errors[16] regarding fundamental truths about God, man and the world. Furthermore, the fact that the elements of truth and goodness present in the various world religions may prepare peoples and cultures to receive the salvific event of Jesus Christ does not imply that the sacred texts of these religions can be considered as complementary to the Old Testament, which is the immediate preparation for the Christ event.[17]
REFERENCES
1. For an analysis of the rivalry between Islam and Christianity, see my paper, "Inter-religious dialogue: two extremes to avoid," Proceedings of the AECAWA IRDC Study Session, Accra, October 2000.
2. SEDOS, 2001, found at www.sedos.org/french/geffre_1.htm.
3. Chapter 7 of his Person and society (Pittsburgh: Duquesne U.P., 1969), pp. 145-175.
4. Donald J. Goergen, O.P., The Jesus of Christian history. A theology of Jesus series, vol. 3 (Collegeville: The Liturgical Press, 1991).
5. Interfaith Dialogue Conference, joint project of The University of Santo Thomas, Manila, and The Assumption University, Bangkok, 7-12 February 2001.
6. Modern Western Christian understandings of Muslims since the Second Vatican Council (Washington D.C.: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 2002).