3-1
ANALOGYGeneral features and kinds
Commentary on the Sentences I, d.16, q.1, a.3. ad 3
To speak metaphorically is not to speak falsely; for by such speech one does not intend to express the natures of things signified by the words one uses, but rather those characteristics that have a certain likeness to those things.
Commentary on the Sentences I, d.19, q.5, a.2, ad 1
Something is predicated analogously in three ways. First, there is analogy (+) according to signification only and not (~) according to existence. This takes place when one meaning is related to several things according to priority and posteriority, though the existence of such a thing, is found in only one of them. For example, the word health refers to an animal, to urine, and to diet in different ways, according to priority and posteriority, but not according to different acts of existence, because health is actually found only in an animal.
Second, there is analogy (+) according to existence but not (~) according to signification. This takes place when several things are alike as regards the signification of some common reality, but that common reality does not exist in the same way in all of them. Thus all bodies are alike in the notion of body. The logician, who is concerned with signification only, says that the name body is predicated univocally of all bodies, even though the existence of this natural being is not the same in corruptible and in incorruptible bodies. Therefore, as far as the metaphysician and the philosopher of nature are concerned - since they consider things according to their existence - the name body and any other thing like it is not predicated univocally of corruptible and of incorruptible things, as is clear in Metaphysics X, according to the Philosopher and the Commentator.
Third, there is analogy (+) according to signification and (+) according to existence. This takes place when there is no identity either in a common signification or in existence, as in the case of being predicated of substance and accident. What is common in them has existence in each one of the things of which it is predicated, but this differs according to a greater or lesser perfection. In the same way we say that truth and goodness and all things of this kind are predicated analogously of God and of creatures.
C.G. I, 34
In this second mode of analogical predication the order according to the name and according to reality is sometimes found to be the same and sometimes not. For the order of the name follows the order of knowledge, because it is the sign of an intelligible conception. (1) When, therefore, that which is prior in reality is found likewise to be prior in knowledge, the same thing is found to be prior both according to the meaning of the name and according to the nature of the thing. Thus, substance is prior to accident both in nature, insofar as substance is the cause of accident, and in knowledge, insofar as substance is included in the definition of accident. Hence, being is said of substance by priority over accident both according to the nature of the thing and according to the meaning of the name. (2) But when that which is prior in nature is subsequent in our knowledge, then there is not the same order in analogicals according to reality and according to the meaning of the name. Thus, the power to heal, which is found in all health-giving things, is by nature prior to the health that is in the animal, as a cause is prior to an effect; but because we know this healing power through an effect, we likewise name it from its effect. Hence it is that health-giving is prior in reality, but animal is by priority called healthy according to the meaning of the name.
C.G. III, ch.54
Now the proportion of the created intellect to the understanding of God is not, in fact, based (~) on a commensuration in an existing proportion, but (+) on the fact that proportion means any relation of one thing to another, as of matter to form, or of cause to effect. In this sense, then, nothing prevents there being a proportion of creature to God on the basis of a relation of one who understands to the thing understood, just as on the basis of the relation of effect to cause.
De veritate, q.2, a.3, ad 4
A thing is said to be proportionate to another in two ways. (1) In one way, a proportion is noted between two things. For example, we say that four is proportioned to two since its proportion to two is double. (2) In the second way, they are proportioned as by a proportionality. For example, we say that six and eight are proportionate because, just as six is the double of three, so eight is the double of four; for proportionality is a similarity of proportions.
Now since in every proportion a relation is noted between those things that are said to be proportioned because of some definite excess of one over the other, (~) it is impossible for any infinite to be proportionate to a finite by way of proportion. When, however, things are said to be proportionate (+) by way of proportionality, their relation to each other is not considered. All that is considered is the similarity of the relation of two things to two other things. Thus nothing prevents an infinite from being proportionate to an infinite; for just as a particular finite is equal to a certain finite, so an infinite is equal to another infinite.
De veritate q.2, a.11
Since an agreement according to proportion can happen in two ways, two kinds of community can be noted in analogy. (1) There is a certain agreement between things having a proportion to each other from the fact that they have a determinate distance between each other or some other relation to each other, like the proportion which the number two has to unity in as far as it is the double of unity. (2) Again, the agreement is occasionally noted not between two things which have a proportion between them, but rather between two related proportions, for example, six has something in common with four because six is two times three, just as four is two times two. The first type of agreement is one of proportion; the second, of proportionality.
(1) We find something predicated analogously of two realities according to the first type of agreement when one of them has a relation to the other, as when being is predicated of substance and accident because of the relation which accident has to substance, or as when healthy is predicated of urine and animal because urine has some relation to the health of an animal. (2) Sometimes, however, a thing is predicated analogously according to the second type of agreement, as when sight is predicated of bodily sight and of the intellect because understanding is in the mind as sight is in the eye.
(1) In those terms predicated according to the first type of analogy, there must be some definite relation between the things having something in common analogously. Consequently, nothing can be predicated analogously of God and creature according to this type of analogy; for no creature has such a relation to God that it could determine the divine perfection. (2) But in the other type of analogy, no definite relation is involved between the things which have something in common analogously, so there is no reason why some name cannot be predicated analogously of God and creature in this manner.
But this can happen in two ways. (a) Sometimes the name implies something belonging to the thing primarily designated which cannot be common to God and creature even in the manner described above. This would be true, for example, of anything predicated of God metaphorically, as when God is called lion, which cannot be attributed to God. (b) At other times, however, a term predicated of God and creature implies nothing in its principal meaning which would prevent our finding between a creature and God an agreement of the type described above. To this kind belong all attributes which include no defect nor depend on matter for their act of existence, for example, being, the good, and similar things. ["proper proportionality"]
De veritate q.20, a.4
We must remember that a thing can be seen in something only in the way in which it exists in that thing. However, there are two ways in which a number of things can come to exist in one thing. (1) In one way, they exist there in separation and multiplicity, as for instance, with many forms, each is reflected separately in a mirror, and as many men are in one house. (2) In the other way, they are there according to one simple form, as many effects exist virtually in a cause, as conclusions in a principle, and as bodily members in seed.
Accordingly, whoever sees anything must, as a consequence, also see those things which exist in it in multiplicity and division. For each one of them presents itself to him in the same way as that single thing in which they are contained presents itself. To this extent, one who sees a mirror sees the forms reflected by the mirror. But one who sees some one thing does not have to see all the things which exist in it as united in one form, except when he comprehends the total power of that one thing. Thus, one who sees some principle does not have to see all the conclusions which exist virtually in it, unless he comprehends the principle.
But created things are not in God in multiplicity, but in unity, as Dionysius says. Hence when we say that a thing is in God, this is more like the manner in which effects are in a cause and conclusions in a principle, than like the manner in which forms are in a mirror.
De veritate q.21, a.1
A relation is merely conceptual, according to the Philosopher, when by it something is said to be related which is not dependent upon that to which it is referred, but vice versa; for a relation is a sort of dependence. An example is had in intellectual knowledge and its object, as also in sense and the sensible object. Knowledge depends on its object, but not the other way about. The relation by which knowledge is referred to its object is accordingly real, but the relation by which the object is referred to the knowledge is only conceptual. According to the Philosopher, the object of knowledge is said to be related, not because it is itself referred, but because something is referred to it.
The same holds true of all other things which stand to one another as measure and thing measured or as perfective and perfectible.
De veritate q.21, a.4
Every agent is found to effect something like itself. If, therefore, the first goodness is the effective cause of all goods, it must imprint its likeness upon the things produced; and so each thing will be called good by reason of an inherent form because of the highest good implanted in it, and also because of the first goodness taken as the exemplar and effective cause of all created goodness.
S.T. I, q.12, a.1, ad 4
Proportion is twofold. (1) In one sense it means a certain relation of one quantity to another, according to which double, treble, and equal are species of proportion. (2) In another sense, every relation of one thing to another is called proportion. And in this sense there can be a proportion of the creature to God, inasmuch as it is related to Him as (a) the effect to its cause, and as (b) potentiality to act; and in this way a created intellect can be proportioned to know God.
Commentary on the Posterior Analytics I, lesson 41, n.7
Whatever beings have a common mode of predication, even though not univocal but only analogical, belong to the consideration of one science. But being is predicated in this way of all things. Therefore, all beings belong to the consideration of this one science which considers being insofar as it is being.
Being or that which is can be spoken of in various ways. Something can be predicated of different things in several ways. (1) At times a term is predicated of things when the meaning is entirely the same, as animal is predicated of a horse and an ox, and this is called univocal predication. (2) In other instances the same term is predicated of things when the meaning is completely different, as the term dog is applied to a star and to an animal. This is called equivocal predication. (3) In still other cases the same term is predicated of things when the meaning is partly different and partly the same - different insofar as diverse relationships are implied, but the same in that these diverse relationships are all referred to one and the same thing. This is called analogical predication.
Commentary on the Ethics I, lesson 7, n.96
Thus, be [Aristotle] says that goodness is predicated of many things, not according to a meaning that is entirely different, as happens in those things that are equivocal by chance, but rather according to analogy, that is, (1) they are proportionately the same insofar as all good things depend on one principle of goodness, or insofar as they are all ordered to one end. Or (2) also all good things are analogously good, that is, according to a similar proportion, as vision in the eye is a good of the body and vision of the intellect is a good of the soul. Therefore he [Aristotle] prefers this kind of analogy, because it is taken to refer to goodness that is really inhering in things.
No Univocal Predication Between God and Things
Summa Contra Gentiles I, Chapter 32
(1) It is thereby evident that nothing can be predicated univocally of God and other things.
(2) An effect that does not receive a form specifically the same as that through which the agent acts cannot receive according to a univocal predication the name arising from that form. Thus, the heat generated by the sun and the sun itself are not called univocally hot. Now, the forms of the things God has made do not measure up to a specific likeness of the divine power; for the things that God has made receive in a divided and particular way that which in Him is found in a simple and universal way. It is evident, then, that nothing can be said univocally of God and other things.
(3) If, furthermore, an effect should measure up to the species of its cause, it will not receive the univocal predication of the name unless it receives the same specific form according to the same mode of being. For the house that is in the art of the maker is not univocally the same house that is in matter, for the form of the house does not have the same being in the two locations. Now, even though the rest of things were to receive a form that is absolutely the same as it is in God, yet they do not receive it according to the same mode of being. For, as is clear from what we have said, there is nothing in God that is not the divine being itself, which is not the case with, other things.' Nothing, therefore, can be predicated of God and other things univocally
(4) Moreover, whatever is predicated of many things univocally is either a genus, a species, a difference, an ac6ident, or a property. But, as we have shown, nothing is predicated of God as a genus or a difference; and thus neither is anything predicated as a definition, nor likewise as a species, which is constituted of genus and difference. Nor, as we have shown, can there be any accident in God, and therefore nothing is predicated of Him either as an accident or a property, since property belongs to the genus of acciden ts. It remains, then, that nothing is predicated univocally of God and other things.
(5) Again, what is predicated of many things univocally is simpler than both of them, at least in concept. Now there can be nothing simpler than God either in reality or in concept. Nothing, therefore, is predicated univocally of God and other things.
(6) Everything, likewise, that is predicated univocally of many things belongs through participation to each of the things of which it is predicated; for the species is said to participate in the genus and the individual in the species. But nothing is said of God by participation, since whatever is participated is determined to the mode of that which is participated and is thus possessed in a partial way and not according to every mode of perfection. Nothing, therefore, can be predicated univocally of God and other things.
(7) Then, too, what is predicated of some things according to priority and posteriority is certainly not predicated univocally. For the prior is included in the definition of the posterior, as substance is included in the definition of accident according as an accident is a being. If, then, being were said univocally of substance and accident, substance would have to be included in the definition of being insofar as being is predicated of substance. But this is clearly impossible. Now nothing is predicated of God and creatures as though they were in the same order, but, rather, according to priority and posteriority. For all things are predicated of God essentially. For God is called being as being entity itself, and He is called good as being goodness itself. But in other beings predications are made by participation, as Socrates is said to be a man, not because he is humanity itself, but because he possesses humanity. It is impossible, therefore, that anything be predicated univocally of Cod and other things.
Not All Names Said of God and Creatures Are Equivocal
Summa Contra Gentiles I, Chapter 33
(1) From what we have said it likewise appears that not everything predicated of God and other things is said in a purely equivocal way, in the manner of equivocals by chance.
(2) For in equivocals by chance there is no order of reference of one to another, but it is entirely accidental that one name is applied to diverse things: the application of the name to one of them does not signify that it has an order to the other. But this is not the situation with names said of God and creatures, since we note in the community of such names the order of cause and effect, as is clear from what we have said. It is not, therefore, in the manner of pure equivocation that something is predicated of God and other things.
(3) Furthermore, where there is pure equivocation, there is no likeness in things themselves; there is only the unity of a name. But, as is clear from what we have said, there is a certain mode of likeness of things to God. It remains, then, that names are not said of Cod in a purely equivocal way.
(4) Moreover, when one name is predicated of several things in a purely equivocal way, we cannot from one of them be led to the knowledge of another; for the knowledge of things does not depend on words, but on the meaning of names. Now, from what we find in other things, we do arrive at a knowledge of divine things, as is evident from what we have said. Such names, then, are not said of God and other things in a purely equivocal way.
(5) Again, equivocation in a name impedes the process of reasoning. If then, nothing was said of God and creatures except in a purely equivocal way, no reasoning proceeding from creatures to God could take place. But, the contrary is evident from all those who have spoken about God.
(6) It is also a fact that a name is predicated of some being uselessly unless through that name we understand something of the being. But, if names are said of God and creatures in a purely equivocal way, we understand nothing of God through those names; for the meanings of those names are known to us solely to the extent that they are said of creatures. In vain, therefore, would it be said or proved of God that He is a being, good, or the like.
7) Should it be replied that through such names we know only what God is not, namely, that God is called living because He does not belong to the genus of lifeless things, and so with the other names, it will at least have to be the case that living said of God and creatures agrees in the denial of the lifeless. Thus, it will not be said in a purely equivocal way.
Names Said of God and Creatures Are Analogical
Summa Contra Gentiles I, Chapter 34
(1) From what we have said, therefore, it remains that the names said of God and creatures are predicated neither univocally nor equivocally but analogically, that is, according to an order or reference to something one.
(2) This can take place in two ways. In one way, according as many things have reference to something one. Thus, with reference to one health we say that an animal is healthy as the subject of health, medicine is healthy as its cause, food as its preserver, urine as its sign.
(3) In another way, the analogy can obtain according as the order or reference of two things is not to something else but to one of them. Thus, being is said of substance and accident according as substance and accident are referred to a third thing.
(4) Now, the names said of God and things are not said analogically according to the first mode of analogy, since we should then have to posit something prior to God, but according to the second mode.
(5) In this second mode of analogical predication the order according to the name and according to reality is sometimes found to be the same and sometimes not. For the order of the name follows the order of knowledge, because it is the sign of an intelligible conception. (1) When, therefore, that which is prior in reality is found likewise to be prior in knowledge, the same thing is found to be prior both according to the meaning of the name and according to the nature of the thing. Thus, substance is prior to accident both in nature, insofar as substance is the cause of accident, and in knowledge, insofar as substance is included in the definition of accident. Hence, being is said of substance by priority over accident both according to the nature of the thing and according to the meaning of the name.
But (2) when that which is prior in nature is subsequent in our knowledge, then there is not the same order in analogicals according to reality and according to the meaning of the name. Thus, the power to heal, which is found in all health-giving things, is by nature prior to the health that is in the animal, as a cause is prior to an effect; but because we know this healing power through an effect, we likewise name it from its effect. Hence it is that the health-giving is prior in reality, but animal is by priority called healthy according to the meaning of the name.
(6) Thus, therefore, because we come to a knowledge of God from other things, the reality in the names said of God and other things belongs by priority in God according to His mode of being, but the meaning of the name belongs to God by posteriority. And so He is said to be named from His effects.
Analogy of Names Said of God and Creatures
Summa Theologiae I, q. 13, art. 5
We proceed thus to the Fifth Article:
Obj. 1. It seems that the things attributed to God and creatures are univocal. For every equivocal term is reduced to the univocal, as many are reduced to one: for if the name dog be said equivocally of the barking dog and of the dogfish, it must be said of some univocally - viz., of all barking dogs; otherwise we proceed to infinitude. Now there are some univocal agents which agree with their effects in name and definition, as man generates man; and there are sonic agents which are equivocal, as the sun which causes heat although the sun is hot only in an equivocal sense. Therefore it seems that the first agent, to which all other agents are reduced, is a univocal agent: and what is said of God and creatures is predicated univocally.
Obj. 2. Further, no likeness is understood through equivocal names. Therefore, as creatures have a certain likeness to God, according to the text of Genesis (i. 26), Let us make man to our image and likeness, it seems that something can be said of God and creatures univocally.
Obj. 3. Further, measure is homogeneous with the thing measured, as is said in Metaph. X. But God is the first measure of all beings. Therefore God is homogeneous with creatures; and thus a name may be applied univocally to God and to creatures.
On the contrary. Whatever is predicated of various things under the same name but not in the same sense is predicated equivocally. But no name belongs to God in the same sense that it belongs to creatures; for instance, wisdom in creatures is a quality, but not in God. Now a change in genus changes an essence since the genus is part of the definition; and the same applies to other things. Therefore whatever is said of God and of creatures is predicated equivocally.
Further, God is more distant from creatures than any creatures are from each other. But the distance of some creatures makes any univocal predication of them impossible, as in the case of those things which are not in the same genus. Therefore much less can anything be predicated univocally of God and creatures; and so only equivocal predication can be applied to them.
I answer that univocal predication is impossible between God and creatures. The reason of this is that every effect which is not a proportioned result of the power of the efficient cause receives the similitude of the agent not in its full degree, but in a measure that falls short; so that what is divided and multiplied in the effects resides in the agent simply, and in an unvaried manner. For example, the sun by the exercise of its one power produces manifold and various forms in these sublunary things. In the same way, as was said above, all perfections existing in creatures divided and multiplied preexist in God unitedly.
Hence, when any name expressing perfection is applied to a creature, it signifies that perfection as distinct from the others according to the nature of its definition; as, for instance, by this term wise applied to a man, we signify some perfection distinct from a man's essence, and distinct from his power and his being, and from all similar things. But when we apply wise to God, we do not mean to signify anything distinct from His essence or power or being. And thus when this term wise is applied to man, in some degree it circumscribes and comprehends the thing signified; whereas this is not the case when it is applied to God, but it leaves the thing' signified as uncomprehended and as exceeding the signification of the name. Hence it is evident that this term wise is not applied in the same way to God and to man. The same applies to other terms. Hence, no name is predicated univocally of God and of creatures.
Neither, on the other hand, are names applied to God and creatures in a purely equivocal sense, as some have said. Because if that were so, it follows that from creatures nothing at all could be known or demonstrated about God; for the reasoning would always be exposed to the fallacy of equivocation. Such a view is against the Philosopher, who proves many things about God, and also against what the Apostle says: The invisible things of God are clearly seen being understood by the things that are made (Rom. 1:20).
Therefore it must be said that these names are said of God and creatures in an analogous sense, that is, according to proportion.
This can happen in two ways: (1) either according as many things are proportioned to one (thus, for example, healthy is predicated of medicine and urine in relation and in proportion to health of body, of which the latter is the sign and the former the cause), or (2) according as one thing is proportioned to another (thus, healthy is said of medicine and an animal, since medicine is the cause of health in the animal body). And in this way some things are said of God and creatures analogically, and not in a purely equivocal nor in a purely univocal sense. For we can name God only from creatures. Hence, whatever is said of God and creatures is said according as there is some relation of the creature to God as to its principle and cause, wherein all the perfections of things pre-exist excellently.
Now this mode of community is a mean between pure equivocation and simple univocation. For in analogies the idea is not, as it is in univocals, one and the same; yet it is not totally diverse as in equivocals; but the name which is thus used in a multiple sense signifies various proportions to some one thing: e.g., healthy, applied to urine, signifies the sign of animal health; but applied to medicine, it signifies the cause of the same health.
Reply Obj. 1. Although in predications all equivocals must be reduced to univocals, still in actions the non-univocal agent must precede the univocal agent. For the non-univocal agent is the universal cause of the whole species, as the sun is the cause of the generation of all men. But the univocal agent is not the universal efficient cause of the whole species (otherwise it would be the cause of itself, since it is contained in the species), but is a particular cause of this individual which it places under the species by way of participation. Therefore the universal cause of the whole species is not a univocal agent: and the universal cause comes before the particular cause. But this universal agent, while not univocal, nevertheless is not altogether equivocal (otherwise it could not produce its own likeness); but it can be called an analogical agent, just as in predications all univocal names are reduced to one first non-univocal analogical name, which is being.
Reply Obj 2. The likeness of the creature to God is imperfect, for it does not represent the same thing even generically, as we have said before.
Reply Obj. 3. God is not a measure proportioned to the things measured; hence it is not necessary that God and creatures should be in the same genus.
The arguments adduced in the contrary sense prove indeed that these names are not predicated univocally of God and creatures; yet they do not prove that they are predicated equivocally.
How Names Are Predicated of God and Creatures
Commentary on the Sentences, I, d. 35, q. 1, art. 4
1. It seems that God's knowledge is univocally the same as ours, for an agent produces an effect univocally like itself by reason of its form, as fire by means of heat produces heat univocally the same as its own heat. This is what Origen says in his Commentary on Romans, Chap. 16, vs. 27, and Dionysius says in his work On Divine Names, Chap. 7, that God is called wise because He endows us with wisdom by means of His own wisdom. Therefore, it seems that His wisdom is univocally the same as ours.
2. Moreover, the measure and what is measured have one concept, so that for each there is a special measure, because a liquid and a solid, for example, are not measured in the same way, as it is said in Metaphyics III. But God's knowledge is the measure of our knowledge: the more truth we have, the more we approach more closely to Him. Therefore it seems that His knowledge is univocal with our knowledge.
3. If you were to say that it is not univocal with our knowledge because God's knowledge exceeds ours, one can answer to the contrary that more and less do not create diverse species. But greater knowledge comes from the fact that one knows more or less. Therefore it seems from this that univocity of knowledge is not taken away.
4. If one were to say, as does the Commentator in Metaphysics X, that God's knowledge is not univocal for this very important reason that His knowledge is the cause of things and our knowledge is caused by things, one can argue to the opposite point of view. It is true that speculative knowledge in us is caused by things; but practical knowledge in us is the cause of things. Nevertheless, the name knowledge is not predicated equivocally of both of these. Therefore, this argument does not take away the univocity of knowledge.
5. On the contrary, there is nothing common between the eternal and the corruptible except in name, as is said in Meta. X, quoting the Commentator as well as the Philosopher. But God's knowledge is eternal while ours is corruptible; this latter is evident, for example, by the fact that knowledge can be lost through forgetfulness, and knowledge can be gained through instruction and attention. Therefore knowledge is attributed equivocally to God and to us.
6. Moreover, when things are seen to be univocal on a certain point, there is a common likeness of them. But in all likenesses there is some kind of comparison. But comparison is attributed only to things that agree in some kind of nature. Since, therefore, no creature agrees with God in some kind of common nature, since that would make it (the common nature) prior to both of them, it seems that nothing can be said univocally of God and of a creature.
7. Moreover, nothing univocal can be in one case a substance and in another case an accident. But knowledge in us is an accident while in God it is His substance. Therefore it is to be predicated equivocally.
Solution: I reply that something can be common to several things in three ways, namely, univocally, equivocally, or analogically.
(1) It is true that nothing can be predicated univocally of God and of a creature. The reason for this is that in treating reality one must consider two things, namely, the nature or the quiddity of a thing and its existence. It is necessary that in all univocal things there be a community according to nature and not according to existence, because one existence can be only in one thing. Therefore the character of humanity is not present in two men according to one and the same existence. Therefore whenever the form signified by a name is existence itself, it cannot have a univocal agreement, just as, therefore, being cannot be predicated univocally. Therefore, all those things which are predicated of God are by nature or from His own existence, since His act of being is His nature, and for this reason He is said by certain philosophers to be being not by essence, or knowing not by knowledge, and so on; thereby understanding that His essence is not really distinct from His existence, and so for every attribute, it follows that nothing can be predicated univocally of God and of creatures.
(2) It is for this reason that some say that whatever is predicated of God and of a creature is said by pure equivocation. But this, too, cannot be, because in those things which are equivocal by chance or fortune (per casum et fortunam) it is not possible to know the one by means of the other as is true when the same name is found to be common when applied to two men. Since, therefore, we come to an understanding of God's knowledge through our own knowledge, it cannot be that it is entirely equivocal.
(3) Therefore, one must say that knowledge is predicated analogically of God and of a creature, and so on for all other things of this kind. But there is a two-fold kind of analogy. (1) Some things are in agreement by reason of one thing which is attributed to them by priority and posteriority. Now this kind of analogy cannot exist between God and creature just as there cannot be univocity. (2) There is another kind of analogy according to which one thing imitates another insofar as that is possible; it cannot perfectly attain that likeness. This is the analogy between the creature and God.
To the first difficulty we say that a univocal effect is produced by an agent through its form only when the recipient is apt to receive the full power of the agent or can receive it according to its very nature. In this respect no creature is apt to receive knowledge from God in the way that knowledge is present in Him, just as no lower forms of body can receive beat in a univocal manner from the sun even though the sun acts by reason of its form.
To the second difficulty we say that God's knowledge is not a measure by which our knowledge is judged but rather that it exceeds our knowledge. Therefore it does not follow that it is of the same nature and is univocally the same as our knowledge but rather they are alike according to analogy.
To the third difficulty we say that more and less never take away the univocity or the unity of a species, but those things through which the greater and the Icss are caused can create a difference of species and take away univocity. Now this happens when the greater and less are caused not by different participation in one nature but rather by reason of a gradation according to different natures, as when an angel is said to be more intellectual than man.
To the fourth difficulty we say that the reason given by the Commentator is not per se sufficient to prove that univocity is destroyed unless one is dealing in a particular kind of matter. The knowledge which is the cause of things, as divine knowledge, cannot be univocally the same as knowledge caused by things. The reason for this has already been given.
The other reasons which seem to conclude that there was only equivocation are now to be answered.
To the fifth difficulty we answer that the argument is to be understood with respect to existence but not with respect to the common notion (intentionem) which is predicated. For the example of body which is used is predicated equivocally of corruptible and incorruptible things, even though the same notion or definition is found in both of them as long as one considers only the common idea of body.
To the sixth difficulty we say that there is no agreement in likeness on some common point between God and creature but that there is only an imitation. Therefore, the creature is said to be like God but the proposition is not convertible, as Dionysius says in his book On Divine Names, Chap. IX, Para. VI.
To the seventh difficulty we say that knowledge is not predicated of God according to a kind of genus, namely, as a quality or some accident, but only by reason of its specific diversity. This pertains to its perfection and in this respect is imitated by nature, as has been said.
Summa Theologiae 1, q. 13, art. 6
We proceed thus to the Sixth Article:
Obj. 1. It seems that names are predicated primarily of creatures rather than of God. For we name anything accordingly as we know it, since names, as the Philosopher says, are signs of ideas. But we know creatures before we know God. Therefore the names imposed by us are predicated primarily of creatures rather than of God.
Obj. 2. Further, Dionysius says that we name God from creatures.2 But names transferred from creatures to God are said primarily of creatures rather than of God; as lion, stone, and the like. Therefore all names applied to God and creatures are applied primarily to creatures rather than to God.
Obj. 3. Further, all names applied to God and creatures in common are applied to God as the cause of all creatures, as Dionysius says. But what is applied to anything through its cause is applied to it secondarily; for healthy is primarily predicated of animal rather than of medicine, which is the cause of health. Therefore these names are said primarily of creatures rather than of God.
On the contrary. It is written, I bow my knees to the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, of Whom all paternity in heaven and earth is named (Eph 3:14, 15); and the same holds of the other names applied to God rather than to creatures.
I answer that, in names predicated of many in an analogical sense, all are predicated through a relation to some one thing; and this one thing must be placed in the definition of them all. And since the essence expressed by the name is the definition, as the Philosopher says, such a name must be applied primarily to that which is put in the definition of the other things, and secondarily to these others according as they approach more or less to the first. Thus, for instance, healthy applied to animals comes into the definition of healthy applied to medicine, which is called healthy as being the cause of health in the animal; and also into the definition of healthy which is applied to urine, which is called healthy insofar as it is the sign of the animal's health.
So it is that all names applied metaphorically to God are applied to creatures primarily rather than to God, because when said of God they mean only similitudes to such creatures. For as smiling applied to a field means only that the field in the beauty of its flowering is like to the beauty of the human smile by proportionate likeness, so the name of lion applied to God means only that God manifests strength in His works, as a lion in his. Thus it is clear that applied to God the signification of these names can be defined only from what is said of creatures.
But to other names not applied to God in a metaphorical sense, the same rule would apply if they were spoken of God as the cause only, as some have supposed. For when it is said, God is good, it would then only mean, God is the cause of the creature's goodness; and thus the name good applied to God would include in its meaning the creature's goodness. Hence good would apply primarily to creatures rather than God. But, as was shown above, these names are applied to God not as the cause only, but also essentially. For the words, God is good, or wise, signify not only that He is the cause of wisdom or goodness, but that these exist in Him in a more excellent way. Hence (1) as regards what the name signifies, these names are applied primarily to God rather than to creatures, because these perfections flow from God to creatures; but (2) as regards the imposition of the names, they are primarily applied by us to creatures which we know first. Hence they have a mode of signification which belongs to creatures, as was said above.
Reply Obj. 1. This objection refers to the imposition of the name: to that extent it is true.
Reply Obj. 2. The same rule does not apply to metaphorical and to other names, as was said above.
Reply Obj. 3. This objection would be valid if these names were applied to God only as cause, and not also essentially, for instance, as healthy is applied to medicine.
On the Power of God, q. 7, art. 7
The seventh point of inquiry is whether these terms are attributed to God and creatures univocally or equivocally.
1. Measure and the thing measured must be in the same genus. Now God's goodness is the measure of all created goodness, and the same applies to his wisdom. Therefore they are said of creatures univocally.
2. Things are like which have a common form. Now the creature can be likened to God, according to Genesis 1:26, Let us make man to our own image and likeness. Therefore there is a community of form between God and the creature. Now something can be predicated univocally of things that have a common form. Therefore something can be predicated univocally of God and the creature.
3. More or less makes no difference in the species. Now whereas God is called good and the creature also is called good, the difference seems to be that God is better than the creature. Therefore goodness in God and the creature is of the same species and consequently is predicated univocally of both.
4. There is no comparison possible between things of different genera, as the Philosopher proves (Physics VII); thus we cannot compare the speed of alteration with the speed of local movement. But we compare God to the creature: thus we say that God is supremely good, and that the creature is good. Therefore God and the creature are in the same genus and consequently something can be predicated 6f them univocally.
5. Nothing can be known except through a homogeneous species: thus whiteness in a wall would not be known by its image in the eye unless the two were homogeneous. Now God by his goodness knows all beings, and so forth. Therefore God's goodness and the creature's are homogeneous: and consequently good is predicated univocally of God and the creature.
6. The house that the builder has in his mind and the material house are homogeneous. Now all creatures came from God as a work proceeds from the craftsman. Therefore goodness that is in God is homogeneous with the goodness that is in the creature: wherefore we come to the same conclusion as before.
7. Every equivocal agent is reduced to something univocal. Therefore the first agent which is God must be univocal. Now something is predicated univocally of a univocal agent and its proper effect. Therefore something is predicated univocally of God and the creature.
1. On the contrary the Philosopher says (Metaph. X, 7) that nothing except in name is common to the eternal and the temporal. Now God is eternal and creatures temporal. Therefore nothing but a name can be com mon to God and creatures: and consequently these terms are predicated equivocally of God and the creature.
2. Since the genus is the first part of a definition, a difference of genus causes equivocation: so that if a term be employed to signify something in different genera it will be equivocal. Now wisdom as attributed to a creature is in the genus of quality: wherefore seeing that it is not a quality in God, as we have shown, it would seem that this word wisdom is predicated equivocally of God and his creatures.
3. Nothing cam be predicated except equivocally of things that are in no way alike, Now there is no likeness between creatures and God: for it is written (Isa. 40:18): To whom then have you likened God? Therefore seemingly nothing can be predicated univocally of God and creatures.
4. But it will be replied that although God cannot be said to be like a creature, a creature can be said to be like God.
On the contrary, it is written (Ps. 82: 2): 0 God, who shall be like to thee? as if to say None.
5. A thing cannot be like a substance in respect of an accident. Now wisdom in a creature is an accident, and in God is the substance. Therefore man cannot be like God by his wisdom.
6. Since in a creature being is distinct from form or nature, nothing can be like being itself by its form or nature. Now these terms when predicated of a creature signify a form or nature: while God is his own very being. Therefore a creature cannot be like God by these things that are predicated of a creature: and thus the same conclusion follows as before.
7. God differs more from a creature than number from whiteness. But it is absurd to liken a number to whiteness or vice versa. Therefore still more absurd is it to liken a creature to God: and again the same conclusion follows.
8. Things that are like have some one thing in common: and things that have one thing in common have a common predicate. But nothing whatever can be predicated in common with God. Therefore there can be no likeness between God and the creature.
I answer that it is impossible for anything to be predicated univocally of God and a creature: this is made plain as follows. (1)Every effect of an univocal agent is adequate to the agent's power: and no creature, being finite, can be adequate to the power of the first agent which is infinite. Wherefore it is impossible for a creature to receive a likeness to God univocally. (2) Again it is clear that although the form in the agent and the form in the effect have a common meaning (ratio), the fact that they have different modes of existence precludes their univocal predication: thus though the material house is of the same type as the house in the mind of the builder, since the one is the type of the other; nevertheless house cannot be univocally predicated of both, because the form of the material house has its being in matter, whereas in the builder's mind it has immaterial being. Hence granted the impossibility that goodness in God and in the creature be of the same kind, nevertheless good would not be predicated of God univocally: since that which in God is immaterial and simple, is in the creature material and manifold. (3) Moreover being is not predicated univocally of substance and accident, because substance is a being as subsisting in itself, while accident is that whose being is to be in something else. Wherefore it is evident that a different relation to being precludes an univocal predication of being. Now God's relation to being is different from that of any creature's: for he is his own being, which cannot be said of any creature.
Hence in no way can it be predicated univocally of God and a creature, and consequently neither can any of the other predicables among which is included even the first, being: for if there be diversity in the first, there must be diversity in the others: wherefore nothing is predicated univocally of substance and accident.
Others, however, took a different view, and held that nothing is predicated of God and a creature by analogy but by pure equivocation. This is the opinion of Rabbi Moses, as appears from his writings. This opinion, however, is false, because (1) in all purely equivocal terms, which the Philosopher calls equivocal by chance, a term is predicated of a thing without any respect to something else: whereas all things predicated of God and creatures are predicated of God with a certain respect to creatures or vice versa, and this is clearly admitted in all the aforesaid explanations of the divine names. Wherefore they cannot be pure equivocations. (2) Again, since all our knowledge of God is taken from creatures, if the agreement were purely nominal, we should know nothing about God except empty expressions to which nothing corresponds in reality. (3) Moreover, it would follow that all the proofs advanced about God by philosophers are sophisms: for instance, if one were to argue that whatsoever is in potentiality is reduced to actuality by something actual and that therefore God is actual being, since all things are brought into being by him, there will be a fallacy of equivocation; and similarly in all other arguments. (4) And again the effect must in some way be like its cause, wherefore nothing is predicated equivocally of cause and effect; for instance, healthy of medicine and an animal.
We must accordingly take a different view and hold that nothing is predicated univocally of God and the creature: but that those things which are attributed to them in common are predicated not equivocally but analogically. Now this kind of predication is twofold. (1) The first is when one thing is predicated of two with respect to a third: thus being is predicated of quantity and quality with respect to substance. (2) The other is when a thing is predicated of two by reason of a relationship between these two: thus being is predicated of substance and quantity. In the first kind of predication the two things must be preceded by something to which each of them bears some relation: thus substance has a respect to quantity and quality: whereas in the second kind of predication this is not necessary, but one of the two must precede the other. Wherefore since nothing precedes God, but he precedes the creature, the second kind of analogical predication is applicable to him but not the first.
Reply to the First Objection. This argument avails in the case of a measure to which the thing measured can be equal or commensurate: but God is not a mcisurc of this kind since he infinitely surpasses all that is measured by him.
Reply to the Second Objection. The likeness of the creature to God falls short of univocal likeness in two respects. First it does not arise from the p2rticipation of one forni, is two hot things are like by participation of one form, because what is affirmed of God and creatures is predicated of him essentially, but of creatures, by participation: so that a creature's likeness to God is as that of a hot thing to heat, not of a hot thing to one that is hotter. Secondly, because this very form of which the creature participates falls short of the nature of the thing which is God, just as the heat of fire falls short of the nature of the sun's power whereby it produces beat.
Reply to the Third Objection. More and less may be considered from three points of view, and predicated accordingly. First when it is only a question of the quantity of the thing participated: thus snow is said to be whiter than the wall, because whiteness is more perfect in the snow than in the wall, and yet it is of the same nature: and consequently such a difference of more or less does not cause a difference of species. Secondly when the one is predicated participatively and the other essentially: thus we might say that goodness is better than a good thing. Thirdly when the one same term is ascribed to one thing in a more eminent degree than to another, for instance, heat to the sun than to fire. These last two modes of more and less are incompatible with unity of species and univocal predication: and it is thus that a thing is predicated more and less of God and creatures, as already explained.
Reply to the Fourth Objection. When we say that God is better or that he is the sovereign good we compare him to creatures not as though he participated of the same generic nature as creatures, like the species of a genus, but as the principle of a genus.
Reply to the Fifth Objection. Inasmuch as an intelligible species has a higher mode of existence, the knowledge arising therefrom is the more perfect: for instance, the knowledge arising from the image of a stone in the mind is more perfect than that which results from the species in the senses. Hence God is able to know things most perfectly in his essence inasmuch as in his essence is the super-eminent but not homogeneous likeness of things.
Reply to the Sixth Objection. There is a twofold likeness between God and creatures. One is the likeness of the creature to the divine mind, and thus the form understood by God and the thing itself are homogeneous, although they have not the same mode of being, since the form understood is only in the mind, while the form of the creature is in the thing. There is another likeness inasmuch as the divine essence itself is the super-eminent but not homogeneous likeness of all things. It is by reason of this latter likeness that good and the like are predicated in common of God and creatures: but not by reason of the former, because when we say God is good we do not mean to define him from the fact that he understands the creature's goodness, since it has already been observed that not even the house in the mind of the builder is called a house in the same sense as the house in being.
Reply to the Seventh Objection. The equivocal agent must precede the univocal: because the latter's causality does not extend to the whole species (else it were its own cause) but only to an individual member of the species,
But the equivocal agent's causality extends to the entire species and consequently the first agent must be an equivocal agent.
1. Reply to the First Argument on the contrary side. The Philosopher refers to things that are common physically, not logically. Now things that have a different mode of existence have nothing in common in respect of that being which is considered by the physicist, but they may have some common 'intention' that the logician may consider. Moreover, even from the physicist's point of view the elemental and the heavenly body are not in the same genus: but in the view of the logician they are. However, the Philosopher does not mean to exclude analogical but only univocal community, since he wishes to prove that the corruptible and the incorruptible have not a common genus.
2. Difference of genus excludes univocation but not analogy. In proof of this, healthy is applied to urine in the genus of sign, but to medicine in the genus of cause.
3. In no sense is God said to be like the creature, but contrariwise: for as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. x), likeness is not reciprocated between cause and effect, but only in co-ordinates: thus a man is not said to be like his statue, but vice versa, the reason being that the form wherein the likeness consists is in the man before it is in the statue. Hence we do not say that God is like his creatures but vice versa.
4. According to Dionysius (ibid.) when it is said that no creature is like God this is to be understood as referring to effects which are imperfect and beyond all comparison fall short of their cause: nor does this refer to the quantity of the thing participated but to the other two modes, as explained above (Reply to Third Objection).
5. A thing cannot be like substance in respect of an accident, so that the likeness regards a form of the same kind: but there may be the likeness that is between cause and effect: since the first substance must needs be the cause of all accidents.
6. The Sixth Argument is answered in like manner.
7. Whiteness is not in the genus of number, nor is it the principle of a genus: wherefore they do not admit of comparison. Whereas God is the principle of every genus, and consequently all things are somewhat likened to him.
8. This argument refers to things that have a common genus or matter: which docs not apply to God and the creature.