We must distinguish, however, between transient action, where the end is external to the agent, and immanent action, where the action itself is an end, although it may be specified by an object, as in the case of knowing and willing.

The recognition that mistakes, failure or sin can take place is a recognition that things have purpose which it is possible for them to miss; otherwise a mistake would be no different from a successful action.

In any case, a chain of ends cannot be infinite, since an infinitely distant goal could never act as a motive for an agent to take the first step. Thus a builder may take many steps to complete a house; once it is built his job is over and he may use what he earned for another series of actions.

An objection is that if evil is unnatural or unintended it should not be so common, since natural activity is distinguished from chance by its regularity. ─ Corruption or death is not evil simply speaking, but only accidentally and to the outgoing individual, since matter is in potency to all forms and it is not expected to have one form rather than another any more than a man is expected to have wings. Moreover, the generation of a new thing always entails the corruption of the old; so it is natural and not by chance. But if something is born defective, that is a non-intended evil; if it happens regularly that indicates a defect in the parent; otherwise it is by chance.

Another objection is that sin is voluntary, since no one would be punished unless he intended to do evil. ─ A voluntary agent is moved not by good in general but by a particular good. If a moral defect is usually or always attached to that good, it can be presumed to be known and intended and is therefore sinful, but if an evil happens rarely, such as an accident for a good driver, that is not intended or sinful. Deliberate sin occurs mostly because people live on the level of sense attraction and are prepared to forsake reason to get pleasure; they intend the evil indirectly, just as during a storm at sea someone willingly throws cargo overboard to save the ship and his own life.

Likewise, nothing is essentially evil (III:7-9), since evil is a privation of what should be present, and that is always in a subject that is good, since it is being. So we read: "God saw all that he had made, and indeed it was very good" (Genesis 1:31); "He made everything He has created good" (Qur'ân 32:7).

It could be objected that some moral actions are specifically and intrinsically evil, and a species indicates the essence of a thing. We answer that the goodness or evil of an action comes from its object which is always good in itself, but bad for man because it is not in accord with the order of reason.

Again, all the contraries of nature are positive, even if they are based on degrees of intensity of the same thing, such as hot and cold, white and black. Similarly, good and evil are contraries; so they should both be positive. We can answer that moral evil is a privation of the good, but founded in something positive, just as a blind man is first of all a man and then blind.

Furthermore, evil is active, as when we say that evil corrupts. Yet we must observe that the power to corrupt is good, but corrupts by misuse, as happens with explosives and firearms.

Others point out that evil is an obvious reality in the world. But reality and being are the same thing; so it seems that evil has its own existence. We can answer that being as reality does not include any privation or evil, but the being of judgement extends to privation and evil, as when we say that something is lacking what it should have.

This position counters the Manichaeans of old, who posited two principles of the universe: one good and spiritual and the other evil and material; their position was also held by later Zoroastrianism, the ancient religion of Persia. In our own times there are those who, insisting on the reality of evil in the world, tend to assume that it has some existence of its own. African traditional belief also tends in this direction, in assuming that there are some evil spirits who are not under God's control.

The cause of evil is good (III:10). That is because evil is not a being of its own; hence it cannot be a cause. But good causes evil only by accident, because good can only produce good, but its active power may be deficient, and so the effect is also deficient. So also defects can result from an imperfect instrument or lack of the proper matter, such as nutrition.

A moral evil consists in a defective act of the will. The will is defective not by nature nor by chance, but when the will is shopping around the various goods presented to it by the senses and the intellect it manipulates reason to select what is not fitting in the present circumstances.

Evil is rooted in good (III:11), since it cannot exist on its own, but is a privation that can only exist in a subject. Any particular evil is not found in its specific opposite, such as blindness in sight, but in a substance, such as an animal.

However much it multiplies, evil cannot totally overcome good (III:12), because, as a privation, it must always have a subject which is good. Even though sight, for example, can diminish until it is totally gone, the blindness remains in a subject.

But some good, especially moral good, is corrupted not so much by taking something away from a power but by piling up obstacles to its proper operation. This happens to the will by sinful actions; the more the will repeats these actions the deeper it gets stuck in the wrong direction and the more difficult it is to get out. Thus moral evil can be multiplied infinitely, but the natural goodness of the will remains.

Even, then has a cause accidentally (III:13-14). It has a cause because it is in a subject as a state opposite that of goodness and contrary to nature. But its cause is accidental, because every cause is directly a cause of some being and goodness. Either the efficient cause may be defective, as a machine that is not working well, or the material cause is deficient, as when a plant or animal is not adequately nourished, or one form is lost through the generation of a new thing, or a wrong end can prevent something from being ordered to the proper end.

There is no supreme evil (III:15). That is because there can be no evil entirely separated from good. Likewise, a supreme evil would have to be essentially evil, but any essence, as we have seen, is by nature good. Also evil cannot exist or act apart from the good in which it is rooted. Furthermore, a supreme evil would have to have no cause, but evil happens and is caused accidentally.

The purpose of everything is a good (III:16), since everything acts for a good, where its natural desire rests. Things which know the end are moved by themselves to the end, whereas things without knowledge are moved by another, such as a car by the driver or natural things by the author of their nature.

God, however, is not an end that is the realization of a process, like a game to be won. Rather, he exists before any process of motion towards him. Also he is not like a general for whose sake soldiers achieve victory. He acquires nothing from the action of creatures for his sake. On the contrary, being fully in act, he is the one who always gives, so that creatures are enriched by acting for him.

God's goodness is fertile, in that he liberally creates and distributes goodness countless ways. So creatures also tend to imitate God in being the cause of other things (III:21-22). It is clear that only mature or more perfect things can replicate themselves. This includes not only physical generation but also, in human affairs, education and spiritual formation. So we hear: "After all, we do share in God's work" (1 Corinthians 3:9). "Have they not looked at the earth, how many things we made grow on it from every sort of noble pair?" (Qur'ân 26:7).

Things fulfil their purpose of existence through operation, but in different ways (III:22). Sometimes it is by receiving, as when something is warmed. Sometimes it is by acting on another, such as by warming it. Other operations are not physical changes, but immanent action, such as sensation and understanding. The potency of matter is perfected to the extent that it has a more perfect form, so that there are steps of perfection, from simple elements to simple compounds, organic compounds, vegetative life, sentient life and finally intellective life.

Higher things depend on and use what is lower, since the perfections specific to any level are more intense at that level than at higher levels. Thus at the sentient level insects and animals have better powers of sense and mobility than man has. The perfections of lower orders of existence which are not incorporated in higher orders serve the higher orders extrinsically; thus man obtains his nourishment, clothing, shelter, transport etc. by using lower things. So everything, including the cosmic order permitting life on earth, is ordered to the good of man. Thus we read: "You made him lord over the works of your hands, put all things at his feet" (Psalm 8:8). "He subjected ships to you so that you may voyage on the sea by his command; he subjected the rivers to you; he subjected to you the sun and the moon in their motion; he gives you whatever you ask of him. If you count the blessings of God you cannot number them" (Qur'ân 14:32-34).

Even things that lack knowledge reach for a good which is a divine likeness (III:24). These things act for an end directed by God who created their natures and preserves them individually in existence. The purpose of their actions is a goodness or perfection which is a participation in God's goodness. Since these things are under the direction of God, the first cause, their prior purpose is to participate in God's goodness as the final purpose of everything; secondarily this participation happens to be their own good.

Here we can distinguish different levels of participation in God's goodness: The lowest level is the tendency to preserve one's individual existence. A higher level is to reproduce other individuals of the same species. A still higher level is to produce generic goods that benefit other species as well, such as trees which produce fruit for animals or men to eat; this is found in an exceedingly complex and marvellous way in the balance of the cosmic eco-system. The highest but simplest level of participation in God's goodness is in the act of existence which resembles God analogically and directly depends on him.

Finding happiness or reaching God is not primarily through the will (III:26), such as by loving God. That is because the intellect attains God before the will, since the will loves only what is known. Any act of the will, such as desire, love or pleasure, is only consequent to knowledge. God is good and lovable because he is supremely intelligible. Knowing him is the perfection of the intellect and the most satisfying human activity.

Neither does happiness consist in sensual pleasure (III:27), such as food and sex, because the pleasure of these acts is so that they can achieve the purpose, common to all animals, of sustaining the individual or the species, neither of which is the ultimate purpose of man.

Moreover, sensible goods are not only inferior to the world of the intellect, but they can only be enjoyed in moderation, whereas there is no limit to enjoying the supreme good which is above us. In fact, sense pleasure can impede approaching God by contemplation.

So we read the thought of the godless: "True happiness lies in eating and drinking and enjoying whatever has been achieved under the sun" (Ecclesiastes 5:7); "Let us leave the signs of our revelry everywhere, since this is our portion, this our lot!" (Wisdom 2:9). "[The unbelievers] delight in this life below, but this life below is only a faint pleasure compared to the next life" (Qur'ân 13:26); "Men are misled by love of the pleasures of women, children, money fashioned from gold and silver, race horses, cattle and farms. Those are faint pleasures of this life below, but with God there is a good place of retirement" (Qur'ân 3:14).

Nor does happiness consist in honour or popularity (III:28-29), since they are extrinsic to man and presuppose a higher good that is more worthy of honour.

Moreover, honour is out of the control of man and it can even be given to evil people.

Popularity or fame, likewise, which consists in being known, is highly subject to error and very unstable, because opinion can be manipulated and one little thing can make a popular person unpopular.

Nor does happiness consist in riches (III:30), since these are only means of making life possible and comfortable. They are not only subservient to man, who is a higher good, but can be lost by good people and had by bad people. In fact, it is more praiseworthy to give money away than to hoard it.

Nor does happiness consist in political power (III:31), which is another good that is exterior to man. It also is highly unstable and depends on many other people and circumstances. Besides, since it does not presuppose that its holder is virtuous, it can easily be misused.

Nor does happiness consist in bodily well-being (III:32), such as health, beauty and strength, since these can be had by good and evil people alike, and are highly unstable and passing. Besides, the good of the soul is higher and specific to man, whereas bodily well-being is common to all animals. In fact animals excel man in bodily condition.

Nor does happiness consist in sense knowledge (III:33), since this also is common to all animals, and inferior to intellectual knowledge. Sensation is important for its usefulness in bodily needs and also as a source for intellectual knowledge; in that case it is subservient to a higher good.

Nor does happiness consist ultimately in the practice of the moral virtues (III:34), since each of them is subservient to a higher good; thus justice is for the sake of peace, and the moderation of emotions and passions is for the sake of leading a life according to reason, wherein God's own perfection is most perfectly reflected.

Nor does happiness consist ultimately in the practice of the practical intellectual virtue of prudence (III:35), or good sense, since this is the exercise of reason only with respect to the practice of the moral virtues. It determines the mean to be observed in controlling emotions and conducting oneself in society.

Nor does happiness consist in the exercise of art (III:36), another intellectual virtue, consisting in the knowledge and ability to make things, either for the use of man or for enjoyment. Thus all the branches of technology produce things for the consumption or service of man, while the fine arts produce works of beauty which are recreative and dispose for the contemplation of truth.

Nor does happiness consist in sports and entertainment, even though they seem preferable to ordinary work. These exist only to restore the body and soul to a state of freshness, so that a person can not merely return to work but, on a higher plan, devote time to the contemplation of truth, especially divine truth.

Happiness, finally, does consist in the contemplation of God (III:37). Since happiness is not found in exterior things, nor in bodily goods, nor in the sensitive part of the soul, nor in intellectual virtues pertaining to action, what remains is the act of the intellect in contemplating the truth. This action is proper to man and shared by no lower creature. Contemplation of the truth is an end in itself, towards which everything else in life is ordered. But, since there are different levels of things that can be known, human happiness does not consist so much in knowing lower things as in knowing the highest things, particularly the origin of all, which is God.

Happiness, however, does not consist in that had by most ordinary people outside the monotheistic religions (III:38). Almost everyone has at least a general and confused idea of God, since reason leads people intuitively to know that the universe has an outside cause and designer. But many are not sure whether this cause is one or many or whether it is a force distinct from nature. Such knowledge is not only mixed with error, but is very rudimentary and general, whereas happiness consists in a perfect operation of the intellect.

Nor does happiness consist in the knowledge of God had by demonstration (III:39), such as that which shows God to be unchangeable, eternal, incorporeal, completely undivided and one etc. This kind of knowledge is not completely satisfying, for several reasons: All of these demonstrations show what God is not, but do not tell us what he is.

Moreover few people are able to get even so far as this demonstrative knowledge, whereas happiness ought to be available to the whole human race.

Moreover, many philosophers who engage in such demonstrations fall into various errors and uncertainty about God, but happiness cannot be found in the presence of error and uncertainty.

Nor does happiness consist in knowledge of God by faith (III:40). Revelation does step in to correct the errors of philosophy and give us a better knowledge of God. But faith is essentially about truth that is not seen or understood, but accepted on the word of another. Even if this other is God, the truths proposed still leave the intellect starved and even more anxious to see these truths directly. Thus we read: "As long as we are at home in the body we are exiled from the Lord, guided by faith and not yet by sight" (2 Corinthians 5:6-7). "Those are truly the believers; they will have high standing with their Lord along with forgiveness and generous provision" (Qur'ân 8:4).

Nor does happiness consist in knowing God through knowing spirits (41-46), as Ibn-Rushd thought [Commentary on De Anima, III, 36]. His reason is that knowing spirits allows us to participate in the superior knowledge of God that they have by knowing their own essence directly which reflects the perfection of their Maker. One problem with this theory is that in this life all our knowledge comes through sense images. Like our knowledge of God, our knowledge of spirits comes from knowing their effects in the sensible world; these may tell us the existence of spirits and much of what they are not, but not what they are. Even our own soul we cannot know directly in this life, but by seeing ourselves in action.

Another problem is that, even if we were to know spirits directly in themselves and share their knowledge of God, this would still be an imperfect knowledge of God, since it is only seeing him reflected in his effects, even though these spiritual creatures are more brilliant reflections of God than material things.

We can conclude that in this life we cannot know God's essence (III:47), since all our thought derives from and utilizes sense images. Wherever Scripture talks of someone seeing God, it must be understood as through sensible representations, either physical or formed in the imagination, or that the person sees God through spiritual effects.

St. Augustine's illumination theory of knowledge, which posits that all our knowledge comes from God, the First Truth, must be understood to mean that all our knowledge is a created reflection of God's own eternal knowledge, not that we know sensible things by seeing God's essence.

So we read: "No man can see me and live" (Exodus 33:20); "Now we see only reflections in a mirror, mere riddles, but then we shall be seeing face to face" (1 Corinthians 13:12). "Mortals can be addressed by God only through symbols or behind a veil or he sends a messenger who indicates what God wants by his permission" (Qur'ân 42:51).

We can also conclude that perfect happiness cannot be had in this life (III:48), since by none of the forms of knowledge reviewed can we know his essence, but they all leave us hungry for a more perfect knowledge. Also, this life is very unstable, and sickness or tragedies can prevent us from enjoying whatever makes us happy in this life. For it is impossible completely to avoid hunger, thirst, too much heat or cold; no one is totally exempt from disordered passions which make him swerve more or less from the mean of virtue; no one is never mistaken in some matters or at least is ignorant of what he would like to know. Moreover, moral and intellectual maturity attained by a lifetime of striving is quickly crowned by death.

Several philosophers, therefore, concluded that the maximum human happiness is what we attain in this life, even though it is imperfect. For Aristotle it consisted in knowledge of God through metaphysics; for Ibn-Rushd it consisted in contact with angels. Yet, in struggling with this question, these great minds could not answer the fact that a natural desire, such as we have for perfect happiness, cannot be in vain and forever frustrated. We are saved from this dilemma if we take the position that perfect happiness cannot be had in this life, but only in the next. There the soul will have a superior way of knowing, like that of the angels. So we hear: "Rejoice and be glad, for your reward will be great in heaven" (Matthew 5:12). "This life below is only a joke and a laugh, but the dwelling hereafter is better, for those who are reverent" (Qur'ân 6:32).

God directs everything to its purpose by his providence (III:64). Since everything is ordered to God as its ultimate purpose, it pertains to God, as the supreme governor and artist of the universe, to lead everything to its assigned purpose. That includes guiding natural things, which have no knowledge, to their intrinsic finality, such as a tree to producing fruit, and directing them to serve the needs of other things in the world's eco-system in a harmonious balance. So we hear him called "the Great King over all the world" (Psalm 47:2) and "Lord of the universe" (Qur'ân 1:2). This position counters those who would exclude God from the process of natural or cosmic evolution.

God preserves things in being (III:65), since continuation in being is presupposed to any operation towards an end. Any parent generates its individual offspring and its activity stops there; it is not responsible for the continued existence of its offspring nor for the nature of the species (manifested in genes). Whatever is not its own existence has existence by participation and direct dependence on God's existence, while the nature of its species, or essence, is similarly dependent directly on God's direct causality. So, just as any man-made object presupposes the work of nature in its components, so the work of nature presupposes God's creating and sustaining hand. So we hear him described as "sustaining all things by his powerful command" (Hebrews 1:3). "God is the creator of everything, and he is the one and the dominating" (Qur'ân 13:16).

The above outline of how all things constantly depend on God's power is quite different from that of certain Ash`arite theologians, such as al-Bâqillânî, who denied the existence of nature or a natural unit, and said that everything is nothing more than an accidental formation of infinitesimal atoms which have no continuity in space or time, but cease to exist and are recreated every successive instant.

Yet no agent gives existence except as an instrument of God's power (III:66), since any agent is itself directly dependent on God for existence. So whatever any agent does to bring something into being, its action is dispositive to the crowning act of existence, which is the proper effect of God as the first agent. So we read: "To exist─for this he created all things" (Wisdom 1:14). "If we will something, all we need to say to it is 'Be', and it is" (Qur'ân 16:40).

Similarly, God is the cause of action in everything (III:67). That is because everything depends on God not just as the originator of its nature, but also for its continued existence and for every action, so that if God's influence stopped, all action would stop.

Also every action is in some way the cause of being, either substantial or accidental, and as such the action is an instrument of God.

Besides, every action has its own finality or purpose, which is directed by God. So many events are attributed to God as to their first cause, as we read: "Yahweh, you will grant us peace, having completed all our undertakings for us" (Isaiah 26:12). "Victory comes only from God... You were not fighting them, but God fought them; you were not shooting, but God was shooting" (Qur'ân 8:10,17).

Therefore, God is everywhere and in all things (III:68), since he sustains all things in being and moves them to action by his power. Also, since his power is infinite, it must extend everywhere without exception.

Thus God's power touches constantly and directly without any intermediary: 1) the existence of any created thing, 2) its specific essence, apart from its individuality, 3) prime matter, 4) immaterial forms, that is, separated substances. So we read: "Do I not fill heaven and earth?" (Jeremiah 23:24). "God owns everything in the heavens and on earth, and God encompasses everything" (Qur'ân 4:126).

Nonetheless, we also read of heaven as the place of God: "High above all nations is Yahweh, above the heavens is his glory. Who is like Yahweh our God, who is enthroned on high?" (Psalm 113:16). "Who is the Lord of the seven heavens, the Master of the mighty throne?" (Qur'ân 23:86). This is only a reference to his power over the universe as a whole, in which our earth is a small dependent part. But, being simple and undivided, his power extends equally and totally everywhere, without his being contained in any place.

On the other hand, we must maintain that creatures do have their own natural causality (III:69-70), contrary to the opinion of a number of thinkers, starting with Plato. He argued that forms which exist in matter do not exist on their own but derive from immaterial forms, so that the world of ideal forms is the real cause of sensible things and there is no natural causality.

Ibn-Sînâ was of the same line of thought in attributing the generation of everything in this world to a separate agent intellect as a cause.

Some Ash`arite theologians, notably al-Ghazâlî [Tahâfut al-falâsifa, q. 17], imagine that natural causality would stand in competition with God's power. So they deny all causality to nature and attribute it exclusively to God, reducing natural things to occasions of God's action, backing up this position by atomism, as was explained above.

Similarly, David Hume denies all causality among things, calling into question the validity of any natural science.

This position goes against sense evidence, which attests to definite effects coming regularly from definite things, such as heat from fire and not from ice. It is also contrary to divine wisdom to cause all action directly and at the same time bring in various things as useless occasions. Also, to reduce nature to an atomized occasion of God's direct action is to detract from God's power, since his power is shown in the perfection of his effects rather than in their poverty. Likewise God's goodness is manifested in the fecundity of nature; to deny that is to detract from his goodness. Also, such a position removes the whole order of the universe, whereby one thing depends on another.

So, holding that natural things are active in so far as they are in act by their own form, we admit that their causality extends not only to accidental effects, such as heat and pressure, but also to substance, in generating their like. At the same time we attribute all these effects to God who acts through nature as his instrument.

Those who deny natural causality object that one action cannot come from two agents, one natural and the other God. Their problem is that they do not understand secondary or subordinate causality, how one cause can act instrumentally through the influence of a higher agent. It is not a question of partitioning the action and the effect between two agents, as when two workers cultivate different sections of a farm, or even when two men lift the same load. One cannot assign a certain percentage to God and another to the created agent, as the Mu`tazilites held and the Ash`arites denied, but the work belongs 100% to both, at different levels of causality.

God's providence does not exclude all evil (III:71). That is because secondary causes can be defective, as when a good artist works with bad tools; and it is not for a good ruler to intervene constantly in his subordinates' performance of their duties.

It also serves the ecological good of the universe that the corruption of one thing should be the generation or sustenance of another.

Also, greater moral good accidentally arises from the presence of evil, such as injustice and persecution, since these are occasions for good people to practice heroic virtue.

Evil, or the privation of good, also makes the good stand out and thus helps us to appreciate it better, as well as the fact that we receive it from God's generosity and not from any obligation he has towards us.

So we read: "Does misfortune come to a city if Yahweh has not caused it?" (Amos 3:6). "We put your faith to the test with evil and with good" (Qur'ân 21:35).

So those who deny God's existence because of the presence of evil are mistaken, because evil presupposes good and ultimately a perfect good, so that we can argue on the contrary: If there is evil, God exists!

At the same time we can solve the question whether evil actions are from God: As far as they are actions, or being, they are ultimately from God, but as far as they are defective, or lacking in being, they are not, but arise from defective secondary causes.

Also, God's providence does not impose necessity on things so as to exclude contingency (III:72). This is evident from the fact that things change and are corrupted and are often impeded in producing their effects; thus most seeds do not germinate. On the other hand, God allows the human soul and separated substances enjoy immortality by the necessity of their natures.

Nor does God's providence exclude free will (III:72), since it is a perfection more closely resembling divine perfection than any natural power, since it is not determined to a single pattern of acting.

Also, were God to eliminate free will, many good things would be missing, as are included in the whole range of human virtue and good character.

So we read: "He himself made human beings in the beginning, and then left the free to make their own decisions" (Sirach 15:14). "Whoever wishes will believe; and whoever wishes will disbelieve" (Qur'ân 18:29).

Nor does God's providence exclude chance (III:74); otherwise everything would happen necessarily and nothing would be contingent. In that case, nothing would be corruptible and the balance of nature would suffer.

Also, the proper activity of natural things is restricted to intrinsic finality, such as for a tree to produce fruit; what happens to that fruit is a matter of chance, as far as the tree is concerned. So, if nothing happened by chance, there would be no balance of nature and many good things would be missing.

So we read: "Another thing I have observed under the sun: that the race is not won by the speediest, nor the battle by the champions; it is not the wise who get food, nor the intelligent wealth, nor the learned favour: chance and mischance befall them all" (Ecclesiastes 9:11). "They will have eternal torment, like those before them who were stronger than them and had more wealth and children than them" (Qur'ân 9:68-69).

Since God's providence allows for contingency and chance, it positively includes care for individual contingent things (III:75). If his providence did not extend to them, it would be either because he does not know them, or is unable to care for them, or does not will to do so. But his infinite knowledge and power does reach them, while his will extends to every good thing. He cares for them by freely keeping them in being and enabling them to carry out all their actions and fulfil their purpose of being. Thus the perfection of God's knowledge and power is shown when he cares for each smallest detail of the universe. So we read: "Can you not buy two sparrows for a penny? An yet no one falls to the ground without your Father knowing. Why, every hair on your head has been counted" (Matthew 10:29-30). "To him belongs everything in the heavens and on the earth, what is between them, and what is under the soil" (Qur'ân 20:6).

Some blame Aristotle for holding the contrary to this position, but such an opinion cannot be substantiated in his words.

God's providence extends to every single thing immediately (III:76). This is counter to an opinion attributed to Plato, that God's direct providence concerns only spiritual creatures, and through them indirectly to everything else. Such a position is an anthropomorphism, because in human affairs a head of state cannot know every detail of a country, but must leave most of the details of administration to subordinates who know the details better. But God is not like that; rather, he knows everything and regulates every detail directly. So we read: "What is, what will be, you have planned; what has been, you designed" (Judith 9:5). "With him are the keys of the mysteries; only he knows them. He knows what is on the dry land and in the sea. Not a leaf falls but he knows it, nor a grain into the dark earth nor a fresh or dry branch but it is all in a clear book" (Qur'ân 6:59).

God's providence makes use of intermediaries in its execution (III:77). Although it is immediate with regard to planning and regulating every detail, and therein his perfect wisdom is at work, the execution of his providence is fittingly left to secondary causes which are proportionate to the envisaged effects. In this way the different levels of goodness found in creation share in God's own diffusive goodness and an order of inter-dependence is established in the universe. So we read: "Bless Yahweh, all his soldiers, his ministers who do his will" (Psalm 103:21). "In charge of that fire are fierce and severe angels who do not disobey God in whatever he orders them; they do whatever they are commanded to do" (Qur'ân 66:6).

Among intellectual creatures, it is natural for the lower to be directed by the higher, since these have a greater share of God's wisdom. Thus there are varieties of angels with different functions (III:80), some concerned with the overall plan of creation, others with one area or another, and others with various needs of man. Thus we hear of Seraphim (Isaiah 6:2,6) and Cherubim (Ezekiel 10 etc., Hebrews 9:5), who are closest to God (compare Qur'ân 40:7), Archangels (1 Thessalonians 4:16), particularly Michael (Daniel 10:13,21, Jude 9; Qur'ân 2:98), Angels (throughout), particularly Gabriel (Luke 1:19,26; Qur'ân 2:97-98, 66:4).

The word "angel" means messenger, and that is what their job is said to be (e.g. Acts 10:4-6; Qur'ân 81:19); elsewhere they are said to offer men's prayers to God (Tobit 12:12), to guide and heal (in the case of Raphael, Tobit 12:14), to fight for the faithful (e.g. 2 Kings 19:35; Qur'ân 8:9,12), to record men's actions against the Day of Judgement (e.g. Qur'ân 82:10) and to carry souls at death (e.g. Qur'ân 32:11).

As for Principalities, Ruling Forces, Powers and Sovereignties (Ephesians 1:21), some were considered promulgators of the Mosaic law (Galatians 3:19) but then the lot of them were rejected as demonic powers who enslaved people to the law, distracting them from their Creator (Galatians 4:3, Colossians 2:15, Ephesians 1:21, 2:2, 6:12; 1 Corinthians 15:24).

Human intelligence is at a disadvantage because one starts life with only a vague idea of the general lines of God's providence. To learn the detailed order of things requires study of the world about us. Nonetheless, because man stands over irrational animals (III:81), we read: "Let them be masters of the fish of the sea, the birds of heaven, the cattle, all the wild animals and all the creatures that creep along the ground" (Genesis 1:26). "God has subjected to you everything on earth as well as the ships that sail on the sea by his command" (Qur'ân 22:65).

Animals, likewise, stand over plants and other things that lack knowledge, as we hear: "I give you all the seed-bearing plants everywhere on the surface of the earth, and all the trees with seed-bearing fruit; this will be your food. And to all the wild animals, all the birds of heaven and all the living creatures that creep along the ground, I give all the foliage of the plants as their food" (Genesis 1:29-30). "We poured out rain abundantly and ploughed the earth well; we made grain spring up, along with grapes, canes, olive and palm trees, luxuriant gardens, fruits and pasture, for your enjoyment and that of your flocks" (Qur'ân 80: 25-32).

Within man, too, his bodily power should serve his power for sensation, and his sensitive powers should serve his intellect and be guided by its commands.

Within human society those endowed with greater intelligence naturally should take the leadership in coordinating the talents of others for the common good. So we read: "From all the people at large choose capable and God-fearing men... and make them the people's permanent judges" (Exodus 18:21). "Obey the Apostle and those in authority among you" (Qur'ân 4:59).

Nevertheless, this order is frequently inverted, just as sensuality can take over a man's intellect. So some people grab power by violence or bribe their way in. But God's providence allows this through the defects of human agents; yet even here he preserves some sanity by providing wise men who can sometimes advise and guide stupid rulers, or help good rulers to rule better. So we hear: "Plans are matured by consultation; take wise advice when waging war" (Proverbs 20:18). "Take counsel with them in the affair" (Qur'ân 3:159).

To complete the picture of providence, we can observe that most of the energy of the universe is in non-living physical and chemical forces (III:82-83). In this terrestrial world, most of this is controlled and directed by the sun, as the earth goes through daily and annual cycles of position towards the sun, causing an alteration of heat and cold, with winds and many other consequences. The moon and other heavenly bodies have a lesser influence. All of these are executors of God's providence to support life on the earth.

On the other hand, heavenly bodies cannot impress ideas on our minds or move our wills (III:84-88), although it is possible for them to reach our intellect and will indirectly by affecting our bodies. But that influence, apart from our moods being affected by the weather, has been grossly exaggerated by ancient and medieval philosophers and modern astrologists with no scientific basis.

In any case, stellar or any other physical influences cannot compel the human will in its choice. Nor to they make every natural event in this world happen from necessity.

Neither can spirits directly influence our will; the most they can do is influence our imagination, which is a sensitive power in a physical organ. A voluntary act, by definition, cannot be forced, since it comes from the interior of the soul. A man or an angel can move someone's will only by persuasion, which is an approach to the intellect by proposing some good which the person may freely choose.

Only God can move the will without violence and from within, since he is its creator who gave it its natural hunger for good, and he and keeps it in being and in operation. So we read: "Like flowing water is a king's heart in Yahweh's hand; he directs it wherever he pleases" (Proverbs 21:1). "God guides those he wishes in the right way" (Qur'ân 2:213).

Thus God not only gave us the power to will, but also moves our will to act (III:89-90). This is only an instance of the general principle shown above that God moves everything in its own acts in the same way that a workman uses a tool. So we read: "It is God who, in his good will toward you, begets in you any measure of desire or achievement" (2 Philippians 2:13 NAB). "Had God so willed, he would have made all of you one people" (Qur'ân 5:48).

Thus all human acts and choices fall under God's providence, even more than events in the physical world, because intellectual beings are closer and more beloved to God and through them he cares for the rest of creation. Thus we hear the view condemned: "Yahweh has abandoned the country, Yahweh cannot see" (Ezekiel 9:9), whereas "God knows what is in front of them and what is behind them" (Qur'ân 2:255).

On the other hand we hear: "He himself made human beings in the beginning, and then left them free to make their own decisions" (Sirach 15:14); "God will repay everyone according as he deserves" (Qur'ân 14:51). These passages refer to human free will and show that God's providence does not make human actions flow from the human will by necessity.

In his providence God cares for us directly or indirectly in all our weaknesses (III:91). Since our wills are shaky and fallible, as is evidenced by the fact of sin, we depend directly on him, whose will is unchangeable and who alone can touch our will. Our intellects are likewise prone to error as it tries to organize rationally multiple and complicated sense data; in this we can be helped by God through angels, whose intellects see all that they know in a single glance that cannot be mistaken. Our bodies are also unstable as they require times for nourishment, exercise and rest; this is regulated and given a measure of stability by cosmic rhythms, such as the revolution of the earth on its axis and around the sun.

God's providence also covers luck (III:92-93), which is something that happens to a person without his intending it, as when a farmer ploughing his field finds a buried treasure, or when two people go somewhere and unexpectedly meet. All of this is chance as far as created causality is concerned, but is part of God's universal plan, whereby he both directs human choice towards good and provides the means to carry out this choice. In this, God can use angels to inspire ideas of good things, but they cannot compel choice. He may also use natural circumstances to incline us to do things, such as the weather, the sights that we see and the sounds that we hear.

In any case, we must reject astrological explanations of human character, since even natural events cannot be traced to the stars with any scientific certitude.

God's providence is universal (III:94), so that nothing escapes it; it is unchangeable by God's eternal decision (95); yet does not make things happen from necessity. The universality of God's providence follows from the fact that he brought all things into being and sustains them in being and operation so as to bring them to perfection.

God's providence is perfect in that his planning reaches every detail of the universe, while at the same time he executes this plan through a splendid concatenation of secondary causes. While the universe as a whole achieves the purpose for which it was made, in being ordered to the good of man, whose own good is God, not everything in the universe has equal perfection or reaches its own perfection as an individual; many things are hardly born before they are consumed for the good of something else.

As each secondary cause operates according to its own nature, it interacts with other things according to chance and not necessity. Science can predict some of this interaction to a limited extent, such as weather for a few days ahead, but God knows from eternity the interaction of every particular thing with another according to the plan that he wills. So everything inevitably happens according to God's plan, but not according to the nature of any individual thing.

The inevitability of God's providence does not make prayer useless (III:96), since the purpose of prayer is not to change the eternal plan of God's providence, but to obtain from God what he decided to give in answer to prayer. Since intellectual creatures share in God's goodness more than any other creatures, he loves them more and wishes to see them reach happiness through fulfilling their good desires. These desires, expressed in prayer, are a disposition and condition for God to give people what is good for them. So we read: "Yahweh performs the will of those who fear him; he hears their cry and saves them" (Psalm 145:8). "I am near and hear the prayer of a supplicant when he calls on me; so ask me to hear you and believe in me" (Qur'ân 2:186).

At times God does not hear prayers. That can be because something is requested that is not really good for the person, whether he realizes it or not, as we hear: "You do not know what you are asking" (Matthew 20:22); "When you pray and to not receive, it is because you prayed wrongly, wanting to indulge your passions" (James 4:3); we should rather be like "those who pray seeking from their Lord the means to be the closest [to him], hoping for his mercy and fearing his punishment" (Qur'ân 17:57).

Or he does not hear because a person's desire slackens and he stops praying; thus we hear of "the need to pray continually and never lose heart" (Luke 18:21).

Or he does not hear because the person does not pray humbly, devoutly and with faith, as we hear: "It was because you do not have enough faith" (Matthew 16:20). "Those only are believers whose hearts become full of fear when Allah is mentioned, and when His communications are recited to them they increase them in faith, and in their Lord do they trust" (Qur'ân 8:2).

Or it can be because the person has abandoned God's friendship by sin, or if one prays for someone else who is not in God's friendship, as we hear: "You may multiply your prayers, I shall not be listening. Your hands are covered in blood" (Isaiah 1:15); "Call on your Lord humbly and in secret; he does not love transgressors" (Qur'ân 7:55).

What we have said excludes two errors concerning prayer. The first is to say that all prayer is useless, either because God has no providence at all, as the Epicureans said, or it does not reach human affairs, or because everything happens of necessity, as the Stoics said. The second error is to say that prayer works by changing the mind of God. Some Scripture passages could be taken in this sense, such as: "Should the nation I have threatened abandon its wickedness, I then change my mind about the disaster which I had intended to inflict on it" (Jeremiah 18:8); "If anyone repents and reforms after committing a crime, God will repent towards him; God is forgiving and merciful" (Qur'ân 5:39). But we have seen before that God does not change, nor does his universal plan of providence change. Yet this plan can include change of particular chains of consequences; thus God can move a person from a habit of sin leading to hell to a habit of virtue and prayer leading to heaven. In this case, God is said metaphorically to repent.

God's providence operates according to a rational plan (III:97). This is shown first in the great diversity found in his creation, since any single creature reflects a small aspect of God's goodness, whereas all together they reflect many different aspects of his goodness at different levels of perfection. Because things are different, they have different operations, different bodily shapes and parts, and different kinds of interaction with other things. So there are different orders of causal dependency in the world which God uses to accomplish his purposes, such as evaporation, clouds, wind and condensation to produce rain.

The rationality of God's providence counters the occasionalism we saw above [III:68], which would have fire equally warm or chill something, depending simply on God's will. It also counters the view that everything in the world happens from necessity, allowing no place for chance. So, regarding the first cause of all things, we hear: "Whatever he wills, Yahweh does in heaven and on earth (Psalm 135:6), but regarding the order of secondary causality we hear: "You ordered all things by measure, number and weight" (Wisdom 11:20). With respect to both we hear: "God creates what he wishes and then chooses what is best for the good" (Qur'ân 28:68).

Evil spirits are not substantially evil, but evil by sin (III:106-110). The being of everything as made by God is good, and every intellectual creature has a natural tendency to truth and goodness, and an angelic intellect cannot err. The sin of an angel cannot arise, as in man, from a disorder of passions, since angels have no bodies and no passions, but from a choice regarding its ultimate good. By nature an intellectual creature must desire its own perfection, but it is not forced to seek that perfection outside itself, in a superior good. So an angel could choose its own excellent nature as its ultimate good and refuse to be subject to God; that is the sin of pride, as Isaiah said of the king of Babylon: "I shall climb high above the clouds, I shall rival the Most High" (Isaiah 14:14). "When we told the angels to bow down to Adam, they all bowed except Iblîs, who refused out of pride and became one of the unbelievers" (Qur'ân 2:34). The other angels then split between those who rallied behind Satan and those who remained loyal to God.

God has a special concern for rational creatures, because of their superior nature and their destiny, which is God himself. Therefore God provides for man for his own sake, but for the rest of the physical universe for the sake of man (III:111-112). In the physical world only man is free to direct his own acts, while other things are directed by nature and ultimately by the author of their nature; things thus passively used are instruments for the sake of a higher good.

Moreover, man is the only physical creature that can reach God directly by knowing and loving him; any other thing can only go part way and must therefore find its fulfilment in serving man, who can reach God.

Besides, all other things are perishable, indicating that they have only a temporary use, whereas only man, in his soul, is imperishable.

Also, in any whole there are principal parts and other adjunct parts ordered to the former; thus some things are there to feed man, others to serve his other needs, but all are there for the perfection of his mind as he knows them and through them knows something about God.

In this way everything is important: Individual things are subservient to the good of their species, so that the whole species can be subservient to man, and not just one man, but the whole human race collectively, while all men, finally, find their perfection in God and in their place in the universe and the society of other intellectual creatures.

So we read: "Every living thing that moves will be yours to eat, no less than the foliage of the plants" (Genesis 9:3). "Eat and drink what God has provided for you" (Qur'ân 2:60).

Thus we reject as erroneous the opinion that we may not kill animals. Since God made them for the use of men, we can legitimately kill and eat them or use them for any other service. Scriptural references to avoiding cruelty to animals (e.g. not killing a hen with chicks, Dteuteronomy 22:6, or killing a sacred camel, Qur'ân 26:155-158 etc.), these are to teach people not to act similarly towards men, or to prevent mutilation, scarcity or danger to the species.

For irrational creatures the survival of the species is important, while the individual is expendable. The human race, on the contrary, is secondary to the value of the individual.

God directs human actions not merely as human but also as they belong to each individual (III:113). That is because each man exists not merely for the sake of his species but also in his own right with an immortal destiny. Moreover, his actions are not determined by his nature but by his own free will; the great diversity of human action that results from this must all come under God's providence. Besides, by intellect and free will men, as individuals, are instruments of God in governing other creatures. Therefore we hear: "What is man that you should think of him, or the son of man that you should care for him?" (Psalm 8:5), or in words ascribed to Joseph: "Lord, you have given me authority and taught me interpretation of proverbs. Creator of the heavens and the earth, you are [my] protector in this life and the next" (Qur'ân 12:101).

Therefore it is necessary for God to give men laws to direct them towards their goal, since law is an ordinance of reason guiding action to the common good (III:114). Besides, since men share in God's providence in ruling over human society and the rest of creation, they need guidance from the Supreme Ruler of all. So we read: "Within them I shall plant my Law, writing it on their hearts" (Jeremiah 31:33). "These [commandments] are part of the wisdom with which your Lord has inspired you" (Qur'ân 17:39).

The purpose of divine law is to direct people to God (III:115), since the purpose for which God created them is happiness with God, and every human action is good to the extent that it contributes to this purposes. So we read: "And now, Israel, what does Yahweh you God ask of you? Only this: to fear Yahweh your God, to follow all his ways, to love him, to serve Yahweh your God with all your heart and all your soul" (Deuteronomy 10:12). "Anyone who hopes to meet his Lord should do good works and not worship anyone alongside his Lord" (Qur'ân 18:110).

The purpose of divine law specifically is the love of God (III:116), since that is the chief way we can reach God in this life. The highest human action, knowing God, is imperfect in this life and is completed by the act of the will directed to God. The will can be directed to God either by love or by fear. Fear keeps us loyal to God in order to avoid evils that come from not being loyal to him, but love directs us to God for his own sake. Besides, someone is called good because he has a good will, and his will is good because he loves what is good, especially the Supreme Good. Love also is the strongest, sweetest and most perfect way of being directed towards God. So we hear: "Love is the fulfilment of the Law" (Romans 13:10). "If you abandon God's religion, he will bring another people whom he loves and who love him" (Qur'ân 5:54), as if to say that love is the summation of religion.

Divine law also includes love of neighbour (III:117), since those who are going in the same direction should be joined by a common spirit and help one another on the way. Also, those who love God should love those whom God loves, which includes all men. Besides, peace is required for the worship and the study of divine things, and peace is secured mainly by mutual love. So we hear: "Love your neighbour as yourself" (Leviticus 19:18). "God established concord in the [believers'] hearts; were you, [Muammad], to spend all the money on earth you would not have been able to establish concord in their hearts, but God established concord among them" (Qur'ân 8:63).

Divine law obliges men to seek the right faith (III:118). If we are to love God, we must first have an idea of him as an object of happiness, which only faith, which exceeds natural reason, can tell us about. The faith we embrace must give us a correct idea of God, since God cannot ask anyone to believe in falsehood, especially since any error about God, who is utterly simple, makes us miss him entirely. For instance, someone who believes that he is a body does not know him at all. So we hear: "Listen, Israel: Yahweh our God is the one, the only Yahweh. You must love Yahweh your God with all your heart, with all your soul, with all your strength" (Deuteronomy 6:4). "Your God is one God, there is no God but him, the Merciful and Compassionate" (Qur'ân 2:163).

We have gone about as far as we can on a common Christian-Muslim path. The remaining chapters of Book III of the Contra gentiles bring up matters where a common stand would be more speckled with differences, such as principles of worship, sexual morality, natural law, evangelical counsels or religious life, sin and punishent, actual and sanctifying grace, charisms, deliverance and preservation from sin, and predestination. Book IV is devoted to exclusively Christian beliefs.

In matters of faith there can and should be dialogue, but this book is confined to the preambles of faith.