Guardian, 27-28 February 2012

The Boko Haram menace —what is the solution? The debate sways between a military solution and dialogue. Can we look inside Boko Haram, understand it from its own perspective, and from its historical antecedents? If so, we can understand what are its assets and liabilities, and what are its chances of turning Nigeria, or at least the north, into an Islamic Republic.

Getting a profile of Boko Haram poses problems. At this time, people see its hand in every blast, later to discover a different culprit, or simply a faulty electric connection. (See Bishop Kukah, Guardian, 16-17 January 2012.) Similarly, speculation is rife about what Boko Haram stands for, or wants to achieve. Here, I utilize two YouTube videos of Abubakar Shekau, the Boko Haram "imam", the first following the Madalla Christmas bombing (15 minutes), the second following the Kano attack of 20 January 2012 (40 minutes). In these videos, he claims responsibility for both incidents, and also explains his intentions. His position is not new in Islamic history. How its precedents fared is a lesson for today.

The Boko Haram position

"Allah ya fi ka ƙarfi" —God is stronger than you," Abubakar Shekau told President Jonathan (on YouTube). That was after the Madalla bombing. Similar words followed the Kano attack. The Boko Haram leader is full of confidence. Why? —Because, he says, we are doing God's work. Regarding the Christmas Madalla bombing, he said: "Yanzu, 'yan kwanakin nan, da mun yi ayyuka, Allah ya ba mu nasara, mun yi abin da muka yi —Now, a few days ago, when we did some operations, Allah gave us victory; we succeeded in what we did."

Why should this be God's work? Boko Haram's official name, its leader explains, is Jamā`atu ahl as-sunna li-d-da`wa wa-l-jihād —Society of Sunna-adherents for Conversion-preaching and Jihad. Its job is simply to establish the Qur'ān and the Sunna as law of the land, and implement their provisions. In doing so, the Society has met four groups of opponents:

1. The Nigerian Government and its Constitution, which he says are kafirci (in denial of Islam). "Wallahi tallahi, kowa ya san demokrasi ɗin ba na Allah ba ne... ya san wannan Constitution, dokan da aka tsara ana bi a wannan ƙasa dai, ba na Allah da Annabi ba ne. —Everyone knows that this democracy is not of God... and knows that this Constitution, the law that was composed and is followed in this country is not from God or his Prophet."
2. The proponents of secular education, including music and sports. They aim to trivialize the Qur'ān. If you touch Qur'ānic schools, "we will start bombing your primary schools, secondary schools and universities." "اللهم، هدم الديمكراتية والمدارس الأجنبية —O God, destroy democracy and foreign (= secular) schools."
3. Christians, since, he insists, they have backed the Government in attacking them and other Muslims in several northern cities. Christianity, he adds, is not a religion, because, in denial of the Qur'ān, it affirms that Jesus is the Son of God. These arna (pagans) must repent, and become Muslims.
4. Muslims who cooperate with the Government and Christians in opposing Boko Haram. They have joined our enemies. Their prayer and mosque attendance notwithstanding, za mu kashe su —we will kill them.

Precedents: Khārijism and Ḥanbalism

As countless statements by Muslim leaders indicate, Boko Haram's principles and actions run counter to mainstream Islam. Yet they are not without precedent. When Abū-Bakr became the first Khalīfa, the Bedouin Arabs claimed to be Muslims, but refused the authority of Abū-Bakr. A Muslim is not allowed to fight another Muslim because they are brothers (Q. 49:9-10). If fighting cannot be avoided it must be justified, and that by showing that the enemy has lost the right to call himself a Muslim. He is an apostate, murtadd. The rebellion of the newly converted Arabs was called ridda (apostasy) to justify the force used to put it down.

In the second civil war, between the fourth Kalīfa, `Alī, and Mu`āwiya, `Alī agreed to a truce and negotiations. Some of his followers then accused him of treason against God who had put him in power. These dissidents, called Khārijites (who quickly dissented among themselves), condemned both Mu`āwiya and `Alī, on the principle that obedience to the divine precepts in the Qur'ān is part of faith, and whoever disobeys them is no longer a Muslim. He has become a kāfir (unbeliever) and must be killed. And so they killed `Alī. Khārijism, in its true revolutionary spirit, never was a permanent movement, but it is an ever-recurring ideology, taking on different names. It appeals to Muslims who are marginalized and desperate in a Muslim society.

Aḥmad ibn-Ḥanbal (d. 855), like the Khārijites and some others, rejected any social system of laws apart from what is laid down in divine revelation, as contained in the Qur'ān and Ḥadīth. Ibn-Ḥanbal insisted on literal interpretation of the Qur'ān, without any allegorical or philosophical speculation, and rejected the Mu`tazilite doctrine imposed by al-Ma'mūn (ruled 813-33). That landed him in prison until the death of al-Ma'mn. The common people regarded Ibn-Hanbal as a holy martyr. At his prompting, they demonstrated in the streets of Baghdad against the intellectual liberalism of the regime. They even opposed the conservative theological school of Ash`arism because it dared to use philosophical reasoning in presenting matters of faith. At last, in 847, the caliph al-Mutawakkil was forced to shut down Bayt al-Ḥikma University, and send away all the philosophers and dangerous theologians.

Ḥanbalism differs from Khārijism in one important respect: It does not include practice in the definition of faith. Therefore, if a Muslim is not faithful to the duties of Islam, it does not declare him an apostate (murtadd).

Continuance of Ḥanbalism

Ḥanbalite principles resurfaced in Ibn-Taymiyya (d. 1328), and `Abdalwahhāb in 18th century Arabia. Hanbalite Wahhabism is the ideology of the present Saudi regime. Ḥanbalism also influenced the reform movement of al-Afghānī (d. 1897), Muḥammad `Abduh (d. 1905), Rashīd Riḍā (d. 1935), and Abū-l-A`lā Maududi (d. 1979). These reformists maintained that the Qur'ān contains all science, and that the best of the West (democracy, religious tolerance, women's rights) was borrowed from Islam.

On the political front, from 1928 and more so after 1935, Ḥasan al-Bannā set in motion in Egypt the Muslim Brothers, with branches throughout the Middle East. Al-Bannā's guiding principle was: "We believe that the laws and teaching of Islam are comprehensive, ordering the affairs of men in this world and the next... Islam is both creed and worship (`aqīda wa-`ibāda), homeland and a nationality (waṭan wa-jinsiyya), religion and government (dīn wa-dawla), spirituality and work (rūḥāniyya wa-`amal), scripture and sword (muṣḥaf wa-sayf). This is close to Ḥanbalism, but differs from it in promoting sports, learning (not only religious), and culture.

Bannā met his death in 1949 by assassination, probably by the police of King Faruk. Nevertheless, the brotherhood grew and helped Nasser in his 1952 revolution. Later the Muslim Brothers broke with Nasser because he would not share power with them. They remained a persecuted opposition party until the revolution of January 2011. For a long time, they supplied the poor with social services that the government neglected, such as education, health and job training programmes. These programmes were open to both Muslims and Christians alike. Because of their reputation for dedication, honesty, efficiency and competency, the Muslim Brothers party, Ḥizb al-ḥuriyya wa-l-`adāla, swept the 2012 elections.

In Nigeria, Ḥanbalism, with the stamp of Saudi Wahhabism, is represented by Jamā`at izālat al-bid`a wa-iqāmat as-sunna (Society for the removal of heresy and the establishment of Sunna), commonly known as Izala. This organization, strong in its day, has waned since the death of its founder, Abubakar Gumi, in1992. It not only fights Christians in demanding an Islamic state, but also the Sufi brotherhoods and any Muslims who promote modernization or a revival of traditional African culture. So, at that time, we along with burning of churches, we saw fights among Muslims in the mosques.

The establishment of Shar`ia in many states of the north follows the same line. In contrast with the state-harassed Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, state-promoted Shari`a in Nigeria has yet to yield appreciable dividends.

Continuance of Khārijism

The Umayyads crushed the Khārijites of the Middle East, but similar revolts reoccurred in the `Abbāsid period, such as the Black slave revolt in Baṣra, which lasted from 869 to 883, and the Qarāmiṭa in the Arabian peninsula.

In recent times, Sayyid Quṭb, a Muslim Brother put in prison for refusing to cooperate with Nasser, wrote a commentary on the Qur'ān. In it, he abandoned several Brotherhood positions. Most notably, he reverted to the Khārijite principle that a regime that does not apply Shar`īa fully is un-Islamic (jāhilī) and imposed by force (ḥākimī). In countries of Islamic tradition, that is equivalent to an apostate regime. For Quṭb, jihad is an obligation of every individual, who must constantly fight for the establishment of Sharī`a law, first in traditionally Islamic societies, and then in the whole world. Quṭb looked forward to the revival of an Islamic state with an imam or caliph really devoted to Sharī`a. This would be the kingdom of God on earth and real Utopia.

Quṭb accused Muḥammad `Abduh and Rashīd Riḍā of falling under the influence of Christian orientalists and Jews, who distorted Islam with their critical and deviant interpretations. For Quṭb, Muslims should not try to confirm the Qur'ān by modern science or try to adapt it to modern thought. Rather science and history must give in to the supreme truths of the Qur'ān. Besides, reason as distinguished from revelation can say nothing about morality and social life. So, for Quṭb, one must apply fully all the Qur'ānic provisions concerning the non-exposure of women, polygamy, divorce and inequality in inheritance and witnessing in court, and prohibition of banking interest. Otherwise, one is not a Muslim, for all one's trappings of Islam, including professing the shahāda.

Christians and Jews have no right to the tolerance given to them by the early verses of the Qur'ān. Having gone back to polytheism and broken their pact with God, they are unbelievers (kāfirūn). Therefore they should be attacked, according to the provisions of Qur'ān 9:1-35; and this is what the followers of Quṭb do up to today. Although executed in prison in 1966, Quṭb's influence has continued to grow.

In Egypt, Quṭb influenced the more radical movement, Jamā`at al-Jihād al-Islāmī. Its founder, Muḥammad `Abdassalām al-Farj, author of The Unseen Obligation (al-Farīḍa al-ghā'iba), insisted on the obligation of each individual Muslim to fight for the establishment of an Islamic state. Unlike Quṭb, this movement —in its various transformations and varieties— did not insist on starting at home, but also went after high-profile targets abroad. Al-Farj's followers assassinated President Sadat for not fully implementing Sharī`a. Ayman aẓ-Ẓawāhirī, present leader of al-Qā'ida, was an early member of al-Jihād. He helped Usāma Ibn-Lādān in forming al-Qā'ida, and assisted the Taliban party in Afghanistan. The Taliban, in particular, set the example for similar movements elsewhere.

In Nigeria, the actions of the Maitatsine movement (Kano in December 1980, Maiduguri in October 1982 and Yola in February 1984) had all the characteristics of Khārijism. It was a revolt of the poor against corrupt government, which it fought as having betrayed Islam. Unfortunately, in those days there were no GSMs or Internet for Maitatsine to publicize its agenda, and no one bothered to interview any of them. Statements by Muslim leaders at that time simply put them outside the pale of Islam, with the addition of accusations of sorcery etc., for which no evidence was presented. In Yobe in 2002, a similar uprising claimed for itself the name and ideology of "Taliban".

Boko Haram follows in the footsteps of Maitatsine; only it is articulate. However offensive these are, and how erroneous in declaring Muslim opponents apostates, their Muslim opponents still regard them as Muslims, so long as they profess the two-fold shahāda. They do not loose their right to life, but must only, as outlaws (bughāt), face restraining force (Qur'ān 49:9). The case calls to mind the Donatist heretics of 4-5^th century Algeria, who would not recognize Catholics as Christians, but St. Augustine replied that we must accept them as Christians, because of their baptismal profession.

Boko Haram's assets and liabilities

If any Muslim grabs power, he must first claim to be a reformer (mujaddid) of the Muslim community, or at least its defender, committed to champion the cause of the downtrodden, and assure justice as decreed by God (in the Qur'ān and Ḥadīth). Abubakar Shekau makes this claim for Boko Haram, and that clothes it with an aura of legitimacy. Its deeds, however, reflect a skewed understanding of divine justice, and have offered nothing to benefit the downtrodden.

Boko Haram's second asset is the devotion and expertise of many of its members, not only military, munitions and strategic expertise, but also in the use of media, especially Internet. Boko Haram's rejection of secular education, however, deprives it not only of military sophistication, but more importantly of public-relations or image-marketing strategy.

External assets consist in support from politicians and people in public service, and foreign training and financing. Who are sponsoring the movement, and how they operate, is still a largely undisclosed secret. Yet Boko Haram does have patrons and sympathizers in high places, particularly the northern "establishment". In spite of their condemnation of bombings, many are still smarting at the results of the last presidential election, and would be quite happy to weaken Federal power, and put Christians down. Boko Haram is a useful tool for that.

As for liabilities, Boko Haram's fundamental weakness is its takfīr (declaring an unbeliever) of anyone who dissents from any point of its interpretation of Sharī`a or of its application. It tolerates no disagreement in its ranks, or among Muslims it interacts with. Of course, it writes off Christians universally as avowed opponents. Apart from the flimsy foundation of such a position, it fails to acknowledge the extent to which other Muslims and even Christians share their vision for a just society under God. Instead of welcoming their support, Boko Haram alienates it. While Shekau trusts absolutely in the divine wisdom of the Qur'ān, he fails to take into account the imperfection of its human administrators. Thus even his own movement is splintering and becoming like a mafia, with rival bosses fighting each other, and the common people reduced to silence, for fear of assassination.

Boko Haram's second liability is failure to distinguish between self-defense and (chain-reactive) reprisals, and between aggressors and anyone belonging to the same religion. Therefore, under the guise of self-defense, it targets the innocent, people who had no part in attacking them or other Muslims. Shekau lists many incidents where Muslims were attacked. He is right to complain. But he does not acknowledge the many gratuitous attacks on Christians and their churches. And he is outraged that these people, like Muslims, claim the right to defend themselves. Should he be surprised if, in response to the bombings, the government resolves to "crush" them?

A third liability is Boko Haram's failure to distinguish, in educational policy, between true science, "to be sought even in China", and secular ideologies that are hostile to Islam (and Christianity as well).

A fourth liability, which should concern all northern leadership, both political and traditional rulers, is the impoverishment of the North. The insecurity is driving away industry and business, and depriving the region of professional people who can provide basic services.

Boko Haram's chances of establishing an Islamic Republic

Abubakar Shekau aims to replace the Nigerian Constitution with Sharī`a. Although no one gives him any chance of imposing Sharī`a on the whole country, that does not daunt him, for: "Allah ya ce, in ka bi shi, zai ba ka ƙarfī —God said, if you obey him, he will give you power." No one doubts God's capability, but few agree that Shekau correctly reads God's intentions.

What are Boko Haram's chances of success on a state or regional level? To answer that, let us review the factors of internal regime change in the Muslim world. Until recent times, the prevalent pattern has been that of one army defeating another, e.g., Mu`āwiya against `Alī, the `Abbāsids against the Umayyads. Another pattern was military coup, e.g. Nasser against King Faruk, Ghaddafi against King Idris. Even any case, the winner usually (but not always) exploited popular support.

Recent times have witnessed revolutions from below, depending almost entirely on broad popular support. The Arab Spring uprisings are obvious examples, but they do not share the narrow Islamist aims of Boko Haram. The Iranian Islamic revolution of 1979 resembled Boko Haram, by defining itself in Islamic terms, but, unlike Boko Haram, enjoyed strong popular support. Before his return from exile, Ayatollah Khomeini had convinced most Iranians to support the revolution. True, he convinced them by words, not deeds, but they believed him then, and that assured the revolution's success.

Ḥizbullāh has become a semi-autonomous government in southern Lebanon. Its success comes not primarily from its ability to defend itself with arms, but from its transformation of an impoverished Shī`ite region, which now enjoys schools, hospitals, water, electricity, internal security, roads etc. Ḥizbullāh is not just a ruling party; it has become part of the people.

As noted above, although the Muslim Brothers did not spearhead the revolution in Egypt, they swept the elections. That is because of their record of honesty and service to the people.

Boko Haram, however, has no such popular support, but relies solely on terror attacks.

Is terror paying off? Recently, the President has suggested "dialogue", or negotiations. That, in political language, means giving up on victory. The government would cut its losses and yield to some Boko Haram demands. Abubakar Shekau has categorically rejected any sulhu (compromise truce). But Boko Haram's military success depends much on the good will of its patrons.

This cozy relationship faces two dangers. The first is, should Boko Haram challenge its patrons, they will use every means to crush it. The other is that the patrons may tire of Boko Haram, and view them as a liability. That may already be happening, as northern leaders see their jurisdictions go down the drain.

Boko Haram, like Greece on the brink of bankruptcy, must make painful changes or fold up.

Guardian, 23 October 2011

Sokoto —I first went there in 1964. I met Sultan Abubakar, visited Waziri (later Sultan) Maccido, who graciously gave me access to his library, saw and heard the Sardauna, Ahmadu Bello. Sokoto had an aura. It was the awesome Birnin Shehu. Another aura kept surfacing. Sokoto appeared to be an annex hall of the British Museum, a society frozen in the past, alien to the rest of Nigeria.

Matthew Hassan Kukah —I first met him in Jos. I arrived there, as a visiting lecturer in St. Augustine Seminary, days before the Dimka coup in 1976. Among the students, Kukah stood out. Ignatius Kaigama (now Archbishop of Jos) was also there, but lost in the crowd. It was only on a courtesy call in 2004 that I learned he was in my class, and appreciated the rudimentary Arabic I threw in.

Some years later I stopped at the seminary again. Fr. Kukah was a new lecturer there. In the common room, where we were sitting, he spotted a coffee-table picture book someone had given. It depicted "native" African culture, selecting plenty of feathers and skin. Fr. Kukah looked at it and protested, "Is that our culture?" He dubbed it a travesty and an insult. It was the budding voice of a Nigerian and African patriot.

Since then we met many times, when his record was public. He crossed swords with the high and mighty, both in government and Church, and got away with it. How? —Because he did not excoriate, but engaged in dialectic. To some, he appeared fuzzy, dodging conclusions. But he was effective, and proved himself in the end. Now he stands at a new beginning, a new bishop in a new Sokoto, with a new Sultan.

Guardian, 17 August 2011

If you want a loan, find a friend, not a bank —unless you are very sure you can make the payments. If not, before long you may be homeless. And if you make the payments, when it comes to menu, you may find yourself on 0-0-1. Interest rates may appear low in the beginning. But when they begin to compound, you may want to abscond, start from scratch under a new identity.

When banks lend to defaulters like you, they come on hard times. But banks are getting wise. They see through your bluff, your designer attire, your confident demeanour, your know-it-all discourse. They check your credit rating, your collateral, the fine print of your proposal. Their astuteness pays off. See the handsome profits banks are posting.

On the international scene, the name of the game is hardball. They prefer lending to governments, not businesses. Businesses can declare bankruptcy, but governments cannot. What does it matter if loans are embezzled? Government can always impose austerity measures. The poor may complain, the rich are secure, and government cannot abscond. With compounded interest, its debts are many times over the original loan. Circumstances must be very hopeless before a debt is written off. Even then, be sure land or resources are not part of the bargain.

So economic injustice is the problem. What solutions are possible? The Central Bank proposes Islamic banking. Then comes furor. Why should government get involved in Islamic institutions? The furor, I think, is premature. Muslims are proposing a solution to a problem weighing on all of us. Why reject it out of hand, just because it is "Islamic"? Muslims, you may answer, are not bothered about economic injustice. They simply want to obey the Qur'anic command: No interest on loans. —But, in fact, they are bothered about the injustice, and they see Islamic banking as a remedy.

Then what about its conditions? If you take a loan from an Islamic bank, the bank and its depositors have a share in your enterprise and its profits. Besides, your enterprise must be Shari`a compliant, e.g. it cannot be a brewery. Maybe you do not like these conditions. No one is forcing you to use Islamic banking. Compare it with interest banking. It is for you to decide which is more advantageous.

But the furor gets stronger. Islamic banking is part of a scheme to turn Nigeria into an Islamic state, step by gradual step. Then comes agitation. Christians are persecuting Muslims. They won't let us bank as our religion dictates. They squash our well-meaning initiatives. Islamic banking is our right. Do not stand in the way!

"Calm down," the referee calls. Examine the issues. What are the Christian complaints? (1) The first complaint is that the original guidelines of 4 March 2010 (BSD/DIR/GEN/NIB/01/008) restrict non-interest banking to Shari`a banking, i.e. no other form of non-interest banking is allowed: "A non-interest bank means a bank which transacts banking business, engages in trading, investments and commercial activities, as well as the provision of financial products and services in accordance with the principles and rules of Islamic commercial jurisprudence."

This complaint is dealt with in the revised guidelines of 21 June 2011, which reverses that restriction: "For the avoidance of doubt, section 23 (1) and section 66 of the BOFIA 1991, (as amended) explicitly provide for the licensing of Non-Interest Banks (NIBs). The CBN is obliged, by law, to issue licenses to appropriate entities for the establishment of NIBs provided they meet the regulatory requirements for licenses. In view of this, the CBN is open to receiving and evaluating applications for licensing of non-interest banking institutions based on other principles rather than the Islamic variant and will soon issue separate guidelines for non-interest banking under other principles."

(2) A more serious complaint is that CBN, by setting up a Shari`a Council to oversee the Shari`a banking operations, is instituting government enforcement of Shari`a observance. The 4 March 2010 Guidelines provides: "There shall be an advisory committee on non-interest banking within the CBN to be called the CBN Shariah Council (CSC), which will be outsourced. The CSC shall advise the CBN on Islamic laws and principles for the purposes of regulating noninterest banking business." This arrangement follows the Malaysian model, whereby government guarantees the Shari`a compliance of the banks.

But there are other models. Shari`a banking is widespread in the United States. LARIBA Bank is licensed with the Nationwide Mortgage Licensing System, and in 19 States that require licenses. The government and licensing bodies ensure compliance with general law. They do not regulate the Shari`a aspect of its banking. That is a matter between the Bank and its customers or professional advisers. If word gets out that the Bank is faulty with regard to Shari`a, customers can decamp to another bank that satisfies their conscience. As for the government, in that matter, it is hands off.

The U.S. model, in my view, seems appropriate for Nigeria. It should quiet the alarm over a creeping Islamic take-over. It would give Muslims scope to do banking as they see fit. And, if it succeeds, it will provide a model for others to imitate.

There has been some shift in this direction. Mallam Lamido Sanusi declared: "The Central Bank is not promoting or establishing Islamic bank, the CBN is simply licensing and regulating an institution that is allowed to exist under the law." And the revised guidelines state: "Another significant review is the removal of any reference to Sharia Council which has been changed to Advisory Council of Experts whose responsibility is to advise the CBN on the appropriateness of relevant financial products to be offered by the institutions."

Yet the word "appropriateness" requires clarification. Does that mean Shari`a compliance, or simply conformity with general law? To allay all suspicions, CBN should clearly state that, in licensing Shari`a banks or "windows", it entrusts all Shari`a regulation to the banks . If they want a warrantee, let them get it from the Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs.

Guardian, 21 April 2011

Palm Sunday Procession: Hosanna to the Son of David. Hosanna, not to Jonathan the winner, but to INEC and Nigeria. We finally got it right, over 95% free and fair.

Palm Sunday Gospel Reading: The Passion of our Lord Jesus Christ according to Matthew. The Passion of northern Jonathan supporters. Former House Speaker Na'Abba's house in Kano, Vice President Sambo's house in Zaria, the Catholic church in Funtua (for the 2nd time) and Malumfashi clinic, churches in Daura and Tsafe (Sokoto State, 2nd time) —to name a few— are now smoldering ruins. News trickling in points to mammoth vengeance.

Buhari northern loyalists are in a rage, a rage exceeding that following Abiola's annulment. Why? Buhari himself, in an Aljazeera interview, alleged rigging. Never mind the total election figures (and some under-age Buhari voters). On the street, that translates into one conclusion: Buhari really won, but PDP stole his mandate.

This big lie only partly explains the rage. Jonathan's votes came from Christians, yes, but in considerable numbers from Muslims. The Sultan of Sokoto emphatically urged people to vote not on the basis of religion or ethnicity, but for the candidate who would move the country forward and be just to all. Other Muslim leaders took the same position.

But there was a dissenting voice, from some mosques: "How can you allow a kafiri to rule us? What are you doing about it?" Jonathan's crime was to be a Christian candidate. His supporters shared his guilt. They are the enemies who frustrated a Shari`a compliant government.

Muslims and Christians burnt out of their homes —they rightly seek defense and compensation. Often they do not find it. Still, they hold their heads up high. Their consciences are clear. They suffered for righteousness; theirs is the kingdom of heaven.

The organizers of the attacks have vented their rage. They go home dejected, dejected at a lost election, dejected at the evil they wrought, that will recoil on themselves. Yet they still have a chance.

Palm Sunday has come and gone. The Resurrection is coming.

Guardian, 29 March 2011

"The Acting Head of the Department of Religious Studies, University of Ibadan, Dr. Mrs. Dorcas Akintunde bade the world goodbye some days ago." So Afis Oladosu noted in the Friday Islamic column of the Guardian, 18 March 2011. He went on to say: "Akintunde was a good Christian and a friend. She was like the beautiful tree in the forest, beautiful trees do not last in the timberland."

Who was Dorcas Akintunde (née Amusan), to warrant such an encomium from the Acting Head of the Arabic and Islamic Department, University of Ibadan?

She had just clocked 50, 30 of them happily married. Looking back, very few of my U.I. students do I remember individually. Yet Dorcas stood out from her diploma and undergraduate days: pleasant, well-mannered, serious with studies. I sometimes met her at the residence of Prof. & Mrs. J. Omosade Awolalu, who took her under their wing. Prof. Awolalu, then Head of Department, was Anglican, Dorcas C.A.C. That made no difference in the highly mixed Department, where we were all one family.

Time moved on. Dorcas graduated, married, had 2 sons, with a daughter in between, finished her Ph.D., was hired as a lecturer in the Department. She followed Dr. (now Prof.) Deji Ayegboyin and myself, first in the business management, then in the editorship of Orita, Ibadan Journal of Religious Studies. That is one of the oldest—and most respected—continuously published journals in Nigeria, beginning in 1963. (The oldest, however, is Nigerian Field, which started in 1932.) It made me proud, after retiring, to see Orita climb to greater excellence, both in content and appearance. Dorcas dedicated three issues to retired professors: S.O. Abogunrin, M. Nabofa, and myself.

I was also privileged to work with her in the Association for the African Study of Religion, which has published several volumes, including one of her own.

Dorcas harmonized family life with academics, involvement in learned societies, and frequent participation in international conferences. Her many worthy publications, mainly in New Testament and Women Studies, assured her a professorship. That was in process before death met her.

In February she organized a Religious Studies Conference, a herculean task after several years of dormancy. There were so many participants, that it had to run in two streams.

Concurrently, she was organizing, together with Dr. Oladosu, Acting Head of Arabic and Islamic Studies, an inter-departmental forum for good governance in Nigeria, towards successful elections in 2011. Prominent religious leaders, traditional leaders, leaders from different political parties, representatives of INEC and NGO's observing elections took part, at Trenchard Hall, 10 March 2011.

On that day Dorcas was down from fatigue. On the 14th she came to her office. The next day, a heart attack took her. On Friday 1 April, after lying in state in Trenchard Hall, the funeral service will take place at Our Lady Seat of Wisdom Parish Hall, University of Ibadan.

We lost a competent, good-hearted, indefatigable woman. It is painful to bury one's daughter, which she was to me.

Guardian, 21 March 2011

Ibadan-Lagos: How long will it take me? —Plan between 2 to 14 hours. —That's no advice! I have to catch a plane. Where can I find a travel advisory? —Nothing is published. Everyone knows about first Fridays. For more details, ask any frequent traveler.

In the old days, it wasn't like that. Between Ibadan and Lagos, there was nothing but green. Now it's nothing but concrete, and go-slow. It's not just at the prayer arenas, but most of the way, with hawkers on the road, just like the middle of Lagos.

Ibadan-Oyo: For the first time, last week I plied this "expressway". The whole way is still mostly green. But concrete is coming fast. We were moving well over 100 km, when we suddenly had to brake. Vehicles were pulling over to market stalls. The stalls abutted the road shoulder. You could tell they were new, because they did not yet have awnings covering the shoulder. Further on, myriads of stick frames signaled more stalls to come. And buildings under construction signaled new traffic turn-off and turn-on.

Abuja-Zaria: Fine to the outskirts of Kaduna. Then expect go-slow all the way to Zaria. Let's not even talk about east-bound Ibadan-Ife, or Lagos-Benin. It's total horror.

What is the basic problem? Apart from construction flaws and degeneration of the roads, it is the privatization of public roads. Expressways are meant for long-distance travel. People with frontage on the roads have hijacked our expressways for their private use, obstructing free flow of traffic.

What is the solution? At the Lagos end of the Ibadan-Lagos route, a third lane has been added on both sides. It has not eased the traffic. Then came an announcement of expansion to 10 lanes, 5 on each side. That, they propose, would be the final answer.

Let us not delude ourselves. The outside lane would go to parking, the second to taxi loading, the third to taxi hawking and maneuvering, the fifth would be a queue for left turns. Only the fourth would move, at the pace of the slowest tanker.

Maybe the solution is just to wait. We will soon be in the resurrection world to come, where we don't need transport to go somewhere. Just will it, and we are instantly at our destination. No need to phone that we are coming; instant thought transfer will suffice.

No need to wait for that. There is a simple, cheap, effective solution we have overlooked. A maximum of 3 lanes in each direction would solve most of our problems, provided we introduce simple expressway features standard elsewhere in the world. What are these features?

The basic feature is restriction of access to entry and exit ramps. Barriers along the side eliminate all driveways, and prevent anyone, pedestrian or vehicle, from entering the road. Anyone heading for a local destination must exit at a junction ramp, and then take a local road. Secondly, stopping (or parking) on the road is prohibited, except for emergency, on the shoulder only. Thirdly, heavy vehicles must keep to the right lanes.

Implement that, and, with the existing lanes, you can forget about Ogere lorries, detention camp hold-ups, and road-side market slow-downs. You will have smooth sailing, no stops, no braking, all the way to your destination.

Guardian, 17 February 2011

Egypt—a strategic global crossroad

Geographically, Egypt bridges Africa and Asia and Europe. On the economic front, The Suez canal connects Europe with Arabian oil. On the religious front, Cairo's a Al-Azhar is the Islamic point of a triangle with Jerusalem and the Vatican.

On the political front, looming over all other considerations, it is the United States' Arab ally in assuring the security of Israel and battling al-Qa'ida.

Commentators distinguish between American principles and American interests. In fact, American principles, such as freedom of expression, democracy and the like, are sometimes sacrificed to American interests.

As a result, Egypt has a dictatorship, with no freedom of expression, no free elections, little done for the common people, while the government elite accumulate fortunes.

Al-Qai'da vowed violent confrontation. It was jihad against the United States and its proxies, and jihad against Christianity. Where they could not reach Americans, they bombed churches and slaughtered Christians from Iraq to Alexandria. The United States poured money into Egypt, to shore up Mubarak, and repress all forms of Islamic extremism.

Since the time of the Pharaohs, Egypt has been autocratic, and has been a pivot of world politics. The common people could do nothing. They had no say—until now.

Egypt exploded, not in violence, but in massive rallies. The people shouted their demands, centering on Mubarak's removal. Against intimidation, they persevered. They secured their right to protest, against an as yet entrenched government.

Al-Qa'ida leaders were stunned and silenced. This was not their revolution; it usurped their agenda. Even the Muslim Brotherhood stood in the background. They offered to help, but made no attempt to steer the movement. United States and al-Qa'ida interests were out of the picture. There was no Islamist confrontation of Christians.

On the contrary, Muslims and Christians worked together, disowned division, and proclaimed unity. While Muslims prayed, Christians formed a line of defense against government thugs. And, while the Christian Copts celebrated Mass in Tahrir Square, Muslims formed a ring of support around them.

Nigeria—Africa's giant

If Nigeria fails, all Africa fails; if it succeeds, Africa will succeed. So, many political commentators observe. As a result, many foreign powers seek influence there, to promote their interests.

During the colonial period, the British limited Nigerian contacts with Arab countries, to prevent sedition. Soon, and especially after Independence, the perception developed among many Christians that Nigerian Muslims are an Arab protectorate, and among many Muslims that Nigerian Christians a protectorate of Britain or the United States.

Today's international climate sharpens that perception. Al-Qa'ida affiliates with Boko Haram. The United States enlists Nigerian support in "the war against terrorism". Some see President Jonathan, not as an Ijaw innocent, thrust into power without fighting for it, but as Obama's boy. Others see his PDP Northern opponents as caliphate and Saudi stooges, who want to dip the Qur'an into the sea.

In the meantime, unelected debris from the military era control the Senate, House of Representatives, and most state governments. Leaders, with huge salaries, still loot the treasury, while the masses groan in poverty. Up to the time of writing, every election (except Abiola's) is more rigged than the previous.

While some are singing oriki dirges about a failed state, others have had a dream and are strategizing. Not to take to the streets, as the Egyptians did. That will achieve nothing. But concentrate on the coming election. Let's make this one different.

How? In the past, JDPC members monitored elections. They had only partial success. In Ibadan, thugs beat up the JDPC chairman, Fr. Owoeye. How can we get over this obstacle? The answer is simple. Let Christians and Muslims put aside foreign interest polarization, and join hands in this battle. Combined, we can face down election hijackers. Egypt has shown us the way.

Already planning in this direction is underway. May there be more. A luta continua!