OF CHRISTIAN MORAL PRINCIPLES

Man's happiness

The search for happiness is a full time occupation for everyone. Whether we are going after money, success, education, friends or God himself, we are doing so because we think they will help us to be happy. Even if we are not grasping for something but are giving our most precious possessions and time and effort for the good of others, we are doing so because we think that will make us truly happy. Happiness is the motive which sets us in motion, and we can do nothing without happiness as our goal. If all we do is a search for happiness, this is because we are incomplete and must look outside ourselves for what we need.

Happiness, then, is a kind of completion. Any motion is a striving for completion and implies a kind of love or desire. This is a cosmic principle; so that Paul says, "There was this hope: that creation itself would one day be set free from its slavery to decay, and share the glorious freedom of the children of God. For we know that up to the present time all of creation groans with pain like the pain of childbirth" (Rom 8:20-22). And it is said that "Love makes the world go round," or, in more modern terms, makes the universe expand or contract.

But love as a metaphorical term for physical forces is quite different from human love. Our intellectual power puts us in contact with the physical universe and the mysteries of nature. We have some understanding of the natures of things and their causes, and from the contingency of physical being we have a glimpse of the Creator. All being, whether God or any of his creatures, is good; being and goodness are interchangeable. So the being we know with our intellect is the goodness we love with our will. Just as the idea of being underlies any particular thing we know, so the factor of goodness underlie any particular thing we love.

However free our will may be, we are not free in our orientation to goodness. Whatever we love must be good, not just in itself, but good for us, at least in appearance. Sin, or willing evil, is nothing other than choosing a good which is not really good for us. Some good things are not good for us because they do not contribute to our happiness. We can call them "false goods" in a moral sense. As long as a certain thing or activity is only one limited good among many we are not determined to this particular good, but are free to choose. The root of our mysterious freedom of will is our intellectual nature. We know being and we know goodness as a general concept, and as long as any particular thing does not appear to us to embody the full and exhaustive perfection of being and goodness we are not compelled to love and look for our happiness in it. We can set our hearts on anything in creation, provided we think, even mistakenly, that it is good for us.

A Christian inspired philosophy sees god, the only supreme and perfect good, as the only good which can satisfy us. Our hearts are restless until they rest in him. If we saw God as he is we could look no further for our happiness. But in this life we do not have perfect knowledge of God, and consequently are not drawn irresistably to him as our perfectly satisfying good. Our effort in this life must be to focus more clearly on god as our own goal and as the goal of all men, the Father who makes us all brothers, the true good who attracts true love and makes us love one another truly.

Once we love God, we can love other things for his sake. So our happiness will consist principally and essentially in God himself, but our integral happiness will also include the necessities of life and all the good things we enjoy in a well ordered life with God at its centre.

Happiness, then, means making our own some goodness that lies outside ourselves. So we can distinguish the object of our happiness and our subjective happiness. The latter is our own grasp or ownership of the goodness we seek. We make consumer goods our own by using them or by gaining a legal title over them and reserving them for our future use. But there are other goods we enjoy simply by looking at them, such as a beautiful garden. The world of science and intellectual knowledge can be shared even more perfectly; the only competition arises in the matter of degrees and recognition. The only way we can grasp God is by knowing him and loving him. This is an activity we can share fully with others, so that my grasp of God is never in competition with someone else. In fact the more we know and love God the more we discover that his goodness grasps us all (Cf. Phil 3:12) and makes us more sharing and more open to others.

We will grasp God perfectly by the beatific vision in the next life. This is an intellectual activity accompanied by love and proportionate to the love we have for God when we leave this life. But in this life we can know God only partially, by faith, as a dim image on a mirror. (Cf. 1 Cor 13:12.) That means that our happiness in this life cannot be perfect, but is only a relative happiness. We touch God by faith, hope and above all by love, but do not see him face to face. Yet in a way this life is much more important than the next life, because it is the time we have to grow and get ready for a happier eternity.

Grace: our life in God

Our perfect happiness consists in seeing God, and the greatest happiness we can have in this life is in relating to him by a life of faith, hope and love. Yet the natural power of our intellect only allows us to infer God's existence through our knowledge of this world; we have no way of taking a direct look at God Faith is a submission to God's special revelation of himself. This revelation goes beyond human reason; reason can neither prove it nor disprove it. It is therefore possible for us to love God as our creator by the natural power of our will, but to love him in himself, in his own inner life, is beyond our natural power. This means that to achieve the happiness for which God created us we need a special gift from God which raises our natural selves and proportions us to personal interaction with God himself. God's own life, which consists in knowing and enjoying his own divine nature, becomes our life through grace.

God's grace or favour in its source is his own eternal love for us and is identical with his own being. Yet, since god's love does not result from the goodness of his creatures, but is the cause of their goodness, his grace effectively is not something in God or God himself, but is a special goodness which God produces in us. It is a transformation of our own spirit enabling us to possess and enjoy God's own goodness; it is thus a new dynamic principle added to our spirit. This principle is accidental to our human nature, since our human nature remains intact, but it is far more valuable than our human nature because it relates us directly to God's nature and the enjoyment of his own goodness.

Grace is called supernatural because it enables us to do things we could not do by our natural power. Just as our human spirit is the dynamic principle of our nature and source of our natural activity, so grace is the dynamic principle of our supernatural life and the source of all our activity related to God. And as any activity which engages our natural forces results in intellectual and moral growth through the strengthening of acquired virtues, so any activity which engages the dynamism of grace results in growth in the theological and moral virtues which God infuses into our intellect, will and affective powers along with grace. Anyone living the life of grace uses both his natural and supernatural powers. But grace gives all his activity a supernatural dignity by ordering it all to God. So we do not live any purely natural life, but all our activity is either for god or against him in some way.

So the life of grace involves first of all and fundamentally a supernatural dynamism in our very spirit or soul; this is called habitual or sanctifying grace. Secondly, our intellect, will and emotional powers are strengthened by infused virtues (such as faith, hope, love, prudence, justice, fortitude and temperance) and other gifts. Some of these gifts, as those listed in Isaiah, ch. 11, supplement the infused virtues by making us open to special inspiration or movement of the Holy Spirit living our Christian life faithfully and heroically under specially demanding circumstances.

Other gifts, such as those listed in 1 Corinthians, ch. 12, are not necessary for the individual Christian but are important in serving the needs of the community. The latter gifts are usually called charisms.

The following diagram shows the relationship between the various levels of our natural and supernatural existence:

Root	Power	Activity	Object
The human spirit perfected by: Grace	Intellect, will etc.	perfected by: Acquired virtues & Infused virtues and gifts	Faith, love etc.	God and the community of his kingdom

The human spirit and grace are the root principles of activity; the virtues and gifts are proximate powers to act.

The fact remains, however, that these principles of activity do not compel us to act. Every time we act in faith or love of God we need God's help, and this for two reasons: The first is that our activity relative to God is like any activity of nature in the universe in that it involves newness of being, and as such depends upon God as well as upon its own created principles. The second reason is that the presence of grace in our spirit does not necessitate the full maturity of our virtues; we can still be defective and have contrary inclinations, as Paul explains in his letter to the Romans. We need God's help to act rightly in spite of these contrary inclinations or "law of sin". This help is often called "actual grace".

Actual grace is not an extra power enabling us to act, but it is our very act of faith, love etc. in so far as it is produced by God. Actual grace is distinct and the source of our action only when considered as God's activity itself, which is identical with his being.

God concurs in all the activity of creation. Ordinarily he works through nature and in accord with the limited power of nature. Only when his action moves men to act beyond the power of nature do we call this action grace. Actual grace is necessary to do any good for the love of God, but especially to repent of sin and to persevere in God's love; perseverance is not assured by the presence of sanctifying grace, but is a gift we must pray for, since many fall by the wayside.

It may sound strange that the same act, such as loving God, can come from our own free will and from God at the same time. In fact god moves us through and in accord with our free will. Our will still remains undetermined in its nature to any particular good thing. But in the concrete situation if God moves us efficaciously to one choice we certainly will make that choice, but still freely of our own accord.

The question of free will properly comes under the topic of Predestination in the study of the One God. We can only point out here that god in fact moves some people to do good more than others. He not only moves them to do good, but along with this gives them a greater share in his own life by letting them grow in sanctifying grace and the love of god. The fact that God shares his life more fully with some people than with others means that he loves them more. The only ultimate reason for God's greater love of them is his own choice, because the goodness of the creature is the effect, not the cause, of god's love.

Yet there is reason for us to speak of merit, because God usually (but not necessarily) gives his grace in some order, so that one grace is a preparation for another, and growth in grace resembles growth in nature; think of the parables of the sower and of the mustard seed.

Sometimes the relationship of one grace to another is one of strict justice; for instance, a man who dies with the love of God merits the vision of God. Other times the relationship is only congruous or fitting; for instance, if a man loves god very much and prays for his own perseverance or for the conversion of his brother it is fitting, but no strictly necessary, for God to answer his prayer. Similarly if we are working to spread God's kingdom it is fitting for God to provide us with the material means necessary to do this job.

The guardian of death

Definition and kinds of sin

What is sin? Because sin implies responsibility it must be a voluntary choice and not something beyond our control. Even if it is an omission the omission must be the result of a choice. Besides being a human act, sin involves a defect or lack of order. All our actions should be ordered towards our happiness; sin is a deviation from that reasonable order and is thus contrary to our rational nature. From a theological perspective we can say that sin is not only contrary to reason but also, and by that very fact, contrary to God's eternal law, which is simply his wisdom guiding our actions and all things to himself as their goal; sin is a deviation from this relationship to God. This deviation takes place when we turn to any created good and love it partially (venially) or wholly (mortally) for its own sake without reference to God, so that it becomes another centre or the centre of our lives.

Sin is mortal if it totally cuts us off from loving God. Any sin less than this is called venial. Venial sin is a partial turning away from God, and is possible only because of the cloudiness of our intellect which may not clearly see the connection between our everyday choices and our final goal. Venial sin is impossible for an angel and would also be impossible for us if our natural state were in perfect order.

Mortal sin normally involves serious matter, but it could just as well be a fixation on something unimportant to the exclusion of God; the deciding factor is our full realization of what we are doing and our free consent.

Sins can also be distinguished according to their object, such as sins against faith, hope or love, which directly concern our relationship with God, sins against temperance and fortitude, which concern ourselves, and sins against justice, which concerns our neighbour.

Causes

The will is the primary cause of sin, in that it makes an act which lacks some order. No outside cause is responsible for this defect of order in the act of the will. Agents such as other men or the devil can apply force to the body or try to persuade the intellect, but they cannot directly touch the ill, which is a free spiritual principle. Only God, the creator of the will, can move the will interiorly and without violence. But his movement always directs everything to himself as to its final purpose. Only in a negative way is God responsible for sin, when he does not move a person efficaciously by grace to do good, but leaves him in his hardness of heart.

The will is free to sin simply from malice, by blindly preferring some temporal good to the love of God, but more commonly ignorance and emotion contribute to the will's choice.

Ignorance may be either of a general principle or of a particular fact; in either case, if it concerns knowledge a person should have and neglects to acquire he is responsible for this ignorance, which is called vincible ignorance, and for the sin which results from his ignorance. On the other hand, if he could not have known some principle or fact which results in a wrong choice, his ignorance is called invincible and he is not responsible for it. Note, however, that vincible ignorance admits of degrees, depending on how voluntary it is; if it is only indirectly voluntary, such as through neglect to read directions, it reduces responsibility for the resulting wrong that is done.

Emotion or passion is another frequent factor in sin. The emotions cannot directly determine the choice of the will, just as an external agent cannot. But they can influence the will indirectly.

First of all they can absorb a person's psychic energy, so that his will does not function with its full strength.

Secondly, by stirring up the imagination and fixing it on a certain object, they can overthrow right reason by impeding the intellect form applying its general or habitual knowledge while judging about the goodness or evil of a particular act.

Thirdly, they can alter a person's physical state and in that way impede the use of reason.

Emotions can be stirred up spontaneously, due to circumstances; these are called antecedent, because they precede the act of the will. Or they can be stirred up as a result of deliberate choice; in this case they are called consequent. To the extent that antecedent emotions cloud reason they reduce freedom and responsibility, because the resulting act comes less from the will and more from psychological compulsion in the sense powers.

It is important to distinguish between a sin of injustice and a sin in the feelings that accompany it. Although related, the two sins are distinct; it is possible for someone to be excessively angry inside and yet be perfectly just in his action, and therefore not obliged to restitution.

Sometimes all sin is ascribed to love of the world, as in 1 John 2:16. This is true in that all sin involves loving some created good in an unreasonable way.

On the other hand self-love is often cited as the cause of all sin. This is also true, because whatever we love in the world we love for ourselves and because we love ourselves; so that any disorder in loving the world must also be a disordered love of ourselves. Inordinate love of oneself and of the world is a generalization covering all sin.

But some particular sins can be the cause of many or all other sins; for instance in1 Timothy 6:10 it is said that "Love of money is the root of all evil." And in Sirach 10;13 it is said that "Pride is the reservoir of sin and source of vice." Pride is the source of all sin because it is a perverted love of one's own excellence detracting from subordination to God; one's own perverted version of superiority becomes a goal and the purpose of all other sins. Love of money is the cause of many other sins because it provides the means of satisfying pride.

Sins are related not only to pride and love of money, but also one to another in many complex relationships of cause to effect, because a man who sets his heart on one evil course of action will take any means to his goal and will commit many sins in the process. Here Thomas adopts Pope St. Gregory the Great's list of "capital sins" and their "daughters".

Original sin

While talking about the causes of sin, and noticing how weak people are and how easily they succumb to the destructive pressures and allurements of their surroundings, we can ask a deeper question about the origin of sin. Is moral decadence the normal condition of man? Have man and society ever been any better or any worse? What is God's plan of grace in the history of mankind? This leads to the question of original sin. The description of the sin of Adam in Genesis is given a theological interpretation in Paul's letter to the Romans, chapter five, and 1 Corinthians, chapter 15. Paul says that sin came into the world through one man (Rom 5:12). He does not say anything about a state of innocence preceding the sin. Biblical scholars today do not hold that the story of Adam is a historical description of the state of the first man, but is an aetiological story accounting for the actual state of sin in the world of our experience. The problem is to explain just what this sin is, why it should affect everyone, and what are its consequences.

If we look at God's end plan for the human race as it is described in Scripture, we see that God wants all men to be saved and enjoy the fullness of grace in this life and glory in the next life. And he wants this to begin now, as human history is being enacted. Theologians who took the Genesis story of Adam literally suppose that God wanted the whole human race to be born with sanctifying grace, integrity of his natural powers and the fullness of virtue. They call this gift "original justice". John Paul II referred to Adam's state of innocence as "man's theological pre-history" (Wednesday audiences).

Whether the first man historically enjoyed such a state or not, it is clear that before he had any children he had no such gift. Although he repented and regained sanctifying grace, this was not annexed to his nature, and so it could not be passed on to his descendants. Consequently we are all conceived deprived of sanctifying grace. Besides, thenceforward the gift of sanctifying grace did not automatically include integrity of natural powers and the fullness of virtue.

Just what is original sin, then? Many people think it is the sin of Adam. Others think it is our physical, psychological and moral weakness, which makes us prone to sin.

Yet the word "original" does not mean Adam's first sin, but refers to our own origin or conception. It is a defect that is with us right from our conception, even if our parents are baptized and very holy people. It is a "sin" only in an analogous sense, because it is no act on our part. In its essence it does not include any positive contrariety to grace, but is simply the privation of habitual grace. We are conceived without it. If grace is a gift, the lack of it cannot in the strict sense be called a punishment. It is only a fact of life, and in God's wisdom the starting point from which we receive one blessing after another from the fullness of the grace of Jesus Christ (cf. Jn 1:16).

Original sin is a privation of sanctifying grace in the essence of the soul. But since the infused virtues stem from the presence of sanctifying grace in the soul, so the absence of sanctifying grace entails also the absence of the infused virtues. As a result the will is not inclined to be subject to God, and the other powers of the soul are dislocated and easily pulled by their own inclinations into disorderly behaviour.

Besides the absence of grace, people are not born with complete integrity of their natural powers. By heredity or conditioning most people fall short of the organic, emotional and spiritual integrity of Michelangelo's David. For most, in varying degrees, living a life of virtue is a struggle. But with growth in grace and virtue, disorder gradually gives way to the order and rule of the Holy Spirit.

So original sin is essentially the privation of sanctifying grace in the soul. Only by way of consequence it is the privation of harmony and order in the rest of the psyche.

Effects of sin

There is no question that sin, whether personal or original, is damaging to a person. In the history of Christianity some writers have said that human nature was corrupted by sin. Thomas Aquinas makes some distinctions: The gift of grace is taken away by mortal sin, but the fundamental goodness of our nature and of the powers of our soul remains untouched. Our natural tendency to moral goodness is not taken away, but weakened or blocked; this natural tendency to virtue is sometimes buried deep under accumulated personalism, but it can be retrieved. Our disinclination to virtue as a result of sin is summed up by Venerable Bede under four "wounds" of sin:

1. in the intellect: ignorance,
2. in the will: a readiness to do evil,
3. in our irascible emotions: lack of courage, and
4. in our concupiscible emotions a tendency to unmeasured indulgence.

St. Paul links death with sin when he says to the Romans (5:12): "Sin came into the world through one man, and his sin brought death with it. As a result, death spread to the whole human race, because all men sinned." St. Augustine concludes that if the first man had not sinned we would not have to die. Even granting such a supposition, Thomas Aquinas says that this kind of immortality resulting from a special preservation by God is very different from the immortality we will enjoy in the next life; there we will be transformed and the glorified state of our soul will naturally keep us from death and suffering. It is not necessary to suppose that god ever intended us to be immortal in this life; we may wonder how good that would be —for instance, where would all the people fit on earth? In fact, Thomas says that, although the human soul survives death, it is natural for us to die, because we are made up of matter which is subject to physical alteration and change.

In Jesus Christ we have victory over death and suffering. This is true in three ways:

1. As Jesus went about healing the sick and raising the dead, so the power of his Spirit in the Church gives us the power to be healed now, both spiritually and physically; thus suffering is alleviated and death deferred.
2. Jesus took away the pain and tragedy of dying. Even Lazarus had to die again after being raised to life. But death for a mature Christian is the high point and fulfilment of his life. Paul said to the Philippians (1:21,23): "For what is life? To me, it is Christ! Death, then, will bring something even better... I am caught form both sides: I want very much to leave this life and be with Christ, which is a far better thing..." And St. Teresa of Avila said (Interior Castle, 7:3, p. 221): "Such people are no more afraid of death than they would be of a gentle rapture."
3. Finally, Jesus overcame death and suffering by the promise of our eventual resurrection into glory with him. St. Paul says (1 Cor 15:26) that after defeating sin and the powers who maintain it, "the last enemy to be defeated will be death."

In any of the three ways that Jesus overcomes death his victory over sin is presupposed as a necessary precondition. Sin is connected with death, because it is an obstacle to the gift of life.

Reconciliation: Rebirth in God's life

From original sin

The removal or original sin is reconciliation in a radical sense. In the case of actual sin a person is reconciled by turning to God from a contrary orientation. But original is simply the absence of grace and orientation towards God. The Church has always looked upon baptism as a means of taking away original sin and, in the case of an adult, all other sins besides. But it is evident that sanctifying grace is often given before baptism; we have only to think of the case of Cornelius and his friends in Acts, chapter 10. For this reason the Church speaks of "baptism of desire", which, like "baptism of blood" (martyrdom), is just as effective as baptism with water in taking away original sin and giving sanctifying grace.

Faith has always been considered a necessary requisite in receiving sanctifying grace. In the baptism of infants the parents or god-parents make the profession of faith and, because of solidarity with their believing parents and a believing community, infants receive at baptism, along with sanctifying grace, the habit or virtue of faith, even though they make no act of faith until they are older. The New Testament insists on faith both in God and in Jesus Christ who is the way of salvation.

For an adult to be baptized this faith normally must be explicit, but explicit faith is not absolutely necessary for salvation, as in the case of non-Christians. Thomas Aquinas taught that the Jews of the Old Testament were saved by faith in the Christ who was to come; for a few of them this faith was explicit to some extent; for most it was only implicit. "For pagans Thomas postulated the possibility of a special revelation about Christ, but said that it was sufficient for them "to have implicit faith in divine providence, believing that god frees men in the ways he chooses" (II-II, 2:7, ad 3). Any such people really belong to the New Testament (I-II, 106:1 ad 3, 107:1 ad 2). Vatican II says clearly: "Those also can attain to everlasting salvation who through no fault of their own do not know the gospel of Christ or his Church, yet sincerely seek God and, moved by grace, strive by their deeds to do his will as it is known to them through the dictates of conscience" (The Church, n. 16).

Note also what Vatican II says about the faith of atheists: "Some form for themselves such a fallacious idea of God that when they repudiate this figment they are by no means rejecting the God of the gospel" (The Church Today, n. 19). The existence of God which these atheists deny explicitly they affirm implicitly. In the same way we can suppose that many Muslims who deny explicitly that Jesus is the Way to the Father may affirm this truth implicitly.

The question Vatican II does not answer is how non-Christians come to the life of grace. Thomas Aquinas raised the question when he asked whether non-baptized people can commit venial sin as their first human act when coming to the age of reason (I-II, 89:6). Her says no, because in one's first human act a person must decide what his ultimate goal in life is, since the choice of any good must be either for itself or in reference to a further goal; and an infinite series of intermediate goals is impossible; otherwise it would be impossible to act. Thomas says that if the person by grace chooses the "proper goal" (debitum finem), he will be freed from original sin. If not, he sins mortally. The term "proper end" leaves the way open for implicit faith.

Karl Rahner developed the idea of "fundamental option", which resembles Thomas' thinking in some ways, but diverges from it in other serious ways.

For Thomas, a person's first concept about which he makes a judgement or a choice is of "being" in a very general sense. Included in this concept is an implicit glimpse that the being we experience is contingent and dependent on a necessary Being who is the source and goal of all contingent being. In a person's first orientation of himself toward the ultimate goal it is possible for him to aim beyond contingent being straight to Necessary Being. As young person would not be able to analyse his experience in philosophical terms; on a psychological level he would experience an openness to truth and a reaching out to a reality beyond and superior to himself, thus avoiding the sin of pride and self-centeredness. This choice necessarily takes place by the time a child reaches the age of moral responsibility, but it may possibly take place earlier, at the age of intellectual awakening before any choices have to be made about proximate matters.

We can see how it is possible for millions of non-Christians to be living a life of grace. Such people are united to the Church and to their Saviour Jesus Christ in a way that is not obvious by ordinary appearances. Such people, nevertheless, lack the fuller happiness of knowing Jesus explicitly and sharing the rich life of his Church; so we should not complacently abandon them as they are.

A final question about original sin is: What happens to babies who die without baptism and have not had a chance to make an option for God? This includes miscarried or aborted babies. Medieval theologians thought that they go to a place called "limbo" where they are separated from the vision of God and suffer no other punishment. The theory of limbo is not a teaching of the Church and is not much accepted today. There are two theories on how non-baptized infants can receive sanctifying grace.

One theory is that God gives them a special illumination before they die enabling them to make a choice for God which is normally not possible at their age.

Another theory is that they can be given sanctifying grace along with the habit of faith and love without any act or choice on their part, as is the case with infants who are baptized. The basis for this theory is the desire of their parents to have them baptized. Just as the parents' profession of faith at baptism substitutes for that of the child, so the parents' desire can substitute for the child's baptism of desire. We could radically extend this theory and suppose that God gives sanctifying grace to all fetuses everywhere shortly after conception by reason of the faith and desire of the Church, which is a reflection of God's desire for all men to be saved (cf. 1 Tim 2:4). Such a supposition, although attractive, is still only tentative.

Pope Benedict XVI asked his Theology Commission to examine the whole question.

By whatever way sanctifying grace replaces original sin, the first reception of grace is only a beginning, a seed. There is an enormous difference between the beginning and a fully developed life of grace, especially as lived by some famous saints. Jesus came not just to give us life, but life in all its fullness (cf. Jn 10:10). The vast majority of the world is living spiritually at a subsistence level, and only a very few people have a relative fullness of the life of God. This imbalance is not a question of distribution of goods, because spiritual goods are unlimited and available to everyone. Yet God normally gives the fullness of his grace through the ministry of the Church. "There is a great harvest, but few workers to gather it in. Pray to the owner of the harvest that he will send out more workers to gather in his harvest" (Mt 9:37-38).

From actual sin

One serious consequence of sin is what is sometimes called the stain of sin, which is the same as the state of sin. If someone commits a sinful act he is not purified by the simple fact that his sin is past and he is no longer actually committing it. His will still stands in approval of what he did until he retracts this approval by a contrary act of repentance, restoring the order he disturbed in himself, in his relationship to his neighbour and to society, and in his relationship to God. If a person is alienated from God by a mortal sin and does not repent in this life, his alienation perdures for eternity; this is what is meant by the punishment of hell.

Reconciliation is a work of grace and takes place by a movement of the will away from sin and towards God in faith and love; the state or stain of sin is thereby removed. Reconciliation takes place in an instant, because there is no intermediate state or grey area between being in sin or living in God's friendship. Yet God usually prepares a person for repentance by actual graces over a period of time, disposing him to make the final step of repentance. Sometimes a person can be given the grace of instant conversion, as St. Paul on the way to Damascus; such a grace can be termed "amazing", because such a sudden conversion is extraordinary and miraculous. St. Augustine calls the conversion of a sinner the greatest work of God, because it makes a person capable of sharing God's own life, which is a higher good than any good of nature, which is the work of creation.

Reconciliation takes place in the human will, but is celebrated in the sacrament of reconciliation for two important reasons:

1. Reconciliation is not only between a person and God, but also between the person ad individuals he has offended and the whole church. Presupposing the necessary reconciliation with the particular individuals involved, the Church wants to welcome back the lost sheep who, by whatever sin he has committed, has departed from the life of the Church.
2. The ministry of the Church in its sacrament strengthens the act of repentance in the will of the penitent and also helps to heal the other wounds of sin.

By reconciliation we primarily mean turning from mortal sin. Venial sin does not leave such a stain or state of sin. Even holy people commit frequent indeliberate and light venial sins. Thomas Aquinas says that John is referring to venial sin when he says, "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves" (1 Jn 1:8). These sins, nevertheless, leave a trace which gets in the way of the flourishing of grace. Paul refers to such traces as "wood, grass or straw," which will be burnt up in God's judgement (1 Cor 3:12-15). For a person living a serious Christian life, his intense love of God, especially in prayer and in receiving Communion, will blot out his venial sins practically as fast as they occur.

Repentance, whether of mortal or venial sin, takes place on the level of the will. Yet sin leaves other damage which, even after repentance, may take time to repair. Externally there is sometimes injustice and scandal caused to one's neighbour. Internally a person's psychological harmony and integrity may be disrupted. The damage done to oneself by sin is the basis for the Church's teaching the need for a purgatory, because if this damage is not healed in this life it must be healed after death before a person can enjoy the vision of God.

Moral criteria: How do we know what is right?

Everything we do should be aimed at our happiness in God in the community of the Trinity and of all God's people. God calls us to put all our effort into that by loving him with all our heart, mind, will and strength, and our neighbour as ourselves. The problem comes in deciding what contributes to this aim and what is opposed to it, in other words, what is right or wrong. Among moral philosophers and theologians there is a great diversity of approach on how to decide this.

The first crossroad of divergence is whether what is right and wrong should be decided by reference to our feelings, or by reference to the will (of God or a legislator) or by reference to reason.

Those who appeal to feelings are called emotivists. Such a point of view was once propounded by Jean Jacques Rousseau, but its major proponent today is A.J. Ayer. For him moral norms are statements of facts about our feelings: To say something is right means that I feel positively toward it; if I have negative feelings I am saying that it is wrong. Emotivism is right in its appeal to common sense against many sorts of pseudo-ideologies. Even Aristotle repeatedly appeals to the norm of what a good man considers good. The merit of appealing to our feelings is that we have a God-given natural inclination to virtue, so that we can generally trust our feelings —provided they are not distorted. Emotivism as an ethical theory is inadequate in that it provides no corrective for discerning distorted feelings and no criteria for dealing with complicated situations where feelings are no guide.

Those who appeal to the will are called voluntarists or deontologists (δέον = "binding"). Most of these emphasise law as the expression of the superior's will telling us exactly what is right or wrong: Something is right because it is permitted; it is wrong if it is forbidden. Others (as Hans Kng) say that the will of God is ultimate, but are opposed to any form of legalism. They quote St. Augustine's saying, "Love, and do what you will," but must refer to the teaching of Jesus to explain what love really means.

Those who appeal to reason emphasise man's ability to decide by reason and experience what is good for him. Some of these, especially when talking about conscience, make reason the ultimate criterion of what is right and wrong. Others give a greater role to revelation, law and inspiration of the Holy Spirit in supplementing reason and compensating for its defects. In order to understand and evaluate the various ethical theories based on will or reason let us now consider the role of law.

Definition of law

I must first disagree with the voluntarists, who base law ultimately on the will of a superior. The whole purpose of law is to help us make choices which are in harmony with our final goal. The will cannot act blindly, but must follow reason's recognition of the relationship between particular options and our final goal. If the will of a superior is not regulated by reason it is wickedness rather than law, and leads to drastic consequences. God's will is always right because it is in accord with his wisdom; even when he reveals his will we must use our reason to interpret his revelation and apply it.

Law, then, is a command of reason. It also must be for the common good, since it is not for the advantage of some over others, but for our ultimate happiness in God's community which we begin to realize right now in God's reign of justice and love. Law must come from the proper authority; this may be God, or the ruler or legislature accepted by the community, or the community itself acting democratically. Finally, law must be made known, or promulgated. The function of law in making moral decisions can be explained more clearly by discussing the various kinds of law.

The kinds of law

Theologians over the centuries have attempted to see all legitimate law as deriving from eternal law. What is that? God made the universe and guides its course through his wisdom, as is described in Proverbs 8:22-31. Thus eternal law is the plan of God's wisdom directing everything towards its proper purpose and finality. Irrational creatures are subject to eternal law blindly, through their natural inclinations. Men have a natural inclination to virtue, but do not act humanly unless they know what they intend to do; to fulfil God's purpose for them by obeying his eternal law they must know it in some way, either through reason or through faith and the gift of wisdom. Eternal law is a reality in God (identical with himself), but we cannot consult it unless it is communicated to us in some accessible form.

One of the ways God communicates his intentions for us is through what is called natural law. In the wide sense this includes all the physical laws of nature, but properly speaking it refers to our participation in God's eternal law. God has given us a natural inclination towards what is good for us on the bodily, spiritual and social levels. By recognizing what is in accord or disaccord with this God-given inclination we have some knowledge of eternal law. Natural law in this sense concerns basic human needs and values which are common to all men everywhere; what is variable according to the culture and times pertains to positive law. The problem comes in judging what is a universal human value. Many modern moral theologians criticize the over-extension of what was supposed to be absolute in morals, particularly since the time of St. Alphonsus Liguori; they also criticize what they call the "classical" approach which always looks for what is stable and unchanging in human nature, and prefer a "historical" or sociological approach which sees most human values as variable and the result of cultural conditioning, so that what is a crime in one culture can be a virtue in another.

To debate about which particular human values are stable and which are relative does not belong to this discussion of the principles of moral theology. Most people admit the existence of two such categories of values, but we must make another distinction: Values recognized as basic by practically everybody are very few, but there are other values which the Church and many wise people teach are objectively basic for everyone everywhere, but are not recognized as such by many people, for example that abortion directly procured is wrong. We could hardly say that unless there is unanimity about a certain value it is not a basic human need and belongs to the realm of cultural relativism. So we have three types of values:

1. Basic values recognized as such by practically everyone,
2. Basic values recognized only by experience and accumulated wisdom (or manifested by revelation), and
3. Relative values which are legitimately different according to the society and times. The last kind of values is the proper sphere of positive law and custom. All three types of values are contained in human law and divine law, which will be discussed later.

At this point, since natural law is not a code written in any book but is a judgement of reason, we should examine the different ethical systems which are based on reason.

Ethical theories relying on reason

However much voluntarism has prevailed among theologians in recent centuries, there is a tradition of thought which accepts and bases its moral norms on a basic stability of human nature with inbuilt finality. Because it recognizes this stability it is called ontological; because it recognizes finality it is called teleological. Any ontological teleological ethics goes beyond the factual generalizations of psychology and sociology to an anthropology of what human nature and its basic needs are. There are many such anthropologies and ethical schools based on them. Here let us simply summarize some introductory principles which one teleologist, St. Thomas Aquinas, offers for deciding what is right or wrong in human action (cf. Summa theologiae, I-II, 18-21).

The choice of a particular good thing is right if this good fits into the common good of the Kingdom of God, which is man's goal (19:10; 21:3-4). Human reason (ratio) participates in God's eternal law or wisdom when it recognizes the objective relationship (ratio/ ordo rationis) between particular good things and man's goal. Some things, objects of choice, by their very nature are related to man's happiness; other things are indifferent. But objects are always accompanied by circumstances, and these also determine the goodness or evil of a choice. The final element in a choice is the aim of the person choosing. By reason of circumstances and aim a good thing can become bad or better, a bad thing can become worse, but cannot become good, and an indifferent thing must become good or evil.

Thomas notes some complicating factors: Sometimes a circumstance has its own specific goodness or evil and, as a principal condition of an object, gives the object an added or different moral specification. Thus to help the poor is a good object; but to give them money which should be restored to its owner makes the act specifically wrong, since it is not a circumstance with variable moral evil, such as the wrong time or place (18:10). Another complication is that reason or conscience may be invincibly wrong; a person must follow his conscience in that case even if it means rejecting Jesus as Saviour if he thinks that is blasphemy (19:56). A further complication concerns evil side-effects of an action which is otherwise good. If such an effect naturally (per se) and usually follows, it makes the act evil. If it follows accidentally and outbalances the good directly achieved, the action is evil if the evil effect is foreseen; the action is not evil if the disproportionate evil effect is not foreseen or if the evil effect is foreseen but not disproportionate (20:5). This article by Thomas was developed by later theologians in the theory of the double effect.

Another ethical theory relying on reason is utilitarianism, otherwise known as consequentialism. According to this theory an action is good if its good effects outweigh its evil effects; the ideal is to provide the greatest good for the greatest number, in terms of "cost/benefit" business analysis. No distinction is made between effects which are direct and natural (per se) results off an action and those which are incidental (per accidens), because this theory does not recognize and intrinsically good or evil object. The effects by which the morality of an action is judged are, in Thomistic terms, only circumstances. The reason why proponents of this theory say there is not intrinsically good or evil object is because they allege they can always find an exception. Their underlying philosophy is that nothing stable or fixed exists in nature, or at least it cannot be known, and therefore no teleology or inbuilt finality can be found in nature.

One variety of this theory is called act-utilitarianism or situation ethics, of which Joseph Fletcher is a spokesman. The only act which always has good consequences and never evil ones is love; it is therefore the only moral absolute. No other rule can be made, because it always admits of exceptions. Most other utilitarians see the need for some general norms besides love; their approach is called rule-utilitarianism. Their rules are formulated by experience and presumed to be universal until there are found sufficient reasons to make an exception.

Consequentialists among moral theologians rightly reacted against excessive labelling of things as intrinsically wrong; they can point to the history of theology where formerly all charging of interest for loans was considered usury and intrinsically wrong. Yet the answer to such mistakes is not to reject the principle that some things can be intrinsically wrong, but to refine definitions, in this case what is usury. A circumstance should have been added which is a principal and specifying condition, namely that the additional amount charged is beyond the usual productive capacity of the capital lent.

Consequentialists also attack the acceptance of physical and biological finality as normative for moral finality, a position which they trace to the 3^rd century pagan Roman lawyer Ulpian. Consequentialists point out that in modern times we don't find happiness in conforming to nature but in mastering and using nature; technology and medical research can refashion human life. Consequentialists can find support for their hesitation to identify biological function with natural law in the distinction made by traditional theologians, including Thomas Aquinas, between the physical entity of an act and its moral relevance. But consequentialists can be challenged on this point, first because they tend to assume, along with Hume and Kant, that real purposefulness does not exist in nature. Secondly, by eliminating any hypothetical purposefulness or functionalism in the human body or psyche as a factor of moral judgement, they revive a body-spirit dualism, a characteristic of the (Platonic) Greek philosophy which they see as the cause of all the woes of Western theology.

The main criticism of consequentialism in its general approach is that its quantitative balancing of good and evil consequences of an act does not give adequate attention to human values and priorities and their source in the nature of man as an image of God.

Because of these difficulties many Catholic theologians are moving away from strict consequentialism. Charles Curran opts for what he calls "mixed consequentialism", which brings additional factors into moral decisions: Because most moral decisions consist of responding to si9tuations which we did not plan, he advocates a "relationality responsibility model" of ethics, but admits that he has not yet thought out what such a model should entail (Themes in fundamental moral theology, 1977, p. 138). Such a model comes close to the personalist ethics advocated by Benedict Ashley OP (Free in Christ, ms. P. 204 ff). Personalist or relationist ethics is not opposed (as some may think) to teleological ethics, but supplements its two main inadequacies which are:

l. a simplistic view of human freedom as simply a rational process of choosing means to an end; in Thomas Aquinas there is little about the process of growth and the psychological force of the subconscious and superconscious (openness to the Holy Spirit) in making a fundamental option and other decisions.

2. lack of development of the relationist or communitarian dimension of human happiness and fulfilment in the kingdom of God; this aspect is present in Thomas, but is not an axis of his synthesis.

If we adopt an ontological ethics, even with a personalistic or relational emphasis, the question still remains: How do we know if something is right or wrong, either intrinsically on the level of object, or because of circumstances? In other words, how do we discover what are our basic human needs or values and the subordination of some needs to others which are more important? First of all, we cannot deduce this knowledge from a few principles, as in mathematics, but must generalize form experience. This experience can be short and simple for certain basic principles, but must be prolonged and collective if the principles are less obvious, as was said above about natural law. In these matters we need the accumulated wisdom of our elders and the example of certain models of human greatness, such as the life of Jesus. We must also have good will, without prior leaning to rigorism or laxism, since a preconceived selfish goal can lead us into false rationalizations. We must also be aware that in morals, unlike other sciences, we cannot expect absolute theoretical certitude about most things, but practical certitude suffices, which means that the information available indicates a certain course as best. If the decision is important we must make a correspondingly thorough investigation of the situation according to the procedures that prudence or decision-making requires. Moreover, beyond the use of reason we need the guidance of the Holy Spirit, as will be explained in connection with the New Law.

Positive law, human and divine

Human law exists both to enforce certain basic values (of natural law) which need the support of the state, such as safety against robbery, and to decide many things which are undetermined by natural law, such as whether to drive on the right or the left. Human or civil law has as its aim the common good of society. To secure this in practice it must not try to prohibit all evils, but only the more serious ones which have greater repercussions on the rights of others; otherwise the weight of so many laws would become too much and be cast off altogether (cf. I-II, 96:2). For instance, a Catholic, even while condemning fornication, homosexuality etc., need not necessarily support laws making these punishable by civil authority. Another limitation to human law, even though its aim is to make the citizens virtuous (92:1), is that its proper authority extents only to external acts, and these only in so far as they are directly or indirectly related to the common good of society. Therefore civil government cannot legislate about interior motives and should steer clear of matters which can be regarded as belonging to the private life of its citizens (96:3).

Our basic attitude to human law should be one of respect. Yet it is useful to summarize grounds for not abiding by some laws:

1. If the law goes against man's relationship to God, for instance by commanding citizens to deny their faith
2. If the law is unjust in its aim, either by depriving citizens of their basic human rights or by providing only for the private good of the ruler and not the common good
3. If the law is unjust because it steps beyond the competency of the author of the law, for instance if a lower official makes restrictions which he is not empowered to make
4. If the law is unjust by distributive inequity, such as by taxing one class of people and not others.

   Such laws are acts of violence rather than real laws (96:4). Other reasons why a law may not bind are:

5. Because a person or group has a privilege, special permission or dispensation from a legal provision
6. When a law, because it must provide for the more usual situation, does not serve the common good in an exceptional situation (96:6). To make exceptions is not a compromise, but pertains to the special virtue called epieicheia (II-II, 120). Yet Thomas advises that laws should not be quickly changed, because a law is effective to the extent that people get used to it (I-II, 97:2)

   Divine law is a manifestation of eternal law by way of revelation. It is necessary:

   1. In order to direct man to his supernatural goal of eternal happiness
   2. To make up for the uncertainty and incompleteness of human judgement concerning matters of natural law
   3. To demand the fullness of virtue which consists not only in exterior acts but also in the right interior motives (91:4).

   According to Thomas Aquinas the Old Testament is divine in origin and good in its contents, although it did not provide the grace of the Holy Spirit to carry out its precepts (98:1). Modern Biblical scholars have shown that, even while divine guidance was at work in the Old Testament, the human origin of its contents is much more than Thomas could have imagined; they also point out that its moral teachings were not always so perfect and the holy Patriarchs were not so sinless as Thomas supposed; therefore Thomas'; benign interpretation of dubious teaching and examples in the Old Testament was unnecessary. Nevertheless modern theologians generally hold that, while God inspired the Biblical record of the cultural attitudes of Old Testament people with all their imperfections, he also affirmed the best of these peoples' traditions and put them in the unique perspective of his covenant leading to the coming Messiah. In so far as this Old Testament teaching reflects natural law, it is for all men everywhere, but in so far as it goes beyond this it was only for the Jews of Old Testament times (98: 4-5).

   Thomas Aquinas distinguishes three kinds of precepts in the Old Law:

   1. Moral
   2. Ceremonial or cultic
   3. Judicial or civil.

   The moral precepts, according to Thomas, represent what is of natural law and are permanent universal norms. These include the ten commandments (100:3) and many other laws (100:11), but these other laws are reducible to the ten commandments in that they are elaborations of what is contained in principle in the ten commandments (100:3). Although in keeping the moral precepts of the Old Law one should have love and interior virtue (100:9-10) which is built on grace, the outward keeping of the moral precepts does not produce grace, which is only a gift of god (100:12; cf. Romans, chs. 3 & 4).

   Ceremonial or liturgical laws all have a figurative meaning, as is explained in Hebrews, chapters 7-10. In the life to come we will rejoice in seeing the divine reality in itself; in Old Testament times both this reality and the way of reaching it were hidden in the symbolism of the Temple worship and other observances. In the New Testament the Way has been manifest in Jesus Christ, but the divine reality itself is still hidden (101:2). Although the liturgical rites of the Old Law did not cause grace of themselves, in so far as the worshipers were joined by faith to Jesus Christ prefigured in these rites they received grace and were put right with God (103:2). This is true even if their recognition of Jesus Christ in these rites was only implicit (II-II, 2:7). As for the present validity of these rites, Hebrews 10:9 says: "God does away with all the old sacrifices and puts the sacrifice of Christ in their place;" that is because the old sacrifices were only foreshadows of the real sacrifice of Christ (103:3). And since they signified that Christ is coming in the future, these sacrifices are not only done away with, but are also contrary to faith that Christ has already com; therefore to observe them at the present time is sinful (103:4).

   Judicial precepts are determinations of obligations and rights within civil society; they are additional to natural law (104:1 and were valid only for the duration of the Old Testament. Yet because they were not figurative, to observe them now is not contrary to our faith, provided they are not considered obligatory by divine command and are only followed for their practical advantage (104:3).

   It is easy to see which laws are ceremonial in the Old Testament, but the difference between moral and judicial laws is not generally evident. The different technical terms used (moral laws = מִצְוֹת; ceremonial laws = חֻקּוֹת; judicial laws = מִשְׁפָטִים) often are used interchangeably along with various other terms (note 99:5), e.g. in Psalm 119. Theologians may have different opinions about which laws of the Old Testament really pertain to the natural law and which are positive cultural (or divine) determinations for a certain society at a certain time.

   In contrast to the Old Law the New Testament is said to be a New Law. Essentially the New Law is nothing other than the very grace of the Holy Spirit, referred to in Romans 8:2: "For the law of the Spirit, which brings us life in union with Christ Jesus, has set me free from the law of sin and death." The books of the New Testament do not contain the New Law itself, which is only in the hearts of men, but contain matters of faith and practice which dispose us for the grace of the Holy Spirit and show us how to use this grace (106:1). Because it is the grace of the Holy Spirit, the New Law justifies, or puts one right with God; apart from this grace "the Bible kills" (2 Cor 3:6); this is true not only for the Old Testament, but also of the New (106:2).

   The New Law was revealed after a fitting time of preparation, and will last until the end of the world. The reason is that it prepares us for immediate entrance into the life of glory, as is said in Hebrews 10:19-20: "We have complete freedom to go into the Most Holy Place by means of the death of Jesus. He opened for us a new way, a living way, through the curtain —that is, through his own body." Having the grace of the Holy Spirit, we can go through no more perfect stage (such as Islam, which claims to replace Christianity) before entering the next life. It is true that the Church can have its ups and downs in vitality, but no radically new age of the Spirit is to be expected, or an outpouring of his grace more than the Apostles had, who were given "the first fruits of the Spirit" (Rom 8;23 — 106:4).

   In spite of the New Law's abolition of the liturgical and civil ordinances of the Old Law, the relationship of the New Law to the Old is one of a perfect to an imperfect thing, since the New Law fulfilled the goal of the Old Law by giving men the actual power to become virtuous, and it fulfilled the moral code of the Old Law by insisting on the right interior motives and on the right priorities in human life (107:1-2), especially in the Sermon on the Mount (108:3). These requirements of the New Law are in themselves more difficult than the external observances of the Old Law, but with the grace of the Spirit they become easy. As for external observances, the Old Law was much more onerous, since Jesus and the Apostles enjoined very little which is not a matter of natural law and already taught in the Old Law. Church authorities added other laws later, but here Thomas quotes Augustine to issue a word warning: "Some people add slavish burdens to our very religion, which the mercy of God wanted to be free except for some very few and obvious sacramental celebrations. As a result the situation of the Jews was more tolerable, since they were subject to rites instituted by law and not to human presumptions" (107:4).

   In mentioning the "very few things" that Jesus and his Apostles added to natural law, Thomas had no idea of the positions of modern Scripture scholars who see many of these things as temporary adaptations to the local culture (such as women covering their heads when they pray — But note 103:4 ad 3; 108:2 ad 3). On the other hand, because of our human bodily nature we need to touch and celebrate the Spirit through external sensible forms; thus these "very few things" include the sacraments, particularly baptism and the Eucharist. Profession of our faith is another necessary outward expression of grace and faith within us. But other external matters are left for the individual or the community to decide freely (108:1).

   In leaving us so free, Jesus did not, as Muslims allege, leave us adrift without guidance. The natural law, particularly as the Bible helps us to understand it, is a reference point for the constantly changing situation of society. Other laws, which must be human and temporary, are derived from natural law in an attempt to assure basic human values in the conditions of life today. Moreover, since any law concerns general situations and cannot settle particular concrete problems, we always need to use our intelligence and the virtue of prudence in making decisions. Both in making laws and in making concrete decisions we also have at our disposal the guidance of the Spirit who "will tech you everything" (Jn 14:25) through his various gifts. The Spirit gives us a certain instinct or feeling (Thomas calls it "connaturality") for what is right, even though we are not able to explain why. (Compare this with the emotivist theory of Ethics described above.) A mature Christian will refer both to reason and to the Spirit to make right decisions. When a problem comes up, we need both to think about it and to pray about it.

   Conclusion

   This has been a very brief discussion of moral principles. For further study you can either go more deeply into the questions raised above, or, if they are clear enough, proceed to study specific moral problems.