Joseph Kenny OP: Satisfaction for sin (M.A.)

by
Joseph (Colum) Kenny, O.P.

A Dissertation
Presented to
The Faculty of the School of Theology
In Partial Fulfilment of
The Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts in Theology
Dubuque, Iowa
1964

0. INTRODUCTION

1. THE THEORIES
        1.1. To restore the balance of justice
                1.1.1 Strict Justice
                1.1.2 The Bible and mercy
                        1.1.2.1 Obtained by prayer
                        1.1.2.2 Obtained by fasting
                        1.1.2.3 Obtained by showing mercy
                        1.1.2.4 Summary
                1.1.3 Christian development of the idea of satisfaction
                        1.1.3.1 Fulfilment of justice
                        1.1.3.2 Mitigations
                        1.1.3.3 Resulting view of satisfaction
                1.1.4 Declarations of the Church
                1.1.5 Present state of the question
        1.2 To cure the sinner
                1.2.1 The view of the Bible
                1.2.2 Christian development of the idea
                1.2.3 Current view
        1.4 To protect society from further harm

2. RECONCILING THE THEORIES
        2.1 Remedy for turning from God
        2.2 Remedy for turning to a created good inordinately
        2.3 Vicarious and communal satisfaction
        2.4 Social repression and hell

3. CONCLUSION

0
INTRODUCTION

As the crime, so the penalty. So runs the saying. So also teaches Christ: "The servant who knew his master's wishes, yet made no attempt to carry them out, will be flogged severely. But one who did no know them and earned a beating will be flogged less severely" (Lk 12:47). Why do penalties follow upon a wrongdoing? Why is punishment or satisfaction proportioned to the crime? To restore the balance of justice, to cure the offender, to deter him and others from repeating the crime: each of these has had its advocates and its adversaries. The first reason particularly has been under attack in recent years, especially with regard to capital punishment.⁽¹⁾

The first part of this thesis will be mainly historical; it will survey the theories in support of each reason for punishment or satisfaction, particularly the retributive and medicinal theories. The second part will compare and evaluate these two theories and propose a solution to the question what is the purpose and value of man's effort to satisfy for sin.

1
THE THEORIES

1.1 To restore the balance of justice

The retribution theory views punishment from the point of view of justice. He who has committed damage against society must be paid back by society with a corresponding punishment. Or, to look at the debt in another way, he must undergo a penalty in order to restore to society what he has taken from it. The completion of the exchange - a quid pro quo of punishment in proportion to the crime - restores the balance of justice.

1.1.1 Strict justice

An idea which has found its clearest expression in modern Western thought, the concept of punishment to restore the balance of justice, has a long history. Its pre-Christian antecedents will be mentioned only briefly. The primitive law of punishment was an unrestricted, seventy-times-seven revenge (Gen 4:24). In place of this the Mosaic law substituted the law of talion, or equal exchange (Ex 21:23-25), a law, however, which could not measure the punishment due to rebellion against God (Dt 23:15-68; Is 5:24-25; 42:18-25 etc.). The law of punishment in proportion to the crime is also found in the ancient Code of Hammurabi,⁽²⁾ and later in Aristotle⁽³⁾ and Cicero.⁽⁴⁾ Although Christ restricted the application of this law now we must forgive seventy times seven (Mt 18:22) - still he insisted upon its essential validity: If we do not forgive each other from our hearts, our heavenly Father will hand us over to the torturers until we pay back everything we owe (Mt 18:23-35; 5:26; 16:27; Rm 13:1-6; Rev 18:7).

1.1.2 The Bible and mercy

Mercy, or forgiveness, is a complicating factor for a theory of punishment based on the equality of justice. That mercy is not contrary to justice is difficult enough to explain. What is harder to explain is the fact that in the Biblical narratives God usually forgives sin while demanding at the same time some act on the part of the sinner. In the Old Testament it was the sin offering (Ex 29-30; Lev & Num passim), which in the New Testament gave way to the sacrifice of Christ (Mt 20:28; 26:28; Rm 3:24-26; 5:6-21; 8:3-4; 1 Cor 6:20; 7:23; Eph 1:7; Gal 1:4; 3:13; 4:5; Col 1:14; 1 Tm 2:6; Heb 9:1- 10:18; Tit 2:14; 1 Pt 1:18-19; Rev 5:9). In the New Testament, sacrifice in its most proper sense is the work of Christ; we only participate in or receive the effects of his offering through faith and the sacraments. There are, however, other acts more fully our own which supplemented sacrifice in the Old Testament and -perdured into the New Testament. They are well expressed in Tobit: "Prayer with fasting, and almsgiving with justice is better than riches and injustice... For Almsgiving delivers from death, cleanses from every sin" (12:8-9).⁽⁵⁾ Are these acts partial payments of what is due in justice because of sin, or are they dispositions of the sinner for receiving God's mercy?

1.1.2.1 Obtained by prayer

The Old Testament describes several instances when individuals prayed for forgiveness of their sins (Ps 19:12-13; 25:18; 32:5; 39:8; 51:2; Is 55:6-7; Dn LXX 4:27,33a,34) or the sins of the whole people (Ex 32:32; Nm 14:19; Dt 9:18,25; 1 Kg 8:33-41,46-52; 1 Chr 6:24-25,36-39; Dn 7:4-20). Sirach is notable for encouraging prayer for the forgiveness of personal sins (17:24-25; 21:1; 28:2-4; 38:9-10; 39:5).

The only instance in the New Testament of a person praying for forgiveness are those when the publican prayed in the temple (Lk 18:13), and when Simon repented of trying to buy the power of the Spirit (Acts 8:22-24). For the early Christians, sin was the condition they had renounced at baptism and which did not exist in their new life with Christ.⁽⁶⁾ The Lord's prayer is the only instance of an instruction to pray for forgiveness of sins in one's daily life after baptism (Mt 6:12-15; Lk 11:4).⁽⁷⁾

In all these examples, prayers is presented as a means of winning forgiveness, but never as a payment or even a partial satisfaction of a debt owed to God because of sin.

1.1.2.2 Obtained by fasting

In the Old Testament, fasting is most often an expression of sorrow accompanying a plea for mercy when a tragedy has happened or is threatening (Jdg 20:26; 1 Sam 31:13; 2 Sam 1:12; 12:16-23; 1 Kg 21:9,12; 21:27; 1 Chr 10:12; 2 Chr 20:3; Esd 8:21,23; Neh 1:4; Jd 4:7,13; Est 4:3,16; Bar 1:5; Dn LXX 2:18; Ps 35:13; 69:10; 109:24; 1 Mac 3:47; 2 Mac 5:12.). The fast inspired by such an occasion sometimes passed into a way of life for an individual (Jdt 8:6), or into an annual feast for all (Est 9:31; Zach 7:5; 8:19). In a few places the reason for the fast is not mentioned (Is LXX 1:13; 58:3-6; Jer 36:6,9). In a number of places, however, it is declared to be part of a program of repentance for sin (1 Sam 7:6; Neh 9:1-3; Sir 34:26; Tob 12:8; Jol 1:14; 2:12,15; Jon 3:5; Dn LXX & q 9:3 ff.). In Leviticus, fasting is enjoined under the general term "affliction of soul", an observance to be undertaken on Yom Kippur, the day of atonement for sin (16:29; 23:26-32).

In the New Testament, fasting is used twice of an involuntary deprivation of food (2 Cor 6:5; 11:27), once as an equivalent of Yom Kippur (Acts 27:9), once in describing a widow's way of life (Lk 2:27; cf. Jdt 8:6), once in connection with Christ's retreat to the desert in preparation for his ministry (Mt 4:2), and twice as part of the supplications of the Church preceding ordinations (Acts 13:2; 14:23). The fasting of the disciples of John the Baptist was presumably part of the meta,noia which John preached (Mt 9:14-15; Mk 2:18-20; Lk 5:33-35; cf. Mt 11:21). The Pharisee of the parable who fasted twice a week may have done so in order to be sure he had paid God everything he owed because of his inadvertent sins (Lk 18:22). Christ exonerated his disciples form fasting like the disciples of John the Baptist for the time the Bridegroom was with them. When the Bridegroom was taken from them, then they would fast as part of their mourning (Mt 9:14-15; Mk 2:18-20; Lk 5:33-35). It is not indicated whether their mourning would be solely for the absence of the Bridegroom or also for their sins, a morning which would require a greater manifestation of sorrow when Christ was no longer visibly present. In the Sermon on the Mount Christ gave rules on the manner of fasting (Mt 6:16-18). The reasons for this fasting is not stated, but it would seem to be for the forgiveness of sins, since this passage comes immediately after some verses concerning praying for forgiveness of sins. Christ urged prayer and fasting as the only means of driving out certain devils (Mt 17:21 var.; Mk 9:29 var.). In this case, it may be observed, fasting is directed against the guilt itself which allowed the devil to gain power. It is notable that although this fasting is not presented as satisfaction, it is for the benefit of others; it is vicarious suffering, if only by the fact that it strengthens the faith and prayer of the exorcist.

Fasting was condemned in the Bible, or deemed useless: 1) when it was undertaken to the neglect of the more important obligations of being just and merciful towards the unfortunate (Is LXX 1:13; 58:3ff.; Zach 7:5 ff.), 2) when the person practised it without repenting of his sin (Jer 14:12; Sir 34:26), 3) when a person practised it to gain the admiration of men (Mt 6:16-18), and 4) when the reason for fasting disappeared, as when God delivered Israel from enemy domination (Zach 8:19; Ps 30:12; 90:5; 126; Is 61:3; Jer 31:13; Est 9:22). In general, however, fasting to obtain forgiveness of sins is approved in the Bible. Its purpose was chiefly that of expressing and stimulating one's sorrow for sin. If some people of the Old Testament also thought of fasting as a reparation paid to God, by and large much greater emphasis was placed on sacrifices for this purpose. In official teaching, inner repentance was always of greater importance than any prayer or outward sign of repentance or satisfaction. In the New Testament, the notion of fasting in satisfaction for sins gave way completely to the eminent satisfaction offered by Christ.

1.1.2.3 Obtained by showing mercy

Mercy, or almsgiving, and charity are the further requisite for receiving complete forgiveness of sins. Although this is not their direct purpose, these virtues are indispensable for overcoming the remains of sin, and are more efficacious than any other practice undertaken expressly for the purpose:

What do I care for your sacrifices... your feast days... your prayers?.. Aid the oppressed; give justice to orphans; plead the cause of widows. Then come and we will asrgue. If your sins were like scarlet they will be as snow. -- Is 1:11-18 (cf 58:6-12; Mt 23:23 ff.; Lk 11:39 ff.)

The proverb "By your mercy and faithfulness sin is expiated" (Prov 16:6; cf. 21:21; Sir 29:12-13; Lk 16:9) developed into the beatitude "Blessed are the merciful, for they shall have mercy" (Mt 5:7). The mercy which obtains forgiveness consists in helping the needy (Dan 4:24; Sir 3:30- 4:10), and in forgiving offences (Sir 28:1-5; Mt 5:23-24; 6:12-15; 18:23-35; Mk 11:25). There is such a thing as performing works of mercy without charity (1 Cor 13:3), as for the sake of the esteem of men (Mt 18:23-35), but true mercy includes charity, as Paul described it: "Put on garments that suit God's chosen people, his beloved: compassion, kindness, gentleness, patience. Be forbearing with one another, and freely forgiving (carizo,menoi) where any of you had cause for complaint: as the Lord freely forgave (ecari,sato) you, so you must forgive each other" (Col 3:12-13; cf. Eph 4:32). As this passage and the parable of the merciful debtor show (Mt 18:23-35), the practice of mercy is not a satisfaction of justice for sins committed, but is only condition for God's free pardon.

1.1.2.4 Summary

In conclusion, it may be said that the bible maintains the idea of punishment in proportion to the gravity of the sin, but it modifies the application of strict justice by stressing God's mercy, yet in such a way as to leave something for men to do as a condition for receiving his mercy. It remains now to see how this idea was developed in Christian theology.

1.1.3 Christian development of the idea of satisfaction

For Christians, the sacrifice of Christ has always remained the paramount payment to God of the debt of all sin. But very early the practices by which Christians merit pardon were on occasion spoken of as payments for sin. Note, incidently, that the ecclesiastical writers who had this concept did not always distinguish obtaining forgiveness of sin and obtaining release from the remains of or punishment due to sin. Nor were they in agreement whether the satisfaction should be performed before absolution or after.

1.1.3.1 Fulfilment of justice

Among the earliest Christians, the writer of the Didache says: "If you have anything at your disposal, give it as a price to redeem your sin."⁽⁸⁾ The pseudo-Barnabas wrote: "Work with your hands for the redemption of your sins."⁽⁹⁾ Tertullian spoke of the work of the penitent to obtain forgiveness as a "price".⁽¹⁰⁾ Cyprian used such words as "placate" and "satisfy", when speaking of penance.⁽¹¹⁾ None of these authors, however, give a theoretical interpretation to the words they use. Origen considered eight ways a Christian can offer sacrifice for sins besides participating in the sacrifice of Christ.⁽¹²⁾ Yet all the works he mentions are acts of virtue extolled as sacrifices in comparison with the sacrifices of the Old Law. Ambrose interprets the payment of the last farthing (Lk 123:59) as the paying of the debt of sin by acts of charity and other acts of satisfaction.⁽¹³⁾ Ambrose's comment is, however, far from a theoretical interpretation of these acts as a true fulfilment of justice. Augustine occasionally spoke of penitential exercises in terms of satisfaction,⁽¹⁴⁾ but did not elaborate a theory basing this satisfaction on the fulfilment of the equality of justice. In the East, the penance imposed by the confessor is called an epiti,mion, which Sozomen explains as the payment of a debt.⁽¹⁵⁾ In doing so, he stands apart form the dominant view of the East, which considered the penance primarily as a remedy.

In the West, theorizing about the reasons for satisfaction remained somewhat in the background u;ntil the Middle Ages. But the development of penitential discipline contributed to a growing emphasis upon the aspect of retributive justice rather than upon the remedial or deterrent aspects of penitential works. Originally, public penances were proportioned to the gravity and the species of the crime; the purpose of curing the offender or of punishing him were not opposed or sharply distinguished. The history of penitential discipline, however, is one of progressive mitigation,⁽¹⁶⁾ a process which contributed to viewing the debt due to sin as something objective and detached from the condition of the sinner.

1.1.3.2 Mitigations

During the seventh and eighth centuries public penance and reconciliation of sinners within the liturgy gave way to the Irish system of exclusively private penances. These penances consisted of prayers, fasting, or almsgiving, determined according to the gravity of the crime, and have sometimes been called "taxes" or "tariffs". They were codified in books called "penitentials", which covered every possible species of crime. Since, however, the tariffs constantly had to be modified and adapted, ultimately the penitentials were found impractical as a guide for giving penances.

As a substitute for the penances prescribed by the penitentials, in the eighth century the practice of redemptions was introduced, which became the rule by the tenth century. Redemptions were simply commutations of the legal penance to something lighter. Peter Damian tells of one of his monks asking for a penance of 100 years.⁽¹⁷⁾ Once the same monk asked permission to perform a penance of 1,000 years during Lent.⁽¹⁸⁾ According to the system of redemptions, the latter penance simply meant that6 he would say the Psalter 200 times while striking himself with his hands.

Another form of mitigation of the tariff penances were indulgences, the first of which were given in the late eleventh century to the crusaders. Indulgences are reductions of a penance, but unlike redemptions, they are not looked upon as commutations, but as remissions of the whole or part of the penance, accorded on the occasion of the performance of some good work. They Church insists that when indulgences are gained, they do not merely reduce the penance demanded by the Church (external forum), but lessen the satisfaction demanded by God as well (internal forum).⁽¹⁹⁾ Although different theologians have placed varied emphasis on the dispositions required of a person to gain an indulgence, they agree that indulgences are not automatically or always gained.⁽²⁰⁾

1.1.3.3 Resulting view of satisfaction

In the popular mind, however, the reduction of the Church's penalties for sin by way for redemptions and indulgences served to promote a retributive and juridical view of satisfaction. The punishment due to sin came to be looked upon as something detached form the sinner, as an objective debt which a judge could reduce at his discretion without any change being effected in the recipient, provided only that the recipient be in the state of grace and intend to receive the clemency offered.

Since indulgences imply vicarious suffering or an application of the merits of Christ and the saints, the once popular concept of Christ's death as a penal substitution for the punishment due to men⁽²¹⁾ aided in fostering the view that man's satisfaction is primarily the payment of a debt. When the idea of Christ's solidarity with his members and of his members with each other is lost, then it becomes impossible to conceive of vicarious satisfaction causing an intrinsic change in the recipient, because one man's medicine cannot be taken for him by another. The only purpose left, then, for vicarious satisfaction is that it be accepted by God as payment towards the eventual cancellation of an objective debt.

1.1.4 Declarations of the Church

The canons of the fourteenth session of the Council of Trent define the satisfactory value of good works, but they do not say whether satisfaction is the payment of a debt or the purification and cure of the penitent.⁽²²⁾ A chapter of the same session, however, says:

Let them (priests) bear in mind that the satisfaction they impose be not only for the protection of a new life and a remedy against infirmity, but also for the vindication and punishment of past sins; for the early Fathers also believed and taught that the keys of the priests were bestowed not to loose only but also to bind.⁽²³⁾

The retributive view of punishment and satisfaction, in various forms and degrees, has been the prominent view in the West, both in secular jurisprudence and in theology. In recent times, however, the humanitarian approach to punishment, and to capital punishment in particular, has become increasingly prominent; many authors reject the retributive aspect of punishment altogether, condemning it as pure vengeance and unjustified retaliation, productive of no good.⁽²⁴⁾ Pius XIII, therefore, took the occasion of his address to the Sixth International Congress of Penal Law on 3 October 1953 to reaffirm the retributive function of punishment,\ although for the practical purpose of creating an international penal law he allowed collaboration with those who hold other theories of punishment.⁽²⁵⁾ Pius XII reaffirmed his position in his talk of 15 October 1954 to the International Commission of Criminal Police.⁽²⁶⁾ In his address of 5 December 1954 to the Sixth National Congress of the union of Italian Catholic Lawyers he began what was to be a full treatise on punishment and its function.⁽²⁷⁾ In this address he explained how the purpose of punishment is to reestablish the order of civil and divine justice which has been broken by crime.⁽²⁸⁾ In the same address the Pope found it possible to combine the vindictive and medicinal functions of punishment.⁽²⁹⁾

1.1.5 Present state of the question

The retributive purpose of punishment is currently defended by men such as Illtud Evans, O.P.,⁽³⁰⁾ Michael Connolly,⁽³¹⁾ C.S. Lewis,⁽³²⁾ Austin Gaskell, O.P.,⁽³³⁾ and Carl Schaub, O.P.⁽³⁴⁾ But a number of Catholic writers, even after Pius XII's addresses, have expressed difficulty with the retributive theory. Canon Jacques Leclercq wrote: "The notion of vindictive punish4emnt is irreducibly obscure."⁽³⁵⁾ Anthony Kenny delivered a sharp attack on the weakest point of the theory, the seemingly abstract unreality of the balance of justice which punishment is supposed to restore.⁽³⁶⁾ Dom Marx Pontifex, O.S.B., searches for the good which society or the offender derives from punishment, but finds difficulty in seeing any in the punishments of hell or in vicarious suffering.⁽³⁷⁾

The proper meaning and value of the retributive purpose of punishment and satisfaction, and the connection of this purpose with those of curing the offender and deterring anyone form imitating the crime will be determined later, after tracing the history of the medicinal and deterrent theories.

1.2 To cure the sinner

A commonly held opinion today is that the purpose of punishment rightfully can only be to reform the offender and to warn others against imitating his crime. The medicinal purpose of punishment is recognized in pagan literature,⁽³⁸⁾ but is given particular importance in Sacred Scripture.

1.2.1 The view of the Bible

The affliction of forty years wandering in the desert is described as retribution in the Book of Numbers (14:20-23), but later, in Deuteronomy, it is seen as a corrective: "So you must realize that Yahweh, your God, disciplines you even as a man disciplines his son" (8:5). Israel's idolatry after it entered the promised land merited God's avowal: "I for my part will not clear a way for them any more of the nations which Joshua left when he died" (Jgs 2:21). This punishment had a remedial purpose, "to prove whether or not they (the Israelites) would keep the way of the Lord and continue in it as their fathers had done" (v. 22), and "that he might try all those Israelites who had no experience of the battles with Canaan" (3:1). The same theme continues throughout the Old Testament. Israel's defeats are explained not only as the result of their infidelity, but also as a means of purifying the nation and leading it to a greater appreciation of God's mercy (Lev 26:14-45; Is 8:7-12; Jer 5:3; Am 4:6-11; Hag 2:17; Wis 12:1-2). Personal punishments too, such as David received even after being forgiven his sins, were for the purpose of curing and purifying the offender, and instructing him in the wisdom and love of God. (Ps 6, 30, 51, 60, 103, 107; Prov 3:11-12; Wis 11:9-10).

In the New Testament, punishment is usually considered as final retribution. The rejection of a prophet entailed temporary punishment until the people repented or another prophet was sent. But when God sent his only Son whom he loved, his people had their last chance to turn to God and be cured of the blindness and deafness of their sin (Mt 9:12; 13:15 - Is 6:9-10; Mk 2:17; Lk 5:31; Jn 12:40; Acts 28:278; Heb 12:4-13; 1 Pt 2:24 - Is 53:5). There would be no more remedial punishment after an individual had definitely reject the Son of God (Mt 21:3-46; Mk 12:1-9; Lk 13:1-9; 20:9-19) or the Holy Spirit (Mt 12:31-32; Mk 3:28-29; Lk 12:9-10; Heb 6:4-8; 1 Jn 6:16).

1.2.2 Christian development of the idea

Even in apostolic times, it was recognized that a Christian might sin and then benefit form punishment or an admonition (1 Cor 5:5; 2 Cor 2:5-11; 1 Tim 1:20; Rev 2-3; & 1 Cor 3:15 - Purgatory). Tertullian calls penance after baptism "a medicine to be taken for the recovery of health."⁽³⁹⁾ Cyprian,⁽⁴⁰⁾ Ambrose,⁽⁴¹⁾ and Augustine⁽⁴²⁾ speak in similar terms. Nevertheless, the dominant view of penance in the West, especially in the centuries following these men, was that of retribution.

The East was the stronghold of the view of punishment as a remedy. This view predominates in the Apostolic Constitutions,⁽⁴³⁾ Asterics Amaseias,⁽⁴⁴⁾ and others.⁽⁴⁵⁾ Gregory of Nyssa, who recognized the vindictive purpose of punishment, also expressed the remedial purpose.⁽⁴⁶⁾ John Chrysostom is typical of the same view: Penances must be proportioned to the sin and to the sinner, because "great skill is required to persuade the sick to submit to the remedy of the priest."⁽⁴⁷⁾ Regarding the length of the public penances, Chrysostom says:

Do you say they have been expiating their sins a long time? How long, a year, or two, or three? I am not concerned with the length of time, but with the correction of their soul. Show me whether they have repented, if they have changed, if the treatment is completed. If it is not, the length of time means nothing. We do not ask whether the wound has been dressed often, but if the dressing has accomplished anything. If it has accomplished its purpose in a short time, do not apply it any longer; if it has not, leave it on even after ten years. It is the time to remove the bandage when the state of the wounded person indicates that it should be removed.⁽⁴⁸⁾

The Eastern idea of penance was brought into the West by Cassian.⁽⁴⁹⁾ Cassian's formula is reflected in that of Gregory the Great,⁽⁵⁰⁾ and in the definition of Gennadius: "True penance is not to consent to what has to be repented, and to deplore having consented to it. Satisfaction, in penance, is to cut off the causes of sin, and not to leave oneself open to their suggestions."⁽⁵¹⁾ Under Augustine's name, Gennadius' definition passed to Peter Lombard,⁽⁵²⁾ and to Thomas Aquinas.⁽⁵³⁾ The Eastern idea of penance was explained at the Council of Florence by Mark of Ephesus. While remaining faithful to the Greek rejection of the idea of a debt of temporal punishment that remains after a sin has been forgiven, he nevertheless explained the medicinal purpose of the epiti,mia as assuring the strength both to avoid the sin in the future and to have a true hatred for the sin committed in the past.⁽⁵⁴⁾

The Council of Trent upheld the medicinal and deterrent purpose of punishment or satisfaction: "For without doubt, these satisfactions greatly restrain form sin, check it as if it were with a bit, and make penitents more cautious and vigilant in the future; they also remove remnants of sin, and by acts of the opposite virtues destroy habits acquired by evil living."⁽⁵⁵⁾ Nevertheless, the immediate intention of the penitential works is the justification of a repentant sinner.

Among Catholic apologists after the Council, the retributive purpose naturally received the most emphasis. But this emphasis was not limited to theological circles; the retributive view of punishment was the dominant notion among secular courts until the humanitarian movement and the revisions of penal codes in modern times. Now, the overwhelmingly dominant view in civil penology is that the purpose of punishment is primarily, if not exclusively, to cure the offender and prevent others from following his bad example.⁽⁵⁶⁾

1.2.3 Current view

Pius XII encouraged the tendency of modern penology to stress the reform and rehabilitation of offenders against society, and he urged clemency whenever the offenders manifest signs of a true reform which promises to be permanent.⁽⁵⁷⁾ The Pope's recommendations have been developed in numerous articles, especially in Blackfriars, The Catholic Lawyer, the Downside Review, Die Neue Ordnung, Social Order, and the Wiseman (Dublin) Review.⁽⁵⁸⁾

Some writers, however, as Dom Marx Pontifex,⁽⁵⁹⁾ tend to make the medicinal purpose the whole purpose of punishment. To be sure, these authors do not limit the medicinal purpose to that of assuring that the offender becomes virtuous and sins no more. In extending the meaning of medicinal punishment, however, they sometimes fall short of the view of some of the Church Fathers who see punishment and satisfaction as a remedy not only for the future, but also for the past sins whose remains are still tin the soul. Exactly how a remedial theory of punishment and satisfaction can embody all the requirements of justice will be seen later.

1.3 To protect society from further harm

The deterrent purpose of punishment is recognized in the Bible and in all Christian tradition, and is not contested today. For this reason, and because deterrence is only consequential to restoring a just order and reforming the offender, this essay will not trace the history of the deterrent theory.⁽⁶⁰⁾

The problems modern writers have with this theory are how to balance the amount of punishment called for by the guilt of the offender with the amount required to deter other potential offenders, and whether particular forms of punishment, such as capital punishment, actually deter form crime to the extent expected. A more theoretical problem, which will be considered in the next chapter, is how deterrent satisfaction undoes the bad example of crime and forms part of the reparation which the offender owes to society.

So far the development of the retributive and medicinal view of punishment have been considered in some detail. It remains to evaluate and compare these views, and to see with what qualifications they can be made mutually compatible and complementary.

2
RECONCILING THE THEORIES

Most of the discussion about the purpose of punishment and satisfaction in recent years centered around the problems of civil penology. There are, however, deeper theological problems concerning deliverance from sin and from the punishment due to sin which are not such burnign popular issues, but demand attention because of their relevance to the question of justification and grace, a bête noire of the ecumenical movement. Space does not permit the development of a solution incorporating a full documentation of the opinions of theologians on this matter, but a brief summary of conclusions can be presented.⁽⁶¹⁾

2.1 Remedy for turning from God

Punishment and satisfaction are always an antidote for a responsible evil act, that is, for sin. Although (mortal) sin is a rebellion against God, sin does not detract from him, but affects man's orientation to God. Nevertheless, because sin is a turning away from the infinite goodness of God, its malice is infinite. Having turned from God by sin, man cannot return to God and focus his love on God's infinite goodness by his own human power; his return requires a God-given power, grace.⁽⁶²⁾ This grace is a free gift from God, communicated to the sinner by Christ

Speaking in a legal framework, one might say that Christ won this grace for us by suffering in our stead; God accepted the suffering of his Son as a penal substitution for the eternal punishment due to us. A more accurate view of Christ's mediation, however, is based on Christ's solidarity with the whole human race. When Christ, the only and beloved Son, obeyed his Father unto death, he became a new Adam in whom the whole human race was reborn and found favor with God. Then, through Christ as ahead, God fashioned a living body of believers, calling men one by one from a state of alienation and enmity to one of reconciliation and friendship with God.⁽⁶³⁾

If one insists on legal terminology, the infinite debt which each person incurs by turning away from the infinite goodness of God is paid by the infinite satisfaction which the person offers by turning back, through the merits of Christ, to God's infinite goodness. In no wise, however, should the debt of sin be conceived as a mere account in an audit book or in the mind of God, a debt which is liquidated by Christ's satisfaction without any change in the sinner. If the sinner can be said to owe a debt, it is none other than that his life be reorientated to God in charity. This point can best be emphasized if justification is described in medicinal terminology: The infinite damage within the sinner, his separation from God's infinite goodness, is repaired when he turns back to God through the power of Christ's resurrection and loves God above all things with his whole heart and soul.

2.2 Remedy for turning to a created good inordinately

Sin is not only a turning away from God; it is also a turning toward something in opposition to God in which one finds delight. Sin usually begins with a disordered inclination to the things of the world and ends with the rejection of God. Justification, on the other hand, begins with a reconciliation with God and ends with the healing of one's disordered inclinations towards the things of the world.⁽⁶⁴⁾ In legal terminology, the final work of healing after reconciliation with God is called satisfaction for the temporal punishment due to sin. Here, as before, there is a danger of conceiving this debt as something detached from and independent of the sinner's state of soul. A medicinal terminology seems to be more in accord with the reality described and with the prevailing contemporary mode of thought. Thomas Aquinas adds a medicinal view to a legal one when he says: "Satisfaction, which is an act of justice inflicting pain, is a medicine curing past sins and preserving from future sins."⁽⁶⁵⁾

A conversion from sin is seldom so perfect that all trace of actual sin is at once removed. Even though the person has been restored to grace and friendship with God, the practice of virtue is usually a struggle for him for some time, because he bears the wounds of sin, namely, the weakening of the will, darkening of the intellect, and rebellion of the sense appetites.⁽⁶⁶⁾ These wounds can never be perfectly healed in this life; they are closed, though insecurely, when a person has just turned from sin to grace. A healing of these wounds not only assures virtue, self-control and the power to avoid future sin, but also seals off nostalgia for the pleasures of past sin and weakness of resolve in renouncing them.

The Council of Trent speaks of medicinal satisfaction in a limited, technical sense, referring only to its contribution to a new life of grace and virtue, and its assistance in the avoidance of sin in the future.⁽⁶⁷⁾ But medicinal satisfaction can be understood in a wider sense, such as the early Fathers and the Eastern tradition understand the term. This idea looks not only to the future, but also to the past; it is capable of forming the basis of a complete view of punishment and satisfaction.

A person's weakness, both in renouncing past sins and in avoiding future sins, is a psychological reality of the moral order, extending from a manifest lack of emotional control to a subtle pride of the will. The curing of this weakness is a gradual process effected by grace, both alone and employing human efforts. Human effort consists first of all in the practice of the virtue opposed to the sin, but also in the general remedies: prayer, self-discipline, and mercy or almsgiving.

Prayer:

in general is a lifting of the mind to God. By its very nature it draws a person away from attachment to sin.
Specifically as petition, it can also be directed toward overcoming the remains of sin.⁽⁶⁸⁾

Self-discipline, which may be understood as any mortification, fasting or abstinence, serves:

as a person's direct combat against the rebellious tendencies within him,
as a means of freeing a person for a time from the ordinary cares and necessities of life in order to concentrate more intensely on prayer in preparation for an important occasion of grace,
As a means of awakening sorrow for sin.⁽⁶⁹⁾

Mercy, or almsgiving:

Is helping one's neighbor in his need. Since it derives from the love of God, consequently it is a movement away from disordered self-love, or sin.
Secondarily, mercy wins the gratitude and prayers of one's neighbor. It may be supposed that in answer to their prayers, God shows his free mercy to such benefactors, especially in their spiritual needs. Yet showing mercy in order to win prayers has an element of the mercenary. Christ advised his followers to give in secret, realizing that Christ accepts what they do for their neighbors as done for himself (Mt 6:2-4; 10:40-42; 25:35-045; Mk 9:41).⁽⁷⁰⁾

Purgatory completes the work of healing when a person dies still bearing the wounds of sin. If at death a person's love is not clearly and firmly focused on God so that the plerson desires all else only for the sake of God, after death his charity must be purified and strengthened before he is given the vision of God. This consolidation of the person's charity effects all the satisfaction required by God's justice; the process, at the same time, is in every way medicinal, effecting the perfect cure of the soul. The purification of purgatory, therefore, is a consolidation of charity, that is, a removal of the impediments to acting in proportion to one's habitual power of love, while the purification accomplished in this life is consolidation and growth in habitual power.⁽⁷¹⁾

2.3 Vicarious and communal satisfaction

The three previously mentioned remedies for the remains of sin have social overtones. To some extent people should undertake these works together as a group, because all who are in grace are bound together and with Christ into one body. The health they bring to one part of the body should be shared with all the others. It is not enough for a person, even a holy person, idly to approve the struggle of others against the wounds of sin. Rather, all members of Christ should join in a concerted effort to assist converted sinners.

A person can benefit another member of Christ by prayer, as is evident from many New Testament examples (Mt 5:44; Lk 6:28; 22:32; Acts 8:15,24; 12:5; Rom 1:10; 10:1; 15:30; 2 Cor 1:11; 9:14; Eph 1:16; 6:18; Phil 1:4,9,19; Col 1:3,9; 4:3,12; 1 Thes 1:1; 5:25; 2 Thes 1:11; 1 Tim 2:1; 3:1; Phlm 4,22; Heb 13:18; Jam 5:16). Self-discipline cannot directly benefit another person. Yet because the whole Church suffers from the evil of any of its members, the whole Church should be sorry for the evil and pray that it be remedied. Fasting and other penitential exercises can help stimulate sorrow and concentration on prayer for this purpose.

Spiritual and corporal works of mercy benefit others by their natural, human efficacy. But since they proceed form grace and ultimately from Christ who gives life and movement to his members, they can also contribute to building up the body of Christ and repairing the damage it has suffered.

One reason for the social efficacy of the latter practices may be that works done in charity are effects and signs of God's special love for the person who does them; God's love sometimes extends to friends of the person or those otherwise associated with him, in view of his love of the first person. In such a case the work of grace in the latter person is one example of congruous merit.⁽⁷²⁾ Works done in charity may perhaps benefit others by being instruments or channels of the operation of the Holy Spirit. In the New Testament this possibility is developed in the themes of witness, charisms and ministries. It is not apparent whether God uses these actions as instrumental efficient causes or only as occasions of grace.⁽⁷³⁾ But if one person brings grace to another only by way of merit, merit does not have to be pictured as a claim ascending to God and descending in the form of a blessing paid to oneself or another. Since God is the principal actor in the history of salvation, whenever he uses men, they do not work through him, but he works through them. Their charity to their neighbor, therefore, whatever may be the order of causality, works laterally. The more active and deep a person's charity is, the more powerful is God's presence in him, and the more God communicates himself through that person to those with whom the person is united by ties of charity.

The individuality of each man, however, and his freedom of will, always make it possible for him to close himself to the grace which God offers him through Jesus Christ in the society of the Church. A person can refuse to repent of sin, or, if he repents, can refuse to undertake the labor of self-discipline which he needs in order to repair the wounds of his sin. In either case, any benefit he might draw through the Church is conditioned on the overcoming of his unwillingness to be healed.

Indulgences can be understood against this background of the efficacy of the Church. In the legal terminology of Canon Law, indulgences are "a remission before God of the temporal punishment due to sins which have already been taken away as to guilt; ecclesiastical authority gives this remission from the treasury of the Church to the living by way of absolution, to the dead by way of sufferage" (c. 911).⁽⁷⁴⁾ The words "remission of temporal punishment due to sin" can be taken as equivalent to "the healing of the wounds of sin". The terms "ecclesiastical authority", "treasury of the Church", and "by way of absolution" need explanation.

If one person or group of persons, by the power of the Holy Spirit dwelling in them by charity, can contribute to the spiritual healing and strengthening of specific members in Christ's body whom they know and want to help, they can do the same for all the members of Christ's body in general. Anyone who is empowered to speak for a part or the whole of the Church can, respecting the wishes of the people he represents, direct the efficacy of their charity to specific persons. Thus, anyone - priest, deacon, minister, layman - who can speak for the intentions of a congregation can give an indulgence, this indulgence being the application of the power of the congregation's charity to the purpose of healing the wounds of sin in one of their brother members of Christ. An indulgence given by the persons mentioned, however, is limited by the finite vitality of the congregation's participation in Christ's own life of grace.⁽⁷⁵⁾ But a bishop, who holds authority in the Chruch by Christ's institution, can speak for his flock and also for Christ its head; the indulgence he gives is an application of the unlimited vitality of the whole body of Christ.⁽⁷⁶⁾

Indulgences, therefore ,do not have to be pictured as alms which the pope and the bishops draw from the treasury of the Church and distribute to the faithful so that they might thereby pay the debt of punishment due to their sins. Perhaps a better idea of the nature of indulgences can be gotten when it is seen that indulgences are one aspect of the dynamism of the Church, radiating its healing energy to all parts of the body of Christ which bear the wounds of sin. Healing wounds is only one function of a vital body; it is a function distinct from growth. Although it is possible to separate these functions, as actually happens in purgatory where wounds are healed without growth in one's fundamental stature of grace, in this life the action of healing the wounds of sin ordinarily entails growth; one whose sins have been forgiven and the wounds of his sin cured usually does not stop at resuming his former love of God, but loves him more than he did before he sinned.⁽⁷⁷⁾ In this way, the conferral of an indulgence is incidently a conferral of grace.

Whether an indulgence causes a growth in grace or merely the partial or total healing of the wounds of sin, its effectiveness is not ex opere operato. Not even the absolution in the sacrament of penance completely cures the soul in this way. The words "by way of absolution" apply first of all to the jurisdictional remission of the canonical "tariff" penalties demanded by the Church, which no longer exist.⁽⁷⁸⁾ Now the word "absolution" is only an emphatic way of stating the infallible ordering of the general power and congruous merits of the church to a specific intention.⁽⁷⁹⁾ The effectiveness of an indulgence, therefore, is ex opere operantis ecclesiae, and is conditioned on the free will of the beneficiary who can refuse to be cured, and on the measure of divine wisdom in giving the will to be converted and healed.⁽⁸⁰⁾

2.4 Social repression and hell

In destroying charity, sin not only disrupts a man's orientation to God, but also the fellowship which binds him to the members of Christ, and the balance which should exist in his love and the use of things of the world. If a person dies unrepentant, he is forever cut off from God and the fellowship of the saints. The things, also which he sought to possess as his domain of happiness refuse to be possessed; remaining subject to God's rule, they cause the person frustration and tribulation rather than pleasure.⁽⁸¹⁾

In this life, sin not only destroys the charity which unites a person with his fellow men, but often inflicts damage upon the society of which he is part.⁽⁸²⁾ As an individual has life and health which he must preserve, so also does society. As long as a person who has injured society is not repentant, or, if repentant, not yet so decidedly reformed that it is reasonably certain that he will not go back to a life of crime, society is justified and obliged to detain the person or take other measures to protect itself against him.⁽⁸³⁾ The immediate purpose of this action is not to anticipate possible reiterations of the crime - to disable the enemy before he strikes, as in a preventative war - but to repress the criminal in his actual present state of rebellion against society, a rebellion which he has declared by the crime he committed, and which continues ready to erupt into further action against society until he repents of his crime.

Absolutely speaking, society has a right to punish someone who is only internally in rebellion against society and has not yet committed an external crime.⁽⁸⁴⁾ But because human powers of knowing cannot penetrate the secrets of another person's heart, civil laws require proof of an attempt at the crime or at least of plotting it.

The limitations of human knowledge are also reflected in the laws and customs determining the severity of punishment for a crime. Generally speaking, the more serious the offense, the greater and more dangerous is a person's rebellion against society, and the greater are the measures of repression which are required. But this is not always so. Sometimes the person may be suffering from insanity, in which case any action taken by society is more a security measure than a punishment.⁽⁸⁵⁾ Sometimes the person may have repented of his crime. If his repentance is certain, then the punishment should be discontinued unless it serves to strengthen the person's repentance if it is still weak and unreliable, or unless it consists in making him repair the damage he has caused.⁽⁸⁶⁾

This reparation, however, is not served by the sinner's merely suffering pain, but by his making a positive repayment, insofar as this is possible.⁽⁸⁷⁾ Punishment is by its very nature medicinal if "medicinal" is understood widely enough to describe a reaction of the social organism in protection of its own life. The justice of punishment in society consists in the ordering of punishment to the reestablishment of the order to which society has a right. Tehrefore, it is not just ot punish a reformed sinner if the punishment does not positively contribute to restoring or preserving the order hwich his sin has damaged. To inflict pain in return for evil in this case may be in accord with a just positive law which envisages the generality of cases, but is not in accord with the particular part of justice called epiekeia, or equity, which observes what is just in particular situations where positive law fails.⁽⁸⁸⁾

Besides the possibility of the sinner having reformed, another reason for mitigating or discontinuing punishment is to contribute more effectively to the reform of the offender when this has not been accomplished. Sometimes non-painful methods of reform and rehabilitation will produce more good in the sinner (and consequently in society) than repressive punishments. This is the value of mercy or clemency.⁽⁸⁹⁾

Clemency is also fitting when a person is unrepentant, but is so disabled that he could not possibly harm society again. In this case, society would not be justified in punishing him unless it hoped thereby to restore the damage he inflicted on society, to prevent further harm from resulting from his sin, or to help him to reform; otherwise the punishment would be pure retaliation. Such a person has all the punishment he deserves by the fact that he has cut himself off from God and the society of the saints, and will suffer forever the sting of the things he has tried to take from the domination of God and set up his gods.

The punishments of hell and the punishment inflicted by society, therefore, are not exception to the validity of a medicinal view of punishment which applies to all cases of just punishment.

3
CONCLUSION

This thesis has proposed an understanding of satisfaction in terms of medicinal analogies. It does not thereby exclude a view of satisfaction which uses commercial or legal analogies; both a medicinal and a retributive view are found in Scripture and Tradition. If there is a real difference between these views, it is that the retributive view is based on a relation of an action or a state of will to the praise or punishment it deserves, while the medicinal view is based upon the fundament of that relation, the goodness or evil of the action or state of will.⁽⁹⁰⁾ Although different traditions within the Bible and Christianity have developed one or the other view with almost exclusive emphasis, each view is capable of expressing all the essential elements of satisfaction, because of a process of synechdoche: Merit and demerit can stand also for their fundaments, and the fundaments for the merit or demerit which they cause.

A less essential difference between the two views, yet one which is more important in accounting for the espousal of one view rather than the other by different traditions, is the image which each view possesses. It is easy to see the reasonss for the thesis that Sacred Scripture (and theology) should use metaphors,⁽⁹¹⁾ and yet to forget, while trying to understand and correlate logically the wealth of revelation, that images are essential to scientific theological speculation. The idea of repasration of injustice and of curing the wounds of sin may designate different realities, or, by synechdoche, one whole reality; nevertheless, these ideas represent realities which are not directly experienced, but are known by faith. Any concept of these realities has to be formulated by analogy, that is, by transferring terms and concepts of realities which are directly experienced. Since, moreover, a reality of faith is not exhaustively represented by one analogy or image (One could use the term "myth" with caution), several are often used. These images represent the same reality, but in different and sometimes conflicting ways; for example, the Church is depicted as the boy of Christ, and again as his bride.

The different images conveyed by the retributive view of satisfaction and the medicinal view supplement each other in expressing the same truth. But difficulties arise if too much attention is placed on the images rather than on the reality they represent, and if the elements of the image are developed too far. Such difficulties have been especially true in the development of a juridical-commercial image of satisfaction in Latin theology. A study of the medicinal view will help to correct the extreme consequences of the juridical image.

Another advantage of this study is that it will provide away for people of our times to understand the meaning and necessity of satisfaction for sin. The juridical image may have been easy to understand where and while Roman law had an influence. But for people of modern democracies, an idealization of justice is incomprehensible. They are more concerned with what is good and reasonable than with the relationship of merit and demerit which an action begets, with what is just in the concrete than with what is an abstract, idealized and sometimes personified justice. For them, to restore the balance of justice is an unreal and poor, if not ugly, image in which to express the purpose of satisfaction for sins. To repair the damage of sin to the person, property or reputation of another, to correct the scandal and to reform and rehabilitate the sinner are goals which appear real, positive and desirable to people of our times. These goals are the aims of satisfaction for sin as expressed in a medicinal view.

NOTES

1. Cf. M.B. Crowe, "Theology and capital punishment," Irish Theological Quarterly, 31 (1964), 24-61, which is a comprehensive history of theology on this point. See also the review of recent discussion on the subject of punishment in general by P.-D. Dognin, "La résponsibilité pénale," Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques, 47 (1963), 619-624, which is a review of La responsabilité pénale, Travaux du Colloque de philosophie pénale (12-21 Jan 1959), préesentés par J. Léauté (Annales de la Faculté de Droit et des Sciences Politiques et Economiques de Strasbourg, 8. Paris: Dalloz, 1961).

2. Laws 116, 210, 230, tr. Theophile J. Meek, Ancient Near Eastern texts, ed. J.B. Pritchard (Princeton U.P., 1955), 163-180.

5. This translation is based on Codex S, with a correction from Codices BA. Compare the translation given by R. Pautrel, Tobie, La Sainte Bible (Paris: Cerf, 1957), 52: "Mieux vaut la prière avec le jeûne, et l'aumône avec la justice, que la richesse avec l'iniquité"; that of A. Clamer, Tobie, La Sainte bible (Paris: Letouzey, 1949), 463-464: "La prière est bonne avec le jeûne, mais l'aumône l'emporte sur tous deux;" and that of F. Stummer, Das Buch Tobit (Würzburg: Echter-Verlag, 1950), 29: "Gut ist Gebet (verbunden) mit Fasten und Almosen und Gerechtigkeit."

6. Note, however, Rev 2-3, concerning the lessening of fervor; and the numerous references to false brethren and false prophets.

7. 1 Jn 1:8 probably refers to past sins; 5:16 refers to mortal sins of weakness in one's brother, for whom one should pray.

8. Ea''.n e]ch|èéj dia. tw/n ceirw/n sou, dw,seij lu,trwsin a`martiw/n sou (4:6. The Loeb Classical Library, The Apostolic Fathers, I (N.Y.: Macmillan, 1912), 314-316).

9. Dia. tw/n ceirw/n sou evrga,sh| eivj lu,trwsin tw/n a`martiw/n sou (EPISTOLH KAQOLIKH. PG 2, 780).

10. Quam porro ineptum, quam perversum poenitentiam non adimplere et veniam delictorum sustinere, hoc ist pretium non exhibere et ad mercem manum emittere (De paenitentia, 6:4. CCSL 1, 329-330).

11. Liber de lapsis, 35-36 (PL 4, 507-510); De opere et eleemosyna, 5 (PL 4, 628).

13. Sicut qui pecuniam solvunt debitum reddunt, nec prius evacuatur faenoris nomen quam totius sortis ad nummum usque quocumque solutionis genere quantitas universa solvatur, sic conpensatione caritatis actuumque reliquorum vel satisfactione quacumque peccati poena dissolvitur (Expositio evangelii Lucae, 7:156. CSEL 32:4, 352).

14. Perhaps Augustine's strongest statement of the retributive aspect of satisfaction is contained in his Sermon 19: "Peccatum enim, fratres, impunitum esse non potest. Si peccatum impunitum remaneat iniustum est, ergo sine dubitatione puniendum. Hoc tibi dicit deus tuus: 'Puniendum est peccatum aut a me.' Punitur ergo peccatum, aut ab homine paenitente, aut a deo iudicante. Punitur ergo aut a te sine te, aut a deo tecum. Quid est enim paenitentia, nisi sua in se ipsum iracundia? Qui paenitet irascitur sibi. Nam si non ficte fiat, unde est peccatoris tunsio? Quid feris, si non irascreris? Quando ergo peccatus, irasceris cordi tuo, ut satisfacias domino tuo. Potest enim etiam sic intelligi quod scriptum est: Irascimini et nolite peccare. Irascere quia peccasti, et puniens teipsum noli peccare. Exsuscita cor paenitendo, et noc erit sacrificium deo. Placari deo vis? Nosce quid agas tecum, ut deus placeatur tibi. In eodem psalmo adverte; ibi enim legitur: Quoniam si voluisses sacrificium, dedissem utique; holocaustis non delectaberis. Ergo sine sacrificio eris? Nihil oblaturus, de nulla oblatione deum placaturus?" (2-3. CCSL 41, 252-253).

More typical of this view, however is the following: "Quare et hic (in reference to the sin of David) non dicitur: 'Si propter peccatum illud fuerat comminatus, cur dimisso peccato erat minatus inplevit?' nisi quia rectissime, si dictum fuerit, respondebitur remissionem illam peccati factam, ne homo a percipienda vita inpeddiretur aeterna, subsecutum vero illius comminationis effectum, ut pietas hominis in illa humilitate exerceretur atque probaretur? Sic et mortem corportis et propter peccatum deus homini inflixit et post peccatorum remissionem propter exercendam iustitiam non admit" (Depeccatorum meritis et remissione, 2:34:56. CSEL 60, 125). Cf. Also In Psalmos ennarationes, 50:11-15. CCSL 36, 683 ff.).

15. W[sper ti a;flhma dialu,saj th.n timwri,an th/j a`marti,aj a`ni,qtai(EKKLHSIASTIKH ISTORIA, 8:16. pg 67, 1461).

16. On the history of penitential discipline, cf. Oscar D. Watkins, A history of penance (New York: Burt Franklin, 1961), 2, 587 ff.; Paul Galtier, L'église et la remission des pédhés aux premiers siècles (Paris: Beauchesne, 1932); and idem, "Satisfaction," Dictionnaire de théologie catholique, 14:1, 1129-1210.

19. Cf. Clement VI, Bulla iubilaei "Unigenitus Dei Filius", 25 Jan 1343, in H. Denziger, Enchiridion symbolorum (New York: Herder, 1963, nn. 1025-7; Leo X, Decretum "Cum postquam" ad Caietanum de Vio legatum Papae, 9 Nov 1518, in Denziger, nn. 1447-9; and the Council of Trent, sess. 25, Decretum de indulgentiis, 4 Dec 1463 in Denziger, n. 1835.

20. Cf. Thomas de Vio Caietanus, Quaestiones de suscipientibus indulgentias, 1. An praeter gratiam requiratur ex parte suscipientis indulgentias aliqualis dispositio, in Thomae Aquinatis, Opera Omnia, ed. Leonina, 12, Romae: Typ. Polyglotta, 1906, 367-368.

21. On the various theories of the meaning of Christ's satisfaction, cf. Jean Rivière, Le dogme de la rédemption (Paris, 1931), and F. Lakner, "Erlsung, III. In der Dogmengeschichte," Lexicon für Theologie und Kirche, 3 (1959), 1020-1024.

22. Can. 13. Si quis dixerit, pro peccatis, quoad poenam temporalem, minime Deo per Christi perita satisfiere poenis ab eo inflictis et patienter toleratis vel a sacerdote iniunctis, sed neque sponte susciptis, ut ieiuniis, orationibus, ellemosynis vel aliis etiam pietatis operibus, atque ideo optimam poenitentiam esse tantum novam vitam: A.S.

Can. 14. Si quis dixerit, satisfactiones, quibus poenitentis per Christum Iesum peccata redimunt, non esse cultus Dei, sed traditiones hominum, doctrinam de gratia et verum Dei cultum atque ipsum beneficium mortis Christi obscurantes: A.S.

Can. 15. Si quis, claves Ecclesiae esse datas tantum ad solvendum, non etiam ad ligandum, et propterea sacerdotes, dum imponunt ploenas confitentibus, agere contra finem clavium & contra institutionem Christi; et fictionem esse, quod virtute clavium sublata poena aeterna, poena temporalis plerumque exsolvenda remaneat: A.S. -- in J.D. Mansi, Sacrorum Conciliorum nova et amplissima collectio, 33, Graz: Akademische Druk-u. Verlagsanstalt, 1961, 102.

23. Habeant autem prae oculis, ut satisfactio, quam imponunt, non sit tantum ad novae vitae custodiam et infirmitatis medicamentum, sed etiam ad praeteritorum peccatorum vindictum et castigationem: nam claves sacerdotem non ad solvendum dumtaxat, sed et ad ligandum concessas etiam antiqui Patres et credunt et docent (Doctrina de sacramento poenitentiae, c. 8, Mansi, 33:97) The translation is that of H.J. Schroeder, Canons and Decrees of the Council of Trent (St. Louis: Herder, 1941), 98, with the exception of the word "vindication" for which he translates "atonement".

24. Cf. The history of the humanitarian reaction to retributive punishment in T.C. Schaub, Theological foundations of the retributive theory of punishment (Washington D.C.: Dominican House of Studies, dissertation, 1962), 1-5.

25. Discorsi e radiomessaggi di Sua Santità Pio XII (Tipografia Poliglotta Vaticana), 15 (1953-54), 335-353. The following passage expresses his point: "Le noeud de la faute, c'est l'opposition libre à la loi reconnue obligatoire, c'est la rupture et la violation consciente et voulue de l'ordre juste. Une fois qu'elle s'est produite, il est impossible de faire en sorte quelle n'existe pas. Pour autant cependant que l'on peut accorder satisfaction à l'ordre violé, il faut le faire. C'est une exigence fondamentale de la "justice". Son rôle dans le domaine de la moralité est de maintenir l'égalité compromise. Celle-ci demande que, par la peine, le résponsable soit soumis de force a l'ordre. L'accomplissement de cette exigence proclame la suprématie absolute du bien sur le mal; par elle s'excèrce l'absolute souveraineté du droit sur l'injustice. Veut-on encore faire un dernier pas: dans l'ordre métaphysique, la peine est une conséquence de la dépendance envers la Volonté suprême, dépendance qui s'inscrit jusque dans les derniers replis de l'être créé. S'il faut jamais reprimer la révolte de l'être libre et retablir le droit violé, c'est bien ici quand l'exige le Juge suprême et la justice suprême. La victime d'une injustice peut renoncer librement à la reparation, mais la justice de son coté la lui assure dans tous les cas. -- p. 351-352.

26. Aussi bien, comme Nous l'avons dit, qu'on laisse à la théorie et à la pratique le soin de définir de la peine dans le sens moderne plus étroit ou dans l'autre plus large. Dans l'une comme dans l'autre hypothèse, une collaboration est possible et l'on peut viser à la création d'un droit pénal international (Ibid., 353).

28. Ibid., 275-289. The last part of the talk, not delivered on the occasion, was made public 5 Feb 1955 (Ibid., 349-365).

29. Although the whole address deserves careful study, the following is particularly pertinent: "Col concetto del fatto colpevole è congiunto quello che il suo autore diviene meritevole di pena (reatus poenae). Il problema della pena ha principio, nel singolo caso, al momento in cui l'uomo diviene colpevole. La pena e la reazione, richiesta dal diritto e dalla giustizia, alla colpa: sono come colpo et contracolplo. L'ordine violato con l'atto colpevole esige reintegrazione e ristabilitmento del turbato equilibrio. È ufficio proprio del diritto e della giustizia di custodire e preservare la concordanza fra il dovere, da una parte, e il diritto, dall'altra, e di ristabilirla, se fosse lesa. La pena non tocca per se il fatto colpevole, ma l'autore di esso, la sua persona, il suo Io, che con cosciente determinazione ha compiuto l'azione colpevole. Parimente la punizione non viene quasi da un astratto ordinamento giuridico, ma dalla persona concreta investita della legittima Autorità. Come l'azione colpevole, così anche la punizione mette di fronte persona à persona" (Ibid., 279).

30. "Is punishment a crime?", Dublin Review, 230 (1956), 4-11; "The purpose of punishment: a medieval disputation," Blackfriars, 38 (1957), 194-214. See also his "Crime and punishment in the United States," Blackfriars, 45 (1964), 156-157.

32. "The humanitarian theory of punishment," Catholic Mind, 59 (1961), 254-260; The problem of pain (New York: Macmillan, 1962).

35. "La notion de justice vindicative est irréduciblemente obscure" (Leons de droit naturel, 4:1, 185, quoted by Michael Connolly, op. Cit., 486).

38. To cite only one example, cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 2, c. 3, 1104b:16-18; and 10, c. 9, esp. 1081b:4.

39. Pigeat sane peccare rursus, sed paenitere non pigeat; pudeat iterum periclitari, sed iterum liberari neminem pudeat: interandae valitudinis interanda medicina est (De paenitentia, 7:13. CCSL 1, 334).

40. Quam magna deliquimus, tam granditer defleamus. Alto vulneri diligens et longa medicina non desit. Poenitentia crimine minor non sit... Incunctanter et largiter fiat operatios, census omnis in medelam vulneris erogetur (Liber de lapsis, 35. PL 4, 507-508).

41. Sic flevit et Niives populus et denuntiatum excidium civitatis evasit; tanta est enim paenitentiae medicina, ut mutare videatur suam Deus sententiam (De paenitentia, 2:48. CCEL 73, 183-184).

44. O`MILIA, 13 protre,ptiko.j peri. metanoi,aj, and 14 lo,goj ei`j th.n a`rchn tw/n nesteiw/n (PG 40, 352-389, esp. 386).

47. Dia. tou/to pollh/j cre,ia th/j mhcanh/j, i[na meiqw/sin e[kontej e`autou.j u`pe,cein tai/j para. tw/n i`ere,wn qerape,iaj oi` ka,montej (PERI IEROSYNHS, 2:3. PG 48:634).

48. VallV i`kanon e;dosan cro,non fhsi,) Po,son* ei`pe, moi, evniauto.n kai e;th du,o kai. tri,a* avllV ouv tou/to, zhtw/ cro,nou plh/qoj* avlla. yuch/j dio,rqwsin, tou/to toi,noun evpe,dezon* eiv kateuu,chsan, eiv metaba,lanto* kai. to. pa/n ge,gonen w`j, a[n mh. tou/to h|=, ouvde.n o[feloj tou/ cro,nou) Ouvde. ga.r eiv polla,kij evpede,qh to. trau/ma zhtou/men* avllV eiv w;nhse ti o` desmo,j) Eiv me.n ou/n wvfe,lhse kai. evn cro,nw| bracei/* mhke,ti prosdei,sqw\ kai. to. o[roj ou-toj e;stw lu,sewj* tou/ dweme,nou to. ke,rdosj (UPOMNHMA EIS THN PROS KORINQIOUS DEUTERAN EPISTOLHN, OMILIA, 14:3, PG 61, 501).

49. The following explains his view: "Poenitentiae plena et perfecta definitio est, ut peccata pro quibus poenitudinem gerimus, vel quibus nostra conscientia remordetur, nequaquam ulterius admittamus. Indicium vero satisfactionis et indulgentiae est affectus quoque eorum de nostris cordibus expulisse. Noverit enim unusquisque necdum se peccatis pristinis absolutum, quamdiu sibi satisfactioni et gemitibus incubanti vel illorum quae egit vel similium criminum oculos imago praeluserit, eorumque non dicam oblectatio, sed vel recordatio infestaverit mentis arcana. Itaque tunc se is qui pro satifactione pervigilat a criminibus absolutum, ac de praeteritis admissis veniam percepisse cognoscat, cum nequaquam cor suum eorumdem vitiorum illecebris sensuerit vel imaginatione perstringi. Quamobrem verissimus quidem examinator poenitentiae et undulentiae in conscientia residet nostra, qui absolutionem reatus nostri ante cognitionis et iudicii diem adhuc nobis in hac carne commorantiubus detegit et finem satisfactionis ac remissionis gratiam pandit. Et ut haec eadem quae dicta sunt, significantius exprimantur, tum demum praeterita nobis vitiorum contagia remissa esse credenda sunt, cum fuerint de corde nostro praesentium voluptatum desideria pariter passionesque depulsae (Collatio 20, de poenitentiae fine, 5. PL 49, 1154-1155).

50. Poenitentiam quippe agere est et perpetrata mala plangere, et pllangenda non perpetrare (Homilia in evangelia, 34:15. PL 76, 1256).

51. Poenitentia vera est, poenitenda non admittere, et admissa deflere. Satisfactio poenitentiae est, causas peccatorum excidere, nec earum suggestionibus aditum indulgere (De ecclesiasticis dogmatibus liber, 54. PL 58, 994).

52. Libri IV Sententiarum (Ad Claras Aquas: Typogr. Coll. S. Bonav., 1916), 4, dist. 15, c. 3:148.

53. Scriptum super Sententiis, 4 (Paris: Lethialleuz, 1947), 1:4, dist. 15, q. 1, a. 1, qu. 3.

54. Patrologia Orientalis 15, 163-168; cf. P. Galtier, "Satisfaction," ed. cit., 1151-1152.

55. Procul dubio enim magnopere a peccato revocant, et quasi freno quodam coercent hae satisfactoriae poenae, cautioresque et vigilantiores in futurum paenitentes afficiunt; medentur quoque peccatorum reliquiis, et vitiosos habitus male vivendo comparatos contrariis virtutum actionibus tollunt (Sess. 14, Doctrina de sacramento poenitentiae, c. 8, ed. cit., 96-7); tr. By H.J. Schroeder, op. cit., 97.

56. Cf. The reports in Catholic Lawyer, 6 (1960); and the more recent information in the sketch by Alice Ogle, "Is the death sentence dying?", Ave Maria, 99:2 (11 June 1964).

57. Nell'applicazione del condono non può valere l'arbitrio. Come norma debbono servire il bene del reo, non meno che della communità giuridica, il rispetto, la quale egli ha colpevolmente violata, e, al di supra di ambedue, il rispetto, la eccelenza dell'ordine stabilito secundo il buono e il retto. Quella norma esige, tra l'altro, che, come in generale nelle relazioni degli uomini fra di loro, così anche nell'applicazione della potestà penale siano tenuti in conto non soltanto lo stretto diritto e la giustizia, ma anche l'equità, la bontà e la misericordia. Altrimenti si sorre pericolo di trasformare il "summum ius" in "summa iniuria". Precisamente questa riflessione inclina a stimare che, nelle pene medicinali come anche, entre certi limiti, nelle vindicative, kuna remissione della pena dovrebbe essere presa in considerazione, ogniqualvolta si è conseguita la morale certezza di essersi ottenuto lo scopo immanente della garanzia della sua durevolezza (To the Sixth National Congress of the union of Italian Lawyers, ed. cit., 362). On the aims of reform and rehabilitation, cf. Ibid., 225-229, 364-365.

60. For a discussion of the detrrent purpose of punishment, cf. The works cited in notes 30-37, 56.

61. Cf. Paul Galtier, "Satisfaction," ed. cit.; idem., De paenitentia (Rome: Univ. Greg., 1950); P. de Letter, "Theology of satisfaction,": The Thomist, 21 (1958), 1-28. Joseph Lecuyer, "Note sur une définition thomiste de la satisfaction," Doctor Communis, 8 (1955), 21-30; L. Hodl, ":Genugtuung," Lexicon für Theologie und Kirche, 4 (Freiburg: Herder, 1960), 683-685.

62. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I-II, 109, 7, and the Council of Trent, sess. 6 (13 Jan 1547), Decretum et canones de iustificatione (Mansi, 33, 32-43). On God's loving us before we love him, cf. 1 Jn 4:10,19. On the necessity of God's grace for justification and salvation, cf. Acts 15:11; Rom 3:23-24 (the whole theme of Romans); 1 Cor 15:10; 2 Tim 1:9; Tit 3:4-7.

64. On the process of justification, cf. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae,m I-II, 113, II-II, and the Council of Trent, loc. cit.

65. Unde et satisfaction, quae est iustitiae actus poenam inferentis, est medicina curans peccata praeterita et praeseverans a futuris" (In Sent., 4, d.15, q.1, a.1, qua.3 [Suppl. Summae Theologiae, 12, 3]; cf. also Summa Theologiae, II-=II, 108, 4.). This statement is significant, because St. Thomas usually speaks of the medicinal purpose of satisfaction in the limited sense of preserving from future sins. The medicinal purpose of the latter sense is distinct from the satisfactory purpose of restoring the order of justice upset by the former sin (Cf. In Sent., 4, d.15, q.1, a.4, qua.1; Summa Theologiae, I-II, 87, 6, ad 3). Nevertheless, even describing the restoration of the balance of justice, he seems to follow two traditions. In one he abstracts from any functional value of the pain, considering only that suffering in proportion to the seriousness of the sin honors God, and that it is virtuous for the person to want to honor God by so suffering (cf. In Sent., 4, d.15, q.1, a.4, quae.1-2 [Suppl. Summae Theologiae, 15, 1-2], Summa Theologiae, I-II, 87, 6; III, 86,4). In the other he considers suffering as a means of overcoming a person's inordinate attachment to the things which drew him from God; an intense love of God can substitute for suffering in accompanying this purpose (cf. Summa Theologiae, III, 86, 4, ad 1; a.5, c. and ad 1-3; 87, 1-3; 89, 2; Contra Gentiles, 3, c.158, arg.1; 4, c.72). Note that, regarding the wounds or remains of sin, Thomas Aquinas carefully distinguishes between the positive dispositions or habits, and the privation of right order which is conjoined to these inclinations. The reatus poenae is founded per se on the latter (cf. In Sent., d.42, q.1, a.2, ad 3). But the removal of the reatus coincides with the restoration of order in the powers of the soul (cf. In Sent., d.14, q.2, a.1, qua.3). Fur further analysis of St. Thomas, cf. J. Lecuyer, op. cit.

66. Thomas Aquinas gives four wounds of sin: infirmitas, ignorantia, malitia, and concupiscentia (Summa Theologiae, I-II, 85, 3). Infirmitas is a defect of the irascibile appetite, concupiscentia of the concupiscible. Both can be subsumed under "rebellion of the sense appetites". St. Thomas attributes the teaching of the four wounds to Venerable Bede. See the latter's In Lucam, lib. 3, super 10:30 (PL 92, 469).

68. On the meaning and purpose of prayer, cf. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, II-II, 83, 1, c. and ad 2. St. Thomas borrows the definitions given by John Damascene in his De fide orthodoxa, 3:24: Proseuch, evstin avna,basij tou/ nou/ pros.j qeo.n, h; ai;thsij tw/n proshko,twn para. Qeou/ (PG 94, 1089).

69. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, II-II, 147, 1. He bases his three reasons for the value of fasting on the passage of pseudo-Augustine's Sermo 73, De verbis Evangelii Matthaei, 17:20, "Hoc genus in nullo eiicitur nisi oratione et ieiunio": Ieiunia cor purgat, mentem sublevat, carnem spiritui subiicit. Ieiunium cor aficit contritum et humiliatum, quod Deus non spernit; ieiunium concupiscenciae nebulas dispergit, libidinum ardores extinguit, castitatis lumen accendid (PL 39, 1887). St. Thomas expresses his third reason in this article in the words "ad satisfaciendum pro peccatis". In article 3 he expresses the same idea in the words "ad delectationem et cohibitionem culpai". Philip Melanchthon criticizes St. Thomas on this point in his Apologia Confessionis Augustanae, art. 15, De traditionibus humanis in Ecclesia:

Paulus ad Colossenses scribit traditiones habere speciem sapientiae. Et habent profecto. Nam sutazi,a illa valde decet in ecclesia, eamque ob causam necessaria est. Set humana ratio, quia non intelligit iustitiam fidei, vanitates affingit, quod talia opera iustificent homenes, quod reconcilient Deum etc. Sic sentiebant vulgus inter Israelitas, et hac opinione augebant tales ceremonias, sicut apud nos in monasteriis creverunt. Sic iudicat humnana ratio etiam de exercitiis corporis, de ieiuniis, quorum finis com sit coercere carnem, ratio affingit finem, quod sint cultus, qui iustificent. Sicut Thomas scribit: Ieiunium valere ad deletionem et prohibitionem culpae. Haec sunt verfba Thomae. Ita sapientiae ac iustitiae species in talibus operibus decipit homines. Et accedunt exempla sanctorum, quos dum student imitari homines, imitantur plerumque externa exercitia, non imitantur fidem eorum (Die Bekentnisschriften der evangelish-lutherischen Kirche, Gottingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, 1956, 301-302).

70. For a discussion of the meaning and kinds of mercy or almsgiving, cf. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, II-II, 32-33.

71. Leo X reflects common Catholic teachin in his condemnation in the Bull Exsurge Domine, 15 June 1520, of the proposition: "Animae in purgatorio non sunt securae de earum salute, altem omnes: nec probatum est ullis aut rationibus aut Scripturis, ipsas esse extra statum merendi vel augendae caritatis (n. 38. Denziger, 778). Interpreting this teaching, some theologians, as John of St. Thomas, the Salmanticenses, Garrigou-Lagrange etc., hold that remiss acts of charity in this life merit an increase of tfhe habit of charity, but this increase is given in the next life if the person is not disposed for it by a more fervent act in this life. One difficulty with this theory is that, in making merit independent of the proximate dispositions of a person's will, it risks making merit a relation without a foundation, or worse, an external imputation: because God accepts the merit of remiss acts, he gives both the increase of habitual charity and the dispositions necessary for it in the next life. Therefore, I prefer the explanation of Capreolus, Cajetan, Vitoria, Baez etc., who hold that an increase of the habit of charity is given only with a more fervent act in this life. The value of remiss acts is explained by Marceliano Llamera as a positive, remote disposition for an increase of the habit of charity. Directly, remiss acts cause a greater inclination and facility in the will which disposes for amore intense act. See his discussion of the quetion in the Summa Theologica de Sancto Tomas Aquino, 7 (Madrid: BAC, 1959), the introduction to II-II, q.24, p. 731-751.

72. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I-II, 114, 6. There has been no ecclesiastical definition on the possibility of one person meriting for another; the value of praying for another takes precedence. Yet a tradition supports the possibility of meriting for another, particularly with regard to Mary. Cf. Juniper B. Carol, Mariology (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1955).

73. In Pius XII's two major statements on the power of Christ shared by the Church to communicate grace, the encyclical Mystici corporis, which is concerned mainlyu with the sacramental and hierarchical power of the Church, and his address to the Second World congress for the Lay Apostolate, Six ans se sont (5 Oct 1957. Discorsi e radiomessagi, 19, 453-473; cf. The Pope Speaks, 4, 119-134), the Pope did not develop the precise causality involved in the Church's extra-sacramental power. With regard to preaching, Charles Davis has developed the possibility of some true instrumental causality beyond that of a mere occasion of grace. Cf. his "The theology of preaching," Preaching, ed. R. Drury (N.Y.: Sheed & Ward, 1962), 1-25.

74. Omnes magni faciant indulgentias seu remissionem coram Deo poenas temporalis debitas pro peccatis, ad culpam quoad iam delectis, quam ecclesiastic auctoritas ex thesauro Ecclesiae concedit pro vivis per modum absolutionis, pro defunctis per modum suffragii.

75. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, In Sent., 4, d.20, a.4, qua.1 (= Suppl. Summae Theologiae, 26, 1). St. Thomas gives two reasons for reserving the term "indulgence" to that given by a bishop or the pope. The first, that only a bishop can absolve from the penance commanded by the Church, no longer applies, because, according to the present canon law (c. 911), indulgences are only for the remission of punishment due coram Deo. The second reason, the finite limits of the merits of a single congregation, is still reason for using different terms for an indulgence given by a bishop and one given by anyone less than a bishop, although both realities are fundamentally the same.

76. It is significant that St. Thomas considered the authority to grant indulgences in the name of the whole Church as lying essentially within the ordinary power of a bishop (cf. In Sent., 4, d.20, qua.1 = Suppl. Summae Theologiae, 26, 1). In St. Thomas' time, as in our own, Canon Law reserved the full exercise of this authority to the people, in order to preserve uniform practice in granting them, and also because individual bishops can exercise theri authority in matters pertaining to the whole Church only according to the regulations of the pope.

77. Cf. Lk 7:47: w-| de. ovli,gon avfi,etai( ovli,gon avgapa/. The first part of the verse, avfe,wntai ai` a`marti,ai auvth/j ai` pollai,( o[ti hvga,phsen polu,, can have the same meaning in a positive form. Ceslaus Spicq comments: "A première lecture, et selon la logique de la situation, on comprend que Jésus - interprétant les gestes de la pécheresse comme des manifestations d'amour, au sens susdit - déclare que la 'charité' obtient la remission des péechés, mérite le pardon. C'est l'interprétation de la Vulgate, des Pères et de nombreux modernes. Mais si l'on tient compte de la parabole des deux débiteures, acquittes de leur dette, l'homogenéité de l'enseignement demanderait de traduire le v. 47 de la faon suivante: 'Desormais elle aimera beaucoup parce qu'il lui a été beaucoup parconné,' ou mieux: 'Il faut que de très nombreux péchés lui aietn été remis, puisqu'elle vient détémoigner ujn tel amour." Dans ce cas, l'amour serait l'effet et no plus la cause du pardon" (Agapé dans le Nouveau Testament, 1, Paris: Gabalda, 1958, 130).

78. On these penalties and their remission see the references in note see the references in note 16, and E. Magnin, op. cit.

79. K. Rahner says: "Damit is nicht bestritten, dass im Ablass auch ein jurisdiktioneller Akt ursprunglich gegeben war: die Nachlassung der kanonischen Busse, die heute freilich nur noch hypothetisch ist und lediglich zum Ausdruck einer (veriablen) Intensitt dient, mit der die Kirche ihre Fürsprache zusichert" ("Ablass," Lexicon für Theologie und Kirche, 1, 51.

80. Karl Rahner and Herbert Vorgrimler are in accord with St. Thomas in their definition of an indulgence: "die Zusage einer besonderen Fürbitte der Kirche um Erlass einer zeitlichen Strafe vor Gott für Sünden, die hinsichtlich der Schuld schon getilgt sind" (Kleines Theologisches Wrter buch, Frieburg: Herder, 1961, p. 11). K. Rahner develps this idea in his Schriften zur Theologie, 2 (Einsiedeln: Benziger, 1961), "Bemerkungen zur Theologie des Ablasses," 185-210. In summary he says: "Der Ablass ist das mit einem jurisdiktionallen Nachlass einer kirchlichen (wenigstens hypothetischen) Bussauflage verbundene Sakramentale der Tilgung zeitlicher Sündenstrafen vor Gott und wirklich als soches Sakramentale ex opere operantis (orantis) Ecclesiae, nicht ex oper operato, wie heute die meisten Theologen lehren, wenn es auch aus historischen Grunden verbunden ist mit einem jurisdiktionellen Akt der Kirche, der sich auf den Nachlass einer Kirchenbusse bezieht und diesbezuglich eine sichere Wirkung hat" (p. 209-210). Note by way of comparison that even the sacrifice of the Mass is satisfying only ex opere operantis; cf. Thomas Aquinas, Suymmas Theologiae, III, 79, 5.

81. This latter is the poena sensus. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I-II, 87, 4. The punishment of hell is not merely one of loss and of inner remorse, but also of external affliction. Yet it is not necessary to suppose that God specially prepares instruments of punishment; merely by being disoriented form God, a person is in a condition in which the world of nature resists and afflicts him. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I-II, 85, 5; II-II, 164, 12; Suppl., 97, 1. Karl Rahner has a good existential explanation of the same point in his "Bemerkungen zur Theologie des Ablasses," 205-208.

82. Not every sin affects civil society, at least directly. Therefore civil law does not prohibit every sin or command every act of virtue. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I-II, 96, 2-3.

83. Cf. note 25. According to the threefold order which sin disturbs: that of reason, civil ordinance, and divine ordinance, a threefold restorative action is required: one from the person himself, one form civil authority, and one from God. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I-II, 87, 1 and 2.

84. The question is one of punishing (or killing) in self-defence. Cvf. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, II-II, 64, 7. Commenting on this article, John of St. Thomas cites Baez: "Secundum est, quot si quis sit certus moraliter, quod invadetur ab alio, qui jam incipit parare insidias contra ipsum, neque supersit aliud medium quam occidere invasorem etiam in quiete jam existentem, poterit occidere licite. Et ratio est, quia tunc formaliter non praevenit aggressorem, com jam ipse incepit esse aggressor, et sic alius habet jus ad defendendam fitam suam meliori modo quo potest, et cum not plossit alia via se defendere nisi occidento alterum, poterit uti ilo medio." John of St. Thomjas comments on the previous argument: "Nihilominus non sentit illam occisionem debere esse tunc intentam, aut volitam tamquam medium ad defensionem propriae vitae, neque Bagnez sumit medium in isto rigore; sed mens ejus est dicere esse licitum uti illa actione, quae est usus armorum tamquam medio ad defensionem sui" (Cursus Theologicus, 7, Paris: Vives, 1885, 503-555.

85. Thomas Aquinas distinguishes between poena flagelli and poena damni in his Summa Theologiae, II-II, 108, 4, ad 2.

87. Thomas Aquinas frequently says that the penalties of this life are more medicinal than retributive in purpose; cf. Summa Theologiae, II-II, 66, 6, ad 2; 68, 1; 108, 3, ad 2; 108, 4. If they are not medicinal for the individual, they are medicinal at least for society, in that crime is deterred; cf. I-II, 87, 2, ad 1. St. Thomas did not prescribe the expulsion of dead members from the living Church. Although he strongly emphasized the medicinal purpose of punishment inflicted in this life, the modern humanitarian movement must be credited with the clearly formulated demand that punishment should provide some positive good to the individual or at least to society.

88. For a discussion of this virtue, cf. Thoms Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, II-II, 120.

89. On the difference between epiekeia, piety, mercy, meekness and clemency, all of which concern the lessening of penalties, cf. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, II-II, 157, 3, and 4 ad 3. St. Thomas does not mention the effects of clemency in this section, but Sylvius comments: "est fructus clementiae et mansuetudinis, tum in hoc saeculo, tum in futuro. In hoc quidem, 'Misericordia et veritas custodiunt regem, et roberatur clementia thronus ejus' (Prov. 20), S. Asntoninus (p. 4, cap. 3) scribit, quod mansuetudo facit correptionem esse furctuosam, juxta illud Psalmi 89 "Quoniam supervenit masuetudo et corripimur': additque, quod leo leviter castigatus reverentiam exhibet castiganti. Hinc est, quod dist. 45, cap. 'Litcet,' ex S. Leone monetur: 'Ut pius erga corrigendos agat benevolentia quam severitas;' et alioquin evenire, ut 'quod provisum est ad concordiam, tendat ad noxam.'" (Commentarii in II-II S. Thomae, 3., Venice: Balleoniana, 1726, 681-683).

AQUINAS INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY

SATISFACTION FOR SIN

TABLE OF CONTENTS

0
INTRODUCTION

1
THE THEORIES

3
CONCLUSION

NOTES

AQUINAS INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY SATISFACTION FOR SIN

TABLE OF CONTENTS

0INTRODUCTION

1THE THEORIES

3CONCLUSION

NOTES

AQUINAS INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY

SATISFACTION FOR SIN

0
INTRODUCTION

1
THE THEORIES

3
CONCLUSION