MASS STIPENDS: DOCTRINAL PROBLEMS In a previous article I treated some historical, theoretical, and practical aspects of Mass stipends. In this article I wish to examine further the theory behind Mass stipends.
The common theory of Mass stipends since the Middle Ageswhich I did not question in my previous articlebriefly and without noting all the variations given to it by different theologians is this: Each Mass has an objective impetratory power independent of the dispositions of the celebrant and those attending the Mass. The benefits resulting from this impetration come in three distinct portions: one for the whole church, one for the celebrant himself, and a special one for certain persons, usually stipend givers, whom the celebrant designates. Only the celebrant can apply the latter portion, because only he properly offers the Mass by making Christ present on the altar in the state of a victim. The special beneficiaries of the Mass are determined by an intention which the celebrant forms some time before the consecration, and not by the many petitions found in various parts of the Mass. The more liberal of the theologians who hold the common theory say that to multiply the intentions of the Mass does not prejudice the first intention or fraction the fruits of the Mass. They allow the celebrant to offer the Mass for his private intentions and all the intentions expressed in the prayers of the Mass as well as for the intention of the stipend giver. Several recent theologians have questioned the very basis of this theory. (1) Christ, they admit, truly acts through the priest in every Mass by becoming present in the state of a victim at the consecration of the bread and wine. But, they add, in accomplishing his sacrifice on Calvary Christ assumed the permanently actual state of a perfect victim accepted by his Father. No matter how many Masses are celebrated, Christ does not add to the act or to the value and impetratory power of his one sacrifice. He only makes his offering sensibly present to us through the consecratory action symbolizing his death. What is added in the Mass is the Church's offering of itself joined to Christ's eternal offering. Apart from this participation of the faithful, the Mass adds nothing to Christ's eternal sacrifice.
Although Christ's offering is of infinite impetratory value, those who participate in it receive its fruits in a limited way according to the measure of their faith and devotion and the decision of God's free mercy. The celebrant has no greater claim by reason of his office to a special share in the fruits of the Mass than a person who attends, because the priest's role in the Mass differs from that of the layman only in the realm of sacramental signin making Christ and his sacrificial offering present on the altarnot in the realm of participation in what is signified.
The celebrant, together with the congregation, should accompany the offering with prayers for special intentions. Offering Mass for a special intention is nothing more than that, and can be done by one who attends the Mass just as fully as by the celebrant. The value of offering a stipend does not consist in the fact that the donor's intention becomes the celebrant's intention in offering the Mass, but in the fact that to give a stipend is a way of participating more actively and more perfectly in the Mass. To offer a stipend is equivalent to taking part in the offertory contribution when the latter is not possible. The material gift not only provides the needs of the celebration and the sustenance of the priest; it also expresses the donor's gift of himself to God and his expectation that God will accept his gift and answer his prayers. To "apply the Mass," the celebrant does not have to intend anything more than to designate a definite stipend to be offered in a definite Mass. The stipend expresses and as it were bears the donor's petition to God, although it is fitting that the celebrant also join his prayers with those of the stipend giver. This theory of Mass stipends has been ably argued for by its exponents. Nevertheless, both the theory and its practical consequences will become clearer by examining two papal pronouncements which seem opposed to it.
An Objection
The first objection comes from Pope Benedict XIV's comment on a passage from the Council of Trent, in his encyclical Cum semper oblatas, August 19, 1744. The Council of Trent said:
By divine precept it is enjoined on all to whom is entrusted the care of souls to know their sheep, to offer sacrifice for them. (2)Benedict XIV commented:
There have by no means been lacking those who through empty and frivolous interpretations have tried to take away the obligation imposed by the Sacred Synod, or at least to extenuate it; but since the said words of the Council are clear and obvious enough, and since the said Congregation of the Council which has been given charge of private interpretation has constantly said that they who have been entrusted with the care of souls must not only celebrate the Sacrifice of the Mass, but also apply the intermediate (special) fruit for the people entrusted to them, and may not apply it to others, or receive an alms for this application. (3)Benedict XIV was obviously thinking along the lines of the first theory described above. The phrases "apply the intermediate fruit" and "not apply it to others" can be discounted as a reflection of the Pope's private theology. Nevertheless, his association of the pro populo obligation with the "divine precept" in Trent's declaration must be weighed with consideration. In principle, the pro populo Mass is enjoined in order to give all the people of the parish the opportunity to share in this Mass the very same thing that the stipend donor intends.
If the theory of recent theologians is acceptable: that the application of the Mass to the stipend donor is no more than admitting the donor into the position of offering his gift at a definite Mass, then the pro populo Mass essentially can be no more than that Mass in which all the gifts of the people to their pastor are liturgically accepted. The Pope's declaration would then demand that single donors of stipends must never displace the rest of the people from frequently enjoying this form of active participation in the Mass.
A pro populo Mass is understandable if we consider that in most parts of Europe at the time of the Council of Trent and of Benedict XIV the custom of a Sunday offertory collection had fallen into disuse. Pastors depended for support, in addition to stipends, upon various forms of taxes and benefices. All such extra-liturgical gifts could be "applied" to the pro populo Mass as the equivalent of an offertory gift or stipend.
In the United States and other places in the modern world, however, the people exercise their lay priesthood in a direct and visible way by contributing to the offertory collection at each Sunday Mass. Whether the priest applies a stipend to these Masses or not, any individual's contribution to the offertory collection is just the same as if he "had a Mass said." In view of these considerations, the pro populo Mass is an anachronism wherever an offertory contribution is the custom. That is to say, a common offertory contribution is the real thing for which the application pro populo is an imitation and a substitute.
It goes without saying that on certain days the primary intention of the prayers in the Mass should be for the people of the parish; this also is intended by Benedict XIV's ruling. But being prayed for is quite a different thing from taking part in thee offering.
And a condemnation
The second objection to the modern view of stipends comes from Pope Pius VI's apostolic constitution Auctorem fidei, August 28, 1794, in which he condemned some propositions of the Synod of Pistoia. Let us look first at what the Synod said, then at Pius VI's condemnation. The Synod of Pistoia declared:
Besides this general offering, we believe that a special commemoration in the liturgy can be made of special persons, whether living or dead, praying to God for them in a special manner; not however that we believe that it is in the power of the priest to apply the fruits of the sacrifice to whom he wishesrather we condemn this error as greatly offensive to the rights of God, who alone distributes the fruits of the sacrifice to whom He wishes and in the measure He pleases.
And since the false opinion has been introduced among the people that those who give the priest an alms with the condition that he celebrate a Mass gain a special fruit from the sacrifice, the Synod commands pastors to teach their flock that the sacrifice of the Mass is of infinite value, but that the application of its fruits depends upon God, and that the way to participate more greatly in it is to unite oneself with the priest in offering it with a firm faith and a penitent spirit, burning with charity; that they will have the merit of almsgiving when it is done through the spirit of charity, since God does not look at the gift, but at the piety of the giver. (4)
Pius VI replied:
The teaching... that apart from any particular commemoration or prayer, the special offering or application of the sacrifice by the priest is not more advantageous, ceteris paribus, to those for whom the application is made than for anyone else; as if no special fruit came from the special application which the Church encourages and commands to be made for special persons or groups of persons... is false, rash, harmful, injurious to the Church, and leads into the error which was elsewhere condemned in Wycliffe. (5)The Synod of Pistoia is clearly more in accord with the modern theology of Mass stipends than with what has until recently been the common view. In his own mind, Pius VI undoubtedly accepted the common view, although his statement does answer one error of the Synod: that it is simply false that "those who give the priest an alms with the condition that he celebrate a Mass gain a special fruit from the Sacrifice." According to the view of recent theologians, however, a person who gives a Mass offering does share more, ceteris paribus, in that Mass than someone who does not give one, because he puts more of himself into the Mass. In the newer theory, the "application" of the Mass has to be understood as the assigning of a particular stipend to a particular Mass. This, of course, is not what Pius VI meant by application, but it does not seem to be against what he intended to define.
The phrase "apart from any particular commemoration or prayer" makes the value of offering a stipend independent of the celebrant's prayers and how fervent they are. It does not follow, however, that the phrase "special offering or application of the sacrifice by the priest" is a definition that the priest can confer a special benefit from the Mass ex opere operato, independently of his own or the donor's positive dispositions. For the modern theory, the latter phrase is an affirmation of the ex opere operantis value of the act of the donor as it is completed by the priest's assigning the stipend to a particular Mass.
Practical Conclusions
The new theology of stipends, which in fact claims to be ancient view, does not seem to be opposed to these two most prickly statements of the highest Church authority. What should be done, therefore, when John offers the priest a large sum of money and says, "I would like you to offer one hundred Masses for my intention?"
First, the priest should realize that he does not have to wait for the Masses at which John's stipends are offered in order to offer Mass for John's intention. He can offer Mass with the prayer that Christ extend the benefits of his sacrificial death to John or those for whom John wishes to pray at the same time as he prays for others who may have offered a stipend. The priest's prayer is a matter of charity distinct from the contractual obligation of designating the stipend as an offering within a Mass. Also his prayer is no more efficacious because he is the celebrant than that of those who merely attend the Mass. He should invite John to join his prayers with those of the priest.
Secondly, John should realize that his material gift is not a payment for the priest's offering the Mass for his intention. Rather, it is the embodiment of John's own involvement in the offering of the sacrifice of Christ made present on the altar through the action of the priest. One important factor in determining whether John's petition will be answered is the intensity of faith with which he joins himself to Christ's offering. The mere offering of stipends is of no value if it does not represent a real self-giving on John's part to God. The widow's mites which were all she could offer were of more value than the large gifts of the rich (Mk. 12: 41-44; Lk. 21: 1-4). In like manner, a single stipend which represents a sacrifice on the part of the donor is of more value than many stipends allocated from one's abundance.
Thirdly, John should prefer to make his offering at a Mass which he attends, bringing his gift to the altar himself at the offertory, or at least previously placing it in an offertory box which is brought to the altar at that time. Just as he receives Communion outside Mass only when he cannot receive it within Mass, so he should give a stipend or offering outside Mass only if he cannot attend the Mass or present his offering within it.
Sometimes he may be able to attend and offer at one Mass, but may wish to join in the worship of some distant community to which he somehow belongs, for instance because it is a poorer community of which he is a benefactor or because he is a relative of the priest. In such cases, however, his stipend should not be a substitute for offering at the Mass he attends. Much less should it be a gift with a proviso attached that the community or priest pray for him in return.
Fourthly, John's intentions should not be put on the publicized list of intentions if the Masses are to be said in close succession in the same place. Publicized intentions should be an invitation to the parish to join in prayer for the intentions announced. These intentions should concern needs of the whole Church or of the particular community and its members, and should be announced on the basis of equitable consideration of the needs of all, not according to who gave stipends. The offering of a stipend is of value to the donor and his intention no matter what intention is announced.
Fifthly, John may legitimately desire his offering to be spread out so that as far as possible he may have something to give at each Mass he attends or wishes to participate in from a distance. But he should also be willing that his smaller stipend for each Mass be combined with the offerings of the congregation or be added (with his understanding and permission, to conform with Canon 825) (6) to another stipend the priest may have. John will not share any less thereby in the Mass. The law of the Church "one stipend for one Mass" is designed to assure that stipends are spread equitably among many priests without a few getting a lion's share.
Sixthly, both John and the priest should realize that offering a material gift at Mass has the same value whether the Mass is sung or low. Nevertheless, John should wish as far as possible to partake of a Mass in which the scene, words and action of the liturgy signify in the best way possible the mysteries being celebrated. He would do well, if his stipend is large, to stipulate that the extra amount be used to provide good music and the other requirements of a more fitting celebration. It is accidental to the nature of a Mass offering how it is distributed after it is offered. Naturally, "they who serve the altar should have their share with the altar" (I Cor. 9: 13), but this includes others besides the celebrant.
Lastly, from the foregoing it goes without saying that the priest should not tell John that his offerings will not be accepted on certain days on which the priest says a "free Mass," that is, a Mass without a stipend which the priest says for his own special intentions. The concept of a "free Mass" is absurd; it is as if the priest thought he could get more from the Mass by saying it alone without anyone participating in it with him. Not only are several intentions which the priest may have not opposed to each other, but the value of offering a stipend is entirely independent of the intentions for which the celebrant prays.
Other corollaries can be drawn from the new view of Mass stipends. Especially, the question could be raised how definite must the application of a stipend to a Mass or Masses be. The more remote the stipend is from the Mass the more legal fictions and complications are introduced. It is hoped from this article, at any rate, that the new view of Mass stipends will be seen as not opposed to the declarations of the Church.
1. On the general question of the reiteration and fruits of the Mass, cf. Karl Rahner, S.J., "Die vielen Messen und das eine Opfer," Zeitschrift fiir Katholishe Theologie, 71 (1949), 257-317; H. McCormack, "The Act of Christ in the Mass," Worship, 37: 630-9 (November, 1963); Gundulf Hoeberichts, "ConcelebrationTheological Evaluation and Problems," African Ecclesiastical Review, 6: 138-54 (April, 1964). Specifically with regard to Mass stipends, cf. Maurice de la Taille, S.J., The Mystery of Faith and Human Opinion (New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1930); Klaus Mörsdorf, "Erwägungen zurn Begriff und zur Rechtfertigung des Messstipendiums," Theologie in Geschichte und Gegenwart, ed. J. Auer and H. Volk (München: Karl Zink, 1957), 103-22; J. A. Jungmarm, S.J., "Mass Intentions and Mass Stipends," Unto the Altar, ed. Alfons Kirchgaessner, tr. R. Brennan (New York: Herder and Herder, 1963), 23-31; C. Edward Gilpatric, S. J., "Mass Stipends and Mass Intentions," Worship, 38:190-201 (March, 1964).
2. Sess. 23, Decretum de reformatione (Mansi, 33, 140). This and the subsequent translations are my own.
3. P. Gasparri, Codicis iuris canonici fontes, 1 (Rome: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1923), p. 825.
4. Decreto della Eucharistia (Mansi, 38, 1041).
5. N. 30 (Mansi, 38, 1269).
6. According to interpretations offered in Clergy Review, 8 (1934), 323-5; and 22 (1942), 81-2.