Ibn-Sīnā and Thomas Aquinas
on the
THE INNER SENSES
(الحواس الباطنة)

a contribution to Psychology

Joseph Kenny, O.P.

Abstract

In his book on the soul in the collection الشفاء, Ibn-Sīnā in a systematic way treats of the inner senses, a subject only mentioned in passing by Aristotle. Aristotle mentions "common sense" and "imagination" in his book On the Soul. He also wrote a small treatise Memory and Recollection. He never discussed the "estimative sense".

Ibn-Sīnā treats each of these senses in detail, with considerable originality.

Thomas Aquinas credits Ibn-Sīnā for what he says about these senses,[1] which is simply a résumé of Ibn-Sīnā. Thomas' treatise has become part of the Thomistic legacy, and thus has entered the mainstream of Western thought up to today.

Ibn-Sīnā's treatise is relevant to Psychology today, for two reasons:

1. It neatly balances the physical and the psychic aspects—an area where there is current polarity, between those who opt for chemical treatment of the mentally ill and those who opt for psychoanalysis.

2. It provides a neat interface between the natural and the supernatural: the physical natural man with all his complexes and drives, and elevated phenomena such as dreams, prophecy and religious experience.

The subject of this study is Sections 1-3 of "Maqāla" 4 of the Book on the Soul of Ibn-Sīnā's Shifā'. An appendix contains the parallel passages found in three other works: الإشارات والتنبيهات، النجاة، النكت والفوائد في العلم الطبيعي, together with the résumé by Thomas Aquinas.

 

Introduction

For most of the 20^th century, from Freud to Karl Menninger, mainstream psychology focused on behavior. Its concern was to foster functional, normal or adjusted behavior and remedy dysfunctional, abnormal or mal-adjusted behavior. The first kind of behavior produces contentment with oneself and harmony with others.—Virtue was out of the picture. The second kind of behavior is the opposite.—with vice and repentance totally out of the picture.

Going to the cause of positive behavior, such psychologists stressed affirmation by others, good health and diet, and a balanced life style-with little reference to moral standards. Remedying negative behavior was achieved by psychoanalytic recall of childhood traumas and bad memories, with an effort to confront these and neutralize their binding power.

There were other practitioners, such as Alfred Adler and his followers, who dissented from behaviorism, but still confined themselves to psychoanalysis.

Later it was discovered that (psychotic) behavior problems resulted from chemical imbalance in the brain, and could be controlled by medicine.

At the same time, some psychologists and psychiatrists came to realize that religion and the spirit are factors to be reckoned with in their practice.[2]

Psychologists are rather good at understanding behavior patterns, how one set of actions or attitudes leads to predictable results. They also are good at how these chains of actions can be broken by other factors that may steer the person in a different direction.

Psychologists of whatever persuasion, however, have given little attention to the make-up of the human psyche. This is unfortunate, because what we are-by nature and then by habit-determines how we act.

A notable exception is the school of A.A.A. Terruwe (1911-2004) and Conrad Baars (1919-1981).[3] They correlate clinical psychiatric experience with the perennial philosophical tradition rooted in Aristotle, expanded in the philosophers of the Muslim world, and reaching fruition in Thomas Aquinas.

Ibn-Sīnā's treatise is a high-point in the history of exploration into the human psyche. It discusses human nature from every physical and spiritual aspect. What is of particular value to current Psychology is his discussion of (1) the inner senses, (2) the emotions, and (3) their relation to reason. Each of these deserves attentive study. This paper, however, restricts itself to the inner senses. These underlie the other two, and are the foundation of an integral study of Psychology.

Ibn-Sīnā's Shifā' is patterned after the works of Aristotle. In Book 6, on the Soul, "Maqāla" 4, in a systematic way he treats of the inner senses, a subject only mentioned in passing by Aristotle. Aristotle mentions "common sense" and "imagination" in his book on the Soul. He also wrote a small treatise "Memory and Recollection". He never discussed the "estimative sense". In this "Maqāla", Section 1 discusses what the inner senses are, one by one. Sections 2 and 3 describe the behavior of these senses.

The Shifā' has no separate volume corresponding to Aristotle's Parva Naturalia. Some of their contents (memory and recollection, sleep and being awake, dreams, divination and prophecy) are worked into Sections 2 and 3.

In this study, I present the text and translation of ash-Shifā', Book 6 on the Soul, Maqāla 4, Section 1, with (1) the Arabic text, (2) a translation, and (3) annotations. The paragraph numbers and subtitles are my own. In the annotations I summarize explanations given in Sections 2 and 3, which describe the behavior of these senses. A reference such as "2:3" means Section 2, paragraph 3, in the Arabic edition.

An appendix contains the parallel passages to Section 1 found in three other works: الإشارات والتنبيهات، النجاة، النكت والفوائد في العلم الطبيعي, together with a summary of it by Thomas Aquinas. Thomas Aquinas credits Ibn-Sīnā in his own discussion of these senses,[4] which is simply borrowed from Ibn-Sīnā. Thomas' treatise has become part of the Thomistic legacy, and thus has entered the mainstream of Western thought up to today.

الشفاء: الطبيعيات
الكتاب السادس: النفس

(تصدير ومراجعة الدكتور إبراهيم مدكور، بتحقيق الأب الدكتور جورج قنواتي وسعيد زايد
القاهرة: الهيئة المصرية العامة للكتاب، 1975)
المقالة الرابعة
في الحواس الباطنة

Ash-Shifā' [= healing]: The Natural Sciences
Book 6: the Soul

(published and reviewed by Dr. Ibrahim Madkūr, edited by Fr. Dr. George Anawati (O.P.) and Sa`id Zayd)
Cairo: The General Egyptian Book Society: 1975)
The 4^th Maqāla
on the internal senses

الفصل الأول
فيه قول كلي على الحواس الباطنة التي للحيوان

The First Section
which is a general treatment of the internal senses in an animal

Annotation: In this chapter, Ibn-Sīnā distinguishes five internal senses. These are:

— the collative sense	المشترك
— the imagination / recording power	الخيال / المتصور
— the estimative sense	الوهمية
— the imaginative / cogitative power	المتخيلة / المفكرة
— memory / recollection	الحافظة = الذاكرة / المتذكرة

Other works of Ibn-Sīnā (الإشارات، النجاة، النكت والفوائد في العلم الطبيعي) give the same names and the same descriptions of these five senses, except for النكت, which confuses the description of the imaginative/cogitative power with that of memory.

1.       The collative sense—المشترك

وأما الحس المشرك فهو بالحقيقة غير ما ذهب إليه من ظن أن للمحسوسات المشتركة حساً مشتركة، بل الحس المشترك هو القوة التي تتأدي إليها المحسوسات كلها، فإنه لو لم تكن قوة واحدة تدرك الملون والملموس لما كان لنا أن تميز بينها قائلين: إنه ليس هذا ذاك. وهب أن هذا التمييز هو للعقل، فيجب لا محالة أن يكون العقل يجدهما معاً حتى يميز بينهما، وذلك لأنها من حيث هي محسوسة وعلى النحو المتأدي من المحسوس لا يدركها العقل كما سنوضح بعد. وقد نميز نحن بينها، فيجب أن يكون لها اجتماع عند مميز إما في ذاته وإما في غيره، ومحال ذلك في العقل على ما ستعلمه. فيجب أن يكون في قوة أخرى، ولو لم يكن قد اجتمع عند الخيال من البهائم التي لا عقل لها المائلة بشهوتها إلى الحلاوة مثلاً أن شيئاً صورته كذا هو حلو لما كانت إذا رأته همت بأكله، كما أنه لو لا أن عندنا نحن أن هذا الأبيض هو هذا المغني لما كنا إذا سمعنا غناءه الشخصي أثبتنا عينه الشخصية وبالعكس. ولو لم يكن في الحيوان ما تجتمع فيه صور المحسوسات لتعذرت عليها الحياة، ولم يكن الشم دالاً لها على الطعم، ولم يكن الصوت دالاً إياها على الطعم، ولم تكن صورة الخشبة تذكرها صورة الألم حتى تهرب منها. فيجب لا محالة أن يكون لهذه الصور مجمع واحد من باطن.

The collative sense is really different from what people imagine as a "common sense" for common sensibles. Rather the collative sense is a power towards which all sensibles converge. For if there were no single sense that apprehends what is colored and what is palpable, we would not be able to distinguish them, by saying "This is not that." Grant that the intellect makes this distinction. But the intellect must necessarily find them together before distinguishing them—and that at the sensible level. And the intellect does not perceive the action of the sensible, as we will explain later. But we do distinguish them. Therefore they must be joined when they are distinguished—either essentially or externally. But that is impossible for the intellect, as you will come to know. So it must be another power. And if these sensibles were not joined in the imagination of unintelligent beasts that gravitate by desire towards sweetness, for example, which it pictures to be in a certain thing, it would not rush to eat when it sees it. And if we were not able to identify this white man with this singer when we hear his personal song, we would not be able to recognize him personally, and vice-versa. And if an animal had no way to combine sensibles, its life would be impossible—smell would not lead it to food, neither would sound, nor would the appearance of a club remind it of the appearance of pain which it would flee from. So necessarily there must be one interior repository of these forms.

Annotation: The term "sensible" is used here as a noun, the sensible thing and object of sensation.

I use the phrase "collative sense" in place of the literal "common sense" which has the very different current meaning of practical prudence. Ibn-Sīnā points out that the combination of diverse data makes life possible for beasts and humans. Later he distinguishes between data that is pure "form" (șūra) and data which has a value-significance (ma`nā). Not having yet made that distinction, he speaks here as if "pain" and "food" are simply data provided by the external senses.

2.       The collative sense, continued

وقد يدلنا على وجود هذه القوة اعتبارات أمور تدل على أن لها آلة غير الحواس الظاهرة مما نراه من تخيل المدورية أن كل شيء يدور، فذلك إما عارض عرض في المرئيات أو عارض عرض في الآلة التي بها تتم الرؤية، وإذا لم يكن في المرئيات كان لا محالة في شيء آخر. وليس الدوار إلا بسبب حركة البخار في الدماغ وفي الروح التي فيه، فيعرض لتلك الروح أن تدور، فتكون إذن القوة المرتبة هناك هي التي يعرض لها أمر قد فرغنا منه. وكذلك يعرض للإنسان دوارمن تأمل ما يدور كثيراً على ما أنبأنا به. وليس يكون ذلك بسبب أمر في جزء من العين، ولا في روح مصبوب فيه. وكذلك نتخيل استعجال المتحرك النقطي مستقيماً أو مستديراً على ما سلف من قبل، ولأن تمثل الأشباح الكاذبة وسماع الأصوات الكاذبة قد يعرض لمن تفسد لهم آلات الحسن أو كان مثلاً مغمضاً لعينه، ولا يكون السبب في ذلك إلا تمثلها في هذا المبدأ. والتخيلات التي تقع في النوم إما أن تكون لارتسام في خزانة حافظة المصور، ولو كان كذلك لوجب أن يكون كل ما اختزن فيها متمثلاً في النفس ليس بعضها دون بعض حتى يكون ذلك البعض كأنه مرئي أو مسموع وحده أو أن يكون يعرض لها التمثل في قوة أخرى، وذلك إما حس ظاهر وإما حس باطن، لكن الحس الظاهر معطل في النوم، وربما كان الذي يتخيل ألواناً ما مسمول العين فبقي أن يكون حساً باطناً، وليس يمكن أن يكون إلا المبدأ للحواس الظاهرة. والذي كان إذا استوات القوة الوهمية وجعلت تستعرض ما في الخزانة تستعرضه بها ولو في اليقظة، فإذا استحكم ثباتها فيها كانت كالمشاهدة.

فهذه القوة هي التي تسمى الحس المشترك وهي مركز الحواس، ومنها تتشعب الشعب، وإليها تؤدي الحواس، وهي بالحقيقة هي التي تحس.

We are introduced to the existence of this power by the evidence of things indicating that the soul has an instrument other than the external senses. This is evident from the imaginary surmise of dizzy people, who say that everything is spinning. That is either an accidental occurring in visible objects or an accidental occurring in the instrument where vision is perfected. And if it is not in the visible objects, it necessarily must be in something else. For the spinning only occurs because of the motion of vapor in the brain and in the brain's spirit. For that spirit happens to be spinning. Therefore it is the power established there that was exposed to the phenomenon we have just finished with. Likewise, a man can experience dizziness from thinking intensely about something that is spinning, as we have observed. For that does not occur because of something in a part of the eye, nor in a spirit poured into it. Likewise we can imagine a pointed object moving in a straight line or in a curve, according to the preceding. Again, appearances of false ghosts and hearing false voices can happen to those with damaged sense organs, or it may happen because of a representation blocking the person's eye. But the cause of that can only be the appearance of these phenomena in this principle [the collative sense].

Imaginary experiences in sleep could occur because an image is depicted in the repository of forms. If that were the case, everything that was stored there should appear to the soul, not a part of it without the rest—with that part alone audible. Otherwise these [sleep] experiences occur in another power. That can only be an external sense or an internal sense. But external senses are disengaged in sleep.

Also, someone with eyes removed can still imagine some colors. Therefore [the seat of these experiences] must be an internal sense. This can only be in the [unifying] principle of the external senses.

This happens when the estimative sense takes over and conducts a review of the contents of the repository. It does so even when the person is awake. And if it takes complete control of the repository, the contents appear as if they were witnessed in reality.

This power is called the collative sense, and it is the center of the senses. From it they branch out, and in it the senses terminate. It is the power that really senses.

Annotation: As evidence for the existence of the collative sense, Ibn-Sīnā inductively from four examples:

1. He first adduces the experience of phrenetics who suffer from hallucinations. He argues that these cannot take place in the external sense organs, but must occur in the brain. The "spirit" in the eye refers to the physical spirits supposed to be instruments of the soul in administering the body.
2. He then turns to dreams occurring in sleep, when the external senses are idle.
3. He then cites the case of a person whose eyes have been gauged out, who can still imagine colors.
4. Finally, he makes reference to the estimative sense (to be discussed below). This sense fixes on objects of fear or delight, and can become so strong that the enemy—or the pleasure—can seem to be really there right in front of the person.

All these arguments point to the existence of some internal sense in general. In what follows, Ibn-Sīnā goes on to distinguish the inner senses from one another.

3.                   The imagination / recording power—الخيال / المصورة

لكن إمساك ما تدره هذه هو للقوة التي تسمى خيالاً وتسمى مصورة وتسمى متخيلة، وربما فرق بين الخيال والمتخيلة بحسب الاصطلاح، ونحن ممن يفصل ذلك. والحس المشترك والخيال كأنهما قوة واحدة وكأنهما لا يختلفان في الموضوع، بل في الصورة. وذلك أنه ليس أن يقبل هو أن يحفظ، فصورة المحسوس تحفظها القوة التي تسمى المصورة والخيال، وليس إليها حكم البتة، بل حفظ. وأما الحس المشترك والحواس الظاهرة فإنها تحكم بجهة ما أو بحكم ما، فيقال إن هذا المتحرك أسود وإن هذا الأحمر حامض، وهذا الحافظ لا يحكم به على شيء من الموجود إلا على ما في ذاته بأن فيه صورة كذا.

But retaining what the power perceives belongs to another, called the imagination, or recording or imaginative sense. The imagination and the imaginative are sometimes distinguished in technical terminology. We are with those who distinguish them.

The collative sense and the imagination are like one power, as if they do not differ in location but in form. The collative sense cannot retain its object, but the sensible form is retained by the recording power or imagination. This makes no judgment, but simply retains [the forms]. But the collative sense and the external senses do judge, in a certain way or with a certain kind of judgment, such as "this moving thing is black", or "this red thing is sour". But the retaining power makes no judgment about a thing existentially, but only about its essence, that it has such a form.

Annotations: Ibn-Sīnā introduces the notion of judgment to sense perception. He is careful to distinguish it from proper intellectual judgment. The collative sense's combination of "a moving thing as black" resembles a judgment, without exiting from the domain of perception.

Ibn-Sīnā adds (Section 2:1) that the recording power is not limited to data from the external senses (through the collative sense) alone, but also includes new combinations of this data, such as designs, made under the guidance of the cogitative power. Other data can result from "imagining, thinking, or something coming from the position of heavenly bodies".

These images can enter the collative sense and appear real in the form of visions or voices. That happens when the intellect is not active (e.g. in sleep) or, if the intellect is active, when the imagination and estimative sense take over. Thus fear can overpower the collative sense and make a person see an enemy approaching when there is no enemy.

This can happen, Ibn-Sīnā explains (2:2), because of the unity of the soul. Heightened operation of one power can impede the operation of another. Thus the inner senses can overpower the outer senses, or vice-versa. The concupiscent (pleasure) appetite can overpower the irascible (or "utility") appetite, and vice-versa. Concentrating on getting something done can impede perception of other things, and vice-versa. If the soul is at peace, then the highest power, the intellect, reigns, without any one power getting out of order. This order can be upset not only through the soul's negligence, but also by injury, weakness, sickness, fear, or sleep.

(2:3) The imagination, left to itself, is free roaming. Its freedom is restricted (1) when the external senses present more engaging data, (2) when the intellect employs it in study or otherwise calls it back to reality.

Ibn-Sīnā (2:4) goes on to take the case of someone with a powerful imagination and a powerful soul. Such a person, while awake, could see or hear things not coming from the external senses, but from elsewhere. This opens the door for prophecy. There is no one, he says (2:5), who has not experienced a vision while awake. The cause of this is "contact" or "conjunction" [with the heavenly world] (اتصال —a focal theme with Ibn-Rushd). The person may be unaware of it when it happens and have no memory of it, but his imagination moves from that to something else, maybe to understand something (المعقولات), maybe to be on guard (الانذارات), or maybe just poetry. A discerning soul keeps the imagination from going haywire.

(2:6) Laws of association guide the movement of the imagination, but heavenly factors can also intervene. (2:7) The imagination quickly moves from one thing to another, often forgetting where it started. When the person wants to go back, then he faces the difficult labor of recollection.

(2:7,11) While asleep or awake, one can come into contact with the heavenly kingdom (الملكوت). If the person is well disposed, he has no need of an interpretation and has no trouble remembering it. Otherwise, he comes away with a confused impression which he cannot reconstruct. Some visions (2:8) are partial, cut off, and incomplete. These need interpretation. Others (2:9) are mere remembrances of past experiences, without any new contact.

(2:12) Someone with a noble soul and powerful imaginative and recalling powers can experience these things while awake without being disturbed by his outward sensations. Others experience them only when their discerning power is turned off. Someone can experience an emanation from the hidden divine world (فيض الغيب) into his inner senses in two ways: (1) by picturing its particular meaning in a way that can be remembered, (2) by the help of his will, drawn to it without effort. In such experiences, a link is established between the hidden divine world and the soul and the imaginative power. At the same time it must not be distracted by the activities of the external senses or the intellect.

(2:13) What is the basis of religious experience? —God knows everything that ever will happen. Angels share in this knowledge. Humans are naturally more in contact with this world than with the sensible world. But our contact is blocked by our being locked in the body and by being dragged down by impurities. Even our dreams from childhood are about our experiences in the world about us. To get in contact with the heavenly kingdom, we need to rise above the demands of nature (food, sex, warmth, coolness etc.) and also (2:14) the demands of our will, i.e. the things we concentrate on, which surface in our dreams. Dreams can also be influence by positions of the heavenly bodies, and have nothing to do with the heavenly kingdom. (2:15) So revelations claimed by poets, liars, wicked, mad or drunk people can be dismissed. True visions occur during an incantation (سحر), when a person is in good shape and his mind is at peace. [I wonder what Ibn-Sīnā has in mind.] (2:16) The person with the best physical temperament is the best receptor.

(2:17) Someone is awake when his external senses are active and his will is in control of his movements. Otherwise he is asleep. (2:18-20) He can be drowsy when the [physical] spirit is busy digesting food with its heat. Drowsiness can also come from brain imbalance (too much moisture).

Against the tendency of Ibn-Sīnā and other Arab philosophers to reduce prophecy to a completely natural phenomenon resulting from eminent intelligence and good inner senses, Thomas Aquinas holds that true prophecy is a purely gratuitous gift out of the control of the prophet, which he cannot exercise whenever he wishes. As a gift, it has nothing to do with the natural intelligence of the prophet, but the adaptation of his intellect to receive divine enlightenment is a supernatural gift.[5]

Thomas Aquinas also would take exception to what Ibn-Sīnā says in (2:13), that humans are naturally more in contact with the angelic world than with the sensible world or, as he says elsewhere, that sense knowledge is only an occasion for the infusion of intellectual knowledge from an outside agent intellect. For Thomas, the essences of physical things are the proper object of human knowledge, and through them we come to know the immaterial. Anything more we grasp by gratuitous revelation. Thus he says:

Si autem dicatur, secundum Avicennam, quod sensus sunt animae necessarii, quia per eos excitatur ut convertat se ad intelligentiam agentem, a qua recipit species; hoc quidem non sufficit. Quia si in natura animae est ut intelligat per species ab intelligentia agente effluxas, sequeretur quod quandoque anima possit se convertere ad intelligentiam agentem ex inclinatione suae naturae, vel etiam excitata per alium sensum, ut convertat se ad intelligentiam agentem ad recipiendum species sensibilium quorum sensum aliquis non habet. Et sic caecus natus posset habere scientiam de coloribus, quod est manifeste falsum. Unde dicendum est quod species intelligibiles quibus anima nostra intelligit, non effluunt a formis separatis.

And if it be said with Avicenna, that the senses are necessary to the soul, because by them it is aroused to turn to the "active intelligence" from which it receives the species: neither is this a sufficient explanation. Because if it is natural for the soul to understand through species derived from the "active intelligence," it follows that at times the soul of an individual wanting in one of the senses can turn to the active intelligence, either from the inclination of its very nature, or through being roused by another sense, to the effect of receiving the intelligible species of which the corresponding sensible species are wanting. And thus a man born blind could have knowledge of colors; which is clearly untrue. We must therefore conclude that the intelligible species, by which our soul understands, are not derived from separate forms.[6]

Again:

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, obiectum cognoscibile proportionatur virtuti cognoscitivae. Est autem triplex gradus cognoscitivae virtutis. Quaedam enim cognoscitiva virtus est actus organi corporalis, scilicet sensus. Et ideo obiectum cuiuslibet sensitivae potentiae est forma prout in materia corporali existit. Et quia huiusmodi materia est individuationis principium, ideo omnis potentia sensitivae partis est cognoscitiva particularium tantum. Quaedam autem virtus cognoscitiva est quae neque est actus organi corporalis, neque est aliquo modo corporali materiae coniuncta, sicut intellectus angelicus. Et ideo huius virtutis cognoscitivae obiectum est forma sine materia subsistens, etsi enim materialia cognoscant, non tamen nisi in immaterialibus ea intuentur, scilicet vel in seipsis vel in Deo. Intellectus autem humanus medio modo se habet, non enim est actus alicuius organi, sed tamen est quaedam virtus animae, quae est forma corporis, ut ex supra dictis patet. Et ideo proprium eius est cognoscere formam in materia quidem corporali individualiter existentem, non tamen prout est in tali materia. Cognoscere vero id quod est in materia individuali, non prout est in tali materia, est abstrahere formam a materia individuali, quam repraesentant phantasmata. Et ideo necesse est dicere quod intellectus noster intelligit materialia abstrahendo a phantasmatibus; et per materialia sic considerata in immaterialium aliqualem cognitionem devenimus, sicut e contra Angeli per immaterialia materialia cognoscunt. Plato vero, attendens solum ad immaterialitatem intellectus humani, non autem ad hoc quod est corpori quodammodo unitus, posuit obiectum intellectus ideas separatas; et quod intelligimus, non quidem abstrahendo, sed magis abstracta participando, ut supra dictum est.

As stated above, the object of knowledge is proportionate to the power of knowledge. Now there are three grades of the cognitive powers. For one cognitive power, namely, the sense, is the act of a corporeal organ. And therefore the object of every sensitive power is a form as existing in corporeal matter. And since such matter is the principle of individuality, therefore every power of the sensitive part can only have knowledge of the individual. There is another grade of cognitive power which is neither the act of a corporeal organ, nor in any way connected with corporeal matter; such is the angelic intellect, the object of whose cognitive power is therefore a form existing apart from matter: for though angels know material things, yet they do not know them save in something immaterial, namely, either in themselves or in God. But the human intellect holds a middle place: for it is not the act of an organ; yet it is a power of the soul which is the form of the body, as is clear from what we have said above. And therefore it is proper to it to know a form existing individually in corporeal matter, but not as existing in this individual matter. But to know what is in individual matter, not as existing in such matter, is to abstract the form from individual matter which is represented by the phantasms. Therefore we must needs say that our intellect understands material things by abstracting from the phantasms; and through material things thus considered we acquire some knowledge of immaterial things, just as, on the contrary, angels know material things through the immaterial.[7]

4.                   The imaginative / cogitative sense— المتخيلة / المفكرة

ثم قد نعلم يقيناً أنه في طبيعتنا أن نركب المحسوسات بعضها إلى بعض، وأن نفصل بعضها عن بعض، لا على الصورة التي وجناها عليها من خارج ولا مع تصديق بوجود شيء منها أو لا وجودة. فيجب أن تكون فينا قوة نفعل ذلك بها، وهذه هي التي تسمى إذا استعملها العقل مفركة. وإذا استعملها قوة حيوانية متخيلة.

We are certain of this, that it is in our nature to combine and to separate sense data, in disconformity with the external data as we found it, and this without affirming that our constructs really exist or not. There must be a power in us enabling us to do that. If this power is used in the service of the intellect, it is called the cogitative power. If it is at the service of an animal power, it is called the imaginative power.

Annotation: As noted in the introduction, this passage has its parallels in الإشارات, النجاة, and النكت, except that the last one confuses its description with that of memory.

Faithful to Ibn-Sīnā up to this point of Section 1, Thomas Aquinas (full text in appendix) observes:

Avicenna vero ponit quintam potentiam, mediam inter aestimativam et imaginativam, quae componit et dividit formas imaginatas; ut patet cum ex forma imaginata auri et forma imaginata montis componimus unam formam montis aurei, quem nunquam vidimus. Sed ista operatio non apparet in aliis animalibus ab homine, in quo ad hoc sufficit virtus imaginativa. Cui etiam hanc actionem attribuit Averroes, in libro quodam quem fecit de sensu et sensibilibus. Et sic non est necesse ponere nisi quatuor vires interiores sensitivae partis, scilicet sensum communem et imaginationem, aestimativam et memorativam.

Avicenna, however, assigns between the estimative and the imaginative, a fifth power, which combines and divides imaginary forms: as when from the imaginary form of gold, and imaginary form of a mountain, we compose the one form of a golden mountain, which we have never seen. But this operation is not to be found in animals other than man, in whom the imaginative power suffices thereto. To man also does Averroes attribute this action in his book De sensu et sensibilibus (viii). So there is no need to assign more than four interior powers of the sensitive part—namely, the common sense, the imagination, the estimative and memorative powers.

5.                   The estimative sense—الوهم

ثم إنا قد نحكم في المحسوسات بمعان لا نحسها، إما أن لا تكون في طبائعها محسوسة البتة، وإما أن تكون محسوسة لكننا لا نحسها وقت الحكم. أما التي لا تكون محسوسة في طبائعها فمثل العداوة والرداءة والمنافرة التي تدركها الشاة في صورة الذئب، وبالجملة المعنى الذي ينفرها عنه، والموافقة التي تدركها من صاحبها، وبالجملة المعنى يؤنسها به. وهذه أمور تدركها النفس الحيوانية، والحس لا يدلها على شيء منها. فإذن القوة التي بها تدرك، قوة أخرى ولنسم الوهم. وأما التي تكون محسوسة فإنا نرى مثلاً شيئاً أصفر فنحكم أنه عسل وحلو، فإن هذا ليس يؤديه إليه الحاس في هذا الوقت، وهو من جنس المحسوس، على أن الحكم نفسه ليس بمحسوس البتة وإن كانت أجزاؤه من جنس المحسوس، وليس يدركه في الحال، إنما هو حكم نحكم به ربما غلط فيه وهو أيضاً لتلك القوة. وفي الإنسان للوهم أحكام خاصة من جملتها حمله النفس على أن تمنع وجود أشياء لا تتخيل ولا ترتسم فيه ويأبى التصديق بها. فهذه القوة لا محالة موجودة فينا، وهو الرئيسة الحاكمة في الحيوان حكماً ليس فصلاً كالحكم العقلي، ولكن حكماً تخيلياً مقروناً بالجزئية وبالصورة الحسية، وعنها تصدر أكثر الأفعال الحيوانية.

Then we predicate tags of sensibles which we do not sense—either because they are not sensible in their natures at all, or because they are sensible but we do not sense them at the time of predication. An example of something not sensible in its nature is enmity, harm, and [the need for] flight, which the sheep senses at the appearance of a wolf. In summary, a tag is what makes the sheep flee from it, or it is an advantage that it sees in something—such a tag attracts the sheep to it. These are the things that animal nature perceives, but [external] sense provides the animal with no indication of them. So the power which perceives them is another power; we call it the estimative power. As for the sensible, we see for example something yellow, and we judge that it is honey and sweet, whereas this judgment is not about anything sensible at all—even though some of its components are sensible—and cannot be perceived in any way. Our judgment about it can even be erroneous. Yet it too pertains to that power.

In man the estimative power makes special kinds of judgments—some of them carry the soul to deny the existence of things it cannot imagine or depict, and to refuse to affirm them. This power is undeniably present in us, but it is the supreme judging power in animals. Its judgment is not a decision like an intellectual judgment, but is only an imaginative judgment characterized by particularity and sense images. It is the source of most animal activity.

Annotation: "Estimative" is a broad term that includes both animal and human functioning of this sense. Applied to animals alone, the proper term would be "instinct".

I prefer to translate معان as "significance"—in this context, value-significances or utility-significances. (Thomas Aquinas uses the term "intentio".) Later, in describing memory, we will see that they can include time significances. These significances are combined with the objects of the external senses, which have been combined by the collative sense. External sensibles include what is proper to each sense—such as color to sight—and common sensibles, i.e. the mathematical factors of shape, number and motion. These can be sensed directly along with the proper objects—by more than one external sense.

In this passage, the advantages or threats perceived by the estimative sense are combinations of proper sensibles, i.e. pleasure or pain with a particular sensible thing. Ibn-Sīnā speaks of this sense's "judgment", which he again distinguishes from a proper intellectual judgment, which composes or divides two concepts. The estimative sense seems to make a judgment because it joins diverse sense data in a single perception. The sheep does not perceive that the wolf is harmful, but it perceives the wolf as harmful.

The example of the sheep fearing the wolf is one item already found in al-Fārābī:

الوهم قوة تدرك من المحسوس ما لا يحس، مثل القوة التي في الشاة إذا أشبحت صورة الذئب في حاسة الشاة.[8]

Commenting on the function of this sense (3:1), Ibn-Sīnā says that it is the chief discerning power in animals, even though it does not have the deciding power (تفصيل) of intellect. Many people are dominated by this sense, instead of following reason, so that they hardly differ from animals. But when this sense comes under the influence of reason, it helps man in various ways, such as conducting scientific experiments.

(3:2) This sense is evident in babies, as they instinctively suck the breast etc. Animals too have instinctive inspirations (إلهامات غريزية) necessary for their survival. (3:3) Much of this is inborn, but some is learned by association. For example, a dog learns to fear a stick raised against them.

(3:4) The estimative sense requires the service of the memory and the external senses. It requires the service of the imagination (or recording power) only for the sake of memory and recollection, discussed next.

6.                   Memory and recollection— الحافظة (الذاكرة) والمتذكرة

وقد جرت العادة بأن يسمى مدرك الحس صورة ومدرك الوهم معنى، ولكل واحد منهما خزانة. فخزانة مدرك الحس هي القوة الخيالية، وموضعها مقدم الدماغ. فلذلك إذا حدثت هناك آفة فسد هذا الباب من التصور، إما بأن تتخيل صوراً ليست أو يصعب استثبات الموجود فيها.

وخزانة مدرك الوهم هي القوة التي تسمى الحافظة، ومعدنها مؤخر الدماغ، ولذلك إذا وقع هناك آفاة وقع الفساد فيما يختص بحفظ هذه المعاني. وهذه القوة تسمى أيضاً متذكرة. فتكون حافظة لصيانتها ما فيها، ومتذكرة لسرعة استعدادها لاستثباته، والتصور به مستعيدة إياه إذا فقد، وذلك إذا أقبل الوهم بقوته المتخيلة فجعل يعرض واحداً واحداً من الصور الموجودة في الخيال ليكون كأنه يشاهد الأمور التي هذه صورها. فإذا عرض له الصورة التي أدرك معها المعنى الذي بطل، لاح له المعنى حينئذ كما لاح من الخارج، واستثبته القوة الحافظة في نفسها كما كانت حينئذ تستثبت فكان ذاكراً. وربما كان المصير من المعنى إلى الصورة، فيكون التذكر للمطلوب ليس نسبته إلى ما في خزانة الحفظ، بل نسبته إلى ما في خزانة الخيال. فكأن إعادته إما في وجه العود إلى هذه المعاني التي في الحفظ حتى يضطر المعنى إلى لوح الصورة فتعود النسبة إلى ما في الخيال ثانياً، وإما بالرجوع إلى الحس. مثال الأول أنك إذا نسيت نسبته إلى صورة وكنت عرفت تلك النسبة تأملت الفعل الذي كان يقصد منها، فلما عرفت الفعل ووجدته وعرفت أنه أي طعم وشكل ولون يصلح له فاستثبت النسبة به وألفت ذلك وحصلته نسبة إلى صورة في الخيال وأعدت النسبة في الذكر، فإن خزانة الفعل هو الحفظ لأنه من المعنى. فإن كان أشكل ذلك عليك من هذه الجهة أيضاً ولم يتضح، فأورد عليك الحس صورة الشيء، عادت مستقرة في الخيال وعادت النسبة إليه مستقرة في التي تحفظ.

It is customary to call the object of sense "form" and the object of the estimative sense a "significance". Each of these has its own repository. The repository of sense data is the imagination, and its location is in the front of the brain. Therefore if this part suffers damage, this results in impaired recording. The imagination then produces forms that do not or hardly correspond with reality.

The repository of the estimative data is called the retentive power. Its location is the back of the brain. Therefore if this part suffers injury, the ability of this power to retain significances is impaired.

This power is also called retentive because of what it produces there. It is called recollective because of its speedy readiness to ascertain a thing, to represent it, and to retrieve it if it is lost. That comes about when the estimative power comes with its imaginative power and examines the contents of the imagination one by one, as if witnessing the things of which these are the forms. And when it meets a form that it had once perceived with a significance, but later lost it, that significance then bursts upon this power as if from the outside. The retentive power then verifies it in itself as it had perceived it then, and it thereby remembers.

Sometimes the route goes from the significance to the form. In that case the recollection of the required [missing] data is not related to what is in the memory repository, but to what is in the imagination repository. Then you could say its return is either (1) by way of return to these significances that are in the memory until the significance is forced onto the form, and [the memory] is linked once more to what is in the imagination, or (2) by way of a return to the [external] sense.

As an example of the first, if you forget the significance's link to a form, but you know that link, then you think about the act that was expected from it. Once you know the act and find it and know that it is some sort of flavor, with the form and color that befit it, then you ascertain what it is linked to, become familiar with that, acquire it as it is linked to a form in the imagination, and re-establish the link in the memory. For the repository of the act is the memory, because the act is a significance.

If [doing] that by this procedure is difficult for you, and is not clear, [the alternative is for external] sense to bring you the image of the thing; [then] it settles once more in the imagination, and the link to it returns, settled in the power that retains it.

Annotation: Ibn-Sīnā's description of the imagination repository reminds us of a data bank. The memory, which stores the significances, reminds us of a data bank index, which cross-references the data, and can discover whatever combination we are looking for.

In this section, Ibn-Sīnā concentrates on recalling, and has little to say about remembering. We should note Aristotle's observation that only animals that sense time have memory (449b).

Aristotle remarks (450a) that memory [of sensible things] belongs only incidentally to the intellect, but essentially to the primary faculty of sense perception—i.e. the collative sense (ὥστε τοῦ νοῦ μὲν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἂν εἴη͵ καθ΄ αὑτὸ δὲ τοῦ πρώτου αἰσθητικοῦ). Thomas Aquinas comments:

Posset aut alicui videri quod ex his quae hic dicuntur, quod phantasia et memoria non sunt potentiae distinctae a sensu communi, sed sint quaedam passiones ipsius. Sed Avicenna rationabiliter ostendit esse diversas potentias. Cum enim potentiae sensitivae sint actus corporalium organorum, necesse est ad diversas potentias pertinere receptionem formarum sensibilium quae pertinet ad sensum, et conservationem earum, quae pertinet ad phantasiam sive imaginationem; sicut in corporalibus videmus quod ad aliud principium pertinet receptio et conservatio: humida enim sunt bene receptiva, sicca autem et dura bene conservativa. Similiter etiam ad aliud principium pertinet recipere formam, et conservare receptam per sensum et intentionem aliquam per sensum non apprehensam, quamvis aestimativa percipit etiam in aliis animalibus, vis autem memorativa retinet, cuius est memorari rem non absolute, sed prout est in praeterito apprehensa a sensu vel intellectu.

It could seem to someone, however, based on what has been said, that imagination and memory are not powers distinct from common sense, but are certain states (passiones) of it. Avicenna, however, reasonably showed that they are different powers. For because the sensory powers are actualities of corporeal organs, it is necessary for there to be different powers for the reception of sensible forms, which pertains to sense, and the conservation of them, which pertains to phantasia or imagination. In this way we see in the case of physical things that reception and conservation pertain to different principles. For humid things receive well, whereas dry and hard things conserve well. Likewise too it pertains to different principles to receive or to conserve (a) a form received through the sense and (b) some intention not apprehended through sense, which the estimative power perceives even in other [non-human] animals, whereas the memory power retains it. This latter power remembers a thing not absolutely, but as it has in the past been apprehended by sense or intellect. Yet it may be that of various powers one is as it were the root and origin of the others, and that their acts presuppose the act of that first power: in the way that the nutritive power is as it were the root of the growing and generative powers, both of which use nutrition. Likewise, then, the common sense is the root of phantasia and memory, which presuppose the act of common sense.

In Ibn-Sīnā's discussion of recollection, the example which he says may be difficult and not clear is, in fact, an obscure passage. I tried to make the best sense of it that I could.

Commenting on the behavior of this sense (3:4), Ibn-Sīnā states that memory is found in other animals, but recollection, which is an exercise of the imagination to bring back what fell from memory, is found only "as far as I can suppose" in man. That is because the discovery that something was there and then was lost can only be the work of the rational power. Other animals may appear to be rational, but it is only the estimative power at work in them, imitating reason. Other animals are not concerned about searching for what they forgot.

(3:5) Recalling resembles learning in that both are searching for the unknown. But recalling is looking for future knowledge that it had in the past, whereas learning is not about past knowledge. Besides, learning proceeds by definition and argument, but remembering proceeds by chance associations.

(3:6) Some people are better at learning than recalling, because they focus on necessary universal truths; for others it is the opposite. Likewise, some are good at remembering but weak at recalling, and others the opposite. Those who recall best are those who are best at recognizing associations or symbols (إشارات). Ibn-Sīnā looks for a physical basis for this difference, and develops a theory based on the qualities of elements, following Aristotle (450b): If the brain organ tends to be dry, it takes an imprint (learns) slowly, but does not lose it easily (forget). If the organ tends to be moist, it receives an impression easily (learns), but loses it easily (forgets). Plenty of mental motion or distractions is another reason forgetting—Therefore babies (who also are very curious) remember well, but distracted youth do not. For old people, Ibn-Sīnā goes back to the chemical explanation: Their brain is too moist.

(3:7) Recollection often revives the anger, sadness, depression and the like, which was experienced in a past event. The same holds for hope—which imagines some thing as already given—and wish, which is a desire for a pleasure it will enjoy if it comes about. Fear is the opposite of hope, and despair is its absence. All these are judgments made by the estimative sense.

7.                  Memory continued, and concluding observations

وهذه القوة المركبة بين الصورة والصورة، وبين الصورة والمعنى، وبين المعنى والمعنى، هي كأنها القوة الوهمية بالموضوع، لا من حيث تحكم، بل من حيث تعمل لتصل إلى الحكم. وقد جعل مكانها وسط الدماغ ليكون لها اتصال بخزانتي المعنى والصورة. ويشبه أن يكون القوة الوهمية هي بعينها المفكرة والمتخيلة والمتذكرة، وهي بعينها الحاكمة فتكون بذاتها حاكمة وبحركاتها وأفعالها متخيلة ومتذكرة، فتكون متخيلة بما تعمل في الصور والمعاني، ومتذكرة بما ينتهي إليه عملها. وأما الحافظة فهي قوة خزانتها، ويشبه أن يكون التذكر الواقع بالقصد معنى للإنسان وحده، وأن خزانة الصورة هي المصورة والخيال، وأن خزانة المعنى هي الحافظة. ولا يمتنع أن تكون الوهمية بذاتها حاكمة متخيلة، وبحركاها متخيلة وذاكرة.

This power, which combines form and form, or form and significance, or significance and significance, is like the estimative sense in location, not in judging, but in working to link with judgment. Its location is the middle of the brain, so that it can communicate with the repositories of both significances and forms.

It might seem that the estimative sense is itself the cogitative and imaginative and recollective powers, but it is itself a judging power: by its essence judging, by its movements and actions imagining and recalling. It is imagining by how it acts upon the forms and significances, and remembering in the way its action terminates.

The retentive sense is the power of its repository.

It seems that the recollective power, which operates with purpose, is an attribute of man alone, and that the repository of the form is the recording power or imagination, and that the repository of the significance is the memory.

But it is not impossible for the estimative power, by its essence, to be judging and imaginative, and by its movements imaginative and remembering.

Annotation: The last paragraph of this section discusses resemblances between the various inner senses.

He starts with "this power"—a continuation of the discussion of the recollective power, but combination of data takes place both in the memory—when something is first remembered, and in the process of recalling what is forgotten. Memory, which retains the data of the estimative sense, does not do the estimating (judging) itself, but connects with estimated data.

Ibn-Sīnā does not identify the different types of significances used in recalling, but Aristotle (451b) mentions starting "from either the present or another moment, or also from something similar, contrary, or contiguous to what we seek" (ἀπὸ τοῦ νῦν ἢ ἄλλου τινός͵ καὶ ἀφ΄ ὁμοίου ἢ ἐναντίου ἢ τοῦ σύνεγγυς). Thomas Aquinas explains how a time significance works. We can select any familiar date and work forwards or backwards from that in an attempt to remember something that happened on another day.[9] Thomas concludes:

Sic ergo ad bene memorandum vel reminiscendum, ex praemissis quatuor documenta utilia addiscere possumus. Quorum primum est, ut studeat quae vult retinere in aliquem ordinem deducere. Secundo ut profunde et intente eis mentem apponat. Tertio ut frequenter meditetur secundum ordinem. Quarto ut incipiat reminisci a principio.

If we want to remember or recall well, from the foregoing we can learn four useful ways: (1) Put what you want to remember in some kind of order. (2) Store it in your mind intensely and deeply. (3) Frequently go over what you stored in the order you stored it. (4) In recalling, start from the beginning.

Later,[10] Thomas observes that remembering can be impeded by being distracted. The person must then restart his search from the beginning. This is what Ibn-Sīnā observed above, when talking about imagination (#3, annotation 2:7).

The estimative sense utilizes the imagination and recollective power, but its task is essentially to evaluate a object, to perceive it as beneficial or harmful. The last line includes constructive imagining as another essential function of this power. In section 3:1, Ibn-Sīnā explains that the estimative power is a creature of habit, sometimes taking things as beneficial or harmful even when reason judges otherwise.

Ibn-Sīnā summarizes (3:8) characteristics of all animal knowing powers. First, all of them operate through organs. Secondly, they perceive forms that are particular and not abstracted from matter.

Why do senses need organs? —It is because their objects are bodily. The senses must be bodily themselves to link with bodily objects. They also must be organic to receive images of physical objects. Ibn-Sīnā goes on to make a graphic illustration corresponding to that made by Aristotle towards the end of his book Memory and Reminiscence (452a-b).

(3:9) The imagination requires an organ, just like the external senses, because it depicts objects as they physically exist, or in a modified but always physical way. The intellect, on the contrary, can make hypotheses about physical objects without depicting them, for instance, in supposing that an image is inverted, or rotated in any direction at any angle. (3:11) The imagination cannot depict something simultaneously black and white, (3:12) but the intellect can know black and white together, without affirming them to exist simultaneously.

What was said of the imagination applies equally to the estimative sense.

Summary thus far

In this passage, Ibn-Sīnā demonstrates his ability to use Aristotle's observations, and go far beyond them. In the parallel passage in النجاة (a summary of الشفاء—reproduced below), Ibn-Sīnā keeps to the same teaching, but lists the inner senses in a different and clearer order.

The first three have to do with simple forms:

1. The collative, when these forms are present
2. The imagination or recording power, which stores these forms
3. the imaginative, which formulates new, unreal combinations

The last two have to do with value-significances:

4. The estimative, when these significances are present
5. The memory, to store them.

Thomas Aquinas' summary of Ibn-Sīnā in Summa Theologiae (reproduced below) is only that, a summary, not intended to replace detailed discussion of the original. Thomas' only contribution to the discussion was his siding with Ibn-Rushd in merging numbers 2 and 3 of the above list, because "this operation is not to be found in animals other than man, in whom the imaginative power suffices thereto."

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APPENDIX
PARALLEL PASSAGES

النجاة

في الحواس الباطنة[11]

وأما القوى المدركة من باطن، فبعضها قوى تدرك صور المحسوسات، وبعضها قوى تدرك معاني المحسوسات. ومن المدركات ما يدرك ويفعل معاً، ومنها ما يدرك ولا يفعل. ومنها ما يدرك إدراكاً أولياً، ومنها ما يدرك إدراكاً ثانياً. والفرق بين إدراك الصورة وإدراك المعنى أن الصورة هي الشيء الذي تدركه النفس الباطنة والحس الظاهر معاً، لكن الحس الظاهر يدركه أولاً ويؤديه إلى النفس، مثل إدراك الشاة لصورة الذئب، أعني شكله وهيئته ولونه، فإن نفس الشاة الباطنة تدركها، ويدركها أولاً حسها الظاهر. وأما المعنى فهو الشيء الذي تدركه النفس من المحسوس من غير أن يدركه الحس الظاهر أولاً، مثل إدراك الشاة لمعنى المضاد في الذئب، وهو المعنى الموجب لخوفها إياه وهربها عنه، من غير أن يكون الحس يدرك ذلك البتة. فالذي يدرك من الذئب أولاً بالحس، ثم القوى الباطنة، هو الصورة، والذي تدركه القوى الباطنة دون الحس، فهو المعنى.

والفرق بين الإدراك مع الفعل والإدراك لا مع الفعل أن من شأن أفعال بعض القوى الباطنة أن تركب بعض الصورة والمعاني المدركة مع بعض، وتفصله عن بعض، فيكون لها إدراك وفعل أيضاً فيما أدركت. وأما الإدراك لا مع الفعل، فأن يكون الصورة أو المعنى يرتسم في الشيء فقط، من غير أن يفعل فيه تصرفاً البتة. والفرق بين الإدراك الأول والإدراك الثاني وقع للشيء من نفسه، والإدراك الثاني هو أن يكون حصولها له من جهة شيء آخر أداها إليه.

فمن القوى المدركة الباطنة الحيوانية قوة فنطاسيا، أي الحس المشترك، وهي قوة مرتبة في أول التجويف المقدم من الدماغ، تقبل بذاتها جميع الصور المنطبعة في الحواس الخمس متأدية إليه منها.

ثم الخيال والمصورة، وهي قوة مرتبة أيضاً في آخر التجويف المقدم من الدماغ، يحفظ ما قبله الحس المشترك من الحواس الجزئية الخمس، وتبقي في بعد غيبة المحسوسات. واعلم أن القوة التي بها القبول غير القوة التي بها الحفظ. فاعتبر ذلك في الماء، فإن له قوة قبول النقش، وليس له قوة حفظه.

ثم القوة التي تسمى متخيلة بالقياس إلى النفس الحيوانية، ومفكرة بالقياس إلى النفس الإنسانية، وهي قوة مرتبة في التجويف الأوسط من الدماغ عند الدودة، من شأنها أن تركب بعض ما في الخيال مع بعض، وتفصل بعضه عن بعض بحسب الاختيار.

ثم القوة الوهمية، وهي قوة مرتبة في نهاية التجويف الأوسط من الدماغ، تدرك المعاني الغير المحسوسة الموجودة في المحسوسات الحزئية، كالقوة الحاكمة بأن الذئب مهروب عنه، وأن الولد معطوف عليه.

ثم القوة الحافظة الذاكرة وهي قوة مرتبة في التجويف المؤخر من الدماغ، تحفظ ما تدركه القوة الوهمية، من المعاني الغير المحسوسة، الموجودة في المحسوسات الجزئية. ونسبة القوة الحافظة إلى القوة الوهمية كنسبة القوة التي تسمى خيالاً إلى الحس، ونسبة تلك القوة إلى المعاني كنسبة هذه القوة إلى الصور المحسوسة.

فهذه هي قوى النفس الحيوانية. ومن الحيوان ما يكون له الحواس الخمس كلها، ومنه ما له بعضها دون بعض. أما الذوق واللمس، فضروري أن يخلق في كل حيوان، ولكن من الحيوان ما لا يشم، ومنه ما لا يسمع، ومنه ما لا يبصر.

Annotation: This passage approaches the internal senses by a process of division. There are those that refer to:

—      sensible forms only (صور):
	—      present	"fantasy" / collative	فنطسيا / مشترك
	—      stored	imagination / recording power	الخيال / المصورة
	—      composed	imaginative	المتخيلة
—      sensible significances (معان):
	—      only	estimative	الوهمية
	—      stored	memory	الذاكرة / الحافظة

Note that the term "fantasy", in Aristotle, refers to the imagination, not the collative sense.

 

الإشارات والتنبيهات

القسم الثاني: الطبيعة
النمط الثالث: في النفس الأرضية والسماوية
المسألة السادسة: في الحواس الباطنة[12]

فعندك قوة قِبل البصر، إليها يؤدي البصر كالمشاهدة، وعندها تجتمع المحسوسات فتدركها. وعندك قوة تحفظ مثل المحسوسات بعد الغيبة مجتمعة فيها. وبهاتين القوتين يمكنك أن تحكم أن هذا اللون غير هذا الطعم، وأن لصاحب هذا اللون هذا الطعم. فإن القاضي بهذين الأمرين يحتاج إلى أن يحضره المَقضي عليهما جميعاً. فهذه قوى

وأيضاً فإن الحيوانات ناطقها وغير ناطقها تدرك من المحسوسات الجزئية معاني جزئية غير محسوسة، ولا متأدية من طريق الحواس، مثل إدراك الشاة معنى في الذئب غير محسوس، وإدراك الكبش معنى في النعجة غير محسوس، إدراكاً جزئياً تحكم به، كما يحكم الحس بما يشاهده. فعندك قوة هذا شأنها.

وأيضاً فعندك وعند كثير من الحيوانات العجم قوة تحفظ هذه المعاني، بعد حكم الحاكم بها، غير الحافظة للصور.

ولكل قوة من هذه القوى آلة جسمانية خاصة واسم خاص.

فالأولى هي المسماة بالحس المشترك وبنطاسيا، وآلتها الروح المصبوب في مبادئ عصب الحس، لا سيما في مقدم الدماغ.

والثانية المسماة بالمصورة والخيال، وآلتها الروح المصبوب في البطن المقدم، لا سيما في جانبه الأخير.

والثالثة الوهم، وآلته الدماغ كله، ولكن الأخص بها هو التجويف الأوسط.

وتخدمها فيه قوة رابعة، لها أن تركب وتفصل ما يليها من الصور المأخوذة عن الحس والمعاني المدركة بالوهم. وتركب أيضاً الصور بالمعاني، وتفصلها عنها. وتسمى عند استعمال العقل مفكرة، وعند استعمال الوهم متخيلة. وسلطانها في الجزء الأول من التجويف الأوسط. وكأنها قوة ما للوهم. وبتوسط الوهم للعقل

والباقية من القوى هي الذاكرة، وسلطانها في حيز الروح الذي في التجويف الأخير، وهو آلتها. وإنما هدى الناس إلى القضية بأن هذه هي الآلات أن الفساد إذا اختص بتجويف أورث الآفة فيه.

Annotation: Here we have a simple list, just as in the Shifā':

—      collative	المشترك
—      recording power / imagination	المصورة / الخيال
—      estimative	الوهم
—      imaginative / cogitative	المفكرة / المتخيلة
—      memory	الذاكرة

 

النكت والفوائد في العلم الطبيعي

النكتة [13]

وأما الباطنة فمنها الحس المشترك. وذلك أنا قد نجد فينا قوة تجتمع فيها إدراكات الحواس الظاهرة، إما ثلثة أو أربعة أو أقل أو أكثر، كاللون والرائحة والطعم والشم. وليس في الظاهرة شيء تجمع بين شيء من ذلك. وربما لقينا جسماً لونه إلى الصفرة فأدركنا أنه عسل، وله حلاوة وطيب رائحة وهو سيال، فلم نذقه ولا شممناه ولا لمسناه بتلك القوة. نعرف التمييز بين البياض والحلاوة إذ الفارق بينهما هو العارف لهما، ومعرفته لهما بحصولهما فيه. فبيّن أن فينا قوة تجتمع ذلك فيها وتصير صورة أحدية، وهي هذه القوة المتصورة التي تسمى حساً مشتركاً.

وليس من الجائز أن يكون شيء من الخارجة لأن الخارجات إنما تفعل أفاعيلها في اليقظة، وهذه في اليقظة والنوم جميعاً. ولا تصغينّ إلى ما يقوله شيخ اليهود أن المدرك لذلك هو النفس بذاتها لا بآلة، لاستحالة أن ينطبع في النفس الصور الجزئية الجسمانية أولاً بل الصور الكلية العقلية على ما سيُتلى عليك آنفاً. وأيضاً فكوننا نرى القطر النازل كالخط والنار الواحدة إذا أُديرت بسرعة دائرة، ولا يُحس ما ليس له وجود ولا وجود له في الخارج، فبقي أن يكون في الداخل، ولا يكون وجوده في النفس لأنها تقضي بخلافة. وأيضاً فلا تحصل فيها الصور الجزئية، فبقي أن يكون وجوده في قوة أخرى داخلة، تلك المسماة بالحس المشترك، والمحسوسات تجتمع إليها. ثم تجردها إلى العقل.

ثم الخيال، وذلك لأن نجد فينا قوة تحفظ فيها صور المحسوسات بعد غيبتها وتجمعها وتفرقها وتركبها وتبسطها وتوقع فيها أصناف الاختلافات من غير زوالها عن الحس المشترك، والحس المشترك لا يفعل هذه الأفاعيل، وليس له إلا التصور والأخذ من الحواس الظاهرة فقط. وربما صورت هذه القوة باطلاً وكذباً. وما لا يوجد في الحس المسترك وتخيل أشياء مخالفة لما عليه الأمر في الخارج.

ثم المتوهمة وذلك لأنا نجد فينا قوة تفعل غير فعل تلك القوتين، وهو الحاكمة حكماً جزماً بأن الشيء كذا أو ليس، وبها يقع التحذر والتحير. وتلك معان جزئية غير محسوسة ولا بحيث تتأدي من الحواس، وذلك كالميل إلى الولد للشاة والهروب من الذئب، وما وقع فيها وحرمت به كان ظناً.

ثم المتخيلة، وذلك لأنا نجد فينا قوة تحفظ جميع ما يقع في الوهم ويحكم به من الأمور الجزئية كعداوة الذئب وصداقة الولد، وهذا غير فعل كل واحدة من القوى الأولى. والفرق بين هذه وبين الحافظة للصور—وهي الخيال—أن هذه حافظة للمعاني وتلك حافظة للصور، فهي مغايرة لها ضرورة مغايرة فعليهما. وليست بالوهمية لأن لتلك التوهم ولهذه الحفظ، وكل واحد غير الآخر. وليست بالخيال فإن الخيال قد يخيل ما لا يقع في الوهم ولا يجامعه بوجه، وهذه يكون فيها ما تأدي من الوهم. ونسبتها إلى الوهمية نسبة الخيال إلى الحس المشترك، ونسبتها إلى المعاني كنسبة تلك إلى الصور. وهذه إذا استعملتها النفس الحيوانية سميت متخيلة، وإن استعملتها النفس الناطقة سميت مفكرة.

ثم الذاكرة، وذلك لأنا نجد فينا قوة تحفظ جميع ما تؤديه إليها الحواس وكأنها الخزانة للمحسوسات تخزن فيها المعاني الكلية. متى شاء الإنسان استحضارها أحضرها.

Annotation: This text has a list that resembles the others, but with some radical differences:

—      cogitative	المتخيل
—      imagination	الخيالة
—      cogitative / imaginative	المفكرة / المتخيلة
—      estimative	الوهم
—      recollective	المتذكرة

There are reasons to doubt the authenticity of this work, because of its discrepancy from the treatment of the inner senses in other works of Ibn-Sīnā.[14] Note the following differences:

1. The second paragraph, as it stands, is a continuation of the first, about the collative sense. Yet everything in it points to the imagination. The author states that this sense operates whether one is awake or asleep. But all the other passages make it clear that the collative sense does not operate during sleep. The examples of a drop falling in a straight line or of a spinning flame—which have no external existence—point to what Ibn-Sīnā calls the imaginative power (#4 above), which Thomas Aquinas reduces to the imagination. The concluding line mistakenly attributes all these phenomena to the collative sense.
2. The third paragraph states that the imagination is the repository of sense images. That is what all the other texts say about the imagination. This passage goes on to say that this power can combine data or record it wrongly or falsely, not corresponding to reality. The possibility of false combinations Ibn-Sīnā above (#5) attributes to the estimative power.
3. The fifth paragraph, describing the imaginative power, corresponds exactly to what the other works attribute to memory.
4. The sixth paragraph, which talks of memory, really describes the function of recollection. The parallel passages make recollection one of the functions of memory.

 

Summa Theologiae

Part I, question 78, article 4

Sed contra est quod Avicenna, in suo libro de anima, ponit quinque potentias sensitivas interiores, scilicet sensum communem, phantasiam, imaginativam, aestimativam, et memorativam.

Respondeo dicendum quod, cum natura non deficiat in necessariis, oportet esse tot actiones animae sensitivae, quot sufficiant ad vitam animalis perfecti. Et quaecumque harum actionum non possunt reduci in unum principium, requirunt diversas potentias, cum potentia animae nihil aliud sit quam proximum principium operationis animae. Est autem considerandum quod ad vitam animalis perfecti requiritur quod non solum apprehendat rem apud praesentiam sensibilis, sed etiam apud eius absentiam. Alioquin, cum animalis motus et actio sequantur apprehensionem, non moveretur animal ad inquirendum aliquid absens; cuius contrarium apparet maxime in animalibus perfectis, quae moventur motu processivo; moventur enim ad aliquid absens apprehensum. Oportet ergo quod animal per animam sensitivam non solum recipiat species sensibilium, cum praesentialiter immutatur ab eis; sed etiam eas retineat et conservet. Recipere autem et retinere reducuntur in corporalibus ad diversa principia, nam humida bene recipiunt, et male retinent; e contrario autem est de siccis. Unde, cum potentia sensitiva sit actus organi corporalis, oportet esse aliam potentiam quae recipiat species sensibilium, et quae conservet. Rursus considerandum est quod, si animal moveretur solum propter delectabile et contristabile secundum sensum, non esset necessarium ponere in animali nisi apprehensionem formarum quas percipit sensus, in quibus delectatur aut horret. Sed necessarium est animali ut quaerat aliqua vel fugiat, non solum quia sunt convenientia vel non convenientia ad sentiendum, sed etiam propter aliquas alias commoditates et utilitates, sive nocumenta, sicut ovis videns lupum venientem fugit, non propter indecentiam coloris vel figurae, sed quasi inimicum naturae; et similiter avis colligit paleam, non quia delectet sensum, sed quia est utilis ad nidificandum. Necessarium est ergo animali quod percipiat huiusmodi intentiones, quas non percipit sensus exterior. Et huius perceptionis oportet esse aliquod aliud principium, cum perceptio formarum sensibilium sit ex immutatione sensibilis, non autem perceptio intentionum praedictarum. Sic ergo ad receptionem formarum sensibilium ordinatur sensus proprius et communis, de quorum distinctione post dicetur. Ad harum autem formarum retentionem aut conservationem ordinatur phantasia, sive imaginatio, quae idem sunt, est enim phantasia sive imaginatio quasi thesaurus quidam formarum per sensum acceptarum. Ad apprehendendum autem intentiones quae per sensum non accipiuntur, ordinatur vis aestimativa. Ad conservandum autem eas, vis memorativa, quae est thesaurus quidam huiusmodi intentionum. Cuius signum est, quod principium memorandi fit in animalibus ex aliqua huiusmodi intentione, puta quod est nocivum vel conveniens. Et ipsa ratio praeteriti, quam attendit memoria, inter huiusmodi intentiones computatur. Considerandum est autem quod, quantum ad formas sensibiles, non est differentia inter hominem et alia animalia, similiter enim immutantur a sensibilibus exterioribus. Sed quantum ad intentiones praedictas, differentia est, nam alia animalia percipiunt huiusmodi intentiones solum naturali quodam instinctu, homo autem etiam per quandam collationem. Et ideo quae in aliis animalibus dicitur aestimativa naturalis, in homine dicitur cogitativa, quae per collationem quandam huiusmodi intentiones adinvenit. Unde etiam dicitur ratio particularis, cui medici assignant determinatum organum, scilicet mediam partem capitis, est enim collativa intentionum individualium, sicut ratio intellectiva intentionum universalium. Ex parte autem memorativae, non solum habet memoriam, sicut cetera animalia, in subita recordatione praeteritorum; sed etiam reminiscentiam, quasi syllogistice inquirendo praeteritorum memoriam, secundum individuales intentiones. Avicenna vero ponit quintam potentiam, mediam inter aestimativam et imaginativam, quae componit et dividit formas imaginatas; ut patet cum ex forma imaginata auri et forma imaginata montis componimus unam formam montis aurei, quem nunquam vidimus. Sed ista operatio non apparet in aliis animalibus ab homine, in quo ad hoc sufficit virtus imaginativa. Cui etiam hanc actionem attribuit Averroes, in libro quodam quem fecit de sensu et sensibilibus. Et sic non est necesse ponere nisi quatuor vires interiores sensitivae partis, scilicet sensum communem et imaginationem, aestimativam et memorativam.

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod sensus interior non dicitur communis per praedicationem, sicut genus; sed sicut communis radix et principium exteriorum sensuum.

Ad secundum dicendum quod sensus proprius iudicat de sensibili proprio, discernendo ipsum ab aliis quae cadunt sub eodem sensu, sicut discernendo album a nigro vel a viridi. Sed discernere album a dulci non potest neque visus neque gustus, quia oportet quod qui inter aliqua discernit, utrumque cognoscat. Unde oportet ad sensum communem pertinere discretionis iudicium, ad quem referantur, sicut ad communem terminum, omnes apprehensiones sensuum; a quo etiam percipiantur intentiones sensuum, sicut cum aliquis videt se videre. Hoc enim non potest fieri per sensum proprium, qui non cognoscit nisi formam sensibilis a quo immutatur; in qua immutatione perficitur visio, et ex qua immutatione sequitur alia immutatio in sensu communi, qui visionem percipit.

__________________

Avicenna (De Anima iv, 1) assigns five interior sensitive powers; namely, "common sense, phantasy, imagination, and the estimative and memorative powers."

I answer that, as nature does not fail in necessary things, there must needs be as many actions of the sensitive soul as may suffice for the life of a perfect animal. If any of these actions cannot be reduced to the same one principle, they must be assigned to diverse powers; since a power of the soul is nothing else than the proximate principle of the soul's operation.

Now we must observe that for the life of a perfect animal, the animal should apprehend a thing not only at the actual time of sensation, but also when it is absent. Otherwise, since animal motion and action follow apprehension, an animal would not be moved to seek something absent: the contrary of which we may observe specially in perfect animals, which are moved by progression, for they are moved towards something apprehended and absent. Therefore an animal through the sensitive soul must not only receive the species of sensible things, when it is actually affected by them, but it must also retain and preserve them. Now to receive and retain are, in corporeal things, reduced to diverse principles; for moist things are apt to receive, but retain with difficulty, while it is the reverse with dry things. Wherefore, since the sensitive power is the act of a corporeal organ, it follows that the power which receives the species of sensible things must be distinct from the power which preserves them.

Again we must observe that if an animal were moved by pleasing and disagreeable things only as affecting the sense, there would be no need to suppose that an animal has a power besides the apprehension of those forms which the senses perceive, and in which the animal takes pleasure, or from which it shrinks with horror. But the animal needs to seek or to avoid certain things, not only because they are pleasing or otherwise to the senses, but also on account of other advantages and uses, or disadvantages: just as the sheep runs away when it sees a wolf, not on account of its color or shape, but as a natural enemy: and again a bird gathers together straws, not because they are pleasant to the sense, but because they are useful for building its nest. Animals, therefore, need to perceive such intentions, which the exterior sense does not perceive. And some distinct principle is necessary for this; since the perception of sensible forms comes by an immutation caused by the sensible, which is not the case with the perception of those intentions.

Thus, therefore, for the reception of sensible forms, the "proper sense" and the "common sense" are appointed, and of their distinction we shall speak farther on (notes below). But for the retention and preservation of these forms, the "phantasy" or "imagination" is appointed; which are the same, for phantasy or imagination is as it were a storehouse of forms received through the senses. Furthermore, for the apprehension of intentions which are not received through the senses, the "estimative" power is appointed: and for the preservation thereof, the "memorative" power, which is a storehouse of such-like intentions. A sign of which we have in the fact that the principle of memory in animals is found in some such intention, for instance, that something is harmful or otherwise. And the very formality of the past, which memory observes, is to be reckoned among these intentions.

Now, we must observe that as to sensible forms there is no difference between man and other animals; for they are similarly immuted by the extrinsic sensible. But there is a difference as to the above intentions: for other animals perceive these intentions only by some natural instinct, while man perceives them by means of collation of ideas. Therefore the power by which in other animals is called the natural estimative, in man is called the "cogitative," which by some sort of collation discovers these intentions. Wherefore it is also called the "particular reason," to which medical men assign a certain particular organ, namely, the middle part of the head: for it compares individual intentions, just as the intellectual reason compares universal intentions. As to the memorative power, man has not only memory, as other animals have in the sudden recollection of the past; but also "reminiscence" by syllogistically, as it were, seeking for a recollection of the past by the application of individual intentions. Avicenna, however, assigns between the estimative and the imaginative, a fifth power, which combines and divides imaginary forms: as when from the imaginary form of gold, and imaginary form of a mountain, we compose the one form of a golden mountain, which we have never seen. But this operation is not to be found in animals other than man, in whom the imaginative power suffices thereto. To man also does Averroes attribute this action in his book De sensu et sensibilibus (viii). So there is no need to assign more than four interior powers of the sensitive part—namely, the common sense, the imagination, and the estimative and memorative powers.

Notes on the collative/common sense:

1. The interior sense is called "common" not by predication, as if it were a genus; but as the common root and principle of the exterior senses.
2. The proper sense judges of the proper sensible by discerning it from other things which come under the same sense; for instance, by discerning white from black or green. But neither sight nor taste can discern white from sweet: because what discerns between two things must know both. Wherefore the discerning judgment must be assigned to the common sense; to which, as to a common term, all apprehensions of the senses must be referred: and by which, again, all the intentions of the senses are perceived; as when someone sees that he sees. For this cannot be done by the proper sense, which only knows the form of the sensible by which it is immuted, in which immutation the action of sight is completed, and from immutation follows another in the common sense which perceives the act of vision.

Annotation: This text represents another version of Ibn-Sīnā's teaching. Here we may observe how good a pupil he was of Ibn-Sīnā, both in accurately grasping his teaching, and, as is expected of a good pupil, coming up with his own modifications of his master's teaching.

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Conclusion

Ibn-Sīnā first identifies the inner senses and describes their behavior as they should exist in a mentally healthy person, that is, someone whose emotions and senses are guided by reason.

Secondly, he analyses the state of those who rise above normal. These enjoy fully normal mental health, but they also are in contact with the supernatural world. This affords them enlightenment and a strength of soul beyond that many people do not take advantage of.

Thirdly he analyses the state of those who fall below standard, the mentally impaired. Many of these claim to be in contact with the supernatural world, but they are fake, and their emotional life is in turmoil, out of the control of reason.

Ibn-Sīnā's insistence on both the psychic and the somatic factors in explaining each of these states of mental health is particularly helpful in diagnosing the mentally ill.

Today, one whose disorderly condition is the result mainly of a defective brain condition, whether hereditary or from some damage, is called a psychotic. This can be treated by medication, but the person's cooperation is needed, and this is sometimes difficult to obtain, because he never sees that he is doing anything wrong.

A neurotic is one whose disorderly condition is mainly on the psychic level. Freud was right when he attributed psychic disorders to repression, but wrong in his allocation of the repression. In fact, a neurotic condition arises when the emotions do not listen to reason, but to one another. Fear can repress the pleasure emotions. These, in turn, can find irrational expression in other outlets. Or fear itself can get out of control. Ibn-Sīnā shows this well in his description of the estimative sense, which works hand in hand with fear.

This is very manifest in majority versus minority communal conflict, such as in northern Ireland or Northern Nigeria, or years ago in the South of the United States. People belonging to the majority display a totally irrational, neurotic fear of the repressed minority. This they learned from childhood. All this is rooted in the estimative sense when it resists reason, as Ibn-Sīnā explains. It is treatable by positive exposure and education.

Another irascible emotion, courage or audacity, can get out of control and manifest itself in workaholic energy, to the detriment of human relations. To complicate matters more, fear can be repressing the desire for pleasure, and at the same time up-beat energy can be repressing fear. In all these complicated psychological states, the estimative sense utilizes a fertile imagination, and can even harness the intellect to devise inventive ways of expression. Thus neurosis upsets the natural order whereby the intellect presides over the emotions and the senses. It does not destroy their spontaneity, but channels them in the right direction, as Ibn-Sīnā makes clear in his writings.

As for the supernatural, Ibn-Sīnā perspicaciously distinguishes fake from true religious experience. It is noteworthy that, for him, authentic religious experience is not restricted to the elite, but everyone has some of it (much in agreement with Catholic theology). All the criteria for evaluating true religious experience go beyond the sphere of psychology, but Ibn-Sīnā makes this much clear: One criterion of true religious experience (at least of the prophetic type) is that it is accompanied by sound mental health.

Psychology over the past century has made enormous strides on the clinical level. Retrieving the legacy of past great thinkers can assist the interpretation of these discoveries and facilitate further progress.

Both Ibn-Sīnā and Thomas Aquinas highlight the role of reason in assuring the well-being and happiness of a person. For them, psychological disturbances do not come from reason (taken as a repressive "super-ego"), but from the absence of reason, with the result that the concupiscent and irascible emotions fight each other and put disorder in the inner senses.

In this way, our two authors have made a lasting valid contribution to Psychology.

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NOTES

[1] Summa theologiae, I, question. 78, article. 4. He also makes frequent reference to Ibn-Sīnā in his commentary on Aristotle's De memoria et reminiscentia.

[2] For instance, D.H Barlow & V.M. Durand, Abnormal psychology: an integrative approach (3^rd ed. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2002); B.L. Fredrickson, "Cultivating positive emotions to optimize health and well-being," Prevention and treatment, 3, article 1 (http://journals.apa.org/prevention/volume3/pre0030001a.html — 2000); P. Fosarelli, "Fearfully wonderfully made: The interconnectedness of body-mind-spirit," Journal of Religion and Health, 41:3, 207-229; G. Miller, Incorporating spirituality in counseling and psychotherapy: Theory and technique (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2002).

[3] See especially A.AA. Terruwe, Psychopathic personality and neurosis (New York: P.J. Kennedy, 1958); for further information on her, see http://www.rudolfallers.info/terruwe.html. She worked in collaboration with Conrad Baars; see his publications: http://www.conradbaars.com/Baars-books.htm.

[4] Summa theologiae, I, question. 78, article. 4. He also makes frequent reference to Ibn-Sīnā in his commentary on Aristotle's De memoria et reminiscentia.

[5] Summa theologiae, II-II, qq. 171-174. See my survey of prophecy in my Philosophy of the Muslim World, authors and principal themes. Washington D.C.: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 2003, pp. 140-146. See this online at: www.josephkenny.joyeurs.com/phil/default.htm.

[6] Summa Theologiae, I, q. 84, a. 4. The translation is that of the Fathers of the English Dominican Province (Benziger Bros., 1947).

[7] Ibid., q. 85, a. 1.

[8] كتاب الحدود والرسوم في الفاضلة المدينية، تحقيق جعفر آل ياسين. بيروت، 1985، ص 650.

[9] In librum De memoria et reminiscentia commentarium, lectio 5. This commentary is a very good supplement to Ibn-Sīnā's discussion of memory and recalling. See http://www.home.duq.edu/~bonin/thomasbibliography.html.

[10] Op. cit., lectio 6.

[11] تنقيح الدكتور ماجد فخري. بيروت: منشورات دار الآفاق االجديدة، 1985، ص200-202. See F. Rahman, Avicenna's Psychology: an English Translation of Kitab al-najat, Book 11, Chapter 6 (London: Oxford University Press, 1952).

[12] تصحيح الأستاذ سليمان دنيا. القاهرة: دار إحياء الكتب العربية، عيسى البابي الحلبي وشركاءه، 1948. الجزء الثالث، ص 348-358. انظر شرح الإشارات والتنبيهات لخواج نصر الدين الطوسي. قم، ص 332-349.

[13] Wilhelm Kutsch, S.J., "Ein neuer Text zur Seelenlehre Avicennas," Avicenna Commemoration Volume. Calcutta: Iran Society, 1956. pp. 154-156.

[14] Hans Daiber, in a personal conversation, confirmed that this whole work is spurious.