WISDOM WORDS OF THOMAS AQUINAS
selected and digested by Joseph Kenny OP
1
Evil by chance/ by choiceObjection
What is accidental does not happen so commonly.
But evil is more common than good,
as is said in Qoheleth 1:15 (Latin): "The number of stupid people is infinite."
Therefore the cause of evil is per se, not per accidens.Reply
What is accidental is not always less common. On the contrary, sometimes it happens always or usually. For example, someone who goes to market to buy will always or most often meet a lot of people, even though he does not intend to meet them. Likewise an adulterer who looks for the good of having sexual enjoyment with his neighbor's wife, to which evil is always attached, always falls into sin.
As for the fact that goodness is found in few men and evil in most, this is because there are many more ways to deviate from the virtuous mean than to stay in the mean (as is said in II Eth., ch. 6), and because sensible goods are more familiar to most people than rational goods.
—Quaestiones disputatae de malo, 1:3, 17
2
God permits evil?God:
neither wishes evil to happen
nor does he wish evil not to happen,
but he wishes:
that he should not wish evil to happen
and that he should not wish evil not to happen. —Quaestiones disputatae de malo, 2:1, 5
Even loving God can be wrong, as when someone loves God for the sake of temporal things.
—Quaestiones disputatae de malo, 2:1, 7
3
Sinning with charity?Not every act coming from a will informed by charity is meritorious, if "will" is taken as a faculty; otherwise venial sins would be meritorious, since people who have charity sometimes commit them. But it is true that every act that comes from charity is meritorious.
Yet it is simply false that every act that comes from a will not informed by charity is demeritorious. That it completely false, because otherwise those who are in mortal sin would be sinning in every act, and they could not be advised that the good works they do in the meantime dispose them for receiving grace.
Everyone is held to conform his will to God's will by willing whatever God wills him to will, as God's will is made known by prohibitions and commandments. But a person is not held to will everything from charityexcept according to the opinion that the mode of charity is a matter of precept. This opinion is partly true; otherwise someone could fulfil the law without charity, and that is the heresy of Pelagianism. But this opinion is not altogether true, because it implies that someone who does not have charity, yet honors his parents, sins mortally because he does not honor them from charity, and that is false.
Thus the mode of charity is a matter of precept as a necessary condition for gaining eternal happiness, but not as a requirement to avoid punishment for sin. Thus someone who does not have charity yet honors his parents does not merit eternal life, but he does not merit punishment either.
Thus it is clear that not every human act, even in the concrete, is meritorious or demeritorious, although every act is either good or bad. And I say this with regard to those who do not have charity. But for those who have charity, every act is either meritorious or demeritorious (venially).
—Quaestiones disputatae de malo, 2:5, 7
4
God to blame for sin?Objection
Whatever is the cause of a cause is the cause of that cause's effect. But God is the cause of free will, which is the cause of sin. Therefore God is the cause of sin.
Reply
The effect of a caused thing, in so far as it is caused, is reducible to the cause.
But if something comes from a caused thing not according as it is caused, this effect cannot be reduced to the cause.
For example, the motion of a leg is caused by the moving power of an animal, and this moves the leg. But walking with a limp does not come from the leg because of a failure of the moving power, but as it is defective and unable to receive perfectly the influence of the moving power; therefore limping does not come from the moving power.
Therefore sin is caused by free will in so far as it is deficient; thus God is not the cause of sin, although he is the cause of free will.
—Quaestiones disputatae de malo, 3:1, 4
5
Reckless behaviorPleasure and any other human affair should conform to the rule and measure of reason and divine law. For the will to make an inordinate choice presupposes a failure to use the rule of reason and divine law.
There is no need to look for any other cause of not using this rule than the very freedom of the will, by which one can act or not act. Not to pay actual attention to such a rule is neither an evil nor a fault nor a natural defect, because the soul has no obligation nor even ability always to pay actual attention to this rule.
But sin first comes in when a person, without actually considering this rule, goes ahead to make a choice. This is like a carpenter who does not sin by not always keeping his measurements in mind, but does sin when he goes ahead to cut without measuring. So also the sin of the will does not consist in not actually attending to the rule of reason or of divine law, but in going ahead to choose without regard to this rule and measure.
So Augustine says in The city of God, ch. 12, that the will is the cause of sin in so far as it is deficient. But that deficiency he compares to silence or darkness, because it is a pure negation.
—Quaestiones disputatae de malo, 1:3
6
God made me sin?Objection
God is the cause of human powers' tending in a certain way. But some God-given powers incline one to sin, as hot temper leads to killing, and sex energy leads to adultery. Therefore God is the cause of sin.
Reply
Sins do not come from these human powers as they were designed by God, but as they fall short of the way he wired them in the factory. They were set up to be subject to human reason; so when they incline a person against reason to sin, this is not from God.
—Quaestiones disputatae de malo, 3:1, 5
7
Sin psychoanalyzedSince the act of sin or of virtue is according to choice, and choice is a desire for something previously deliberated about, and deliberation is a kind of inquiry, it is necessary that in every act of virtue or of sin there be a kind of syllogistic deduction. But a temperate and an intemperate person syllogize differently. The same holds for a continent and an incontinent person.
A temperate person is moved only by a rational judgement, using a syllogism of three statements, as:
Fornication should never be committed.
This act is fornication.
Therefore it must not be done. An intemperate person, however, totally follows concupiscence, and likewise uses a syllogism of three statements, as:
Everything pleasurable must be enjoyed.
This act is pleasurable.
Therefore it must be enjoyed. But a continent and an incontinent person have two moving forces. One is reason, to avoid sin. The other is concupiscence, to commit it. But for the continent person the judgement of reason wins, whereas in the incontinent person the movement of concupiscence wins. Thus each of them uses a syllogism of four statements, but leading to contrary conclusions.
The continent person uses the following syllogism:
No sin must be committed (a judgement of reason).
Everything pleasurable must be enjoyed (what concupiscence presents to his heart).
This is a sin (the victorious judgement of reason).
Therefore this should not be done. The incontinent person, for whom the judgement of concupiscence prevails, argues this way:
No sin must be committed (a judgement of reason).
Everything pleasurable must be enjoyed (what concupiscence presents to his heart).
This is pleasurable (the victorious judgement of concupiscence).
Therefore it must be enjoyed. Thus the incontinent person has universal, but not particular, knowledge of the issue, since he does not follow the particular judgement of reason but that of concupiscence.
—Quaestiones disputatae de malo, 3:9, 7
8
Hot-cold-lukewarm"I wish you were hot or cold, but because you are lukewarm I begin to vomit you from my mouth" (Rev 3:15-16).
The "cold" person is the unbeliever, who has some excuse in sinning from ignorance, as the Apostle said, 1 Tim 1:13, "I have gained mercy because I acted ignorantly in my unbelief."
The "lukewarm" person is the Christian sinner, who sins more gravely when he does what the unbeliever does, as the Apostle says, Heb 10:29, "How much more severe a punishment does he merit who treats the blood of the Testament as unholy?"
—Quaestiones disputatae de malo, 3:13, 1
9
Offending the TrinityAs power is appropriated to the Father and wisdom to the Son, goodness is appropriated to the Holy Spirit.
He who sins from weakness, which is opposed to power, is said to sin against the Father.
He who sins from ignorance, which is opposed to wisdom, is said to sin against the Son.
He who sins from malice, which is opposed to goodness, is said to sin against the Holy Spirit.
—Quaestiones disputatae de malo, 3:14, SC 2
10
Doing good by grace freely (1)God moves the will immutably because of the efficacy of his moving power which cannot fail. But because of the nature of the will which is moved, which is related indifferently to different objects, there is no necessity imposed on the will, but it remains free.
The same holds for divine providence, which works infallibly in everything. Yet from contingent causes come contingent effects, in as much as God moves all things proportionally, each according to its own mode.
—Quaestiones disputatae de malo, 6, ad 3
11
Doing good by grace freely (2)The will makes its own contribution when it is moved by God, since it is the will that acts, although moved by God. Therefore, although this motion is from without, as from the first principle, it is not violent.
—Quaestiones disputatae de malo, 6, ad 4
12
Doing good by grace freely (3)An active power does not move from necessity unless it overcomes the power of a passive subject. Since the will's potency is related to universal good, no good can overcome the power of the will, moving it from necessity, unless it is good from every possible angle. And that is only the perfect good, which is happiness.
The will cannot not will happiness, that is, cannot will its opposite. But it can not will it actually, by dismissing the thought of happiness as it controls the activity of the intellect; in that way it does not of necessity will even happiness, just as someone does not necessarily become heated if he can keep away from the fire.
—Quaestiones disputatae de malo, 6, ad 7
13
Does sin fulfil God's will?The human will is somehow at odds with God's will when it wills something that God does not want it to will, as when it wills to sin. Even here God does not want the will not to will to sin, because if God so wished it would not happen; for "the Lord does whatever he wishes".
Although the will is in this way at odds with God's will, as far as the motion of the will is concerned, it can never be at odds with his will regarding the end result, because the will of man always gets the result whereby God gets his way regarding man.
But as for the mode of willing, it is not necessary that the will of man should be conformed to the will of God, because God eternally and infinitely wills each thing, which man cannot do. Thus Isaiah 65:9 says, "As the heavens are raised above the earth, so are my ways exalted above your ways."
—Quaestiones disputatae de malo, 6, ad 5
14
What makes the will free?When there is only one way to achieve an end, one act of the will covers both the end and the means. But in the case of happiness, there are many ways. So, although man necessarily wishes happiness, he does not necessarily will any particular way to happiness.
—Quaestiones disputatae de malo, 6, ad 9
15
Love transformsLove is said to transform the lover into the loved, in so far as the lover is moved by love to the very thing that is loved.
Knowledge, however, assimilates, in so far as a likeness of the thing known results in the knower.
The first action is imitative as the agent seeks an end. The second is imitative according to form.
—Quaestiones disputatae de malo, 6, ad 13
16
Why are some holier than others?Love can be greater or lesser both because of its agent and because of its subject. On the part of the agent, this is not because of his greater or lesser power, but because of his wisdom and choice, as he distributes different measures of grace and love to men...
On the part of the subject, this is because man disposes himself for grace and love in a greater or lesser way by good works.
—Quaestiones disputatae de malo, 7:2
17
How bad is venial sin?Venial sin does not at all diminish glory, but only delays entrance into glory.
Likewise it does not at all diminish love, but only slows down its act and growth.
—Quaestiones disputatae de malo, 7:2, 14
18
Sexual temptations (1)When there is illicit motion of sensuality, reason is in any one of three positions:
- As resisting —Then there is no sin, but the merit of a crown.
- As commanding, as when it deliberately excites the motion of concupiscence —Then, if the object is in the genus of mortal sin, there is mortal sin.
- Neither refusing nor commanding, but consenting —Then there is venial sin.
—Quaestiones disputatae de malo, 7:6, 6
19
Sexual temptations (2)Because the sense appetite is moved by some apprehension, yet is also a power in a bodily organ, its motion can arise from two sources: (1) from the body's disposition, (2) from some apprehension.
Bodily disposition is not subject to the command of reason, but every apprehension is subject to the command of reason, for reason can stop the exercise of any apprehensive power, especially in the absence of touch contact, which sometimes cannot be avoided.
Since the sense appetite is capable of sin in as much as it can obey reason, the first motion of sense appetite which is from bodily disposition is not a sin; this is what some call "first first" motions. Yet the second motion, which is excited by some apprehension, is a [venial] sin.
Reason can in no way avoid the first, but the second it can avoid one by one, but not all together, because as it turns its thought from one it runs into another, which can give rise to an illicit motion.
—Quaestiones disputatae de malo, 7:6, 8
20
Can the devil tempt to venial sin?By the very fact that the devil tempts people to commit venial sin he has the perverse intention of leading them into mortal sin.
That is why it is a sin to have anything to do with the devil, not even to seek information from him, as Chrysostom says. Thus, even when he professed the truth of the Lord's divinity, the Lord stopped him (Mark 1:25; Luke 4:35).
Nor is the word of the devil to be believed, because he is a liar and the father of lies (John 8:44).
—Quaestiones disputatae de malo, 7:9, 4
21
Forgiveness of venial sins (1)The venial sins that a person has in addition to mortal sin are usually greater than in someone who has charity, since they come from a greater lust which is not held in check by charity.
But for those who have perfect charity, venial sins mostly happen by surprise, and are quickly forgiven because of the virtue of charity, as is said in 2 Chronicles 30:19, "The good Lord will be merciful to all who seek the Lord God of their fathers, and they will not be blamed for being only partially purified" (Latin).
—Quaestiones disputatae de malo, 7:10, 5
22
Forgiveness of venial sins (2)It is most probable that anyone who has charity and is conscious while facing death will experience a motion of charity towards God and against all the sins he committed, including venial sins. This is sufficient for the remission of venial sins as far as guilt is concerned, and perhaps for the punishment due, if the person has an intense love.
This is not so for someone who is unconscious or otherwise distracted.
—Quaestiones disputatae de malo, 7:11
23
Forgiveness of venial sins (3)Habitual displeasure with venial sin is not sufficient for their forgiveness, but it must be an act of displeasure.
It is sufficient, however, if it is general [without bringing up each particular venial sin].
—Quaestiones disputatae de malo, 7:11, 4
24
Purgatory and venial sinsThe punishment due to venial sins is forgiven in Purgatory by the purgative pain one endures; in this way the debt is cleared.
But the guilt of venial sin is not forgiven by enduring suffering or thinking about it, since there it is not meritorious; it would not be an act of charity to detest venial sin because of punishment; rather that would be servile or natural fear.
Therefore the guilt of venial sins is forgiven in Purgatory by the power of grace, not as a habit which can co-exist with venial sin, but as it issues forth in an act of charity detesting the venial sin.
—Quaestiones disputatae de malo, 7:11, 9
25
Seven capital sinsSome human goods are desired, while others are avoided. Those which are desired are of three categories, as they pertain to the soul, the body or exterior things.
- One soul-good is the imaginary good of excellence that attracts honor and glory; this is the object of pride or vain glory.
- One bodily good is food, which is for the preservation of the individual; this is the object of gluttony.
- Another bodily good is sex, which is for the preservation of the human race; this is the object of unchastity.
- Exterior goods are covered by avarice, since "All things obey money" (Qoheleth 10:19).
Some goods are avoided because they are an obstacle to others that are inordinately desired. A person may either turn away from such goods or fight them.
- One may turn away from one's own spiritual good because it disturbs one's rest or bodily pleasure; that is spiritual sloth.
- One may turn away from another's good because it impedes one's own excellence; that is envy.
- Or one may fight the good of another, by anger.
—Quaestiones disputatae de malo, 8:1
26
PridePride, directly and essentially, is an immoderate desire for excellence.
Antecedently, it is persuading oneself that one has such an excellence.
Consequently, it is showing off such excellence by words and deeds.
—Quaestiones disputatae de malo, 8:3, 7
27
Announce donors' names?It is good to announce peoples good works so that others may be edified to imitate them and thus achieve salvation.
Yet if people do works of virtue for the sake of glory, their inordinate desire for glory is a fault, because works of virtue should not be done for the sake of glory but for the good of virtue or rather for the sake of God.
—Quaestiones disputatae de malo, 9:1 & ad 6
28
The daughters of vain gloryVain glory leads a person to show off either directly or indirectly. Directly, this takes place:
- by words, and this is boasting.
- by deeds which attract attention, and this is novelty display (since new things attract greater admiration).
- by false deeds, and this is hypocrisy.
Indirectly one shows off his excellence by trying to show that he is not put down by others. This is on the level of:
- the intellect, when a person sticks to his own opinion and is unwilling to believe in a more sensible opinion and this is stubbornness.
- the will, when one refuses to go along with the will of better people, and this is discord.
- words, when a person does not want to be defeated by the words of another, and this is quarreling.
- deeds, when a person does not want to subject his deeds to the precept of a superior, and this is disobedience.
—Quaestiones disputatae de malo, 9:3
29
Envy—zealAugustine says, "Zeal for good things belongs to the virtuous, but envy is a battle of the depraved." A zealous person prepares himself to enter the race for good things, but the envious person tries to prevent his neighbor from having good things.
For envy is when someone is said that his neighbor has the good things that he himself does not have, but zeal is when someone is sad that he himself does not have the good that his neighbor has.
It is praiseworthy for a student to try to learn what someone else knows, as the Apostle said, 1 Cor 12:31, "Be eager for the better gifts."
—Quaestiones disputatae de malo, 10:1, 11
30
The daughters of envySince envy is sadness at someone else's glory, which is apprehended as an evil, an envious person will try to do different things against his neighbor:
- To start with, he will try to bring down the other person's glory which is making him sad. He will do so by speaking evil of him privately, which is gossip,
- or openly, which is detraction.
- In the end, with regard to the person he envies, he will not simply be sad at his excellence, but simply wish him evil, and this is hatred.
- As for himself, if he succeeds in diminishing his enemy's glory, he will be happy, and this is exulting in the adversity of his neighbor.
- If he does not succeed in this goal, he will be sad, and that is affliction in the prosperity of his neighbor.
—Quaestiones disputatae de malo, 10:3
31
Painful obedienceA work can very well be painful in itself, but delightful as it is referred to the service of God; thus Augustine (on Gal 6) says that the martyrs "sowed in tears". Their sadness was not spiritual sloth, because it was not about an interior good, but an exterior evil. They were happy about an interior good, and their joy was all the more meritorious the more the exterior evil was painful.
Likewise, if someone voluntarily does something because of obedience or a precept, and is sad because it is painful and tiresome, that sadness is not spiritual sloth, because it is not about an interior good, but an exterior evil.
—Quaestiones disputatae de malo, 11:1, 4
32
The daughters of spiritual slothSince spiritual sloth is sadness at an internal divine good, and no one can remain in sadness without pleasure, someone will try to escape what is making him sad and run to what will give him pleasure:
- Since those who cannot enjoy spiritual pleasures usually look for bodily pleasures, and this is wandering into illicit things which a worldly character will enjoy.
- Escaping spiritual goods which should give pleasure is to withdraw from the divine things that one should hope for, and this is desperation.
- Such a person will also try to avoid doing the common obligatory spiritual activities which are necessary for salvation, and that is torpor.
- He will also try to avoid doing difficult things that are matters of the counsels, and that is pusillanimity.
- Escaping sadness also includes resistance. So if someone is trapped in spiritual exercises which he does not like, he will first revolt against those who have trapped him, and that is rancor.
- Then he will revolt against the spiritual goods themselves, and that is, in the special sense, malice.
—Quaestiones disputatae de malo, 11:4
33
Anger always wrong?Objection
Every excited motion of anger blinds the eye of the heart. Therefore whoever angrily corrects his brother does wrong.
Reply
Anger which follows the judgement of reason does disturb reason a little, but it helps prompt action. So it does not take away the order of reason which was determined by previous judgement. Thus Gregory says that wrong anger blinds the mind of the heart, but anger out of zeal does not blind, but only disturbs.
Objection
Anger, even from zeal for what is right, impedes the highest act of man, which is contemplation. Therefore all anger is evil.
Reply
Not everything which impedes something better is evil; otherwise marriage would be evil, because it impedes virginity.
Besides, what temporarily impedes some good can even be better for that time. Thus, even though contemplation is simply the best human activity, in some cases some action, helped by anger, can be better.
—Quaestiones disputatae de malo, 12:1, 4 & 11
34
Venial or mortal?Reason directs everything from the end. Therefore anything that excludes the proper end is directly contrary to reason, and must be a mortal sin. But if there is disorder in matters leading to the end without excluding the end itself, this is not properly against reason but apart from reason, and that is a venial sin.
—Quaestiones disputatae de malo, 12:3, 8
Man's reason is part of his nature. So whatever is against reason is against the nature of man. Therefore indulgence in pleasure is against the nature of man when it transgresses the rule of reason, either by destroying one's relation to the end, and this is simply against reason, or by disturbing the order of things that lead to the end, and this is against reason indirectly, or rather it is apart from reason.
—Quaestiones disputatae de malo, 14:2, 8
35
The difference between anger and hatredAnger and hatred have several differences in the way they cause harm to one's neighbor:
- First, anger intends harm only as just retribution; so it goes only against those who hurt us or our people, but hatred can extend to others who never hurt us, just because their disposition is contrary to our tastes.
- Secondly, anger is always against particular persons, because it is caused by their harmful acts, and acts always belong to particular persons. Hatred, however, can extend to something common, as when a man hates all thieves as a whole.
- Thirdly, an angry person will try to harm his neighbor only to the extent that seems required as just punishment; when he does this his anger calms down. But hatred is never satisfied with what the neighbor suffers, but wishes him evil absolutely.
- Fourthly, An angry person wants the person he hurts to know that he is suffering because of the harm that he caused, but someone who hates does not care whether the victim deserves to be punished or not.
So it is clear that hatred is a more serious sin than anger.
—Quaestiones disputatae de malo, 12:4, 3
36
The daughters of angerAnger can be considered in three ways: (1) as it is in the heart, (2) as it is in the mouth, and (3) as it extends to action.
- As it is in the heart, one will magnify the injury suffered because the person who caused it is considered so low in status, and this is indignation.
Also the heart will think of different ways of punishing the other and this will excite his spirit; this is called a steaming mind.
- As anger extends to speech, one may blame God for allowing the injury to happen, and that is blasphemy.
Or it may turn on one's neighbor. This may take the form of pointless raving, or of abusive accusations.
- As anger extends to action, there are quarrels, which lead to blows, killing etc.
—Quaestiones disputatae de malo, 12:5, c.
37
Too little anger?There is a vice in not having enough anger. Of this, Chrysostom says (on Matt 5:22): "Unreasonable patience sows vices, nourishes neglect and invites not only evil people but also good people to do evil."
—Quaestiones disputatae de malo, 12:5, 3
38
The daughters of avariceAvarice does two things:
1. The first is to refuse to give or help others with one's means, and this results in hardness against mercy.
2. The second is to accumulate excessively, and this in two ways:
2.1 In the heart one may be too much concerned about money and possessions, and that is worry. 2.2 In action:
One may sometimes try to get things by force, and that is violence. Or one may use deceit, either by simple words, and that is lying. Or one may swear falsely, and that is perjury. Or one may cause the innocent to be punished, as Judas did to Christ, and that is treachery. —Quaestiones disputatae de malo, 13:3, c.
39
How many ways can you sin by eating?Gluttony is the disordered desire for the pleasure of eating.
1. The pleasure can be natural or artificial:
1.1 As for the natural pleasure of food, one may be over-concerned to get the best, and that is lavishness. 1.2 As for artificial pleasures, one may look for too fancy a preparation, and that is finickiness. 2. The desire can be disordered in three ways:
2.1 Before eating one can be over-eager and therefore rush to eat. 2.2 During eating one may be too ardent, and that is voraciousness. 2.3 In the end result one may have eaten too much, and that is over-eating. —Quaestiones disputatae de malo, 14:4, c.
40
The daughters of gluttonyFrom immoderate pleasure in eating or drinking there can result:
1. On the part of the body, impurity.
2. On the part of the soul:
2.1 Reason is made less sharp because of too much eating or too much thought of eating. This leads to mental sluggishness. 2.2 The emotions are disengaged from reason and one becomes too gay; this is called giddiness. 2.3 Speech then becomes careless and loose, and that is garrulousness. 2.4 Disordered action follows when one begins to behave like a clown, and that is scurrility. —Quaestiones disputatae de malo, 14:4, c.
41
Is virginity a sin?Objection
Every vice by excess has a corresponding vice by defect. But the opposite of inordinate sexual indulgence is virginity. Therefore virginity is a sin.
Reply
Virginity or perpetual continence is not opposed to sexual excess as an extreme, but as the mean because the mean in virtue is not measured by quantity but by right reason.
The extreme by defect would be for a married person to abstain from sexual union without a good reason, or to abstain because of a superstitious reason, such as out of reverence for evil spirits.
—Quaestiones disputatae de malo, 15:1, 9
40
The daughters of sexual excessSexual excess, which consists in physical pleasure, drags down both the mind and the will.
1. The mind directs human actions by four acts:
1.1 The first is understanding, which is to have a correct idea of the goal of life, which is the principle of action. When this is impeded, we have blindness of mind.1.2 The second act is counsel. When concupiscence takes impedes this, we have carelessness. 1.3 The third act is judgement about what to do. When this is impeded we have acting without thinking, which is rashness. 1.4 The fourth act is the decision to act. When this is impeded we have inconstancy. 2. The will is disturbed in two ways:
2.1 When sexual pleasure is sought as an end in itself we have: self-love, since one desires pleasure for oneself, and hatred of God, since he forbids making pleasure an end in itself. 2.2 The desire for the means to get sexual pleasure lead to: love for the present world, and despairing of the future world, which is held in contempt. —Quaestiones disputatae de malo, 15:4, c.
43
Angelic knowledgeBecause our knowledge of things is universal, we can be led into error by confusing particular things with the universal, such as saying that everything white is a lily. Angels' knowledge is universal in a different way because it includes proper and complete knowledge about all the particular things that are included under the universal.
—Quaestiones disputatae de malo, 16:6, 16
44
Can angels know the future?Angels know existing things not by ideas newly acquired when the things exist, but by previous general ideas. These ideas do not let them know the future, because all knowledge involves an assimilation of the knower and the thing known. The ideas that are in an angel's intellect directly represent the nature of things and enable them to know singular things that have this nature, but only when they actually exist and not before. Thus as soon as they exist an angel knows them.
It is the opposite with us, because the stone we see exists before we know it. An angel knows the nature of things before particular things exist, but particular things have to exist before we can sense or know them.
—Quaestiones disputatae de malo, 16:7, 6
45
How spirits talk to usA good angel, but not a devil, can enlighten the human intellect. It does this not by conferring the natural light of intelligence, but by strengthening it. As for supplying information, both angels and devils cannot directly communicate their own ideas to the human mind, but they can work through the brain on the imagination or even present exterior signs from which the mind can derive information, just as one man can make his mind known to another by explanations suitable to the intelligence of the listener.
—Quaestiones disputatae de malo, 16:12, 7
46
Self-control (1)Not all rebellion of the concupiscible and irascible appetites against reason can be eliminated by virtue. That is because the irascible and concupiscible appetites by their very nature go after sense goods which sometimes are opposed to reason. Yet this rebellion can be eliminated by divine power, which is able to change nature itself.
Nevertheless, virtue diminishes that rebellion as these sense appetites become trained to obey reason. Thus they can act virtuously in so far as reason has power over them, but to some extent they retain their own inclinations which sometimes go against reason.
—Quaestio disputata de virtutibus in communi, 4:7
47
Self-control (2)Objection
Man's nature is to be reasonable. So he should experience no rebellion of the sense appetites.
Reply
Certainly reason is sometimes an active principle in man, but for the integrity of human nature not only reason is required, but also the lower powers of the soul, and the body itself. Therefore, in the condition of human nature left to itself, there is sometimes rebellion against reason in the lower powers of the soul, since they have motion proper to themselves. The situation is otherwise in the state of innocence and in the state of glory, where the soul is so perfectly united with God that it can totally control its lower powers.
—Quaestio disputata de virtutibus in communi, 4:8
48
Prudence and virtueObjection
Aristotle says that knowledge is of little or no use for being of good character. Therefore prudence cannot be a virtue.
Reply
The Philosopher is speaking there of practical or moral science. But prudence is more than moral science. For in moral science there is a universal judgement about behavior, such as "Fornication is evil," "Stealing should be avoided" and the like. Someone can have this knowledge and still deviate from reason and judge wrongly about a particular act. So moral science is said to contribute little to virtue, because a person can have good moral science and still sin against virtue.
But it is by prudence that one judges particular actions correctly. This judgement is corrupted by any sin. Therefore, as long as a person holds to prudence, he cannot sin. Therefore, prudence contributes not a little, but in a big way to virtue. In fact, it causes virtue.
—Quaestio disputata de virtutibus in communi, 6:1
49
Prudence and ignoranceObjection
Ignorance excuses from sin. Therefore prudential knowledge can only contribute to guilt and not help one to be good.
Reply
The ignorance that is opposed to prudence is the ignorance of choice, and in this way everyone who does evil is ignorant. This ignorance come because the judgement of reason is intercepted by the inclination of the appetite. This kind of ignorance does not excuse from sin, but rather constitutes sin. But the ignorance which is opposed to moral science excuses from or diminishes sin.
—Quaestio disputata de virtutibus in communi, 6:3
50
Power in weaknessThe text, "Power/virtue is perfected in weakness" (2 Cor 12:9), does not mean that weakness causes virtue, but it provides an occasion for practicing virtue, such as humility. It is also the matter of certain virtues, namely, patience and also charity, in so far as one comes to the aid of another in his weakness. And naturally it is a sign of virtue, because the soul demonstrates a higher virtue when it can move a weak body to an act of virtue.
—Quaestio disputata de virtutibus in communi, 9:19
51
Infused and acquired virtueNeither acquired virtues nor divinely infused virtues entirely take away passions inclining a person to evil, unless miraculously, because there always remains the struggle of the flesh against the spirit, even when moral virtue is present; thus the Apostle says that "the flesh lusts against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh" (Gal 5:17). But such passions are reduced by both acquired and infused virtues, so that a person will not be moved out of bounds by these passions.
But the two kinds of virtue have a different advantages. Acquired virtue reduces one's experience of rebellion of the flesh. That is because by frequent action a person gets used to virtue and to resisting such passions; and so he will feel their harassment less.
But infused virtue has the advantage of insuring that, however much one feels passion, he will not give into sin. And it does this infallibly, as long as it remains present. But acquired virtue is deficient in that, like other natural inclinations, it fails on occasion. Thus the Apostle said, "When we were in the flesh, the passions of sin which were evident by the law, were operating in our members, so as to bring forth the fruit of death. But now we are freed from the law of death in which we were detained, so that we may serve in newness of spirit and not in the oldness of the letter" (Rom 7:5).
—Quaestio disputata de virtutibus in communi, 10:14
52
Infused virtue and moral struggleQuestion
Why, after receiving the new life of God in baptism and all the graces of many Confessions and Communions, do I still have to struggle to be good?
Reply
In the beginning infused virtue does not take away the experience of passions in the same way as acquired virtue does. For this reason in the beginning one does not find it easy or pleasurable to do good. Yet this does not mean that you do not have virtue, because to have virtue it suffices that you do good without sadness. It is not required that you be free from the harassment of passions which impede the pleasure of doing good.
—Quaestio disputata de virtutibus in communi, 10:15
53
Love a go-between?When it is said "Whoever is joined to the Lord is one spirit [with him]" (1 Cor 6:17), the two are not united as one substance, but as one in affection, such as a lover has with the one he loves. In this union the habit of charity is a principle of loving, not something that stands between the lover and the beloved. For the act of love goes directly to God as the beloved, without being directed to the habit of love.
—Quaestio disputata de caritate, 1:3
54
How strong is love?Charity is a habit, and therefore is not easily shaken. Thus someone who has charity is not easily inclined to sin. Nevertheless charity can be lost by sin.
—Quaestio disputata de caritate, 1:9
55
The good politicianTo be a good politician, one must love the good of society. Anyone who is allowed to participate in the benefits of a society and is a citizen of that society ought to have certain virtues that help him carry out his civic duties and to love the good of the society.
Loving the good of society implies looking after two things: having it, and seeing that it is preserved.
Wanting to have or possess the good of society does not make a good politician, because even tyrants love the good of society so that they can have power over it. That is loving oneself more than society. But to want to preserve and defend the good of society is truly to love society. That is what a good politician does: To preserve and extend the good of society he would even expose himself to the danger of death and neglect his private good.
—Quaestio disputata de caritate, 2:c
56
The citizen of heavenAnyone enrolled as a citizen of heaven must have certain virtues freely infused by God. The first of these is love of the heavenly kingdom, which is a divine good and the object of eternal happiness.
But to love the good that the blessed in heaven have does not make one worthy of eternal happiness, because even evil people desire that good. But to be worthy of the company of the blessed, one must want to see that good established and spread. This is the work of charity, which loved God for his own sake, and one's neighbors, who have the capacity for eternal happiness, as oneself. It also opposes every impediment to that happiness in oneself and in others. Thus it can never co-exist with mortal sin, which is an impediment to eternal happiness.
Thus charity is not only a virtue; it is the strongest of all virtues.
—Quaestio disputata de caritate, 2:c
57
An absent loverIt is the nature of love to join people in affection, so that the one considers the other as another self, and wishes him well in the same way as he wishes himself. But it is not necessary for charity that the people be physically united. Therefore it can exist between people who are far apart. It makes one desire the beloved who is absent, just as it makes one enjoy his presence.
— Quaestio disputata de caritate, 2:6
58
Loving without limitThe object of charity, God, exceeds all human power. So no matter how much the human will tries to love God, it cannot love him as much as he should be loved. Therefore charity is said to have no measure, because there is no fixed term to divine love making an excess contrary to virtue, as happens in the moral virtues which keep to the mean. Thus the measure of charity is to have no measure.
This does not mean that charity is not a virtue, but that it does not measured by the mean, as are the moral virtues.
—Quaestio disputata de caritate, 2:13
59
Know the lower; love the higherThe act of the will carries a person towards things as they are in themselves, but the act of the intellect is to bring things into the mind. So, regarding things beneath us, knowing them is better than loving them, because in our intellect they have a higher existence than they do in themselves, being there in an intelligible way. But as for things that are above us, the will can rise higher than the intellect.
Therefore, in moral matters that are beneath man, prudence, which is a virtue of the intellect, directs the other moral virtues that moderate the appetites. But in the theological virtues, which are directed towards God, charity, which is in the will, gives form and life to faith, which is in the intellect.
—Quaestio disputata de caritate, 3:13
60
Love the beginning or the end?Faith comes before hope, and hope before charity, in the order of generation, just as the imperfect comes before the perfect. But in order of perfection, charity comes before faith and hope; therefore it is said to be their form, as a perfect thing gives form to what is imperfect.
—Quaestio disputata de caritate, 3:15
61
Charity wider than friendshipPerfect friendship cannot extend to many people, so as to cater to their individual interests. But when friendship is very perfect towards one person, it can extend to many who are loved because of that one person. Thus charity, which is the most perfect kind of friendship, extends to God and to all who can be conscious of God, including unknown people and enemies.
—Quaestio disputata de caritate, 4:11
62
Love without pleasureVirtue gives pleasure when it operates with respect to its principal object, but with regard to secondary objects pleasure may be absent, without sadness. In this way, charity operates with pleasure with regard to God, its principal object, but it may suffer difficulty in a secondary object, like loving an enemy. Here it is sufficient that one loves without sadness.
—Quaestio disputata de caritate, 4:12
63
Why love others?Charity loves God for his own sake, and loves all others in so far as they are ordered to God. Thus it somehow loves God in all neighbors. A neighbor is loved in charity because God is in him or in order that God may be in him. Thus it is the same habit of charity by which we love God and neighbor.
But if we love our neighbor for his own sake and not because of God, this belongs to another love: natural, political or some other.
—Quaestio disputata de caritate, 4:c
64
How to lose charityCharity is infused by God into men. Anything that is caused by divine infusion needs divine action not just in the beginning, when it comes into existence, but as long as it lasts, so as to be preserved in being. It is like light coming from the sun, which depends on the sun not just when it starts, but as long as it lasts. Therefore, if any obstacle is placed in front of the sun, the light goes. It is the same way when mortal sin comes, which impedes the direct turning of the soul to God, in that it prefers something else to God; then the infusion of charity is cut off and it ceases to exist in the person, as Isaiah says, "Our sins separated us from our God" (59:2).
But when the mind of man returns to look directly at God, loving him above all things (which can only happen by divine grace), then he returns to the state of charity.
—Quaestio disputata de caritate, 6:c
65
How does a good man fall?It is not easy for a good man suddenly to commit a mortal sin, but by negligence and various venial sins he is disposed to fall one day into mortal sin.
—Quaestio disputata de caritate, 6:1
66
One mortal sin, and charity is goneObjection
If it takes much practice and many acts to build up a virtue, how can it be lost by a single sin?
Reply
Moral virtue that is acquired by acts and inclines a person to a good way of acting is not destroyed by a single sin. But the infusion of charity from God is cut off by a single act; thus one act of sin removes charity.
—Quaestio disputata de caritate, 6:3
67
Any kind of mortal sin destroys charityYou might say that charity is destroyed only by its opposite, which is hatred. But indirectly all sins are opposed to charity, in so far as they include contempt for God by preferring something else to him, who is to be loved above all things.
—Quaestio disputata de caritate, 6:4
68
Charity and venial sinImperfect acts, such as venial sin, can be found in someone who has charity, but they do not come from charity. Charity is a principle of action which does not necessarily influence everything a person does, because rational creatures have the freedom to use or not use a habit that they have.
—Quaestio disputata de caritate, 6:12
69
What can pull down the houseTamper with a part and you may not destroy the whole, but in the question of science you can be ignorant of specialized matters, but ignorance of basic common principles makes you ignorant of the whole science. Similarly, the ultimate end is like basic common principles. Any disorder from the ultimat end by mortal sin takes away charity totally, but not every particular disorder does this, as is clear in the case of venial sins.
—Quaestio disputata de caritate, 6:13
70
Falling because of weaknessSomeone who sins from weakness may think that he is not losing everything, but if he realizes that he loses God by committing a mortal sin and gives in to the temptation anyway, he is really loving what he is doing more than God.
Thus charity is not just loving God above all things in general, but in particular as well. Thus an act of unchastity is contrary to charity and excludes one from God.
—Quaestio disputata de caritate, 6:14-15
71
Human love in divine loveSince all human goods are ordered to eternal happiness as their ultimate goal, the love of charity includes all human loves, except those based on sin which is not referable to happiness. So if relatives love one another, or fellow citizens, or fellow travelers or the like, this love can be meritorious and from charity. But loving one another to commit armed robbery or adultery cannot be meritorious or from charity.
—Quaestio disputata de caritate, 7:c
72
Can we love animals?By charity we can love only what is capable of eternal happiness, and that is restricted to what has an intellectual nature. God has eternal happiness by his essence, rational creatures by participation. Our body has it by an overflow of glory from the soul. Other creatures are instrumental to man's attainment of happiness by providing his needs or manifesting to him God's wisdom.
—Quaestio disputata de caritate, 7:c
73
Is self-love bad?People are blamed for self-love when they love themselves more than they should. But that does not happen with regard to spiritual goods, because no one can love virtue too much. Only with regard to exterior and bodily goods can someone love himself too much.
—Quaestio disputata de caritate, 7:13
74
Is love of your body bad?Not all love of the body is bad, but only what is contrary to virtue. Thus we can love our body from charity. Charity does not flee the body, but only the corruption of the body.
—Quaestio disputata de caritate, 7:14-15
75
Can you love without knowing it?It is not possible to know for sure whether we have genuine charity. But this does not mean that we cannot love by charity, only that we cannot judge whether we love from charity. Thus we can be commanded to love from charity, but we do not have to judge that we love frm charity. Thus the Apostle Paul says, "I do not judge myself, but it is the Lord who judges me" (1 Cor 4:3).
—Quaestio disputata de caritate, 7:16
76
Is God our neighbor?Neighbors are those who give or receive benefits from one another. But not every benefactor is a neighbor, but neighbors must share on some common level. Thus, although God gives benefits, he cannot be called our neighbor. Christ, however, in so far as he is a man, can be called our neighbor who gives us benefits.
—Quaestio disputata de caritate, 7:18
77
What love can an enemy claim?Between us and our enemies the only bond is that of charity. We are commanded to show them a general love, both inwardly and outwardly, and a special love in case of extreme necessity. But to show them, for God's sake, any special inward or outward sign of love, such as we show to others who are related to us is a work of perfect charity and comes under the counsels. It is a matter of perfect charity to treat an enemy with the same special love as one has for a friend.
—Quaestio disputata de caritate, 8:c
78
Hating enemiesAn enemy, as enemy, is not the object of love, but he is so only in so far as he belongs to God. Thus we must hate the fact that he hates us, but desire that he should love us.
God does not hate what is his in anyone, that is, any natural or acquired good, but only what is not his, namely, sin. So we too must love in enemies what belongs to God, but hate in them what is alien to God, as Psalm 139:22 says, "I hate them with a perfect hate."
—Quaestio disputata de caritate, 8:6,8
79
Should we love the damned?If it is known that someone is already in hell, we do not have to wish him eternal life, since he is totally excluded from it by God's sentence. But we can love them as works of God in which divine justice is manifested; God loves them in that way.
But as for a sinner not yet in hell, we must wish him eternal life, because it is not yet clear to us whether he will go to hell.
—Quaestio disputata de caritate, 8:9
80
Punishing enemiesIt is lawful for someone in authority to punish evildoers, and kill them if necessary, still loving them with charity. Gregory says that the just take up arms, but lovingly, and if outwardly they enforce discipline harshly, inwardly they preserve the sweetness of love.
—Quaestio disputata de caritate, 8:10
81
Is loving enemies possible?Loving enemies, in so far as they are enemies, is difficult or even impossible. But to love an enemy because of something that is very much loved is easy. And so what seems impossible in itself, God's love makes easy.
—Quaestio disputata de caritate, 8:13
82
Psalm curses"May they be blotted out of the book of life, and not inscribed with the just" (Ps 139:29). "May death come upon them; may they descend to the underworld while they are living" (Ps 55:16). Such imprecations by the prophets are to be understood as announcements of the future. They used such language in conformity with the justice of God revealed to them.
—Quaestio disputata de caritate, 8:15
83
Better love friends or enemies?Loving an enemy is better than loving only one's friends, because it shows a more perfect charity. But if we compare the two absolutely, it is better to love a friend than an enemy, and it is better to love God than a friend. The difficulty found in loving an enemy does not make loving him more meritorious, but only shows the perfection of charity which overcomes this difficulty. If charity were so perfect as to eliminate the difficulty altogether, it would be more meritorious. We are talking about someone who loves his friend with such perfect charity that it extends to loving enemies. This charity is more intense in loving a friend, unless accidentally loving an enemy becomes more intense because of the greater effort it takes to overcome the repugnance.
—Quaestio disputata de caritate, 8:17
84
Priority of faithThe object of the Faith is the truth; so as some things are more true we can have more faith in them. Since truth consists in the conformity of the intellect to reality, on the level of conformity there is no variation and thus nothing more or less true, but on the level of being, which is the foundation of truth, some things have more reality, being the reasons for the existence of other things. Thus in science we believe principles more than conclusions. The same applies to matters of the Faith. Thus the Apostle Paul proves the future resurrection of the dead from the resurrection of Christ (1 Cor 15).
—Quaestio disputata de caritate, 9:1
85
Pick-and-choose faith?A habit is constituted by its formal object rather than its material contents. Take away the formal object, and the habit is gone. The formal object of Faith is the First Truth, manifested by the teaching of the Church, just as the formal object of science is the medium of demonstration.
Just as someone who crams the conclusions of geometry without knowing how to demonstrate them has no science, but only conclusions that are opinions, so someone who holds to certain doctrines of the Faith, but does not hold them because of the authority of Catholic doctrine does not have the habit of Faith.
Anyone who holds any teaching because it is Catholic doctrine assents to all that is contained in Catholic doctrine. Otherwise he would rather be believing in himself than in the doctrine of the Church.
Thus it is evident that anyone who obstinately rejects one article of Faith does not have Faith in the other articles. I am talking about Faith which is an infused habit. Such a person would only hold such articles of the Faith as opinions.
—Quaestio disputata de caritate, 13:6
86
Whom to love moreIn natural love, where the lover is the principal object of love, one will love those who are most like oneself. But in the love of charity, the principal object is God, and so one will have greater love for those who are more united to God, other things being equal.
Yet we love all equally, in so far as we wish them all eternal life.
—Quaestio disputata de caritate, 9:5,8
87
Love neighbor as much as yourself?We are held to love our neighbor as ourselves, but not as much as ourselves. Therefore it does not follow that all neighbors are to be equally loved.
We love some more not only by wishing them greater good, abut also by wishing them the same good with more intense affection. So, as we wish the same good, which is eternal life, for all, we do not love all equally.
—Quaestio disputata de caritate, 9:9-10
88
Love relatives more than holy people?Those who are in the heavenly homeland have reached their ultimate goal, and thus their love is regulated by the goal itself. Therefore for them the order of charity is simply the order of closeness to God; so they love more those who are closer to God.
But while we are on the way to our ultimate goal, we have to take into consideration the help that we get from others to reach that goal. Therefore we do not always love the best people most, but we also consider our relationships with others. So both factors determine how much love we owe to others.
—Quaestio disputata de caritate, 9:12
89
More love to parents or to children?According to the love one owes oneself, a man loves his wife and children more than his parents, because they are somehow part of the man. Thus a man's love for his wife and children is more included in his love for himself than the love which he has for his parents. This is not loving children for their own sake, but for oneself.
But according to the love which we owe to others for their own sake, our parents are more deserving of love than our children, because we received more benefits from our parents, and the honor of a son depends more on the honor of his father than the other way around. Therefore in showing reverence, obedience, deference etc., we ow our parents more than we do our children. But in providing for needs, we owe more to our children than to our parents, because parents should leave wealth to their children, and not the other way around, as is said in 1 Corinthians 4.
—Quaestio disputata de caritate, 9:18
90
Perfect charity possible in this life?In this life we can be without mortal sin, which separates us from God. We can also be without worry for temporal things, as the Apostle says, "He who is without a wife is concerned for the things of the Lord, how he may please God" (1 Cor 7:33). But in this life we cannot be free from the distraction of sleeping, eating etc., and from the weight of a corruptible body which keeps the divine light from shining in us and perfecting our charity, as the Apostle says, "As long as we are in the body, we are exiled from the Lord" (2 Cor 5:6). Only Jesus Christ, who had the beatific vision while on this earth, was free from this third obstacle to charity.
—Quaestio disputata de caritate, 10:c
91
How can prayer be a pain?An activity can cease being pleasant not only on the part of its object, but also on the part of the doer, who may not be very capable. So for one's mind to be actually lifted towards God is always pleasant on the part of the object, but on the part of someone living this life it cannot be continuously pleasant, because contemplation by the human mind requires the use of the imagination and of other bodily powers, which sometimes have to rest because of the weakness of the body, making contemplation unpleasant. Thus it is said that "much thinking wearies the body" (Qoheleth 12:12).
—Quaestio disputata de caritate, 10:7
92
Loving with you whole heart and mindIt is one thing to refer everything to God habitually, and another thing to do so virtually. Someone can refer something habitually by doing or intending nothing, such as in sleep. But one does so virtually when one organizes his actions for this end, and may not even thing of the end while he concentrates on the action at hand.
We are commanded to refer everything to God virtually, since that means nothing other than to have God as one's ultimate end.
—Quaestio disputata de caritate, 11:3
93
The enemies of charityThe soul, as the subject of charity, is incorruptible, but by the contrary disposition of sin it can become unfit to house charity. The cause of charity, God, is also incorruptible, but his influence can be impeded by sin, which separates us from God. The object of charity is God, who is the unchangeable good, but the human will can turn away from him. A contrary agent, which is sin, is weaker than charity, but can be stronger if charity is not actually operating and sin drags a person into a particular tragic choice. Charity is strongest with regard to the ultimate end, but sin can be a stronger motive in a particular choice.
—Quaestio disputata de caritate, 12:11
94
Persevering in charityWith regard to John 10:27 "My sheep hear my voice, but do not hear the voice of strangers," Augustine comments that there is a certain saying of Christ that no one hears except the sheep who belongs to him by predestination. This saying is: "Whoever perseveres until the end will be saved." Augustine understands this to mean that who does not remain in the word of Chris is not truly his disciple, because he did not really learn from him how to persevere. Nevertheless he could for a time be a disciple of Christ, in so far as he has a temporary love of God and neighbor.
—Quaestio disputata de caritate, 12:18
95
Mortal sin—God's defeat?If a gift that depends on the donor for its preservation is taken away by force, we could say that the donor was defeated. But if the beneficiary voluntarily throws away the gift, we cannot say that the donor is defeated, since he is not supposed to force a person to be virtuous.
—Quaestio disputata de caritate, 12:23
96
One mortal sin and charity is goneThe habit of charity does not have a cause in its subject, the soul, but totally depends on an extrinsic cause. For it is infused into our hearts by the Holy Spirit who is given to us (cf. Rom 5:5). But God is not just the cause of charity's origin in the soul and not of its continuous existence, as a builder is responsible only for building a house and it remains after he is gone. Rather, God is the cause of the origin and continuous existence of charity and grace in the soul, just as the sun is the cause of light in the air. Just as sunlight disappears if there is any obstacle to it, so the habit of charity disappears from the soul when the soul turns from God by sin.
—Quaestio disputata de caritate, 13:c
97
Two ways of losing charityCharity can be lost in two ways: one directly, the other indirectly. It can be lost directly by actual contempt of God, as in the case of those who say to God, "Depart from us; we want no knowledge of your ways" (Job 21:14). It can be lost indirectly when someone, without thinking of God, consents to something against God's commandment because of a passion of fear or concupiscence, and thus loses charity.
—Quaestio disputata de caritate, 13:2
98
When not to correct your neighborOne of the most important circumstances required for an act of virtue is that the act should be proportioned to the end which the virtue intends. In correcting one's neighbor, charity looks for his improvement. The act would not be virtuous if the correction were done in such a way as to make him worse. Therefore it is said, "Do not argue with a scoffer" (Prov 9:8). His mocking you is not to be feared, but it is important not to lead him to hate you, which would make him worse.
—Quaestio disputata de correctione fraterna, 1:1
99
Whom should you correct?There are two kinds of correction of a wrong-doer. One is by simple admonition, and that is fraternal correction, and should take place only when it is hoped that the person will of his own will listen to the correction. The other is coercive correction with the imposition of penalties. Such correction belongs only to those in authority, who also should try to deliver the wrong-doer from his bad mind.
—Quaestio disputata de correctione fraterna, 1:2
100
Should you look for faults?The commandment of correcting our brother does not oblige us to investigate the sins of others so that we might correct them. If that were so we would be probing into the lives of others, against which we are warned: "Do not look for wickedness in the house of a just man, and do not spoil his rest" (Prov 24:12 - Latin).
—Quaestio disputata de correctione fraterna, 1:9
101
Should you correct if you are guilty?A person is not excused from the duty of correcting another because of his own sin, but he is made unworthy of this act because he does not correct himself. He is not, however, in a dilemma, because he should first stop sinning and correct himself, as is said, "First take the beam from your own eye; then you will see well enough to take the speck out of your brother's eye.
—Quaestio disputata de correctione fraterna, 1:15
102
Should you start with private correction?Objection
Paul instructs Timothy to correct the sinner in front of all (5:20).
Reply
That instruction should be understood of public sins. Even if these are against an individual they affect all who see it, as is said, "His fellow servants who saw what he did were very sad" (Mt 18:31). But Matthew 18:15 talks about hidden sins, which you must first correct privately.
—Quaestio disputata de correctione fraterna, 2:1
103
What if private correction does not work?If we correct someone privately and he does not listen to us, then, if we think there is a good possibility that by continuing the procedure he may change his ways, we should bring in witnesses and confronting him before them. But if we think that such a step will more likely make him worse, we should not try it, but abandon the attempt to correct him fraternally.
—Quaestio disputata de correctione fraterna, 2:2
104
Types of fearFear has to do with any sort of defect in oneself in relation to another. There can be three kinds of defect in man: One is to receive punishment; this is the object of servile fear. Another is to be guilty of a wrong; this is the object of filial or chaste fear, and is proper to this life where it is possible for us to sin. Both these kinds of fear will be absent in heaven, where the power of guilt and punishment will be gone, as we read: "He will live secure, have quiet and fear no evil" (Prov 1:33).
There is a third natural defect, which is the infinite distance of any creature from God, and this defect can never be taken away. This is the object of reverential fear, and will be found in heaven, showing reverence to one's Creator from a consideration of his majesty and one's own smallness.
—Quaestio disputata de spe, 4:2
105
Was Paul chaste?Paul confessed that "I see another law in my members fighting the law of my mind" (Rom 7:23). To this it must be said that temperance does not exclude all evil concupiscence, but a temperate person does not suffer such temptations as vehemently and strongly as do those who have not tried to restrain their concupiscence. Paul therefore suffered from inordinate concupiscence because of the remains of original sin. But it was not vehement or strong with him, because he was careful to restrain it by chastising his body and bringing it to subjection. So he was truly temperate.
—Quaestio disputata de virtutibus cardinalibus, 1:6
106
Virtues are inter-connectedVirtues that are simply perfect (excluding the sciences and arts) are connected because of charity, since no such virtue can be had without charity, and if there is charity all these virtues are present.
On a lower level the moral virtues are inter-connected though prudence, because without prudence none of them can exist, and prudence cannot be present if any of them is lacking.
—Quaestio disputata de virtutibus cardinalibus, 2:c
107
Why still struggle after confession?A habit should result in eager and pleasant action, but this can be impeded by extrinsic factors, just as someone with the habit of science can sometimes be unable to use it because of sleep, inebriation or the like.
Therefore someone who repents regains sanctifying grace, charity and all the other virtuous habits, but because of dispositions left from the acts of previous sins, he can find it difficult to act according to the infused virtues he has received.
This does not happen with virtues acquired through repeated acts, which both remove contrary dispositions and generate virtue.
—Quaestio disputata de virtutibus cardinalibus, 2:2
108
How can some baptized people manage their lives stupidly?Anyone who is baptized has received charity together with prudence and all the other virtues. But prudence does not necessarily make one wise in all practical matters, such as in business, conducting war and the like, but only in the things that are necessary for salvation. This prudence is not lacking in all who are in the state of grace, no matter how simple they may be, as we read: "The anointing he gave you teaches you everything" (1 John 2:27).
Yet the act of this prudence can be impeded because of age, as in children, or because of brain disorders, as in morons and mad people.
—Quaestio disputata de virtutibus cardinalibus, 2:3
109
What is spiritual growth?Charity is the greatest of all the virtues. As it grows, all the other virtues grow proportionally with it in the same individual, just as the fingers of a hand, though not of the same size, grow proportionally as an infant becomes an adult.
—Quaestio disputata de virtutibus cardinalibus, 3:1