St. Thomas Aquinas

The Summa Theologica

(Benziger Bros. edition, 1947)
Translated by
Fathers of the English Dominican Province


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Deinde considerandum est de fructibus. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor.    We must now consider the Fruits of the Holy Ghost: under which head there are four points of inquiry:
Primo, utrum fructus spiritus sancti sint actus.     (1) Whether the fruits of the Holy Ghost are acts?
Secundo, utrum differant a beatitudinibus.     (2) Whether they differ from the beatitudes?
Tertio, de eorum numero.     (3) Of their number?
Quarto, de oppositione eorum ad opera carnis.     (4) Of their opposition to the works of the flesh.


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Question: 70  [<< | >>]
Article: 1  [<< | >>]

Whether the fruits of the Holy Ghost which the Apostle enumerates (Gal. 5) are acts?

Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod fructus spiritus sancti quos apostolus nominat ad Galat. V, non sint actus. Id enim cuius est alius fructus, non debet dici fructus, sic enim in infinitum iretur. Sed actuum nostrorum est aliquis fructus, dicitur enim Sap. III, bonorum laborum gloriosus est fructus; et Ioan. IV, qui metit, mercedem accipit, et fructum congregat in vitam aeternam. Ergo ipsi actus nostri non dicuntur fructus.   Objection 1: It would seem that the fruits of the Holy Ghost, enumerated by the Apostle (Gal. 5:22,23), are not acts. For that which bears fruit, should not itself be called a fruit, else we should go on indefinitely. But our actions bear fruit: for it is written (Wis. 3:15): "The fruit of good labor is glorious," and (Jn. 4:36): "He that reapeth receiveth wages, and gathereth fruit unto life everlasting." Therefore our actions are not to be called fruits.
Praeterea, sicut Augustinus dicit, in X de Trin., fruimur cognitis in quibus voluntas propter ipsa delectata conquiescit. Sed voluntas nostra non debet conquiescere in actibus nostris propter se. Ergo actus nostri fructus dici non debent.   Objection 2: Further, as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 10), "we enjoy [*'Fruimur', from which verb we have the Latin 'fructus' and the English 'fruit'] the things we know, when the will rests by rejoicing in them." But our will should not rest in our actions for their own sake. Therefore our actions should not be called fruits.
Praeterea, inter fructus spiritus sancti enumerantur ab apostolo aliquae virtutes scilicet caritas, mansuetudo, fides et castitas. Virtutes autem non sunt actus, sed habitus, ut supra dictum est. Ergo fructus non sunt actus.   Objection 3: Further, among the fruits of the Holy Ghost, the Apostle numbers certain virtues, viz. charity, meekness, faith, and chastity. Now virtues are not actions but habits, as stated above (Question [55], Article [1]). Therefore the fruits are not actions.
Sed contra est quod dicitur Matth. XII, ex fructu arbor cognoscitur; idest, ex operibus suis homo, ut ibi exponitur a sanctis. Ergo ipsi actus humani dicuntur fructus.   On the contrary, It is written (Mt. 12:33): "By the fruit the tree is known"; that is to say, man is known by his works, as holy men explain the passage. Therefore human actions are called fruits.
Respondeo dicendum quod nomen fructus a corporalibus ad spiritualia est translatum. Dicitur autem in corporalibus fructus, quod ex planta producitur cum ad perfectionem pervenerit, et quandam in se suavitatem habet. Qui quidem fructus ad duo comparari potest, scilicet ad arborem producentem ipsum; et ad hominem qui fructum ex arbore adipiscitur. Secundum hoc igitur, nomen fructus in rebus spiritualibus dupliciter accipere possumus, uno modo, ut dicatur fructus hominis, quasi arboris, id quod ab eo producitur; alio modo, ut dicatur fructus hominis id quod homo adipiscitur.   I answer that, The word "fruit" has been transferred from the material to the spiritual world. Now fruit, among material things, is the product of a plant when it comes to perfection, and has a certain sweetness. This fruit has a twofold relation: to the tree that produces it, and to the man who gathers the fruit from the tree. Accordingly, in spiritual matters, we may take the word "fruit" in two ways: first, so that the fruit of man, who is likened to the tree, is that which he produces; secondly, so that man's fruit is what he gathers.
Non autem omne id quod adipiscitur homo, habet rationem fructus, sed id quod est ultimum, delectationem habens. Habet enim homo et agrum et arborem, quae fructus non dicuntur; sed solum id quod est ultimum, quod scilicet ex agro et arbore homo intendit habere. Et secundum hoc, fructus hominis dicitur ultimus hominis finis, quo debet frui.    Yet not all that man gathers is fruit, but only that which is last and gives pleasure. For a man has both a field and a tree, and yet these are not called fruits; but that only which is last, to wit, that which man intends to derive from the field and from the tree. In this sense man's fruit is his last end which is intended for his enjoyment.
Si autem dicatur fructus hominis id quod ex homine producitur, sic ipsi actus humani fructus dicuntur, operatio enim est actus secundus operantis, et delectationem habet, si sit conveniens operanti. Si igitur operatio hominis procedat ab homine secundum facultatem suae rationis, sic dicitur esse fructus rationis. Si vero procedat ab homine secundum altiorem virtutem, quae est virtus spiritus sancti; sic dicitur esse operatio hominis fructus spiritus sancti, quasi cuiusdam divini seminis, dicitur enim I Ioan. III, omnis qui natus est ex Deo, peccatum non facit, quoniam semen ipsius in eo manet.    If, however, by man's fruit we understand a product of man, then human actions are called fruits: because operation is the second act of the operator, and gives pleasure if it is suitable to him. If then man's operation proceeds from man in virtue of his reason, it is said to be the fruit of his reason: but if it proceeds from him in respect of a higher power, which is the power of the Holy Ghost, then man's operation is said to be the fruit of the Holy Ghost, as of a Divine seed, for it is written (1 Jn. 3:9): "Whosoever is born of God, committeth no sin, for His seed abideth in him."
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, cum fructus habeat quodammodo rationem ultimi et finis, nihil prohibet alicuius fructus esse alium fructum, sicut finis ad finem ordinatur. Opera igitur nostra inquantum sunt effectus quidam spiritus sancti in nobis operantis, habent rationem fructus, sed inquantum ordinantur ad finem vitae aeternae, sic magis habent rationem florum. Unde dicitur Eccli. XXIV, flores mei fructus honoris et honestatis.   Reply to Objection 1: Since fruit is something last and final, nothing hinders one fruit bearing another fruit, even as one end is subordinate to another. And so our works, in so far as they are produced by the Holy Ghost working in us, are fruits: but, in so far as they are referred to the end which is eternal life, they should rather be called flowers: hence it is written (Ecclus. 24:23): "My flowers are the fruits of honor and riches."
Ad secundum dicendum quod, cum dicitur voluntas in aliquo propter se delectari, potest intelligi dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum quod ly propter dicit causam finalem, et sic propter se non delectatur aliquis nisi in ultimo fine. Alio modo, secundum quod designat causam formalem, et sic propter se aliquis potest delectari in omni eo quod delectabile est secundum suam formam. Sicut patet quod infirmus delectatur in sanitate propter se, sicut in fine; in medicina autem suavi, non sicut in fine, sed sicut in habente saporem delectabilem; in medicina autem austera, nullo modo propter se, sed solum propter aliud. Sic igitur dicendum est quod in Deo delectari debet homo propter se, sicut propter ultimum finem, in actibus autem virtuosis, non sicut propter finem, sed propter honestatem quam continent, delectabilem virtuosis. Unde Ambrosius dicit quod opera virtutum dicuntur fructus, quia suos possessores sancta et sincera delectatione reficiunt.   Reply to Objection 2: When the will is said to delight in a thing for its own sake, this may be understood in two ways. First, so that the expression "for the sake of" be taken to designate the final cause; and in this way, man delights in nothing for its own sake, except the last end. Secondly, so that it expresses the formal cause; and in this way, a man may delight in anything that is delightful by reason of its form. Thus it is clear that a sick man delights in health, for its own sake, as in an end; in a nice medicine, not as in an end, but as in something tasty; and in a nasty medicine, nowise for its own sake, but only for the sake of something else. Accordingly we must say that man must delight in God for His own sake, as being his last end, and in virtuous deeds, not as being his end, but for the sake of their inherent goodness which is delightful to the virtuous. Hence Ambrose says (De Parad. xiii) that virtuous deeds are called fruits because "they refresh those that have them, with a holy and genuine delight."
Ad tertium dicendum quod nomina virtutum sumuntur quandoque pro actibus earum, sicut Augustinus dicit quod fides est credere quod non vides; et caritas est motus animi ad diligendum Deum et proximum. Et hoc modo sumuntur nomina virtutum in enumeratione fructuum.   Reply to Objection 3: Sometimes the names of the virtues are applied to their actions: thus Augustine writes (Tract. xl in Joan.): "Faith is to believe what thou seest not"; and (De Doctr. Christ. iii, 10): "Charity is the movement of the soul in loving God and our neighbor." It is thus that the names of the virtues are used in reckoning the fruits.


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Whether the fruits differ from the beatitudes?

Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod fructus a beatitudinibus non differant. Beatitudines enim attribuuntur donis, ut supra dictum est. Sed dona perficiunt hominem secundum quod movetur a spiritu sancto. Ergo beatitudines ipsae sunt fructus spiritus sancti.   Objection 1: It would seem that the fruits do not differ from the beatitudes. For the beatitudes are assigned to the gifts, as stated above (Question [69], Article [1], ad 1). But the gifts perfect man in so far as he is moved by the Holy Ghost. Therefore the beatitudes themselves are fruits of the Holy Ghost.
Praeterea, sicut se habet fructus vitae aeternae ad beatitudinem futuram, quae est rei; ita se habent fructus praesentis vitae ad beatitudines praesentis vitae, quae sunt spei. Sed fructus vitae aeternae est ipsa beatitudo futura. Ergo fructus vitae praesentis sunt ipsae beatitudines.   Objection 2: Further, as the fruit of eternal life is to future beatitude which is that of actual possession, so are the fruits of the present life to the beatitudes of the present life, which are based on hope. Now the fruit of eternal life is identified with future beatitude. Therefore the fruits of the present life are the beatitudes.
Praeterea, de ratione fructus est quod sit quiddam ultimum et delectabile. Sed hoc pertinet ad rationem beatitudinis, ut supra dictum est. Ergo eadem ratio est fructus et beatitudinis. Ergo non debent ab invicem distingui.   Objection 3: Further, fruit is essentially something ultimate and delightful. Now this is the very nature of beatitude, as stated above (Question [3], Article [1]; Question [4], Article [1]). Therefore fruit and beatitude have the same nature, and consequently should not be distinguished from one another.
Sed contra, quorum species sunt diversae, ipsa quoque sunt diversa. Sed in diversas partes dividuntur et fructus et beatitudines; ut patet per numerationem utrorumque. Ergo fructus differunt a beatitudinibus.   On the contrary, Things divided into different species, differ from one another. But fruits and beatitudes are divided into different parts, as is clear from the way in which they are enumerated. Therefore the fruits differ from the beatitudes.
Respondeo dicendum quod plus requiritur ad rationem beatitudinis, quam ad rationem fructus. Nam ad rationem fructus sufficit quod sit aliquid habens rationem ultimi et delectabilis, sed ad rationem beatitudinis, ulterius requiritur quod sit aliquid perfectum et excellens. Unde omnes beatitudines possunt dici fructus, sed non convertitur. Sunt enim fructus quaecumque virtuosa opera, in quibus homo delectatur. Sed beatitudines dicuntur solum perfecta opera, quae etiam, ratione suae perfectionis, magis attribuuntur donis quam virtutibus, ut supra dictum est.   I answer that, More is required for a beatitude than for a fruit. Because it is sufficient for a fruit to be something ultimate and delightful; whereas for a beatitude, it must be something perfect and excellent. Hence all the beatitudes may be called fruits, but not vice versa. For the fruits are any virtuous deeds in which one delights: whereas the beatitudes are none but perfect works, and which, by reason of their perfection, are assigned to the gifts rather than to the virtues, as already stated (Question [69], Article [1], ad 1).
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio illa probat quod beatitudines sint fructus, non autem quod omnes fructus beatitudines sint.   Reply to Objection 1: This argument proves the beatitudes to be fruits, but not that all the fruits are beatitudes.
Ad secundum dicendum quod fructus vitae aeternae est simpliciter ultimus et perfectus, et ideo in nullo distinguitur a beatitudine futura. Fructus autem praesentis vitae non sunt simpliciter ultimi et perfecti, et ideo non omnes fructus sunt beatitudines.   Reply to Objection 2: The fruit of eternal life is ultimate and perfect simply: hence it nowise differs from future beatitude. On the other hand the fruits of the present life are not simply ultimate and perfect; wherefore not all the fruits are beatitudes.
Ad tertium dicendum quod aliquid amplius est de ratione beatitudinis quam de ratione fructus, ut dictum est.   Reply to Objection 3: More is required for a beatitude than for a fruit, as stated.


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Whether the fruits are suitably enumerated by the Apostle?

Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod apostolus inconvenienter enumeret, ad Galat. V, duodecim fructus. Alibi enim dicit esse tantum unum fructum praesentis vitae; secundum illud Rom. VI, habetis fructum vestrum in sanctificatione et Isaiae XXVII dicitur, hic est omnis fructus, ut auferatur peccatum. Non ergo ponendi sunt duodecim fructus.   Objection 1: It would seem that the fruits are unsuitably enumerated by the Apostle (Gal. 5:22,23). Because, elsewhere, he says that there is only one fruit of the present life; according to Rm. 6:22: "You have your fruit unto sanctification." Moreover it is written (Is. 27:9): "This is all the fruit . . . that the sin . . . be taken away." Therefore we should not reckon twelve fruits.
Praeterea, fructus est qui ex spirituali semine exoritur, ut dictum est. Sed dominus, Matth. XIII, ponit triplicem terrae bonae fructum ex spirituali semine provenientem, scilicet centesimum, et sexagesimum, et trigesimum. Ergo non sunt ponendi duodecim fructus.   Objection 2: Further, fruit is the product of spiritual seed, as stated (Article [1]). But Our Lord mentions (Mt. 13:23) a threefold fruit as growing from a spiritual seed in a good ground, viz. "hundredfold, sixtyfold," and "thirtyfold." Therefore one should not reckon twelve fruits.
Praeterea, fructus habet in sui ratione quod sit ultimum et delectabile. Sed ratio ista non invenitur in omnibus fructibus ab apostolo enumeratis, patientia enim et longanimitas videntur in rebus contristantibus esse; fides autem non habet rationem ultimi, sed magis rationem primi fundamenti. Superflue igitur huiusmodi fructus enumerantur.   Objection 3: Further, the very nature of fruit is to be something ultimate and delightful. But this does not apply to all the fruits mentioned by the Apostle: for patience and long-suffering seem to imply a painful object, while faith is not something ultimate, but rather something primary and fundamental. Therefore too many fruits are enumerated.
Sed contra, videtur quod insufficienter et diminute enumerentur. Dictum est enim quod omnes beatitudines fructus dici possunt, sed non omnes hic enumerantur. Nihil etiam hic ponitur ad actum sapientiae pertinens, et multarum aliarum virtutum. Ergo videtur quod insufficienter enumerentur fructus.   Objection 4: On the other hand, It seems that they are enumerated insufficiently and incompletely. For it has been stated (Article [2]) that all the beatitudes may be called fruits; yet not all are mentioned here. Nor is there anything corresponding to the acts of wisdom, and of many other virtues. Therefore it seems that the fruits are insufficiently enumerated.
Respondeo dicendum quod numerus duodecim fructuum ab apostolo enumeratorum, conveniens est, et possunt significari per duodecim fructus de quibus dicitur Apoc. ult., ex utraque parte fluminis lignum vitae, afferens fructus duodecim. Quia vero fructus dicitur quod ex aliquo principio procedit sicut ex semine vel radice, attendenda est distinctio horum fructuum secundum diversum processum spiritus sancti in nobis. Qui quidem processus attenditur secundum hoc, ut primo mens hominis in seipsa ordinetur; secundo vero, ordinetur ad ea quae sunt iuxta; tertio vero, ad ea quae sunt infra.   I answer that, The number of the twelve fruits enumerated by the Apostle is suitable, and that there may be a reference to them in the twelve fruits of which it is written (Apoc. 22:2): "On both sides of the river was the tree bearing twelve fruits." Since, however, a fruit is something that proceeds from a source as from a seed or root, the difference between these fruits must be gathered from the various ways in which the Holy Ghost proceeds in us: which process consists in this, that the mind of man is set in order, first of all, in regard to itself; secondly, in regard to things that are near it; thirdly, in regard to things that are below it.
Tunc autem bene mens hominis disponitur in seipsa, quando mens hominis bene se habet et in bonis et in malis. Prima autem dispositio mentis humanae ad bonum, est per amorem, qui est prima affectio et omnium affectionum radix, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo inter fructus spiritus primo ponitur caritas; in qua specialiter spiritus sanctus datur, sicut in propria similitudine, cum et ipse sit amor. Unde dicitur Rom. V, caritas Dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris per spiritum sanctum, qui datus est nobis. Ad amorem autem caritatis ex necessitate sequitur gaudium. Omnis enim amans gaudet ex coniunctione amati. Caritas autem semper habet praesentem Deum, quem amat; secundum illud I Ioan. IV, qui manet in caritate, in Deo manet, et Deus in eo. Unde sequela caritatis est gaudium. Perfectio autem gaudii est pax, quantum ad duo. Primo quidem, quantum ad quietem ab exterioribus conturbantibus, non enim potest perfecte gaudere de bono amato, qui in eius fruitione ab aliis perturbatur; et iterum, qui perfecte cor habet in uno pacatum, a nullo alio molestari potest, cum alia quasi nihil reputet; unde dicitur in Psalmo CXVIII, pax multa diligentibus legem tuam, et non est illis scandalum, quia scilicet ab exterioribus non perturbantur, quin Deo fruantur. Secundo, quantum ad sedationem desiderii fluctuantis, non enim perfecte gaudet de aliquo, cui non sufficit id de quo gaudet. Haec autem duo importat pax, scilicet ut neque ab exterioribus perturbemur; et ut desideria nostra conquiescant in uno. Unde post caritatem et gaudium, tertio ponitur pax. In malis autem bene se habet mens quantum ad duo. Primo quidem, ut non perturbetur mens per imminentiam malorum, quod pertinet ad patientiam. Secundo, ut non perturbetur in dilatione bonorum, quod pertinet ad longanimitatem, nam carere bono habet rationem mali, ut dicitur in V Ethic.    Accordingly man's mind is well disposed in regard to itself when it has a good disposition towards good things and towards evil things. Now the first disposition of the human mind towards the good is effected by love, which is the first of our emotions and the root of them all, as stated above (Question [27], Article [4]). Wherefore among the fruits of the Holy Ghost, we reckon "charity," wherein the Holy Ghost is given in a special manner, as in His own likeness, since He Himself is love. Hence it is written (Rm. 5:5): "The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, Who is given to us." The necessary result of the love of charity is joy: because every lover rejoices at being united to the beloved. Now charity has always actual presence in God Whom it loves, according to 1 Jn. 4:16: "He that abideth in charity, abideth in God, and God in Him": wherefore the sequel of charity is "joy." Now the perfection of joy is peace in two respects. First, as regards freedom from outward disturbance; for it is impossible to rejoice perfectly in the beloved good, if one is disturbed in the enjoyment thereof; and again, if a man's heart is perfectly set at peace in one object, he cannot be disquieted by any other, since he accounts all others as nothing; hence it is written (Ps. 118:165): "Much peace have they that love Thy Law, and to them there is no stumbling-block," because, to wit, external things do not disturb them in their enjoyment of God. Secondly, as regards the calm of the restless desire: for he does not perfectly rejoice, who is not satisfied with the object of his joy. Now peace implies these two things, namely, that we be not disturbed by external things, and that our desires rest altogether in one object. Wherefore after charity and joy, "peace" is given the third place. In evil things the mind has a good disposition, in respect of two things. First, by not being disturbed whenever evil threatens: which pertains to "patience"; secondly, by not being disturbed, whenever good things are delayed; which belongs to "long suffering," since "to lack good is a kind of evil" (Ethic. v, 3).
Ad id autem quod est iuxta hominem, scilicet proximum, bene disponitur mens hominis, primo quidem, quantum ad voluntatem bene faciendi. Et ad hoc pertinet bonitas. Secundo, quantum ad beneficentiae executionem. Et ad hoc pertinet benignitas, dicuntur enim benigni quos bonus ignis amoris fervere facit ad benefaciendum proximis. Tertio, quantum ad hoc quod aequanimiter tolerentur mala ab eis illata. Et ad hoc pertinet mansuetudo, quae cohibet iras. Quarto, quantum ad hoc quod non solum per iram proximis non noceamus, sed etiam neque per fraudem vel per dolum. Et ad hoc pertinet fides, si pro fidelitate sumatur. Sed si sumatur pro fide qua creditur in Deum, sic per hanc ordinatur homo ad id quod est supra se, ut scilicet homo intellectum suum Deo subiiciat, et per consequens omnia quae ipsius sunt.    Man's mind is well disposed as regards what is near him, viz. his neighbor, first, as to the will to do good; and to this belongs "goodness." Secondly, as to the execution of well-doing; and to this belongs "benignity," for the benign are those in whom the salutary flame [bonus ignis] of love has enkindled the desire to be kind to their neighbor. Thirdly, as to his suffering with equanimity the evils his neighbor inflicts on him. To this belongs "meekness," which curbs anger. Fourthly, in the point of our refraining from doing harm to our neighbor not only through anger, but also through fraud or deceit. To this pertains "faith," if we take it as denoting fidelity. But if we take it for the faith whereby we believe in God, then man is directed thereby to that which is above him, so that he subject his intellect and, consequently, all that is his, to God.
Sed ad id quod infra est, bene disponitur homo, primo quidem, quantum ad exteriores actiones, per modestiam, quae in omnibus dictis et factis modum observat. Quantum ad interiores concupiscentias, per continentiam et castitatem, sive haec duo distinguantur per hoc, quod castitas refrenat hominem ad illicitis, continentia vero etiam a licitis; sive per hoc quod continens patitur concupiscentias sed non deducitur, castus autem neque patitur neque deducitur.    Man is well disposed in respect of that which is below him, as regards external action, by "modesty," whereby we observe the "mode" in all our words and deeds: as regards internal desires, by "contingency" and "chastity": whether these two differ because chastity withdraws man from unlawful desires, contingency also from lawful desires: or because the continent man is subject to concupiscence, but is not led away; whereas the chaste man is neither subject to, nor led away from them.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod sanctificatio fit per omnes virtutes per quas etiam peccata tolluntur. Unde fructus ibi singulariter nominatur propter unitatem generis, quod in multas species dividitur, secundum quas dicuntur multi fructus.   Reply to Objection 1: Sanctification is effected by all the virtues, by which also sins are taken away. Consequently fruit is mentioned there in the singular, on account of its being generically one, though divided into many species which are spoken of as so many fruits.
Ad secundum dicendum quod fructus centesimus, sexagesimus et trigesimus non diversificantur secundum diversas species virtuosorum actuum, sed secundum diversos perfectionis gradus etiam unius virtutis. Sicut continentia coniugalis dicitur significari per fructum trigesimum; continentia vidualis per sexagesimum; virginalis autem per centesimum. Et aliis etiam modis sancti distinguunt tres evangelicos fructus secundum tres gradus virtutis. Et ponuntur tres gradus, quia cuiuslibet rei perfectio attenditur secundum principium, medium et finem.   Reply to Objection 2: The hundredfold, sixtyfold, and thirtyfold fruits do not differ as various species of virtuous acts, but as various degrees of perfection, even in the same virtue. Thus contingency of the married state is said to be signified by the thirtyfold fruit; the contingency of widowhood, by the sixtyfold; and virginal contingency, by the hundredfold fruit. There are, moreover, other ways in which holy men distinguish three evangelical fruits according to the three degrees of virtue: and they speak of three degrees, because the perfection of anything is considered with respect to its beginning, its middle, and its end.
Ad tertium dicendum quod ipsum quod est in tristitiis non perturbari, rationem delectabilis habet. Et fides etiam si accipiatur prout est fundamentum, habet quandam rationem ultimi et delectabilis, secundum quod continet certitudinem, unde Glossa exponit, fides, idest de invisibilibus certitudo.   Reply to Objection 3: The fact of not being disturbed by painful things is something to delight in. And as to faith, if we consider it as the foundation, it has the aspect of being ultimate and delightful, in as much as it contains certainty: hence a gloss expounds thus: "Faith, which is certainly about the unseen."
Ad quartum dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, super epistolam ad Galat., apostolus non hoc ita suscepit, ut doceret quod sunt (vel opera carnis, vel fructus spiritus); sed ut ostenderet in quo genere illa vitanda, illa vero sectanda sint. Unde potuissent vel plures, vel etiam pauciores fructus enumerari. Et tamen omnes donorum et virtutum actus possunt secundum quandam convenientiam ad haec reduci, secundum quod omnes virtutes et dona necesse est quod ordinent mentem aliquo praedictorum modorum. Unde et actus sapientiae, et quorumcumque donorum ordinantium ad bonum, reducuntur ad caritatem, gaudium et pacem. Ideo tamen potius haec quam alia enumeravit, quia hic enumerata magis important vel fruitionem bonorum, vel sedationem malorum; quod videtur ad rationem fructus pertinere.   Reply to Objection 4: As Augustine says on Gal. 5:22,23, "the Apostle had no intention of teaching us how many [either works of the flesh, or fruits of the Spirit] there are; but to show how the former should be avoided, and the latter sought after." Hence either more or fewer fruits might have been mentioned. Nevertheless, all the acts of the gifts and virtues can be reduced to these by a certain kind of fittingness, in so far as all the virtues and gifts must needs direct the mind in one of the above-mentioned ways. Wherefore the acts of wisdom and of any gifts directing to good, are reduced to charity, joy and peace. The reason why he mentions these rather than others, is that these imply either enjoyment of good things, or relief from evils, which things seem to belong to the notion of fruit.


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Article: 4  [<< | >>]

Whether the fruits of the Holy Ghost are contrary to the works of the flesh?

Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod fructus non contrarientur operibus carnis quae apostolus enumerat. Contraria enim sunt in eodem genere. Sed opera carnis non dicuntur fructus. Ergo fructus spiritus eis non contrariantur.   Objection 1: It would seem that the fruits of the Holy Ghost are not contrary to the works of the flesh, which the Apostle enumerates (Gal. 5:19, seqq.). Because contraries are in the same genus. But the works of the flesh are not called fruits. Therefore the fruits of the Spirit are not contrary to them.
Praeterea, unum uni est contrarium. Sed plura enumerat apostolus opera carnis quam fructus spiritus. Ergo fructus spiritus et opera carnis non contrariantur.   Objection 2: Further, one thing has a contrary. Now the Apostle mentions more works of the flesh than fruits of the Spirit. Therefore the fruits of the Spirit and the works of the flesh are not contrary to one another.
Praeterea, inter fructus spiritus primo ponuntur caritas, gaudium, pax, quibus non correspondent ea quae primo enumerantur inter opera carnis, quae sunt fornicatio, immunditia, impudicitia. Ergo fructus spiritus non contrariantur operibus carnis.   Objection 3: Further, among the fruits of the Spirit, the first place is given to charity, joy, and peace: to which, fornication, uncleanness, and immodesty, which are the first of the works of the flesh are not opposed. Therefore the fruits of the Spirit are not contrary to the works of the flesh.
Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit ibidem, quod caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, et spiritus adversus carnem.   On the contrary, The Apostle says (Gal. 5:17) that "the flesh lusteth against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh."
Respondeo dicendum quod opera carnis et fructus spiritus possunt accipi dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum communem rationem. Et hoc modo in communi fructus spiritus sancti contrariantur operibus carnis. Spiritus enim sanctus movet humanam mentem ad id quod est secundum rationem, vel potius ad id quod est supra rationem, appetitus autem carnis, qui est appetitus sensitivus, trahit ad bona sensibilia, quae sunt infra hominem. Unde sicut motus sursum et motus deorsum contrariantur in naturalibus, ita in operibus humanis contrariantur opera carnis fructibus spiritus.   I answer that, The works of the flesh and the fruits of the Spirit may be taken in two ways. First, in general: and in this way the fruits of the Holy Ghost considered in general are contrary to the works of the flesh. Because the Holy Ghost moves the human mind to that which is in accord with reason, or rather to that which surpasses reason: whereas the fleshly, viz. the sensitive, appetite draws man to sensible goods which are beneath him. Wherefore, since upward and downward are contrary movements in the physical order, so in human actions the works of the flesh are contrary to the fruits of the Spirit.
Alio modo possunt considerari secundum proprias rationes singulorum fructuum enumeratorum, et operum carnis. Et sic non oportet quod singula singulis contraponantur, quia, sicut dictum est, apostolus non intendit enumerare omnia opera spiritualia, nec omnia opera carnalia. Sed tamen, secundum quandam adaptationem, Augustinus, super epistolam ad Galat., contraponit singulis operibus carnis singulos fructus. Sicut fornicationi, quae est amor explendae libidinis a legitimo connubio solutus, opponitur caritas, per quam anima coniungitur Deo in qua etiam est vera castitas. Immunditiae autem sunt omnes perturbationes de illa fornicatione conceptae, quibus gaudium tranquillitatis opponitur. Idolorum autem servitus, propter quam bellum est gestum adversus Evangelium Dei, opponitur paci. Contra veneficia autem, et inimicitias et contentiones et aemulationes, animositates et dissensiones, opponuntur longanimitas, ad sustinendum mala hominum inter quos vivimus; et ad curandum, benignitas; et ad ignoscendum, bonitas. Haeresibus autem opponitur fides, invidiae, mansuetudo; ebrietatibus et comessationibus, continentia.    Secondly, both fruits and fleshly works as enumerated may be considered singly, each according to its specific nature. And in this they are not of necessity contrary each to each: because, as stated above (Article [3], ad 4), the Apostle did not intend to enumerate all the works, whether spiritual or carnal. However, by a kind of adaptation, Augustine, commenting on Gal. 5:22,23, contrasts the fruits with the carnal works, each to each. Thus "to fornication, which is the love of satisfying lust outside lawful wedlock, we may contrast charity, whereby the soul is wedded to God: wherein also is true chastity. By uncleanness we must understand whatever disturbances arise from fornication: and to these the joy of tranquillity is opposed. Idolatry, by reason of which war was waged against the Gospel of God, is opposed to peace. Against witchcrafts, enmities, contentions, emulations, wraths and quarrels, there is longsuffering, which helps us to bear the evils inflicted on us by those among whom we dwell; while kindness helps us to cure those evils; and goodness, to forgive them. In contrast to heresy there is faith; to envy, mildness; to drunkenness and revellings, contingency."
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod id quod procedit ab arbore contra naturam arboris, non dicitur esse fructus eius, sed magis corruptio quaedam. Et quia virtutum opera sunt connaturalia rationi, opera vero vitiorum sunt contra rationem; ideo opera virtutum fructus dicuntur, non autem opera vitiorum.   Reply to Objection 1: That which proceeds from a tree against the tree's nature, is not called its fruit, but rather its corruption. And since works of virtue are connatural to reason, while works of vice are contrary to nature, therefore it is that works of virtue are called fruits, but not so works of vice.
Ad secundum dicendum quod bonum contingit uno modo, malum vero omnifariam, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., unde et uni virtuti plura vitia opponuntur. Et propter hoc, non est mirum si plura ponuntur opera carnis quam fructus spiritus.   Reply to Objection 2: "Good happens in one way, evil in all manner of ways," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): so that to one virtue many vices are contrary. Consequently we must not be surprised if the works of the flesh are more numerous than the fruits of the spirit.
Ad tertium patet solutio ex dictis.    The Reply to the Third Objection is clear from what has been said.

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